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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L13678November12,1918
THEUNITEDSTATES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
PRUDENCIOSALAVERIA,defendantappellant.
JoseR.Varelaforappellant.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralParedesforappellee.

MALCOLM,J.:
ThemunicipalcouncilofOrion,Bataan,enacted,onFebruary28,1917,anordinancewhich,amongotherthings,
prohibitedtheplayingofpanguingueondaysnotSundaysorlegalholidays,andpenalizedtheviolationthereofby
acasero[housekeeper]byafineofnotlessthanP10normorethanP200,andbyjugadores[gamblers]byafine
ofnotlessthanP5normorethanP200.ThejusticeofthepeaceofOrion,whenthisordinancewentintoeffect,
wasPrudencioSalaveria,nowthedefendantandappellant.Notwithstandinghisofficialstation,ontheeveningof
March8,1917,notaSundayorlegalholiday,sevenpersonsincludingthejusticeofthepeaceanhiswifewere
surprisedbythepolicewhileindulginginagameofpanguingueinthehouseofthejusticeofthepeace.Thechief
ofpolicetookpossessionofthecards,thecounters(sigayes),atray,anP2.07inmoney,usedinthegame.
Thesearefactsfullyprovenbytheevinceandbytheadmissionsoftheaccused.Convictedinthejusticeofthe
peacecourtofOrion,andagainintheCourtofFirstInstanceofBataan,Salaveriaappealstothiscourt,making
fiveassignmentsoferror.Thethreeassignments,ofatechnicalnature,arewithoutmerit,andafourth,relatingto
the evidence, is not sustained by the proof. The remaining assignment of error, questioning the validity of the
ordinance under which the accused was convicted, requires serious consideration and final resolution. This
ordinanceinpartreads:
RESOLUTIONNO.28
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Whereas,thisCouncilisvestedwithcertainpowersbysections2184and2185oftheAdministrativeCode
Whereas,itisthemoraldutyofthisbodytosafeguardthetranquillityandstabilityoftheGovernmentandto
fosterthewelfareandprosperityofeachanalloftheinhabitantsofthismunicipalitytherefore,
Beitresolvedtoenact,asitherebyisenacted,thefollowingordinance:
OrdinanceNo.3
xxxxxxxxx
Third.Thegamesknownas"Panguingue""Manilla,""Jungkiang,""ParisParis,""Poker,""Tute,""Burro,"
and"Treintayuno"shallbeallowedonlyonSundaysanofficialholidays.
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The following penalties shall be imposed upon those who play the above games on days other than

Sundaysandofficialholidays:
Fortheownerofthehouse:AfineoffromTentoTwohundredpesos,orsubsidiaryimprisonmentincase
ofinsolvencyattherateofonepesoaday.
For the gamblers: A fine of from Five to Two hundred pesos each or subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvencyattherateofonepesoaday.
The Philippine Legislature has granted to municipalities legislative powers of a dual character, one class
mandatoryantheotherdiscretionary.OfthefirstclassistheprovisionoftheAdministrativeCodewhichmakesit
the duty of the municipal council, conformably with law, "to prohibit and penalize . . . gambling." (Sec. 2188 [i],
Adm. Code of 1916 sec. 2242 [i], Adm. Code of 1917.) This is a more restricted power than that found in the
originalMunicipalCodewhichauthorizedamunicipalcouncilto"provideagainsttheevilsofgambling,gambling
houses, and disorderly houses of whatsoever sort." (Act No. 82, sec. 39 [u].) The present municipal law, since
makinguseoftheword"gambling,"mustbeconstruedwithreferencetotheInsularLaw,ActNo.1757,relatingto
the same subject. Act No. 1757 in section 1 defines "gambling" as "the paying of any game for money or any
representative of value or valuable consideration or thing, the result of which game depends wholly or chiefly
uponchanceorhazard,ortheuseofanymechanicalinventionsorcontrivancetodeterminebychancetheloser
or winner of money or of any representative of value or of any valuable consideration or thing." In the United
Statesvs.Hilario([1913],24Phil.,392),theSupremeCourtwentintothesubjectofthemeaningof"gambling"in
thisjurisdiction,andfoundthatitincludesthosegamestheresultofwhichdependwhollyorchieflyuponchance
orhazard,andexcludesthosegamestheresultofwhichdependwhollyorchieflyuponskill,withtheresultthat
sections621to625oftheReviseOrdinancesofthecityofManila(734738oftheRevisedOrdinancesof1917)
werefoundtoprohibitonlygamesofchanceorhazard.
