Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MISSION:
Filei
R 475p
Study Nmbor
52
UBLrTJ OF CONTENTS
Chapter 6 .
Chapter 7 .
CDL Tanks
Chapter
8.
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---
- -
--
--
35
- -- - -- - - -
41
- - -- - - -- - - - -
- -
Chapter 9 .
Chapter 10.
Special Equlpment O r g a n i z a t i o n s
Section- 1.
U.S.
Sectior. 2 .
F u t u r e Requirements
Chapterll.
- - - - - - - 26
and E r i t i s h Orgznizetlons
- -
- - - -
--
43
- -
45
- - - - - 47
- -- - - - - -
50
Appendices :
1. O r k a n i z a t i o n C h a r t , B r i t i s h 79th Armored D i v i s i o n .
2 , BnploTpent of' CROCODLLL Tanks i n x t t a c k on F'T. MOi<TBI..HY
n e z r BhbST, France.
- 1 -
. . . C h i e f , Arnored S e c t i o n
. .. .. Arnored
Section
Armored S e c t i o n
1 2 t h Armd Div
. .. ... 3dConnanding,
Gomanding, 8 t h
Div
Armored D i v i s i o n
M p _ j Gen R o d e r i c k h, A l l e n , 04652 ,
Maj Gen John M. Devine, 05232 , ,
B r i g Gen Truman &. Boudinot, 06777 ,
B r i g Gen ,es
8. C o l l i e r , 015474
C o l W a l t e r A . Bigby, 010294
,
C o l C h a r l e s V. bromley Gr, 015239
C o l B j a r n e Furuhomen, 015725
,
Col W a l t e r B u m s i d e , 015208 , ,
,
,
Armd
. . . 2d Armored D i v i s i o n .
. . . . . 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n
. . 1 2 t hSArmored
Division
. . . .. Gr3
e c t i o n , Gen Bd,
. . Armored
S e c t i o n , Gen Ed
Formerly Comdr, 10th Armd Gp
C o l Nelson K. L l n d s Jr, 017730 . . . . Ordnance O f f i c e r , Gen Bd
Col Horace Mop. Woodward Jr, 010188 . Chemical O f f i c e r , Gsn Bd
C o l Wendell Flanohard, 015528 . . . . . 4th. Armored Division
Col F r e d e r i c J. Brown, 016761 . . , . . 3d Armored, D i v i s i o n
C o l R i c h a r d J. Handy, 017130 . , . . . 1 s t Armored D i v i s i o n
Col Carl I. B u t t o n , 018177 , , , , . . Zd Armored D i v i s i o n
CoL A l b e r t 6. H a r r i s , 018121 , . , .
,a
.,
Armored S e c t i o n , Gen Bd
Formerly 6 t h Armd Div
, , Armored S e c t i o n , Gen Ed
Formerly Comdr, 7 0 t h Tk Bn
Ordnar-ce S e c t i o n , Gen Bd
.G-3 S e c t i d n , USFET
Formerly Somdr, 753d Tk B n
, Armored S e c t i o n , Gen Ed
Formerly Comdr, 7 4 7 t h TIC 13n
, Chemical S e c t i o n , Gen Ed
Engifiecr S e c t i o n , @n Bd
.. .. .. ..
.. .
McN&bb, 0900514 . .
L t Col S t u a r t G. F r i e s , 019827
L t Col W i l l i a m M.
?ifajor W i l l i a m H. C o r r e a l e , 0196483
- 2 -
..
TE GENERAL BOAID
APO LO8
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
- 3 -
CIIAPTER 2
SECTION i
GENKiUL
5.
plodcrs
WG
d-valoped f o r
b. X s c r i p t i c n .
'Three d i f f e r e n t rnodc1.s of p r e s s u r e typc mine
c x p l d o r s vwre s u p p f i e d t h i s s h c a t e r p r i o r t o 'fD-Day", and ivcre employed i n combat.
- 5 -
t h e London M w i t i o n s Assignment Board f o r the procuroment of 45 additional. CRABS from t h e Bri.t,ish i n January l ~ and~ this
~ re
, ujrement
was i n c r e a s e d .to a t o t a l of '105CRABS t h e following month.&
Of t h i - s
t o t a l 50 were t o be used t o convert the two mine exploder b a t t a l i o n s
t o CILIBS, and 5s were f o r t h e replacement of s i x months a n t i c i n a t e d
b a t t l e losses. This requirement-was cancelled several.-weeks p r i o r t o
W-31iDay when it could bc Qeen tho rerpirement for a d c i t i o n a l n i n e
explndcrs no longer oxisbed,
8. i n t r o d u c t i o n
P
8..
Two mine exploders, T1E3, were received with s p e c i a l
Od.IUnCo p w " e l i n . 4 p j . l 1944 i n advance of t h Q r e c e i p t s of the
bulk o i t h e mine exploders from t h e Zone o f I n t e r i o r , and were demons-l;ra I,cd in tho UniLed Rinfidom t o r e a r e s e n t a t i v e s from the ma.$or
7 9 t h Armoured E l v i s i o n . ( T h i s u n i t i s also d i s c u s s e d i n S e c t i o n 1
of ChE.pter 10.) A t t h e cesuati.un o f h o s t i l i t i e s t h e 79th Armored
D i v i s i o n i n c l u d e d a V l a i l Brigadell c o n s i s t i n g of tmee I I F l e i l Regi1nentS" Of tl?rW? s q u d r o n s 02 15 O h B S each (See Append- 1).
t o spearhead a ne:v
of t h e r o a d . Ir. both
exploders became
by t h o column.
b . Thc CRAB plxtooii formed by thc 2d Armored D i v i s i o n (paragriiph (I,, nbovr:) WZJ employed iviih th. 7117th Tank B a t t a l i o n which was
attached t o t h a 29th I n f a n t r y Division f o r tho a s s a u l t a g a i n s t ST LO,
l;'r.nnc;.:, in ,July 1Yl.ih. T h i s 1;own had been s u b j e c t e d t o v e r y severe a i r
and a r t i . l l o r y bombarchlent, ani: t h o r x x l t i n g r u b b l c Lhat had c o l l c c t e d
i n th; s t r w t o iriado t h e f l a i l s i n e f f a c t i v c . Thorcfore, t h e s e t a n k s
w o r u ult.unatwly omploycd as f i g h t e r t a n k s , and, as m c h , m a t e r i a l l y
a i d c d :in t h c aosaull;.
c . :Iho 738.1;h and 739th Tank B a t t a l i o n s (Nino Zxplodar) at~L;lciicdrmu : o r l p ~ . ~ ~tyo each of .the Corps of F i r s t and Ninth l1.S. Armii?s,
r c s p : Lively. T11u od3U.bh Kiiic F i e l d C l c m ~ l c oCotnpany was employed
i n a Z i m i l i u * n:mnor by ~ ; r v c n t h U. S. Ariny. Sn;all dctachmu~its oquivaIr:n.L; ,to :I p.Ln.toon or s e c t i o n c f inino cxpl.odcrs w r c normally a t t a c h e d
to vnr.i.ous m g i n u c r con;bxt group3 and battalioils and W C ~ Oomployad
in cl. NU- i i i r ; i ~ j o : l . n L ~soc.cions
d
02 r o a d s and 1dr.c f i c l d s c n c o u n t c r e d o r
'bypss:;~Cl :in t h ~ndv:lnco -LO t h c iiOE13 .River and bctwccn t h c 120Eii and t h o
rli.IINB L t i v u s i : i January, February, and March 17bS.
