H ub Oil Accide n t

12th Annual IPEIA Conference, Banff, Alberta

February 5 7, 2008

Mike Poehlmann
Manager of Inspections
the pressure equipment safety authority

Incident
Investigation
Legal proceedings
Lessons learned

the pressure equipment safety authority

Ba ck gr ou n d
Two men killed in
explosion and fire
August 9, 1999
28 firefighters took
more than 10 hours to
extinguish the fire
Approximately 1500
people evacuated from
nearby residential area

the pressure equipment safety authority

H u b Oil Com pa n y
Commenced operations at the South East Calgary plant
around 1958.
Refiner - recycler of used oil.
Feedstock was waste oil collected from various sources:
major industries, small garages, local residents.
Waste oil contained varying amounts of contaminants
(water, glycol, gasoline, diesel fuel, paint, etc.)
Oil was processed to remove contaminates.
Product storage capacity at time of incident over
7,000,000 litres.
Hub Oil had been the subject of local controversy
because it was located within city limits with residential
neighborhood and commercial area nearby.

the pressure equipment safety authority

(Source: maps.google.com)
the pressure equipment safety authority

(Source: maps.google.com)
the pressure equipment safety authority

I n ve st iga t ion
Investigation was managed by Calgary Joint
Forces Arson Unit (Police and Fire)
Alberta Environment, Alberta Workplace
Health & Safety, and ABSA supported
investigation
Initially 3 ABSA Safety Codes Officers
Hundreds of hours on initial investigation and
over the following 7 years

the pressure equipment safety authority

ABSA I n ve st iga t ion

Purpose is to identify the cause of an accident to help
prevent similar accidents in the future.
Information gathered may be analyzed for use in:
issuing Alerts, Notifications or Directives
recommending changes to regulations
recommending changes to codes and standards

the pressure equipment safety authority

ABSA I n ve st iga t ion

Monday 9 August
Notified of explosion and fire by staff family
member
Decided we would investigate because we knew of
pressure equipment operating at Hub Oil
Tuesday 10 August
Contacted WH&S, arranged site meeting at fire
department mobile command
Met district fire chief and Hub Oil company
representative
Informed them of ABSA jurisdiction

the pressure equipment safety authority

ABSA I n ve st iga t ion

Wednesday 11 August
Morning
Contacted by Joint Forces Arson Team, requested
our help, invited to meeting in afternoon
Asked us to bring along any inspection records for
plant equipment
Informed us of site hazards and necessary PPE
Afternoon
Attended meeting 1300
Visited site 1500 1900

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

Ve sse l
Known as Unit # 2
Fabricated in 1963
84 i.d. x 30 long
90 p.s.i. @ 720oF
A-285-C-FBX
Shell 0.5625 , Heads 0.5

Reported not in use , and deregistered in 1971

It was later determined by other investigators
Hub Oil obtained the vessel from a scrap dealer
for $1500 in 1985
Put into service as Unit # 2 in 1990
the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

Th e Pr oce ss

the pressure equipment safety authority

Ex plosion

Plant was processing first batch following a

maintenance shutdown.
Pressure vessel ruptured releasing
approximately 5,000 gallons of oil at a
temperature approximately 650oF.
Released oil ignited in a massive explosion.

the pressure equipment safety authority

Fa ilu r e

Ru pt ur e a n d Ex plosion

Vessel ruptured due to

overpressure as a result
of sudden rapid boiling
of water left in the
system following shut
down maintenance
work.
Failure analysis
estimated vessel failed
at approximately 201
p.s.i.

the pressure equipment safety authority

D ir e ct Ca u se of Ex plosion

the pressure equipment safety authority

D ir e ct Ca u se of Ex plosion

the pressure equipment safety authority

D ir e ct Ca u se of Ex plosion

the pressure equipment safety authority

D ir e ct Ca u se of Ex plosion

the pressure equipment safety authority

D ir e ct Ca u se of Ex plosion

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority

Le ga l Pr oce e din gs
Prosecution on criminal charges
Public Fatality Inquiry

the pressure equipment safety authority

Cr im in a l Tr ia l
Prosecuted by Alberta Environment Special
Prosecutions.
Hub Oil ultimately charged under the Criminal
Code of Canada with 8 charges of causing a
common nuisance .
ABSA was contacted by prosecutor fall 2000.
Provided technical advice to prosecutors and
served as expert witness.

the pressure equipment safety authority

Ou t com e of Tr ia l
Hub Oil changed its plea to guilty midway
through the trial in June 2005.
Company (bankrupt) fined $200,000 and
required to establish
Two $50,000 bursaries for petroleum
engineering students at SAIT.
Four $25,000 education trust funds for the
children of Eckhard and Silver.

the pressure equipment safety authority

Pu blic Fa t a lit y I n qu ir y
Medical Examiner notified Fatality Review
Board of deaths and circumstance in 1999.
Decision made then to conduct inquiry.
Fatality Inquiry could not begin until all
criminal matters settled.
Purpose of public fatality inquiry is to make
recommendations to prevent recurrence, not
lay blame or settle damages.
Served notice as interested party November
2005.
the pressure equipment safety authority

Ou t com e of I n qu ir y
Judge Kirkpatrick concluded modifications and
reconfiguring the equipment contributed to the explosion
Recommendation
t hat oil refineries be prohibit ed from ut ilizing pre- used oil
refinery equipm ent in any configurat ion ot her t hat t hat
in which t he equipm ent was originally designed t o be
operat ed by t he m anufact urer. Any ot her use requiring a
subst ant ial change t o t he equipm ent or t he way in which
it is int ended t o be deployed should be approved by t he
appropriat e m unicipal or provincial bodies prior t o t he
act ivat ion of t he equipm ent on sit e. The appropriat e
aut horit ies would have t o det erm ine what t ypes of
equipm ent would require such approvals.
Kirkpatrick report to Minister of Justice, October 27,2006
www.justice.gov.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.aspx?id=47282

the pressure equipment safety authority

Le sson s Le a r n e d
Ca u se of Ex plosion
Excessive pressure in vessel caused initial explosion.
Con t r ibu t in g Fa ct or s
Excessive water in system.
Vented to atmosphere indirectly through series of
process equipment.
No safety valve.
Indirect control of pressure of pressure by manual
operation of burner fuel supply valve to change heat
input to the system.
Intended for low pressure operation (not in regulated
pressure equipment service).

the pressure equipment safety authority

Le sson s Le a r n e d
Root Ca use of Ex plosion
Failure to fully understand hazards resulted in
inadequacies:
Management of change
Safeguards, controls and instrumentation
No safety valve
Operating procedures
Operator training
Maintenance procedures

the pressure equipment safety authority

Le sson s Le a r n e d
For Inspectors
Due diligence - facility inspections
Gap in regulatory scheme

the pressure equipment safety authority

the pressure equipment safety authority