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NICORP vs. De Leon GR No. 176942
FACTS: These consolidated petitions assail the Decision of the CA finding respondent De
Leon as a bona fide tenant of the subject property. Respondent filed a complaint praying
that petitioners Lim and/or NICORP Management and Devt Corp.be ordered to respect
her tenancy rights over a parcel of land in Cavite registered to the De Leon sisters, who
were likewise impleaded as parties-defendants in the suit. Respondent alleged that she
was the actual tiller and cultivator of the land with full knowledge of the owners, who
were her sisters-in-law. Petitioner denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject
property and alleged that respondent is no longer physically capable of tilling the land.
Respondent submitted evidences to prove that she was made a tenant of the land as
well as the agricultural activities of respondent and her family. However, a Decision was
rendered dismissing the complaint for failure of resp.to prove by substantial evidence all
the requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship. On appeal, the CA reversed the
findings of DARAB stating that there was sufficient evidence to prove the elements of an
agricultural tenancy relationship. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied. Hence, this petition from petitioners Lim and NICORP.
ISSUE: WON occupancy and continued possession of the land makes one a de jure
tenant.
HELD: NO. The respondent being allowed to cultivate the property without opposition,
does not mean that the De Leon sisters impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold
relation with respondent. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy
relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on
what the alleged tenant does upon the land but is a legal relationship. Thus, the intent of
the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written

agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are more
important.
There is a tenancy relationship if the ff.essential elements concur: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship
is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

DAR vs. PCPC GR No. 168787

FACTS: In the late 1990s, respondent sought to convert its 280 hectares of its coconut
plantation into a special economic zone. The following year, PCPCI applied for the
reclassification of its agricultural lands into mixed residential, commercial and industrial
lands. Sometime in 2003, petitioner DAR notified PCPI that a portion of the Polo estate
had been placed under the CARP and would be acquired by the government. PCPI filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA asserting that the DAR acted with grave abuse of
discretion in placing the Polo estate under the CARP. In its Feb. 16, 2005 decision, CA
found that Polo estate was no longer agricultural land when the DAR placed it under
CARP. The DAR asserts that the reclassification of the Polo estate did not place it beyond
the reach of CARP.
ISSUE: WON the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo estate
under the CARP.
HELD: NO. Protests regarding the implementation of the CARP fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. He determines whether the tract of land is covered by
or exempt from CARP. Likewise, questions regarding the eligibility of CARP beneficiaries
must be addressed to him. The DAR Sec.decides to whom lands placed under CARP shall
be distributed.
In another decision rendered by the Court, it was held that reclassified agricultural lands
must undergo the process of conversion in the DAR before they may be used for other
purposes. Since the DAR never approved the conversion of the Polo estate from
agricultural to another use, the land was never placed beyond the scope of the CARP.
The approval of the DAR of the conversion of agricultural land into an industrial estate is
a condition precedent for its conversion into an ecozone. A proposed ecozone cannot be
considered for Presidential Proclamation unless the landowner first submits to PEZA
(Phil.Economic Zone Authority) a land use conversion clearance certificate from DAR.
This PCPCI failed to do.
Manubay v. Hon. Garilao GR No. 140717
FACTS: Petitioners owned a 124-hectare land in Camarines Sur. In November 1994, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of coverage placing the
property under the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP). Petitioners did not
protest the notice and filed an application at the DAR for conversion of the property from
agricultural to residential. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed a Resolution approving
the Pili Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996, reclassifying the subject property from
agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed residential and commercial use.
Thereafter, petitioners requested the DAR Regional Director to set aside the November
1994 notice of coverage, pointing out that the land had been reclassified and the