(1) A
platoon of f i v e C.1ABS f r o 3 Comphny IIAlI, '739th Tmlc
rj3tI;dion was xttnchcd t o t h o 3G3d Engincer Combat
Ilr.ttalion t o brcach a l a r g c m L m f i e l d . on 30 January
17003ii ilivcr ap$-occh.
'Tho a s s a u l t f a i l c d
' a s 'tv:o ciuns wcrc dostroyod by onmny anti-tnnlc gun
v i a 3 d i z a b l x i by anti-t nk ininos,
f j . r c , tvro CNI~IS
a mec!ianlcal. f a i l u r e .l?
and cric s~lfi'c~.cd
13LlJ.r i n t h o
(2)
j,;-twool~
i;hc d ~ ~ and
l ; RHIXZ R'lvors i n 1vi:rch -945.
*ypi!:;o
opc!rak,ions wore savcrly handicappcd b y r o a d
qraLcrs, wrccltcd ocpipnarh, moa and mud, .ad sharp
.turns ;i1
roads.
- 7 -
S c v x , i l mini: u x p l o a c r s w r x ~
t e m p o r a r i l y d i s a b l e d by mines d e t o n a t e d by t h o t r a c k
i n back'ng and t u r n i n g t o n o g o t i a t c sharp road
t u r n s .I&
d.
LO.
b.
Deficiencies:
TlE3 rondbound.
fuses, and
r e l a t i v e l y large explosive c h a r g e s .
(3) h l k y and d i f f i c u l t t o t r a n s p o r t ; n e c e s s i t a t i n g
f r e q u e n t assembly md disasseinbly.
( 5 ) The T1E3
OqUiVa-
a. Merits:
(b) Providc;; ~ m c . rp r o t o c t i o n
b.
f o r crew.
Dc..ficiancies:
(1) Vulncr&le t o off-sot mines, delay fuses, and rolaL i v e l y lLwgc a p l o s i v c charges.
(2)
Vehicle p r a c t i c a l l y b l i n d when f l a i l is i n operation.
( 2 ) F l a i l s wear out
rain
r a p i d l y on pavcmant o r r o c b t o r -
a g a i n s t mines buriud i n e x c e s s
(4)
tmoffec(;ive
o six inches deep i n normal t C r r a i n .
of f i v c
SXTION 3
CONCUSSION TYPE MINE EXPLODERS
for
- 9-
t o d e s a n s i t i z o t h c n i t r o g l y c e r i n cxplosivc ( W o b o l
8 2 2 ~ 1 1of) t h e CoNGEII t o f r o a z c . This made t h e cans
of e x p l o s i v e t o o ' s e n s i t i v e t o b e handled i n tempera t u r e below 320 P.20
10
?
.
SllE MMY
( 3 ) Must r a p i d .iathcd w a i l a b l e f o r c l e a r i n g s c a t t e r e d
mines on l i n e s of communication.
(11: Scvcral models c a n b: used i n a l t e r n a t c r o l e a s a
1lf
b.
i eh t c r
11
tank.
Deiiciencies.
(3) D i f f i c u l t t o t r a n s p o r t .
(4)
1.7.
l
a.
E f f e c t i v e method 0." c l e a r i n g a l l
(4) MosL
e x c e p t t h o s o l o c a t e d in road ways.
- li -
t y p o s o f mmes
b. D e f i c i e n c c s .
(4)
Vulnerable t o disablement o r d e t o p a t i o n by l a r g e
c a l i b e r f i r e and v i t a l l y placed m.al1 a r m s f i r e d w i n g employment.
( 5 ) U n s u i t a b l e
f o r u s e i n c l e a r i n g a i r p o r t s o r roadways.
18. Concb.sions.
a. An u r g e n t requirement e x i s t s f o r s a t i s f a c t o r y n e t h o d s of
l o c a t i n g and b r e a c h i n g mine f i e l d s , and e x p e d i t i o u s % c l e a r i n g and/or
d e t e c t i n g s c a t t e r e d mines on r o a d s a i i h t r a i l s
(2)
>
1. TM 9-736,
W i n e Exploder, T l Z l I l , 2 5 Kay
1944.
3. S e c t i o n L, " 7 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n
h. War
5. ETOIJSA
Cable
F i n a l Report", July
4 September
1943.
23 January 1944.
12
1945.
7.
8.
ETCUsk Cable E-56808, 23
9.
ETOUSA Cable EX
October
1944 to
19h.
10.
ETOUSA Gable EX 66026, 22 November 19!h and 21st Army Group Cable
11.
ETOUSA Cable,
12.
Staff Study re:
- Cline EXplod-
L t r , Lieport, Hq, 25th Ammored j3ngir.cer B a t t a l i o n t o CG, 6th hrrflorod D i v i s i o n , subj: %$ne R o l l e r ( ~ 1 ~ 30 )e r a t i o n During Period
6 and 9 October 19bh, d a t e d 11 October 19x4.
15.
" A f t e r a c t i o n xcportsrl, company I ~ A I I 7, 39th ~ankB a t t a l i o n (hfE-spec),
dntcd
16.
"After
5 .F.zbruay 1945.
A c t i o n Elcportsl'
, 730th
Tank B a t t a l i o n (ME-Spcc) d a t e d
47, dated
25 Octobcr 1 9 h .
18.
IITechnical Data and I n s t r u c t i o n s - 2 I1Con,bes,JIk I", OC-3, H q
Corn 2, 23 August 1945.
llgiegfried Line in V I 1 C o r p s Zone of Advancet', Hq, V I 1 Corps, OCEJ
18 Octobsr 1944.
20.
War O f f i s e Cab1.e~57173 and 59135, dated h and 1 2 Jatmary
re spect i v e l y ,
- 13 -
1945,
CHAPTER 3
;.
- 14 -
tallon, (total
tclion),
( 3 ) ~
Y Cp e r s o l f - p r o p e l l e d t a n k d e s t r o y e r oompnny m t h
t m k d e s t r o y e r b u t t e l i o n s equipped w i t h 3" G u n
Motor Cmriogk, 110, o r SOnin G u n Motor C c r r i a g e ,
bBb, ( t G t C . 1
SlX per b a t t s l i o n ) .
SEction 1, p . r 5 9 bclow).
Tnnlc d o i b r s were ~ l s oirbtnined from t h o n t e r
21..
Dnplcymont i n 51ombc.t.
C.
country.
(2)
- 1'5-
S h o r t l y a f t e r D-Day a p l a t c o n of f o u r t r n k d o z e r s
of t h e 741st Tcnk BGttalicn o p e r n t i n g on t h e batches
under i n t e n s e f i r e , removed bench o b s t a c l e s , opened
r a n d s , and pushed o f f beached l a n d i n g v e h i c l e s .
The t a n k dozer was used t o b r m k through hedgerows,
broaden e x i s t i n g gaps and gaps blown w i t h E x p l o s i v e
charges; arid thereby f o c i l i t a t e d t h e use o f c t h e r
t h a n normal entrances through hedgerows. 5
Tank and gun emplacements were prepared.
