IAEA-CN-155-050

MITIGATION OF DEGREDATION OF HIGH ENERGY SECONDARY

CYCLE PIPING DUE TO FLOW ASSISTED CORROSION (FAC) AND
LIFE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH ENERGY PIPING IN INDIAN NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS
T.M. Moolayil
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd., India
Email address of main author: tmathew@npcil.co.in
Abstract
Ensuring safe, reliable operation of secondary cycle system in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)
is very important not only from power generation point of view but also from the industrial
safety concerns. Secondary cycle comprises of various high energy systems such as main
steam system, re-heat system, boiler feed water system, auxiliary feed water system,
condensate system, boiler blow down system, separator drain system, reheater drain system,
heater drain system, steam drains system etc. Failure of any pipes and fittings pertaining to
high energy systems piping can result in complex challenges to the operating staff and
plant.Most of the secondary cycle systems are housed in the turbine building and it is routine
for the workers to enter this building for daily checks and other purposes. It is important to
not only prevent the radiation hazards but also prevent industrial accidents at Nuclear Power
Plants.On 9th February 2006 in Kakrapar Atomic Power Station unit-2 (KAPS-2), 220 MWe
pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) in India, a pipe segment in the 10% feed water line
to steam generator (SG-4) immediately downstream of flow element ruptured releasing steam
in boiler room. This failure was assessed to be because of flow assisted corrosion (FAC).
Subsequent to above incident, lot of efforts had been put to mitigate degradation of high
energy secondary cycle piping due to FAC and to prevent similar incidence of piping failures
in high energy systems of Indian NPPs. This paper brings out various measures adopted to
mitigate flow assisted corrosion (FAC) related degradation and life management of high
energy system piping of secondary cycle systems in Indian NPPs.
1. Introduction
The phenomena of wall thinning in carbon steel piping due to flow assisted corrosion (FAC)
had resulted in rupture of both single phase and two phase high energy systems piping of
secondary cycle in Nuclear Power Plants worldwide. Based on the experience of FAC and
studies conducted by many authors, carbon steel material is now being considered susceptible
to FAC. A Study was done to review whether high energy system piping secondary cycle of
Indian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors are likely to have similar kind of degradation.
Based on the available informations it is noted that FAC phenomena can not be totally
eliminated, but it has to be managed by regular inspection, repair/replacement of degraded
piping components, improvements in piping layout design and usage of better FAC resistant
material.
2. Incident pipe line rupture at KAPS-2 220 MWe PHWR (India)

IAEA-CN-155-050
On 9th February 2006 in Kakrapar Atomic Power Station unit-2, a pipe segment in the 10%
feed water line to steam generator (SG-4) immediately downstream of flow element ruptured
releasing steam in boiler room. The process details at full power operation and other
specification of the ruptured pipe segment is given below.
Process fluid
--- Feed water (liquid)
Normal operating temperature
--- 171 C
Design pressure
--- 72 kg/cm
Normal flow & Velocity
--- 31 Tones /hr & 2.33 m/sec
Material
--- Carbon steel SA 106 Gr.B
Size and thickness
--- 80 NB and 7.62 mm (nominal wall thickness)
Dissolved oxygen(feed water)
--- < 5 ppb
pH(feed water)
--- 8.8 to 9.5 (maintained average 9.2)
The inspection done on this pipe during 2004 showed considerable reduction in wall
thickness. Minimum measured thickness observed at the immediate upstream and down
stream of the rupture locations were 1.46 mm and 1.63 mm respectively.Minimum thickness
required for continuous operation was 2.89 mm.The investigation indicated that the failure
was due to FAC. Ruptured location of 10 % feed water line to S.G and schematic is given in
the fig.1 and 2 respectively.

