Feminist Terror K

Feminist Terror K
Notes
So, the thesis behind a lot of our cards about the need to
theorize the relationship between local (domestic) violence
and global (terrorist) violence draws on feminist theory that
criticizes politics that overly focuses on *big* state issues like
war, terrorism, etc at expense of *local* issues like structural
violence, human security, etc. I think thats our linkage into a
lot of these broader cards about state politics/patriarchal
militarism, etc. Domestic violence and global terrorism are
necessarily linked its because of patriarchal expectations
that we think either are okay, we dont talk about something
so close to home, yet we fight the rare threat of terrorism with
violent c/t.
Good summary of the K
Rhonda Hammer, PhD in sociology @ York University, lecturer in women studies,
renowned author. October 29 2003 Militarism and Family Terrorism: A Critical
Feminist Perspective Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714410390225911
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the Bush administrations
militarist and unilateralist response dramatized the centrality of globalization and
the vulnerabilities of the entire world to destructive violence. These events have
provoked widespread discussions of terrorism which generally fail to recognize that
terrorism and militarism often finds their basis in patriarchal codes which
permeate a variety of political, social, economic, and cultural relations of
everyday life. Here I want to explore the relationship between militarism and what
I call family terrorism and to further theorize multiple forms of violence in terms of
relations between individualized, familial, public, nationalized, and globalized
terrains. I will employ critical feminist theories that offer broad perspectives on
terrorism and militarism that include in their rudiments patriarchal violence and
domination, in order to address dimensions neglected in many current discussions.1
The events of 9/11 and their volatile aftermath have provoked growing concerns,
debates, and an increase in writings on war and terrorism within conservative,
liberal, and radical scholarly arenas, as well as within mainstream and alternative
mass media forums. And although some of the most significant debates on war,
terrorism, and militarism are being generated by progressive movements, the
underlying codes of patriarchy that are so fundamental to any understanding
of the concrete and ideological dimensions of terrorism , war, nationalism,
and globalization are often overlooked or underestimated. Moreover, the real
human atrocities resulting from these pathological practices are also sometimes
minimized or reduced to one-dimensional statistics.
-File by Blake & Bright-Patterson, ALGG Lab, NDI 2015
1NC
Short
Government and media rhetoric of international terrorism
neutralizes masculine violence gendered violence is are
created under the same justifications
*This card has been edited for potentially offensive content. We do not endorse the
use of blind in this card*
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714410390225911
In fact, the material conditions of militarization and war, especially contemporary warfare, are often forgotten or downplayed within
Howard Zinns passionate opposition to a war against Iraq and

his cogent description of the realities of warfare make sense. He points out that what is missing from many
of these critiques that expound upon the strategy and tactics, geopolitics and
personalities is what an American war on Iraq will do to tens of thousands or
hundreds of thousands of ordinary human beings . . . 2 In fact, the effectiveness of
doublespeak3 contributes to the negation or neglect of basic human realities
and rights in all too many of these analyses. He argues that discussions of the
wounded and dead as human beings rather than casualties would provoke the
withdrawal of public support for most wars.4 This sanitized discourse and mind-set
constitutes what many consider to be one of greatest omissions in discussing
multiple forms of terrorisms, especially militarization. Hardly restricted to the written and oral
word, media depictions of military actions and war in general contribute to this
distorted epistemology that sanitizes and aestheticizes war. Thus the penetrating style of
much of the discussion of terrorism. It is in this context that
camerawork that offers a chance to look through the eyes of a weapon echoes the point of view available in many video and
The extensive use of

statistics combined with overhead helicopter and satellite camera shots resemble
the manner in which sports events are televised and watched . Hence, viewers watch
war as they would a baseball game, from high above, from the heights reserved for the
owners of luxury boxes, or, in the case of war, from the aerial vantage points usually reserved for government
authorities. The public is then misled into viewing military action, war and /or many acts
of terrorism as naturalized, rule-bound sports events.6 As a case in point, the bombing of
Afghanistan has been treated as if human beings are of little consequence. 7 It
becomes, instead, a distorted and decontextualized abstraction that is translated as a war on
terrorism, rather than a war on men, women, and children . This is only one manner of ideological
computer games and in broadcast news accounts of contemporary military actions . . .5
mystification of the real, material conditions of human beings that are violated in war and terrorism. Yet, as some feminists reveal,
one of the most significant sets of relations, mandatory for any understanding and credible analysis, is
recognition of one of the most persuasive lacunae in the interrogations of terrorisms in globalized, nationalized, militarized, and socalled private domains. Gender, or what Cynthia Enloe identifies as gender
blindness [obscuring], characterizes

What many critical feminists and
human rights activists make clear is that militarization itself, like nationalist
identity, is gendered.9 Moreover, this failure to recognize the significance of
gender (and sexuality) in war and terrorism is a reflection of a wider
disregard for seriously considering gender and patriarchal codes in analyzing
the escalating violence which defines so much of everyday life. As Catherine Lutz and Jon
much work on violence, especially studies of nationalism and the military.8
Elliston put it, in their analysis of a recent U.S. epidemic of murders by soldiers of their wives during the summer of 2002 in Fort
Bragg, North Carolina.
In the Pentagons approach to the problem and virtually all media
accounts, gender has been left hidden in plain sight . As in the 1990s schoolyard
shootings, where a rhetoric of kids killing kids disguised the fact that boys were
overwhelmingly the killers, here the soldiers are seen simply as an occupational group and the problem, at most, as
one of an institutional culture where soldiers have difficulty asking for help from family service providers abundantly available at
installations like Bragg.10 (emphasis mine). Diane Russell, goes on to argue that the
fact that is repeatedly

erased by these gender-neutral statements is that it is almost always males, not
females, who act out in violent ways in too many kinds of terrorist situations.11
This militarism is patriarchal, replicates oppression and

interventionism in all circumstances, is the sole root cause of
war, and is internalized by society through discourse
Burke 94 [Colleen Burke, Womens International League for Peace and Freedom; Women and Militarism;
Nuclear Monitory Issue 509-510; 12/1994; accessed 07/21/2015; <http://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclearmonitor/509-510/women-and-militarism>.]
Militarism encompasses much more than just the armed forces of a state and their activities.
It is an ideology of power affecting governments with different political objectives and its
influence can become part of a social process which penetrates all areas of a society . One
useful definition of this complex idea comes from the World Council of Churches, which defines militarism as
the result of the process of militarization in which "military values, ideology and pattern
of behavior achieve a dominating influence on the political, social, economic and
external affairs of the state, and as a consequence the structural, ideological and behavioral patterns of both
the society and the government are 'militarized'". Militarism involves a willingness on the part of
states to realize their policies through deliberate and organized use of physical force. War is not a
continuous state of humanity, nor is it something which creates itself or "just happens". It is a direct
result of militarism, and should be seen in that light. Militarism as a process has both material and
ideological manifestations. These vary in different cultures and at different times, but there are some common
The material forms of militarism which are evident around the world include wars and
direct military interventions, destabilization of other countries through proxy armies,
foreign-sponsored coups, foreign and colonial occupation, military rule and abuse of
human rights. Its institutional manifestations include the armed forces and government budgets which
devote a disproportionate amount of money to the military . Militarization is the "gradual
elements.
encroachment of the military institution into the civilian arena", including, for example, industrial plants becoming
dependent on military contracts or the state relying on the military to solve its unemployment problems. The
ideological manifestations of militarism are more difficult to identify because often

they are internalized by the society. They include a dissemination of military values,
symbols and language among the civilian population which promotes acceptance of
hierarchies, nationalism which defines the "other" as enemy, violence as a
legitimate means of resolving conflicts, and strict division of proper masculine and
feminine roles. "Power over the other" is the basic value of militarism and the military is
an exaggerated microcosm of this dominance which protects those in power. It is hierarchical and
unaccountable to the people. In a militarized society, the population begins to accept the idea
that "might is right" and that society should be founded on a dominant-submissive mode of relationship and
this has ramifications for interpersonal relationships . This hierarchy is seen as a prerequisite for
social stability and not as a form of repression.
Vote negative to rethink framings of violence reject their

backwards scholarship and embrace the alternatives new
politics of spatiality, interaction, and practice, only our
starting point solves
Pain and Staeheli 14 (Rachel and Lynn, Department of Geography, Durham
University, Introduction: intimacy-geopolitics and violence, Area, 2014, 46.4, 344
360) Links to K affs on terror too their critical geopolitical analyses are wrong.
While many critical geopolitical analyses have emphasised
state violence on bodies in different places, and in so doing worked across scale to a
certain degree, often this has implied and reinscribed a certain kind of spatial
hierarchy that does not acknowledge that the same violences are often already
there within the intimate realm. The short papers here are intended to draw out this point, and demonstrate the three sets of
intersecting relations in practice. As Pains paper contends, intimate and international violences are closely
related. Not only are state violence and armed conflict experienced as onslaught in
the intimate realm in a range of ways (as the papers by Dowler et al., Marshall, Harker and Sharp also show), but
intimate violence is foundational to geopolitical dynamics and force. So the
simultaneous, multiple workings of violences are essential to revealing how they
work. The diffusion of geopolitical violences is achieved through their presence in the intimate, and intimate violences persist precisely because
they are rooted in other sites. And at the same time, contestation of violence through varied
practices of resistance and peacemaking by individuals, communities, and social
movements and institutions continuously wind through intimate and global (see Askins
We can extend this analysis to violence.
paper). It always does so in relation to violence, and vice versa: resistance to occupation may be met with further violence; feminist campaigns become
more vigorous in the face of a backlash that attempts to reiterate the legitimacy of violence. So resistance may undo violence and create further forms at
, the potential
epistemic violence of scholarship is wound into a similar set of spatial relations . What
we argue here is that our analysis of violence as geographers is enriched by taking these
entwined spatial relations as a starting point: by rotating the usual lens of
analysis. Intimacy is seen to stretch, and reaches around its others those who are non-intimates, the public, the global, the geopolitical and turns
insideout. This framing addresses urgent questions currently resonating through political and activist spheres, and it has implications for responses to
the same time, as Harker suggests. Moreover, as highlighted by the reflections by Sharp, and Pratt and Johnston
violence at different sites: which violences receive attention and resourcing, and from whom? How does their everyday framing as intimate or geopolitical
work to sustain them? The short papers each address an issue for geopolitics within a particular context. Using qualitative, ethnographic and participatory
methodologies, the authors carefully situated research draws out the complexity of cross-cutting connections and relations of geopolitics to intimacy and
our framework of three intersecting sets of relations: intimacygeopolitics as a spatial relation, a mode of interaction, and a set of practices . Intimacyviolence. Together, the papers reflect
geopolitics as a spatial relation First, all seven papers illustrate the entanglement and indivisibility of proximate and distant spaces. Dowler et al. provide a
framing piece, exploring the utility of three feminist visualisations for intimacy-geopolitics across three case studies of research in Liberia, Iran and the
USA. These help to map complex spatial relations between citizens, activists, the military, states and the international community. The papers by Marshall
and Harker attend to the position of personal relationships in relation to the intimate work of occupation by the state in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict,
paying particular attention to the intimate as a resource in resistance and alternative ways of living. In parallel, Pain connects intimate dynamics across
domestic violence, international warfare, online and institutional violence. Sharp explores the dilemma of bringing to light hidden sexual and racist
violence in narratives about independence struggles in Tanzania. Modelling the conceptual principle in her paper, Askins works from the intimate
outwards, exploring the relation between dominant national discourses about migration to the UK and interpersonal relationships. Pratt and Johnstons
paper focuses on the transnational movement of academic narratives between places that are differently positioned, both within global hierarchies and
the stories that we tell as researchers and activists. Intimacy-geopolitics as modes of interaction The second theme is the potential for feelings and
interpersonal relationships to effect political change at other scales. Here intimacy-geopolitics is used effectively to articulate the inseparability of politics
from emotional geographies. Dowler et al. describe how emotional and embodied experiences of peace connect to action at a range of scales. Pains
emphasis is on the emotional dynamics that are present across a range of gendered violences at different scales. Askins examines the working of intimacy
in forms of activism, arguing that a transformative geopolitics arises from the friendship between a locally born and a migrant woman in England; such
emotional citizenry has potential to challenge and reshape political discourses. Marshall asks how love functions in political struggle, both as a counterveiling force for resistance and one that occupiers attempt to co-opt. Harker too makes clear the ambivalence of Butlers ethic of cohabitation as a
conceptual resource for living with others. Intimacy-geopolitics as sets of practices Thirdly, the papers demonstrate how certain bodily and social intimate
practices traverse sites and scales. The last two papers critically appraise our own practices as researchers exploring intimacy-geopolitics. As the papers
by Sharp, and Pratt and Johnston, make clear, if the task is to move out conceptually and methodologically from intimacy itself, this involves disclosure
and exposing the lives of others, raising significant questions of ethics and power. Their projects employ specific epistemologies and methods in an effort
to dismantle the customary divides of intimacy-geopolitics, both between fields, scales and sites, and between researchers, activists and communities.
Sharp considers the ethics of pursuing intimate stories as researchers, particularly in cross-cultural contexts, and from their experience of staging a
The goal of
these analyses is to rotate the usual framing of intimacy-geopolitics , to exceed any
testimonial play, Pratt and Johnston ask whether scholarly narratives can have transnational resonance rather than universalise.
all
spatial hierarchy in its relation, and to rethink it as variously configured spatial

relations, interactions and practices in particular places. Intimacy is not simply the
terrain on which broader sets of power relations are written. It is already out there,
quietly working to produce domination as well as resistance across all practices and
sites.
Long
Government and media rhetoric of international terrorism
neutralizes masculine violence terror becomes decontextualized into a spectacle which fails to recognize the
gendered violence which are created under the same
justifications
*This card has been edited for potentially offensive content. We do not endorse the
use of blind in this card*
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714410390225911
In fact, the material conditions of militarization and war, especially contemporary
warfare, are often forgotten or downplayed within much of the discussion of
terrorism. It is in this context that Howard Zinns passionate opposition to a war
against Iraq and his cogent description of the realities of warfare make sense. He
points out that what is missing from many of these critiques that expound upon the
strategy and tactics, geopolitics and personalities is what an American war on
Iraq will do to tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of ordinary human beings
. . .2 In fact, the effectiveness of doublespeak3 contributes to the negation or
neglect of basic human realities and rights in all too many of these analyses. He
argues that discussions of the wounded and dead as human beings rather than
casualties would provoke the withdrawal of public support for most wars.4 This
sanitized discourse and mind-set constitutes what many consider to be one of
greatest omissions in discussing multiple forms of terrorisms , especially
militarization. Hardly restricted to the written and oral word, media depictions of
military actions and war in general contribute to this distorted epistemology that
sanitizes and aestheticizes war.
Thus the penetrating style of camerawork that offers a chance to look through the
eyes of a weapon echoes the point of view available in many video and computer
games and in broadcast news accounts of contemporary military actions . . .5 The
extensive use of statistics combined with overhead helicopter and satellite camera
shots resemble the manner in which sports events are televised and watched.
Hence, viewers watch war as they would a baseball game, from high above, from
the heights reserved for the owners of luxury boxes, or, in the case of war, from the
aerial vantage points usually reserved for government authorities. The public is
then misled into viewing military action, war and /or many acts of terrorism as
naturalized, rule-bound sports events.6
As a case in point, the bombing of Afghanistan has been treated as if human
beings are of little consequence.7 It becomes, instead, a distorted and
decontextualized abstraction that is translated as a war on terrorism, rather than
a war on men, women, and children. This is only one manner of ideological
mystification of the real, material conditions of human beings that are violated in
war and terrorism. Yet, as some feminists reveal, one of the most significant sets of
relations, mandatory for any understanding and credible analysis, is recognition of
one of the most persuasive lacunae in the interrogations of terrorisms in globalized,
nationalized, militarized, and so-called private domains. Gender, or what Cynthia
Enloe identifies as gender blindness [obscuring], characterizes much work on
violence, especially studies of nationalism and the military.8 What many critical
feminists and human rights activists make clear is that militarization itself, like
nationalist identity, is gendered.9
Moreover, this failure to recognize the significance of gender (and sexuality)
in war and terrorism is a reflection of a wider disregard for seriously
considering gender and patriarchal codes in analyzing the escalating violence
which defines so much of everyday life. As Catherine Lutz and Jon Elliston put it, in
their analysis of a recent U.S. epidemic of murders by soldiers of their wives during
the summer of 2002 in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
In the Pentagons approach to the problem and virtually all media accounts, gender
has been left hidden in plain sight. As in the 1990s schoolyard shootings, where a
rhetoric of kids killing kids disguised the fact that boys were overwhelmingly the
killers, here the soldiers are seen simply as an occupational group and the problem,
at most, as one of an institutional culture where soldiers have difficulty asking for
help from family service providers abundantly available at installations like
Bragg.10 (emphasis mine).
Diane Russell, goes on to argue that the fact that is repeatedly erased by these
gender-neutral statements is that it is almost always males, not females, who act
out in violent ways in too many kinds of terrorist situations.11
Counterterrorism against global terror exacerbates and masks

everyday terrorism
Pain 14 (Rachel, Durham University, UK, Progress in Human Geography,
Everyday terrorism: Connecting domestic violence and global terrorism, Vol. 38(4)
531550)
there have also
been stark differences in political response s to global and everyday terrorism in the
West over the last decade, and these responses are directly related through the politics of
fear. Counter-terrorism, constituting efforts by the state to prevent and respond to terrorist violence and threats, now
overshadows global terrorism itself. Foreign and domestic policy responses, frequently
described as driven or justified by fear, have asserted the political authority of
western states and privileged interests within them (Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams, 2009;
Cowen and Gilbert, 2008; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Robin, 2004). The new machismo of the post-2001 war
on/ of terror is drowning out previous progress on a more egalitarian notion of
human security (Hudson, 2005). Some see that, ironically, aggressive securitization as a tactic gives global terrorists
As Phillips (2008) has articulated in the context of Australian political responses to the war on/of terror,
exactly what they seek. For Goodwin (2006: 165), the USA and Australia have in this way traded shamelessly upon peoples fear of
terrorism to win re-election. As the flaws in western discourses and actions during the war on/of terror have become evident, so
language and policies have shifted. The onus of responsibility for counter-(global)terrorism in the UK is now more dispersed, with an
apparently benign but still racialized focus on working with the domestic communities deemed to be a threat, and public
Where is the war on

everyday terror? Understanding domestic violence as terrorism demands
watchfulness becoming embedded in the everyday (Amoore, 2007, 2009; Briggs et al., 2006).
altered responses (Hammer, 2002). There have been significant shifts in the last four decades as the state has taken on
responsibility (Walklate, 2008; Wilson, 1983). Many western countries have seen a similar pattern of everyday terrorism being raised
and addressed by activists in the womens movement during the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the development of policing and
criminal justice measures and state-funded services for people suffering everyday terrorism (Dobash and Dobash, 1992). This shift
can also be seen as a response to public fears, as victims of crime were repositioned as consumers. While these interventions have
been symbolically important, and answered some longstanding feminist demands (see Wilson, 1983), stateled interventions have
taken control away from social movements, community services and the wishes of service users (Phillips, 2008; Stanko, 2006;
Walklate, 2008). There are questions over the effectiveness of criminal justice approaches, as attrition rates remain high and there
are no signs of wider behavioural change (Walklate, 2008). The professionalization of anti-violence services has meant increased
vulnerability to other forms of violence for women of colour (INCITE!, 2006). In addition, there are sharp geographical disparities in
and victims and survivors

