LAND LAWS PROJECT

ON

PUBLIC PREMISES (EVICTION OF

UNAUTHORISED OCCUPANTS) ACT, 1971

Submitted to:

Dr. Kahkashan Y. Danyal

Associate Professor
Faculty of Law
Jamia Millia Islamia

Prepared by:
Gaurav Bhalla
B.A. LL.B.(Hons.)
Faculty of Law
Jamia Millia Islamia
Roll No. - 13

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Acknowledgement...........................................................................4
2. Research Methodology....................................................................5
3. Table of cases...................................................................................6
4. Introduction.....................................................................................8
5. Public Premises Meaning of clause (e)..........................................9
6. Expression belonging to..............................................................12
7. Enquiry for eviction........................................................................15
8. Authorised Occupation - Meaning of Clause (g)............................16
9. Validity of the Act...........................................................................18
10. Retrospective effect of the Act....................................................18
11. Eviction of unauthorised occupants.............................................19
12. Appointment of Estate Officer.....................................................20
13. Claim for damages.......................................................................20
14. Discretionary Power of Estate Officer..........................................21
15. Estate Officer not a Judge............................................................21
16. Eviction Order..............................................................................22

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17. Natural Justice..............................................................................22

18. Proceedings for eviction..............................................................28
19. Unauthorised occupant................................................................31

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The success and final outcome of this project required a lot of guidance and assistance from
many people and I am extremely fortunate to have got that all along the completion of my
project work. Whatever I have done is only due to such guidance and assistance and I would
not forget to thank them.
I owe my profound gratitude to our Seminar Course teacher Dr. Kahkashan Y. Danyal, who
took keen interest in my project work guided me all along, till the completion of my project
by providing all necessary information for the project report.
I am thankful and fortunate enough to get constant encouragement, support and guidance
from all teaching staff of Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia which helped me in successfully
completing my project work. Also, I would like to extend my sincere regards to all the nonteaching staff of Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia, Indian Law Institute and Indian Society
for International Law.
I would also not forget to remember my friends for their unlisted encouragement and more
over for their timely support and guidance till the completion of my project work.

GAURAV BHALLA

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research was conducted using the Doctrinal method of research.
Doctrinal legal research, as conceived in the legal research domain, is research about what
the prevailing state of legal doctrine, legal rule, or legal principle is. A legal scholar
undertaking doctrinal legal research, therefore, takes one or more legal propositions,
principles, rules or doctrines as a starting point and focus of his study.
I located principles, rules or doctrines in statutory instrument(s), judicial opinions thereon,
discussions thereof in legal treatises, commentaries, textbooks, encyclopedias, legal
periodicals, and debates, if any, that took place at the formative stage of such a rule,
doctrine or proposition. Thereafter, I read them in a holistic manner and made an analysis
of the material as well as of the rules, doctrines and formulated my conclusions.
Doctrinal legal research, thus, involves: (i) systematic analysis of statutory provisions and of
legal principles involved therein, or derived therefrom, and (ii) logical and rational ordering
of the legal propositions and principles.

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TABLE OF CASES

A&S Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708

A.B. Tukaral v. G.V. Javalkar, AIR 1981 Bom 72

Accountant & Secretarial Service Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708

Adya Nath Ghatak v. Krishna Prosad Singh, AIR 1949 PC 124

Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855

Baij Nath v. Bank of Maharashtra, AIR 1987 Del 231

Bhagavatula K. Rao v. Mungara Sanyasi, ILR 55 Mad 610

Blaze and Central (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Kant 186

Board of Education v. Rice, 1911 AC 179

Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath, JJ., 1926 AC 586

Gauri Mohan Giri v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Ori 158

Gullappalli Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1376

Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer, 1973 (1) SCR 515

Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1983 Del 409

Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670

Komalam Vardarajan v. Union of India, AIR 1997 Bom 57

Kriapak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 308

L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai, AIR 1980 MP 106

Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd., 1950 (52) Bom LR 688

M. Mohammad v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Bom 443

M.L. Joshi v. Director of Estates, Government of India, New Delhi, AIR 1967 Del 86

M.S. Oberoi v. Union of India, AIR 1970 P&H

M/s. Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt. ) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1983
Del 409

