1. PCIB vs.

ESCOLIN
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, vs. Hon. Venicio Escolin (CFI-Iloilo) and Avelina
A. Magno; Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. Testate Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges. PCIB, administrator-appellant, vs. Lorenzo
Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral, Salvador Guzman, Belcesar Causing, Florenia Barrido, Purificacion Coronado, Graciano Lucero, Ariteo Thomas
Jamir, Melquiades Batisanan, Pepito Iyulores, Esperidion Partisala, Winifredo Espada, Rosario Alingasa, Adelfa Premaylon, Santiago Pacaonsis, and
Avelina A. Magno, appellees, Western Institute of Technology, Inc., movant-appellee
March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.
*This case has the length of a PIL case. Court admitted several times that it was clueless as to some facts so it copied into the decision entire pleadings.
(!!!) Plus, PCIB raised 78 assignment of errors! Well probably read the case again in Spec Pro.
Short version: The Hodges lived in the Philippines for almost half a century and died leaving substantial properties in Iloilo and in the US. The missus died
5 years before the husband, providing in her will that while her estate would go to him, upon his death, the remainder should pass to her siblings. (They
were childless.) The court held that this testamentary provision, while probably ineffectual as a substitution under the Civil Code, is not actually a
substitution, but is a valid and simultaneous institution of heirs, though the passing of title to the inheritance to the others (the siblings) was made to
depend on a resolutory condition (the husbands death). Case was remanded to the trial court for the determination of the proper application of the
renvoi principle (conflict of laws between Philippines and Texas law), and the proper distribution of Linnies, Charles, and their conjugal estates.
Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated
considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City for
around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles. Should
Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and
sisters die before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceaseds siblings place.
When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor, then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to
continue administering the family business, as per Linnie Janes wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages and other necessary
transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate. Charles named
seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy?) Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roys name included.
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August
8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question
as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of
deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will
when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.
Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnies estate, which includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime
employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnies estate) and a Special Administratrix (for Charles). Magno was
appointed, but later Harold Davies (representative of Charles heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special Administrator, who was then replaced by one
Joe Hodges, Charles nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration were
issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced that the parties representing both estates had cooked up a
modus operandi to settle money matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw)which, however, went awry, with more and more heirs
from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers (Ozaetas! Mabantas! Manglapuses!) filing their respective claims for retainer fees. Much much
later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon
Linnie Janes death. Avelina naturally opposed this, as Linnie Janes other heirs (the HIGDONS) would be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her
capacity as administrator (entering into sales and other such conveyances). For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles estate, to
which she responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the estates properties.
PCIBs Claims
Linnie Janes will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic
validity of its testamentary provisions.

Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.

Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national
law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law) should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables, and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) as regards immovables.

Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in the Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should apply.

Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus,
upon Linnies death, of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles, not by
way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership.

The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnies estate, cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or
increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him
(C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire."

Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of
right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can
legally and validly affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime.
(Article 886)

Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent of all of the
conjugal assets of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents,
emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death.

In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnies estate, Charles appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the
assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been
operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal
assets were in his sole possession and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets.

As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the estate. Neither was there any asset left to Linnies estate at the time of
Charles death, though Linnies estate may have referred to all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate which would go to her siblings in the
event of Charles death. The provision is thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets.

There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or

common substitution, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other
substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary
substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute
heirs. At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be
present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be
incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the
Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa even said, when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir,
the second designation can have effect only in case the first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said
testator.

The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming dubious rights to of the conjugal estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim against the
estate of Charles.

It also follows that the conveyances executed by Avelina, claiming to be merely in continuation of the Hodges businesses, and which
corresponding deeds of sale were confirmed by the probate court, are null and void and should be subject to reconveyance.
Avelinas Claims
(At one point, even Linnies heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her capacity as administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant of
the motion, on account of a previous injunction it issued.)

Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate, and gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the
same estate, to her relatives.

After Linnies death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and
sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct.

Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of Linnie and Charles in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no
such separation or segregation, and because of Charles repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of rents,
emoluments and income.
Issue:
1. Is Linnies disposition in favor of her siblings void? NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? REMAND!
Reasoning:
1. To a certain extent, PCIBs contention that Linnies testamentary substitution, when viewed as a substitution, may not be given effect, is correct.
Indeed, legally speaking, Linnies will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the
designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary
substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these
premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section
on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he
may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or
may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges,
subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his
brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal
and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death
would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to Avelinas view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnies estate, as contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles
during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction
whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment to
this kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that
Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)
Hodges acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIBs claims that he had adjudicated to himself all of Linnies estate. While he may
have used language like herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already
probated there is no other person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice, he wouldve
known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very motions, Hodges asserted the rights of Linnies named heirs. He even moved to
include Roys name included in the probate courts order, lest Roys heirs think that they had been omitted.
Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wifes estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death,
more than 5 years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one
can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he
would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax
return in the US. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such
payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. The Court thus viewed that under the peculiar provisions of his
wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the
remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any
such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time. The Court also considered as basis of
Charles intentions several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate taxes abroad, though they have not been introduced in evidence (!!!), only
referred to several times by the parties.
It is obvious, though, that Charles procrastinating in settling Linnies estate, and his sole administration of it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests,
making it difficult to properly make an accounting of their shares. PCIB, then, cannot administer the properties on its own. What would be just and
proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each other.
2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be applied. On the one hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch as Linnie
was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of
renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than onefourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could not have

disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly
she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of
the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to
the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, Linnies brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the
whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Avelina further maintained that, in any event, Charles had
renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the
genuineness and legal significance of which PCIB questioned.
The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an
intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented
(Remember judicial notice in case of foreign laws?). Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, therefore, to
all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings thereafter to be held
for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.
Linnies estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that even PCIB did not maintain that the application of the laws
of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of
Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not permitted to
contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.
The only question that remains to be settled in the remand to the court below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal
controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by
Charles after Linnies death, from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his
intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the
death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows:
(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as
intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December
11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own
share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife;
(2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall
be considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make,
provided that whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters;
(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate
considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife.
Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically ceased
when Linnie died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of
Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these constructions of Linnies will should be adhered
to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
Disposition
Remand for determination of proper application of Art. 16, CC (renvoi), and of Charles alleged renunciation of his ineritance under Linnies will. Avelina
remains to be the administrator of Linnies estate. The said estate consists of of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of
Linnies death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his
death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless
subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective,
no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate. PCIB and Avelina should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each
other, as administrators.
2. CRISOLOGO vs SINGSON G.R. No. L-13876 February 28, 1962
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:

Testamentary Disposition

FACTS:
This involves a lot and improvements thereon. Complaint alleged that Singson owned half pro indiviso of said property
and that Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the duly probated last will of Singson (original owner).
Defendant's defense was that ConsolacionFlorentino was a mere usufructuary of and not owner of one-half proindiviso of the property in question, and that therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.
Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson appealed. At the time of the execution of the will, the
nearest living relatives of the original owner were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and DionisioSingson, her nieces
Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
ISSUE: Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion vulgar or for sustitucion fideicomisaria?
HELD: The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may not only designate heirs wholl succeed him, but also
substitutes in the event that said heirs dont accept or are in no position to accept inheritance or legacies, or die
ahead of him.
Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular person with obligation, on part of latter, to deliver the same to
another, totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular event. The particular testamentary clause provides for
substitution of heir in this manner: upon death of ConsolacionFlorentino, whether before or after that of testatrix,
property bequeathed to her shall be delivered or shall belong in equal parts to testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo,
Manuel, Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of ConsolacionFlorentino. If this created
sustitucion vulgar, necessary result would be that ConsolacionFlorentino, upon death of testatrix, became owner
of one undivided half of the property,but if it provided for sustitutionfideicomisaria, she would have acquired
nothing more than usufructuary rights over same half. In the former, she would be entitled to partition, but not in
the latter.

As Manresa says, a careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs
provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to
the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to
her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides
that upon appellee's death whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix. Her share shall belong to the
brothers of the testatrix. In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased
Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution ConsolacionFlorentino by the brothers
of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after
that of the testatrix.
3. TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ VS. VDA. DE RAMIREZ G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
Doctrine: Art. 863 of the Civil Code validate a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted." One degree means one generation. The second heir must be
related to and be one generation from the first heir.
FACTS: The principal beneficiaries of Jose are his widow, his 2 grandnephews and his companion Wanda.The widow is
French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain.Moreover, the testator provided
for substitutions. Jose, a Filipino, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir. A project partition was
submitted wherein one part shall go to the widow and the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez, the grandnephews. It was provided that 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda. The grandnephews opposed the project of partition and one of the
grounds was that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to
the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree.
ISSUE: Whether or not fideicommissary substitution is valid.
HELD: The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda. The second heir mustbe
related to and be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child ora
parent of the first heir. Therefore, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:1/2
thereof to his widow as her legitime and 1/2 of the estate which is the free portion goes to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horace V. Ramirez, the substitutes.
4. CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara vs. MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and
JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila, G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION
FACTS: The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La Urbana in
Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff,
against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the
plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an
attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee
contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
ISSUE: WON the deposited amount belong to the fideicommisary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara.
HELD: This will certainly provide for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise to a simple
substitution (art. 774, Civil Code). The testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress, and
provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee
on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides
nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary
substitution.
The disposition contained in clause IX of the will, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate. In fact the
enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir
instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the
second heir.
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the
estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in
fideicommissary substitution.
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole
estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole
estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.
5. ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant, vs. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, respondent-appellee. G.R. No.
L-3891 December 19, 1907
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:lawphil.net
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my
said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third
part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have
any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the
properties belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a
sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending
in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la
Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the
husband to the procedure followed by the petitioner. The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper
and from that holding the husband did not appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena
Morente, appealed.
In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision, as we understand it, that the
husband having married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-thirds
thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof could be disposed of by the husband.
The construction given to the will by the court below is not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act
of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children
have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix. lawphil.net
Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793 provides
that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. But
the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained in
the first clauses of the will? It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave
her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the
second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to
comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that
if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit
the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such
a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property contained in the first
clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to
Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.
We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference to such
surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we can not say that it was the
intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other
words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we can not say
that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. In the case of Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime Vano (8 Phil.
Rep., 119), we held that the legacy contained in the will therein mentioned was not conditional. It is true that case
arose under article 797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this case, but we think that it may
be argued from what is said in article 797 that, in order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition
must fairly appear from the language used in the will.
Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural children or legitimate children we do not
decide, for no such question is before us, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause not having arisen, and
we limit ourselves to saying merely that by the subsequent marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the legacy given
to him by the first part of the will. That was the only question before the court below. the judgment of that court,
denying the petition, is accordingly affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
ELENA MORENTE vs. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: MODAL INSTITUTION
FACTS: The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my
said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third
part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have
any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the
properties belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a
sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending
in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la
Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the
husband to the procedure followed by the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the will of Consuelo contained modal institution
HELD: Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793
provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or
widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is
contained in the first clauses of the will?
It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in
the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not
marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the
legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's

sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in the
first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss
We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference to such
surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we cannot say that it was the
intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other
words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we cannot say
that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. In order to make a testamentary provision conditional,
such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will.