property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. The request was denied, on the
ground that petitioners had already been given notices of coverage which must have
been lifted first either because of retention or exemption. Respondent denied petitioners
application for conversion, considering that the property had already been placed under
the CARP. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the denial of their
application for conversion, averring that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he denied their application
ISSUE: WON the act of a department secretary may be directly challenged in a petition
for certiorari.
HELD: Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter
egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter
unless disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by
the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for
certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.
Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari to
prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that
public respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that such abuse
amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. In other words, the public respondent
exercised his power arbitrarily and despotically by reason of passion or hostility.
Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR
FACTS: Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took
over legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657,
the CARL of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect
on June 15, 1988. Before the
laws effectively, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary
offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in
accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President, sent a
letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangas
allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to nonagricultural.
As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion
of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the
interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
MARAGONDON AND TERNATE INCAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS
AS A TOURISTZONE, ANDFOR OTHER PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application
for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the
assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu,Batangas as a tourism
zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding,
the DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries
in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15,
1993covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with
the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order
(AO) No. 6, Series of 1994 which states that all lands already classified as commercial,
industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion
clearance from the DAR.
ISSUE:WON PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu
tourism zone to nonagricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.s three
haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage.
HELD: PP 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three
municipalities including Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Roxas & Co. contends that
PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone,
reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to nonagricultural purposes. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain
areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities that] have potential tourism
value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific
geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism areas are.
The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order, the
application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not
automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original
uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the "specific geographic
areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism development projects in the
areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation
(CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other
crops.Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7,Series of 2004,came up with
clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that B. Proclamations declaring general
areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas as tourist
zones that merely:(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered
provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas to be with potential tourism
value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate
specific geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and to coordinate
said areas development; or (2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located
within the general area declared as tourist zone and direct the Philippine Tourism
Authority to coordinate said areas
development; could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the
entirety of the land area declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification of
lands" denotes their allocation into some specific use and "providing for the manner of
their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government Code) or the "act of
specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan."
Lantican v. CA GR No. 97929
FACTS: Marcos de la Pea died leaving behind him his wife, the private respondent ,
daughter and his common law wife, the petitioner. At the time of his death, he was a
tenant on a Riceland owned by one Rufina Lim and was about to be issued a Cert. of
Land Transfer. Lim chose the private respondent as the successor to the land to which
the petitioners opposed. However, the DAR ruled that private resp.had the sole right to
be the beneficiary of the Cert. of Land Transfer. Petitioners filed a motion to set aside the
above order on the ground that, not only is it contrary to the actual facts relative to the
land in question but it is not supported by the evidence and the applicable law. This
motion was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that DAR has no jurisdiction over the case. Motion was once again denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners having invoked the jurisdiction of the DAR are now stopped
from assailing such lack of jurisdiction

HELD: YES. In a case decided by the Court, it was held that once a party to a case
submits to the jurisdiction of the Court and participates in the trial on the merits of the
case, he cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to his cause, take a total turn
about and say that the condition precedent of compliances with PD 1508.
Machete v. CA GR No. 109093
FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages
before the RTC of Tagbilaran City against herein petitioners. The alleged facts are: 1) that
parties entered into a leasehold agreement regarding private respondents landholdings
and herein petitioners shall pay a certain amount or percentage of their harvest; 2) that
herein petitioners failed to pay their respective rental despite repeated demands of
private respondent; and 3) that petitioner moved to the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, arguing that the instant case is an
agrarian dispute and therefore within the jurisdiction of DARAB.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over cases for the collection of black rentals from
leasehold tenants.
HELD: The Court held that collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants is within the
jurisdiction of DARAB and the SC defined agrarian dispute as any controversy relating
to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture , including disputes concerning farm workers associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining , changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial agreements.
The SC further averred that failure to pay back rentals to leasehold contract is an issue
which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve the controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
Sebastian v. Morales GR No. 141116
FACTS: Private respondents are the heirs of the late Guillermo Sarenas, who died
intestate on June 27, 1986. During his lifetime, Guillermo owned agricultural
landholdings, all located in Samon and Mayapyap Sur, Cabanatuan City. In addition to the
foregoing properties, Guillermo was also the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural
land located at San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of 4.9993 hectares,
which was tenanted by Manuel Valentin and Wenceslao Peneyra. The tenants tilling the
farm lots had already been issued emancipation patents pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Private
respondents filed an application with the DAR Regional Office in San Fernando,
Pampanga, for retention of over five hectares of the late Guillermos landholdings.
Among the lots which private respondents sought to retain under Section 6 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657)On June 6, 1997, the DAR Regional
Office in San Fernando, Pampanga granted private respondents application. Petitioner
Sebastian moved for reconsideration of the foregoing order before the DAR Regional
Director. The DAR Regional Director found that the order was contrary to law for violating
Section 6 of RA No. 6657 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. He then issued a
new order dated October 23, 1997, which instead allowed private respondents to retain a
parcel of land with an area of 4.9993 hectares, covered by TCT No. 143564, located at
San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Private respondents then appealed the order of the
DAR Secretary. Petitioner Sebastian then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this
motion was denied by the DAR Secretary. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition is valid and proper.

HELD: NO. Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR
orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43
that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than
the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of
appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,an appeal
taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode
shall be dismissed. Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners to pursue the
proper mode of appeal. Wherefore, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated December
10, 1999, is AFFIRMED.