TheordinanceofOrion,Bataan,merelyprohibitstheplayingofpanguingueoncertaindays,withoutdescribingit.
Further,althoughthiscourthasconsideredthemethodbywhichmanyothergamesareplayed,ithasneveras
yetauthoritativelydecidedwhetherpanguinguewasagameofskillorhazard.Norwasanyevidenceonthispoint
introducedinthepresentcase.However,areadingofthedecisionofthetrialcourtandofofficialopinionsoftwo
AttorneysGeneral, of which we can take judicial cognizance, warrants the deduction that panguingue is not a
gameofchanceorhazardandisnotprohibitedbyActNo.1757.(SeeOpinionsoftheAttorneyGeneralofJuly
11,1904July25,1904October10,1905andSeptember7,1911alsoBerriz,DiccionariodelaAdministracion,
p. 35.) If, therefore, we were to restrict our investigation to those portions of the Administrative Code which
authorizeamunicipalcounciltoprohibitandpenalizegambling,therewouldexistgravedoubt,tosaytheleast,of
thevalidityofordinanceNo.3ofthemunicipalityofOrion,Bataan.
Thereremainsforconsiderationadifferentapproachtothequestion.
While Philippine law gives to gambling a restricted meaning, it is to be noted that, in its broader signification,
gamblingrelatestoplaybycertainrulesatcards,dice,orothercontrivance,sothatoneshallbetheloseranthe
otherthewinner.(20Cyc.,878Bouvier'sLawDictionaryPeoplevs.Todd[1889],51Hun[N.Y.],4464514N.
Y. Supp., 25.) As one example the Charter of the town of Ruston, State of Louisiana, authorized it "to restrain,
prohibit,ansuppress...gamesandgamblinghousesandrooms...,andtoprovideforthepunishmentofthe
personsengagedinthesame."Underthispowerthetownpassedanordinanceprohibiting"allgamesofchance,
lottery, banking games, raffling, and all other species of gambling," indicating that there were other species of
gamblinginadditiontogamesofchance.(SeeTownofRustonvs.Perkins[1905],114La.,851.)Thecommon
law notion of gambling, which only made it an indictable offense when the play was attended by such
circumstances as would in themselves amount to a riot or a nuisance or to an actual breach of the peace, has
givenwaytostatutesandordinancesdesignedtorestrain,suppress,orcontrolgambling.
AuthorityfortheStateoramunicipalitytotakeactiontocontrolgamblinginthislargersensecanbefoundinan
analysisofwhatiscallethepolicepower.
Anyattempttodefinethepolicepowerwithcircumstantialprecisionwouldsavorofpedantry.TheUnitedStates
SupremeCourttritelydescribesitas"themostessentialofallpowers,attimesthemostinsistent,analwaysone
ofleastlimitableofthepowersofgovernment."(DistrictofColumbiavs.Brooks[1909],214U.S.,138.)Thepolice
power is based on the maxim "salus populi est suprema lex" the welfare of the people is the first law. The
United States Supreme Court has said that it extends "to the protection of the lives, health and property of the
citizens,andtothepreservationofgoodorderandthepublicmorals."(BeerCo.vs. Massachusetts [1878] , 97
U.S.,25Barbiervs.Connolly[1885],113U.S.,27.)TheSupremeCourtoftheseIslandshassaidthatitextends
"the police power of the state includes not only the public health safety, but also the public welfare, protection
against impositions, and generally the public's best interest." (U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.) Recent
judicial decisions incline to give a more extensive scope to the police power that the older cases. The public

welfareisrightfullymadethebasisofconstruction.
NotonlydoestheStateeffectuateitspurposesthroughtheexerciseofthepolicepowerbutthemunicipalitydoes
also.LiketheState,thepolicepowerofamunicipalcorporationextendstoallmattersaffectingthepeace,order,
health, morals, convenience, comfort, and safety of its citizens the security of social order the best and
highestinterestsofthemunicipality.(Casevs. Board of Health of Manila and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250.) The
best considered decisions have tended to broaden the scope of action of the municipality in dealing with police
offenses.Withinthegeneralpolicepowersofamunicipalcorporationisthesuppressionofgambling.Ordinances
aimed in a reasonable way at the accomplishment of this purpose are undoubtedly valid. (See U.S. vs. Pacis
[1915], 31 Phil., 524 39 L. R. A., 523, Note Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th edition, pp. 138, 226, 742
Greenvillevs. Kemmis [1900], 58 S. C., 427 [holding that under the general welfare clause a city may pass an
ordinanceprohibitinggamblinginanyprivatehouse].)