FIG. 1. Ruptured 10% feed water line to SG-4 at KAPS-2

IAEA-CN-155-050

FIG. 2. Schematic of 10 % feed water line to S.G

3. Brief description of the event
KAPS-2 was operating at 155 MWe. At 17:00 hrs of 09/02/2006, Steam Generator (SG-4)
level low alarm appeared. Level was tried to be maintained by opening standby control valve
(CV). Levels of all the boilers were found to be coming down. For SG-1, SG-2 and SG-3 low
level alarm appeared. Fire alarm from fire detector 6054 also appeared due to presence of
steam in boiler room. Further set back got initiated on SG-1 level very low at 17:12 hrs.
Turbine was tripped manually at 17:14 hrs when Turbo Generator (TG) generation reduced to
26 MWe. De-aerator very low level alarmed. Immediately reactor was tripped manually by
actuating primary shutdown system (PSS) at 17:17 hrs. Main boiler feed pumps (MBFPs) got
tripped on auto on de-aerator level very low and auxiliary boiler feed pump (ABFP) got
started on auto. Field personnel reported heavy steam leak in boiler room. Primary heat
transport system (PHTS) was cooled down, depressurized and shut down cooling pump was
started. Boiler room entry could be made at 22:00 hrs. Break in 10 % feed line to SG-4 in
boiler room at downstream of flow element (FE-90) was observed. 11 nos. of blow out panels
in Boiler room were found ruptured.
4. A brief about Flow Assisted Corrosion (FAC)
FAC is a carbon steel pipe system is characterized by the simultaneous dissolution of
iron from the iron oxide-fluid interface and formation of an iron oxide film at the oxide-metal
interface. Flow provides a vital role in providing a sink of dissolution[3].
One of the major risks associated with FAC is that it may result in abrupt rupture of the
piping causing serious safety concern to plant equipment and personnel. It can occur in single
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IAEA-CN-155-050
phase or two-phase regions. A thin layer of porous oxide mostly magnetite (Fe3O4) forms on
the inside surface of carbon steel feed water piping and piping components when exposed to
de-oxygenated water in the temperature range of about 95 to 2600C (2000 to 5000F)[3].
Generally this layer protects the underlying piping from the corrosive environment and limits
further corrosion. The flow assisted corrosion is an extension of the generalized carbon steel
corrosion process in stagnant water. A corrosion process causes wall thinning of carbon steel
piping exposed to wet steam this process is called two phase FAC[3]. If the piping is exposed
to dry or super heated steam, no FAC takes places. A liquid phase must be present for the
FAC damage to occur.
As reported corroded surfaces produced by single phase FAC have a different appearance
than those formed by two phase FAC. When single-phase FAC rate for a larger diameter
piping is high, the corroded surface is characterized by over lapping horse shoe pits that give
an orange peal appearance[3]. The corroded surface of a large diameter piping exposed to
two-phase flow has a well known tiger stripping appearance[3].
As reported, following factors are known to have influence on FAC.
Material susceptibility
Phase of steam
Piping layout & resulting local flow conditions and turbulence (such as near valves or
nozzles, down stream of orifices, closely spaced elbows, bends etc)
Velocity
System temperature
Operating conditions
Water chemistry and pH
FAC is observed when specific combinations of material, water chemistry (including
dissolved oxygen, ferrous ion concentration, metallic impurities in water, pH), and
hydrodynamic conditions coexist.
5. Analysis of KAPS-2 pipeline rupture
The rupture 10% feed water line of KAPS-2 on 9th February 2006 was an alarming incidence
which called for a still more in depth study of the failure and to suggest further steps to
strengthen FAC management program. Failure analysis of the ruptured pipe segment was
done by chemical analysis visual examination, stereo microscopic examination, scanning
electron microscopic examination, surface examination, micro-structural examination,
hardness measurement, XRD analysis, thickness mapping etc. The thickness of the pipe line
had reduced from the original 7.62mm to a minimum of 0.4 mm at the location of failure[1].
On the pipeline part of the failed component, the thickness had reduced to a longer distance of
at least 15 cm. The thickness was 2.2 mm at a distance of 7 cm from the fractured surface.
The chemical composition of various elements analyzed weight percentage from the failed
sample are carbon 0.22%, manganese 0.61%, phosphorous 0.019%, sulfur 0.008% and silicon
0.33%. The composition of unspecified elements are chromium 0.032%, copper 0.009%,
molybdenum 0.001%, nickel nil and vanadium 0.003%[1].
The fractured surface showed a clear ductile failure with no indication of cleavage facets,
which indicates an overload failure[1]. The analysis carried out on the broken part of carbon

