PFR Psychological Incapacity Cases

G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995.
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS, respondents.
*
Remedial Law; Circular 2891; Circular 2891 requires a

certification of non-forum shopping.The petition should be
denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 2891,
which requires a certification of non-forum shopping, but also for
its lack of merit.
Civil
Law; Family
Code;Void
and
Void
able
Marriages;Psychological Incapacity;Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c)
incurability.Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch
I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties, required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.It
should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Balumas Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the

Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudsons Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts
_______________
*
EN BANC.
21
VOL. 240,
JANUARY 4, 1995
Santos vs. Court of
Appeals
2
1
in our law on marriages. Thus correlated, psychological

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
Same; Same; Same; Same;The intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensibility or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability
of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
1
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which

considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Other forms of psychoses, if existing
at the inception of marriage merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.The other forms of
psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of
a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Civil
Law; Family
Code;Void
and
Voidable
Marriages;Psychological Incapacity; Private respondent has been
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least
one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting
with her husband.To my mind, it;is clear that private respondent
has been
22
2
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of
Appeals
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at

least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand,
it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and
cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent
Same; Same; Same; Same; A spouses obligation to live and
cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage.A spouses obligation to live and cohabit with his/her
partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless
there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance,
an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty
of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances
when, for economic and practical reasons; husband and wife have
to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses
always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in
such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular
contacts with the other to inform the latter of his/ her condition
and whereabouts.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her
husband.In the present case, it is apparent that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of
cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact
with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
intention of living and cohabiting with him.
ROMERO, J., Concurring:

Civil
Law; Family
Code;Void
and
Voidable
Marriages;Psychological Incapacity;Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that
every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated
on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an
enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity.Clearly,
by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another
ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for
2
nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same.

Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological
incapacity was the understanding that every petition for
declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-tocase basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration
of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the
23
VOL, 240,
JANUARY 4, 1995
Santos vs. Court of
Appeals
2
3
same be existing at the time of marriage although it be

manifested later.
Same; Same; Same; Same;The judge, in interpreting the
provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, maybe given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law.Admittedly, the provision on
psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is
open to abuse. To prevent this, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case
basis, must be guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Article 36 is a recognition of the
reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of
the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are
constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through
some legally-accepted means.The constitutional and statutory
provisions on the family will remain the lodestar which our society
will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article
36 is not to be taken as an abandonment -of the ideal which we all
cherish, If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting
parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to
find a way of putting an end to their union through some legallyaccepted means.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alexander G. Amor for petitioner.
Saleto J. Erames for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987),
which declares:
24
24
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance

of Leouel Santos (Leouel), brings into fore the above
provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo and the Court of Appeals, Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have
his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos (Julia), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank
of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and
Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo
City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latters parents at the J.
Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City, On 18 July 18 July
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It
was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the
frequent interference by Julias parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also
start a quarrel over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from
Julias parents or whenever Julia would express resentment
on Leouels spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to so
dissuade her, Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989. Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where
he underwent a training program under
1
_______________
Per Judge Enrique Garrovillo.
Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justices Pedro Ramirez
and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.

25
VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 25

1995
the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 10
April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or
to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of
no avail,
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 30, a complaint for Voiding of Marriage Under
Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed,Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer
(through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who
had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree
of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
repeatedly been set, albeitunsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would
neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit.
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petition should be denied not only because of its
noncompliance with Circular 2891, which requires a
3
certification of non-forum shopping, but also for its lack of

merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or
at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
x x x (T)here is no love, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform
_______________
3
Rollo, 3742.
Rollo, 1318.
26
26
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more
or less, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage. Respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos is one such wife.
The Family Code did not define the term psychological

incapacity. The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Article 35The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Article 36x x x
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or

mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,

Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say wanting in
sufficient use instead of wanting in the sufficient use/ but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say wanting in the sufficient use.
On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say wanting
in sufficient reason. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that
the idea is that one is not lacking in, judgment but that he is
lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase was wanting in

sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but
lack of appreciation of ones marital obligations.
27

1995
Judge Diy raised the question: Since insanity is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is insanity only a ground
for annulment and not for declaration of nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
5
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to

the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
word mentally be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred.
Judge Diy, however, preferred to retain the word mentally.
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological Impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the
fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family
Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages. Dean Gupit
said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction,
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is insanity
a ground for voidable marriage, while psychological or mental
incapacity is a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are
lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase
even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest be modified to
read even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest.
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of
the phrase, psychologically or mentally incapacitated'in the first
one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
x x x
xxx
xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making

psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since
otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the
consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make
excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it
is a loose way of providing for divorce,
x x x
xxx
xxx
28
28
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of

incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and
has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
x x x
xxx
xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent, She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is affected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but
in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however,, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
6
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable

of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it
is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of
marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that
even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign
that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. (Romero) opined that psychological incapacity is still
insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they
invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter, Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a
defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a
lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when
there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage; Justice
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy

stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa
remarked that the term incurable has a different meaning in law
and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that psychological incapacity
can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that
psychological incapacity is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision,
it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the
provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, ones psychological incapacity
becomes manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him
to remarry.
x x x
xxx
xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
6
Article 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
29

1995
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the

essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning
not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequence of marriage.
x x x
xxx
xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages, Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence is only
5
even
if
such
incapacity
becomes
manifest
after
its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that even if be substituted with

although On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of
7
_______________
5
Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.
Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2,1986.
30
30
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
psychological incapacity Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in

other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse,
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and
physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice of consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
psychological or mental impotence is an invention of some churchmen
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision

in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision
in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the ground of psychological
incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application,
Judge Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which
the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
1. (1)Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . .
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word mental

precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
psychological incapacity refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage,
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting,
they have decided not to go into the classification of psychological
incapacity because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno remarked that, since there have
been annulments of marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
31

1995
1. (2)Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista
and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
2. (3)Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive
period of ten years within which the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion.
7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision

Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
8
less specificity than expected, has, in fact, so designed the

law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1984); thus:
8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological

incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New

Code of Canon Law, which reads:
9

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage;
1. 1.who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. 2.who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. 3.who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Italics
supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all

that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
codes enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treatise, giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
10
_______________
7
Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.
In her Handbook on the Family Code.
Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986, 129130.
C 1095
Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi;
1. 1.qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;
2. 2.qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura a et official
matrimonialia essentialia mutuo tradenda et acceptanda;
3. 3.qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales
assumere non valent
32
32
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict
and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:

. . .because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to

the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
9
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological

anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. It
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause
of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder;
after all, normal and
_______________
10
Ibid., 131132.
33

1995
healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations
of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term psychological incapacity

defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be
of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled Canons and Commentaries on
Marriage, written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada
and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the
crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage:the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity.
The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which

incapacitates a person from giving what is due(cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be
declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage
and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr.

Gerardo Veloso. a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila (Branch I), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
11
_______________
11
Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
34
34
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the

marriage. although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
10
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,

immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Balumads Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudsons
Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contractvoidable
35

1995
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds
for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters
are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate
in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even
now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
unionbetween a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life, It is
thefoundation of the family and an inviolable social
institutionwhose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Italics supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
11
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the

basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are no doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
36
36
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at

all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel
stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Bidin,Regalado, Davide,
Jr.,Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., On leave.
Padilla, J., Seedissent.
Romero, J., Seeseparate opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied
opinion as Mr. Justice Vitugs ponencia. But, after an
extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my
way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no
ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been

shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e., that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other
hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve
to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term
psychological incapacity defies precision in definition. But,
as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the intent of the framers of
the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for
nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the broad term psychological
incapacity can open the doors to abuse by couples who may
wish to have an
37

1995
easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.
In the case at bench, it has been abundantly established
that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits
specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations, to wit:
1. a.It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United
States to call up her husband.
2. b.Julia promised to return home after her job contract
expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is
12
there any showing that she informed her husband (herein

petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
3. c.When petitioner went to the United States on a mission
for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to touch base
with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of
Julia to do the same.
4. d.When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years
had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin
the petitioner or her whereabouts.
5. e.When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in
her answer, claimed that it is the former who.has. been
irresponsible and incompetent.
6. d.During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and
submit evidence.
A spouses obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner

in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there
are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance,
an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also
be instances when, for economic and practical reasons,
husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital
bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and
respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
absent spouse to at least have regular contacts with the other
to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
38
38
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent

Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting
with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with
him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she

any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private
respondent, an unmistakable indication of psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications we made manifest after the
celebration of the marriage.
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this
Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife
who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in
the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect, directly
or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into
a habitual tryster or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love
which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family
Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity
to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wifes psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE
the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
13
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J., Concurring:
I agree that under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is
not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground
39
name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the

1995
_______________
of psychological incapacity of private respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish
to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
1
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had

thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a
new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked
by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or defacto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree
of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually,
such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another
Written pursuant to the request of Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro during the March 23, 1985 joint meeting of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committees at the UP Law Center for comments on P.B. 3149
(Pacificador Bill) on Divorce, P.B. No. 1086 (Monfort and Collantes Bill) on
Recognition of Church Annulments of Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on
Additional Grounds for Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation and P.B.
No. 1350 (Kalaw Bill) on Equal Rights of Filipino Women which were pending
before her Sub-Committee.
40
40
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social

institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided
by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian

traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry
to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
14
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of

absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in
the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds
not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
declaration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriage in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded
only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.'
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe/
xxx
xxx
xxx
41

1995
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our

country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds
proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground
of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family;; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly. x x x. (Italics
supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the

Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed in the
Civil Code as ground for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion
of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity
based on it should be treated on a caseto-case basis; hence,
the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes
psychological
incapacity.
Moreover,
the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the
15
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the
time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just
like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Moreover, the
judge, in interpreting
2
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the

manner by which some members of the Bench have
implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable,
each being separate and distinct from the other.
Petition denied.
Note.Declaration of nullity of marriage carriesipso
facto a judgment for the liquidation of property, custody and
support of children, etc. There is no need of filing a separate
civil action for such purposes. (Domingo vs. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 [1993])
_______________
o0o
2
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48.
42
_______________
42
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by

experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the
family will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to
achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is
not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all
cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the
contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties
are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union
through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have
interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it
easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
J.A. V. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 37 (1988).
4
As quoted in the majority opinion.
16
G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
*
Civil Law; Family Code;Marriage; The prolonged refusal of a

spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.If a spouse,
although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal
_______________
20
Skedas vs. Skalaroff, 84 RI 206,122 A2d 444.

