Semi-Secret Ballot in Parliament (Also known as

'Delayed Honesty' or 'The Judgement Day System' -- A

Suggestion for Parliamentary Voting Reform,
by delayed disclosure of individual votes, for temporary secrecy, but
eventual accountability. First published on Scribd.com 2010, Katherine
Katz)

Summary:
This is a controlled reform by the gradual introduction of a minimal change in
parliamentary voting. It involves a two-pronged initiation of (1) some non-binding
fully secret ballots, and (2) the delayed publication of the back-bencher votes in the
binding final ballots. The combination of these two compromise systems, both
intermediate between fully secret and immediately open ballot, aims to diminish
the strangle-hold of party-politics on parliamentary debating and voting
patterns, by redistributing some power from the cabinet to the back-bench. It
avoids the instability of proportional representation, yet promises far-reaching
knock-on effects. It is cheap, and ought to save much money normally wasted on
parliamentary party rhetoric. There is little excuse why it should not be trialled as a
partial implementation.

Why is reform needed?

People are disillusioned: with poor parliamentary behaviour, with political rhetoric
chewing up expensive parliamentary debate time, with strict party politics, policy
determination by the few, balance of power situations, factionalism, poor
parliamentary attendance by members, and a host of other annoying features of our
legislative system. Many of these oddities of our system are rightly seen as thwarting
democracy.

With sham democracies multiplying, it is up to true democracies to take the lead and
demonstrate truly democratic practices to the world, as a matter of principle, not out
of expedience.

The aim is to make parliament transparently worthy of respect, without recklessly

swapping to proportional representation or any other quite different system.
Electoral reform is left aside, and parliamentary reform is centre-stage.
Parliamentary voting is where the rubber hits the road, so voting reform is the key to
fundamental change. The immediate target is excessive 2-party politicking and one-
party dominance.

The essence of democracy is not, after all, to democratically elect an autocratic

governing party.

How does 'half-secret' maintain full ministerial and other

public accountability?
'Semi-secret' ballot works by delaying publication of how each back-bencher and
non-government member voted. Ministers and office holders (parliamentary
secretaries, Speaker) must still vote openly on all important legislation. Only their
votes and the overall result is initially known.
'Semi-secret' means that public accountability is preserved, but back-benchers
are given an opportunity to register conscientious objection to 'the party line',
through a temporary respite from party bullying.

• The 'delayed publication' of individuals' votes might be scheduled for

•
~When a fresh election is called -- This is the option most in spirit with the
aims.
~When the prime minister and cabinet is dismissed and a new leader chosen
~6 or 12 months after each vote -- This has a much lesser impact on voting
patterns.
•
It is not recommended that disclosure be forced simply by any minor reshuffle
or new appointment, because that could be abused, and takes away the
certainty of a known period of grace and safety.

• Two other options for delayed disclosure are

~Extended semi-secrecy -- extended to the end of that parliament if the
government bill is passed
~Optional secrecy -- never disclosed, if the selected government bill is
passed. Optional secrecy should not be allowed in other cases, as it is open to
abuse e.g. in order to avoid public accountability.

Optional secrecy or extended semi-secrecy encourage backbenchers to break

party discipline, on the gamble that it won't much hurt them.

Full or partial implementation?

If fully implemented, every vote would be a combination of a non-binding
secret ballot followed by a binding semi-secret ballot, and it should apply to
any institution which claims to be accountable, representative and
democratic.

For partial implementation, the optimum version is a combination of a preliminary

non-binding secret ballot, and a final binding 'semi-secret' ballot.
• The bill goes to its final debate with the results of a preliminary secret ballot
already known, and is then further debated, amended and voted on, by a
ballot which remains secret, as far as non-minister voting is concerned, for
some stated delay.
• A second non-binding secret ballot, could be held just prior to the final
vote, for the benefit of the upper house.
• The bill then goes to the upper house, and the semi-secret process is
repeated.

For trial purposes, the system could be used, initially, only in the upper house. This
suits the traditional purposes of the second house, to represent local interests above
party politics, and to debate, scrutinise, review and reject bad legislation. However,
since most abuse of party politics occurs in the lower house, it rather defeats the
spirit of the system to quarantine it from the target arena.

Why include any fully secret ballots at all, or why not simply
use semi-secret ballot only?
Binding secret ballot by itself is untrustworthy, and would be a revolutionary,
unpredictable and undesirable change, open to abuse. It allows no public
accountability. Yet only secret ballot is recognised as truly democratic and
representative. Non-binding secret ballot is a suitable compromise, but being non-
binding, cannot work by itself alone.

