Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals

G. R. No. 93833 September 25, 1995

Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC
of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation
in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and
furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality,
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200, entitled An Act to Prohibit and
Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, and
Other Purposes.
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
particularly a violation of RA 4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner.
From the trial courts Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
courts order null and void.
Issue: WON Petitioner Ramirez is guilty of Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act
to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes
Held: Yes. Sec. 1 of RA 4200 states It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder.

Following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of
private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.
People vs. Jabinal
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
Antonio J.
Facts: The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of
Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application
of the Supreme Courts ruling in People vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on
September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however,
contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was
likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the
authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace
officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang and
People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court
nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.
Issue: WON defendant Jabinal should be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court
rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the
complete reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Held:
Yes. Defendant should be acquitted. The doctrine laid down in lucero and
Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant
was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946
Facts: Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the
outbreak of war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro
on February 27, 1942, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led
a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area.
The 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding Officer
of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake other missions of Military
character. Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943, assigned
Major Ruffy as Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area.
A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on June
8, 1944: Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo
Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place. On October 19,
1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission
of this crime, the petitioners, it is alleged, seceded from the 6th Military District. It
was this murder which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now
being contested.
The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that respondents be commanded
to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground that
petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of offense.
Issue: WON petitioners are subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
Held: Yes. Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction The Bolo Area was a
contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the United
States army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on
the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which
provides that National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life

imprisonment. The petitioners are in error for courts martial are agencies of
executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary.
The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law as provided for
in Article of War (2d) and since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by
the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation.
The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of
95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover,
they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military
court's jurisdiction. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts: Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army
and commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the
country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and
other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission
was establish under Executive Order 68.
Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the
military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following
grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)
Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the
2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction
is valid
HELD: Yes. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda.
EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of
Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals
of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for
our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not

confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in

treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of
interest because its country and people have been greatly aggrieved by the crimes
which petitioner was being charged of.
Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision
of this special law.

US vs EL CHINO CUNA (alias SY CONCO) December 15, 1908 G.R. No. 4504
Facts: On the 12th of August, 1907, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Isabela, an information charging the defendant
Chinaman Cuna, with a violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippine
Commission, committed as follows:
That the defendant, on or about the 30th day of June, 1907, in the municipality of
Echague, in the Province of Isabela, in the Philippine Islands, sold for ten cents,
Philippine currency, a small quantity of opium, to Apolinaria Gumpal, a Filipino
woman, who was neither a doctor, pharmacist, vender of opium with license, nor an
inveterate user of opium duly registered; all contrary to the law.
During the pendency of the case, Act No. 1761 took effect repealing the former law,
but both Act No. 1461 and Act No. 1761 penalize offenses against the opium laws
Defendant contends that the said Act No. 1461 having been repealed during the
pendency of this case, and the repealing law not containing any exception touching
pending cases, there is no law in force which penalizes the alleged offense.
Wherefore, this court has no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: WON repeal of a penal law by its re-enactment, will destroy criminal liability
Held: No. Repeal of a penal law by its reenactment, will not destroy criminal
liability.

Where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former Act
which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of
thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders
charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal.
The penalty prescribed by Act No. 1761 is not more favorable to the accused than
that prescribed in Act No. 1461 the penalty in both Acts being the same. Thus, Act
No. 1461 will be enforced.

People v. Almuete G.R. No. L-26551 February 27, 1976

Facts: Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion
were charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was
alleged in the information that in December, 1963, in Muoz, Nueva Ecija the
accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her
or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five (5)
cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan.
Defendants contends among others, that there is no law punishing it.
The Solicitor General argues in his brief that the information in this case alleges all
the elements of the offense defined in section 39 of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended of RA 2263 Sections 39 and 57 of the same law reads as follows:
SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or
landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any
time previous to the date set for its threshing- That if the tenant n food for his
family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to allow the
tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for its
threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net share
in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his
representative. Any violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and
penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law
applicable to that act committed.
SEC. 57. Penal Provision. Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and
forty-nine of this Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos
or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court. ... *
Issue: WON the respondent is guilty of pre-threshing under RA 2263 Sections 39
and 57