SECOND DIVISION.
325
VOL. 266,
3
JANUARY 16, 1997
25
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court
of Appeals
of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse
is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; One of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.Evidently, one of the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to

psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; While the law provides that the husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, the sanction therefor is actually the
spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order.While the law provides that the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction
therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it
is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest
act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less.
This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist
has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

of Appeals.
Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.
Prisciliano I. Casis for private respondent.
326
326
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals
TORRES, JR., J.:

17
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a

marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been
placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created
all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife
against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Courts decision on November 29, 1994
and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in
a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the
trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals in its
decision are as follows:
1
From the evidence adduced, the following facts were

preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant
at the Manila Cathedral, x x x Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract. (Exh. A)
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception
at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house
of defendants mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room
for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went
_______________
Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo G.
Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.
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327
16, 1997
Appeals
to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the
first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all
invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City
for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March
15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see
her husbands private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husbands
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications
for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to
return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
18
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes

the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain
the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young
328
328
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still
be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has
some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be
cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured
by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to
the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever
he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did
not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination.
His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose
of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctors Medical Report. (Exh. 2). It is
stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. 2-B),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. 2-C)
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated.
2
_______________
2
Rollo, pp. 20-24.
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16, 1997
Appeals
19
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive

portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID
the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on
May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Concepcion, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr.
Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts

decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no
sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch
as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties

decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
330
330
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Appeals
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving
the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no
independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the
courts conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage
and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course
of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
3
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings.Where an answer fails to

tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the

pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment
of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not
based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
20
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and

was crossexamined by oath before the trial court and was
crossexamined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it became incumbent upon petitioner to present
his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual intercourse between them.
_______________
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the

documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals,G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).
4
Ibid.
331
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331
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Appeals
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why,
as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does
not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been
only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity
by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court
is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in

holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make a categorical finding about
the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis
_______________
4
Rollo, p. 34.
332
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SUPREME COURT
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Appeals
of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily

due to psychological disorders because there might have
been other reasons,i.e., physical disorders, such as aches,
pains or other discomforts,why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
21
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with

the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who
refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on
record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he
wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondents refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could
have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he
wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At
least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried
to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could
be. What he presented in evidence is his doctors Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection. Since it is petitioners claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon
him to prove such a claim.
5
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to

perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the

Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant

nonfulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husbands
plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does
not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed
with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves
to be doubted for not having asserted his rights even though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife
who was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not
go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim.
This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of
her marriage were frustrated by her husbands inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard
to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
We are not impressed by defendants claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not psychological incapacity, and
which can be achieved through proper motivation. After almost
ten months of
_______________
6
Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.
22
334
334
SUPREME COURT
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ANNOTATED
Appeals
cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or

unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he
professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative
of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island,
the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not
have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between
petitioner and private respondent. That isa shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense
of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the
marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children

but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with
loveamor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado(Chairman), Romero, Punoand Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Note.View that a spouses obligation to live and cohabit
with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage. (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])
o0o
23
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT
OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,
respondents.
*
Family Code; Marriage;Psychological incapacity must exist at

the time the marriage is celebrated.In Leouel Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
celebrated. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
Same; Same; Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.On the other hand, in the present case, there is no
clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a difficulty, if not
outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.
Same; Same.The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could not get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
____________________________
*
EN BANC.
199
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FEBRUARY 13, 1997
99
Republic vs. Court of
Appeals
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code.From their submissions and the
Courts own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
24
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that

the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
Same; Same; The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the
illness
200
2
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SUPREME COURT
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ANNOTATED
Appeals
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself

must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Same; Same; Such incapacity must be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable.Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of

marriage.
Same; Same; Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as rootcauses. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Same; Same; Non-complied marital obligation(s) must be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision. Interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable
of contracting mar201
VOL. 268,
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FEBRUARY 13, 1997
01
Appeals
25
riage: Those who are unable to assume the essential

obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Same; Same; Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state.The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge
the
equivalent
function
of
thedefensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

of Appeals.
The Solicitor Generalfor petitioner.
Juanito A. Orallo for respondent.
Oscar V. Cruz andRicardo C. Puno amici curiae.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, psychoogical
incapacity. Since the Codes effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted
the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers
find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor
General has labelledexaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustrationArticle 36 as the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world. Hence, this
Court in
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SUPREME COURT
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ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay

down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirmingin toto the May
14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio, on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing
by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born;
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father
since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
1
26
quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,

Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
went to live with her par-
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking

meals; and (3) Roridels failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following
were stipulated:
1. 1.That the parties herein were legally married on April 14,
1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. 2.That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. 3.That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years;
4. 4.That petitioner is not asking support for her and her
child;
5. 5.That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. 6.That the common child of the parties is in the custody of
the petitioner wife.
____________________________
1
Rollo pp. 25-3.
Sixteenth Division composed ofJ. Segundino G. Chua, ponente and
chairman; JJ. Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.

3
Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-hillipps.
Solemnized by Fr. Jesus G. Encinas.
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VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 203

13, 1997
ents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and
that it would be to the couples best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from
what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo
admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband
and
wife,
but
contended
that
their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to: (1)
Roridels strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridels
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own

testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social
worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits A to E-1.
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.
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On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment

declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
27
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase psychological incapacity (as provided under Art.
36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case, adding that the appealed
Decision tended to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture.
In denying the Solicitor Generals appeal, the respondent
Court relied heavily on the trial courts findings that the
5

marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities. Then, it added its
own
____________________________
rentals. Aside from this, respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And
that at present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child, which fact he
does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour
if we look at the background of their relationship. During their college days, when they
were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and
____________________________
intelligent causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and mother.
5
The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of
Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and
the RTC Decision as follows:
gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of
To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were
his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible,
working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became
dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics
very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing
of respondent are based on petitioners testimony that the former failed to be gainfully
that they know each other much better after two years of going steady, they decided to
employed after he was relieved from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
settle down and get married. It would seem, therefore, that petitioner and respondent
sometime in February, 1986, leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family.
knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.
Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up
petitioner-mother and son except during the first few months of separation when
and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and
respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00
respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their
for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for
frequent arguments and fightings. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their
financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his
parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to
friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he
terms.
bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up
transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were
because of their opposing and conflicting personalties (sic). Neither of them can accept
actually renting the house with the respondents parents responsible for the payment
and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each
of the
other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent
205
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY

13, 1997
cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this
205
resulted because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is
unique and requisite in marriage.
28
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
____________________________
with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family
Code). The
206
206
SUPREME COURT
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opinion that the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter

referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights x x
x. It concluded that:
As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual
fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions

of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that opposing
and conflicting personalities is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground is not
simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which
unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong

relationship between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully understand
and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently) united in
marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among
others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding,
acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires
them to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental roles of a
husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the
unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73)
207

13, 1997
renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
6
29
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear

showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a difficulty, if not
outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that
she and her husband could not get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
A
Q
A
A
Q
____________________________
6
240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code,
First Edition, 1988.

208
208
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
neither its juridicial antecedence nor its incurability. The

expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
8
COURT
Q It is therefore the
recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for
the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
Yes, Your Honor.
There is no hope for the
marriage?
There is no hope, the man
is also living with another
woman.
Is it also the stand of the
psychiatrist that the parties
are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are
psycho logically fit with
other parties?
Yes, Your Honor.
Neither are they
psychologically unfit for
their professions?
Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more
questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged

personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and
gentleness on Reynaldos part and of being conservative,
homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows loves temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond
merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
30
courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to

invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of
the marriage tribunals of each archdiocese or diocese in the country. Aside

from heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most Rev. Cruz is also incumbent
____________________________
8
president of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop

of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and
TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretary-General of the Second
209
Plenary Council of the PhilippinesPCP IIheld from January 20, 1991 to

13, 1997
February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a parliament or a

constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and where theponente,
Cruz, Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of
the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with
written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations,
the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
9
10
who was a Council member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by his
keen mind and prayerful discernments.
10
Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired
Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and law practitioner.
11
Article XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
210
210
1. (1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as
11
____________________________
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
1. the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
12
31
1. (2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physiccal. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or
____________________________
and shall be protected by the state.

Section 3. The State shall defend:
1. (1)The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
2. (2)The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
3. (3)The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
4. (4)The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state
may also do so through just programs of social security.
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.
211
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY
1. one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an

extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
2. (3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness
3. (4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent orincurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
4. (5)Such illness must begrave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
32
13
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
12
13, 1997
211
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be

accepted asroot causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in
____________________________
13
Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
212
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who

are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.
14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family

Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our
law on evi____________________________
212
1. the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the

person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
2. (6)The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
3. (7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
14
This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the
other hand, the text used inSantos vs. CA reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx
xxx
xxx
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruzs Memorandum is
due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are
differently-worded English translations.
213

13, 1997
dencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source
and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent,
separate and apart from each othershall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
33
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of

the nation.
1. (8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have

already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.),Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo,Puno, Francisco,Hermosisima,
Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., See Separate Statement.
Regalado, Kapunanand Mendoza, JJ., In the result.
Romero, J., Please see my separate opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see concurring opinion.
214
214
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED

SEPARATE STATEMENT
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia RosarioBedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA
20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge
the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual millieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling,
upheld petitioner Solicitor Generals position that opposing
and conflicting personalities is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, for the latter is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
34
nature which renders them incapable of performing such

marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of
Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much
psychological incapacity as a difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neg215

13, 1997
lect in the performance of some marital obligations. it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the
result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or
defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a
resultant defect or vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Centers
Civil Code Revision Committee was to excludemental
inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and
focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in
the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took

finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has

dropped any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained
that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appre216
216
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
ciation of ones marital obligation. There being a defect in

consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for viodable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable . . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then was
that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term
is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
1
35
psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . . . Justice

Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion
for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
considered the inclusion of the phrase and is incurable but
Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give
rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage
was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice SempioDiy. Justice
____________________________
1
Justice Caguioas explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.

217

13, 1997
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted
spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages,viz:
1. 1.lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. 2.reasons of public policy;
3. 3.special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under

special cases and special situations, hence its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there
a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even
comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at
the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly
the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores
and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states,inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those)
who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
218
218
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
36
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law

recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two living
Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by
Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite
a number of married couples have found themselves in
limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the
Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions,
some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This
Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required
persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid
consent: Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not
ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and

Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent
to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct
but
219

13, 1997
related grounds for annulment, called lack of due discretion
and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent
at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid.
Lack of due competence means that the person wasincapable
of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the
1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give
valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing
short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated
a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of
an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the persons entire life,
both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
37
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions

about a partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness
in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to theadvances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.
220
220
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of

marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others body
for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the
community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing,
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
2
marriageas presupposing the development of an adult

personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a selfgiving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities.The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according
to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing
and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
3
____________________________
2
Zwack, Joseph P., Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.
The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law
Society of America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.

221

13, 1997
Fr. Green, in an article inCatholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
38
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological

conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any
other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered intocivil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someones failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into.
4
In the instant case, opposing and conflicting personalities

of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological
____________________________
4
Zwack, ibid., p. 47.
222
222
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in

the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more than five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity. Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages
remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said
petitioner husband, after ten (10) months sleeping with his
wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he
alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife
which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the
indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a
basic marital obligation described as to procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage, the
wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the
marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on psychological incapacity,
concluded:
5
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to

perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
39
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to

have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign
of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
____________________________
5
G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20(1995).
G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
223

13, 1997
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
even if such incapacity

solemnization.
becomes
manifest
only
after
its
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of

the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
1
____________________________
1
Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-
Diy, in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.

224
224
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
I concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage

remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity
(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.
CONCURRING OPINION
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from

Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law
VITUG, J.:
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting

marriage; (those)
I fully concur with my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice

Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most
helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the
bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines). The
term psychological incapacity was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
1. 1.who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. 2.who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. 3.who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
that should give that much value to Canon Law

jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment.
2
40
The principles in the proper application of the law teach

us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, one must also
read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the
other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37,
38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would
make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could
justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed
so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Courts statement inSantos
vs. Court of Appeals; viz:
3
(T)he use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36

of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances x x x. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with,
____________________________
2
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.
Supra.
225

13, 1997
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual

obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or
lesbianism,
merely
renders
the
marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
4
In fine, the term psychological incapacity, to be a ground

for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests: viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not
physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume and
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
____________________________
41
At pages 34-35.
226
226
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual

help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may
occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee
has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would
suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others
would also put it, to be an alternative to divorce; however,
the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed
to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have
indeed turned out for the better; if it were otherwise, there
could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the
measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down
in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State
should regard marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution x x x.
Section 1, Article XV:
solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987

Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved
but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
227
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY

13, 1997
People vs. Letigio
227
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory

unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would
cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear
to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the
family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one
that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Petition granted. Judgment reversed and set aside, the
marriage subsists and remains valid.
Notes.Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
(Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with existing precepts in our law on marriage. (Ibid.)
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensibility or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. (Id.)
o0o
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the

foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
42
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003.

DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT
APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
*
OF
Actions; Pleadings
and
Practice; Cause
of
Action;Elements; Words and Phrases; A cause of action is an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the
plaintiff.Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition
fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is an
act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of
the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains
three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an
obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Ultimate facts refer to
the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action reststhe term does not refer to details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the
material elements.The second petition states the ultimate facts
on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
42
4
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barcelona vs. Court of
Appeals
details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which

establish the material elements.
Same; Same; Same;Annulment

of
Marriage; Rules
on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages; The obvious effect of the new Rules
providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is
that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacityonly experts in the fields of neurological
and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause
of psychological incapacity.Procedural rules apply to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious
effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be
alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the
root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the
fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new
Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to
allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains
work, respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do
not understand everything there is to know about the root causes
of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward,
physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules
require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations
indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second
petition complies with this requirement.
Same; Same; Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping;Procedural
Rules and Technicalities; While certificate of non-forum shopping
not attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by
counsel and not by the party himself constitutes a violation of the
requirement, the rule of substantial compliance applies to the
contents of the certification.The Court has consistently held that
a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or
one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party
himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation
43
can result in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However,

the Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial
compliance applies to the contents of the certification.
Same; Same; Same; Same;There is no need to state in the
certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition about the
prior filing and dismissal of the first petition.In Roxas v. Court of
Appeals, the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the
omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case
involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the
petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled: x x x an
43
VOL. 412,
4
SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
3
Appeals
omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any
event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as
in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and
nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils
sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is
in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp.v. National
Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would
be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is
to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. The dismissal of the first petition
precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions
dismissal did not also amount tores judicata. Thus, there is no
need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second
petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and
dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
Same; Same; Same; Same;Circular No. 04-94 should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure, which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously
as possible.Circular No. 04-94, now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to
achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular
to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The
Circular should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness
as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal
of all rules of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the

Court of Appeals.
Villanueva, Bernardoand Gabionza for petitioner.
Horacio R. Makalintal, Jr. for private respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997
Decision as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the
Court of Ap1
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia, and Artemio G. Tuquero concurring.

44
44
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
peals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals

affirmed the Order dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss
2
44
private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for

failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed
Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon
(respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner
Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9523445 (first petition) before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87. On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo
filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court
granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition
for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This
time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9524471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second
petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to
state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on
forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to
which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in
Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued
on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring
resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their
arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing
Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an
Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the
motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when
the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a
cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely
3
_______________
2
Penned by Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison.
Presided by Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan.
45
VOL. 412, SEPTEMBER

24, 2003
Appeals
45
from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to

petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the
petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent
Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge
Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent
Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second
petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo
filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier
dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the
trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the
second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14
February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the
trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on the
Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states
a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that the trial courts second order corrected the situation
since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial
court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed
with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition
45
state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment

if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation
of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence of forum
shopping, the elements of litis pendentiamust exist or a final
judgment in one case must amount tores judicata in the
other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because
respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without
prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition.
Neither is there res judicata because there is no final
decision on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following
issues:
46
46
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
of the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it

contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such
right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates
the right of the plaintiff.
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of
action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The
petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana
were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a
whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract
attached to the petition. The couple established their
residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana
Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October
1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina
Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in
February 1978. The peti5
_______________
1. I.WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND

PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
2. II.WHETHER
RESPONDENT
TADEO
VIOLATED
SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A
PREVIOUS
PETITION
FOR
ANNULMENT
OF
MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION AND STATUS.
4
The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to
state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is an
act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right
Rollo, pp. 243-244.
Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135548, 29
September 2000, 341 SCRA 486.

6
Relucio v. Lopez, G.R. No. 138497, 16 January 2002, 373 SCRA 578.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides: A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to

comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
47
VOL. 412, SEPTEMBER

24, 2003
Appeals
47
46
tion further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically

incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such
incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition
alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
partnership of gains. The separation in fact between the

petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present
time.
6. 10.The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support
of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and
taken as an integral part hereof.
7. 11.The respondent at the time of the celebration of their
marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity
subsisted up to and until the present time. Such
incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological
examination conducted on the relationship between the
petitioner and the respondent.
xxx
1. 5.During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to
their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich
family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters
house or would play tennis the whole day.
2. 6.When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages
suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child,
respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to
speak to her husband.
3. 7.On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months
pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of reevaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She
further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom
from petitioners marital authority and influences. The
petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in
their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents
desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could
dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave
their conjugal dwelling.
4. 8.In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard
the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled
to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a
condominium located in Greenhills.
5. 9.This separation resulted in complete estrangement
between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner
waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents
favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal
48
48
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. 12.Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab
initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in
accordance with Article 39 thereof.
x x x.
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which
respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the
existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does
not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence which establish the material elements.
8
10
47
Petitioner Diana relies mainly on the rulings inSantos

v. Court of Appeals as well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina. Santos gave life to the phrase psychological
incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining
the term in this wise:
11
12
13
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental

(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
celebrated. x x x.
_______________
8
Rollo, pp. 54-55.
Section 1. In general.Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist

the courts and the parties in cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls
short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina.
Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective
because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to
state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from
the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or
incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any
reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the
disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the
marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to
comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos andMolina, the Court adopted the
new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new
Rules). Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new
Rules provides:
14
15
logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be,
omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
10
OSCAR M. HERRERA,Remedial Law I, 1999 Ed.
11
Petitioner Diana relied onSantos for her motion to dismiss in the trial
court and her certiorari petition in the appellate court. In her motion to
reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals, she citedMolina.
12
310 Phil. 21; 240 SCRA 20(1995).
13
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
49
VOL. 412, SEPTEMBER

24, 2003

Appeals
49
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege.A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, ifany, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of thecelebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.(Emphasis supplied)
48
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at

the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new
Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in
the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the
fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent
to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since
the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert
opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there
is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our
brains work, respond to and control the human body.
Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know
about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root
causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to
science even as their outward, physical manifestations are
evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to
allege are the physical manifestations indicative of
psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second petition
complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states
the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation
of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner
Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held:
16
17
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are

sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will
have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint
can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt.
Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152[1992] citing Consolidated Bank &

Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]).To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that theclaim for relief does not
existrather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27
SCRA 50 [1969]). x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of

lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the factual
averments in the complaint. Given the hypothetically
admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could
render judgment over the case.
18
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the
second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which
does not mention the filing of the first petition and its
dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 0494. Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 049419
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking

relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory
pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings:
(a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to
the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is
either pending or may have been terminated, he must state
the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
49
agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days

therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and
sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.
20
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not

disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that he had
previously commenced a similar action based on the same
grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of
non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of
termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of nonforum shopping not attached to the petition or one belatedly
filed or one
_______________
18
Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Gaston, G.R. No 141961, 23
January 2002, 374 SCRA 396.

19
Now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
20
Emphasis supplied by petitioner.
52
52
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a

violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the
dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court
has also previously held that the rule of substantial
compliance applies to the contents of the certification.
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals, the Court squarely
addressed the issue of whether the omission of a statement
on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same
parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas,
the Court ruled:
x x x an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about

any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis
pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering
that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not
present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal
interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum
shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of
procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality

of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also
amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the
certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of
the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the
instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him
and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before
service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there
is nolitis pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already
withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is
there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a
decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
_______________
21
22
21
MC Engineering, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 412 Phil.
614; 360 SCRA 183 (2001).

22
415 Phil. 430; 363 SCRA 207(2001).
53
VOL. 412, SEPTEMBER

24, 2003
53
50

Appeals
Circular No. 04-94, now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to
achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the
Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice. The Circular should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure
which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that
marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the state cherishes and
protects. In rendering this Decision, this Court is not
prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is void
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must
resolve this issue after trial on the merits where each party
can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and
defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the
allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently
alleges a cause of action and does not violate the rule on
forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to
attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed
Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7
August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.,
Chairman), Vitug, YnaresSantiago and Carpio, JJ.,concur.
Azcuna, J., On leave.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.Compliance with the certification against forum
shopping is separate from, and independent of, the avoidance
of forum shopping itself. (Melo vs. Court of Appeals, 318

SCRA 94 [1999])
23
24
25
_______________
23
Preceded by Circular No. 28-91.
24
See note 22.
25
See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.
54
54
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villaruel, Jr. vs. Fernando
Where the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs.

over a property in which they have a common interest, the
signing of one of them in the certification substantially
complies with the rules on certification of non-forum
shopping. (Dar vs. AlonzoLegasto, 339 SCRA 306[2000])
o0o
51
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS,
respondent.
*
Actions; Marriage; Husband

and
Wife; Declaration
of
Nullity;Psychological Incapacity; Words and Phrases; Guidelines
Governing the Application and Interpretation of Psychological
Incapacity; The guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitatedwhat is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the partys psychological condition, for indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.In Republic v. CA and Molina,
the guidelines govern_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
756
7
56
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
ing the application and the interpretation of psychological

incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid
down by this Court as follows: x x x x x x x x x The guidelines
incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or
clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence
that
can
adequately
establish
the
partyspsychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; There could be no conclusion
of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing
that the defects were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his defects were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage, it is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; Legal Separation; Neither is
Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and
the like.Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation,
in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
52
757
VOL. 343,
7
OCTOBER 19, 2000
57
Marcos vs. Marcos
CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.
758
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual

alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best,
the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

of Appeals.
Jimeno, Jalandoni & Cope Law Offices for petitioner.
Macaraig Law Office for private respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity
of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:
1
WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the

marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid.
2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA

Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
_______________
Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices
Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (Division chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
758
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.

Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initiopursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126
and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties children. In
the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is
granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and
the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
action consistent with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and
(2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacanang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of
their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
F).
Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
53
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos

Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
Womens Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978.
After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from
the military service.
They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted
and eventually became sweethearts.
After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.
1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which
she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
759
VOL. 343, OCTOBER

19, 2000
Marcos vs. Marcos
759
After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service

in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did
not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the
head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage
in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict
physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992,
they were already living separately.
All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling
magic uling and chickens. While she was still in the military, she
would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.
The straw that broke the camels back took place on October
16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already
living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid.
The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the
house and sought refuge in her sisters house.
On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters
and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look
for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after
them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children
were renting a house in Camella. Paraaque, while the appellant
was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan,
the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive
to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
760
760
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.

Dayan, Ph. D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp.
207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of
54
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children. x x x.
3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity
had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouses psychological incapacity which should also be
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to
assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in
Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings
about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based
only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x
x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence
to show that he Iwasl not psychologically incapacitated. The root
cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition,
nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at
all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mentalnot physical to
the extent that he could not have known
_______________
761
VOL. 343, OCTOBER

19, 2000
Marcos vs. Marcos
761
the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,

ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable.
4
Hence, this Petition.

Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents for this Courts
consideration the following issues:
5
1. I.Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set

aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
2. II.Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition.
7
The Courts Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless,
the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary
Issue:
Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of
various tests that were submitted to determine respondents
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of
marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because
55
marriage are to be protected by the state.

xxx
xxx
xxx
2. 2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating
_______________
4
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000,
upon receipt by this Court of respondents Memorandum, which was signed

by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita
Linda V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
6
Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
762
762
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds

that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources
of information in order to determine the psychological
capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to
such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, the guidelines governing
the application and the interpretation ofpsychological
incapacityreferred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were
laid down by this Court as follows:
_______________
268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
1. 1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article
shall prescribe in ten years after its celebration.
763
VOL. 343, OCTOBER

19, 2000
Marcos vs. Marcos
763
1. nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by

qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
56
2. 3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time

3. 4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
marriage.
4. 5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
5. 6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be

stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
6. 7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate
given
great
respect
by
our
courts.
xxx
xxx
xxx
petition. The So764
764
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
1. licitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements

earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
11
57
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or

clinically identified. What is important is the presence of
evidence
that
can
adequately
establish
the
partyspsychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main
Issue:
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the
evidence presented in the present caseincluding the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioners
sister and the social workerwas enough to sustain a finding
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his defects were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the
fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of more than six years. It was during this period
that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral

support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to
said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation,
in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At
best, the evidence presented by
12
_______________
12
following grounds:
_______________
10
Supra, pp. 209-213.
11
40 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
1. (1)Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
765
VOL. 343, OCTOBER

19, 2000
Marcos vs. Marcos
Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

2. (2)Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
765
change religious or political affiliation;

3. (3)Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
58
4. (4)Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of

more than six years, even if pardoned;
5. (5)Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
6. (6)Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
7. (7)Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
8. (8)Sexual infidelity or perversion;
9. (9)Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
766
766
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for

declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient
divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina.Petitioner,
however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe
the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as aconditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman),Vitug, Purisima andGonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.Whether
one
spouse
is
psychologically
incapacitated should be immediately determined as there is
no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the

petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who
still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in
the company of each other. (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA
100 [1994])
Where the respondent in a petition for annulment
vehemently opposed the same, and where he does not allege
that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties, the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
(Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,256 SCRA 158 [1996])
o0o
_______________
1. (10)Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term child shall include a child by
nature or by adoption.
59
G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.LOLITA
QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
*
Family Code; Marriages;Constitutional Law; The court is

mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Same; Same; Psychological
Incapacity; Psychological
antecedence and (c) incurability.The guidelines incorporate the
three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
inSantos: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Same; Same; Same;Although, as a rule, there was no need for
an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness.We find that the totality of
evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically
incapacitated
to
assume
his
marital
responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some
kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how

Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had
she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
736
7
36
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. QuinteroHamano
Same; Same; Same; As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to

prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.We must remember that abandonment is also a ground
for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar
was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere
fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. As we ruled inMolina, it is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as
a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical,illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
60
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to

marriage.
Same; Same; Same; The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse.
We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to
be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of
human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
PETITION FOR REVIEW on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The Solicitor Generalfor petitioner.
Public Attorneys Officefor respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated
August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision dated
1
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Hilarion Aquino; Rollo, pp. 24-31.

2
Second Division.
Penned by Judge Rogelio Angeles; Rollo, pp. 32-33.
737
VOL. 428, MAY 20,

737
2004
August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch
72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted
between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and
her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived
in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back
to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by
Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after
the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money
to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her
friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not
bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved
because he was no longer residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12,
61
1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy

of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general
circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because
Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of
60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on
November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales
filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the
parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the
evidence submitted was not fabri738
738
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
cated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted

respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte.She
then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National
Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into the
records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of
the Court.
SO ORDERED.
4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of

Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses
failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior
could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of
entering into marital life.
5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein

petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court
of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated
August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on
hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The
decision of the courta quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6
_______________
4
Rollo, p. 33.
Rollo, p. 52.
Rollo, p. 30.
739
VOL. 428, MAY 20,

739
2004
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and
their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage,
and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family
and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except
62
for two months, he never sent any support to nor

communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent.
He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see
them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to
contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support pursuant
to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an
unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social
inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a
marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left
them without even helping them cope up with family life and
assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?
7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be

equated withRepublic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a mixed
marriage, the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this
lone assignment of error:
8
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF TOSHIO HAMANO TO PERFORM HIS
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS, DESPITE RESPONDENTS FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN
THE MOLINACASE.
10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his

family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely
indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse
falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to
prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the
part of Toshio, in accordance
with the guidelines set inMolina. The Office of the Public
Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of
the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
11
12
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the

interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
1. (1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
63
2. (2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
_______________
11
Article II, Section 12; and, Article XV, Sections 1 & 2 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
12
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Dagdag, 351
SCRA
425 (2001)
citingRepublic of the Philippines vs. Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 (1999).

741
VOL. 428, MAY 20,

741
2004
1. Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

marriage.
4. (5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
marriage.
64
6. (7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate

given great respect by our courts. x x x

petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to

live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned
them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent
sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip
to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned
his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological
_______________
13
Supra, Note 8, pp. 209-212.
14
Supra, Note 9, p. 33.
15
Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, 764 (2000).
13
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements

earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:psychological
antecedence and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be medically or clinically identified. What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.
We now proceed to determine whether respondent
successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill
his marital responsibilities.
14
15
743
VOL. 428, MAY 20,

743
2004
disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondents case had she presented evidence that medically
or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for
legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar
was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of
legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect
from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we
16
65
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed

to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements
inMolina and Santos do not apply here because the present
case involves a mixed marriage, the husband being a
Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse
and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used
for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any
person regardless of nationality.
17
18
In Pesca vs. Pesca, this Court declared that marriage is an

inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband may not
necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Chairman
and
Actg.
C.J.), SandovalGutierrez and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.The guidelines governing the application of
psychological incapacity are: (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. (Marcos vs. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755[2000])
There could be no conclusion of psychological incapacity
where there is absolutely no showing that the defects were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. (Id.)
19
o0o
_______________
16
ANNOTATED
People vs. Cachapero
Article 55 (10) of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more

than one year.
17
Supra, Note 8, p. 210.
18
Ibid., pp. 211-212.
744
744
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
66
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004.

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM,
respondents. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositorrespondent.
462
Civil Law; Family Code;Marriage; Annulment;Psychological

Incapacity; There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders.x x x
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; It must be shown that the
disordered personality completely unable respondent to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state.Respondents sexual
infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute psychological
_______________
*
4
62
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Dedel vs. Court of
Appeals
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.

Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be
equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or
sexual promiscuity.

of Appeals.
Counselors Circle Law Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor Generalfor oppositor-respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. CorpuzDedel while he was working in the advertising business of
his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic
relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before
the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966. The civil
marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane,
born on September 18, 1968; Stephanie Janice born on
September 9, 1969; Kenneth David born on April 24,
1971; and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976. The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
1
FIRST DIVISION.
67
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned

out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother.
She had extramarital affairs with several men: a dentist in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the
Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.
Sharon was once confined in the Manila Medical City for
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.
Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not
stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national
named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom
she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left
the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her
two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and
even considered the two illegitimate children as his own.
Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned
petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children.
Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,
petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the
Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in
the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation
in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and
could not be found in the Philippines.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who
testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of
petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects
completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in
whatever he does.
7
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was

suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by
her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing
with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling
the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
8
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church

marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between
the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete
separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code,
without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil
and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.
9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor

General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
68
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY
THE
SOLICITOR
GENERAL
AS
REQUIRED
IN
THE MOLINACASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of

the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated January 8, 2002. Hence, the instant
petition.
10
11
_______________
9
Rollo, p. 49; penned by Presiding Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga (now
an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals).

10
Rollo, pp. 33-44; per Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with
Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Eliezer R. Delos Santos,

concurring.
11
Rollo, p. 45.
465
VOL. 421, JANUARY

465
29, 2004
Dedel vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused
its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the:
(1) respondent was not suffering from psychological
incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or

incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the
petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the
totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of
respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term
psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled:
12
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a

mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or
lesbianism,
merely
renders
the
marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
69
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These

provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indiciaof psychological
incapacity. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters
are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must,
in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons
with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a

personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In
this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as
being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she
could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in
fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which
produced four children.
14
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and

abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
15
16
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are

grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. How17
_______________
13
Id., at pp. 40-41.
14
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
15
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588, 594.
16
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,supra, pp. 87-88.
17
ART. 55.A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
1. (1)Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child or a child of the petitioner;
2. (2)Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
467
VOL. 421, JANUARY

467
29, 2004
Dedel vs. Court of Appeals
ever, we pointed out inMarcos v. Marcos that Article 36
is not to be equated with legal separation in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction,
habitual
alcoholism,
sexual
infidelity,
abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not
for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of
petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is
exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman
Catholic Church.
18
70
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of

the ap-pellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration
and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation.
Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem. While we sympathize with
petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost duty
is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.
19
20
_______________
1. (3)Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
2. (4)Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six years even if pardoned;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No.
97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.,Chairman), Panganiban and
Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Note.Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity. (Pesca vs.
Pesca,356 SCRA 588 [2001])
o0o
3. (5)Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

4. (6)Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
5. (7)Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage
in the Philippines, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
6. (8)Sexual infidelity or perversion;
7. (9)Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
8. (10)Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term child shall include a child by
nature or by adoption.
18
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 765.
19
Santos v. Court of Appeals,supra, p. 36.
20
Pesca v. Pesca, supra.
468
468
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Scheer
71
G.R. No. 158896. October 27, 2004.

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner, vs.MANUEL
SIAYNGCO, respondent.
*
Marriages; Family Code; Psychological Incapacity; Whether or

not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the
facts of the case.Our pronouncement inRepublic v.
Dagdag is apropos. There, we held that whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the
facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged
according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on all
fours with another.
Same; Same; Same;Psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses;Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.It was
in Santos v. Court of Appeals where we declared that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.
Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.We reiterate that the state has a high
stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of
the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals that the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any

doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual infidelity, per se, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code.What emerges from the psychological report of Dr.
Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation
of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is
a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child
of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has
admitted that: I had [extramarital] affairs because I wanted to
have a child at that particular point.
Same; Same; Same; Mere
showing
of
irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is
not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. As we stated inMarcos v. Marcos: Article
36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

of Appeals.
72

Harry P. Jaminola for petitioner.
Dick B. Perez for respondent.
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and

with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or
regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as
judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and
scream at him and throw objects around the house within the
hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her psychological
incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated
resentment and vindic-
424
424
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102,
Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco (respondent
Manuel).
Petitioner
Juanita
Carating-Siayngco
(Petitioner
Juanita) and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites
on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11
August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a
child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in
1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of
married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all
throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over
domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was
exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature;
that she incessantly complained about almost everything and
anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff
in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
_______________
Per Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (Chairman) and concurred in by
Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong.