• Non-binding secret ballot is not the essence of the semi-secret system, but
works well in conjunction with it. The preliminary non-binding secret ballot
applies moral pressure against bad legislation, and for needed
amendments. It exposes party-discipline for its level of coercion. It
exposes insincere opposition to good law. It encourages back-benchers to
unite, by giving them a good idea of how the numbers stand, during the
progress of the debate.
As a reform in itself non-binding secret-ballot is a powerful tool to exert
pressure, but powerless to directly alter final results.

The other compromise system is to be half-secret. The eventual publication of final

voting acts as a damper on any tendency to extreme departures from the present
voting behaviour. Yet there is little incentive to change voting patterns away from
party-dominated policy-determinations unless there is some extra knowedge of how
others would vote if encouraged.

• The final and binding semi-secret ballot empowers direct input in legislation
formation.
It empowers motions of censure and no-confidence, to the point that a
minister or government can be voted down or out.
It empowers conscience voting, even when there is no official party-room
permission for a conscience vote. A list of other probable effects is given
below. As a reform in itself it is a powerful tool to de-power party dominance,
but it is given extra power, especially in normal bills before the house, by the
encouragement of knowing what the secret ballot shows.

The two compromise systems (non-binding or not fully secret) can work together,
one with the benefits of secret polling, the other with the benefits of remaining
accountable.

Only the combination can safely achieve the best of both worlds.

The combination of non-binding secret ballot, say, after the first debate, and
semi-secret final ballot is more powerful than either alone, in re-empowering
back-benchers.

The combination should be popular, in the public eye, because it serves justice,
and improves a known system, and in the eyes of all members of parliament
except the party leadership, because it redistributes power.

Minimal Change
This is a 'minimal initial change' reform, yet significant in its impact.

• Most, perhaps all, structures and procedures can be retained, and will
remain in the long-term also.
• It should not require constitutional change, to add a non-binding vote, but a
formal change is more likely to be needed if a minimum quota is attached to
the vote.
• It is more probable that constitutional amendment is needed to change
the way a binding parliamentary vote is cast, counted or disclosed to the
public. It depends on the constitution involved.

• A physical facility for secret ballot is required, plus a facility for semi-
secret ballot casting -- a system of recording individual votes for later
disclosure (see Appendix below).
• A non-binding secret vote would be introduced, say after the first round of
debate, and immediately before the final vote.

• Members' attendance in the house is expedient for the preliminary secret

vote, because it is recommended that filling a 25% quota of 'yes' votes is
necessary to proceed with any new bill. Any less and it is obvious that the
government is not commanding a majority even of its own members.

Gradual and Controlled Reform

Gradual evolution to an acceptable level of semi-secret voting.
• For instance, a small but relentlesssly increasing percentage of bills and/or
amendments could be slated down for some form of binding or non-binding
secret or semi-secret ballot.
Bills could be selected, for example, on a basis of 'every fourth this year, then
every third next year', and leave it to the governing party to schedule bills
appropriately. Or a random selection of suitable bills could select a stated
proportion. Or a secret ballot could establish whether or not to have the semi-
secret process applied, or could establish modified odds to be applied to
selection by random number.

Budget Money-Supply bills might be exempt. Issues which have been the subject of
referenda, dissolved parliament or prominent election promises might be exempt.

The system of extra and different ballots is introduced gradually so that all can get a
feel for how it works. Its further progress would be based upon its track record,
popularity and acceptability. (The decision on further implementation should be
scheduled for each new parliament, and removed from the control of the leadership,
e.g. by secret ballot, concerning pre-stated levels of application.)

Such an opportunity for controlled reform is difficult to come across.

Partial Introduction
The range of minimal impact options available for gradual incorporation are...

• making the new ballot fully secret or optionally secret or semi-secret.

• binding or non-binding.
• publishing after a short or long or extended delay.
• using it on preliminary or final votes, and on amendments or not.
• applied to non-ministers or office-holders or ministers.
• for chosen bills only.
• for few or many such bills.
• upper or lower house.

The aim is to remove any excuses as to why the new system should not be trialed in
part.

An election based on the need for parliamentary reform is about the best time to
promise to introduce a trial of the combined system in some form.

The effects of the system

This is a wish-list-come-ignorant-predictions-forecast, open to debate and addition.
But the idea overall is that the reform is fundamental and far-reaching against the
worst aspects of our current 2-party dominated system. Yet any changes are
restrained compared with a secret ballot system.