Held: No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39

of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice
share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law. The
Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy. It is significant
that section 39 is not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose
section 172 repeals "all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.
Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more
purpose because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in
section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms,
as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on September 10, 1971.
Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law
ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.
BP 129
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction G.R. No. 192565
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only
the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has
the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First,
the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial
court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the
necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province
where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries
jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action
is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred.
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it
can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of
its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element
of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal
cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of
its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of
action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information
states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred
at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
US vs Abad Santos G.R. No. L-12262 February 10, 1917
Facts: Defendant Abad Santos is the owner of a printing establishment called "The
Excelsior" and as such was required by law to keep a book in which he should make
detailed entries required by an Internal Revenue Circular. It is charged in the
information that he violated the provisions of said regulation in that he failed to
make any entry for the 5th day of January, 1915, indicating whether any business
was done on that day or not.
Defendant regularly employed a bookkeeper who was in complete charge of the
book in which the entries referred to should have been made and that the failure to
make the entry required by law was due to the omission of the bookkeeper of which
appellant knew nothing.
The board contention is that the accused is responsible for the acts and omissions
of his bookkeeper, and that, if any act or omissions of his bookkeeper, violates the
criminal law, the principal is responsible criminally.
He was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of P10. He appealed.
Issue: WON Abad Santos is liable for the act or omissions of his bookkeeper under
the Internal Revenue Circular.

Held: No. Neither the statute nor the circular of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
nor both together, expressly require such a result nor can we say from the circular
or the law that the intention to do so was so clear as to leave no room for doubt.
Courts will not hold one person criminally responsible for the acts of another,
committed without his knowledge or consent, unless there is a statute requiring it
so plain in its terms that there is no doubt of the intention of the Legislature.
Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No person should be brought within
their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced
criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute.
We do not believe that a person should be held criminally liable for the acts of
another done without his knowledge or consent, unless the law clearly so provides.
In the case before us the accused employed a bookkeeper, with the expectation
that he would perform all the duties pertaining to his position including the entries
required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
People vs. Francisco Sara G.R. No. L-34140 August 15, 1931
Facts: On August 2, 1930, Francisco Sara was out to shoot birds. At the same time
Gabriel Catapang and his wife Ruperta Mendoza were out collecting bananas. A
gunshot was heard and hit Gabriel Catapang. The gunshot came from Francisco
Sara hitting Gabriel in the right lower part of the abdomen. Death followed as a
result of the wound. The accused contended, seeing a bird sitting on the tree,
raised his gun intending to shoot when Gabriel Catapang approached and asked
that he be permitted to shoot the bird, at the same time seizing the barrel of the
gun and pulling it around towards his own body. As the accused at this moment has
his finger on the trigger, the weapon was discharged and Gabriel received the load
at his abdomen. Upon seeing Gabriel fall, he seized with fright and ran away.
Issue: WON Francisco Sara is guilty of homicide?
Held: No. The relation of the parties show the killing was not intentionally
committed thus the Supreme Court held that the homicide should be attributed at
least to the reckless and imprudent act of the accused in handling and discharging
the weapon in his hands. Therefore, the accused is not guilty of homicide but
instead guilty of homicide by reckless imprudence.
People vs. Silvestre and Atienza G.R. No. L-35748 December 14, 1931
Facts: Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage,
cohabited with her codefendant Martin Atienza in the barrio of Masocol,
municipality of Paombong, Province of Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed
with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint for adultery.

On the same day, the said accused were arrested on a warrant issued by said
justice of the peace. Accused were subsequently released as Joaquin dropped the
charges on the promise that they will not live again in the barrio of Masocol.
While in the house of Romana Silvestres son from her former marriage, Nicolas
Dela Cruz, after supper Martin Atienza told Nicolas and his wife to take their
furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being asked
why he wanted to set fire to the house, he answered that that was the only way he
could get revenge upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the
charge of adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre.
As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything
to him. Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once
to communicate with the barrio lieutenant as to what they had just heard Martin
Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard
cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back to it;
but seeing that the fire had assumed considerable proportions. The fire destroyed
about forty-eight houses. Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on
fire.
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson. Martin
was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
cadena temporal) while Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of
presidio mayor).
Issue: WON Romana can be convicted as accomplice
Held: No. Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an
accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act,
who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission
of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet
cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
In the case of Romana, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and
none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and
silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does
not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of
arson. Romana was acquitted.