Road blocks were c l e a r e d ; and i n a d d i t i o n , r u b b l e ,
wrecked v e h i c l e s , imd snow were removed, and c r e t e r s
f i l l e d . It wtrs found necessary i n many i n s t a n c e s
t o p r o v i d e a tank dozer f c r t h e s e purposes t o work
i n c o n j u n c t i o n with t h e r o l l e r type mine e x p l o d e r s
i n sweeping roads and shculders.
cies :
(1) M e r i t s :
(a) The t a n k dozer provides armored u n i t s w i t h
a s t n n d a r d vehicle t h a t c r n be r e a d i l y employed
t o reduce o b s t a c l e s and assist i n t h s cdvance
o f units o r t o a s s i s t i n t h e p r e p e r n t i o n o f
defonsive positions.
( b ) A r m o r p r o t e c t i o n is provided f o r t h e crew.
(c)
(d)
fl
( 2 ) Deficiencies:
( 0 )
The t a n k dozer i n s t a l l a t i o n m a t e r i a l l y l i m i t s
t h e d r i v e r ' s f i e l d O f vision.
There is i n s u f f i c i e n t clearance between t h e
- 16 -
S u f f i c i e n t dozer blade a a c e s s o r i e s w e r e
n o t c v n i l n b l e s o t i n t d o z e r blzLdes s c l v n g e d
from burned tcnks could be r e n d i l y r e i n s t n l l e d
on o t h e r tanks.
1. i. d o l l y o r s i m i 1 c . r devicL t h i t can be t o w e d b e h i n d u.
t a n k should be developed t c f c c i l i t c . t c t r c n s p o r t n t i o n o f t h o d o z e ?
b1c.d; on e x t e n d e d ror:d marches. Considerntion s h o u l d be g i v e n t o
developing a d e h e thct c m r e c e i v e the dozer b l a d e when j e t t i s o n e d
by the t a n k , End t h o r e b y o b v i c t c t h e n t e d f o r ti c r c n c .
9, dc,ted 1 ?&rch
1944.
3. L t r , H2 EJToUsi.,
5.
c).
dLted 19 J u l y 1944.
llrr
201,
- 17 -
CHAPTER 4
DD GNKS
_.__
24.
DescriPticn. The DD (Duplex d r i v e ) d e v i c e i s c modific a t i o n of 8 standLrd M4 Medim Tank (Sherman) w / 7 5 m gun i n which
e m t e r proof canvus c u r t a i n i s . a t t c c h e d t o a S t e t 1 dcck welded
around the t a n k rbt t h e sponson l i n e . The upper edge c f t h e c u r t s l n
i n f a s t e n e d t o a r i g i d one-piece metal frame with f o l d i n g v e r t i c c l
s t r u t s t o a s s i s t i n holding c u r t a i n i n p l a c e when r a i s e d . V e r t i c b l
rubber t u b e s , f a s t e n e d t o t h e i n n e r s i d e o f t h e c u r t a i n r a i s e t h e
c u r t n i n when t h e t u b e s a r e i n f l r t e d from compressed a i r b o t t l e s ccrr i e d on t h e deck o f the tank. $he t a n k h u l l is Wnt6r-proofsd t o t h e
c u r t a i n l i n e and a b i l s e pump i s i n s t a l l e d i n t h e t m k t o pump o u t
water t h a t may l e c k o r s p l a s h ij. Propulsion is e f f e c t e d when t h e
t e n k is water borno by meens of i t w i n propellors geared t o modified
t r a c k r e a r i d l e r s . Tho wcter borne tsnk is s t e e r e d by t u r n i n g the
p r o p e l l c r s i n a h o r i z o n t a l p l a n e . A s t h i s wes n o t e n t i r e l y s e t i s f a c t o r y , some t a n k s hnd, i n e d d i t i o n , a simple ruddcr m s t s l l c d .
The c u r t e i n , when r a i s e d , e x t e n d s 26 inches zbove t h e h i g h e s t p a r t
of t h e t u r r e t , which prevexts t h e use of t h e t e n k wecpons when c f l o e t .
The c u r t a i n i s lowered for contbat o p e r a t i o n s b) t h e use o f 2 d r i v e r operated h y d r a u l i c syqtem of v a l v e s . Tht v e h i c l e i s sen m r t h y i n
z o d e r & t e l y rough \*Ater and hhe a wDter 6peed cf f o u r t o seven m i l a s
p e r hour.
The development of t h e equipment and t h e t r a i n i n g o f u n r t s
i n i t s use wcs c a r r i e d o u t i n utmcst secrecy mid s o f e r as onn be asc e r t a i n e d , i t s s e c u r i t y wf.s n o t compromised even n f t e r t h e two lendi n g s on the French c o a s t . The devick was f i r s t conceived by Nioholzs
S t r a u s s l e r , a B r i t i s h n a t u r a l i z e d Hungarian l n v e n t o r , i n 1940. The
f i r s t model wos f i t t e d t o n "ToTkf~kCIi" ( l i g h t t a n k ) ID 1941 8 ~ dt h e
f i r s t one f l o a t e d i n June of t h a t y e s r .
25. SpeciEl DC u n i t s were n o t orgnniztc. Far t h e Normcndy lmdi n a s . t w o c m p r m i e s each c f t h r e e so;rorote t m k b & t t E l i c n s . I t h e 7 3 t h ..
7 4 1 S i ?nd 743;) were equipped and t r n i n e d with DD tnnks. T r c i n i n g
c a d r e s from t h e s e s i x companies received approximately t h i r t y deys
t r a i n i n g w i t h t h e E r i t i s h 79th hrmored DivisiGn F.: SLX L N D U N a f t e r
which each o f -the companies t r a i n e d for a totel of approximately t h r e e
weeks a t SLt-PWEI U.NDS. Crews s e r e t r e i n e c i n e r e c t i n g , l o w e r i a g , e n d
maintaining t h e convcs c u r t e i n s ; use o f i n d i v i d u a l s s c c p e d e v i c e s ;
use of n a v i g h t i o n e l infitrumcats and a i d s ; weter borne handling o f t h e
For
tank; h u n c h i n g from lancing c r a f t ; and unit t b - c t i c a l t r a i n i n g .
t h e l a n d i n g s on t h e southern c c c s t o f Francc by the Seventh .;rmy,
f o u r t a n k p l a t o o n s , f o u r tanks 6ach (16 tcnks per b a t t a l i o n ) , w e r e
equipped and t r a i n e d f r o m each o f t h r e e tFak b a t t a l i o n s ( l g l s t ,
753d. 7 5 6 t h ) . The crews were t r a i n e d c t EhTTIFt.GLJt.- end i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f SkLEkNG, ITIIZY. T o t a l t r o i n i n g time WE-ss pproximntely 30
days, c o v e r i n g e s s e n t i n l l y t h e scme f i e l d G E W ~ Ec overed by t h e u n i t 3
i n Englnnd.
I
26.
