Adam Pilarski

5/4/2015

Post-9/11 popular discourse seems to have bred the word radicalization into the public
vernacular. The Western mass media has further perpetuated the term, depicting lone wolf
attackers as socially disenfranchised or mentally ill pariahs (Githens-Mazer, 559). These
attributes have, however, been largely refuted by analysts and experts on the subject (GithensMazer, 563). Such widespread erroneous convictions have created a backlash for an entire
population who fit such a criteria, specifically, refugees. This renders a kind of apprehension in
host governments hosting displaced persons from states with well-publicized terrorist activity. In
turn, this produces an alarming dilemma for humanitarian organizations-specifically, how to
counter the threat of radicalization. Using the examples of the al-Kharaz and Dadaab camps, this
paper will attempt to analyze how this dilemma perpetuates itself in both contexts.
At first glance, the al-Kharaz camp is an ideal breeding ground for radicals. Comprised
largely of Somali refugees, this relatively small establishment is straddled between two different
theaters of extremist insurgencies. Fleeing the operating grounds of al-Shabaab in Somalia in
favor of the al-Qaeda harbinger in Yemen, these displaced persons are seen as fleeing one failed
state to another (Somalis Fleeing to Yemen Prompt New Worries in Fight against Al-Qaeda).
News stories and studies dating to 2010 adduce strong Salafist influence in the camp itself. And
indeed, for some time, the Gulf of Aden has served as a bridge for primary operations for terror
networks. Human smuggling, arms deals, and trafficking are all abound in the inlet connecting
the nations (Terrorists Posing as Refugees in Yemen). Both the Yemeni government and the
United Nations have expressed concern of radicalization, albeit to slightly varying degrees
(Countering Radicalization in Refugee Camps). This inculcation seems all the more tangible with

the findings of one such report conducted by the Belfer Center of Harvard University. When
secondary school children of Kharaz were asked what their aspirations for adulthood were, a
notable quantity expressed interest in joining the ranks of al-Qaeda. These individuals cited
convictions that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were the most plausible prospects for peace in
Somalia. Perhaps even more worrying is that many of them expressed outright interest in
repatriating to their nation and taking up arms in the jihad. Such radical sentiments were further
exacerbated by the announcement that the Yemeni government would soon be taking charge of
primary education in the following year. While this decision was primarily an effort to counter
potential indoctrination of students, it served to only heighten tensions. More than half of the
male students responded with militant hostility. In addition to boycotting the system altogether,
some even threatened to surround the school with guns (Countering Radicalization in Refugee
Camps). However, one must not mistake this bellicosity as brainwashed insubordination. Further
research into the matter, later verified by the UN, showed that government-commissioned
primary teachers were every bit as unqualified as they were abusive. The report cited instances of
teachers frequently beating Somali students (but sparing Yemeni students), as well as frequent
corruption and language barriers (Countering Radicalization in Refugee Camps). Failing to
acknowledge this, the government countered this seemingly insurmountable force of radicalism
within al-Kharaz by detaining alleged al-Shabaab recruiters posing as refugees (Somalis Fleeing
to Yemen Prompt New Worries in Fight against Al-Qaeda). Most Somalis, however, are
doubtful that such militant activity is transpiring within the camp. Consequently, such an
arbitrary and unfounded crackdown on Somali refugees residing outside of camps. Most express
fear to leave their homes at night, citing the likely possibility of being detained (Somalis
Fleeing to Yemen Prompt New Worries in Fight against Al-Qaeda) Such counter-measures