ThePhilippineLegislature,asbeforeintimated,delegatedtomunicipalitiescertainlegislativepowersarenamed
specifically.Butinaddition,andprecedingboththespecificpowersofamandatoryanddiscretionarycharacter,is
the general power of a municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations. It is this grant that the
preambleoftheordinanceofOrionassignsasauthorityforitsenactment.Saidsection2184oftheAdministrative
Codeof1916(sec.2238,Adm.Codeof1917)reads:
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as
maybenecessarytocarryintoeffectanddischargethepowersandutiesconferreduponitbylawansuch
asshallseemnecessaryandpropertoprovideforthehealthandsafety,promotetheprosperity,improve
themorals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
andfortheprotectionofpropertytherein.
Thissection,knownasthegeneralwelfareclause,delegatesinstatutoryformthepolicepowertoamunicipality.
Asabovestated,thisclausehasbeengivenwideapplicationbymunicipalauthoritiesandhasinitsrelationtothe
particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the
progressiveviewofPhilippinejurisprudence.
Thegeneralwelfareclausehastwobranches.Onebranchattachesitselftothemaintrunkofmunicipalauthority,
and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this class we are not here directly
concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council
whichareenumeratedbylaw.Itauthorizessuchordinances"asshallseemnecessaryandpropertoprovidefor
thehealthandsafety,promotetheprosperity,improvethemorals,peace,goodorder,comfort,andconvenience
ofthemunicipalityandtheinhabitantsthereof,andfortheprotectionofpropertytherein."
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general powers and
purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. The ordinance of the
municipality of Orion does not seem in itself to be pernicious, or unreasonable or discriminatory. Its purposes
evidently are to improve the morals and stimulate the industry of the people. A person is to be compelled to
refrainfromprivateactsinjuriousbothtohimselfanhisneighbors.Theseobjects,tobeattainedbylimitingthe
pastimetodefinitedays,donotinfringeanylawofthegeneralgovernment.
Theconstitutionalprovisionthatnopersonshallbedeprivedoflibertywithoutdueprocessoflawisnotviolated
by this ordinance. Liberty of action by the individual is not unduly circumscribed that is, it is not unduly
circumscribedifwehaveinmindthecorrectnotionofthis"thegreatestofallrights."Thatgravestofsociological
questions How far, consistently with freedom, may the liberties of the individual member of society be
subordinated to the will of the Government? has been debated for centuries, in vain, if we can not now
discount the time worn objection to any and all interference with private rights in order to effectuate the public
purpose.(SeeJacobsonvs.Massachusetts[1905],197U.S.,11Statevs.Kreutzberg[1902],58L.R.A.,748.)
Almostcountlessarethegovernmentalrestrictionsonthecitizen.
Thepresumptionisallfavorofvalidity.Theinhabitantsofamunicipalityareinthemselvesminiaturestates.The
action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality an with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject, and necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts
andcircumstanceswhichsurroundthesubject,andnecessitateaction.Thelocallegislativebody,byenactingthe
ordinance,hasineffectgivennoticethattheregulationsareessentialtothewellbeingofthepeople.Whoisina
betterpositiontosaywhethertheplayingofpanguingueisdeleterioustosocialorderandthepublicinterestina
certainmunicipalitythemunicipalcouncil,orthecourts?Theanswerisselfevident.TheJudiciaryshouldnot
lightlysetasidelegislativeactionwhenthereisnotaclearinvasionofpersonalorpropertyrightsundertheguise

ofpoliceregulation.(SeeU.S.vs.Joson[1913],26Phil.,1.)
President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission still remain undisturbed by subsequent Acts of Congress
dealing with Philippine affairs and yet constitute a portion of our constitutional law, as to the inviolable rule that
"municipalgovernments...shallbeaffordedtheopportunitytomanagetheirownaffairstothefullestextentof
whichtheyarecapable."Againthesameorganiclawsays,"Inthedistributionofpowersamongthegovernments
organizedbytheCommission,thepresumptionisalwaystobeinfavorofthesmallersubdivision,sothatallthe
powerswhichcanproperlybeexercisedbythemunicipalgovernmentshallbevestedinthatgovernment...."
Letusneverforgettheseprinciplessohighlyprotectiveoflocalselfgovernment.