18
b. 741Et Tank B a t t a l i o n
The DD companies, ( B and C )
were l r u n c h e d a t approximetely x-50, i n s p i t e of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
sea wcs e x t r e m e l y rough, it hcving been decided t h c t t h e GdvEntcge
t o be g a i n e d j u s t i f i e d the r i s k , The tcnks were launched c p p r o x i m e t e l y 6000 y a r d s o f f shore fron: O M 4 M Beech. Fio6 t a n k s o f Co B
succeeded i n reaching s h o r e andifought i n support of t h e l o t h I n f n n t r y R e g b e n t of t h e 1 s t Inf'nntry Division. The remnining 12 t h n k s of
Compeny B and -11 1 7 tanks of Compcnny C were sunk n t d i s t a n c e e varyi n g f r o m 1000 t o 5000 yflrds frcm shore. These s i n k i n g s v l b r e due t o
t h e a c t i o n o f t h e rough sea, tho high surf swmping t h o t t n k s , a n d
were not due t o enemy action.'
c . 743d Tank B a t t a l i o n
Due t o t h e roughness c f the ses. i t
d a c i d e d n o t t o leunch t h e tanks c t serLbut t o move t h e l c r d i n g
c r n f S t u the beach and l a n d as nny atcndcrrd tenk would land. A S c rcsult o f t h i s , t h e tanks lcnded ahead of schcdule. it'o l O S S O S were s u s t a i n e d p r i o r t o Innding.
WDS
Landings
t h e South Coast of W i n c e .
e.
B F C cf
~ the thruc d i v i s i o n s c f t h c V; Corps vc.s o f f e r e d
u maximum o f f o u r plntoons o f f c u r tcnks etch f o r s u p p o r t of t h e l r n d ings. L f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of' t h e pruposed o p e r d i o n c l use end t h e LCT
l o a d i n g s ~ e c ca v a i l a b l e , D D f s w e r e requested. and e l l o c n t s d as fGllOWS:
I n f Div
No
TGnkS
35 t h
3d
16
45th
12
Totnl
36
u s e of DD'S
on t h e Ehine crossing.5
- 19 -
- 20 -
b.
Disodvrntcges.
CannGt
be f i r e d while v e h i c l e 1 s
w t c r bcrno.
( 2 ) Vehiclc i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y
successfully i n
r,
5e:o
rkugh s e z .
(4) Extremely v u l n a r r b l e
t o
r'ropmts.
(5)
r.s i s i r d i n a r i l y
fbund -n rivc-r b?nks. It shsuld be r.A.ed, hcwever,
t h i s d e f e c t i s inhercnt i n tho type ;f t c n k which
wcs used r n d n i t r;tributoblc ts the DD d e v i c e .
c.
B r i t i s h ,;pinion
DiVlSlLIr!
- F i n e l Rcport,
79th Lrmored
ri.
The DD d E V i C k i s r w s o n c b l y s s t i s f c c t s r y as .c mecns c f
supp1en:anting bridZ&s, f ' c r r i c s , lhnding c r c f t r n d o t h e r mc,re e f f l c i w t n e t h o d s o f crcss:nS 6 bvdy of wdter.
P-
- 21 -
Bib1 i sgrephy
Chaptcr 4
1.. A f t e r
LCtiCn
4. R e p c r t on
5.
7. Xftor Action
8. DD L s s a u l t River Crosskng,
Armored D i v i s i c n ( B r i t i s h )
1945.
22
LVT S
I
33.
Emplopntnt.
a.
F i r s t U. S. Army
U. S. t.rmy.
- LVTIs were n c t
b. Ninth U. S. 1.rmy
Thy 747tk Tt.nk B c t t u l i < ; n , Jr. thb 2 4 t h ,
2 5 t h and 2 6 t h vf' ivfcrch 1945, niadt n tc.tr.1 i f 1112 rcsund t r i p s ticr~.jss
t h e Rhine R i v e r . During t h i s Gperatisn twr, bc.tt* 1 i i . m a i t h c 30th
Inf-r?try D i v i s i c n F.r:d m e b c t t o l i o n L'f t h c 7 9 t h I n f n n t r y D i v i s i o n , i n
n d d i t i o n tc, nmmunition, qunrtor-t,:n t r u c k s , i n f n n t r y , cnnnGr. cnd 5711~11
1.T guns, were t r u n s F o r t d c c r u s s t h c r i v e r . ? r i s c ! n e r s L > fw.r iitid
rvtiunded were t r n n s p o r t t d on t h e r o t x n jcurneys.
T h r e e LVT's wore
sunk dus t L d e f e c t i v e b i l g e pumps rnd cvsrc.?rk.
TWL v f e r e d m a g a d by
a r t i l l e r y f i r e , which wf:s s p o r c d i c . There was nc' o t h e r enemy o p p o s i tian.'
c,
T h c r c r r i n, c t h t r exrmples u f LVT's Gr.ploy6d by U. S.
u n i t s s p e c i a l l y t r c i n t d and equipped. They were u s t d t b s3ine e x t L n t
by d i v i s i m c l units cn n s m r l l s c i i l e , ueunlly by the d i v i s i c n e n g l n e & r s ,
0 6 F.dditiona1 e q b i p e n t .
d.
British
LVT's vitrc f i r s t uszd i n t h e i n v a s i o r . c f
1V.LGWREN. L s s ~ . u l t i n gi n f a n t r y , s.ippLirt cannon, E.nd l c t c r s u F p l i c s
and equipment wer,e f e r r i e d a s h c r c . Of 1C4 Buffaloes d i s p a t c h e d ' f r o m
OSTthD on 1 Novembcr 1944, 27 'mre ci.mpl6tely T z r i t t e n o f f . Owing t o
extremely u d u c u s c o n d i t i m s , n;ns c f t h e romnrning 77, t h c u g t s t i l l
- 23 -
mobile, were m e c h a n i c a l l y f u l l y f i t , Of t h e 2 3 o p e r a t i n g f r o m
Battle c a s u a l t i e s were
BRESKENS, s i x were c o m p l e t e l y w r i t t e n off.
mainly f r o m mines and s h e l l i n g 1 The n a t u r e o f t h e s e O p e r a t i o n s W a s
Such as t o e x p l o i t t o c o n s i d e r a b l e a d v a n t a g e t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s O f t h i s
t y p e v e h i c l e 6 The c o n c l u s i o n s of the B r i t i s h r e g a r d i n g t h e B u f f a l o ,
a s a r e s u l t o f t h i s o p e r a t i o n , a r e as followst2
B u f f a l o e s a r e i n v a l u a b l e a s assault v e h i c l e s in
an amphibious o p e r a t i o n of t h i s kind. T h e i r p e r formance a c r o s s t h e f l o o d e d and w a t e r l o g g e d c o u n t r y
i s b e t t e r t h a n any o t h e r v e h i c l e a v a i l a b l e e x o e p t
t h e TfiibEL.
They must b e w e l l c o v e r e d by fire supp o r t and b y smoke, as r e q u i r e d .
34.
M e r i t s and D e f i c i e n c i e s ,
a.
Merits.
L e r g e cargo c a p a c i t y ( 4 tons),
i n mud.
- 24 -
( 4 ) Low s i l h o u e t t e i n h t a r .
b.
Deficiencies i
( 4 ) Lack o f R b i l i t y t o t r e v e l an hard s u r f a c e w i t h o u t
e m e s s i v e t r a c k .damage,
35. Summary.
a. Them is a d e f i n i t e m i l i t n r y requirement f o r a track
laying amphibious cargo c a r r i e r f o r use i n a r e a s c o n t a i n i n g c o n s i d e r able m t e r .
b. There is a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a permrnent o r g e n i z e t i o n
equipped and t r a i n e d w i t h amphibious cargo c a r r i e r s .
0.
There is a m i l i t a r y requirement f o r an amphibious t a n k
f o r use i n n s s a u l t o p e r n t i o n s r e q u i r i n g l a n d i n g of t r o o p s on a hcst i l e shore.