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Mahomed Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur, AIR 1965 SC 1923

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597

Maniklal v. Premchand, AIR 1957 SC 425

Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannoon, 1969 (1) QB 577

N.D.M.C. v. M/s. House of Handicrafts, AIR 1993 Del 349

Nageshwara Rao v. A.P. Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1959 SC 308

National Jewellery Works v. D.P. Works, 1959 (63) Cal WN 192

Shri Krishna Investment v. Union of India, AIR 1976 Cal 333

Union of India v. M/s. Manton Co. Ltd., AIR 1982 Cal 461

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INTRODUCTION
The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 was enacted to provide
for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises.
Section 5 of the Act provides for taking possession of the public premises which are in
unauthorised occupation of persons. Section 7 of the Act provides for the recovery of rent
or damages in respect of public premises from persons who are in unauthorised occupation
thereof. The Act, as it originally stood, did not debar the Government from taking recourse
to Civil Courts to seek the aforesaid reliefs.
The Act provides for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and, for
this purpose, the Act provides for appointment of estate officers who have been given
power, after necessary inquiry, to pass orders of eviction of such unauthorised occupants.
The estate officer has also been given powers to remove, and to order demolition of
unauthorised constructions.
Parliament having provided otherwise by the 1971 Act, that Act will, it can be said, prevail
over the 1956 and 1962 Acts. It is, however, common ground before the Court that thought
the Bank is a corporation wholly owned or controlled by the Government, it has a distinct
personality of its own and its property cannot be said to be the property of the Union.
Clause (e) of section 2 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971
contains the definition of public premises. Item (i) of sub-clause (2) of clause (e) of section 2
of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 provides that any
premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, any company as defined in
section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one per cent. of the paidup share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary of
the first-mentioned company as public premises. The paid-up share capital held by one or
more State Governments is not included under this item.

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Public Premises Meaning of clause (e)

The expression public premises has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. This definition
is in three parts. Sub-clause (1) of Clause (e) takes in premises belonging to, or taken on
lease for appointment by, or on behalf, of the central Government as well as premises
placed by that Government under the control of either House of Parliament for providing
residential accommodation to the members of the staff of the Secretariat of either House of
Parliament. Sub-clause (3) of clause (e) takes in premises belonging to certain local
authorities in the Union Territory of Delhi. Sub-clause (2) of clause (e) brings in premises
belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, various kinds of bodies, such as
Universities, Institutes of Technology, Board of Trustees of Major Port trusts and the Bhakra
Management Board. It takes in any premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf
of, a Government company or its subsidiary. It also taken in - and that is what is court is
concerned with here premises of any corporation (not being a company as defined in
Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 of a local authority) established by or under Central
Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government. There is no dispute that the
premises in question in the present appeal is public premises within the meaning of the
Act.1
The procedure for the eviction of the petitioners will be governed by the 1971 Act as well as
either or both of the State Acts and the question is, which of these will prevail.2
Section 2(e)(1) only defines what Public Premises means, the Government is entitled to
possession of premises as an owner, as a Lessee and as the beneficiary of a Requisition. The
said Act provides for a speedy remedy in favour of the Government to obtain possession of
any such premises i.e. premises covered by any of the three categories, when the same is
found to be in unauthorised occupation. The relationship of the Government when it is a
lessee qua the owner of the premises is that of a tenant and landlord. The landlord, who
may be the allottee and who happens to have purchased the right, title and interest of the
original owner in the premises, cannot, on such acquisition, turn round and say that the
lease like a requisition cannot be for an unreasonably long duration. The relationship of the

1
2

A&S Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708 at p. 1712
Accountant & Secretarial Service Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708 at p. 1713