still counter the everyday terror they experience largely alone, or with informal
support from families and friends. Again, everyday securities are not only
overshadowed by the attention that global crises receive, they are intimately
connected to and shaped by them. This is the case, first, through the resourcing of the
war on/of terror and other global security conflicts at the expense of safety from
violence in the home (Phillips, 2008). Second, and simultaneously, western-sponsored
conflict in other states such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan increases local rates of sexual and
racist violence dramatically (Naber, 2006). Third, recent cuts to services for those experiencing everyday terrorism
public and voluntary sector service provision and access (Brunell, 2005; Coy et al., 2011),
have been justified by global recession. Rollbacks on womens safety are not only the product of financial leanness, but also a
changing climate on gender politics or war on women in the USA, where conservative politicians are targeting everyday terrorism
legislation amid wider assaults on womens reproductive and physical security (Doll, 2012; see also Phillips, 2008, on the Australian
experience). The UK has recently seen cuts of 31% to refuges and vital services tackling everyday terrorism, and on a typical day
230 women seeking emergency refuge space are turned away (Baird, 2012). Concerns about the capacity of organizations to
continue to offer crucial, sometimes lifesaving, services are widespread within the sector (Scottish Womens Aid, 2011; Womens
Aid, 2012), but the government has not acknowledged these sharply gendered impacts of austerity on security (Baird, 2012). As Fine
(2012: 3) writes, in the US context, the aggressive twinning of recession and slashing of the public programs has unleashed a
muscular policy assault on women . . . the effects can be viewed globally, and also . . . locally. Meanwhile, UK government spending
There is a long
way to go before everyday terrorism is recognized as widespread, terroristic, deeply
damaging to societies and deserving of the highest level of public attention. The same is
of 3.5 billion on counter-terrorism and intelligence in 20102011 was an increase on the previous year.
true of empathetic responses to people suffering everyday terrorism in the West and elsewhere that are determined by their own
needs and wishes.
The affirmatives failure change the underlying justifications of

terror explicitly replicates the conditions that they claim terror
creates under US masculine involvement, women and
children are raped, starved, beaten, and forced into
dehumanizing slavery, killing the value to life
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714410390225911
One of the most shocking ideological distortions in describing terrorist activities and
conditions of war involves the insidious employment of the term collateral
damage. This term has been used extensively in contemporary wars, especially the war against terror in
Afghanistan.12 As Julie Mertis and Jasmina Tesanovic demonstrate, in contemporary warfare, 95 percent of
the casualties are civilians, the majority of them women and children .13 During the Gulf War, in
February 1991, for example, U.S. planes bombed an air raid shelter, in Baghdad, killing 400 500 people mostly
women and childrenwho were huddled there to escape the incessant bombing.14 A report published in early December 2001, estimated that the
number of civilian casualties in the first nine weeks of the war against Afghanistan was 3,767.15 Yet George W. Bush exploited the cause of women in his
This war was not a war for womens liberation; it

was a war of revenge. And it was the utmost hypocrisy for George and Laura to shed tears over the oppression of women in Afghanistan
justification for military attacks on Afghanistan. But in fact:
when women are treated essentially as badly in Saudi Arabia, and the First Family doesnt say a word about that.16 Indeed Bushs claims that he was
liberating women of cover (sic), would be laughable if the consequences of the attacks were not so dire for the large majority of civilians, the majority of
RAWA Revolutionary Afghan Women Association
whom are women, children, and the elderly.17 Ignoring

s(
) and
other Afghan womens opposition to war, Bush and his coalition later dismissed recommendations of women activists from the Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan (HRCP), the European Union, as well as RAWA, while demanded the United Nations play a pivotal role in the formation of post-Taliban
government in Afghanistan and through elections.18 Speaking at a news conference in Islamabad on November 3, 2001, representatives of these
womens groups called for the elimination of all fundamentalist groups without any exception or conditions, paving the way for free elections.19
Sahar Saba of RAWA insisted that Bush and his allies not support replacement of the
Taliban with warlords or the Northern Alliance, which she denounced as criminals
and enemies of the people. Yet this is exactly what came to pass and the costs to
the Afghan people have been enormous. Starvation in Afghanistan since the 9/11 bombings has
escalated, with thousands of new widows and orphaned children joining the ranks .20 Povertystricken parents are forced to give up their children to orphanages that resemble nineteenth century Dickensian conditions as one on the last resorts for
Families have too

many children, and for this reason when one parent dies it is as if they were orphaned
because they are economically so poor that simple basic needs cannot be met . . . .
The result for children is catastrophic . They are deprived of food, heat and running
water. Often they also receive little affection because the beleaguered parents have so many mouths to feed that
they can hardly afford to spend time with each child.22 These children, forced to survive on their own , some
through the foraging of papers for 12 hours a day for the equivalent of a dollar, are
called children of garbage.23 Needless to say, many desperate women and children have resorted to prostitution in order to
survive. If this were not enough devastation, the American/coalition war forced even
more Afghan civilians into refugee camps in Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. Afghan citizens have
faced intense poverty, drought, and landmine infestation for decades owing to
continuing strife and wars in the country. According to the Afghan Womens Mission: For more than 20 years
desperately poor parents who cannot afford to care for their children.21 A UNICEF program officer explains that:
Afghanistan has also produced the worlds largest refugee group ever, at times as high as 6.2 million persons. Currently, numbering 2.6 million,
Afghan refugees comprise mostly women, children and the elderly , and are still the largest
displaced population in the world . . . Over one million civilians have been killed as a result of the fighting in Afghanistan, but those that survive face
Afghan refugees experience poverty, lack of rights, discrimination, and

harassment. Facilities in the refugee villages remain primitive and life is often harsh with a chronic lack of food, medical
care and other basic necessities.24 Severe mental illness, distress, and posttraumatic syndromes are rampant throughout the civilian population and the many
refugee camps they populate. A 1997 UNICEF study found that 54 percent of children had already
witnessed seeing someone tortured. Although difficult to document, RAWA found that close to 90 percent of urban women
suffered from psychological disorders resulting from terrorist actions provoked by the war.25 Sex trafficking, rapes, and
other forms of abuse continue under the new regime . The International Federation of the Red
Cross reported that girls in the western part of the country, some as young as ten, were
being sold as brides for as little as 100 kilograms of flour.26 Moreover, it appears that the Talibans
unending hardships.
extensive kidnapping and/or purchase of children for sex slavery is not exclusive to their regime. Many of these children and women continue to be
e family of a kidnapped girl or woman has no real

means of reporting the incident and having the police investigate.28 In fact, Women are still vulnerable to sex trafficking, and the
missing.27 Since the rules of law are still in shambles, th
prospect for justice for the thousand of abducted women remain dim under new leadership.29 Even First Lady Zeenat Karzai, wife of Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, is under tight security and rarely ventures beyond the palace, for fear of abduction. Zeenats family has fears of her being kidnapped by
people opposed to the transitional government. If kidnapped, Zeenat could be used to pressure Karzai into possibly giving up his presidency or giving in to
warlord interests.30 And although women are no longer required to wear the burqa, (the rule was lifted in December 2001) many are too afraid to
most women are frightened to leave

their homes at night and feel that, even during the day, wearing a headscarf does
not provide enough protection.31
remove it in public because they are terrified of harassment and/ or abduction. Thus
This militarism is patriarchal, replicates oppression and

interventionism in all circumstances, is the sole root cause of
war, and is internalized by society through discourse
Militarism encompasses much more than just the armed forces of a state and their activities.
It is an ideology of power affecting governments with different political objectives and its
influence can become part of a social process which penetrates all areas of a society . One
useful definition of this complex idea comes from the World Council of Churches, which defines militarism as
the result of the process of militarization in which "military values, ideology and pattern
of behavior achieve a dominating influence on the political, social, economic and
external affairs of the state, and as a consequence the structural, ideological and behavioral patterns of both
the society and the government are 'militarized'". Militarism involves a willingness on the part of
states to realize their policies through deliberate and organized use of physical force. War is not a
continuous state of humanity, nor is it something which creates itself or "just happens". It is a direct
result of militarism, and should be seen in that light. Militarism as a process has both material and
ideological manifestations. These vary in different cultures and at different times, but there are some common
The material forms of militarism which are evident around the world include wars and
direct military interventions, destabilization of other countries through proxy armies,
foreign-sponsored coups, foreign and colonial occupation, military rule and abuse of
human rights. Its institutional manifestations include the armed forces and government budgets which
devote a disproportionate amount of money to the military . Militarization is the "gradual
elements.
encroachment of the military institution into the civilian arena", including, for example, industrial plants becoming
dependent on military contracts or the state relying on the military to solve its unemployment problems. The
ideological manifestations of militarism are more difficult to identify because often

they are internalized by the society. They include a dissemination of military values,
symbols and language among the civilian population which promotes acceptance of
hierarchies, nationalism which defines the "other" as enemy, violence as a
legitimate means of resolving conflicts, and strict division of proper masculine and
feminine roles. "Power over the other" is the basic value of militarism and the military is
an exaggerated microcosm of this dominance which protects those in power. It is hierarchical and
unaccountable to the people. In a militarized society, the population begins to accept the idea
that "might is right" and that society should be founded on a dominant-submissive mode of relationship and
this has ramifications for interpersonal relationships . This hierarchy is seen as a prerequisite for
social stability and not as a form of repression.
Vote negative to rethink framings of violence reject their

backwards scholarship and embrace the alternatives new
politics of spatiality, interaction, and practice, only our
starting point solves
Pain and Staeheli 14 (Rachel and Lynn, Department of Geography, Durham
University, Introduction: intimacy-geopolitics and violence, Area, 2014, 46.4, 344
360) Links to K affs on terror too their critical geopolitical analyses are wrong.
While many critical geopolitical analyses have emphasised
state violence on bodies in different places, and in so doing worked across scale to a
We can extend this analysis to violence.
certain degree, often this has implied and reinscribed a certain kind of spatial
hierarchy that does not acknowledge that the same violences are often already
there within the intimate realm. The short papers here are intended to draw out this point, and demonstrate the three sets of
intersecting relations in practice. As Pains paper contends, intimate and international violences are closely
related. Not only are state violence and armed conflict experienced as onslaught in
the intimate realm in a range of ways (as the papers by Dowler et al., Marshall, Harker and Sharp also show), but
intimate violence is foundational to geopolitical dynamics and force. So the
simultaneous, multiple workings of violences are essential to revealing how they
work. The diffusion of geopolitical violences is achieved through their presence in the intimate, and intimate violences persist precisely because
they are rooted in other sites. And at the same time, contestation of violence through varied
practices of resistance and peacemaking by individuals, communities, and social
movements and institutions continuously wind through intimate and global (see Askins
paper). It always does so in relation to violence, and vice versa: resistance to occupation may be met with further violence; feminist campaigns become
more vigorous in the face of a backlash that attempts to reiterate the legitimacy of violence. So resistance may undo violence and create further forms at
, the potential
epistemic violence of scholarship is wound into a similar set of spatial relations . What
we argue here is that our analysis of violence as geographers is enriched by taking these
entwined spatial relations as a starting point: by rotating the usual lens of
analysis. Intimacy is seen to stretch, and reaches around its others those who are non-intimates, the public, the global, the geopolitical and turns
insideout. This framing addresses urgent questions currently resonating through political and activist spheres, and it has implications for responses to
the same time, as Harker suggests. Moreover, as highlighted by the reflections by Sharp, and Pratt and Johnston
violence at different sites: which violences receive attention and resourcing, and from whom? How does their everyday framing as intimate or geopolitical
work to sustain them? The short papers each address an issue for geopolitics within a particular context. Using qualitative, ethnographic and participatory
methodologies, the authors carefully situated research draws out the complexity of cross-cutting connections and relations of geopolitics to intimacy and
our framework of three intersecting sets of relations: intimacygeopolitics as a spatial relation, a mode of interaction, and a set of practices . Intimacyviolence. Together, the papers reflect
geopolitics as a spatial relation First, all seven papers illustrate the entanglement and indivisibility of proximate and distant spaces. Dowler et al. provide a
framing piece, exploring the utility of three feminist visualisations for intimacy-geopolitics across three case studies of research in Liberia, Iran and the
USA. These help to map complex spatial relations between citizens, activists, the military, states and the international community. The papers by Marshall
and Harker attend to the position of personal relationships in relation to the intimate work of occupation by the state in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict,
paying particular attention to the intimate as a resource in resistance and alternative ways of living. In parallel, Pain connects intimate dynamics across
domestic violence, international warfare, online and institutional violence. Sharp explores the dilemma of bringing to light hidden sexual and racist
violence in narratives about independence struggles in Tanzania. Modelling the conceptual principle in her paper, Askins works from the intimate
outwards, exploring the relation between dominant national discourses about migration to the UK and interpersonal relationships. Pratt and Johnstons
paper focuses on the transnational movement of academic narratives between places that are differently positioned, both within global hierarchies and
the stories that we tell as researchers and activists. Intimacy-geopolitics as modes of interaction The second theme is the potential for feelings and
interpersonal relationships to effect political change at other scales. Here intimacy-geopolitics is used effectively to articulate the inseparability of politics
from emotional geographies. Dowler et al. describe how emotional and embodied experiences of peace connect to action at a range of scales. Pains
emphasis is on the emotional dynamics that are present across a range of gendered violences at different scales. Askins examines the working of intimacy
in forms of activism, arguing that a transformative geopolitics arises from the friendship between a locally born and a migrant woman in England; such
emotional citizenry has potential to challenge and reshape political discourses. Marshall asks how love functions in political struggle, both as a counterveiling force for resistance and one that occupiers attempt to co-opt. Harker too makes clear the ambivalence of Butlers ethic of cohabitation as a
conceptual resource for living with others. Intimacy-geopolitics as sets of practices Thirdly, the papers demonstrate how certain bodily and social intimate
practices traverse sites and scales. The last two papers critically appraise our own practices as researchers exploring intimacy-geopolitics. As the papers
by Sharp, and Pratt and Johnston, make clear, if the task is to move out conceptually and methodologically from intimacy itself, this involves disclosure
and exposing the lives of others, raising significant questions of ethics and power. Their projects employ specific epistemologies and methods in an effort
to dismantle the customary divides of intimacy-geopolitics, both between fields, scales and sites, and between researchers, activists and communities.
Sharp considers the ethics of pursuing intimate stories as researchers, particularly in cross-cultural contexts, and from their experience of staging a
The goal of all

analyses is to rotate the usual framing of intimacy-geopolitics, to exceed any
spatial hierarchy in its relation, and to rethink it as variously configured spatial
relations, interactions and practices in particular places. Intimacy is not simply the
terrain on which broader sets of power relations are written. It is already out there,
quietly working to produce domination as well as resistance across all practices and
sites.
testimonial play, Pratt and Johnston ask whether scholarly narratives can have transnational resonance rather than universalise.
these
The alternative comes first value to life can only be solved

through this deeper understanding

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714410390225911
The employment of colonization theory, applied by many feminists to dissect terror
relations at both local and global levels, provides for a deeper understanding of the complexities and
multidimensional nature of family terrorism. Translating from classic works on colonization illuminates
multifaceted relationships of violence and terror, especially those directed against
women, children, and the elderly. Colonization is not just restricted to physical deprivation, legal inequality, and economic
exploitation. Sandra Bartky identifies a pathological dimension which is essential to the
process of colonization and terrorisms that Frantz Fanon, who was trained as a psychologist before taking up
revolutionary writings and practice, described as psychic alienation.42 She explains: To be psychologically
oppressed is to be weighed down in your mind ; it is to have a harsh dominion
exercised over your self-esteem. The psychologically oppressed become their own
oppressors; they come to exercise harsh dominion over their own self-esteem.
Differently put, psychological oppression can be regarded as the internalization of intimations.43 The complexities of
psychological states of peoples involved in pathologies of colonization and
terrorisms are often subordinated or ignored in many analytical discussions of these
kinds of relations. Yet, understandings of family terrorism necessitate recognition of
this most sophisticated dimension of colonization . The pathological characteristics of
colonization and its role in family terrorism reveal the complexities of what is often
called the master/slave dialectic.44 Distinctions between patriarchal codes and
essentialized behaviors of a generalized class of men become even more
apparent when discussed within the context of colonization as an elaborate process
usually involving colonizer, colonized, and collaborator . In relation to women and childrens
situations, for example, transformative feminists like Enloe maintain that
Links
Discourse Legalism, WoT

The war on terror is a socio-legal euphemism of the
masculine use of force. Assuming this normal legal actor
attempts to hide a gendered understanding of violence.
Heathcote 11 (Gina, BA, LLB (ANU); LLM (Westminster); PhD (LSE/Lond). Senior
Teaching Fellow, School of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies. Melbourne
Journal of International Law, Volume 11 FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON THE END OF
THE WAR ON TERROR https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1252086730/feminist-reflections-on-the-end-of-the-war-on-terror)
the global war against terrorism and how it was
articulated through a range of excuses for the use of force by a state . This is primarily
evidenced through the US National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 , as well as
I begin this section with a brief discussion of
analysis offered by key (Western) scholars. The global war against terrorism and/or the War on Terror phrase also
emerge in numerous non-legal discourses, including as a political term used to describe or justify US acts of foreign
policy: 20 as a socio-legal discourse in Western communities justifying the curtailment of civil
liberties:21 as media shorthand for a range of international events initiated after the terrorist attacks against the US
in 2001: and
as a
justification for the use of force in specific conflicts, including Afghanistan and Pakistan,22 Iraq,
The global war against terrorism was never a legal term, and
specific legal narratives pre-emptive force, implied authorisation and the
responsibility to protect were invoked to justify the use of force under the global
war against terrorism.26 In this sense, the global war against terrorism offers an
excellent example of how legal norms rely on and engage with other normative
structures, particularly cultural, political and social discourse. The entwining of
social, cultural, legal and political normative orders also contributes to the
regulation of women and is therefore of particular interest to feminist scholarship.
Through looking at the legal implications of the global war against terrorism, and
arguments made that persistent and low-level threats may justify the use of force
by states, I argue that an analogy with the rationale of domestic provocation
defences is apparent. This further illustrates the manner in which international law
on the use of force can be described as gendered. On the one hand, through
the assumption of a legal subject that mimics the masculine legal subject
that legal liberalism utilises as the normal legal actor and, on the other hand,
instrumentalising a gendered understanding of the manner in which
violence is to be justified, tolerated and regulated.
23 Somalia24 and Yemen.25
Discourse C/T, Protection