against radicalism in refugees have engendered a virtually indiscriminate disdain for Somali
citizens both within and beyond the camps borders.
Such universal condemnation of Somali refugees is not exclusive to Yemen. Indeed, in
the ongoing war with al-Shabaab the Kenyan government has formally blamed Somalis as a
collective whole (International Humanitarian Response and Militarization of Refugee and IDP
Camps in Kenya and Sudan). National politicians are quick to trace militancy to radicalization
in the Dadaab camp, which they have hitherto categorized as a nursery for terror. The camp
came into the international consciousness in April, when Kenyan officials publicly announced its
impending closure. The decision was speculatively in response to the deadly attacks at Garissa
University, which claimed the lives of 148 people (Somali Refugees Urge Kenya Not to Close
Dadaab Camp). If one observes the history of the camp, however, one will find that this action
is merely the zenith of an ongoing crackdown on the camp. Indeed, as early as 2011, the Kenyan
government has been exponentially tightening security within the camp. The intensive
monitoring has intensified in proportion with every attack within the nation, and refugees are
almost unrelentingly persecuted. Indeed, many have been subject to arbitrary and often hostile
questioning, having been accused of militant sentiments (Dadaab: The Worlds Biggest Refugee
Camp). This reached yet another watermark when, in 2014, Kenyan authorities demanded that
all Somali refugees return to the Dadaab camp (International Humanitarian Response and
Militarization of Refugee and IDP Camps in Kenya and Sudan). What is perhaps most
disheartening in the case of this camp is the lack of evidence to suggest that radicalization is
taking place. Indeed, the tightened security measures enacted by the state hardly foster an
environment for voices of dissent (International Humanitarian Response and Militarization of
Refugee and IDP Camps in Kenya and Sudan). In spite of this, the very prospect of

radicalization within the camps themselves has rendered the government implacable in its
campaign undercut legitimacy of both Somali refugees and the Dadaab camp itself.
To a certain extent, it could be argued that the very notion of radicalization is simply a
rhetorical device employed in the ongoing war on terror. Indeed, to a certain extent, one might
even say that the concept itself is, more or less, sheer propaganda. Numerous and often
contradictory studies have attempted to explain the stages of radicalization (Milton et al, 635).
As a result, the notion is almost used as a weapon in the struggle for global hegemonic influence.
Given that Yemen and Kenya have both received military aid from the United States in
combatting jihadists, it could be argued that they are both attempting to partake in the global war
on terror (International Humanitarian Response and Militarization of Refugee Camps in Kenya
and Sudan). An unfortunate byproduct, however, is that refugees are caught in the crossfire.
Given that these persons fit the general profile for an individual susceptible to radicalization
(economically destitute, socially marginalized, etc.) they have become a prime target for
governments to legitimize their end of the conflict. This possibility is further evinced by the fact
that their targeting of refugee camps does not seem entirely credible. In the case of Kenya, for
example, the 2014 rounding up of Somalis into Dadaab, and sequential announcement of the
camps closure a year later, might indicate a larger agenda. Specifically, to display an unrelenting
dedication to the absolute eradication of extremist influence in their region. This could be
compensatory for their own ineptitude to quell the terrorist insurgency, or intended as an
exhibition of resolution to potential benefactors. This institutional implementation of policy
virtually paralyzes humanitarian organizations in the matter. Both the UNHCR and other NGOs
have failed to exercise any significant influence on the host governments treatment of refugees
(International Humanitarian Response and Militarization of Refugee and IDP Camps in Kenya

and Sudan). In this sense, they are at the will of a larger hegemonic struggle for influence. In
being rendered impotent by their host government, a greater network of power prevents any
desirable or favorable solution for the refugees of either nation.
To come to a solution, one might first consider the universal nature of this conundrum. In
the event that there are, in fact, refugees being radicalized, one must consider governmental
accountability in the matter. To remove the matter from a contemporary context, take the
example of Cyprus throughout the course of 1914 and 1959. Scholar Charles Dementrieu
attributes the radicalization of Cypriot youth in the 1930s as a last resort. Unheeded by political
institutions, nationalist students staged an unruly protest. This was officially received by the
ruling UK government by abolishing the Legislative Council and sanctioning a formidable
degree of civil liberties (Dementriou, 402). This directly aligns with the severe lack of
institutional representation for refugees within both Kharaz and Dadaab. In the case of the
former, the outright frustration that the youths voice for their systematic discrimination should
further evince that the camps are being used as a theater of hegemonic war. This strategy,
however, only proves beneficial to the radicals in question. Parents of the children within the
Kharaz camp stated that they would rather their children join al-Qaeda for an education than
solely rely upon the system which the state has implemented. This notably comes in spite of their
professed opposition to Salafist ideology, which they are willing to compromise to counter the
insufficiency of the governments aid (Countering Radicalization in Refugee Camps). Thus, in
order to win favor and membership, a political entity may exploit the desperation and destitution
of a refugee. Such a tactic was employed by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1937. When
citizens of Shanghai fled Japanese attacks that August, the CCP promptly established refugee
camps in the surrounded region. Moreover, all other services unavailable to such displaced