2
Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
425
VOL. 441, OCTOBER

425
27, 2004
Siayngco
tiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and
appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that
such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and
expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the
parties; and that he endured and suffered through his
turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22)
years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent
Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in
Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against
her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she
is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel
who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that
73
she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors

despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy
family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was
stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order, the parties only stipulated on the
following:
3
1. 1.That they were married on 27 June 1973;

2. 2.That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
10
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel

first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations
in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved
of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would
return to the seminary. The early years of their marriage
were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted
as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period
that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental to him and his parents. She was also
obsessive about cleanli4
period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they

were engrossed in furnishing their new house. In 1981, when
he became busy with law school and with various community
organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife
started to drift apart. He then narrated incidents during
their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or
distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an
elderly neighbor; when she would visit him in his office and
remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she
kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a
ballpen from his table; when she caused his office drawer to
be forcibly opened while he was away; when she confronted
a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an
affair with him; and other incidents reported to him which
would show her jealous nature. Money matters continued to
be a source of bitter quarrels. Respondent Manuel could not
forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as
judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for
lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to
celebrations of their parish priest. Respondent Manuel then
denied that he was a womanizer or that he had a
mistress. Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their
conjugal properties and obligations.
11
12
13
14
15
16
_______________
3
RTC Record, p. 36.
TSN, 07 October 1998, p. 10.
Id., at p. 13.
Id., at pp. 13-14.
17
18
_______________
426
426
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Siayngco
ness which became the common source of their quarrels. He,

however, characterized their union as happy during that
7
Id., at pp. 16-17.
Id., at p. 19.
Id., at pp. 20-22.
10
Id., at p. 23.
11
Id., at pp. 28-29.
12
Id., at p. 34.
13
Id., at p. 30.
14
Id., at pp. 27-28.
15
Id., at p. 33.
74
16
Id., at p. 30.
17
Id., at p. 37.
18
Id., at pp. 43-44.
Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both

spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a
defective communication pattern which is characteristically
negative and deformed.
427
VOL. 441, OCTOBER

427
27, 2004
Siayngco
_______________
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court,

testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent
Manuels office. But when she was there, she would call
witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of
the office. One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita
rummaging through respondent Manuels drawer looking for
his address book while the latter was in Subic attending a
conference. When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked
drawer she called witness, telling the latter that she was
looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel room
in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner
Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the
lock-smith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open
the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in
August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner
Juanita remark to respondent Manuel sino bang batang
bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR.
VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a
psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita. From her
psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Garcia concluded:
19
TSN, 27 January 1999, p. 3.
20
TSN, 25 November 1998, p. 15.
21
Id., at pp. 9-13.
22
Id., at p. 14.
23
TSN, 10 May 1999, p. 5.
24
Exh. M for petitioner Manuel, respondent herein.
19
20
21
22
23
24
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria

Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a
partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain
the marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
428
428
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Siayngco
This affected their competence to maintain the love and respect

that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both
partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their
disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory,
critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive,
Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to
satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his
felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the
detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to
prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic
psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive
traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and
sensitive) to each others needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot
is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage. Manuel
and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to
75
satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The

clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the
diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS,
with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more
emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits
which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be
pervasive and impervious to recovery.
25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent

Manuels allegations. She insisted that they were a normal
couple who had their own share of fights; that they were
happily married until respondent Manuel started having
extramarital
affairs which
he
had
admitted
to
her. Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to
preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband. She stated further that she has continuously
supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he
was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when
he already filed the present case,
26
27
28
_______________
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a

psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, testified
that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner
Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report.
Said report stated in part:
31
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the

psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria CaratingSiayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and
highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough
psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful
of traditional institutions of society like the institution of
marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and selfsacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe
environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is realityoriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound
decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to
be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.
32
25
Records, pp. 114-115.
26
TSN, 29 March 2000, pp. 5-6.
27
Id., at p. 7.
28
Id., at p. 11.
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since

1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to
each other. The couple would religiously attend prayer
meetings in the community. Both were likewise leaders in
their community. Witness then stated that she would often
33
34
35
429
VOL. 441, OCTOBER

429
27, 2004
Siayngco
_______________
she would still attend to his needs. She remembered that

after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway,
respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to
have a new family.
29
30
29
Id., at p. 12.
30
Id., at p. 22.
31
TSN, 21 June 2000, p. 5.
32
Records, p. 169.
33
TSN, 14 July 2000, p. 4.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
76
incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of

Appeals. Thus:
430
430
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Siayngco
39
_______________
go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she

still saw respondent Manuel there.
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent
Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
36
Id., at p. 6.
37
RTC Records, pp. 205-206.
38
Id., at p. 209.
39
G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 324.
36
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not

preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily
married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son.
Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and
prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical,
depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties
relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-wife
started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor
kneejerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on
marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have
succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of
irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now
stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such
cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a
marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or
she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.
37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an

order dated 04 May 2001.
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically
38
431
VOL. 441, OCTOBER

431
27, 2004
Siayngco
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant
Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and
defendant. That isa shared feeling which between husband and
wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is
a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others feelings
at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening
the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but
for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love
amore gignit amorem, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution
(Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do
no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court.
Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant
but also of himself.
40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred

77
1. I.IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
2. II.IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE
TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING
TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME
OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE
PRESENT
3. III.WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES
LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE
OFREPUBLIC v. MOLINA
4. IV.IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID
ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
_______________
40
Rollo, p. 43.
432
432
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Siayngco
milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple
involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time
of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation
on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed
the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We
sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital
obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a
non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband
who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and
overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with
cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet irritants and
who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his
person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however,
these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led
respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount
to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
_______________
The Courts Ruling

Our pronouncement inRepublic v. Dagdag isapropos. There,
we held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in
a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case
must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own
facts as there can be no case that is on all fours with
another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling
in Chi Ming Tsoidespite a clear divergence in its factual
41
41
433
VOL. 441, OCTOBER

433
27, 2004
Siayngco
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals where we declared that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental
42
78
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly

incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a)
gravity,
(b)
juridical
antecedence,
and
(c)
incurability. In Republic v. Court of Appeals we expounded:
43
44
_______________
42
G.R. No. 112019, 04 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
43
Id.; Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
44
434
434
1. (1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
marriage are to be protected by the state. The Family
Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
2. (2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the
complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Siayngco
1. the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a
79

marriage.
4. (5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
marriage.
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological

incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent
Manuel.
_______________
45
At pp. 209-212. The above pronouncements have been modified by the
provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which took effect on
15 March 2003, particularly Section 2(d) thereof which provides:
(d) What to allege.A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
Previously, the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitted the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders and its Rationale enunciated
among other things, that:
3. Attachment of expert opinion to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
435
marriage under Article 36 is dispensed with. Instead, the court shall determine the
VOL. 441, OCTOBER

435
27, 2004
Siayngco
advisability of expert testimony during the pre-trial conference.

xxx
xxx
xxx
12. The certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is
dispensed with to avoid delay.
1. (7)Interpretations
given by the National Appellate

given great respect by our courts.
45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now

resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence
436
436
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Siayngco
A. Re: Psychological Incapacity of Respondent Manuel

80
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the

preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held
in Republic v. Court of Appeals that the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff
(respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which
is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains candid
admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best
position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the
essential marital obligations of marriage:
46
47
She talked about her spouse, My husband is kind, a good

provider, cool, intelligent but a liar,masamang magalit at
gastador.In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him
whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he
wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not
having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now.
He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them
together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged
him to file the petition. She feels that the problems in the
relationship is [sic] paulit-ulit, but, that she still is willing to
pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is
not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her,
You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family.
She
_______________
46
Sec. 12, Art. II, Constitution.
47
Supra, note 43.
437
VOL. 441, OCTOBER

437
27, 2004
Siayngco
answered and said, Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right.
Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin.
48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as

well as from the testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the
obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity,per se, however, does
not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child
of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent
Manuel has admitted that: I had [extra-marital] affairs
because I wanted to have a child at that particular point.
B. Re: Psychological Incapacity of Petitioner Juanita
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of
the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to
prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies
and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her
controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and
her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave
psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there
any showing that these
49
50
51
52
81
_______________
48
Dr. Garcias psychological report, Exh. M (RTC Record at p. 110).
49
See Art. 68, Family Code.
50
Santos v. Court of Appeals,supra, note 42; Hernandez v. Court of
intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed

by respondent Manuel himself during his direct
examination.
58
_______________
Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, 08 December 1999, 320 SCRA 76; Dedel v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 461.
53
Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 43 at p. 764.

RTC Record at p. 169.
51
Ibid.
54
52
Supra, note 46 at p. 111.
55
Supra, note 46 at pp. 102-103.
56
Id., at p. 111.
57
Id., at p. 110.
438
438
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Siayngco
58
defects were already present at the inception of the

marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba,
whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness,
Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any.
Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that
petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the
contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of
petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceablenot from the
inception of their marriage as required by lawbut from her
experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws
disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood, her husbands philandering, admitted no less by
him, and her inability to conceive. Dr. Garcias report
paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally
during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to
the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing
53
54
55
56
57
Q: Did your wife agree to

your going to law school?
A: I did not encounter any
objection from her.
Q: And what was the marriage
like during this time when
you were attending law
school?
A: I started feeling that we
somehow begun (sic)
drifting apart because I
was developing a new field
of interest in the legal
profession. I was occupied
with leading various
community organization
(sic) including
homeowners association.
Maybe that was when we
started drifting apart.
(TSN, 07 October 1998, at
p. 22)
439
82
VOL. 441, OCTOBER

439
27, 2004
Siayngco
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 44 at p. 207.
60
Supra, note 43 at p. 765.
61
Dedel v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 50, citing Santos v. Court of
Appeals, supra, note 42, at p. 36.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both

parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss
life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married
couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with
the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a
way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. As we stated inMarcos v. Marcos:
59
59
60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with

a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
440
440
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Villariasa-Riesenbeck vs.
Abarrientos
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman),Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
Sr.and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.There could be no conclusion of psychological
incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the
defects were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. (Marcos vs. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755[2000])
o0o
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery

respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled,
so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force
and effect. No costs.
61
_______________
83
G.R. No. 167206. November 18, 2005.

JAIME F. VILLALON, petitioner, vs. MA. CORAZON N.
VILLALON, respondent.
*
Civil Law; Family Code;Annulment of Marriage; The totality

of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital
obligations; Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least
two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a
grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations.The totality of the evidence in
this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On
the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good
husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to
their separation, a loving father to their children and a good
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in
at least two occasions, the same does not appear
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
573
VOL. 475,
5
NOVEMBER 18, 2005
73
Villalon vs. Villalon
to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which
rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The
same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in
petitioners personal history.
Same; Same; Same;Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by
juridical attendance, gravity and incurability.In Santos v. Court
of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the court held that psychological
incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage,
must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and

incurability. It should... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
celebrated....
Same; Same; Same; Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his
alleged psychological disorder.We agree with the Court of
Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and
gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan
described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder as self-centered, characterized
by grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to others,
and one with Casanova Complex as a serial adulterer, the
evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient
proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity; It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.Sexual
infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is
suffering from psycho574
5
74
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
84

logical incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage. The evidence on record fails to
convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On
the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner was a good
husband most of the time when he was living with respondent, a
loving father to his children as well as a good provider.
Same; Same; Same; The cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997).In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), we held that the cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
FurtherThe illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
Same; Same; Same; Refusal to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the
meaning of the law.As held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals, refusal to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the
law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of
the marriage.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Abesamis Law Officesfor petitioner.
Manalo, Puno, Jocson & Guerzon Law Offices for
private respondent.
575
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER

18, 2005
575
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a
petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to
Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior
to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his
psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest
in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and
irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations
of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other
women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and
(d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of
companionship and consortium towards respondent.
Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be
declared null and void ab initio.
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an
answer denying petitioners allegations. She asserted that
her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and
characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth
in their relationship and that their marital squabbles were
normal based on community standards. Petitioners success
1
85
in his professional life aided him in performing his role as

husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that
petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital
responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor
to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion
_______________
1
RTC Records, pp. 1-4.
Id., at pp. 21-26.
10
_______________
576
576
and their relationship became devoid of love, affection,

support and respect due to his constant urge to see other
women. Moreover, their relationship tended to be one-sided
since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever showed
her love, needs, wants and emotions.
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his
marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also
saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
between the parties. The report submitted to the trial court

stated that there was no such collusion.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently
entered its appearance in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines and submitted an opposition to the petition on
September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in
the early seventies when he applied for a job at Metrobank,
where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange
trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a romantic
relationship soon thereafter. After going steady for about two
years, petitioner and respondent were married at the San
Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978.
Petitioner claimed that he married respondent because he
believed that it was the right time to raise a family and that
she would be a good mother to his children.
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from
respondent. According to him, their marriage reached a point
where there was no longer any communication between them
3
Id., at p. 27.
Id., at p. 28.
Id., at p. 73.
Id., at pp. 69-72.
TSN, October 22, 1997, pp. 9-10.
Id., at p. 34.
Id., at pp. 13, 14 & 16.
10
Id., at pp. 19, 20 & 24.
577
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER

18, 2005
577
on, married respondent. Respondent learned of his affairs

but reacted in a subdued manner. Petitioner surmised that
it was respondents nature to be silent and withdrawn.
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and
moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes away.
Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children
who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old,
respectively. Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before
talking to his children. He considered himself as a good and
loving father and described his relationship with the children
as great.
11
12
13
14
15
16
86
Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his

children who stayed with him on alternate weekends. He
voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid for
their tuition fees. He also shouldered the childrens medical
expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees
for the conjugal abode.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical
psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder
of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder
as a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and
occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand
ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is
unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I
personality. A person afflicted with this disorder believes
that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings
and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person
with Casanova Com17
Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both

petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews and
psychological tests.
Respondent testified that she first learned of her
husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was
having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a
trader in her husbands company. The affair was cut short
when the woman left for the United States to work.
Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their
relationship and overcome the crisis.
When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband,
respondent averred that she did not know whether her
husbands acts could be deemed womanizing since there
were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years
apart. She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have
their marriage annulled so he could marry her old
friend. She stated that she has not closed her doors to
petitioner but the latter would have to give up his extramarital relationship.
To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness,
respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were incomplete
because a team approach was necessary in evaluating an
individuals personality. An evaluation of ones psychological
capacity requires the expertise of a psychiatrist and social
worker.
19
20
21
22
23
_______________
11
Id., at pp. 17-18.
12
Id., at pp. 26, 28.
13
Id., at p. 30.
14
Id., at p. 49.
15
Id.
16
TSN, November 19, 1997, p. 7.
17
Id., at p. 24.
24
_______________
578
578
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
plex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from

one relationship to another.
18
18
TSN, August 19, 1998, pp. 12-14.
19
Rollo, pp. 104-134.
20
TSN, February 16, 2000, pp. 8-12.
21
Id., at p. 36.
22
Id., at p. 26.
23
Id., at p. 31.
87
24
TSN, October 1, 1999, pp. 7-16.
579
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER

18, 2005
Upon order
respective
certification
Appeals. In
follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision

dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
579
_______________
of the trial court, the parties submitted their

memoranda. The OSG likewise filed a
pursuant toRep. of the Phils. v. Court of
due course, the trial court rendered judgment as
25
RTC Records, pp. 374-393 & 401-407.
26
Id., at pp. 418-423.
27
335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
28
Rollo, p. 103. Penned by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna.
25
26
27
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the

marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma. Corazon N.
Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initioon
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby
ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of
the Family Code.
As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the
custody arrangement now existing, the custody of the three (3)
childrenMiguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna
Victoriashall remain with the respondent subject to visitation
rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract
between herein parties appearing in the Book of Marriage of the
city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila as well as the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department, EDSA, Quezon
City.
SO ORDERED.
28
Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the

decision of the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
580
580
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
new judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioners petition for

lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
29
Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate court held

that petitioner failed to prove the juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological
incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioners
psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to
give sufficient basis for such a finding. Dr. Dayan also stated
that parental marital instability was the root cause of
petitioners psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate
thereon or link the two variables. Moreover, petitioners
sexual infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a
grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same
merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the
marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
appellate courts decision which was denied in an order dated
October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this recourse under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of
30
88
Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his

psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a
finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is
evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to
respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital
infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear
to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which
rendered him incapable
_______________
29
Id., at p. 82. Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Hakim S.

Abdulwahid.
30
Id., at p. 84.
581
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER

18, 2005
581
of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as

the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage
rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners
personal history.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the court held that
psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability. It should
31
32
... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that

causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of

the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated....
33
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that

petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage
and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such
conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence
showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds
it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioners general claim
that on certain occasions he had two girlfriends at the same
time, no details or explanations were given of such
circumstances that would demonstrate petitioners inability
to be faithful to respondent either before or at the time of the
celebration of their marriage.
Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of
his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described
the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder as self-centered, characterized by
grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to
others, and one with Casanova Complex as a serial
adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the presence of
any of these symptoms.
Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a serial
or habitual adulterer, as he wants the court to believe. As
stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that two
instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could be
89
deemed womanizing, especially considering that these

instances involved the same woman. In fact, at the time of
respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has
been going on for six years. This is not consistent with the
symptoms of a person suffering from Casanova Complex
who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one
relationship to another.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations
of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage. The evidence on record fails to convince us that
petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner was a
good husband most of the time when he was living with
respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good
provider.
In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, we held that the
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity must be identi
fied as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Further
uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to

petitioners discontentment with the marital relationship.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,

not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
o0o
34
However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of

Appeals, refusal to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning
of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.
38
39
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23,

2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.,
Chairman), Quisumbing,Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
35
Note.A mere showing of irreconcilable and conflicting

personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
(Choa vs. Choa,392 SCRA 641 [2002])
36
In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost

his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay
married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner
felt that he was no longer part of respondents life and that
the latter did not need or want him. Respondents
37
90
G.R. No. 162368. July 17, 2006.

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, vs.BRIX
FERRARIS, respondent.
*
Marriages; Annulment;Family
Code; Psychological
Incapacity; The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
case.The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond
the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties
to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Words and Phrases; The term
psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage.The term psychological incapacity to be a ground
for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As
all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most

utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained.
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
397
VOL. 495, JULY 17,

2006
Perez-Ferraris vs.
Ferraris
3
97
Same; Same; Same; Same; A

husbands
alleged
mixed
personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever the
spouses quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks,
the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family,
are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage; It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married personsit is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.We find respondents alleged
mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), where therein respondent
91
preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on
whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.
Same; Same; Same; Same;An unsatisfactory marriage is not a
null and void marriage.We held in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals, 320 SCRA 76, 87 (1999), that habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity. While petitioners marriage with the
respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation,
the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity
of the family; it decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
398
3
98
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Perez-Ferraris vs.
Ferraris
Same; Same; Same; Same;Divorce; Legal Separation; Article

36 of the Family Code should not be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves, and neither is it to be equated with legal separation, in

which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.In determining the import of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,
37, 38, and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make
the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the
law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves. Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr.for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated
June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error.
399
92
VOL. 495, JULY 17,

399
2006
Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris
_______________
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig

City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision denying the petition
for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage with Brix
Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient
to prove infidelity. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied in an Order dated April 20, 2001 where the trial
court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent
is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that
the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or
that his defects were incurable and already present at the
inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found
that Dr. Dayans testimony failed to establish the substance
of respondents psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the
respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed
to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondents character that effectively incapacitated him
from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition
for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that
the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
1
Rollo, pp. 96-99. Penned by Judge Franchito N. Diamante.
Id., at p. 101.
Id., at pp. 9-19. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and
concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Danilo B. Pine.

4
Id., at p. 17.
Id., at p. 18.
Id., at p. 7.
400
400
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. The

Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment but
failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
petitioners motion for reconsideration which it complied on
March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and
the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of
this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination. It is a wellestablished principle that factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this
Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
7
10
11
93
of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to

the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or
when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are
unavailing in the instant case.
The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of
12
_______________
7
Id., at pp. 208-227.
Id., at p. 228.
Concurring Opinion of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 680;268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997).

10
Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. Manila Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106.
11
Domingo v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 812,
817.
12
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856,
February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 63, 69.

401
VOL. 495, JULY 17,

401
2006
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people
may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
13
meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this

reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts
for its understanding of the human personality. However, the
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which
petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
14
15
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of

marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish respondents psychological condition. Here,
appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at
the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioners
evidence showed that respondents alleged failure to perform his
so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some
deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological
malady. To be sure, the couples relationship before the marriage
and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was
not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner
was happy and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioners own reckoning, respondent was
a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondents fidelity. It was only
when they started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed
to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could
_______________
13
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851; 343 SCRA 755, 765 (2000).
14
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40; 240 SCRA 20, 34 (1995).
15
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at p. 677; p. 210.
94
402
402
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
not understand petitioners lack of trust in him and her constant

naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could
not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her
diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called
schizoid, and why he is the dependent and avoidant type. In
fact, Dr. Dayans statement that one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayans information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive
and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder can be part of his
family upbringing x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondents parents having difficulties in their relationship. But
this input on the supposed problematic history of respondents
parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really a natal or supervening
disabling factor on the part of respondent, or an adverse integral
element in respondents character that effectively incapacitated
him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential
marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove
that respondents supposed psychological or mental malady existed
even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up
against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus
of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.
We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the

leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the
violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his
family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
_______________
16
Rollo, pp. 111-113.
403
VOL. 495, JULY 17,

403
2006
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent
preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family
on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents
for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife
regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological
defects spoken of were more of a difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
beincapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals that
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
17
18
16
95
While petitioners marriage with the respondent failed

and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy
however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage
and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
Thus, in determining the import of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction
with, although to be
1. (1)Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even

with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. (2)Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or
both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had
19
the legal authority to do so;

3. (3)Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter;
4. (4)Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article
41;
20
_______________
5. (5)Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to

the identity of the other; and
6. (6)Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
22
the beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
17
Supra note 9 at pp. 669 & 674; pp. 202 & 207.
18
377 Phil. 919, 931; 320 SCRA 76, 87 (1999).
19
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004,441
illegitimate:
1. (1)Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
SCRA 422, 439.

20
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from
2. (2)Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508,
522.
23
404
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for
reasons of public policy:
404
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
1. (1)Between
collateral
blood
relatives,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 that

would
21
22
23
24
2. (2)Between step-parents and step-children;

3. (3)Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. (4)Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. (5)Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
_______________
21
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
adopted child;
6. (6)Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
7. (7)Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. (8)Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
96
9. (9)Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other,
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
killed that other persons spouse or his or her own spouse.
twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
24
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
2. (2)That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebra-
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
405
wife;
VOL. 495, JULY 17,

405
2006
3. (3)That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless

such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage

void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage
merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the
law were indifferent on the matter. Article
4. (4)That the consent of either party was obtained by force,

intimidation
25
or
undue
influence,
unless
the
same
having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with

the other as husband and wife;
5. (5)That either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears
26
to be incurable; or
_______________
6. (6)That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted

disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
tion of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
25
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:

1. (1)That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one,
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority
26
Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 9 at p. 690; p. 224.