Bibliography
Chaptcr
- 25 -
E4-5
-
120 ynrds
4CO g a l l o n s
4 g c l p t r suc
100 seccr.ds
250-353 i p s 1
3000 +si
+25o to -100
450 R Fnd L
Jlpprox 7 t o n s
15 rounds
7 C ynrds
SC gal6
1 gal pcr s6c
50 scconds
375 # p s i
2cco #TSl
4 7 0 to
-100
20 R c.nd ,I
997 lbs
15 rounds
r e s u l t o f E p r e l i m i n i r y e x m i n r . t i o n by i m z r i c n n
o f f i c e r s in t h e Unitad Kingdom, t h e B r i t i s h worc rtdvisba i n h u g u s t
1943 t h n t t h o imcricnr. Forces hcd r.n bstimntbd r t q u i r e n i t n t f o r 100
CROCODlLLS. F i r s t U. S. $rmy t s t n b l i s h s d c f i r m r e q u i r e m e n t f o r 6 s
CHOCODILLS i n Fcbrucry 1944,a Lnd c. f o m a l r e q u i s i t i o n w c 9 immcdintcly
ploced w i t h t h e B r i t i s h f o r ci t o t c l sf 115 (mnking o n a n t i c i p c L t e d
T h i s requiremcnt "ns later
ollonrancc f o r needs of Third U.5. Army).
modified t o t h e e x t e n t t h e t o n l y f o u r GkOCODILhS w e r e ncturllly do'
Those were nssigncd t o thc 739th Medium Tank l j c t t n l i o n
livered.S,6.7
( S p e c i u l ) (Mine Exploder )
a.
ii6 a
Easod on advanced t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m o t i o n r e c e i v e d f r o n
requiremcnt was sEbmittcd 2 1 >.pi1 1944 f o r
t h e immediate shipment o f one E4-5 flnint t h r o w e r f o r dcmonstrution
purpasas, an3 100 n d d i t i o n u l u n i t s f o r clnrly d c l i v c r y . In J u l y 1944,
F i r s t U. S. brmy e s t a b l i s h e d E Jeqmrcmont f o r 200 E4-5 f l m c thrower(;
on the b n s i s 3f ono per medium t a n k p l a t o o n ( o r 9 p e r medium t a n k bsltt a l i o n ) . @ This demand wc.8 b r o u g h t about by t h e nppnront nccd f o r u
mop-up weapon f o r us6 i n ltcdgurow f i g h t i n g .
The t h o n t t r r c q u i r e m e i i t
was i n c r e a s e d t o 333, plus 10 p a r c e n t per month f o r r c p l a c e m e c t s , by
b.
tht Zone o f I n t e r i o r ,
- 26
ckOCOnIIJ$ Brigade o f t h e e ChOCODILZ Regiments? Each of t h e s e r e g i ments included t h r e e squedrons mads up o f f o u r troops (plntoons) of
three o r f o u r CROCODILES and a haadquarters of f o u r f i g h t e r tanks
(See Section 1, Chapt6.r 10 and Appendix 1).
- 20
operations.
below:
d , The CRCCODILE platoon of t h e 739th Tank B e t t u l i o n vms employed vri t h the 2d Armored Division ir. March and h y r i l 1945 ef'ter t h e
Crossing of t h e RHIPX, but t h e r e was littlt .bFpurtunity t o employ f l E "
and t h o p l a t o o n was f r o q u e n t l y nssigrxd rood block m i s s i s c s durii-.g t h i s
r i u i d period.
The B r i t i s h Forces employcd the CROCODILE more exter.sivsly
e.
and w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e s u c c ~ s s . In t h e a s s e u l t of LE IliivTcE; c o o r d i n a t e d
day and r i g h t a t t e c k v were madt with 'the 4931 i n f c n t r y D i v i s i o n end one
squodror. of CROCODILES, w i t h t h e flame t e r r i f y i n g and complctely dcm o r n l i z i n g thc enemy. Resistance was r a p i d l y d i s i n t i g r a t c d eS t h e
enemy r a n t o tha flanks of :ha flame t o s u r r e n d c r . l S Thc oxperiance
Of B r i t i s h and Canndian Forces i n d i c a t e d s u c c t s s f u l smpioynent of fh"
throwers was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e follcwing;
(1) k a s i E m E n t of ivell-definsd objectives s u i t a b l e for
flame.
(2)
.. 30 -
(5) I n f a n t r y '
i n m e d i a t e l y e x p l o i Ling t h c demoralizing
e f f e c t o f t h e flame.
a . Merits.
Provided l o n g e s t r a n g e and l a r g e s t f u e l c a p a c i t y of
any model flame thrower a v a i l a b l e t o t h e European
Theatcr.
b. Deficianciss
(1) T r a i l e r i n s t a b l a t i o n r p s t r i c t s m o b i l i t y of tank w i t h
r t s p t c t t o b a c k i n g up o r n e g o t i a t i n g sharp t u r n s .
(2)
Simplicity o f i n s t n l l a t i o n .
b , Deficiences.
(1) Range t o o s h o r t ,
(2 )
Limited f u e l c a p a c i t y n e c e s s i t a t e s f r e q u e n t r e f u e l Ing
( 3 ) . I n s t a l l a t i o n of flame ;:rower
irisi.de o f Tank:
gunner 'moro d i f f i c u l t .
31
was e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h i s v e h i c l e s i n c e t h e B r i t i s h considered t h e
CROCODILE s u p e r l o r because it r e t a i n e d the t a n k cannon a s p r i n c i p a l arrrament and had g r e a t e r fllel capacity. A t t h a t time, American
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a n t i c i o a t e d t h a t t h e E 4 4 would s a t i s f y t h e i r flame
43. Sumnary.
a . The combat experience o f the huropean Theater confirmed
t h e need f o r armored mechanized flame throwers t o a s s i s t i n t h e a s s a u l t
Of well-organized, d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .
b. The CFOCCDILE was the most r e l i a b l e and e f f e c t i v e meclianiced f h " thrcwer emFloyed i n t h e huropean l h e a t e r .
C.
The mechanized flame thrower, E4-5, vras u n s a t l s f a c t o r y
f o r t h e follovring rkasons:
(2)
I t could not bu r e l ~ e dupon t o f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y i n
combat.
(3) The i n s t a l l a t i o n of
t h e E4-5 hindered t h c r a p i d
escapt- o f t h e d r i v e r and bow gunner from t h e tank.
(4)
- 32
( 5 ) I n f a n t r y
f. No d e f i n i t e conclusions c m b e drawn w i t h r t g a r d t o
as
t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f a p r i n c i p a l armemmt typc flmc t'ovfer
compared w i t h an " f m e s s o r y t ' r t y p e f l u n k t h r o x e r (addcd t.3 t h c t a n k
without d e c r e a s i n g f i r e power), s i n o e t h e p r i n c i p a l a r m m s n t t-6
flcme
thrower was n o t employed i n combat. Howevar, f o r f u t u r e guidance, the
experience o f t h e European R e a t o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t :
(1) Tho f i r e power o f t h e CKCODILL and t h e E 4 5 meteri a l l y assisted t h e advance o f t h e f l a m t thrower tank t o vrithin flame
rsnge.
(2) To i n s u r e successful employment o f t h e CROCODILE
and E4-5 i t was neoessary t o p r o v i d e tke same over-watching and f l a n k
p r o t e c t i o n w i t h f i g h t e r tanks as would be required i n t h c t x n p l o y n m t cf
a p r i n c i p a l armmont .type flame thrower.