Anti-terror efforts revolve around a masculinized idea of
saving the feminine body and consistently suppressing
womens agency. Its not enough to have women in politics.
Western feminist approaches in the era of the global war
against terrorism were unable to significantly contribute to the debate because of
the fundamental lack of discourse within feminist approaches to international law
regarding when, if ever, force would or could be justified. This is consistent with the overall
conclusion of this article that posits that feminist approaches enlarge our understanding of the
law on the use of force, and that the consequences of this knowledge are relevant
for the development of feminist legal theories and for international legal approaches
generally. For example, the possibilities of a feminist re-imagining of the base of
international law through a politics of natality, and the importance of seeing force as
impacting upon the communities that force is directed at and from where force is
directed. Under the first argument, what is notable about institutional responses to
womens issues after 11 September 2001 is the entrenched association of women
with peace alongside elaboration of women as a category of protected (usually
sexualised) subjects. The anti-terrorism narrative, which revolves around the
dynamic of the rogue terrorist versus the just male warrior, also functions
as a gendered discourse. To complete the narrative of the violent male
actor represented in Western states as the transnational terrorist, the
increasing emergence of images of the female mother/child/victim
requiring protection is to be expected. Post-9/11 institutional
developments used gendered representations of womens sexual
vulnerability and consistently suppressed the agency of women in a
retrograde manner. Placed alongside the gendered image of the Muslim terrorist,
it is not surprising that the narrative of male violence expounded under the global
war against terrorism is contemporaneous to projects that centre on womens
sexual vulnerability rather than female empowerment or agency .86 Facilitating the
The third argument contends that
increasingly sexualised representation of women under international law is a general neglect of womens
A further consequence of the discourse on the global war against

terrorism is the averting of attention from womens rights and womens
participation at the international level. The Secretary-General reported in September 2008 that 2.2
participation and agency.
per cent of UN military personnel were women. At one level this demonstrates the inadequacy of Security Council
initiatives such as Resolution 1325 which is constructed under ch VI of the UN Charter as a soft, or non-binding,
resolution, and is therefore without compulsory norms for the active participation of women. As a consequence,
Feminist
approaches to international law, however, demand a more sophisticated analysis.
The reliance by the UN on statistical articulation of gender parity indicates a
fundamental failure to see feminist awareness as requiring more than adding
women to existing security strategies. Furthermore, the dependence on militaries as
there is little incentive for states to make changes to the profile of military communities.
the key strategy to challenge insecurity indicates a larger failure to see the
structure of militaries as complicit in the production of womens insecurity.
Discourse Generic CT
Counterterrorism norms limit out women reinserting women
even in a state of emergency is key
Aolin 10 (Fionnuala N Aolin, Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School; Dorsey &
Whitney Chair in Law, University of Minnesota Law School; and Associate Director,
Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland. SITUATING
WOMEN IN COUNTERTERRORISM DISCOURSES: UNDULATING MASCULINITIES AND
LUMINAL FEMININITIES)
Counterterrorism discourses and norms must be important to feminist theorizing
and feminist advocacy. If we pay attention to the gendered construction of security
discourses we may avoid simplifying the landscape so as to avoid ping-pong
between a telling of male and female experiences of violent conflict and terrorism.
Equally, an assumption of neutrality in the narratives that frame our assessments of security, terrorism, and
paying close attention to

the experiences of women as the subjects of counterterrorism norms underscores
the unique vulnerabilities that women face when their lives intersect with powerful patriarchal institutions
and interests. The long history of emergency law regulation in Northern Ireland offers exemplary
illustrations of the complexity of the terrorism terrain, the conflict over terminology and
legitimacy, and the ways in which womens lives and experiences are excluded from the
narratives that emerge from both state and nonstate entities. There is a critical need to reinsert
women into the conversation as subjects and victims of counterterrorism regulation, to make
counterterrorism should be put aside in any thoughtful reflection. To this end,
visible the complexity of their interaction with violence and violent actors, and to reassess the categories that are
it
encourages a feminist engagement that is comprehensive and willing to see the
entirety of the female form in the land of counterterrorism , not merely selected highlights.
deemed to fall within the action sphere of legal regulation. Such an approach has its gendered pitfalls, but
Global/Local Focus
Prioritizing global terrorism splits the world of private and
public spectacles of violence instead on entwining and
analyzing them together
531550)
Feminist political geographers have long insisted on rupturing global/local binaries
(Dowler, 2012; Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2001; Katz, 2004; Pratt and Rosner, 2006; Staeheli et al., 2004).
These binaries underpin the distinction between global and everyday terrorisms, and
the different levels of attention they receive . Pratt (2012) makes a related argument, in her
sophisticated dismantling of scale in analysis of intimate and state violences experienced by Filipino migrant
domestic workers in Canada. Here, to frame discussion of the relations between everyday and global terrorism, I
draw on a previous framework for understanding geographies of fear as present in both global geopolitics and
existing models for thinking about the

geopolitics of fear conceive the geopolitical and the everyday as two distinct
realms, fixed in a hierarchical relationship where global security practices and
discourses drip down into the manifestation of local fear , we proposed a visual motif based
on the double helix in the structure of DNA which removes any spatial hierarchy . This
represents a feminist take on scale; two equivalent strands (geopolitics and
everyday life) wind into a single structure and form the building blocks of every
assemblage of fear. The two are bound together by numerous connectors, which are: events, encounters,
everyday life (Pain and Smith, 2008). Having argued that
movements, dialogues, actions, affects and things: the materials that connect and conjoin geopolitics and everyday
life. But these engagements are fragile . . . the breaks and discontinuities that occur both randomly and in
patterned ways might represent the awkward, unfinished, disunited, conflicting nature of relations between the
geopolitical and the everyday; but ultimately they are inter-reliant and complementary. (Pain and Smith, 2008: 7)
this model recognizes that neither everyday nor global terrorism

is more or less important than the other, neither exists solely at one scale and nor
should they be analysed as such; instead, they are parts of the same broader structures that
For the current analysis,
sometimes interweave, and there are both connections and disconnections between them. The analysis that follows
focuses on four interconnecting themes, and includes national responses to each terrorism which mediate between
the global and everyday.
Political Overshadowing
The war on terror limits gendered analysis and overshadows
the female body and issues only a gendered perspective can
create a parallel between the two violences
Phillips 8 (Ruth, Senior Lecturer @ U. of Sydney, PhD @ U. of South Wales,
Worked in the Australian government as a policy officer. Feminism, policy and
womens safety during Australias war on terror http://www.palgravejournals.com/fr/journal/v89/n1/full/fr20089a.html)
there are increasing challenges to traditional ideas about
security and ample opportunities to rethink it from a gendered perspective . I have
argued that the recently defeated governments protector state failed womens
personal security and indeed, in its role as protector, reinforced the subordination of
women as citizens. As a consequence of Australias participation in the war on terror,
women appear to be less protected and womens agendas for change are often
overshadowed by a culture of racialized responses, in both the public spheres
of the media and politics, and the private spheres of the home . The lack of a
gendered analysis of violence against women is also due to the effects of a
fractured womens movement, on the one hand, driven to a more individualized
space over a collective space, and on the other hand, a greater self-reflectivity as
activists in a time of the war on terror . This leads to a need to somehow overcome
the incommensurability of ideas within feminism, to a point where structural
oppression can be addressed without being imperialist, elitist or racist. There has been a
As discussed earlier in this article,
substantial lack of national leadership on the issues of domestic violence and sexual assault and an ongoing
The eliding of a womens policy has led

to a reification of the sanctity of the private domain and this raises serious problems
for womens capacities to recognize unequal rights to safety as citizens. If men are
encouraged to model themselves on the leadership of a protector state, they will do
what it takes to be the protector patriarch. This is well explained in Youngs (2003) theorization of
erasure of the feminist perspectives in policy development.
the security state that relies on increased subordination of citizens. Domestic violence and assault are clearly
understood as actions of control and show a constant need to put women in their place. Hoogensen and Rottem
argue for a reorientation of how national leaders and security academics think about security by not prioritizing
some securities over others, but rather acknowledging securities laterally, democratically, and in mutually
the concept of security move away

from the currently dominant patriarchal and hierarchical structure to one that
recognizes, for example, local domestic violence alongside global violence such as
war, and in doing so recognizes that ignoring the former prevents us fully
understanding the causes of the latter (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 169). This position
supports a call on the new Australian federal government to consider its support for
womens advocacy and support organizations as, through a feminist agenda that
recognizes domestic violence and sexual assault as gendered crimes , they have the
capacity to reinvigorate a national debate that forces the entire nation to challenge
the masculinized abuse of power and use of violence against women. Until the
gendered nature of violence against women is brought back as part of public policy
discourse and political leadership in Australia, women will not be secure from violence.
influential and dynamic ways (2004: 168). They would like to see
Women as Peaceful
Assumptions of a peaceful and maternal nature limits out the
perspectives of female combatants, prohibits negotiative
equality, and reinforces gender roles
Detraz 13 (Nicole, Ph.D., Colorado State University, 2009; MA, Colorado State
University, 2005; BA, Louisiana State University, 2002, specializes in international
relations and environmental politics, Apr 24, 2013 International Security and
Gender https://books.google.com/books?
id=oNYk6G5k7EgC&dq=international+security+and+gender+nicole+detraz&sourc
e=gbs_navlinks_s)
Another potentially negative element in the portrayal of women is as mothers and
as inherently peaceful. Women are often defined as mothers and associated with
children, regardless of whether or not the individuals in question actually have
children (Puechguirbal 2010). Supposedly "natural" characteristics of maternalism
and peacefulness are associated with women. A glimpse at women's participation in
the conflict in Northern Ireland demonstrates that there are serious implications
associated with this kind of portrayal. In conflict- resolution discussions women were
typically seen as peaceful. Because of this, the women who were invited to take
part in the discussions were largely women associated with peace activism. Female
combatants were largely excluded from the negotiation table. Sandra McEvoy
(2010: 144) explains the "assumed link between femininity and peacefulness
creates a selection effect for the sort of women who are allowed to participate in
peace processes. Women included in peace processes are often those women who
play roles traditionally
Impacts
Gender Roles
The socialization of militarism and fighting against another
reinscribes gender hierarchy and reifies oppression
military ideology affects all facets of society. What then is the significance of an analysis which
focuses on militarism's specific effects on women ? The interrelation between peace activism and
feminism has long been recognized by activists and scholars and a gender analysis of militarism
The
can serve both movements. Just as peace activists and feminists have similar goals, they also face similar
In their struggle for equality and a just society in which both men and
women are empowered, feminists are confronted by patriarchy , a social power structure and
an ideology which provides a context and justification for institutionalized
discrimination and violence against women . One of the ideological manifestations of patriarchy
is the imposition of rigid conceptions of gender roles . These are used to justify
discrimination against women, and as these beliefs continue from generation to generation, this
situation continues. Gender categories are social relationships , values, behaviors and attributes
obstacles.
culturally associated with male and female biological sexes, respectively. In other words, while sex is biological,
These gender characteristics are often expressed as binary opposition

(active/passive; logical/intuitive; rational/irrational; etc.) and are reinforced by any number of doctrines in
a patriarchal society. They are by no means adopted by all men and women (in fact, many people resist
these roles as restrictive) but they represent what a society deems to be "appropriate"
behavior in "proper" men and women. The clich that the military makes a man out of a boy is a
gender is social.
familiar one. But what kind of a "man" does it create? Is it a man capable of both dominance and submission,
The recruit is
stripped of his individuality and is taught not to show "feminine" traits like
tenderness or weakness. Only those characteristics necessary to be a good soldier are permitted.
Stereotypical masculine characteristics like aggressiveness, bravery, endurance and
discipline are demanded and any stereotypical feminine characteristics such as compassion, cooperation,
aggression and compassion, or is it a man who values only the stereotypically masculine traits?
or nurturing are belittled and weeded out. Accounts of basic training in the military in different countries show a
strategy of "breaking" the recruits and "molding" them into fighters. The i ndoctrination
teaches that
"the good things are manly and collective, the despicable are feminine and
individual". This socialization of men to aspire to the characteristics of a good soldier
is in direct contrast to the socialization of women . Just as militaristic nationalism needs an
antithesis, so too does aggressive masculinity. In a hierarchical structure of domination and submission, there must
By proving his "manhood", a man is

also proving that he is not a child or a woman . Thus, patriarchy (and the military) has
to define feminine traits in opposition to masculine ones . If soldiers (and by extension all
"real" men) are strong and brave and aggressive, then "real" women must be the opposite:
weak, passive and in need of protection. This reinforces the strength and potency of
the masculine soldier. The masculinity of war depends on the myth that women must
be protected.
be someone on the bottom, in a patriarchal system it is women.
Root Cause Turns War

Militarism requires otherization to sustain itself personal
conceptions of identity and militaristic terms of violence in
games like debate prove its normalized
Burke 94
[Colleen Burke, Womens International League for Peace and Freedom; Women and Militarism;
Militaristic nationalism encourages polarization in which a group identity is defined as

being in opposition to the "other". Group membership is most obviously at work within the
military itself, where uniforms, communal living and group activities all serve as
identifiers of belonging to a particular group. Nationalism affects civilians who begin to
identify with "us" and not "them", as the virtues of one culture, race or ethnic group and
the defects of the "other" are both exaggerated. When nationalism is linked to militarism,
the "other" becomes the "enemy". This is cyclical: military ideology creates an "enemy"
out of difference and then uses the existence of this enemy to justify continued
militarism. Thus, "power-over-the-other" is extended beyond the boundaries of the
society. This is reinforced in civilian life by the media which glorifies war, and portrays
violence as necessary, combat as exhilarating and aggression as natural. As violence becomes
accepted, it is minimized through language which distorts and sanitized its impact .
Missiles are called "peacekeepers", civilian deaths become "collateral damage" . Militaristic
terms have pervaded (the English) language, and are especially evident in sports, with teams
"decimating" and "annihilating" each other. The degree to which a society has been
militarized can be seen by the degree to which military institutions and solutions are considered
acceptable or "common sense" by the populace. The acceptance of the military as a viable
career or the belief that recruitment of women soldiers is a triumph for women's liberation are both examples of
"ideological militarization".
Extinction !
Patriarchy legitimates environmental destruction, nuclear war,
violence, and culminates in extinction
Warren and Cady 94 [Karen Warren, quals; Duane Cady, quals; Feminism and Peace: Seeking
Connections; Hypatia Vol 9 Iss 2; Spring 1994.] We do not support the use of rape as a metaphor
evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the

behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the
Operationalized, the
United States, current estimates ate that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she
rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic

pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within
patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and
pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned
within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's Godgiven right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental
value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress."
And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous , and ordinary way to
impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to
knows; globally,
dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current
"unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies , (d), is then viewed as a

consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that
reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions .
Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation, war,
environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of
only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors

the symptoms of dysfunctionalitythat one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to
maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this
patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often
"unmanageability" can be seen for what it isas a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy." The
global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable

and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see
Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that " a militarism and warfare are
continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal
values and fulfill needs of such a system . Acknowledging the context of patriarchal
conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life
on Earth" (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a
dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning:
Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women,
national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if
continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible . It is a stark message, but it is
theme that
plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in
regional, national, and global contexts. CONCLUSION In this paper we have offered six sorts of women-peace
connections provided by feminism and ecofeminisrn which suggest where and how women fit into discussions of
peace. We suggested that if one takes feminism seriously, many current discussions of peace and war must be
updated, expanded, and reconceived. They must be "updated" because feminist literature which points to womennature-peace connections is currently available and, as such, needs to be addressed by any informed philosophical
omission of such discussions will result in

inadequate, because exclusionary, accounts of peace . And they must be "reconceived"
because, once one looks at peace and war through a feminist lens, one sees things differently: Never again
does one have the privilege or luxury of talking about nationalism, and regional
perspective. They must be "expanded" because the
conflict, militarism, war, and violence, as if women and nature didn't matter . They do.
That's what is shown when one takes feminism and peace connections seriously.
Sexual Violence
Global war on terror justifies violent atrocities the legal
models legitimate male centered sexual violence against
women as the passive Other
The global war against terrorism developed (at least) three types of narratives to project
legality on to the political rhetoric. The first type of narrative centred on prior international legal
debates over the possibility of anticipatory force and attempts to expand self-defence under the
conditions of the global war against terrorism to encompass pre-emptive self-defence . That is, the
use of force may be justified in response to low-level and persistent terrorist threats .
The second type of narrative focused on past Security Council resolutions and contended that states may use force
if force can be justified through implied authorisations found in prior Security Council resolutions. The third range of
use of force is justified in failed states, as well as in response to

potential threats from rogue states with the perceived capacity to build weapons of
mass destruction, due to a lack of stable or democratic government. More recent articulations of this
narratives argued that the
justification have used the terminology of a material breach of the Security Council resolutions by Iraq, and thus
cast the US-led invasion as some form of counter-measure or enforcement tool. Under the first narrative, the
anticipatory self-defence came to include a

narrative on the possibility of the use of pre-emptive force to track down, kill or
capture the hard core of the terrorists. Reisman and Armstrong suggest this is more likely to involve
controversial customary international law category of
strategic preemptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction or terrorist training camps than [l]arge-scale
This description constructs terrorist camps and WMD production

facilities as (strangely) outside of the territory of states , implicitly suggesting that
these are something Other to the political independence and territorial integrity
attacks on states.29
encompassed by the prohibition on the use of force articulated in the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter)
under art 2(4). Although the 2010 National Security Strategy appears to dismiss the Bush Doctrine, the Obama
The United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qaida and its
terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates, we are pursuing a
strategy that protects our homeland, secures the worlds most dangerous weapons and material, denies alQaida safe haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the world. Success requires
a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of
American power both military and civilian as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and
multilateral institutions. This somewhat oblique statement must be read alongside continued US
military strikes in Pakistan and other states identified as harbouring the
al-Qaeda threat, often through the controversial use of unmanned drones that mimics rather than
rejects the Bush policy of pre-emptive strikes . The Obama and Bush justification for these military
acts remains that of homeland security. The 2010 National Security Strategy further states: we are working
strategy states:
with partners abroad to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders while acknowledging that [w]e must
deny these groups the ability to conduct operational plotting from any locale, or to recruit, train, and position
statements avoid direct engagement with the international law on the

use of force. US state practice since the Obama Administration came to power, however, indicates that the
operatives. These
perceived terrorist threats abroad have been denied the capacity to materialise through pre-emptive strikes on
the narrative of pre-emptive strikes against terrorist

actors both centralises the state as the key international actor, and functions
civilian communities.34 My concern is that
through recognition of the terrorist actor as outside of the territory of the state
even while acting within a specific state thus functioning to legitimise military strikes on the territory of another
state. Furthermore, the use of force is not against a member state of the UN, but rather against the individual,
This mirrors
the gap between interpersonal self-defence and provocation laws where selfdefence assumes an attack or assault whereas provocation assumes a threat . An
permitting a threat rather than armed attack to function as the justification for unilateral violence.
analogy can then be made with legal discourse that traditionally places womens bodies outside of the remit of laws
laws are complicit in this legal Othering through the