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owner and the Government, who is the lessee is governed by the law of the land in respect
of landlord-tenant and the purchase by the allottee of the landlords interest cannot
extinguish the leasehold interest of the Government which can be done only by adopting
eviction proceedings in a proper forum and obtaining a decree for possession.3
It is in direct conflict with the Premises Act which expressly provides for the forum for
evicting persons in unauthorised occupation of premises which fell in Section 2 of the
Premises Act. The Premises Act being subsequent to the Slums Act, as amended in 1964,
and again being a special Act have a very limited sphere, must necessarily override the
Slums Act on the same lines of reasoning as the Court has indicated in the case of the Rent
Act.4
There is no warrant for confining the scope of the definition of public premises contained
in Section 2(e) to premises used for residential purposes only and to exclude premises used
for commercial purposes from its ambit. In Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer5, similar
contention was advanced and it argued that the expression premises in Public Premises
Act would not apply to agricultural land. This Court rejected the contention with the
observation:
The word premises is defined to mean any land. Any land will include agricultural land.
There is nothing in the Act to exclude the applicability of the Act to agricultural land.
The Court was also unable to hold that the inclusion of premises used for commercial
purposes within the ambit of the definition of public premises, would render the Public
Premises Act as violative of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the
Constitution or right to freedom to carryon any occupation, trade or business guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution or the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate how a person in unauthorised occupation of
public premises used for commercial purposes, can invoke the Directive Principles under
Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution, As indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons,
3

Komalam Vardarajan v. Union of India, AIR 1997 Bom 57 at p. 62: 1997 (1) Bom CR 428: 1997 (2) Mh LJ 632:
1997 (1) Mah LR 664: 1996 (4) All Mah LR 545
4
Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 at p. 674: 1980 Rajdhani LR 626: 1980 DRJ 82: 1980 (2) Ren
CJ 459: 1980 (2) Rent LR 650: 1980 (4) SCC 435: 1980 (18) DLT 262: 1980 (1) Ren CR 590: 1981 (1) SCR 498
5
1973 (1) SCR 515: AIR 1972 SC 2205

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the Public Premises Act has been enacted to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction
of unauthorised occupants of public premises. It serves a public purpose, viz., making
available for use, public premises after eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. The
need to provide speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation
cannot be confined to premises used for residential purposes. There is no reason to assume
that such a need will not be there in respect of premises used for commercial purposes. No
distinction can, therefore, be made between premises used for residential purposes and
premises used for commercial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants
of public premises and the considerations which necessitate providing a speedy machinery
for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises apply equally to both
the types of public premises. The Court is, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri
Y that the definition of public premises contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act
should be so construed as to exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its
ambit.6
The term public premises is defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. The premises in question are
Public Premises. Now, an occupant of a public premises will be deemed to be in
authorised occupation thereof until and unless he is a person, who is in occupation of the
public premises: (1) without authority for such occupation, such as a rank trespasser, or (2)
one, who was continuing in occupation of the public premises under some authority,
whether that authority was by way of grant or any other mode of transfer, and that
authority has either expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. From the
very beginning the trespasser will be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation because he
had no authority to occupy the premises. But, the Courts are mainly concerned in this case
with an occupant, who was in occupation of the premises with authority on the date the
premises were declared public premises by the Act. He was an authorised occupant at that
time. But, if the authority under which that person was occupying the premises has either
expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever by the LIC, the person in
occupation becomes an unauthorised occupant.7

Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 885 at p. 869, 870: 1990 (4) SCC 406
Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1983 Del 409 at pp. 410, 411: 1983 (2) Rent LR 293: 1983
(1) Rent CR 417
7

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Expression belonging to
There is no doubt that the expression belonging to does not mean the same thing as
owned by. The two expressions have two different connotations. The expression
belonging to will take within its sweep not only ownership but also rights lesser than that
of ownership. It must be remembered in this connection that the expressions used in the
statute are to be interpreted and given meaning in the context in which they are used. The
present Act has been placed on the statute book to give a summary remedy to the
Government to evict persons in occupation of public premises to obviate the long or deal of
trial in a Civil Court and of further proceedings, thereafter. Hence, a wider meaning will have
to be given to the expressions used in the Act for defining the concept of public premises.
So, viewed there is no reason why the premises of which possession for the time being vests
in the Government and which are allotted by the Government to others while so in
possession should not be held to be public premises.8
In Mahomed Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur9, the Supreme Court was
called upon to consider the expression belonging to me used by the tenant in an
application to the Compensation Officer under Act 26 of 1948 for the Rehabilitation of
Refugees. While commenting upon this in para 14 of the judgment, the Court observed as
follows:
We do not agree that this is the only or proper construction which the words are capable of
bearing. Though, the words belonging no doubt is capable of denoting an absolute title, is
nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than
that of full ownership could be signified by that word. In Webster, belong to is explained as
meaning inter alia to be owned by the possession of. The precise sense which the word
was meant to convey can, therefore, be gathered only be reading the document as a whole
and adverting to the context in which it occurs....