Bibli ogrciphy
Ctaptcr
(TB
C B 2, 1944;
4 L t r , Eq FUU t o
5.
Fh."
9.
10.
15. Appendices "D" & "E" of' CT! Liaison L e t t e r No 3, dated 17 October
1944.
1;.
18.
19
CDL 'T;.NKS
44.
BPief d e s c r i p t i o n and h i s t o r y .
45. O r g a n i z a t i o n and t r 8 i n i n g
a.
3.s.
,anits
- The 701,
cf units.
h. B r i t i s h u n i t s 1 .The 3 5 t h Armored Brigado (CDL) cons i s t e d of t h r e e regiments of thrse squcdrons ee.ch. E~.chsquc-dron cont a i n e d t h r e e t r o o p s , m c h of six CDL t s n k s and two s t m d u r d f i g h t i n g
tznks. Three s t a n d m d trnks m r t assigzed t o squ:.dron h e a d q u t r t t r s cnd
Tht regiment t h u s
f o u r t o regimcntnl. headqusrters f o r commznd purposes.
c o n t r i n e d 54 CDIr tonks cnd 31 s t a n d a r d f i g h t t r t m k s .
c. Neithor t h s B r i t i s h n o r thc U. S. CDL u n i t s were m-
c s m o t , t h s r o f o r a , be commtntod upon,
46.
T s c t i c a l Doctrine.
0.
I t W ~ Soonsidsred t h c t f o r mexir.um e f f e c t i v e n e s s and
g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f , t h e element o f s u r p r i s e , CDLs s h o u l d
b 6 used, e t l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , i n mass.3 The CDL tEnk End tr-nk tunits can
be employed o f f e n s i v e l y ' o r d e f e r s i v e l y , by dcy or by n i g h t , Dcylight
employment i s i d e n t i c e l t o t h p t of o r d i n r r y trnkp nnd o f f e r s ns advmte-gts o w r t h 6 s t a n d a r d tonk u n i t s .4 If employed defensively, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n d a y l i g h t , t h e CDL u n i t i s hcildiczpped by t h e szmt l i r n i t z t i o n s
as m y s t a n d c r d t c n k unit employed defunsivzly.5
,
b.
Th? c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e CDL tanks are: -firepcwer,
n r m m p r a t e c t i a n , m o b i l i t y , shock a c t i o n and i l l m i n o t l o n . m p l a y e d
o t n i g h t m d t r proper c o n d i t i o n s , t h 6 entmy i s i l l m l i n e t e d b y t h e b e m
r1herec.s our awn ' t r o o p s , o t h e r thpn t h e CDL i t s e l f remeins i n darkness
between o r behind the beems. The f l i c k e r cnd the colored f i l t e r s d s o
may be tmploycd t o f u r t h e r discomfort s.nd confuse t h e enemy.
C.
The CDI, comp6ny is t h e basic t s c t i c a l u n l t . S t m d c r d
form&tions ere t h e l i n e , wedg", cohelon o r box. CDL tanks r r s o p l e c e d
t h a t t h e t e . r g f t met. i s i l l u m i n n t s d by 6verlr.pping beams. EC&LIS t r e
turned on i n t e r m i t t e n t l y , by p l r t o o n s , t o f c c i l i t a t e forvrcrd movment i n
darkness and t o permit replnclng carbons. Stnndnrd f i g h t e r tenks Ere
placed G i t h b r on the f l a n k s of' tha platoons o r i n the i n t e r v d bckveen
CDL tanks.
Normal i n t t r v e l between CDL trnka is 25 ysrds.
d.
of
f.
Tho CDL is
s e n s i t i v e t o t e r r a l n and weather.
Its e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s largely l o s t i n hl;ly or mountainous terrain, in
woods, v i l l a g e s and t o m s , o r i n fog, smoke or d u s t , I t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s
- 30 -
l i t t l e o f t h e p r o j e c t ana t h u s h a d n o t considtred t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
i t s use ir. t h e i r p l m s .
.,
" /
On 17 November 1944 e r e q u e $ t f o r
two CDL b q . t t n l i o n s
and a group hcodqunrters WF.S reoeived fron 6 t h Army
Group. d t t h e t i n e r e o r g m i z c t i o n o f the b e t t a l i o n s
hc.d n o t proceeded beyond r e c a l l . The need f o r stand e r d b t t t c l i o n s was such, howver, t h a t t h i s r e q u a s t
WL'.S r e f u s e d , u n l e s s 6 t h Arny Group hod planned e.
s p o c i f i c c p e r n t i o n around t h e s e t m k s . Since 30
s p e c i f i c o p e r z t i o n hcd a s y e t beon plenned, t h g units
were noz f u r n i s h e d .
- 37 -
49. h p 1 0 y " t .
Although C D L s were n e v e r e q l o y e d i n t e a a s s a u l t
c r o s s i n g f o r t i c purpose of i l l u m i n a t i n g b r i d g e s i t e s Erld f o r d e t e c t i n g
t. F i r s t U. S . Army h r a a
736th Xedium Tnnk B c . t t a l i o n (Mine
E x p l o d e r ) commenced C D L o p e r n t i o n s a t t h 6 kEhLG6N BhiDGE on 5 March
1945 w i t h f o u r CDLs o f Comp-ny C a s s i s t i n g t h o h n g i n e e r s i n e r e c t i n g o
boor. by f u r n i s h i n g i l l m i m t i o n . L d d i t i o n n l C D L s from t h c same company
were ndded t o t h e ?reject c s r e q u i r e d . 'Company h w i z h s i x CCLs commenced o p e r a t i o n s along thu'Rhinc cn 2 1 l a r c h and Company R cn 23 hiarch.
Theso opcrE t i o n c werc conduotcd under c o n s i d c r s b i c a r t i l l e r y f i r c cnd
o c c a s i o n a l a i r a t t a c k . CDLs o p s r a t i o n s t e r m i n a t e d on 16 A p r i l when the
b a t t h l i o n moved t o t h e e z s t a l 0
Third u. S. Arm:{ .. Cns p l n t m n f r o m cnch of t h e f o u r l e t t e r
,c.
conpanias o f t h e 748th Tank R r t t r l i o n WLS equippLd w i t h s e w n C 3 L s cnch.
These were used t o i l 1 m i n r . k tridgo s i t o s c t ST CQ:R,
B i d S;.ISIG tnd
M;INZ.
This m i s s i o n c o n t i n i i d anti1 y ;.?ril 1945;.
d. F i f t e c n t h U. S. Army
C o n x o l of Khinc > c r o s s i n g @l i c v i n g
p a s s e d t o F i f t e e n t h U.S. Army, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i l l m i n c t i o r o f the
c r o s s i n g s f u l l t o t h e XXII a n t XlrIII Corps, Nc T r a i n e d CDL ur.its o r
p e r s o n n e l were a v a i l a b l e .
P e r s o n n e l , t h e r e f o r e , was drcwn f r o m Corps
L r t i l l c r y and t r c i n e d by i n s t r u c t o r s borrowed from t h e 738th Tcnk Batt n l i o n . C D L s were used 8 t n t . i c n l l y t o provide Flliunin,&tion f r o m 1s : . p r i l
*Yo 1 June 1945. CDLs proved unEconomicnl cnd d i f f i c u l t t o m n i n t a i n when
used i n t h i s r o l e m d were g r n d u o l l y roplnced w i t h r e - c o n d i t i o n a d cnpt u r e c German s e a r o h l i g h t s .