406
406
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the

marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. Neither it is to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like.
27
28
97
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for

reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying
the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the
petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J.,
Chairperson), AustriaMartinez, Callejo, Sr. andChico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Motion for reconsideration denied with finality.
Note.A grant of annulment of marriage or legal
separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion,
hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and
to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,256 SCRA
158 [1996])
o0o
_______________
27
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,supra note 19 at p. 439.
28
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 13.
98
G.R. No. 170729.
December 8, 2010.*
ENRIQUE
AGRAVIADOR yALUNAN,
petitioner, vs.ERLINDA
AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR
and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity;
Psychological Incapacity; Words and Phrases; The initial common
consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of
consent.The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that [a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
solemnization. It introduced the concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this
concept eludes exact definition. The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was
that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices SempioDiy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision
committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may
have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was,
nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does
not affect the consent to the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert Testimony; It is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36
of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.In Santos
v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity;
(b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to

be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. We laid down
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
520
5
20
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and

application of Article 36 of the Family Code inRepublic v. Court of
Appeals (the Molina case) x x x These guidelines incorporate the
basic requirements we established inSantos. A later case, Marcos
v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36
of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,
579 SCRA 193 (2009), did not abandon Molina (Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 [1997])far from abandoning Molina, it
simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements
Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
99
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on

psychological incapacity.A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA
193 (2009),declared that it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We stated that
instead of serving as a guideline, Molinaunintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity
to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the
intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to
psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours
with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability
of time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.Ting v. VelezTing, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), and the fairly recent case of Suazo v.
Suazo, 615 SCRA 154 (2010), squarely met the issue and laid to
rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these
cases, we clarified that Ngo Tedid not abandon Molina; far from
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent
requirements.
We
also
explained
in Suazo that Ngo Temerely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based
on psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The intent of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disordersexisting at the time of the
marriageclearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.These
exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the
petitioners testimony on the respondents supposed psychological
or mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the petitioners
theory that
521
VOL. 637,
5
DECEMBER 8, 2010
21
the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her

refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations,
and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity,
irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not
rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires,
and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect, in the performance of some marital
obligations that characterize some marriages. The intent of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disordersexisting at the
time of the marriageclearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If a psychological disorder can be
proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.We do not
suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed
in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration. If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof
cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent
evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this
case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Insensitivity, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report
likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the
100
respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the

respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by
third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to
be suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the Background
History portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac
mentioned that the respondent employed one of her siblings to do
the household chores; did not help in augmenting the familys
earnings; belittled the petitioners income; continued her studies
despite the petitioners disapproval; seldom stayed at home;
became close to a male border; had an affair with a lesbian; did
not disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan; threatened
to poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored
their children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted a
witch doctor to bring bad fate to the peti522
5
22
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
tioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement that

Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her
capacity to render love, respect and support to the family, there
was no other statement regarding the degree of severity of the
respondents condition, why and to what extent the disorder is
grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties
required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a
supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition
that effectively incapacitated the respondent from complying with
the essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws
mentioned above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity,
sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility,
which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Admittedly, the standards used by

the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation
reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of
the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in
assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may
be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle
that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.
Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot
be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the prices
of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform
the essential marital duties.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Gonzaga Law Offices for petitioner.
BRION, J.:
Enrique Agraviador yAlunan (petitioner) challenges
through his petition for review on certiorari1 the decision
dated May 31,
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
523
VOL. 637, DECEMBER 523

8, 2010
20052 and the resolution dated December 6, 20053 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. The
101
challenged decision reversed the resolution4 of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, declaring
the marriage of the petitioner and Erlinda AmparoAgraviador (respondent) null and void on the ground of the
latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on
the other hand, denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 39-55. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, and
concurred in by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate
Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta.
3 Id., at pp. 56-57.
4 Id., at pp. 33-38.
5 Records, pp. 1-4.
Antecedent Facts
The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a
beerhouse where the latter worked. The petitioner, at that
time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs, while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress.
Their meeting led to a courtship, and they eventually became
sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the
respondents rented room, and soon entered into a commonlaw relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent
contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by Reverend
Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners
family was apprehensive about this marriage because of the
nature of the respondents work and because she came from a
broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the
respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque,
Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081.
He alleged that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused
to do house-
524
524
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
hold chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their
house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian;
did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor
in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent
refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became
very close to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he
discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them
inside his room several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity
was not medically identified and alleged in the petition.6The
RTC denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.7
In her answer,8 the respondent denied that she engaged in
extramarital affairs and maintained that it was the
petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that
the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled
because he wanted to marry their former household helper,
Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took
care of their son at the hospital before he died.
102
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor

General to investigate if collusion existed between the
parties.9 The RTC, in its Order of November 20, 2001,
allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.10 The
petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to substantiate his claims.
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated
in his petition, i.e., that the respondent was carefree,
irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did what
she wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling;
refused to do household chores; refused to take care of him
and their children; and consulted a witch doctor in order to
bring bad luck upon him.
_______________
6 Id., at p. 8.
7 Id., at p. 36.
8 Id., at p. 38.
9 Id., at p. 48.
10 Id., at p. 53.
525

8, 2010
The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent
abandoned their sick child, which led to the latters death.
The petitioner further stated that the respondent became
very close to a male border of their house; he discovered their
love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room
several times.
The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for
nullity because the respondent refused to change; he loves
his children and does not want their children to be affected
by their mothers conduct. He intimated that he might

remarry if it would benefit their children.
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a
certified true copy of their marriage contract (Exh. B)11and
the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh. A)12of Dr. Juan
Cirilo L. Patac.
In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the
following findings:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their
helper, the psychological report and the mental status
examination, Enrique is found to be psychologically capable to
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. He coped with
Erlindas selfish and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully
performed what she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried
to understand her and exerted every effort to make her realize the
harm caused by her neglect to the family. Throughout their
marriage, he provided emotional and material support for the
family. He engaged in other business endeavors aside from his
employment as he maintained to be financially productive.
The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage. She manifested inflexible maladaptive
behavior even at the time before their marriage. She is known to
be stubborn and uncaring who did things her way without regard
to the feelings of others. She is an irresponsible individual who
selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to her parents
as wife to Enrique and mother to their children. Before the
marriage at a young age of 17, Erlinda defied her parents as she
lived alone, rented a room for herself and allowed Enrique to sleep
with her. She did not care about the needs of Enrique before and
after marriage and she maintained to
_______________
11 Id., at p. 5.
103
the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric

evaluation report, and concluded that:
12 Id., at pp. 28-33.

526
526
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
be so with her children. She abandoned and relegated her duty to

her family to their helper. She never stayed long in their house
despite pleadings from her children and Enrique. Her
irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the death of one of
their children. Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a
daughter who is presently manifesting behavioral problem. She
kept secrets as she never allowed her husband and children know
where she stays when shes not at work. She falsified documents
as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden surname
in her present employment. She is having illicit affairs and is
reported to be presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire
to bring bad fate and death to Enrique through her consultation
with a mangkukulam point out her lack of care, love, and respect
to Enrique.
Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her
capacity to render love, respect and support to her family.
The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality
Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She has been having this
disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite treatment for
this disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to
perform the obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same
examination as Enrique underwent.13
The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the
respondent in its decision of April 26, 2002. It saw merit in
Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the

findings of the doctor show that Respondent is indeed suffering
from Mixed Personality Disorder that render her incapable of
complying with her marital obligations. Respondents refusal to
commit herself to the marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close
relationship with Petitioner, preferring to be with her lover and
finally abandoning their home for a lesbian, a disregard of social
norm, show that she was never prepared for marital commitment
in the first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted from her family
upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the good of
society and of the parties themselves, it is
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 32-33.
527

8, 2010
best
that
this
marriage
between
ENRIQUE
AGRAVIADOR YALUNAN and ERLINDA AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be
annulled as if it never took place at all. The Civil Registrar of the
City of Manila and the General Civil Registrar, National Census
and Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby
requested to make the necessary correction of the civil record of
the marriage between the parties and on their respective civil
status.
The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR,
EVELYN
AGRAVIADOR
and
EYMAREY
AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate children.
It is SO ORDERED.14
104
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The
CA, in its decision15 dated May 31, 2005, reversed and set
aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.
The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report
failed to establish that the respondents personality disorder
was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not
mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further
ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that the
respondents disorder had no definite treatment because he
did not subject her to a mental assessment.
The CA added that the psychiatric remarks in the
Report were nothing but a showcase of respondents
character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal
or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated the
respondent from accepting and complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may
only give rise to a legal separation suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the
CA denied his motion in its resolution of December 6, 2005.16
_______________
14 Supra note 4, at pp. 37-38.
15 Supra note 2.
16 Supra note 3.
528
528
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to

challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling, based on
the following arguments:
I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE
THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
OF
THE
RESPONDENT[;]
II. THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V.
MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISFIED[;]
III. THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC
EVALUATION REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR
NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE
STATE AND/THE RESPONDENT[; and]
IV. THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL
CASES HAD BEEN SATISFIED[.]
The issue in this case essentially boils down towhether
there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold
that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage,
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
The
totality
of
evidence
presented
failed
to
establish
the
respondents
psychological incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides
that [a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity be105
529

8, 2010
comes manifest only after its solemnization. It introduced
the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity
of marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not
involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision
committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse
may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but
was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990
edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage.17
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage.19It must be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals20 (the Molina case)
where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and con_______________
17 See Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353,
367, citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21; 240 SCRA 20 (1995); A.
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1988 ed.), 37; and
A.
Tolentino, Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines:
Commentaries
and
Jurisprudence (1990 ed.), 274-275.

18 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 33.
19 Id., at p. 34.
20 335 Phil. 664, 676-680; 268 SCRA 198, 209 (1997).
530
530
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
tinuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by
the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
106
must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations

and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's.
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
person, an
531
VOL. 637, DECEMBER
531
8, 2010
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge
the
equivalent
function
of
thedefensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we

established
in Santos.
A
later
case,Marcos
v.
21
Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that
the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a conditionsine
qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
107
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows

that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,22 declared that it may have
been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one inMolina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as
a guideline, Molinaunintentionally became
Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of

the petitioners evidence insufficient to prove the
respondents psychological incapacity.
a. Petitioners court testimony
For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the
petitioners testimony that essentially confirmed what the
petition alleged:
Q:
Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with
children, and how many?
_______________
21 G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
22 G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
A:
Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.
Q:
Where are they now?
A:
All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the
neglect and fault of my said wife who abandone[d] him at the time of his
532
532
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological

incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well
because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can
be considered as on all fours with another. Ngo
Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of timetested guidelines set forth in Molina.
Ting v. Velez-Ting23 and the fairly recent case of Suazo v.
Suazo24 squarely met the issue and laid to rest any question
regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we
clarified thatNgo Te did not abandonMolina; far from
abandoningMolina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent
requirements.
We
also
explained
in Suazo that NgoTe merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.
illness.
Q:
Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?
A:
It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.

_______________
23 G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.

24 G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 154.
533
VOL. 637,
533
DECEMBER 8,
2010
Q:
Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?
A:
She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and

used to impose what she wanted to get, she refused to do
household chores, like cooking, caring for the husband and
children, used to stay from the conjugal dwelling, initially for
weeks, then for months and lately fully abandoned the family
house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]
108
At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to

be very close to a male renter in the ground floor of their house and
caught them several times alone in his room, thus explaining the
reason why she refused to have sex since 1993, up to and until the
present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult mangkukulam
to bring bad fate against the family and death for me.
Q:
By the way did you give her the chance to change?
A:
I gave her but she refused to reform.
xxxx
Q:
Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?
A:
I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to
change for the sake of our family.25
These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the

totality of the petitioners testimony on the respondents
supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean from
these exchanges the petitioners theory that the respondents
psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or
unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a
number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity,
irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or
neglect, in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages.26 The
_______________
25 TSN, November 20, 2001, pp. 3-5.
26 See Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009,
596 SCRA 157, 178.
534
534
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disordersexisting at the time of the marriage
clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.27 The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.28
In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to
establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation
of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition that makes her
completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the
respondent had some personality defects that showed their
manifestationduring the marriage; his testimony sorely
lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents
defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition,
the petitioner failed to discuss thegravity of the respondents
condition; neither did he mention that the respondents
malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The
petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept
her fault, does not want to change, and refused to reform
are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect
that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article
36 of the Family Code.
In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,29 we ruled that it was not
enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
109
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.

Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factoran adverse
integral element in the respondents personality structure
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligationshad to be shown.
_______________
27 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486
SCRA 177.
28 Supra note 23.
29 G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123, 135.
535

8, 2010
b.
Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report
The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation
Report fell short in proving that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not
personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact,
recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to
undergo the same examination [that the petitioner]
underwent.30 Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by
the petitioner, the parties second child, Emmanuel, and
household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the
information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his
Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioners
own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by
Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made
with respect to the respondents condition. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a

party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.31
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the
person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated
must be personally examined by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.32 If a
psychological disorder can be proven by independent means,
no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted and given credit.33 No such independent evidence
appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this
case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish
thejuridical antecedence of the respondents condition by
stating that the respondent manifested inflexible
maladaptive behavior before marriage, pointing out how the
respondent behaved before the marriagethe
_______________
30 Records, p. 33.
31 Suazo v. Suazo, supra note 24.
32 Supra at note 21.
33 Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, supra note 26.
536
536
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room

for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her.
These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are
insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in the
110
history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac

failed to elucidate on the circumstances that led the
respondent to act the way she did, for example, why she
defied her parents and decided to live alone; why she
neglected her obligations as a daughter; and why she often
slept with the petitioner. This is an area where independent
evidence, such as information from a person intimately
related to the respondent, could prove useful. As earlier
stated, no such independent evidence was gathered in this
case. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why
the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and
why the respondents so-called inflexible maladaptive
behavior was already present at the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed
to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondents
condition. He simply made an enumeration of the
respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him
by third persons), and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder.
In the Background History portion of his Psychiatric
Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent
employed one of her siblings to do the household chores; did
not help in augmenting the familys earnings; belittled the
petitioners income; continued her studies despite the
petitioners disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became
close to a male border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan;
threatened to poison the petitioner and their children;
neglected and ignored their children; used her maiden name
at work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to the
petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement
that Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected
her capacity to render love, respect and support to the
family,34 there was no other statement regarding the degree
of severity of the respondents condition, why and to what

extent the
_______________
34 Records, p. 32.
537

8, 2010
disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply
with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise no
showing of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating
psychological condition that effectively incapacitated the
respondent from complying with the essential marital
obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned
above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual
infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which
do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report
highlighted only the respondents negative behavioral traits
without balancing them with her other qualities. The
allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as
well as the claim that the respondent refused to engage in
sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the
petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Even
assuming ex gratia argumentithat these accusations were
true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that
unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits that
antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the
accusation that the respondent abandoned her sick child
which eventually led to the latters death appears to be an
exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and
111
corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioners own

questionable traitshis flirtatious nature before marriage
and his admission that he inflicted physical harm on the
respondent every time he got jealouswere not pursued.
From this perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report
appears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis against the
respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to
conclusively establish the root cause and the degree of
seriousness of her condition.
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to
adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion
that the respondents personality disorder had no definite
treatment. It did not discuss the concept of mixed
personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms,
and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the
respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a
necessary inference that the respondents condition had no
definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our
mind, is the Psychiatric
538
538
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Evaluation Reports failure to support its findings and

conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated the
respondents perceived behavioral defects, and then
associated these traits with mixed personality disorder. We
find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not called on
the witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions
he made in his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have
aided petitioners cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify.
Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing
the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be
deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the

principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.35 Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by
the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties,
especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly
deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the
essential marital duties.
The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have
failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation The
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. We stress
that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital
obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State,
fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that
divorce should be available in this country. Neither should an
Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
_______________
35 Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272,
292.
539

8, 2010
Agraviador vs. Amparo112
Agraviador
sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.36Unless the
evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable
psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of
marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered
into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the
petition and AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama,
Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Notes.A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCwhich was promulgated
on March 15, 2003 and duly publishedis geared towards
the relaxation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
certification that Republic v. Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997),
required. (Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua, 596 SCRA 157
[2009])
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. (Jarillo vs.
People, 601 SCRA 236 [2009])
o0o
113
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993.

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
*
Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of

such fact under the. Family Code even for purposes other than
remarriage.Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Same; Same.In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Same; Same.That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery
of the latters presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property, custody and support of children,
etc. There is no need of filing a separate civil action for such purposes.
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondents ultimate prayer for
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,

petitioners suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court
before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise
clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the
couples properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no
reversible
574
5
74
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of
Appeals
error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of

discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
VITUG, J., Concurring:

Marriages; Certain effects of a valid marriage can flow out of a void
marriage.A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a
nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the
majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or the
consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances where
certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage.
Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due
to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to
failure of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and
recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity of a prior
marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such
void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
114
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent courts ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76
with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite;
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela
Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she
came to know of the prior marriage
575
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 575

17, 1993
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has been working in
Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she
would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her
foreign employer; since 1983 up to the present, he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00,
which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties
without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-infact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and
possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The

petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising
any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their
marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and
Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all
properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and administration
of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and
unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is
in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an
Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a
man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court
of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish
the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases
576
576
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845).

Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage
contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with
another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in
explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of
the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in
his possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits.
1
115
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous

application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September
11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and
gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his
answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
It explained that the case of Yap v. CA cited by petitioner and that
ofConsuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because
these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while
the instant case prays for separa2
such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the
Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion
to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are
the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should
be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP N6. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon and People v.
Mendoza, contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must
be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore,
under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he
submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No.
1989-J contains no
5
_______________
Annex C, Rollo, pp. 28-29.
L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315.
3
Annex J, Rollo, pp. 62-67, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponenteand Justices Luis A.
Javellana and Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurring.
4
L-40003, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 229.
577
1
2

17, 1993
tion of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It
observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the
properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between said
parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity
of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that
private respondents prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage
_______________
Annex M, Rollo, p. 80.
100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
7
95 Phil. 845 (1954).
578
5
6
578
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
allegation of private respondents intention to remarry, said petition

should, therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of
116
remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and

distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the formers previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is void
from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute
nullity of their marriage.
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon
by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
8
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether
that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. x x
x
10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in

subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v.
Lipana, the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragonand Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower courts order
forfeiting the husbands share of the disputed property acquired during
the second marriage, the Court stated that if the nullity, or annulment
of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is
need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates
an action for that purpose.
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
11
_______________
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as

it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there
is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court turned around and
applied theAragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the
prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving
spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that (t)he second marriage that he contracted
with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null
and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the
Court reverted to the Consuegracase and held that there was no need
of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel.
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee which drafted what is now the Family
12
13
14
15
16
CIVIL CODE, art. 80, par. 4; FAMILY CODE, arts. 35, par. 4 and 41.
Rollo, pp. 102 and 106.
10
See: Note 6 at p. 1036; Note 7 at p. 848.
11
L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 615, 620-621.
579
8
9

17, 1993
_______________
L-43905, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 525.
G.R. No. 53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499.
14
FAMILY CODE, art. 39.
15
Id., art. 40. See also: arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148.
16
The Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
prepared the draft of the revision of Book I of the
580
12
13
117
580
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage

should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision
be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes),
however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only. . .
On the other hand. Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Caguioa explained that
his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid
and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the
provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice

Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they
still have to produce the judgment. Justice Caguioa suggested that they say.
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
_______________
Civil Code of the Philippines. After more than four years, the draft was turned over to the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center which reviewed and revised the same
for more than three years.
581
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER

17, 1993
581

basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid,

does it include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the
marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared
void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require
first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages,
with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which
the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the
phrase absolute nullity can stand since it might result in confusion if they
change the phrase to invalidity if what they are referring to in the provision
is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in
the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is
void, which the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista
stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the
marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise
the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void?
Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the
same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that
they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only
on the basis of final judgment . . . Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified
as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
582
582
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
118
ANNOTATED
17, 1993
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first

marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained
only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this
purpose, according to petitioners theory, will warrant dismissal of the
same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will
not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if
one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a

marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his
or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there
is a necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case
of Terre v. Terre. The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter
remained subsisting, said that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to
18
19
_______________
August 23, 1986, pp. 4-7.
J. A.V. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 46 (1988).
19
Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 11.
583
17
18
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER
583
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the

provision of the word solely. As it is placed, the same shows that it
is meant to qualify final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the
precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as
it finally emerged, did not state The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . ., in
which case solely would clearly qualify the phrase for purposes of
remarriage. Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of
petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly,
one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses,
as well as an action for the custody and support of their common
children and the delivery of the latters presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
119
584
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open
and public
584
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
_______________
20
21
22
CONST., art. XV, sec. 2.

FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
22
Id.
585
20
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage

void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words,
for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable
basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as
such, it shall be protected by the State. In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life. So crucial are marriage
and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation . . ., As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another
cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both
parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it voidipso
jure and with no legal effectand nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would
rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and farranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an
official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will
21

17, 1993
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract
of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment
to a second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be
gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be
included in the application for a marriage license, viz, If previously
married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved
and annulled.
Reverting to the case before us, petitioners interpretation of Art.
40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondents failure to state in the petition that the
same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP
No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from
the misplaced emphasis on the term solely was in fact anticipated by
the members of the Committee.
23
Dean Gupit commented that the word only may be misconstrued to refer
to for purposes of remarriage. Judge Diy stated that only refers to
final judgment. Justice Puno suggested that they say on the basis only of
a final judgment. Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
solely instead of only, which the Committee approved. (Italics
supplied)
24
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity
of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the
properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an
eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special
120
3. (4)The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other

spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
4. (5)The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith
shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate
and intestate succession. (n)
court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of

possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is
actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all
the properties were acquired with private respondents money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that
the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be
raised together with the other incident of their
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage
and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by operation of law. (n)
_______________
Id., art. 11.
See: Note 17, at p. 7.
586
23
26
24
586
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
marriage such as the separation of their properties.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings. Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper
cases, are the following:
25
Art. 43. x x x
xxx
xxx
1. (2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership,

as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
2. (3)Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if
the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations
made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondents ultimate

prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioners suggestion that in
_______________
Art. 50 (2).
In relation to Art. 50 (1)The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
587
25
26

17, 1993
order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has
to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower
court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
regarding the couples properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion
to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
121
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The

decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ.,concur.
Feliciano, J., On official leave.
Vitug, J., With concurring opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest
observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I
believe, no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except
in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article
40 of the Family Code; viz:
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Fam588
588
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void
marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages
under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity of a prior marriage), conceived or
born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages,
who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be
considered extant per se.Neither the conjugal partnership of gain under
the old regime nor the absolute community of property under the new
Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property
relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as
a personal view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of a
void marriage because of the psychological incapacity of a party
thereto should have been extended to cover even the personal and
property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void
marriages where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts
and with little uncertainty, the term psychological incapacity is so
relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is
made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance not
only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as
regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.
Petition denied. Questioned decision affirmed.
Notes.Obligation to give or the right to ask for support
does
ily Code in case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to

comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36,
Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39,
Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by the
Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a
nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in
the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status
or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances
122

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G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995.

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

Remedial Law; Circular 2891; Circular 2891 requires a

Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the

in our law on marriages. Thus correlated, psychological

conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which

PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at

ROMERO, J., Concurring:

nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same.

same be existing at the time of marriage although it be

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance

Per Judge Enrique Garrovillo.

Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justices Pedro Ramirez

and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.

VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 25

certification of non-forum shopping, but also for its lack of

The Family Code did not define the term psychological

understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase was wanting in

VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 27

marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of

should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable

temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy

VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 29

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the

Justice Caguioa suggested that even if be substituted with

Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.

Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2,1986.

psychological incapacity Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word mental

VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 31

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision

less specificity than expected, has, in fact, so designed the

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New

Santos vs. Court of Appeals

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all

Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.

In her Handbook on the Family Code.

Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986, 129130.

then a broader one followed:

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological

VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 33

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term psychological incapacity

The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which

Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr.

Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.

it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the

some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,

VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 35

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been

VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 37