location of female bodies as potentially provocative of male violence and therefore sites
where violence may be excused or justified. Feminist legal scholarship argues that the
bounded bodies of men represent the normal body of the legal subject so
that not only are womens bodies defined as penetrable through
heterosexual images of the sexualised female body, but law has tolerated
physical assaults on womens bodies in private space that would be
unthinkable with respect to the bounded male body in motion in public
space.
on assault and battery. Provocation
Blocks
Framework
Counter-Interp: Our interpretation is that the judge is an
ethical decision maker who must question the methodology
and implication of the aff before the affs solvency claims
If we win framework that means a few things:
1) We dont need an alternative if their constructs are
bankrupt, you should not endorse the 1ac
2) They dont get case dont let them outweigh the fact that
the 1AC was a corrupted view they shouldnt be able to
bypass defending their scholarship
If they win framework, then evaluate the kritik as the reason
Congress rejects the plan or as impact turn to the aff
Prefer our interpretation
A kritik of the flaws in the ideological underpinnings of the
concept of terror is necessary change our politics and
viewpoints the K is the most political
Jackson et al, 2010 Richard Jackson is Reader in International Politics at
Aberystwyth University, UK. He is the founding editor of the Routledge journal,
Critical Studies on Terrorism and the convenor of the BISA Critical Studies on
Terrorism Working Group (CSTWG). Eamon Murphy is Professor of History and
International Relations at Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia. Scott
Poynting is Professor in Sociology at Manchester Metropolitan University. Routledge,
Contemporary State Terrorism
state violence and repression have long been studied in cognate fields such as law, history, political
science, criminology, and sociology, among others, research on state terrorism which deliberately utilizes the
concepts, theories, methods, and insights of the well- established and rapidly growing terrorism studies field is still relatively
rare. We have tried to argue in this volume that the study of state terrorism is both
intellectually valid and illuminating of political behavior , and should command a
higher priority in the research activities of IR and terrorism scholars than it presently
does. We have also suggested a preliminary list of topics and questions which could form the basis of a future research agenda
Although
for the still nascent but visibly growing sub- field of state terrorism research (see Blakeley 2009; Stokes and Raphael forthcoming).
there are a
number of well- posted dangers from the broader field of terrorism studies (see Jackson et
al. 2009: 2326) which we would do well to avoid. First, we must remain sensitive to the inherent and
often serious problems and challenges surrounding the employment of the
ontologically unstable term terrorism as a key part of our research agenda.
Terrorism, whether state or non- state, is not an objective, empirically identifiable
phenomenon in which the terroristic qualities are inherent to the violent act; rather,
it is a socially constructed, historically contingent category of human
behavior that is dependent upon circumstance, context, and intention . Most
often, the term is deployed as a derogatory label against ones enemies . Although the
Notwithstanding our call to expand and deepen the study of state terrorism, and to prioritize some key questions,
observed regularities in state violence may be analytically and normatively usefully described as state terrorism at the present
we must remain sensitive to those circumstances in which the term

terrorism is not necessarily helpful or productive and to the possibility that in the
future it may have to give way to other, more productive labels and concepts . Second,
and perhaps most importantly, we must avoid the temptation to engage in polemics and
politically biased analyses, especially the kind which view all state violence as
inherently terroristic or which single out particular cases for unrelenting
condemnation. Accusations of political bias and unfair treatment are already
common strategies employed against state terrorism researchers and human rights
activists; in some cases, they are entirely justified. These cases damage the credibility of research on the subject. Such
moment,
accusations are best met with an uncompromising commitment to the highest standards of scholarship, consistency towards all
cases of state terrorism, and complete transparency regarding our definitions, criteria, and approaches. In this regard, an
authoritative dataset describing all the cases of state terrorism we can find, backed up by source evidence, and published in the
we suggest that scholars of state terrorism aim

to be continually reflexive and use the term judiciously and with real sensitivity to
its inherent instability and to the social and political consequences of its usage . Last,
there is a danger of marginalization and irrelevancy in the competition for both the
funding which will sustain our research, and political influence, whether we are
aiming for input into the policy process or civil society-based activism . Avoiding
both of these outcomes will depend greatly on the nature of our research
its rigour, transparency, the terms in which it is expressed, and the purposes to
which it is put and our willingness to engage with some of the key issues and
concerns of the broader terrorism studies field . On the latter issue, we see real value in exploring the
ways in which studies on state terrorism can add value to the study of non-s tate terrorism. It seems clear that state and
non-state terrorism are linked, and in some real- world cases, they feed off each
other in violent cycles. However, a stronger case needs to be made that studying state and non-s tate forms of the
public domain would be tremendously useful. In short,
phenomenon together is a useful way forward. In the end, there is little to be gained, we feel, in bifurcating the terrorism studies
an outcome can best be avoided

through respectful dialogue and debate. In addition to our broader aims, we hope that this volume
field into state/non- state and critical/orthodox sections. Such
will go some way towards opening up new kinds of questions and provoking new debates on this critical issue within the wider field.
2) Predictability this is most predictable the 1ac relies on

their representations of terror to construct these threats if
they arent prepared to defend their use of it, then their
scholarship is methodologically flawed
3) Agency in our everyday lives, we will never have to make
the policy decisions conducted in a non-kritik debate round.
When we have clash on our constructions we become more
ethical people this is key to portable skills and ethics, which
transcend how fair the debate was.
4) FIAT double bind either the aff's impacts have too short a
timeframe for the round to spillover or they're not true
Alt Solvency
Reframing domestic violence as acts of terror brings the
spectacle of terror to reality This is the most political
Marcus 14 (Isabel Marcus, PhD, Professor School of Law,, The State University of
New York @ Buffalo, USA 2014 REFRAMING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS TORTURE OR
TERRORISM)
Both reframings of domestic violence, as torture or terrorism, jolt our
consciousness and, hopefully, our conscience. They uncover the deep affinities of
domestic violence with categories of violence that are universally condemned as
human rights violations because they deny human dignity and integrity. They shock
us into recognition of the extent to which domestic violence cannot be narrowly
cabined or diminished or controlled by reliance on formal equality. They help us
understand that domestic violence is a form of substantive gendered inequality - a
societal distribution, at both individual and structural levels, of who does and is
allowed to do what to whom. Domestic violence violates the rights of women who,
like men, are entitled to integrity, security and dignity. It constitutes discrimination
against women by maintaining both the individual woman and women as a class in
an inferior and subordinated position within their respective societies.
Consideration of domestic violence under the rubric of torture or terrorism is not
designed to raise the threshold of what constitutes domestic violence. Nor does it
entail the disregard for diminution of its consequences. Nor does it undermine
recognition of survivor/victims agency and resistance. Rather it provides greater
space for the silenced voices of significant numbers of women by acknowledging
their painful, shocking, lived experiences (WHO, 2002) and eliminating the
normalization of their pain and trauma . It helps in the worldwide campaign to
change the nature of the specific behavior from acceptable to unlawful (Meyerfeld,
2010: 267).
Everyday terrorism is key more common, structural, and a

reinforcing root cause of global terrorism and politics of fear.
Alternative modes of addressing spatiality, intersectionality,
and remapping solve.
531550)
Recasting domestic violence as terrorism has implications for addressing both
terrorisms, and for future research. As feminists have argued, the possibility of sustainable
peace is enhanced by the recalibration of understanding violence across
scales and sites as closely interrelated (Moser, 2001). Both terrorisms are
constructed and have impacts in ways that are heavily mediated by relations of
gender, race, class privilege and nationality. Policies to address either form of
violence must therefore acknowledge these structural root causes, and prioritize
the provision of culturally competent services (INCITE!, 2006; Sokoloff and Dupont, 2005). In future geographical research, there is
ample scope for culturally specific, intersectional and place-based accounts of different terrorisms that build on the remapping here.
More research is also needed on the connections between international and intimate violence: their relation in times and places of
war and peace, their experience in different contexts, and further analysis of political discourse to expose the false separation of the
two. This would usefully take forward recent feminist work that is asking not only how geopolitics shape the home and the intimate,
but how these spheres shape geopolitics (Brickell, 2012; Jones, 2013; Pratt, 2012; Pratt and Rosner, 2006). The separate literatures
Analyses of
the invocation and use of emotions as a political strategy remind us that fear and its
emotional complex are not by-products of conflict, but central to its workings . The
on how emotions are formed, experienced and used in global and everyday terrorisms are of mutual interest.
increasingly nuanced analysis of the emotional dynamics of everyday terrorism, what it achieves, and how state interventions can
change, ease or reinforce it, might be taken up in analysis of global terrorism. In the latter this is a substantial gap in understanding,
and building theory empirically from the experiences of those involved would lead to richer and more insightful accounts. How,
across private and public, do people actually experience, make sense of and resist terrorism? How do responses and securitization
at one site relate to domestic or public security elsewhere? What is the role of emotions in survival and recovery, and how are they
deployed in memorialization and counter-terrorism? And how, in the end, do emotions and behaviours that appear personal or
political arise from the same social and political forms? Emotions that cross scales and sites are also present in the political project
of working against violence and fostering inclusive securities (see Pratt, 2012). Sylvesters (1994) empathetic cooperation is
commonly invoked as an alternative to mainstream state responses to global conflict and terrorism, and suggested as an emotional
basis for ethical global responses to conflict (Sjoberg, 2009). For example, Burke (2009) suggests the need for a new human right,
freedom from fear, which would only be possible through a different kind of response to terrorism; here empathetic cooperation
might mean bridging difference through emotional identification, and concern for others security rather than just ones own.
Achieving this, as Eschle and Maiguashca (2009) suggest, is best tackled as a united political project between researchers and
As scholars we have
had a role in the fetishizing and distancing of different forms of violence that comes
with separating out terrorisms along a scaled system with its implied judgements of
magnitude and importance. This itself is a spatial practice built on certain imaginaries, ironically clearest in the
activists, if mainstream perspectives and the marginalization of feminist work are to be challenged.
pattern of geographical work on violence (though also reflected in other disciplines see McKie, 2006; Walby, 2013).
Remapping and relating terrorisms contributes to wider collective recognition of,

and responsibility for, everyday terrorism it is, after all, far more common
than global terrorism, and much more damaging to human life. Domestic violence is
a strange absence in human geography. It is time to bring terrorism home.
The alternative creates a discourse that changes policies from

the bottom up solving terror at the source
Aneela Salman PhD @ Rockefeller College Department of Public Administration
and Policy 2015 Green houses for terrorism: measuring the impact of gender
equality attitudes and outcomes as deterrents of terrorism International Journal of
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2015.1018285
The results suggest a causal explanation: as women are provided equal
opportunities, the society becomes more just and inclusive . This environment
facilitates peaceful resolution of grievances through democratic and nonviolent
means, thus reducing the feelings of alienation, hopelessness, and desperation that
motivates terrorist acts. Furthermore, by comparing attitudes and actual outcomes
of gender equality, this article identifies a gap between individual cultural attitudes
and the collective institutional practices measured by actual progress toward
achieving womens rights. These findings suggest a need to revisit policy
perspectives that ignore the gap between cultural attitudes and actual
practices. This study has important public policy implications for focusing on
greater levels of social, economic, and political gender equality for reducing levels
of terrorism.
The evidence presented here suggests that positive gender equality outcomes
are deterrents to terrorism. This study provides a statistical foundation for
future research on the relationship between terrorism and cultural attitudes. It

contributes to our understanding of how attitudes as well as outcomes affect
terrorism and has tremendous policy implications for focusing on gender equality
outcomes to deter terrorism. Gender equality is indicative of power asymmetry
between men and women, and it is also a good proxy of other inequalities prevalent
in a society that denies justice and access to power to disadvantaged groups. It
implies that progress in gender equality builds a more just and inclusive society,
dissipating feelings of deprivation, frustration, and hopelessness that drives people
and groups to choose violence over peaceful means of protest and conflict
resolution.
A2 Perm do both
As long as we win a risk of the link debate there is no reason
to vote on the perm, it would be the same thing as voting aff.
This means either it links or they sever, which is bad because it
makes the aff a moving target meaning they can spike out of
any argument killing clash.
The perm fails:
1. Impact replication - The affirmatives gendered
constructions of terror will always replicate the threats
causing a continual construction of errors. Affirmative solvency
in the context of the aff is irrelevant when they cash in on the
systems that replicate their impacts
2. New link the perm doesnt solve - Legal solutions to the war
on terror is a reiteration of sexist discourse rampant in past
feats - the feminist analysis cannot be put into any legal
form without dismantling the ideology
After the acts of 11 September 2001 and the instigation of the US global war against
terrorism, feminist scholarship emerged (occasionally) in support, in opposition and in analysis
of this Western narrative. In this section I concentrate on feminist legal responses to the
global war against terrorism and post-September 11 narratives. In examining feminist responses to the
global war against terrorism I indicate the wider possibilities and limitations of adapting feminist approaches to
international law and to understanding the international law on the use of force. My purpose is to reflect on how the
global war against terrorism narratives significantly disrupted any larger feminist study of the law on the use of
I argue that international legal developments that acknowledged

the relevance of feminist approaches and womens participation during the 1990s
were either sidelined by the global war against terrorism narrative or developed
through the production of restrictive categories of female victim-status. I have three
arguments that I wish to bring to the fore under a feminist narrative on the global war against terrorism.
First, alongside the limited narrative of terrorist actors as rogue male actors
functioning outside the boundaries of the state, are images of womens sexual
vulnerability and need for protection that miscast the threat to womens sexual
autonomy as also outside the state. This has recently emerged in specific international legal acts,
notably from the Security Council. I argue that the production of a restrictive female sexuality,
vulnerable to attack from rogue male actors, is a reiteration of the sexed and
gendered discourse which was prevalent in security discourse prior to the global
war against terrorism. Consequently, initiatives such as Security Council Resolution 1820 on
women, peace and security do little to challenge the underlying legal structure that
is inimical to womens security. Underlying this restraint is the feminist methodological limitation related
force during this period.
While feminist analysis of sex and gender is

sophisticated and multifaceted, bringing this knowledge to law often collapses
categories and reinstates binaries that feminist legal theorists have worked
toward dismantling.
to the construction of a feminist ethics.
3. Perm is a framing issue ethics are a prior question, failure

to justify the affirmative terror constructions means the perm
can never fully critique, making the alt moot, proving mutual
exclusivity
4. Advocating perms is badthey dont have to choose which
world they are advocating until the 2AR, which the 2NR cant
effectively pre-empt allowing perm advocacies makes them a
moving target, killing neg ground. Rejecting the argument
doesnt solve, we already made decisions based on the perm
-Cooption DA
Cooption DA- Governmental action against terror does
NOTHING always coopted. Afghanistan under Bush proves.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714410390225911
While the Bush regime would lead us to believe that life has and will get better for
the Afghan people (if you are not Taliban, or a Taliban sympathizer), in reality the
situation for women and children in particular has not gotten better, and many
argue that it has gotten worse, since the U.S. intervention. The change in rule
from Taliban to Northern Alliance has made little difference regarding imprisonment
of women for offenses such as adultery and dating men not chosen by their
families.32 Violence against women is so extreme that womens rights groups are
now calling for expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).33 Yet
it has only 5,000 troops and the U.S. has now ruled out the possibility of using U.S.
personnel as peacekeepers.34 Indeed, Bush and his allies appeared to have
reneged on their $4.5 billion pledge for reconstruction promised at the Tokyo
conference in January 2002. According to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz,
barely 30 percent of what was promised for the year was delivered.35
Although the U.S. has contributed $300 million for reconstruction and ISAF efforts in
Afghanistan, far less than originally pledged, Washington spent an estimated $1
billion a month on the Afghan war efforta fact strongly criticized by the UNs
special representative for Afghanistan.36 Meanwhile, conditions in Afghanistan
remain horrendous:
RAWA paints a bleak picture of Afghanistan today, where two decades of war have
demolished nearly all infrastructure. They say the country lacks banks,
communication systems, and adequate food. The countrys main concern is how to
fight for a piece of bread, says [Tamaheena] Faryal. People have had to sell their
own children. The devastation has left Afghani citizens hopeless.37
The lack of a democratic government and any implementation of human and civil
rights has done little, if anything, to significantly change the plight of women,
children, and the elderly in Afghanistan. This is a country where in all wars and
conflicts, the main victims are women and children. Maternal morality rates among
Afghans are among the highest in the world. One fourth of Afghan children do
not survive their fifth birthday. Literacy rates are also extremely low, barely
above four percent for women. [And] Afghanistan has the lowest UN gender
development ranking in the world.38 Yet in the George and Laura feminist puppet
show, Bushs signing of The Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001,
promising educational and medical assistance to Afghan women and children met a
U-turn: In July, the White House bowed to conservative Christian pressure and cut
$34 million from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which provides
reproductive health services for women in 142 countries.39
Misunderstanding of Afghan culture and blatant ignorance of

alt causes to structural violence mean Western cooption fails,
colonialism uniquely decimates womens rights
Rich 14 [Janine Rich, writer for International Affairs Review; Saving Muslim Women: Feminism, U.S. Policy,
and the War on Terror; International Affairs Review; Fall 2014; accessed 07/2015;
<www.usfca.edu/International_Studies/international_affairs_review/fall2014/articles/Saving_Muslim_Women/>.]
following the 9/11 attacks, the West searched frantically for a

simple, singular explanation of this seemingly incomprehensible act of terror, and found it in
fundamentalist Islam. While it was clear to the majority of analysts at the time that the U.S would go
to war, it was unclear as to who or what was to be the target . International law has yet to
In the days immediately
fully catch up with the dramatic shift from strictly interstate relations to non-state international actors, particularly
in regard to just declarations of war (Bederman 2001). From this obscurity and legal gray area arose the War on
the Bush administrations declaration

of war initially had widespread bipartisan political support, it was necessary to
garner public and international support through an argument not only of al-Qaedas pernicious global
Terror with Afghanistan as the first and primary target. While
presence (the core of which could arguably be traced more accurately to U.S ally Pakistan), but also to
To
do this required a media strategy centered around the assumptions and
anxieties surrounding fundamentalist Islam, with a particularly intense focus on its presumed
effects on women in the Islamic world. Western media and activists, along with feminist
organizations such as the Feminist Majority, were to play an integral role in the production of
widespread support for the war on terror. Coincidentally, the preexisting and deeply ingrained fears
surrounding representations of Islamic fundamentalism made simplistic , black-and-white
explanations of the source of the problems of Afghan women particularly easy to sell . Since
the dawn of the European colonialism the image of the veiled woman has been used to
symbolize and prove Islams unique oppression of women, and ultimately to justify
colonialist enterprises. In her examination of the colonial roots of discourses surrounding Muslim women
and the veil, Leila Ahmed summarizes: It was here and in the combining of the languages of
colonialism and feminism that the fusion between the issues of women and culture
was created. More exactly, what was created was the fusion between the issues of women, their oppression,
and the cultures of Other men. The idea that Other men, men in colonized societies or societies beyond the
borders of the civilized West, oppressed women was to be used, in the rhetoric of colonialism, to
render morally justifiable its project of undermining or eradicating the cultures of
colonized peoples (Ahmed 1992). The powerful media portrayal of the oppressed Muslim
woman, as signified by her veiled body and her refusal or presumed inability to speak for
herself, has long been a tool by which violence is justified in the name of her
salvation. This frenzied, highly politicized discourse has grown continually more prevalent with the coexistent
demonstrate the Talibans cruelty as a justification of war in line with the responsibility to protect paradigm.
rises of Islamic extremism and the ever-increasing U.S military presence in the Middle East. With regard to the 2001
invasion of Afghanistan, The twin figures of the Islamic fundamentalist and his female victim helped consolidate
and popularize the view that such hardship and sacrifice were for Af in an effort to bring attention to the plight of
Afghan women. During this time Mavis and Jay Leno hosted a celebrity gala and fundraiser for the Feminist
Majoritys campaign to end the Talibans brutal treatment of Afghan women. It was an undoubtedly well-intentioned
event, featuring celebrities with tears in their eyes as testimonials of Afghan women were read. The Lenos alone
contributed one hundred thousand dollars for a public awareness campaign; Mavis Leno herself spoke to Unocal
shareholders and presented before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee to dissuade them from investing in
Afghanistan. Similarly the Feminist Majority, founded by Eleanor Smeal (former president of the National
Organization for Women), claims it was their efforts that persuaded Bill Clinton that, "for Afghanistan's own
good.the burqa-clad body of the Afghan woman became a visible sign of an invisible enemy that threatens not
only..citizens of the West, but our entire civilization (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002). That is not to say, however,
that the rise of the terrorist group al-Qaeda, or of terrorism more generally, propelled feminist/military interest in
Afghanistans social and political situation.
In 1999 the fires were already burning to condemn
the Taliban regime. As Mahmood elucidates, Even skeptics who are normally leery of Western
feminists paternalistic desire to save third world women were sympathetic to the Feminist
Majoritys campaign. This was in part because the restrictions that the Taliban had imposed
on women in Afghanistan seemed atrocious by any standard (Hirschkind and Mahmood
2002). At the time, it seemed indubitable that the daunting political, militaristic and
economic might of the U.S could alleviate these problems and bring gender justice
to Afghanistan. In fact, the issue proved an interesting point of collusion for both sides
of the political spectrum, from liberal activists to neoconservative warhawks, and proved to be an
example of the fusion between the language of feminism and the language of
colonialism (Ahmed 1992). Whether the U.S invasion of Afghanistan was a neo-colonialist action is a debate
outside of the scope of this analysis. However, it is important to note that on the eve of the 2001 invasion, feminists
such as Smeal were sharing their ambitions and hopes about Operation Enduring Freedom with the generals in
charge of its planning and execution (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002). In essence, veiling became an ideological
issue as much as political or military one.
The Afghan woman came to represent a visual