persons were sought to with the establishment of clinics, hospitals, and schools. This all
culminated in the partys paramount hand in aiding them to repatriate back to Shanghai. This
administration of aid permitted them to hold formidable sway over the people, coupling their
services with political education (Stranahan, 166-169). Thus, seeing as how the UNHCR may
have difficulty in publicly challenging the discourse of radicalization, it may be advisable for
the organization to work democratically. It could begin by implementing implicit representation
from political refugees within the camps themselves. This way, all variables resulting in refugee
disillusionment-which, in turn, may lead to radicalization-can be effectively addressed.
Works Cited
Camp, Richard Spencer in Al-Kharaz. "Terrorists Posing as Refugees in Yemen." The Telegraph.
Telegraph Media Group, 21 Nov. 2010. Web. 04 May 2015.
Demetriou, C. "Political Radicalization and Political Violence in Palestine (1920-1948), Ireland
(1850-1921), and Cyprus (1914-1959)." Social Science History 36.3 (2012): 391-420.
Web. 4 May 2015.
Githens-Mazer, J. "The Rhetoric and Reality: Radicalization and Political Discourse."
International Political Science Review 33.5 (2012): 556-67. Web. 4 May 2015.
Martin-Rayo, Francisco. Countering Radicalization in Refugee Camps. Working paper. The
Dubai Initiative, June 2011. Web. 4 May 2015.
Milton, Daniel, Megan Spencer, and Michael Findley. "Radicalism of the Hopeless: Refugee
Flows and Transnational Terrorism." International Interactions 39.5 (2013): 621-45.
Web. 4 May 2015.
Mohamed, Hamza. "Dadaab: The World's Biggest Refugee Camp." Al Jazeera English. Al
Jazeera, 4 May 2014. Web. 04 May 2015.

Raghaven, Sudrasan. "Somalis Fleeing to Yemen Prompt New Worries in Fight against AlQaeda." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 12 Jan. 2010. Web. 04 May 2015.
"Somali Refugees Urge Kenya Not to Close Dadaab Camp." Al Jazeera English. Al-Jazeera, 13
Apr. 2015. Web. 04 May 2015.
Song, Young Hoon. "International Humanitarian Response and Militarization of Refugee and
IDP Camps in Kenya and Sudan." Journal of International and Area Studies 19.1
(2012): 115-36. Chatham House. Chatham House, 8 May 2014. Web. 4 May 2015.
Stranahan, P. "Radicalization of Refugees: Communist Party Activity in Wartime Shanghai's
Displaced Persons Camps." Modern China 26.2 (2000): 166-93. JSTOR [JSTOR].
Web. 4 May 2015.

DILEMMA-Threat of radicalization. For Yemen, their hitherto incredibly lenient policies

regarding refugee admittance, particularly of Somalians, might need to tighten down. For
Dadaab, the host government is calling for the U.N. to close the camp altogether. In turn, what
options are they left with? Forced repatriation, resettlement, or relocation?

HOW DOES THIS DILEMMA MANIFEST ITSELF IN EACH REFUGEE CAMP?

Kharaz-Secondary school students (primarily children) express their desire to join the ranks of
al-Qaeda after graduation. This is largely due to the educational opportunities afforded to its
militants, which surpassed those offered in the camp in terms of quality. Additionally, many
children see Osama bin Ladens leadership as the best prospect for peace in Somalia. Indeed,
these same children suggested that they wanted to repatriate so that they may join the fight for
their country. Al-Qaedas presence in the region was hitherto bolstered by the popularity and
firebrand rhetoric of Anwar al-Awlaki. Thus, it is not a matter of no opportunity, but simply a
superior one.

REASONS FOR KENYAN REACTION TO DADAAB-The university attack by al-Shabaab

was one of such unparalleled abhorrence. Consequently, it quickly caught the attention of

international headlines and analysts. This reflected negatively on the Kenyan government, who,
in turn, hopes to eliminate any chance of

What seems to be a trend with host governments in these cases is that they generalize
radicalization threats by the national population, rather than simply the refugees. This is not
entirely unreasonable, given the fact that-in both cases-the host governments accepted claves of
refugees from these nationalities.