IAEA-CN-155-050
steel pipe segment reported that failure was due to pipe wall thinning on account of FAC. The
inside surface of the ruptured pipe showed horseshoe pits giving an orange peel appearance
that is a characteristic of single phase FAC[1]. The water chemistry of the station was also
obtained and submitted to Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) advisory committee on steam
and water chemistry for verification. All the parameters were within the limits.
Almost all stations were carrying out ultrasonic (UT) thickness measurement of vulnerable
locations based on their experience. A systematic periodic monitoring program for UT
thickness measurement of all FAC vulnerable components pertaining to high energy systems
of Secondary Cycle existed in KAPS-1 and KAPS-2 at the time of pipe rupture.
KAPS -1 (220 MWe PHWR) had completed one cycle of examination as per the periodic
monitoring program during shut down in 2005 and KAPS-2 had carried out examination
partly during shut down in 2004.The ruptured location i.e. downstream of flow element was
included in the program as it was vulnerable to FAC. Inspection was done at this location
during 2004 and showed considerable reduction in wall thickness. But replacement/repair or
re-examination was not done at this location afterwards.
6. Remedial measures taken after kaps-2 pipeline rupture

After KAPS-2 pipeline rupture some more additional vulnerable components (around
380) pertaining to various high energy systems of secondary cycle of KAPS-1 & KAPS2 were inspected by UT thickness measurement in addition to the most vulnerable
locations examined as per the existing periodic monitoring program. This was done to
asses overall healthiness of the plant before start up. Both the units were started after
carrying out inspection at around 850 components in each unit and analyzing the
inspected data. All the degraded components were removed from the system and
replaced with new components.
It was thought prudent to enhance the scope of examination including all FAC potential
components/locations in various high energy lines of secondary cycle for all operating
stations to generate base line data and to assess the overall healthiness. The feedback
and information was disseminated to all projects and stations.
Guidelines for repair/replacement/successive examination based on balance life and
procedure for U.T examination, weld overlay, grid size criteria for examination and
format for recording inspection data etc have been prepared and issued to all stations
and projects.
Study was conducted to review materials for pipes, fittings and other components used
in secondary cycle systems, identify suitable materials and to choose the most suitable
material which can resist FAC. Decision was taken to replace the carbon steel material
(which is now being reported to more susceptible for FAC) with low alloy steel ASTMSA-335 Gr. P22 (2% Cr, 1% Mo) in case of FAC prone systems/lines/locations for all
the stations and projects. It was also decided to use pipe & fittings with one scheduler
higher than the required schedule while replacing the existing carbon steel material with
low alloy steel at FAC prone locations.

7. Findings of U.T examination carried at different operating stations

7.1. Identification of commonly affected locations
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IAEA-CN-155-050
After reviewing the results of UT thickness examination carried out as per the periodic
monitoring program of most vulnerable components for operating stations, the systems
/lines/portion of piping which are commonly vulnerable to FAC were identified. The most
commonly affected areas at almost all stations are indicated in Table-1.
Table 1. List of commonly affected areas due to FAC
Serial
Most commonly affected high energy pipe lines / locations due to FAC at
number
different operating stations
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i

10 % feed water line down stream of control valves

90 % feed water line down stream of control valve
Down Steam of control valve of live steam re-heater drain, bled steam reheater drain, separator drain in the normal path and alternate path
Extraction -7 line
Extraction - 6 line
Steam drain system down stream of restriction orifices (ROs)
Heater / MSR (moisture separator re-heater) vents down stream of
restriction orifices (ROs)
Heater drain system down stream of Control Valves (CVs)
Boiler blow down system down stream of control valves near boiler blow
down tank