The judiciary can very well take notice of the fact that municipalities are accustomed to enacting ordinances
aimedattheregulationofgambling.TheexecutiveauthoritiesantheAttorneyGeneralhaveusuallyupheldthe
validity of such ordinances, especially those intended to restrict the playing of panguingue. (Opinions of the
AttorneyGeneral,supraOpinionoftheExecutiveSecretary,July6,1909IndorsementoftheGovernorGeneral,
July 21, 1904.) This general municipal practice, indicative of a social cancer to be eradicated, should not be
discouragedbystrictjudicialconstruction.
More important still, the courts cannot but realize that gambling, in its larger sense as well as in its restricted
sense, is an act beyond the pale of good morals, which, for the welfare of the Filipino people, should be
exterminated. The suppression of the evil does not interfere with any of the inherent rights of citizenship. The
perniciouspracticeisrightfullyregardedastheoffspringofidlenessandtheprolificparentofviceandimmorality,
demoralizing in its association and tendencies, detrimental to the best interests of society, and encouraging
wastefulness,thriftlessness,andabeliefthatalivelihoodmaybeearnedbyothermeansthanhonestindustry.To
becondemnedinitself,ithasthefurthereffectofcausingpoverty,dishonesty,fraud,anddeceit.Manyamanhas
neglectedhisbusinessandmortgagedhisintegritytofollowthefickleGoddessofthecards.Manyawomanhas
wastedherhoursandsquanderedhersubstanceatthegamblingboardwhilehomeandchildrenwereforgotten.
It is highly proper that this pastime should be subject to the control of restraints imposed by the ordinances of
localgovernmentspeculiarlyafflictedbytheevil.(SeeInreVoss[1903],11N.D.,540ExparteTuttle[1891],91,
Cal.,589Greenwoodvs.State[1873],6Baxt.,56732Am.Rep.,53912R.C.L.,709715.)
For the suppression of such an evil, coordinate and harmonious action must concur between the three
departmentsofGovernment.Alaworordinanceenactedbythelegislativebodymustexist.Suchanordinanceis
beforeus.Vigorousexecutiveenforcementmusttakeplacetomakethelaworordinanceareality.Suchactivity
by the police has brought this case to the courts. And finally the Judiciary, having full respect for the legislative
action of the municipal council and for the prosecution by the executive officials, must, by judicial construction,
equally as progressive and constructive, give effect to the action of the other two powers. Wherefore, although
panguingueis not entirely a game of chance, since it is a proper subject for regulation by municipal authorities
actingundertheirdelegatedpolicepower,whoselaudableintentionistoimprovethepublicmoralsandpromote
theprosperityoftheirpeople,theiractionshouldbeupheldbythecourts.OrdinanceNo.3ofOrion,Bataan,is
foundtobevalid.
TheculpritinthiscaseishimselfamemberoftheJudiciary.Insteadofenforcingthelaw,hehasscornedit.His
exampletothepeopleofOrionhasbeenperniciousinitsinfluence.Ifgamblingistobesuppressed,notonlythe
weakandignorantmustbepunished,butthosewithfullknowledgeofthelawandtheconsequencesofviolation.
We would accordingly suggest to Courts of First Instance that in all cases arising under the Gambling Law or
ordinances, except for unusual circumstances, a prison sentence should be imposed, if permitted by the law or
ordinance. We further suggest that, where the defendant has been found guilty and is a man of station, he be
giventhemaximumpenalty.
la w p h il.n e t

Applying the foregoing in this instance, it results that the defendant and appellant must be found guilty of a
violationofordinanceNo.3ofthemunicipalityofOrion,Bataanand,inaccordancetherewith,shallbesentenced
to the maximum penalty of the payment of a fine of P200, or to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
withthecostsofallthreeinstancesagainsthim.Soordered.
Arellano,C.J.,Torres,AraulloandAvancea,JJ.,concur.

SeparateOpinions

JOHNSON,J.,concurring:
Iconcuruponthegroundthattheordinanceinquestionisfullyauthorizedunderthe"generalwelfare"provisions
oftheMunicipalCode.
STREET,J.,concurring:
I agree in the conclusion that the ordinance passed by the municipality of Orion prohibiting the playing of
panguingueonseculardaysisvalidandamoftheopinionthattheauthoritytopasssuchanordinanceistobe
found exclusively in section 2184 of the Administrative Code (1916), which gives a general authority for the
enactment of ordinances which seem proper to improve the morals and good order of the community. As the
game of panguingue is admittedly not a game of chance or hazard played for money, it is not within the
prohibitionsofActNo.1757anIthinkthecaseshouldbedeterminedwithoutreferencetothelegislationagainst
gamblingandwithoutreferencetthecircumstancethatundersubsection(i)ofsection2188ofthesameCodethe
Legislaturehasmadeitmandatoryuponmunicipalcouncilstoprohibitandpenalizegambling.