manifestation of a society deemed to be the antithesis of everything Western
culture holds dear, with a particularly intense and almost fetishistic focus on the burqa/chadri, the
full body veil worn by the majority of women in Afghan cities. Even prior to the declaration of the
War on Terror, the veil had become to signify tyranny , and conversely, unveiling had become a
symbol of freedom and democracy. The history of Western fascination with the veil is complex
and deeply rooted in nineteenth-century European travel accounts of the Muslim world, which espoused a
racist yet highly sexualized fascination with the exotic Orient (Ahmed 1992). Veiled
women were mysterious, removed from political and public spaces, and thus beyond the immediate sphere of
construed as a paradoxical place of

simultaneously indulgent, degenerate sexuality and deeply religious repression . In the
control of European colonizers. They were symbolic of the Orient,
contemporary atmosphere of Islamophobia in the West, veiled womans hidden faces frustrate expectations; they
cannot or will not communicate-yet we claim they convey volumes about the condition of women, the repressive
Within this
construction of Muslim women as passive victims, there is no room for a critical
examination of the vast variety of reasons and motives for veiling . In addition to the
nature of traditional religious practices and the backward nations in which they live (Zeiger 2008).
compulsory wearing of the chadri, which the Taliban violently enforced, especially on urban populations, women
throughout the Islamic world veil for reasons including (but not limited to) political statements of resistance against
Western colonialism, the desire for privacy, and the ability to move comfortably in public spaces, a sense of
liberation from the gaze of men, and expression of religious piety (Zeiger 2008). Through an oversimplification and
attempt to draw a neat line of blame between

the Taliban regime and the horrific situation of Afghan women blatantly ignores
causal factors. They are a grassroots constituency based on combating the Taliban regimes atrocities against
women and girls (Feminist Majority Foundation 2013). Afghanistan has seen decades of war , both
tribal/regional and international, that marred the lives of women even before the Taliban , who
themselves arose as a direct consequence of the U.S/Soviet proxy war that played out
upon Afghan soil. The economy was devastated by these wars causing rampant corruption and
misrepresentation of facts, the Feminist Majoritys
slow job creation. Currently there is a 35% unemployment rate, and only 28% of the population over the age of 15
can read and write, a mere 12% of them women. (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). The concept of national
identity is weak outside of the small circle of urban elites, and that existence of nationalism is a result of a backlash
against British colonial efforts in the nineteenth century. Tribal allegiance remains an integral aspect of society, and
the uniting force among the majority of these diverse tribes is Islam, which is practiced as a blend of Sharia and
Pashtunwali, the tribal code of the Pashtuns, 42% of the population. Afghanistan has the ninth highest fertility rate
of any state in the world, with an average of 5.43 children born per woman. Humanitarian aid was largely removed
due to harsh U.N sanctions beginning in 1999, leaving millions impoverished, starving and without adequate
medical aid. In fact, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, which authorized and delineated the terms of the
sanctions, lists one of the mitigating factors justifying the sanctions as continuing violations of international
humanitarian law and of human rights, particularly discrimination against women and girls (UN Security Council
internationally enforced urgency to help women and girls, the

nationwide starvation and the effects it might have on these women and girls were
1999). In their
apparently not considered. Hard economic conditions, such as dried up foreign investment in Afghanistan,
the egregious violence and U.S-backed militarization of the region has left non-militants at the mercy of militias and
complex structural violence have

greatly harmed and impoverished the lives of Afghan women, yet they are
systematically and categorically ignored by mainstream Western media narratives
and the Feminist Majority campaign. Rather, an idyllic and benign past is imagined in which Afghan
women had equal rights, until the Taliban inexplicably seized control as a monolith,
warlords armed to the teeth with American weaponry. These forms of
precipitated and driven by nothing more than devotion to fundamentalist Islam and hatred for Western freedom.
This type of studied silence (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002) on the part of the U.S and
Western feminist organizations about the enormous role the U.S played in creating
the difficult situation Afghan women face is extremely troubling . A prescient example of this
is the Feminist Majoritys explanation of Afghanistans opium problem as solely caused by the Taliban. Poppies are a
staple crop of Afghanistan, and today accounts for a large percentage of Afghanistans agricultural output. During
the 1979 war mujahideen-controlled areas produced opium to fund the resistance efforts and, under the auspices of
the CIA and the Pakistani security forces, heroin factories were opened along the Afghan-Pakistani border. By 1981,
regardless of Nancy Reagans best efforts, 60% of the U.S demand for heroin came from Afghanistan. The Feminist
Majority erroneously claimed that under the Taliban, Afghanistan became the worlds largest heroin producer
(Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002). Yet the Taliban did not rise to power until 1995, by which time Afghanistan had
already earned this distinction. According to the U.N, by 1997 (within Taliban-controlled regions) heroin production
was all but eliminated, yet still flourished within Northern Alliance-controlled areas. Since the Northern Alliances
rise to power as the internationally recognized government of Afghanistan, heroin production has resumed as a
major cash crop in many of the regions in which the Taliban had eliminated it.
-A2: Women In PTX

1. Doesnt solve the alt replication of patriarchal ideals is the
only question, the perm fails to answer this
2. Thats a link - arguing that because women are in politics
solves their sexist ideals is what replicates it in the first place
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714410390225911
To describe colonization as a process that has been carried on solely by men
overlooks the way male colonizers success depended on some womens complicity .
Without the willingness of respectable women to see that colonization offered
them an opportunity for adventure, or a new chance of financial security or moral
commitment, colonization would have been even more problematic.45
A2: Extinction outweighs

Focus on rare international terrorism obscures experiences of
domestic violence and prohibits understanding of both
531550)
the intimate and structural dynamics of terrorism experienced
in the home not only reflect violence in the international arena, but have shared
foundations and direct points of connection. Building on work in feminist political geography and
international relations, both terrorisms are framed as intimate and structural, global and
everyday, at once. Geographers preference has been for global terrorism as an object
of study; our treatment of it as a phenomenon that is unrelated to intimate violence
neatly reflects the disproportionate recognition and resourcing that the state gives
to the least prevalent form of terrorism. This has negative consequences for both
understanding and responding to the experiences of those who experience
domestic violence. The analysis here centres on the role of fear. Domestic violence does not only or even
This paper argues that that
mostly consist of acts of physical violence, although these are often present. It includes psychological and
emotional tactics including threats, isolation and undermining self-confidence. The severity of its impacts centre on
the common operation of fear, terror and control (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Stark, 2007).
Domestic
violence is a widespread and everyday phenomenon in higher and lower income countries
alike, that appears to cut across boundaries of class, age, ethnicity and sexual
orientation (McCue, 2008). A review of European studies suggests that around one in four women experiences
domestic violence over their lifetime, and between 6 and 10% in any given year (Council of Europe, 2002). Men
make up an estimated 1030% of those who suffer domestic violence (Hester, 2009; Walby and Allen, 2004).2
Domestic violence is marked by its repeated and long-term nature, and is a social
issue that has serious consequences for the physical and mental health of those
who experience it, is a major cause of family breakup, affects patterns of housing
and income, and has farreaching implications for the well-being and the social and
emotional development of children (Abrahams, 2010; Hester et al., 2006). Yet domestic
violence does not receive the levels of attention and resourcing that it merits . In the
current context of austerity in western countries, services for people who have suffered domestic violence have
there is a persistent tendency to

minimize its significance in comparison with more public forms of violence .
This paradoxical distancing, partly explained by the spatialities of domestic violenc e
(Pain, 1997; Warrington, 2001), is often reflected in personal as well as societal attitudes,
and follows through to the presences and absences in geographical scholarship on
violence. Since 2001, the war on/of terror has sparked an enormous literature on global terrorism and the politics
seen brutal cuts. Here is a crime as close to home as it gets, but
of security, while domestic violence has been the focus of little more than 10 articles by geographers. As feminists
events that are commonly viewed as public, political, global

and spectacular continue to have wider appeal as subjects of study than the private
and apparently mundane (Katz, 1996; Marston et al., 2005; Pain, 2009; Rose, 1993; Sharp, 2007; Staeheli
et al., 2004). Domestic violence is the elephant in the room. We know it is present, not
just as something that happens in distant locations to distant others, but in many of
our own lives; but perhaps it feels too large, awkward and close to home to lay bare,
causing us to ask difficult questions about security, space, privilege and power .
have observed, phenomena and
Geographers burgeoning work on global terrorism, meanwhile, offers a field of sophisticated political and spatial
analysis (for example, Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Elden, 2007; Flint, 2003; Gregory, 2004;
Hannah, 2006).
Terrorism is rare in most parts of the world, and especially the western
countries that are the focus of much of this research ; geographers emphasis has been on the
impacts of the threat and fear of global terrorism on international relations and domestic governance, including the
There is
relatively little empirical attention to the experiential, emotional and everyday
dimensions of global terrorism (Pain, 2010; Rapin, 2009). Domestic violence is intimately
bound, too, into national and global politics, and profoundly shaped by state and
social responses. The aim of this review is to connect and bring into dialogue theories
and evidence about global terrorism and domestic violence , suggesting that this might
enrich our understanding of both. The meta-project, following feminist geographers lead (for
state terrorism that some western governments perpetrate or support as part of their response.
example, Dowler, 2012; Hyndman, 2003; Pain and Smith, 2008; Pratt, 2012; Pratt and Rosner, 2006; Staeheli et al.,
is to collapse the scaling of these different forms of violence, drawing together

mainstream and feminist analyses of different terrorisms from across the social and political
sciences. This is not to present a simplistic argument that they, or any forms of violence,
are the same, but to argue for a remapping of the geographies of terrorism. The
2004),
review is mainly confined to everyday and global terrorism as they are experienced in the West. It draws on some
research on colonized and postcolonial settings, and this and anti-racist feminist
analyses provide especial impetus for unsettling the distinction between
international and interpersonal violence. Discourses of fear of both everyday and
global terrorisms are characterized by their whiteness.
A2: Case outweighs

Terrorism poses no substantial threat to our security. Threat is
completely overblown
Muelle and Stewart 15, John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University
and author of Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We
Believe Them, and Atomic Obsession, Mark Stewart is an engineer and risk analyst at the University of Newcastle in
Australia. He is the co-author of Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland
Security and of the forthcoming Chasing Ghosts: The Costly Quest to Counter Terrorists in the United States
(Terrorism poses no existential threat to America. We must stop pretending otherwise, February 24, 2015, The
Guardian, Accessed on: 5/6/15, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/24/terrorism-poses-noexistential-threat-to-america)
the most unchallenged, zany assertions during the war on terror has been
that terrorists present an existential threat to the United States, the modern state and
civilization itself. This is important because the overwrought expression, if accepted as valid, could close
One of
off evaluation of security efforts. For example, no defense of civil liberties is likely to be terribly effective if people
Obama and other top

officials are beginning to back away from this absurd position . This much overdue
believe the threat from terrorism to be existential. At long last, President Barack
development may not last, however. Extravagant alarmism about the pathological but self-destructive Islamic State
The notion that international terrorism

presents an existential threat was spawned by the traumatized in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11. Rudy Giuliani, mayor of New York at the time, recalls that all security experts expected
(Isis) in areas of Syria and Iraq may cause us to backslide.
dozens and dozens and multiyears of attacks like this and, in her book The Dark Side, Jane Mayer observed that
the only certainty shared by virtually the entire American intelligence community was that a second wave of
even more devastating terrorist attacks on America was imminent. Duly terrified, US intelligence services were
soon imaginatively calculating the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States to be between 2,000
and 5,000. Also
compelling was the extrapolation that, because the 9/11

terrorists were successful with box-cutters, they might well be able to
turn out nuclear weapons. Soon it was being authoritatively proclaimed that atomic terrorists could
destroy civilization as we know it and that it was likely that a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States would
transpire by 2014. No
atomic terrorists have yet appeared (al-Qaidas entire

budget in 2001 for research on all weapons of mass destruction totaled
less than $4,000), and intelligence has been far better at counting al-Qaida operatives in the country than
at finding them. But the notion that terrorism presents an existential threat has played on. By 2008, Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff declared it to be a significant existential one - carefully differentiating it,
apparently, from all those insignificant existential threats Americans have faced in the past. The bizarre formulation
survived into the Obama years. In October 2009, Bruce Riedel, an advisor to the new administration, publicly
maintained the al-Qaida threat to the country to be existential. In 2014, however, things began to change. In a
speech at Harvard in October, Vice President Joseph Biden offered the thought that we face no existential threat
none to our way of life or our ultimate security. After a decent interval of three months, President Barack Obama
reiterated this point at a press conference, and then expanded in an interview a few weeks later, adding that the US
should not provide a victory to these terrorist networks by over-inflating their importance and suggesting in some
fashion that they are an existential threat to the United States or the world order. Later, his national security
advisor, Susan Rice, echoed the point in a formal speech. It is astounding that these utterances blindingly
obvious as security specialist Bruce Schneier puts it appear to mark the first time any officials in the United
States have had the notion and the courage to say so in public. Whether that development, at once remarkable
and absurdly belated, will have some consequence, or even continue, remains to be seen. Senators John McCain
and Lindsay Graham have insisted for months that Isis presents an existential threat to the United States. An
alarmed David Brooks reported that financial analysts have convinced themselves that the group has the potential
to generate a worldwide economic cataclysm. And General Michael Flynn, recently retired as head of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, has been insisting that the terrorist enemy is committed to the destruction of
freedom and the American way of life while seeking world domination, achieved through violence and bloodshed.
It was reported that his remarks provoked nods of approval, cheers and ultimately a standing ovation from the
audience. Thus even the most modest imaginable effort to rein in the war on terror hyperbole may fail to gel.
A2 Domestic Violence Terror

Turn associating terror with domestic violence is key to break
down the boundaries of public and private violence to spotlight
the frequency and severity of domestic terrorism
531550)
Since 2001, terrorism has become more commonplace in western language and thought; discourses, images and
metaphors around it have proliferated (Burke, 2009; Onuf, 2009; Richardson, 2006). Lutz (2010) makes this
corrective (above) in a critique of the new critical terrorism studies (see Franks, 2006; Jackson, 2007) he argues
that labelling an ever wider range of violence terrorism risks losing sight of terrorisms specific features. Most
importantly, terrorism is a form of violence that attempts political influence or control through instilling fear
Domestic violence stands out from other everyday crimes in this

respect. In the rest of the paper I refer to domestic violence as everyday terrorism,
while global terrorism refers to terrorism in national and international settings ,
including state terrorism. This terminology is used to distinguish between them, to
identify connections, and to remind us of their relative frequency . I want to be sure to
move the analysis beyond facile comparison. Rather than arguing that global and
everyday terrorism are the same, the paper identifies similarities and discontinuities,
asks how each form of violence is constructed, mediated, used and responded to by
individuals, communities and the state, and what the significance is for remapping
terrorism. Asking these questions is a political as well as an intellectual exercise.
Framing domestic violence as everyday terrorism draws attention to its horror and
severity (Hammer, 2002). It muddies the boundaries between forms of violence that are
usually framed as public, political and spectacular, and forms that are usually
framed as private, apolitical and mundane. The terminology also highlights the
marginalization of feminist theory from mainstream debates around terror (Sjoberg,
(Goodwin, 2006).
2009), and provides an opportunity to connect feminist scholarship on violence across family studies, psychiatry
and psychotherapy, political studies and geography.
A2 Exception/State of Emergency
Discourses over the role of women during wartime have a
concrete impact on how theyre treated Sierra Leone proves
Detraz 13 (Nicole, Ph.D., Colorado State University, 2009; MA, Colorado State
University, 2005; BA, Louisiana State University, 2002, specializes in international
relations and environmental politics, Apr 24, 2013 International Security and
Gender https://books.google.com/books?
id=oNYk6G5k7EgC&dq=international+security+and+gender+nicole+detraz&sourc
e=gbs_navlinks_s )
Several voices have claimed that one major obstacle to effective gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping is
the
way women are portrayed in discussions of war and conflict. It is often the case that
women are depicted as victims, mothers, or inherently peaceful . It is important to note that
these are constructed discourses that feminist scholars often find problematic . For
example, there are important implications to the portrayal of women as vulnerable in
the language of Resolution 1325. There are several instances where women and children are lumped
into a single category. Women are rarely portrayed as having agency, much less as active
participants in conflict. Shepherd (2008: 131) explains that gender equality is conceptualized within UNSC
Resolution 1325 as "the advancement of women, paying scant attention to the situations in which women are
active in the oppression of other women and men are similarly disadvantaged. Furthermore, 'gender equality'
In
many policy reports women are portrayed as a homogeneous group that is
uniformly vulnerable in times of conflict. It is true that many women are vulnerable and victims of
insecurity during conflict, however it is counterproductive to assume all women experience
conflict identically. Case studies on Sierra Leone (Gizelis 2009; MacKenzie 2010) illustrate the
complex roles women play in conflicts. For example, in the civil war in Sierra Leone
women were actively involved in war activities and planning, were the victims of
rape, slavery, and displacement, and were active participants in peace movements .
Despite the diversity of women's roles, in post-conflict discourses women were
overwhelmingly discussed as victims. The result of this is that when the country
was attempting to move from conflict to post-conflict, women who had been
combatants were largely left out of the peacemaking process. Women and
girls were not viewed as ''real'' soldiers but described as sex slaves ,
abductees, camp followers, or domestic workers (MacKenzie 2010). This shows that
discourses on women's vulnerability have concrete impacts for
peacekeeping and peacemaking. Because women were not seen as combatants, they were
assumes difference, thereby obscuring the discursive mechanisms through which the difference is reproduced."
typically excluded from the peacemaking process. On the other hand, peace negotiators turn to those associated
with conflict, including the leaders of local militias and warlords, to discuss the terms of peace and future security.
If women are seen as victims then they are excluded from the "real" business of
conflict resolution. They can also be passed over for positions within the post-conflict government. Susan
Willett (2010: 147) explains that during the process of conflict resolution "resources are prioritized for disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration and security sector reform. These are targeted at militarized men."
A2 Focus Justification
False disconnect between global and domestic terror both
operate politically, based in fear, perpetuate inequality, and
shape one another
531550)
not only are both forms of terrorism political, but these politics operate across
scales rather than being restricted to global or everyday securitie s. The definition of global
First,
terrorism is contested and politicized, as it occurs across a wide range of political situations and goals, actors and places (Burke,
2009; Tilly, 2004). As Flint and Radil (2009) point out, many attempts to define terrorism reflect the power of those defining it, and
their wish to delegitimize and stigmatize opponents. Nonetheless,
fear is widely recognized as fundamental
to terrorism: The consequences of the violence are themselves merely a first step and form a stepping stone toward
objectives that are more remote . . . Terrorism is violence used in order to create fear; but it is aimed at creating fear in order that
the fear, in turn, will lead somebody else not the terrorist to embark on some quite different program of action that will
accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires. (Fromkin, 1975: 692693) Terrorism, then, is
an attempt to
impose or disrupt an order through violence and fear ( Flint and Radil, 2009; Goodwin, 2006; Onuf,
2009). Global terrorism aims to have these effects within macro-political geographic
settings (Flint and Radil, 2009: 151), an upscaling which is especially pertinent to the fourth wave of terrorism (Rapoport, 2004)
currently held to be dominating global security. Flint and Radil urge some caution here, as overly focusing on the recent war on/of
terror risks losing sight of wider patterns in global conflict where broader political and economic processes, especially colonialism
Equally, everyday terrorism is political,