8
9

M. Mohammad v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Bom 443 at p. 464

AIR 1965 SC 1923

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In Strounds Judicial Dictionary at page 269, the word belonging has been defined as
follows:
Property belonging to a person, has two general meanings, (1) ownership, (2) the
absolute right of user: A road may be said, with perfect propriety to belong to a man, who
has the right to use it as of right, although the soil does not belong to him.
Therefore, where a person has an absolute right to user i.e., right of user even against the
owner, it can be said that the property belongs to him. It must be remembered that the
absolute right of user is distinct from the possessory title which a person has against the
whole world except the true owner. In the present case, in the first instance there is no
dispute between the landlord and the Government that the Government is the monthly
tenant of the premises in question. Secondly, even under the Bombay Rent Act, by virtue of
Section 4(1), thereof, the Governments tenancy is protected. Therefore, it can legitimately
be held that the Government has an absolute right of user of the premises in question. If
this is so, then the premises can properly be said to belong to the Government. Since
Court has already observed that the expression belonging to does not merely includes the
right of ownership but also something less than that and since further the premises of which
the absolute right of user vests in a person can be said to belong to him the present
premises will squarely be embraced by the definition of public premises within the meaning
of the said Act.
In Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd.10, the facts were that the plaintiff had filed a
suit for eviction against the defendants, who were a Company to whom a portion of the
building was let out. The plaintiffs predecessor had taken on lease the land from the Port
Trust for constructing the building. After constructing the building, he had let out a portion
of the same to the defendants. The question was whether the building belonged to the Port
Trust or to the plaintiff. If it belonged to the Port Trust, the Rent Court had no jurisdiction in
view of Section 4(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. While holding that the building belonged to
the plaintiff the Court observed as follows:
These decisions, in my opinion, establish that there may be in time relation to property a
dual ownership for a limited period of time; and it would be possible to say in such cases
10

1950 (52) Bom LR 688: AIR 1951 Bom 205

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that even a person, who was not the absolute owner but had a right of ownership limited to
that period was a person to whom the property belonged. No doubt these cases related to
movable property; but I do not conceive that the principle is any different when we are
dealing with immovable property. The tests as to whether for a limited period of time, a
temporary ownership has been created is according to the cases (1) whether there is a
demise of the property, (2) whether there is full dominion and control over the property in
the demises and (3) whether the risk of the property falls on the premises, or the absolute
owner. Applying these principles to the case of lease of land together with the building for a
limited period of time particularly a period as long as 99 years it appears to me that if
the lease demises the land with the building and conforms on the transferee full dominion
and control over the property the transferee taking the risk of the property, then, for that
limited period, the lessee is the owner of the property and the property can be said to
belong to him. Ownership is nothing more than a bundle of rights in relation to property.
The aggregate of rights constitutes absolute ownership. It may be that during a stated
period some of these rights are vested in one person and some in others. In the case of a
lessor and a lessee such as we are considering, the lessee has the right of reversion which of
course is not tangible immovable property, but an intangible thing. He has also a right of reentry under the terms of the lease and he has further a right by covenant to claim the
building upon termination of the lease or upon its determination in any other manner
provided by the lease. With regard to all other rights in the property, these vest completely
in the lessee, who is under the circumstances the owner qua at any rate those to whom he
has let or sub-let such premises. It is consistent with dual ownership that qua the lessee it
may be that the lessor is the owner of the property; and in any proceedings between the
lessor and the lessee it would be possible to say that the premises belonged to the lessor
and not to the lessee. That is not the case before me. The case here arises between the
lessee and those to whom he has let the premises. I have no doubt in my mind that qua the
defendants in these two suits the premises in suit belong to the plaintiff and to nobody else
so long as the lease is subsisting. That being so, those premises are not excluded from the
operation of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, and this Court
has, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain or try either of these suits.