• Dominant 2-party politics gradually gives way to a much looser system,

more representative of individual electorates.
• Party discipline, also known as coercion and bullying, is weakened. Aspiring
cabinet ministers do have incentive to toe the party line, but back-benchers
become a force to be reckoned with, rather than to be taken for granted.
• Independents and minorities are empowered and should increase.

• Real debate supplants political rhetoric, because it aims at persuading back-

benchers and cross-benchers, based on the merits of the legislation, not on
which party is proposing it.
• Parliamentary costs are not wasted on predictable, repetitive party rhetoric.
Less sitting time is needed and/or sitting time is more cost-effective and
efficient.

• Cabinet-room policy-making is made less autocratic.

• More whole party room meetings would be expedient.
• More non-government bills would get further.

• Balance of power situations are eliminated, resulting in fewer deadlocked

parliaments.
• More triggers for early elections, but probably fewer would be taken up --
since the election focus is less about party success, mandate or opposition
obstruction tactics and more about the government's failure to persuade even
its own members.
• Less threats of joint-sitting and double-dissolution. The genuine opposition
causing inability to pass bills is likely to replicate itself in joint sittings, and in
election results to follow.
• Less threats of early election. More full-term parliaments. The focus of
parliament becomes more about doing their job of legislating, and early
quitting would attract criticism.
• More multi-issue elections, and less claiming of 'public mandate' based on
single-issue elections. Elections at the moment are engineered around a
populist angle to swing the election, which disenfranchises the public on all
other issues. With the focus on ministerial and legislative success on a bill by
bill basis, the spotlight falls more on the cabinet makeup and policy
initiatives, not on failure to persuade the house on a specific issue.
• Pre-selection will be delayed until vote-discovery, i.e. until an election is
called. Since pre-selection of approved candidates is a way around equal
opportunity for election to parliament (e.g. in Iran; Communism), this
fundamentally undemocratic procedure needs curbing. Weakening party
politics empowers representative candidates, independents and minor parties.

There are some of the characteristics of proportional representation, but not to the
same extent.
• Less factionalism and more appointments on merit.
• More cross-party cabinets -- government of national unity.
• Less distinction between mainline parties. The current system forces
polarisation, for election purposes. The new system dampens it.
• A wider range of representative minor parties, less tied to the centre.
Factions simply spit off.
• More coalitions would be neeed to secure the numbers.
• Minority government is more workable -- the need for a coalition for a
majority on paper is lessened.

• Less ideologically-driven legislation.

• Less bad legislation.
• No longer can legislation be 'rammed through' so easily. Adequate debate
and back-bench support is ensured.
• Less pork-barrelling, since members left out of perks are more likely to
register their moral or selfish objection to favouritism. Perhaps there will be
an increase of lower-level more evenly-distributed vote-buying.

• Less united opposition to good legislation. This disempowers the non-

government block somewhat, to function as an effective 'opposition', but
many would see that as a welcome reform. Other gains offset this
disadvantage, such as more opposition to bad laws.
• Increased parliamentary attendance. Early votes require a minimum
number of yes votes. Uncertainty in the ongoing outcomes is often increased,
and the debates are more worth listening to. Individual members value their
vote more. Rebel voters need to be sure of their ground by listening carefully
to the debate, to be able to justify themselves later. Absentee 'pairs' are
eliminated.
• Less chance of major reforms succeeding, without dilution by many
amendments. This is a weakness.
• More local issues and self-interest come to the fore.
• Members are more likely to express their private opinions in the secret ballot,
yet express their public opinions in the public ballot. They are elected to
represent a range of opinions in their electorate, yet also elected to abide by
their personal ethics and opinions and beliefs as epressed to the electorate. If
party political ethics are to be diminished, there will be a heightened
expectation for members to be elected for their personal profile, and so to
vote according to their professed character. Eventually there should be a
smaller gap between private and public opinions, and a larger range of
opinions.
• Voting margins are likely to increase, based on merit of the legislation, with
 some normalisation of balance after amendments are included.

• Unpopular ministers, laws and governments can be voted down more easily.
This may be described as 'increased instability', but is more of the nature of
evolution to 'increased accountability'. There is less need for spills, since
the system is achieving reform in a more measured way. The instability might
be expressed more as internal cabinet reform, than in public elections.
• More censure motions put and succeeding -- less likely to be 'voted down
along party lines'.
• More no-confidence motions put and succeeding.
• More conscience votes allowed. The procedure for semi-secrecy is already
in place as an option to be used.
• Conscience votes, if made fully secret, would result in less 'political
correctness' and more private opinion being allowed to count.