49.
I n f r a - r o d 3evelopments
Information was r b c e i v e d a t E T O U B
i n J u l y 1944 of t h e development o f r. GDL t y p e tnnk e q u i p p e d w i t h
- 30 -
a.
The i n t r o d u c t i o n o f e. new wec.pon, p c r t i c u l k r l y a s e c r c t
wecpon, on t h e b a t z l c f i e l d without p r i o r i n d o c t r i m t i o n of tho t r o o p s
IS imprecticnl,
t h a t must work c l o s e l y with thet vic;.~~pOa,
Bibli ogrophy
Chapter
5+
J.
20 November 1942,
d a t c d 23 October 19M
(Requesting authority t o convert f o u r CDL BnttGllonS t o Stcndard
B n t t a l i o n s ).
39
- 40 -
51.
Description.
a.
Tte T-34'is G 60 t u b e 4.5 inch m u l t i p l L r o c k e t lcuncher
d e s i g n e d t o b e mountsd abova thL t u r r e t of t h e M4 (Shermar.] medium
tank.
The r o c k e t s a r e d i s c h c r g e d e i e c t r i c c l l y from i n s i d e t h e t a n k
a t t h e r c t e o f one round e a c h h c l f second. Tht 60 r o c k e t s c a n thus
be d i s c h c r g e d i n 3G seconds. The l n w c h e r is l i n k s d t o t h e gun t u b e
and i s e l c v a t e d dnd d e p r e s s e d by means of t h e gun Elevating mnchanism.
The l e u n c h e r r o t e t e s w i t h t h e t u r r e t . Mnrimum rLnge i s 4COO yards.
Range d i s p c r s i o n is c o n s i d c r a b l o ond wus found t o bc u n p r e z i c t a b l e .
T ~ Blnuncher cnn be j e t t i s o n e d from i n s i d e t h e t e n k .
Use in C m b n t .
0..
One o p e r n t i o n employing n l a r g e numhar of r o c k e t s WGS
planned.
T h i r t y rxkt'cr leunchers were i n s t n l l t d on t h e tunks of t h e
7C3d I'mk Bettc.licn End t r R i n i c g w n s conducttd u r d e r s u p e r v i s i c n o f t h e
7 t h krmorud Group. Thc crperntion, i n v o l v i n g nn a t t a c k by the 30th
I n f e n t r y D i v i s i o n was scheduled f o r t h e middle o f Dacemher. The Germen
Ardcnncs o f f e n s i v e of 16 Dcccmber prevented ths mounting of t h e G t t c c k
End t h e 743d Tnnk Botte.licn j e t t i s o n n e d n;.l l c u n c h e r s and moved t o tho
t h r e a t o n e d crcti. They were n s w r r e i n S t e l 1 e d . l
53.
Summory.
(2)
( 3 ) J e t t i s o n f e c t u r o d i d n o t olways work.
b.
Inusmuch 8 s t h e 7.2 r o c k e t l n u n c h c r w a s n o t used i n c0mbc.t.
IXere i s , hovrevny, o need
n o c o n c l u s i o n s a s t o i t 3 v a l u e c8n be drtwn.
- 41 -
- 42
CFAPT2R 9
hNSINEER~AKWM?E H I C U S
54.
G e n e r a l . Armorod engineer v e h i z l e e being constructcd on
s t a r d a r d t a n k c s s e s , ana having cl?e g e n e r r l a?pearcmo of L tc.&,
n r e o f t e n e r r o n e o u s l y c c l l e d * e n g i n e c r t a n k s . Through lcng usilge, r:
tank may .be d e f i n e d a s an nrmored t r c c k l a y i n g conbet vehicle, desigced 5 0 d e s t r o y t h e e m x y by meens o f i t s f i r e power, shcck a c t i o n
and n o b i l i t y . On t h e o t h e r hanl, t h e srmored mgineer vehicle i s designed f o r p u r e l y engineer work, and as such mounts a minirum cm3unt
of ermnment. It i s unable t o Gccomplish t n c k missions e f f e c t i v e l y
and m y c t t e m p t t y use i t 11s EL t n n k w i l l prevent i t s accomplishing i t s
c~vnj o b p r o p e r l y .
b.
The F a s c i n e , a 7 f o b t diameter bundle o f chestnut p a l i n g ,
could a l s o be c a r r i e d on t h e I?VRE a n d dropped 13 d i t c h e s , crntera and
tho l i k e .
c.
d.
The Bobbin, Q 70 f o o t r o l l of p r e - f a b r i c a t e d matting,
could b e moun:sd
on the AVRE and r o l l e d across patches of boggy ground
t o Fermit t h o .&'@.E t o cross, followed by D t h e r v s h i c l e s .
e . The Skid Briiley, c o n s i s t i n g o f a 60 f o o t Eailey (pref a b r i c a t e d truss b r i d g e ) rrounted o n s k i d s , could be pushed by an I..LTE
t o the p l a c e r u q u i r c d .
57.
E n g i n e e r Armored Vehicle ( U S ) .
- 43 -
2.
-44-
SECPION 1
U. S. B n t t e l i o n s .
8.
The need f o r a s p e c i a l equipment battalion, to o p t r o t e r i n e
explodsrs ar.d o t h e r type spec!nl armored equipment commencing t o s r r i v e
i n t h e ther:ter, having become apparent, the 12th Xrmy Group, on 6
i u g u s t 1944 r e q u e s t e d npproval of t h e reorgntuzotion o f t h r e e of the
s i x CCL b a t t s l i o n s i n t o SDeciEl equipment b a t t d i o n s . This was approved
by S X E F on 5 September. Due to t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of jtopbrdizing t h e
s e c u r i t y O f t h e CDL by t h i s mow, approve1 by t h i a r i t i s h wes requeszed
ond o b w l t i c d . l Accordingly, on 24 September 1744, Hebdquarrers ,%ropes
Theater o f Operations d i r e c t e d C&nding
General, United Kingdom 3 E 6 E
to r e o r g m i z e and t r s i n under the 9 t h Armcred Group two Tank Batthlions,
Special, e.s S p o o i a l Equipment B e t t a l i m s . Although the 12thLrmy Group
had recommended t h a t eech o f the t h r e s l e t t e r companies be orgenized
i d e n t i c e l l y , onoh w i t h c plntoon o f f i v e tank dozers, E pletoon o f f i v e
TlE3ls cnd & p l a t o o n of t h r e e 8RABS and t h e e TlEl's, Hendquerters
Zwopenn Theater of Operktions d i r e c t e d t h c t each battolion contain one
comptny o f 18 TlElls and two compnnies of 12 TlE3's and s i x 6ozers each.'
Com7cnies
(a)
CO
;., B,
C , ench having
Co Hq
(b)
2 Tank Platoons esch consisting of
2 T l E l f s , 2 T l E j ' s , 1.Tank Dozer, 1 F i g h t e r
(.)
(3) S t r v i c e C o m p v
NINTII U.S. A H I a
(1)
Bn Bq & Hq
CO
- 45 -
Tank
Companies A , B, C , each c o n s i s t i n g of
( 8 ) CO
H9
TlE3's.