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Enquiry for eviction

It was contended that the procedure available under the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, ought to be followed by the railway administration because it
not only provides for a show cause notice but an elaborate enquiry is also available to
unauthorised occupant, and therefore, it confers a wider protection to the person
concerned. It is necessary in this context to examine the scheme of the said Act. Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 which was passed earlier was
challenged on the ground that there was two procedure and the choice of either was left to
the unguided discretion of the Estate Officer. It was then amended by the Amending Act,
1971. 1971 Act was deemed to have been given retrospective effect since 16th September,
1958, except to some of its provisions. Further scheme of the 1971 Act is that it confers a
power on Estate Officer to issue notice to persons who are in unauthorised occupation of
any public premises to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.
Unauthorised occupation under the Act in relation to any public premises means the
occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and
includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the
authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was
allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason
whatsoever. Premises are defined to mean any land or any building or part of a building
and includes the garden, grounds and outhouses, appertaining to such building or part of a
building and any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial
enjoyment thereof. Public Premises means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or
requisitioned by, or on behalf of the Central Government as enumerated in Section 2(e) of
the Act.11

11

A.B. Tukaral v. G.V. Javalkar, AIR 1981 Bom 72 at p. 80: 1980 Bom CR 863: 1980 Cri LR (Mah) 490: 1981 Mah
LR (Bom) 1: 1981 Mah LJ 525: 1981 (2) Rent LR 181: 1981 (2) Ser LR 198

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Authorised Occupation - Meaning of Clause (g)

In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank12, the Supreme Court held that the
expression unauthorised occupant contained in Section 2(g) of the Act would even cover a
lessee. Therefore, t he contention of the counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected.
It is manifest that Section 2(2)(g) of the Act does not use the word possession or the words
entry into possession at any point of time at all. The section merely requires occupation of
any public premises. Entry into possession connotes one single terminus, viz., the point of
time when a person enters into possession or occupies the property whereas occupation if a
continuation process which starts right from the time when the person enters into
possession or occupies the premises and continues, until he leaves the premises. What is
germane for the purpose of interpretation of Section 2(2)(g) is whether or not the parson
concerned was in occupation of the public premises when the Premises Act was passed. In
the instant case, it is not disputed that the appellant continued to occupy the property even
after the Premises Act came into force and in fact accepted the LIC as his landlord. In these
circumstances, therefore, the case of the appellant squarely falls within the ambit of the
definition of unauthorised occupation as contemplated by Section 2(2)(g). There is yet
another aspect of the matter which distinguishes the present case from the language
employed in the Punjab Act. Section 2(2)(g) is an inclusive definition and consists of several
limbs (1) where a person is in occupation in relation to any public premises without any
authority for such occupation, and (2) even if the possession or occupation of the tenant
continues after the lease is determined. In the instant case, the lease was doubtless
determined by the landlord by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
whose validity for purposes for deciding the question of law has not been questioned by the
learned counsel for the appellant. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the appellant was
in unauthorised occupation of the premises once the lease was determined. The second
limb mentioned in Section 2(2)(g) is conspicuously absent from the provisions of the Punjab
Act. For the reasons, the Court overrule the first contention raised by the counsel for the