7.2. Other findings of examination of secondary cycle components

Degradation is noticed in many of the secondary cycle systems and on components such
as elbows, reducers, pipe etc.T
Thickness reduction is noticed in boiler blow down system, separator drain system, reheater drain system etc where the bulk velocity is lower than normal recommended
allowed velocities.
Degradation is noticed in the Secondary Cycle Components in the temperature range of
90C to 250C.
Average wear rate of 150 to 200 microns is noticed in some of the commonly
vulnerable systems / lines.

Analysis has been done on the data collected from various units where each unit carried out
comprehensive UT thickness inspection of around 3000 to 3500 components as per initial
examination program (described later).It shows high corrosion at following systems/ locations
which may not be due to one factor but a combination of FAC influencing factors.
Main feed water lines near HPheater-6 and its downstream line to S.G
90% feed water control valve stations
10% feed water control valve stations
Downstream of boiler feed pump/ auxiliary boiler feed pump discharge nozzles
Boiler Blow Down lines
Reheater drain line in alternate path to flash tanks

IAEA-CN-155-050
8. Long term measures taken to mitigate degradation and life management of high
energy secondary cycle piping
8.1. FAC monitoring program
Objective of the monitoring program issued for all operating stations and projects are as
follows. The Program has been developed in two phases.
It should be long term monitoring program
Identifying which systems are susceptible to FAC and sample selection of these systems
for inspection based on engineering judgment under experience, previous inspection etc.
Inspecting components selected for inspection
Analyzing inspection data to determine FAC wear rates and balance life
Guidelines of future inspection times based on inspection results
Repairing or replacing piping components determined or predicted to wear below the
minimum thickness required
8.1.1. Phase 1 Initial examination program
The purpose of initial examination program is to collect one time baseline data for the
maximum number of components pertaining to high energy system piping of secondary cycle
at all plants by UT thickness measurements and assess balance life of the inspected
components.
These data will help in assessing the condition of secondary cycle piping components affected
by FAC. Bases for selection of components for this examination are as follows.
All pipes & fittings upstream as well as downstream up to a distance of 1.5 meters of
restriction orifices, flow elements, control valves, bypass valves, motorized valves, nonreturn valves, manual valves and steam traps
All piping components such as reducers, expanders, bends, elbows, tees and branch
connections in high energy system piping
Main nozzles of equipments, pumps and branch pipe up to a distance of 1.5 meters
8.1.2. Phase 2 Periodic monitoring program
This program was developed to periodically examine the most vulnerable components
pertaining to high energy system piping of secondary cycle from the consideration of FAC for
each operating station. This examination shall be carried once in six years to assess the
healthiness of components and to assess the wear pattern / rate. The bases for identifying FAC
vulnerable components are as follows.
Areas where local flow disturbances are expected
Areas where wetness is high
Areas where velocities are high
Areas where two phase flow are expected
Areas having industrial failure history on other NPPs