contested and understood by its capacity to instil fear through coercive control (Stark,
and postcolonial trends, are central to explaining global terrorism.
2007). If power and control are seen as involving varying and fluid configurations, entanglements and struggles (Sharp et al., 2000),
then we can position terrorism as a relevant framing across scales and violent acts of insurgent groups, the state and family
members. Earlier feminist analyses of everyday terrorism viewed it as innately political and as an exertion of power: force and its
threat is never a residual or secondary mode of influence, rather it is the structural underpinning of hierarchical relations (Hanmer,
Patriarchy was the first political and social system that was considered both
to produce and be produced by everyday terrorism (Dobash and Dobash, 1979). It has since
been recognized as intersected by racism, ethnocentrism, class privilege,
heterosexism and ablism to produce diverse experiences of violence (Harne and Radford,
1978: 229).
2008; hooks, 2000; Mama, 1996; Menjvar and Salcido 2002; Sokoloff and Dupont, 2005). For many feminist and antiracist analysts,
poverty and material conditions both produce and are intensified by everyday terrorism (Fine, 2012; Fine et al., 1998; Hammer,
2002; hooks, 2000; for a quantitative spatial analysis, see Di Bartolo, 2001), although as Sokoloff and Dupont (2005) note, class
Everyday terrorism is also shaped by

contexts of colonization and globalization and reinforces their most harmful effects
analysis is often the least developed in intersectional analyses.
(Hammer, 2002; hooks, 2000; INCITE!, 2006; cf. Flint and Radil, 2009). Surprisingly few geographers have contributed to analysis of
everyday terrorism by considering how place and scale intersect with these political structures. Brickell (2008) is one exception,
linking intimate violence and national politics in her analysis of gender-based violence in Cambodia as it undergoes transition. Nayak
(2005) also carefully draws place into her analysis of variations in violence against women between Indian states, implicating the
political geographies of gender relations, especially movements to improve womens status and an associated and antithetical
The complex politics of both

global and everyday terrorisms operate across scales. Although everyday terrorism
is experienced within the home and family, feminist analysis upscales its causes
and effects, as the above discussion makes clear. Also, as geographers have identified, global terrorism,
securitization and militarization are inserted into the everyday through state
activities, popular culture, material practices and counter-terrorism measures (Amoore,
revivalist backlash which may underpin regional and neighbourhood differences.
2007; Dowler, 2012; Graham, 2010). Katz (2007: 350351) describes how, in response to the war on/of terror, the security state
produces a sense of terror and fear in a drivelly and everyday way . . . the material social practices of banal terrorism work at all
scales.
Global terrorism, then, may be extremely rare in the West, but has become
part of our everyday lives and environments. However, its presence reflects highly
delineated and politically motivated discourses of threat and risk, rather than our
common experiences of violence itself. The far more familiar phenomenon of

everyday terrorism is also spatially present, but less visibly: on bodies harmed by
violence, in private homes where doors, furniture and possessions are marked by
attacks, and in social withdrawal because of spatial entrapment (Warrington, 2001). The
key difference here is that despite the commonness of everyday terrorism it tends
to be hidden or excused: it is distanced despite its everywhereness, and marked by
a lack of spatial fetishism. The terrorism that the state makes paradoxically banal is
the one which is extremely rare. But, in common, representations of both terrorisms
serve to obscure and mystify the social, cultural and political-economic relations
that underpin them (Katz, 2007: 352). Further, the masculinist protection described by
feminists as framing international security (Young, 2003) underpins political responses to
both forms of terrorism. Security is understood as a set of practices aimed at
avoiding current and anticipated future dangers , often involving control and sometimes violence itself.
Scholars in feminist international relations and feminist political geography have
questioned and remapped understanding of security, and whose rights and
responsibilities are prioritized in academic analyses, state discourses and actions
(Hunt and Rygiel, 2006; Hyndman, 2007; Staeheli and Nagel, 2008). To protect economic, sovereign and political interests that have
been defined by men through war, conflict and diplomacy for centuries (Phillips, 2008: 60), the protector state excludes discourses
that challenge its power. Young (2003: 226228) describes how, since 2001, a new security regime in the USA has enacted the logic
you subordinate your actions to our judgement of what is necessary, and we promise to keep you safe, mirroring the patriarchal
sexual contract (Pateman, 1988). Similarly, in everyday terrorism, abusers commonly position themselves as the more ethical
partner (Jones, 2004) and as the protector of those they abuse (Hearn, 1996), and related critiques have been made of paternalistic
Everyday violence is also fundamentally related to global

security, both conceptually and experientially (Eistenstein, 2007; Hammer, 2003; Hoogensen and Rottem,
2004; Moser, 2001; Sjoberg, 2009) for example, in the underpinning of militarism and state
security by hypermasculinity that has also been held to explain failures to
effectively tackle everyday terrorism (Hammer, 2003; hooks, 2000; INCITE!, 2006); in the drive to rescue
state responses (Walklate, 2008).
women from oppression overseas unasked, bypassing local womens movements (Hyndman, 2003; Hunt and Rygiel, 2006; Young,
also reflected in problematic criminal justice approaches to everyday terrorism

in the West (Walklate, 2008); and in the erasure of other knowledges and voices in
determining political responses to global and everyday terrorisms (Hyndman, 2003; INCITE!,
2003),
2006; Stanko, 2006; Sylvester, 1994; Walklate, 2008). Recent research has also highlighted the direct effect of living in a context of
war and terrorist attacks on intimate violence, the associated dilemmas for international human rights responses (see P. Johnson,
2008; SelaShayovitz, 2010), the effects of military culture on everyday terrorism perpetrated by soldiers against their families, and
how, in highly militarized societies such as Israel/Palestine, this everyday violence itself becomes militarized (Adelman, 2003).
the endemic societal practice of everyday

terrorism directly informs the nature of international violence. This co-dependence
of everyday and global terrorisms disrupts, rescales and reorients geographies of
violence. Feminist research is acknowledging securities laterally, democratically,
and in mutually influential and dynamic ways . . . [ as] a multiplicity of securities
flowing concurrently (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 169), and to the question whose securities
matter most? we might add whose terrorisms matter most?.
Writing about the USA, Jones (2013) makes a powerful case that
A2 Reps True
Masculine terror reps are wrong projecting whitewashed
gender stereotypes onto an increasingly female form of
violence
Laster and Erez, 15 (Edna Erez, department of criminology law and justice @
the University of Illinois @ Chicago, Kathy Laster, University of Melbourne. 01 May
2015 Sisters in Terrorism? Exploding Stereotypes
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08974454.2015.1023884)
In a collection devoted to the issue of whether the war on women is over, it is instructive to look at exceptional circumstances when patriarchy lets women
In masculinist cultures, allowing women into

combat violates a core tenet of patriarchy: the obligation of men to protect and
defend their womenfolk (Hasan, 2002; Israeli, 2004). For criminologists, violence and destructive antisocial behavior is typically
understood to be the domain of men. Women are disproportionately the victims of crime and
empirically also the victims of armed conflicts across the globe. If women assume a
more active role in such hotspots, they are generally cast as the moderators or
peacemakers (Marway, 2011; Tessler & Warriner, 1997). In public consciousness, the particularly heinous crime of terrorism is
generally, but increasingly incorrectly, associated with masculinity (Dickey & Kovach, 2002; Nacos,
2005).1 Thus, the involvement of some women in terrorist activity seemingly defies
conventional thinking about gender and violence . Feminists need to be alert to any major shift in gender gear that
brings women squarely into the preserves of men.2 In conflict-riddled geopolitical regions of the world,
women have been heavily involved in both political and terrorist-related activities
that, until relatively recently, have fallen short of engaging directly in violence . But in
into what has typically been mens businesswar and violent crime.
global hotspots, the dark figure of womens diverse operational contribution to terrorist activity has always loomed (Harmon, 2000). Women, for
instance, regularly carry ammunition across enemy territory and distribute medical and other supplies to combatants (e.g., Bloom, 2007, p. 97). Women
have also been heavily involved in activities such as Internet propaganda and recruitment campaigns (von Knop, 2008).3 There is no doubt that they have
also significantly aided and abetted husbands, brothers, and kinfolk by providing material and psychological support to them for their terrorist activities
Women are now increasingly being

deployed, even by strictly gender-segregated fundamentalist Islamic terrorist
groups, as foot soldiers, most notably as highly effective suicide bombers . The rise of the
female terrorist has become a signature feature of New Terrorism. Estimates vary, but it may well be that we have
achieved a perverse kind of equality in which women now constitute at least 50% of
all suicide bombers. In 2000 it was estimated that between 20% and 30% of international terrorist acts were carried out by women
(Harmon, 2000, p. 21; Nacos, 2005). Even well before 9/11, some groups were already regularly
using women as frontline operatives. In Papes (2005) study of 462 suicide bombers
operating between 1980 and 2003, for example, women constituted 50% of the
actors among Kurds, Chechens, and Tamil Tigers . At the time of Papes study, Al Qaeda was not yet enlisting
(Berko & Erez, 2007; Erez & Berko, 2008). Terrorist times, though, are changing.
women into active terrorist service. Hamas initially prohibited the use of women in terrorism in general, and suicide bombing in particular, but then
changed its rules in response to practical constraints that made it difficult for men to penetrate enemy space (Berko & Erez, 2007). But squeamishness
about women as field operatives has now been turned on its head with Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other extremist groups actively recruiting women to these
roles. In this article, we examine the meaning and consequence of the growing number of women engaged in a socially significant violent crime like
womens active participation as terrorists both defies and exploits

conventional gender stereotypes. We contend, however, that war by women makes the position of women individually and
collectively worse in their own society and elsewhere. It also provides ammunition for the war on women in
both fundamentalist societies that resort to terrorism as well as Western
democracies by undermining progressive claims for gender equality.
terrorism. We argue that
A2 Terrorism Turns Patriarchy

White feminisms savior complex denies agency, coopts, and
disempower grassroots movements, and opposes the Evil
Terrorism, absent the alternative introspection and historical
reevaluations are impossible
Rich 14 [Janine Rich, writer for International Affairs Review; Saving Muslim Women: Feminism, U.S. Policy,
and the War on Terror; International Affairs Review; Fall 2014; accessed 07/2015;
<www.usfca.edu/International_Studies/international_affairs_review/fall2014/articles/Saving_Muslim_Women/>.]
Western media and feminist organizations presented the experiences of

Afghan women under the Taliban as singular , unified experiences of victimhood and
oppression. While it is undeniable that the Taliban brutally restricted the lives of urban
women through compulsory veiling, public floggings and executions, and the criminalization of womens
education, medical care and public appearance, the lives of rural women went largely
unchanged. As the New Yorker reported, The Taliban has scarcely altered the lives of
uneducated women, except to make them almost entirely safe from rape (Anderson
2001). This type of nuanced examination of the situation was, and still is, highly unpopular
and uncommon, as if any attempt to broaden the discussion beyond the admittedly brutal
practices of the Taliban was doomed to be labeled as antithetical to womens interests
Similarly,
(Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002). In addition to the genuine lack of factual basis for the assumptions of the
universal
victimhood of all Afghan women, this type of representation has disturbing

political implications: if Afghan women are helpless victims at the hands of their
violently oppressive men, the only logical option that exists to save them is military
intervention. The Feminist Majoritys website describes a desire for the permanent restoration of
womens rights in Afghanistan (Feminist Majority Foundation 2013). This restoration is at surface a
nice idea, yet it underscores the lack of understanding , whether intentional or not, of the
reality of womens situations before the Taliban s rule. There have been homegrown
womens emancipation movements, notably in the 1920s, 50s, and 80s, which clashed
sharply with the rigid social and moral structures entrenched in Afghan society . Each
time Afghan feminist movements begin to gain momentum the backlash was swift and harsh, rooted in tradition,
suspicion of womens rights movements as Western-influenced

meddling. One of the most prominent feminist organizations active today is the Revolutionary Association of the
Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), a self-described political/social organization of Afghan women struggling for
tribal loyalties, and the
peace, freedom, democracy and womens rights, founded in 1977 (Revolutionary Association of the Women of
openly criticize and denounce religious fundamentalism, U.S

occupation, and the U.S-backed Northern Alliance as equally detrimental
to womens advancement and equality. RAWA largely consists of urban, university-educated
women who have suffered immensely under the Taliban and the years of systematic warfare and
structural violence. However, the image of these women, who resist classification as passive
victims and openly criticize Western prerogatives and societies alongside Islamic
fundamentalism, do not fit into the narrative espoused by the Feminist Majority. To put it simply, it is not
convenient to attempt to save a woman who is telling you that your organization
and your country of origin are doing more harm than help . Therefore, Western feminist
organizations first co-opted RAWA, then largely ignored it. There is a disturbing lack of
Afghanistan 2014). They
knowledge among Western feminist activists of the rich history of womens rights activists and trends of intellectual
thought throughout the Muslim world, an ignorance which further compounds the notion that saving Muslim
women from their backwards culture is the moral duty of the enlightened West. In contrast to the popular liberal
the standpoint, feminism is not always a platform for higher justice. The interplay between
Western feminist
causes and U.S foreign intervention is fascinating in that it serves as an example of feminist
thought being used as a justification for violence . Through the manipulation and simplification of
the facts, and the purposeful omission of the deep U.S culpability in the creation of the
social and economic situation of Afghan women , Western media and organizations such as the
Feminist Majority paved the way for the justification of military force in Afghanistan . The
causal factors of the violently oppressive situations many Afghan women face are immensely complicated, yet the
effort to justify and legitimize the War on Terror demanded a simplistic cause, followed by a neoconservative
solution. It is in this mindset that saving Muslim women became the rallying cry of the just .
A neat, causal line between Islamic fundamentalism and womens subjugation was drawn, irrespective of any
potential Western culpability in the creation of either fundamentalist Islam or the myriad problems facing Afghan
Removed from all potential responsibility, the U.S was free to declare a war on
terror that would be played out on the bodies of Afghan women , continuing the cycle
of violent intervention in the name of their salvation While I have used Afghanistan as my
primary example of the troubling military implications of the discourses surrounding Muslim women, this is
by no means a contained or corrected phenomenon . The 2003 U.S-led invasion of
Iraq was a dismal failure, and the Frankenstein-esque specter of Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) arose with chilling swiftness from the destruction wreaked on the region. ISIL gained
its potency and its legitimacy from a complex combination of U.S involvement in
Iraq, the internationally fueled sectarian disaster in Syria, and numerous past and ongoing
military and political interventions by Western powers that have destabilized the
region irreparably. And once more, in the inevitable media hysteria surrounding the ongoing regional chaos,
women.
Muslim women have become trapped in the middle of a discourse that purports to work for their salvation, yet
only serves to further marginalize them. Muslim women in the West as well as abroad, particularly those who
choose to veil, are placed in an impossible position; if they defend their faith or claim to have chosen it from a
position of autonomy and independent choice, they are accused of apologetics, or are paternalistically charged as
victims of false consciousness or of their repressive culture. No amount of denouncing or vilifying ISIL or other
Islamist terrorist organizations is ever enough; in the twisted, bizarrely simplistic rhetoric currently surrounding
Islam in Western media, it has been deemed impossible to both identify as a Muslim and as a proponent of peace
ISILs deranged ideology has exceptionally terrifying ramifications for

women, yet our own role in the creation of ISIL, as well as the way Western
intervention and military policy continues to independently disadvantage,
marginalize and harm Middle Eastern women is utterly ignored. ISIL, and other likeminded extremist groups, are discursively positioned through our media (as well as their own) as the
exact opposite of the U.S and of Western values. As such, it has been taken for granted that,
anything they are, we are not. They are the ultimate evil, so We are the ultimate good.
They harm women, so We bring only gender justice . This is a false dichotomy that
and equality.
operates on many levels, wherein we not only assume absolute difference from our enemies, but also absolute
difference from the oppressed women we purport to be saving. We are feminists, therefore anything They do must
be antithetical to feminism. Yet, as Shabana Mir argues, feminism is local, and has many colors, and isnt always
feminism is owned and run by White women who bring White

men in fighter planes (Mir 2009). The geopolitics of the region is reaching a crisis point, a culmination of
decades of colonial oppression, Western intervention, economic stagnation,
militarization and sectarian strife. Women have long been marginalized by these
issues, with their bodies and their stories utilized to justify violence. In the current atmosphere of hysteria and
politicized propaganda, all hope for a nuanced or alternative discussion has been
lost. Until we create space to genuinely examine these false binaries that
have become so foundational to the discourses surrounding Muslim
women, and until we examine our own troubling role in creating and
sustaining the situations that marginalize women in the Middle East, we
will only see a continuation of our own self-fulfilling prophecy.
called feminism because
Aff Answers
No Link/ Precision Turn