12

AIR 1991 SC 855: 1990 (3) JT (SC) 417

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appellant and the Court held, agreeing with the High Court, that the appellant was
undoubtedly in unauthorised occupation of the premises.13
The opposite party having come to occupy the disputed premises before the said premises
were purchased by the petitioner, they cannot be said to be in unauthorised occupation
thereof notwithstanding the subsequent determination of the authority for the occupation
by the notice to quit. The Court thought this question was no longer res integra in view of
the Supreme Court decision in the case of Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. L.I.C. of
India14, the Supreme Court in the case of Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. L.I.C. of India15,
in this decision, the Supreme Court was interpreting the provisions of the said Act of 1971
which is not under consideration and the Supreme Court clearly explained and distinguished
their own observations in Rajkumar Divendar Singhs case16 wherein the Act under
consideration was a different Act. It was pointed out that those observations were made
having regard to the particular terms of the Punjab Act thereunder consideration which
made entry into possession in the public premises unauthorised is it was so made otherwise
than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant. Whereas in the Act now under
consideration a person, who occupies any public premises without any authority for such
occupation or even continues to occupy the same after such authority had been determined
is said to be in unauthorised occupation in view of the definition clause Section 2(2)(g) of
the said Act of 1971. Thus, there exists material difference between the provisions of the
two Acts. Though, the attention of the learned Chief Justice was drawn to such difference,
he failed to appreciate the same and wholly misread the statute in observing that there is
no material difference between these two statutes. As a matter of fact dealing with the
particular statute, the Supreme Court laid down that what is germane for the purpose of
interpretation of Section 2(2)(g) of the said Act of 1971 is whether or not the person
concerned was in occupation of the public premises when the said Act came into force
irrespective of how and when he came to occupy the same. It was held that, the principal
ground on which the Chief Justice reversed the decision of the Estate Officer is clearly

13

Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 at p. 672: 1980 Rajdhani LR 626: 1980 DRJ 82: 1980 (2)
Ren CJ 459: 1980 (2) Rent LR 650: 1980 (4) SCC 435: 1980 (18) DLT 262: 1981 (1) Ren CR 590: 1981 (1) SCR 498
14
AIR 1981 SC 670
15
Ibid.
16
AIR 1973 SC 66

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misconceived and is based upon misreading of the material provisions of the said Act of
1971. Such a decision, therefore, can hardly be sustained on such a ground.17

Eviction of unauthorised occupants

Section 5. Eviction of unauthorised occupants. - (1) If, after considering the cause, if any,
shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under section 4 and 3[ any evidence produced
by him in support of the same and after personal hearing, if any, given under clause (b) of
sub- section (2) of section 4], the estate officer is satisfied that the public premises are in
unauthorised occupation, the estate officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be
recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be
specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof,
and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part
of the public premises.
(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction 2[ on or before the date
specified in the said order or within fifteen days of the date of its publication under subsection (1), whichever is later,] the estate officer or any other officer duly authorised by the
estate officer in this behalf 2[ may, after the date so specified or after the expiry of the
period aforesaid, whichever is later, evict that person] from, and take possession of, the
public premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary.

Retrospective effect of the Act

In Indu Bhushan v. Rama Sundari, the relation of landlord and tenant, as mentioned in this
Entry, is with reference to land tenures which would not appropriately cover tenancy of
buildings or of house accommodation and that the expression is only used with reference to
relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands. As further explained by
the Supreme Court leases in respect of non-agricultural property are dealt with in the
Transfer of Property Act and would more appropriately fall within the scope of Entry 6 read
with Entry 7 of List III. The Supreme Court in the same case observed that non-agricultural
leases of all kinds, and rights governed by such leases, including the termination of leases
and eviction from property leased, would be covered by the topics of transfer of property
17

Union of India v. M/s. Manton Co. Ltd., AIR 1982 Cal 461 at pp. 464, 465

Page | 18

and contracts. In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Indu Bhushans case18 the
Accommodation Control Act will fall within Entries 6 and 7 read with Entry 46 of the
Concurrent List. Similarly, the Public Premises Act, insofar as it deals with the eviction of
lessees or licenses from premises belonging to a Government company would also fall
within these entries. The Public Premises Act was enacted in 1971 and being a law later to
the Accommodation Control Act will prevail over it in view of the proviso to Article 254(2) of
the Constitution, in spite of the fact that the Accommodation Control Act had received the
assent of the President. The effect of the Public Premises Act is that accommodations
belonging to the Government companies are taken out from the operation of the
Accommodation Control Act and are exclusively governed by the former because the two
Acts in this respect cannot stand together. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner
in this behalf is that the Public Premises Act though enacted on 23rd August, 1971, was given
retrospective effect from 1958 and, therefore, it should be deemed to be a law enacted
earlier to the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The Public Premises Act,
1971, by Section 20 was given retrospective effect to save the actions taken under the
Public Premises Act, 1958; but it cannot be held that the 1971 Act was enacted in 1958. As
earlier stated, this Act was enacted on 23rd August, 1971 and is a law which falls within the
Proviso to Article 254(2) and, therefore, it must prevail against the M.P. Accommodation
Control Act, 1961, which is an earlier law made by the State Legislature. 19