The legislature has clearly authorized the municipal council to use its discretion as to the measures which it
esteemsdesirabletopromotemoralsangoodorderandIknowofnoruleoflawwhichwouldjustifyanycourtin
overrulingthatdiscretioninsuchamatterasisnowbeforeus.CertainlyIwouldbesorrytoseethiscourtadopta
paternalisticattitudeofcaptiouscriticismandcorrectiontendingtoembarrassthefreeexerciseofthelegislative
discretion vested by law in the municipal councils. Those bodies are undoubtedly destined to make mistakes in
theexerciseofthepowersconferredonthem,butthereisnobetterschoolthanthatofexperienceinwhichtheir
members may discover what is most likely to promote the welfare of the community and the interests of their
constituents.
As already suggested, I think that the Gambling Law (Act No. 1757) and the provisions of the Municipal Code
relativetothesuppressionofgambling,strictlyspeaking,havenothingtodowiththecaseandthecircumstance
that those measures are upon the statute book cannot serve in the slightest degree to limit the powers of a
municipalcouncilinlegislatinguponamatternotimplicatedwithgambling.Fromthepreambletotheordinanceit
may be seen that the council had in view the promotion of the general wellbeing and the advancement of
prosperityinthecommunityandtheordinancewasdoubtlessintendedtodiscouragetheplayingofgameswhich
involveafrivolousandidlewasteoftime,ratherthandirectlytosuppressgambling.Butevenifthecouncilhad
supposethatthegameswhichitproposedtoregulatearecalculatedtofomentthegamblinginstinctandshould
besuppressedforthatreason,theordinanceinquestioncouldnotpossiblyhavebeenrenderedinvalidbythat
fact.
FISHER,J.,dissenting:
The importance of suppressing gambling, properly emphasized in the majority opinion, cannot warrant a
conviction where gambling is not involved. The zeal to remedy an evil should not induce the graver evil of
obliteratinglegallandmarks.
Gamblingistheplaying,formoneyoritsequivalent,ofanygameofwhichtheresultdepends"wholly or chiefly
uponchanceorhazard,...."(ActNo.1757).
Thedefendanthereinisaccusedofplayingpanguingue,whichisavowedlynotagameofchanceorhazardwithin
thisdefinition.Itisnotallegedintheinformationthattheplayingwasformoneyoranyotherthingofvalue.The
fact that some money was found on the table when the accused was arrested is immaterial in this case. The
ordinance under which the conviction was had does not make playing the prohibited games for money an
ingredient of the offense, and the decision of the majority proceeds upon the theory that the result would have
beenthesamehadnomoneybeenstakeduponthegame.
Toplayagameofskillwithoutriskinganythingupontheoutcomeisnotgambling,andtheprohibitionofharmless
amusementscannotbejustifiedbytheauthoritytoprohibitgambling.
Inrecognitionofthefactthattheordinanceuponwhichisbasedthisprosecutiongoesbeyondthetermsofthe
statutory authority, it is sought to find power to pass the same under the general welfare clause (section 2238,
Administrative Code of 1917). But the ordinance which imposes a fine and imprisonment upon a man and wife
whoplayagameofcardstogetherasmerepastime,intheirownhome,withoutriskingacentupontheoutcome,
isbeyondtheprotectionofsuchgeneralprovisionfortworeasons.Inthefirstplace,itisunreasonablysubversive

ofthelibertyofthecitizenanunnecessary.Inthesecondplace,theLegislatureoftheIslandshasspokeninwell
definedtermsonthesubjectofgambling,anditspronouncementonthesubjectfillsthefieldandprecludesthe
possibility of stretching the authority delegated to municipalities into the right to repeal, modify, or supplement
existinglegislation.
The subject of gambling has merited the attention of our Legislature and Act No. 1757 very clearly defines the
intentionandwillofthatbodyinthepremises.Itslimitationoftheprohibitionisitsrefusaltoprohibitgamesofskill
and games in which no value is at stake, and is the exact equivalent of a pronouncement that nongambling
pastimesshallnotbeprohibited.