No link & turn aff doesnt create ignorance of domestic
violence, it co exists with other sub disciplines that focus on it.
Maintaining the precision of terrorism crucial to effective
policymaking
Lutz 10 (James M., Professor at Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort
Wayne, A Critical View of Critical Terrorism Studies, Perspectives on Terrorism,
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/130/html)
there is also an important difference between terrorism
and fear (or terror). In many situations, criminals induce fear in their victims, but the goal of
that is to reduce resistance in burgleries or extortions, there is no politics involved.
In addition to the distinction between terrorism and repression,
The use of fear for financial gain is most obvious in kidnappings for profit or with demands for protection money by organized crime groups. Similarly, governments are usually able to
induce some fear in criminals due to the prospect of arrest, conviction and punishment. At some level there is also the political objective of enhanced peace and security for citizens. Yet
If normal,
everyday activities become crimes, there is fear, but the situation generally reflects
one of repression rather than government terrorism. Thus, the presence of fear cannot by itself be used to define the existence of the use
such fear of punishment generally occurs within the rule of law; it is not arbitraryor at least not consistently arbitrary, certainly in democracies.
of terrorism by the state. The failure to distinguish between terror and terrorism also occurs when analysts make comparisons with military actions, which normally involve governments.
Most generals prefer to find a way to create overwhelming fear or terror among opposing troops. An army that panics and runs away yields an easy victory. Fear is present in these
circumstances, but not terrorism. Aerial or artillery bombardment of villages or urban areas will induce fear and terror among local residents. Often the goals of such bombardments are
military objectives only distantly related to the political objectives that are inevitably part of any military conflict. If the bombardment occurs on enemy territory during a war, the
resulting action may constitute a wartime atrocity or massacre if there was no military necessity but it is a conceptual stretch to call this terrorism even if it creates great fear. [18] The
same may be true in domestic military campaigns in circumstances of rebellion or civil war. Civilian areas can become targets as part of efforts to subdue rebellious regions or territories
in turmoil, even though, in point of fact, such bombardments are often counterproductive from a political perspective. [19] Military commanders, however, may be more interested in
limiting casualties among their own troops than they are in furthering political objectives of their governments. Many military officers are either not interested or not trained to look at
the political consequences of their combat decisions; often they hold political goals in some disdain if these interfere with military objectives. Even in circumstances where heavy
casualties result, such as the devastation of large sections of the town of Hama in Syria in February 1982 (which cost up to 40,000 lives at the hands of government forces) or, more
recently, relatively indiscriminate attacks by Nigerian military forces against communities in the Niger delta, this might not be best described as terrorism. Rather, such massacres could
It needs to be recognized that not

every form of violence that is evil or reprehensible , when performed by governments, constitutes
terrorism. Genocide is far worse than terrorism, but genocide does not primarily seek to create fear in a target audience. In fact governments undertaking genocide may
either been described as gross human rights violations or qualify as war crimes under humanitarian law.
even seek to lull the victims into a false sense of security to make the killing easier. This was the case with the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the Jews during the Holocaust and,
more recently, according to some reports, also with the Tutsi in Rwanda. Similarly, harsh repression of non-violent dissent is evil, but it is usually not terrorism as long as it is not
indiscriminate. Slavery is a pernicious attack on human dignity, but it is not terrorism. Institutional violence in which some citizens have fewer rights or situations where equal rights are
not equally protected are to be deplored, but it is not terrorism (unless accompanied by government-tolerated vigilante violence intended to enforce the control of particular groups).
It
is quite legitimate and desirable to focus public and scholarly attention on these
issues, but it is not appropriate to consider them to be examples of terrorism . To
fault those who study other forms of terrorism than state terrorism, as CTS scholars do, is unjust since
these type of situations are actually frequently analyzed in other academic
(sub-)disciplines. Therefore, it cannot be said that orthodox analysts refuse to examine cases of state terrorism (very broadly defined). [20] If almost every
example of government use of force to maintain law and order is labeled state terrorism, then the concept of terrorism ceases to have any real meaning and simply becomes a polemic
term used to apply a negative and pejorative label to a government or states that an observer dislikes. Supporters of the CTS perspective also argue that the conventional approach to
terrorism noticeably ignores the violence involved in the counterterrorism strategies of governments. They further argue that governments take advantage of the presence of dissident
terrorist actions to crack down on opponents to the regime in power. It has even been suggested that the recent wave of attacks by dissident groups has led governments to
manufacture a new concept of terrorism in order to further the interests of the elite. [21] Governments in many circumstances have indeed long used threats and acts of violent protest
from dissidents as often not unwelcome pretexts for crackdowns on dissenters or for other political purposes. Such manipulation of public events, however, does not necessarily qualify
as terrorism even when it frequently involves manipulation and repression. The use of dissident actions as an excuse for government repression or the excesses of counterterrorism have
also been cited by CT scholars to allege that the conventional orthodox terrorism perspective is flawed in another way. They often suggest that the research focus has been on
government reactions while discussing terrorism from the perspective of the terrorists is a taboo stance within Western scholarship. [22] While much of the conventional literature on
terrorism does not directly address the viewpoint of the terrorists directly, the whole issue of the causes of terrorism (e.g. in studies on radicalisation) does address the perspectives of
those involved in terrorist actions. For example, arguments that repression or lack of participation lead to political violence, including acts of terrorism, clearly involves looking at events
from the perspective of the dissidents. [23] Admittedly, since it is at least in Western democracies - much easier to get documentary material on the perspectives of governments and
their counterterrorism strategies, greater attention has been given to these. Even so, communiqus and statements by leaders of dissident groups to provide insights into the
perspectives of the dissident groups, have been used for analyses of the origins and motives of dissident and insurgent groups using tactics of terrorism. Further, considerations of
reform and concessions as counterterrorist strategies implicitly view events also from the perspective of the terrorist groups rather than merely that of the government. [24] In Defense
of the Critical Terrorism Studies Perspective Notwithstanding the above comments, it is important to recognize that the CTS perspective has something valuable to offer to analysts since
it reminds everyone that many governments can and do use terrorism (in a narrowly defined sense of the term). Death squads operating with government tolerance or active support are
designed to create terror in target audiences. Such para-military squads also provide the state with a shield, however thin, of plausible deniability. [25] When Black Americans were
lynched in the American south (and elsewhere) in the years before World War II, local government officials in Southern States of the United States often tolerated such actions. In effect,
a number of local governments supported terrorism against a minority population as a form of social control. The support was especially obvious where perpetrators of the lynchings
were rarely charged. Moreover, on the rare occasions that they were even brought to trial, they were generally acquitted. When a Black American was accused of a crime or of violating
appropriate social norms, ideally the real culprit would be punished for the action. If the actual culprit could not be discovered or caught, then any black person could be killed to serve
as a message to the entire community to remember each of its members of his or her place in society. [26] Clearly, this type of action goes beyond repression and institutional violence
and reaches the level of terrorism. Other examples of state terrorism have been documented. In Burundi the periodic pogroms against Hutus by the Tutsi elite qualified as terrorism. The
targets of the violence were not able to avoid death by individual lawful behaviour. P pogroms against Jews in Central and Eastern Europe that occurred after the 1970s with the tacit or
active consent of governments would qualify as terrorism as well. More recently, the government of Sudan has unleashed Arab janjaweed militias against its domestic opponents, first in
the southern, mainly Christian, part of the country and then in Darfur (which is mainly populated by African muslims) as part of efforts to terrify dissident groups into submission. The
quasi-governmental ruling groups in the Serbian portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina used in the 1990s terror as part of a very conscious policy of ethnic cleansing. Murder and rape
became weapons of choice, convincing Muslims to flee the areas that Serb para-militaries were claiming for their own. The actions of some of the supporters of President Mugabe in
Zimbabwe also qualify as state terrorism. There state authorities have consistently ignored violence by the governments party para-militaries and veterans of the independence
struggles when directed against members of the opposition. One circumstance that makes state terrorism so important to study is that it is much more deadly in terms of number of
precision is always important

when discussing political and social phenomena. The concept of state terrorism cannot
be stretched to include all the forms of political violence and repression that non-democratic but
also some democratic states perform. Nor can the term terrorism be allowed to become a negative term to apply to capitalist states onlywhether democratic or not . It needs
to be defined in a way that has a clear and consistent meaning for everyone. Nor
should analysts who choose to focus on dissident terrorism be accused of being
pawns of the state. Second, while state terrorism has not received the attention that those in favor of the Critical Terrorism Studies perspective think that it
victims than dissident terrorism. [27] Conclusions To conclude this discussion, first it is worth emphasizing that
should rightfully have, it clearly has not been ignored by academics. Negative state actions and state repression have been frequently studied, sometimes in great detail. Finally,
with a more balanced and limited view of how governments can and do use
terrorism, it should be possible for scholars embracing the Critical Terrorism Studies
perspective to contribute in a much more constructive way to the analysis of the
notion of government terrorism and the techniques that such regimes use.
Terror Reps Justified

Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically
validour authors are self-reflexive
Boyle and Horgan 8
Michael J. Boyle, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and

John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State
University, April 2008, A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 5164
Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed
Orthodox Terrorism Studies. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its
state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security
projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be a skeptical
An implicit presumption from this is that

terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that
their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological
problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but
also have provided their own searching critiques of the field at various points during the last few
attitude towards accepted terrorism knowledge.
decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, Understanding Terrorism).
Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism implied in
Orthodox Terrorism Studies have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the
nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism . For example, Jackson
(2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and Jongman (1988) to support his claims that
theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction
of the second edition they
point out that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the
first edition, because the failure to address persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined
progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of
research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p.
Silkes (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research

performed a similar function, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous
primary data collection. A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such
scathing indictments of its own work.
xiv). Similarly,
Data is accurate
Weinberger and Eubank, 8 [Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the
University of Nevada, Reno. He is a Senior Fellow at the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
in Oklahoma City and at the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa. William Eubank is Associate
Professor in Political Science at the University of Nevada. Problems with the critical studies approach to the study
of terrorism. Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2008, 185195. ]
Is the quality of the data used by terrorisms orthodox investigators as poor as the
critics assert. Perhaps it was at one time, but it is no longer the case. The reliance on
newspaper accounts and other secondary sources is diminishing . Marc Sageman, for instance, has
developed his own database on al-Qaedas core membership (Sageman 2004, pp. 61135 ). A number of
researchers have conducted and continue to conduct interviews with individuals
involved in terrorist activities in Germany, Italy, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Iraq, the West Bank, and Gaza
Strip. The family and friends of suicide bombers have been interviewed, as have those who have sent them on their
Those who attempted to kill themselves but were apprehended before they
could do so have been interviewed in prison. Among the long list of orthodox terrorism researchers
missions.
who have had these extended and systematic face-to-face encounters, we should mention Nicole Argo, Anat Berko,
Mia Bloom, Mohammed Hafez, John Horgan, Ariel Merari, Donatella della Porta, Jerrold Post, the late Ehud Sprinzak,
Our understanding of terrorist

motivations what causes them to become radicalised (or de-radicalised) expands correspondingly.
and Yoram Schweitzer.6 The list is partial and continues to grow.
Framing/No Alt Solvency

The alts rhetoric change deals in abstractions, undermining
solvency. Only a political action can solve.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2015.1018285
In the light of these results, there is need to revisit policy perspectives that tend to
ignore the distinction between cultural attitudes and actual outcomes. This study
confirms an important gap between attitudes that people have and the actual
outcomes on the ground, especially with regard to gender equality. The gap might
be due to discrepancies between what people say and what they actually do, or due
to institutional, structural, and social barriers to realizing what one wants to
achieve. Outcomes capture the presence of state policies, access to rights, and
agency to exercise those rights. Attitudes, on the other hand, are limited to
opinions regarding those rights. These findings challenge the rhetoric that
changing attitudes fixes issues of inequality. Attitudes are difficult to
measure and hard to shape and change with outside interventions.
Designing anti-terrorism strategies on the assumption of attitudes reflecting actual
situation on ground can be misleading and problematic. On the other hand,
actual outcomes are more tangible and visible, relatively measureable, and can
be addressed by appropriate policy interventions. This research has a broad
applicability to other areas of policy interventions, which rely on cultural attitudes
as measure of change.
Perm
Perm Do Both
Sheperd 8 (Laura, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of
Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Univ New South Wales, Gender,
Violence And Security p. 10-11
international) security can be reconceptualized in conjunction with (gender) violence, and to
separate these concepts is to construct an analytical framework that is both partial and highly
problematic. I recognize that focusing on gender in an effort to understand the particular articulations of violence and security in the documents with which I am concerned also
Ultimately, I argue that (
functions to produce a partial reading, as I marginalize concerns of race, class, ethnicity and other (post)structural hierarchies of exclusion. I refer to these hierarchies as (post)structural as I
this book is of relevance not only to

academics working on security and violence, but also to the institutions in question, the UN Security Council and the NGO Working
Group. The book evidences the ways in which academic and policy discourses are largely mutually constitutive. Policymakers
and academic theorists [b]oth use and are used by language ... that dominant powers always dream of
fixing (Der Derian 1990: 297), and that is fixed in the authoring of documents such as UNSCR 1325. The policy relevance of
this study is the exploration of different possibilities . I do not wish to map out the best, or even a better, way that UNSCR 1325 could have been written. I
wish to think gender, violence, security and the international differently through this research process, joining Butler in her desire to follow a double path in
politics: we must use this language to assert an entitlement to conditions of life in ways that affirm the
constitutive role of gender and sexuality in political life, and we must also subject our very categories to
critical scrutiny. (2004: 378) I do not read the use of must in the above exhortation as inscribing a sense of unified agenda, with which I would not be entirely comfortable.
Such usage would suggest that work that does not follow this double path can be judged by some standard as lesser. Rather, I read it as an acknowledgement that I am (an assumed we
are) both literally and philosophically bound by the language available to discuss conditions of life, by
the limits of the discourses. Therefore, the insistence on focusing on the words that are used to make policy,
on subjecting those words to critical scrutiny, is certainly compatible with the approach I take in this book.
see them as mutable through contextual performance, rather than as sedimented structural conditions. Moreover,
The alts rhetoric change deals in abstractions, undermining

solvency. Only a political action can solve.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2015.1018285
In the light of these results, there is need to revisit policy perspectives that tend to
ignore the distinction between cultural attitudes and actual outcomes. This study
confirms an important gap between attitudes that people have and the actual
outcomes on the ground, especially with regard to gender equality. The gap might
be due to discrepancies between what people say and what they actually do, or due
to institutional, structural, and social barriers to realizing what one wants to
achieve. Outcomes capture the presence of state policies, access to rights, and
agency to exercise those rights. Attitudes, on the other hand, are limited to
opinions regarding those rights. These findings challenge the rhetoric that
changing attitudes fixes issues of inequality. Attitudes are difficult to
measure and hard to shape and change with outside interventions.
Designing anti-terrorism strategies on the assumption of attitudes reflecting actual
situation on ground can be misleading and problematic. On the other hand,
actual outcomes are more tangible and visible, relatively measureable, and can
be addressed by appropriate policy interventions. This research has a broad
applicability to other areas of policy interventions, which rely on cultural attitudes

as measure of change.
Perm do Both keeps gender on the agenda within masculinist

institutions
Hooper 1 (Charlotte, teacher of Gender politics and IR, lecturer at University of
West England, , Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender
Politics Columbia University Press, New York. p230-1)
Third, while the main thrust of this book has been to show how resilient and sophisticated hegemonic masculinity is, a counterthread,
running through the discussions, has emphasized the potentially disruptive encroachment of gender issues into the previously naturalized
masculine institutions of both The Economist and IR. Institutions that are defined as masculine, or are exclusively male,
are important arenas for the production, reconstruction, and naturalization of masculinities. Masculinity
appears to have no stable ingredients and therefore its power depends entirely on certain qualities
constantly being associated with men. Masculine spaces are precisely the places where such associations
are cemented and naturalized. Therefore, even the marginal appearance of women (particularly if they refuse to play
the part of honorary men), together with feminist ideas, and/or other self-conscious references to gender issues, may sufficiently
alter the overall ambience of such spaces that their masculine associations become weakened. Under such
circumstances, the power of such institutions to underpin institutionalized gender differences (whether intentional
or otherwise) would be diminished, even if the majority of their practices remain masculinist. The setting
within which such practices take place is as important as the practices themselves, in that it is the setting
that naturalizes the practices as masculine. Feminists and feminist sympathizers, therefore, should perhaps continue to
try to enter masculinist environments and then keep gender somewhere on the agenda, even if only through
humor. In spite of apparently limited gains, and regardless of marginalization or even derision, such
actions may yet prove effective in the long run.
Alt alone is a retreat to the local

Tohidi 2 (Nayereh, , The Global-Local Intersection of Feminism in Muslim
Societies: The Cases of Iran and Azerbaijan, Social Research, Vol 69, No 3, Fall)
Intensified globalization has made conventional demarcation between the "internal" and the "external,"
or the "local" and the "global" or the core-periphery)- model somewhat artificial as it is becoming more
difficult to determine where the local stops and the global begins. The "cultural flow" of globalization is
not simply from the global to the local, but also the reverse (Abu- Lughod, 1991: 132) and forces from
various metropolises that are brought into new societies tend to become indigenized in one way or another
(Appadurai, 1996: 32). Although many feminists feel compelled to "think globally and act locally," some actions
have to be carried out globally if certain changes are to take place locally.-3 Given the situation of
Afghanistan, for example, no local improvement in women's status can take place without a global action
to alter present devastation. The concerns of women around the world have to be addressed, then, in the
historicized particularity of their relationship to multiple systems of subordination and oppression:
patriarchy and/or male supremacy at local levels (family, community, and nation) and international sexism
and economic hegemony at the global level. As Uma Narayan (1997) puts it, "we need to articulate the
relationship of gender to scattered hegemonies such as global economic structures , patriarchal
nationalisms, "authentic' forms of tradition, local structures of domination, arid legal-juridical oppression
on multiple levels."
Terrorism Turns K Impact