• A different set of pressures operates on the leaders. Loyalty issues increase.

Appointments on perceived merit are in focus. The job description is more
about cross-party coordination and party-administration duties. Personalities
that can command cross-party respect and cooperation ought to emerge,
somewhat allowing more visionary reform agendas, to offset the initial
difficulties of getting anyone to agree to anything.
• Backbenchers would need to think for themselves far more clearly, as they
consider how to vote.

• Less media spectacle, and less pitching speeches to the media.

'Parliamentary performance' would be gauged by competence, not by media-
friendly audio-visual grabs.
• Less personality politics.
• Less dog-fights in parliament.
• Less big-spending party-driven advertising campaigns, American-style.

• Better parliamentary behaviour.

• More public respect for politicians and politics.
• More respect for parliamentary politics as a career-choice, it being seen as a
service to the public.
• There is increased focus on long-term honesty and on loyalty and
independence. This should alter the moral landscape. Having to explain
yourself years later ensures a longer lasting commitment to each issue.

• More respect for parliamentary procedure, and parliamentary debate.

• The public will vote less along party lines, more for candidates promising
independent and representative policy. Voting apathy and ignorance should
decrease.
• However, many would feel that they no longer know what an individual
candidate stands for, if party policy plays less of a role.

• More public interest in voting patterns of individual candidates and

members. This partially offsets the delay in public scrutiny.
• The public sees their votes as counting more. They would recognise
someone willing to vote against the party as good to vote for.
• The public would see their local member as more likely to achieve a change.
They would approach that member more readily.

• On the down side: Lobby groups have more scope for corrupt vote buying
-- the secrecy initially hides a corrupt vote, but the eventual publication
allows the vote to be verified by the buyer. The time delay takes many issues
away from the public interest.
• Party factions may take the opportunity under cover of fully secret ballots to
vexatiously embarrass a minister from the opposing faction.
• Less smear-tactics, less dirty tactics, fewer death-threats. These thrive where
the future outcome can be altered. The delay protects politicians from pre-
voting intimidation.

Appendix: Semi-Secret Ballot Equipment and Procedure

This is simply a detail to be implemented. Examples are offered below, but many
variations are possible.

The physical procedure, as a model for the electonic equivalent, can be envisaged as
this:

A scutineer identifies a member, and hands them an unsealed envelope with their
name inside. The name is verified and the envelope is sealed under scrutiny. Then
the vote is written on the outside. A random checkword is written alongside. The
vote lodged in a ballot box. After voting, the envelopes are displayed for counting
and verification -- each voter can recognise their own paper from the checkword.
Much later the envelopes are opened and the names discovered.
To thwart vote-wrecking, really important votes can be done in quadruplicate, for
distribution.

The equivalent electronic procedure needs to be transparent in both procedure and

implementation (e.g. every wire is fully visible) and secure (by means of private-
public key encryption).
One example is:

Individual members are allocated individual seats, each with a dedicated electronic
terminal for that member only.
Each terminal is linked to a hub and then to the central dedicated computer of the
clerk of the house. No external connections are allowed. The hub ensures that the
central computer cannot identify the source of any electronic packets of information.
The terminal uploads the member's name automatically, together with their selected
vote and an auto-generated random checkword (e.g. zebra037762339), in 3
packages, automatically encrypted with two public keys, as follows.
(1)The whole upload (name+vote+checkword) is encrypted with key#1, and kept in
storage for decrypting much later.
(2)In addition, the vote and checkword are encrypted for secure transmission
purposes with key#2, for decryption by the clerk of the house, immediately after all
the votes have been received and shuffled. This information is displayed as 3 lists
(Yes; No; Abstain) in alphabetical order of the checkwords.
(3)The name is encrypted with key#2, and transmitted separately. This list is also
decrypted and displayed for cross-checking purposes, to verify the presence of the
member in the house.
For fully secret votes, (1) and (3) are disabled. That could be controlled from the
clerk's desk, e.g. suppying power to one or both functions, according to the vote.

The private key#1 needs to be automatically internally encrypted upon generation,

by three public keys in succession, belonging to three independent parties (e.g.
leaders of government, opposition and minor parties) and these keys are kept in safe
but known and emergency-accessible places. Later they come together to decrypt
the private key#1, which allows decryption of the voting patterns.

To counteract vote-wrecking and vexatious objections ('My vote is not there!'),

triplicate transmissions can be used, and consulted in cases of contention. These can
be verified while they are still encrypted.