IAEA-CN-155-050
Components pertaining to all high energy systems such as main steam system, re-heater
system, boiler feed water system, boiler blow down system, moisture separator and re-heater
drain system, heater drain system, steam drain system condensate system, extraction steam
system, auxiliary steam system, auxiliary feed water system etc are included in the periodic
inspection program.
8.2. System for recording inspection data and review
A comprehensive data management sheet (format for recording data) has already been worked
out and forwarded to all stations and projects to bring out uniformity in the reporting of
inspection data pertaining to Secondary Cycle Piping. This sheet facilitate in recording
present inspection data, previous inspection data if any, system, line number, component
detail, material used, dimensional details, process parameters, previous inspection history etc.
FAC related UT thickness inspection data of secondary cycle piping components will be
entered in the format for recording issued to all stations and electronic form (soft copies) of
same will be forwarded to Head quarters to facilitate quick assessment and balance life
estimation. After analysis recommendations regarding replacement and balance life of each
component will be forwarded to respective stations for implementation.
8.3. Basis for assessment of balance life
To arrive at the corrosion/wear rate for the components examined, the prevailing measured
minimum pipe wall thickness is subtracted from the reference initial thickness and divided by
number of hot operating years. In absence of the pre-service inspection or in-service
inspection data in case of very first inspection, nominal wall thickness (NWT) is taken as the
reference initial thickness.However during any subsequent inspection, minimum measured
thickness of previous inspection will taken as reference initial thickness. Minimum wall
thickness of the pipe for design pressure is worked out by using formula as per design
code.This minimum wall thickness is subtracted from the prevailing minimum wall thickness
and divided by corrosion /wear rate to arrive the balance life of the inspected component.
Evaluation of balance life is done once the prevailing measured minimum pine wall thickness
is less than 0.875 NWT only.
8.4. Guidelines and Procedures
Guidelines and procedures issued to all stations and projects as part of FAC management
program are given below.
To provide step by step method to be followed regarding initial examination, first
examination and successive examination of components selected for inspection
Criteria for replacement/ repair of degraded components
Criteria for grid size marking on the components to be inspected
procedure for U.T thickness measurement
procedure for weld deposit
Steps to identify the suitable material for replacing the degraded components and
generating its base line data
Guidelines for inspection of balance items which are not included in the periodic
inspection program but pertaining to secondary cycle system

IAEA-CN-155-050
In Indian PHWRs biennial shut down(BSD) is of operating station is once in 2 years. The
Guidelines say that for the components having balance life up to 2 years in any examination
shall be replaced in the same shut down itself. Components where balance life is found in
more than 2 years but up to 4 years may be replaced/repaired in the same shut down if no shut
down is planned before next BSD or shall be examined before completion of 50 % of balance
life. For the components, having balance life more than 4 years, reassessment will be carried
out before 50 % balance life is over at an appropriate biennial shut down (BSD). Flow chart
of the activities associated with examination, balance life estimation, repair / replacement /
successive examination is given in the figure 3 below.
Guidelines of criteria for grid sizing of identified components for UT examination have been
prepared referring code case ASME-N480. Square grid of the components selected for
examination is categorized in three different groups. For components of sizes 80mm to
100mm, 150mm to 500mm and 500mm to 1000mm square grid sizes are 30mm, 50mm and
100mm respectively. For higher size component higher is the grid size and circumferential
grids are started from toe of the reference weld. If at any point thinning is observed, thickness
gauging is continued in the same direction until the nominal thickness readings are obtained.
Most of the degraded components which are not suitable for the service are replaced after
assessment of life. However as an alternative to replacement restoration of thickness of high
energy carbon steel pipe and fiitings is accepted in case thinning is localized and required
replacement material is not available. However most of the degraded components have been
replaced with fresh new components.

IAEA-CN-155-050

FIG. 3.Activity flow chart for replacement/repair/successive examinatin

9.

Material

Existing carbon steel pipes and pipe fittings are to be replaced with better FAC resistant
materials at FAC prone portion of piping / lines of various high energy systems of secondary
cycle. It is observed that carbon steel is highly susceptible to FAC and low alloy steel2.25%Cr, 1%Mo (SA-335 Gr.P-22 for pipes and SA-234 Gr.WP-22 / SA-182 Gr. F-22 for
pipe fittings) is most suitable FAC resistant material for secondary cycle piping.
10. Water chemistry aspects
The matter on FAC has been referred to advisory committee on steam and water chemistry
along with related data for further review of water chemistry to reduce FAC. Water chemistry
as per recommendation of advisory committee on steam and water chemistry is being
maintained. In feed water pH recommended is 8.8 to 9.5 and dissolved oxygen is less than 5

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IAEA-CN-155-050
ppb. The concentration of iron, ethanolamine, pH and conductivity to be measured in different
steam, condensate lines, drain lines and feed water lines wherever sampling is possible to
establish the base line data.
11. FAC management action plan for operating stations