The spread of radical terrorism based on a distorted view on
Islam is worse for women than a masculine state
Elliot Friedland February 19, 2014 "Women's Rights Under Sharia"
www.clarionproject.org/understanding-islamism/womens-rights-under-sharia
Sharia law is an Islamic legal system which provides an Islamic alternative
to secular models of governance. Women in societies governed by sharia have far
fewer rights than women in the West. Muslim-majority societies have varying
degrees of sharia integrated into their law codes, but almost all use sharia to govern
family affairs. Sharia courts also exist in a number of Western countries, particularly
to adjudicate family law for Muslim citizens. There is no one overarching authority which
Overview
determines sharia, nor is there one conception of how women's rights fit into sharia law. Different interpretations
and laws depending on which of the four schools of Islamic Jurisprudence is being used, and the customs of the
Many Muslim feminists argue that current

interpretations of sharia that persist in oppressing women have no basis
in Islam and are man-made misinterpretations of the sacred texts . "I argue
sects and country in question.
that Muslim family laws are the products of sociocultural assumptions and juristic reasoning about the nature of
relations between men and women. In other words, they are man-made juristic constructs, shaped by the social,
cultural and political conditions within which Islams sacred texts are understood and turned into law." - Mir
Hosseini, Ziba, Towards Gender Equality: Muslim Family Laws and the Sha'riah. Marital Rights Although various
opinions exist regarding Islamic marriage laws, the following constants remain:
A man is entitled to up to
four wives, but a woman may only have one husband . In Western societies, a man typically only
takes one wife. The husband (or his family) pays a bride price or "dower" ( mahr, which is money or
property paid to the bride) which she is entitled to keep. This mahr is in exchange for sexual
submission (tamkin). Sexual submission is traditionally regarded as unconditional
consent for the remainder of the marriage. A man can divorce his wife by making a
declaration (talaq) in front of an Islamic judge irrespective of the woman's consent. Even her presence
is not required. For a woman to divorce a man (khula), his consent is required. The husband is
responsible for the financial upkeep of home (nafaqa). Temporary marriage (even for less than a half an
hour) is allowed by some scholars, others regard it as a form of prostitution. A report by the
Gatestone Institute charts its development in Britain. Wife beating permitted according to
some scholars. There is no joint property; the man owns all property, (except for what the
woman owned before the marriage). There is no specific minimum age for marriage, but most agree a woman
must have reached puberty. Marriage as young as 12 or 13 is not uncommon in Muslim-majority countries. In Yemen
in 2013, there was a highly publicized case of an eight-year-old girl who died of internal injuries suffered on her
wedding night. According to Al Jazeera, "Nearly 14 percent of Yemeni girls [are] married before the age of 15 and 52
percent before the age of 18." The case prompted calls for Yemen to pass a law setting a minimum age for
Muslim Feminists such as Dr. Elham Manea argue

that the interpretation of sharia in the area of marriage amounts to discrimination ,
the type of which is prohibited under Western legal systems . Public Rights Most Muslim-majority
marriage, although it has not yet done so.
countries are not democracies, so issues of who can vote do not apply. Nevertheless, women still have a
significantly reduced role in the public sphere in these countries compared to men. Conservative ideas of gender
roles are taken very seriously in Islamic societies. Even in the West, where Muslim women have the same legal
rights as men, they have been prevented from exercising those rights by their male relatives. Under sharia, women
have: Lesser inheritance rights compared to men Lesser status as witnesses In Saudi Arabia, women are not
allowed to drive. Modesty Laws Many Muslim women respect the requirement to dress modestly and choose to
Failure
to comply with modesty laws has been known to elicit extreme violence
from police in places like Iran, Afghanistan and Sudan . Garments women are required to
do so. However, in Muslim-majority countries, women do not necessarily have the choice not to do so.
wear range from a hijab (a scarf covering the hair and neck), an abaya (a cloak-like, loose-fitting overgarment), a
niqab (a face veil worn in addition to the hijab and abaya) to a burqa (a full-body and head cloak which includes a
netted rectangle over the eyes). Exactly what constitutes immodest dress is the subject of much debate.
Violations of modesty laws are frequently met with violence in Muslim countries.
Western women visiting Muslim-majority countries for example, Saudi Arabia -- are advised to dress modestly and
not to travel unaccompanied by a man. Dubai has notoriously strict public indecency laws. Many Western tourists
have fallen foul of them in the past. Iranian President Rouhani has recently halted the activities of the countrys
Male Guardianship Male
Guardianship applies to all women whether married or not according to strict
interpretations of sharia. In the event of the deaths of male relatives, it can result in mothers being legally
modesty police, but has handed over their remit to the Ministry of the Interior.
subservient to their sons. Under sharia: A woman becomes subservient to her husband and needs his permission
to: "leave the house, take up employment, or to engage in fasting or forms of worship other than what is
obligatory." An unmarried woman is under the guardianship of her nearest male relative. Human Rights Watch has
issued a 50-page report condemning the situation of women in Saudi Arabia alone. Rights under International
Law International law currently exists in a grey area, as it is unclear to what extent states are bound by
international treaties regarding various rights, and which of those rights, if any, international authorities have the
power to enforce. The UN Declaration of Human Rights includes equal rights for women and calls have been made
for Muslim countries to abide by these statutes. UN supports equal rights for women and recently adopted a new
campaign aimed at ending violence against women. The Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement condemning this
UN declaration (for violating sharia principles). Who Is Affected by Sharia? Any Muslim woman who undertakes
to be married under Islam is bound to a greater or lesser extent by sharia, depending on where they live. Muslim
women living in Western countries are bound by the laws of the countries in which they live as well, whereas
women living in countries such as Saudi Arabia are bound by sharia alone. In cases where sharia and the law of the
land conflict, a woman is bound by sharia. Islamic Feminism There are many different Islamic thinkers and
activists campaigning on issues pertaining to women's rights, most of whom are both female and Muslim. They
come from a variety of different Islamic groups and live in different countries. Some are line with Western feminist,
while others seek to address grievances from a more traditional angle. Journalist Samira Shackle draws a
distinction between "Islamic Feminists who explicitly draw their feminism from their faith, and Muslim women who
also happen to be feminists." An international network of Muslim feminists has started an organization called
Musawah. A directory of different Islamic Feminist groups is provided here. Glossary of Terms Used in Sharia
Law Ghairah Male sexual honor and jealousy. Hayah Female sexual modesty and shyness. Khula Female
Initiated divorce. This is very difficult to obtain, and requires the consent of the husband. Technically a woman can
appeal to an Islamic court to force the husband into a divorce, but in practice this rarely ever happens. Mahr
Bride-price paid by the groom's family to the bride. This money becomes legally her property. Nafaqa
Maintenance, the woman's right to be financially supported by her husband. Nushuz A legal state of disobedience
if a wife does not obey her husband. Talaq 'Repudiation of the wife.' Male initiated divorce. This is extremely easy
to obtain. The husband's declaration of talaq causes the divorce to come into effect. Tamkin Sexual submission of
the wife to her husband.
Turn Gender Essentialism

They totalize patriarchy placing women perpetually in the
victim role, turns the K
Mohanty 86 (, postcolonial and transnational feminist theorist, Chandra Talpade, Under Western Eyes,
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/raim0007/RaeSpot/under%20wstrn%20eyes.pdf)
Fran Hosken," in writing about the relationship between human rights and female genital mutilation in Africa and the Middle East, bases her
whole discussion/condemnation of genital mutilation on one privileged premise: the goal of genital mutilation is "to mutilate the sexual
pleasure and satisfaction of woman" ("FGM," p. 11). This, in turn, leads her to claim that women's sexuality is controlled, as is their
reproductive potential. According to Hosken, "male sexual politics" in Africa and around the world "share the same political goal: to assure
female dependence and subservience by any and all means" ("FGM," p. 14). Physical violence against women (rape, sexual assault, excision,
infibulation, etc.) is thus carried out "with an astonishing consensus among men in the world" ("FGM," p. 14). Here, women are
defined consistently as the victims of male controlthe "sexually oppressed." Although it is true that the
potential of male violence against women circumscribes and elucidates their social position to a certain
extent, defining women as archetypal victims freezes them into "objects-who-defend themselves," men
into "subjects-who-perpetrate-violence," and (every) society into powerless (read: women) and powerful
(read: men) groups of people. Male violence must be theorized and interpreted within specific societies,
both in order to understand it better, as well as in order to effectively organize to change it." Sisterhood
cannot be assumed on the basis of gender; it must be forged in concrete, historical and political practice
and analysis.
Depiction of women as victims of a toalizing patriarchy fails to

successfully challenge repression
Keohane 91 (Robert, Prof Intl Affairs at Princeton, Gender and International
Relations, Ed Grant and Newland, p. 45)
Feminist empiricism takes a fundamentally sociological approach, investigating how gender (the
institutionalization of sex differences) affects the modern inter-state system. Feminist empiricism emphasizes that
women have been victims of patriarchal states and that both major aspects of modern international
relations its institutionalization of warfare and its reinforcement of state sovereignty have had harmful ,
and often disastrous, effects on womens lives. It is often pointed out, for instance, that Third World development has been male
dominated and that women have often suffered from the form that development has taken. Recognition of these often over-looked facts is an
important contribution of feminist empiricism.
Nevertheless, emphasizing the victimization of women by the patriarchal state or the interstate system
provides only limited insights into international relations. Some analysts succumb to the temptation to
discuss, in sweeping terms, the patriarchal state or the war system without making distinctions among
states or international systems. To do so commits the analytical error of reifying a stylized patriarchal
state or war system. Furthermore, excoriating universal repression seems to lead more toward moralizing about
its iniquity than toward the analysis of sources of variation in its incidence.
makes women the metaphor for victimhood, ignoring that

those most effected in conflict are those already without power
whether men, women or children
Charlesworth 8 (Hilary, Australian Research Council Federation Fellow in the Regulatory Institutions Network at
the Australian National University., Feminist Legal Studies, 16:347361)
The second element I termed competitive vulnerability, that is, the claim that women always suffer more in
conflict and have more to gain from peace than men. Women have become the metaphor for
vulnerable/victim in war. Again, the evidence from the examples I have sketched does not support this. For
example, in relation to Bougainville, it is possible to argue that the most vulnerable of all were the very
young and the elderly, who suffered greatly from the PNG blockade of the island which prevented access to
medicine. Moreover, mens experience of war is not simply one of brotherhood and glory; it is much more the
experience of death, suffering and mental illness. More men die in conflict than women, and more are held
as prisoners. The high incidence of rape during conflict is often the reason why women are regarded as
particularly vulnerable. But sexual violence is also regularly used against men, although it attracts much
less attention (Sivakumaran 2007, p. 256).24
What is clear, however, is that conflict accentuates existing differences of power and access to resources,
weakening the position of those who are already without power, whether they are men, women or
children (El Bushra 2007, p. 136).
Turn Appropriation of Suffering

Appropriation of experiences, eradicates difference
Lyshaug 6 (Brenda, University of Utah, Solidarity without Sisterhood?
Feminism and the Ethics of Coalition Building, Politics & Gender, 2 (2006), 77100)
The first case of problematic identification occurs when the one who identifies with another actually
appropriates the others experiences, claiming them as her own. Identification, here, takes an egoistic
form in which one loses a proper sense of the distance that separates oneself from the other. Elizabeth
Spelman discusses a striking instance of such appropriation that illustrates its ethically troubling
character. In the nineteenth century, white women suffragists frequently compared their situation to the
plight of slaves. Drawing on research by Jean Fagan Yellin, Spelman discusses how white women used vivid
images of slavery to describe their own suffering, while allowing the suffering of actual slaves to recede
from their view. They appropriated the experiential territory of black women and men, but in ways that
erased slaves themselves from that territory (Spelman 1997, 116). This appropriation of the language of
slavery promoted the suffragist cause precisely by denying differences between the suffering of white women
and that of slaves and, ultimately, by drawing attention away from the distinctive circumstances in which slaves
suffered. In this instance of identification, the other is erased; the individual who appropriates the others
experience uses this claimed commonality for her own purposes and does so in a way that threatens her
apprehension of the others difference (ibid., 11317).
No Impact Patriarchy not Cause War

Exaggerated debates about patriarchy impacts mislead about
the impacts and cant solve
Crenshaw 2 (Carrie, PhD, Former President of CEDA Perspectives In Controversy:
Selected Articles from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 2002 p. 119-126
Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. Increasingly, students rely on
feministauthors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist
thought, I am concerned that such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound
causal reasoning in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical
proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim
debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to

marginalize the voices of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value
of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that causal arguments are
desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer
over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning
increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments
promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people
tolerate the existence of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for
"commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim,
caprice, or the non-reflexive "claims of immediacy " (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important
that
role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of
cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning.
The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material
conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific
investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human
beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type
of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions "to provide reasons to justify a belief that
a causal connection exists" (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the
provision of "good reasons" to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence
of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal
analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for
causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this
phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters
argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992
resolution, "[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of
women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to
women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the welfare system
exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patriarchy cases.
Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing
rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both
desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy

includenightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many
topics,
debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the
feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising
provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately
solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the
state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the
consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a
Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single
feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism
as a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmaticentity and feminists as women with identical m
otivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single
whole.
or root cause of all forms of oppression . Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the
consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental
degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist
arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the complexities of human motivation and
explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and
physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists to feminism and
theidentification
of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to

the current form of intercollegiate debate practice . By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of
form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite"
(Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic
criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293).
He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads
a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that
there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree
the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has
no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form
can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact
as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ
Debaters practice the convention of poor causal

reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional
form Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic
impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will
rhetorical proof in arguments about causality.
take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally
related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments
Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause

relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience
expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The
themselves are conventional.
convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified
the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us

from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught
by the sequence. I suspect that
between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and
subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical
answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding
The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the

subject matter they are debating. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a
pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole
cause of oppression. The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular
feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the
causal relationship between link and impact Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic
assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated .
of causal reasoning.
Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches
to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive
ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist
feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common
commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and
reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different
categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural
feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two
distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on
behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and
individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that
contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists
have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of
non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and
Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are
united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have
resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist
discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept
definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17).
The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The
power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and
from that feminism. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been
satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as
oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory
Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include

and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and
silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status . This position
becomes clearer when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate
debate patriarchy is the sole cause of oppression. Important feminist thought has resisted
this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole
cause foppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression
like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism ch subjugation has the
effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as
struggles of equal importance. "Within feminist movement in the West, this led to the
assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist
action than resisting racism and other forms of domination" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The
18).
. Su
relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the
identifying patriarchy as the single source of

oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and
domination, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do participate in
politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. If focus on
patriarchal domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention
from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women cooperate in suppressing and
promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for
transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20). Characterizing patriarchy as
the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for
the exercise of class and race privilege . It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as
secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because
debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a
"sole cause" argument In addition,
large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments
arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof
The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of

certain feminist voices. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. Privileging the
act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices
and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle hooks, Talking Back
14). Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more
concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would
learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the
marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself . The content of the speech of
for complex causal relationships.
"(
feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore
alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal
voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If
the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and
distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined
by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this
point,
arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be
overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in

assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic
impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single
feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression . In
making this critique, I am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate
debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns
affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in
everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of power in our
private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism,
consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation. "lE]ducation for critical
consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways
sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our collective experience" (hooks, Talking Back 24).
Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the
importance of feminists to individual or societal consciousness raising.
Case Adv Turns K

Patriarchy is caused by war
AFP 4 (Agence France Presse, December 10, 2004, http://www.worldrevolution.org/news/article1702.htm)
Raped, treated as the sexual 'booty' of war or slain by indiscriminate bombings,
women are too often the first
victims of conflict, Amnesty International charged Wednesday in a report demanding legal redress. The London-based
human rights group called for action by the International Criminal Court to halt oppressive violence against women. " Patterns
of violence against women in conflict do not arise 'naturally' but are ordered,
condoned or tolerated as a result of political calculations ," its secretary general Irene Khan said in
introducing the 120-page report on women in war. Not only are women "considered as the legitimate
booty of victorious army," the report said, but "the use of rape as a weapon of war is
perhaps the most notorious and brutal way in which conflicts impact on women."
"Women's bodies, their sexuality and reproductive capacity are often used as a
literal battleground," it said. Khan, the first women, the first Asian and the first Muslim to head Amnesty International,
told AFP in an interview that "it's quite interesting to see that women rights have been used as
justification for military intervention, in the cases of both Iraq (news - web sites) and
Afghanistan (news - web sites)." But, she added, "on the ground the situation changes very little in favor of women ... In the
case of Afghanistan we have seen no improvement. "Warlords are occupying parts of the territory and see women as commodities
for trading, to settle land dispute. Abductions and forced marriages are about as bad, if not worse, than at any time in Afghan
history. "Warlords
are not being pulled out, they're not being prosecuted, they're not
being investigated for the crimes that are openly committing ." Even where women are not
deliberately targetted, they are the main victims of so-called collatoral damage, whether caused by "precision" bombing or
landmines, the report said. "In Iraq in 2003, US forces reportedly used more than 10,500 cluster munitions containing at least 1.8
million bomblets. An average failure rate of five percent would mean that about 90,000 unexploded munitions are now on Iraqi soil."
The report urged the International Criminal Court to "pick up and prosecute one or two high-profile cases because that will send the
message that violence against women cannot continue in such an impunity, which is the norm today." The court, headquartered in
The Hague (news - web sites), began operating in July 2002 and is mandated to try genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes. Kahn acknowledged the way ahead would be tough, but said she hoped the report would generate pressure for change.
Women and children make up 80 percent of the world's 40 million refugees, but they have no voice, and injustices go unpunished,"
she added. "If
you take the example of the Korean women, the comfort women in Japan,
who were used as sex slaves during the second world war, even now they're still
battling for the recognition of their case ," Khan said. The report detailed widespread rape in conflicts
around the world, including the Darfur region of Sudan, Colombia, Nepal, Chechnya
(news - web sites), India and, earlier this year, in the tiny Pacific territory of the Solomon Islands. Tens of
thousands of women and young girls were raped during the conflicts sweeping the
Democratic Republic of Congo (news - web sites). "Ten years on from the genocide in
Rwanda, where violence against women was a central element of the strategy to
eliminate a particular ethnic group, little or nothing seems to have been learned
about how to prevent such horrors," the report said.

Feminist Terror K - Northwestern 2015

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Feminist Terror K - Northwestern 2015

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

-File by Blake & Bright-Patterson, ALGG Lab, NDI 2015

Howard Zinns passionate opposition to a war against Iraq and

The extensive use of

blindness [obscuring], characterizes

In the Pentagons approach to the problem and virtually all media

fact that is repeatedly

This militarism is patriarchal, replicates oppression and

ideological manifestations of militarism are more difficult to identify because often

Vote negative to rethink framings of violence reject their

spatial hierarchy in its relation, and to rethink it as variously configured spatial

Counterterrorism against global terror exacerbates and masks

Where is the war on

and victims and survivors

The affirmatives failure change the underlying justifications of

This war was not a war for womens liberation; it

RAWA Revolutionary Afghan Women Association

whom are women, children, and the elderly.17 Ignoring

Families have too

Afghan refugees experience poverty, lack of rights, discrimination, and

e family of a kidnapped girl or woman has no real

most women are frightened to leave

This militarism is patriarchal, replicates oppression and

ideological manifestations of militarism are more difficult to identify because often

Vote negative to rethink framings of violence reject their

The goal of all

The alternative comes first value to life can only be solved

Feminist Perspective Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies

Discourse Legalism, WoT

Discourse C/T, Protection

A further consequence of the discourse on the global war against

paying close attention to

existing models for thinking about the

this model recognizes that neither everyday nor global terrorism

The eliding of a womens policy has led

the concept of security move away

These gender characteristics are often expressed as binary opposition

By proving his "manhood", a man is

Root Cause Turns War

Militaristic nationalism encourages polarization in which a group identity is defined as

evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the

rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic

"unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies , (d), is then viewed as a

only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors

global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable

omission of such discussions will result in

use of force is justified in failed states, as well as in response to

anticipatory self-defence came to include a

This description constructs terrorist camps and WMD production

statements avoid direct engagement with the international law on the

the narrative of pre-emptive strikes against terrorist

laws are complicit in this legal Othering through the

we must remain sensitive to those circumstances in which the term

we suggest that scholars of state terrorism aim

an outcome can best be avoided

2) Predictability this is most predictable the 1ac relies on

Everyday terrorism is key more common, structural, and a

Remapping and relating terrorisms contributes to wider collective recognition of,

The alternative creates a discourse that changes policies from

future research on the relationship between terrorism and cultural attitudes. It

I argue that international legal developments that acknowledged

While feminist analysis of sex and gender is

3. Perm is a framing issue ethics are a prior question, failure