'2:
61. B r i t i s h U n i t s .
a. In A p r i l 1943 it was d e c i d e d by t h e B r i t i s h t o concentrate
a l l t h e i r s p e c i a l i z e d armor i n the 7 9 t h Armored Division i n order t o a i d
i n t h e development and employment of t h i s type of equipment snd t o sdvise o n i t s use. A t the conclusion of t h e campalgn t h e equipment had
included F l a i l s , CROCODILES, AVRE's, ED'S, Buffaloes, Kangaroos, end
CDL's. The 79th D i v i s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s shown i n Appendix 2. rmoughOut t h e cnmpaign v a r i o u s sub-units o f s p e c i a l equipment were a l l o t t e d t o
corps and d i v i s i o n s as required. S p e c i f i c examples are giver. ef"-e-7
2nd Armored D i v i s i o n
5th
29th
75th
78th
79th
84th
102nd
17th
82nd
Annored D i v i s i o n
Bfar-try Division
Infantry b i v i s i o n
I n f a n t r y D-vl
; 'sion
Infantry Division
Infantry Division
.&fantry Division
Airborne D i v i s i o n
Airborne? D i v i s i o n
- 46 -
SdCTION 2
FUTURE 3EQUIRElvE3NTS
Or
b , Support v t h i b l e s , s u c h G S mine e x p l o d e r s , b r i d g o 1 W @ r S ,
end d e m o l i t i o n v e h i c l e s . These may al'so bo olassifiod O S e n g i n c a r
armored v e h i c l e s .
c,
S p e c i a l f i g h t i n g v z h i c l e s such a s f l a m t . t h r o w o r tmnks.
d.
65.
O r g a n i z c t i o n f o r Peace.
a.
- 47
.3
(1)
( 3 ) Mine explo$ers
66. Organizetion
f o r cambas.
( 3 ) Through c a r e f u l s t u d y of t h e t e r r n l n End
- 48
th6 enemy
h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s aoncerning t h c i r p r o d u c t i o n m d
issuo.
Chopter 10
1.
8.
3.
a.
5.
6.
7. 7 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n F i n n 1 Report.
- 49
57. Conclusions.
a.
Combaz experienae i n t h e BuroTean Theater substantiated
t h e requiremonk f o r the followfng types of armored special eouipment:
(5)
( 5 ) Tank dozers.
b, The rsquirement f b r t h e following types of armored s p t c i a l
eq,apmont tuos n o t s u b s t a n t i a t e d by t h e combat experience of the curopean
Thohter :
(1) The DD do v i c e .
(2)
66.
Rsaonintndntions.
It i s recommended t h a t :
The davclopment of' armored special equipxent be
8.
With P a r t i c u l a r emphasis pleced on t h e development 3f sati*fac$ory
- 50
e q u i p m e n t in t h e f o l l c w i n g c n t e g c ; r i e s :
(1) Kine e x p l o d e r s f o r :
(n)
Breaching l o c a t e d mine f i e l d s .
( b ) E x p e d i t i o u s l y d e t e c t i n g and/or
c l e a r j n g sca.ttwad
mines on r o a d s n n d t r a i l s .
( 2 ) Amphibious tnnks and t r a c t o r s .
( 5 ) E ngineer
armored v e h i c l e s , i n c l u d i n g bridge
lP.yerS,
(1) The DD d e v i c e .
( 2 ) Roaket l a u n c h e r s mounted a s a d d i t i o n a l e q u i p m o n k on
stnndord f i g h t i n g t a n k s .
c. 1. Headquarters, Special Equipment Troops, w i t h t h e
n e c e s s u r y units, and with the f u n c t i o n essentially as o u t l i n e d i n
p a r a g r a p h 65, Chapter 10,: be c r g a n i z e d a t t h e Icrmored. .Sohool.
HO SQN
P U I L LIDE
CRCCGDILE BDE
EOFbALO EOE
I
A
RDCT.
Eng
(F4 &
SIGS
1 Sqn)
Wo
FUILRECT
FLAXL
om
6DE RL.
3. Sqn. R.E.
ARd) LNCIEh
FUIL
REGT
I
I
0. 0.
blRFALO
6LT.kLO
BWFALO
m;
3 CRUISER
R;s
nB" SOC
"An SUI
"C"
I
RA Y C
swi
LI. FD.
Y(B
1 CEUISEh &
2csTKs
A18
WD
DE,%
I
(EACH
NIL(
TP
BDE SICS
SQN
FUIl
FIAIL
TP
TP.
(EICR F U I L TP 5 F U I L CRITISER
COY
TP 6 BLTFAL(KS)
FUIL
IT
m
INF DN
nrS)
[IFP
W DIV I A W W
wc
( A M EDE)
RL YE
PSBD
TP
TI'
TP
E C I I 7 P 12 1LLht.LhllL4
TP
3XBkT OBSERVE3
1 2 t h Army Group
Headquarters VI11 Corps
COPY
c OF?
REPORT NO 13
E! A
~ ~ C K
1. Squadron B, l
u Reet. Royal Armored Corps, equipped -ihth 15
c r o c o d i l e (flame-throwing) C h u r c h i l l Tanks and b Gun m d coric,:snd chw..
chill Tanks, VTaS employed cn 1 4 and 16 September ir. sup:>ort of the
a t t a c k of 1st B a t t a l - i o n , 116th I n f n n t r y , 29th Division .on Fort ~ o n t j z r e y , defecding a AeSte:n a7proach t o 3 e s f , Frnnce. The sction 17%
probably t h e f i r s t employment of t h i s equipment i n support of E. s.
Forces. T r s i n i n g e x e r c i s e s i n i n f a n t r y - flame throver t a n k coordinat i o n were conducted p r i o r t o t h e operation. (See Operation Meno. be: 18, Hq 2 9 t h I d . Div. dated l k Sept. Ld. %cl. No. 2)
wound@cl
r e s e r v e , b u t n o t employed. A t t a c k was suspended. Tank r e s u l t s rep o r t e d by Tanl: Bn. CO: 2 - 2c guns knocked o u t , 2 I n f a n t r y s t r o n g
points reduced - o u t s i d e t h e main fort.
e . On 15 Sept. t h e e n g i n e e r s h r t h e r h p r o v e d t h e t m k lane
and prapared deinolition c h a r g e s . t o t c l i n g 2000 l b s . t o f i l l t h e moat
and breach t h e f o r t .
f . On 16 Sept. t h e a t t a c k was renewed v i t h 2 r i f l e comps;nies
i n a s s a u l t and 1 i n r e s e r v e . A t 1030 3 flame tanlcs went i n t o t h e edge
of t h e moat and flamed i n t o t h e moat and over t h c fort x v d l until f u e l
nas exhausted.
HE at t h e f o r t g a t e
5.
RESULTS:
f.
O f f i c e r s of t h o t a n k squadron d s s c r i b c t.hc t e r r a i n as t h e
6.
spc c i d Materiel
a,
aployed:
- 5 trocps
Flame t a n k s
of 3 tanks each.
Other armament: 1
75rm gun.
2" s n o b m o r t a r .
4 tanks
- 2 w i t h y$rn
guns (anti-
M4
serics)
7 . 9 h machine guns.
Other armament: 2
--
Individual a r m :
7.
Communications: -43-1t a n k s c a r r y
4 radios.
/s/
F,V, WILKIXSON
Col., F.A.
(;orabot Observer