To implement UT thickness gauging monitoring program, including that for base line
data, for high-energy system piping of secondary cycle for all operating stations as
mentioned above.
To replace progressively the existing carbon steel pipe and fittings of the lines / portion
of piping of high energy systems which are prone for FAC with low alloy steel SA-335
Gr.P22 (for pipes) and SA-234 Gr.WP22/SA-182 Gr.F22 (for fittings) being more FACresistant material.
To follow water chemistry as per recommendations of advisory committee on steam and
water chemistry and are already pursuing review of this matter referred to them.

12. FAC management action plan for projects under construction

To generate baseline data of all installed piping components pertaining to high-energy

system piping of secondary cycle by UT thickness measurement before start up of plant.
Such components include pipes & fittings upstream as well as down stream up to a
distance of 1.5 meters of restriction orifices, flow elements, control valves, by pass
valves, motorized valves, non-return valves, manual valves and steam traps. Base line
data is also generated for piping components such as reducers, expanders, bends,
elbows, tees and branch connections, equipment nozzles and piping close to equipment
nozzles.
To examine all identified vulnerable components as per the periodic monitoring
program from consideration of FAC by UT thickness measurement within 12 to 24
months after first start up of plant and assess balance life of the components. Thereafter
periodic monitoring program will be repeated after every six years.
To replace the existing carbon steel pipe and fittings of the lines / portion of piping of
high energy systems which are prone for FAC with low alloy steel SA-335 Gr.P22 (for
pipes) and SA-234 Gr.WP22/SA-182 Gr.F22 (for fittings). Action has been already
initiated for procurement of these materials.

13. FAC mitigation plan for future plants

To use better FAC resistant material instead of carbon steel in FAC prone lines / portion
of piping of high energy systems.
To provide higher corrosion allowance for pipes and pipe fitting in FAC prone lines /
portion of piping of high energy systems. Excess material, over and above that required
for pressure integrity and structural and mechanical strength, can be provided. This
excess material is allowed to waste away over the design life of the piping system.

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Proper velocity assumptions will be considered wherever felt necessary while sizing the
piping system for future projects.
To develop piping layout to minimize flow disturbances. In the future projects all
efforts will be made to design the piping system geometry so as to minimize turbulent
flow, direct pipe wall impingement, vortex flows which are the perceptible causes to
increase FAC
To implement UT thickness gauging periodic monitoring program of piping
components.

14. Conclusion
As discussed above overall FAC management program of secondary cycle high energy piping
and piping components is being achieved in Indian Nuclear Power Plants through continuous
examination and monitoring of components in all stations, its residual life analysis, following
uniform guide lines for repair / replacement and performing successive examinations. Actions
are also taken for replacing the pipes and fittings at FAC prone lines/ portion of piping of high
energy systems with a better FAC resistant material (i.e. low alloy steel),of one schedule
higher thickness than required, in case of stations and projects. For projects under
construction base line data of the large number of installed components is also being
generated for future reference. Water chemistry in various lines of secondary cycle is also
maintained as per recommendations of advisory committee on steam and water chemistry. For
future projects efforts are being initiated to minimize the effect of FAC influencing factors
through improved pipe layout, better FAC resistant materials, higher corrosion allowance, and
proper velocity assumptions during line sizing etc. All above actions are aiming mitigation of
degradation of high energy piping and life management of secondary cycle piping due to
Flow Assisted Corrosion (FAC).
REFERENCES
[1] Failure analysis Report of 10% feed water line at KAPS-2 performed by material
science division of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
[2] ASME code case N480, Section XI, Division 1 Examination requirements for
pipe wall thinning due to single phase Erosion and corrosion
[3] NUREG/CR5632 Incorporating aging effects into probabilistic risk assessment
A feasibility study utilizing reliability physics models prepared by C.L Smith, V.N
Shah, T.Kao, G.Apostolakis

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