When the legislature authorized municipalities to "penalize . . . . gambling" it was aiming at the vice of risking
moneyuponthehazardofagameofchance.TheLegislaturehasnotprohibitedtheplayingofcardgamesin
itself an innocent pastime but the playing for money of games of hazard. When it delegated like power to
municipalitiesithadalikeobjectinviewandnotother.
Equally untenable, to my mind, is the attempt to justify the statute under the "general welfare" clause. The
prohibitionbyordinanceoftheplayingofcertaincardgamesasanamusement,withoutstakeorwager,cannot
besaidtopromotethehealth,safety,morals,peace,goodorder,comfortorconvenienceoftheinhabitantsofa
municipality. The majority opinion contends that the purpose of the enactment was to "improve the morals and
stimulatetheindustryofthepeople."Unfortunatelyforthattheoryitappearsthattheordinanceexpresslypermits
these "immoral" diversions on Sundays and official holidays. I am unable to see how one's morals are to be
improvedbypermittinghimtoplaypanguingue,pokerorburroall day Sunday, and then sending him to jail for
engaginginthesameamusementMondayevening.Sofarasthe"stimulationof...industry"isconcerned,that
argumentmighthavehadsomeweightiftheprohibitionoftheseamusementshadbeenlimitedtoworkinghours.
Butsuchisnotthecase.TheinhabitantsofOrionmayplaypokerwithoutawagertotheirheart'scontenton
Sunday,buttodoitSaturdayevening,aftertheworkoftheweekisover,isprohibitedtheirmoralsaretobe
"improved"andtheirindustry"stimulated"untilmidnight.Afterthattheymayyieldtotheirdepravedinstinctsuntil
midnight of Sunday, without let or hindrance. I submit that it is obvious that the ordinance in question was
intended to prevent gambling, but is not warranted by the delegated authority of municipal councils over this
subject, because it is so drawn as to include harmless amusements not within the legislative definition of
gambling.Bylimitingthedefinitionandprohibitionofgamblingtotheplayingformoneyofgamesofhazard,the
Legislature by implication permitted the playing of all other games not within the prohibition. Is the "general
welfare"clauseofgrantofpowertomunicipalcorporationtobesoconstruedastomaketheexpressdelegation
ofpowerredundantanduseless?Ifunderthegeneralwelfareclausetheplayingofwhistorchessinone'sown
house,notformoney,butmerelyforamusement,maybeprohibitedunderthegeneralwelfareclause,certainly
thepower"topenalizeandprohibit...gambling"musthavebeenincludedinthatclause.Ifso,thespecialgrant
relatingtogamblingismerelyredundant.
Isubmitthatwhenaspecialpowertoenactordinancesisgrantedtoamunicipalcounciluponaparticularsubject,
thepowerastothatmatteristobemeasuredbytheexpressgrant,withoutenlargementbytheinterpretationof
the general "welfare clause." The express grant of power to regulate public dance halls (section 2243 [k],
Administrative Code of 1917) is not be expanded under the general "welfare clause" so as to authorize the
prohibition and penalizing of dancing in private houses. The express grant of power to establish and maintain
streets cannot be expanded, under the general welfare clause, this court has held, so as to authorize an
ordinancetocompelcitizentocleanthestreets.(U.S.vs.Gaspay,33Phil.Rep.,96.)
IthinkthelawonthissubjectiscorrectlyexpressedinJudgeDillon'sauthoritativeworkonMunicipalCorporations
asfollows:
When there are both special and general provisions, the power to pass bylaws under the special or
expressgrantcanonlybeexercisedinthecasesandtotheextent,asrespectsthosematters,allowedby
thecharterorincorporatingactandthepowertopassbylawsunderthegeneralclausedoesnotenlarge
orannulthepowerconferredbythespecialprovisionsinrelationtotheirvarioussubjectmatters,butgives
authority to pass bylaws, reasonable in their character, upon all other matters within the scope of their
municipalauthority,andnotrepugnanttotheConstitutionandgenerallawsoftheState.
But if we disregard entirely the delegated power relating to the prohibition of gambling and consider the matter
from the standpoint of the general welfare clause alone, it seems equally clear to me that the ordinance in
questionisvoidasbeingcontrarytothepubliclegislativepolicy,asestablishedbythePhilippineLegislature.In
DillononMunicipalCorporations(fifthedition,paragraph601)itissaid:
. . . A municipal corporation . . . cannot, in virtue of its incidental power to passbylaws, or under any
generalgrantofthatauthority,adoptbylawswhichinfringethespiritorarerepugnanttothepolicyofthe