Validity of the Act

Under Article 228 of the Constitution is not competent as no question arises relating to the
interpretation of any Article of the Constitution. What is contended is that Sections 4, 5 and
7 of the Public Premises Act are unconstitutional. The challenge to the constitutionality of
some sections of an Act does not mean that a question of law relating to the interpretation
of a provision of the Constitution is involved and, therefore, the learned District Judge was
right in dismissing the application, but he decided finally that sections 4, 5 and 7 of the said
Act were valid and constitutional, that is, while deciding the miscellaneous application, the

18

AIR 1970 SC 228

L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai, AIR 1980 MP 106 at pp. 109, 110: 1980 Jab LJ 183: 1980 (1) Ser LR
645: 1980 (1) Rent LR 553: 1980 MP RCJ 140: 1980 MPLJ 429: 1980 (2) Ren CR 216
19

Page | 19

learned District Judge decided that appeal. The petitioner challenges the validity of that
order under Article 227 of the constitution.20

Appointment of Estate Officer

The authority of the Estate Officer is dealing with the eviction proceeding has been
questioned on the ground of his lack of jurisdiction. Section 2(b) of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, defines Estate Officer to mean an officer
appointed as such by the Central Government under Section 3 of the said Act provides that
the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint such persons
being Gazetted Officers of Government or officers of equivalent rank of the statutory
authority, as it thinks fit, to be Estate Officers for the purpose of the said Act. Held: In view
of such conferment of powers of officers as Estate Officers, the impugned proceedings
having been dealt with by such officers, who were appointed as Estate Officers by the
Central Government, the Court does not see any lack of jurisdiction in their dealing with the
matter.21

Claim for damages

No damages were claimed by any action of the respondent in the Court of Law. That apart
the petitioner has today placed before Court statement showing the consumption of
electricity by the respondent, and the respondent, on Courts direction, has also produced
the telephone bills in respect to the telephone installed in the premises in question. The
perusal of the two clearly shows that the office premises have been used by the respondent
all along and, therefore, the contention that the said premises were inhabitable or were not
being used does not seem to be correct. Apart from anything else the principle of quantum
merit must apply and the respondent having used the premises till today was bound to pay
the license fee specially when it chose firstly, to challenge the correctness of the order of
cancellation and, secondly, did not terminate the license deed on finding the premises to be
inhabitable. It is clearly a case where the respondent has succeeded, uptil now in retaining
the premises, using them and not paying any money to the licensor. The order of the
Additional District Judge is clearly contrary to law and the Court, therefore, allowed the writ
20
21

M.S. Oberoi v. Union of India, AIR 1970 P&H 407 at p. 409: 1970 (72) Pun LR 830
Gauri Mohan Giri v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Ori 158 at p. 160

Page | 20

petition, issued a writ of certiorari quashing the said order of the Additional District Judge,
dated 10th January, 1992 and the Court restored the order of the Estate Officer.22

Discretionary Power of Estate Officer

The Act itself has laid down sufficient guidelines for exercise of power under the Act and
also provides reasonable opportunities for the parties likely to be affected to make
representations and showing cause as to why such an order for eviction should or should
not be made against them. The power or the discretion vested in the Estate Officer is not
arbitrary. But, no statute can be struck down only on the ground that the powers
thereunder, when abused, would result in discrimination. An abuse of powers vested by a
statute does not render the source of the power tainted; it only renders such act of abuse
liable to be struck down. Section 5 no doubt uses the word may in authorising the Estate
Officer to make an order of eviction as such words are always used in all enabling
provisions. That Section contemplates an adjudication prior to the making of the order and
furnishing of a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the party proceeded against. Such
adjudication may in some cases, make out reasonable grounds for not making an order of
eviction. Therefore, on the scheme of things, the statute cannot but only make an enabling
provision leaving the exercise of such powers to the discretion of the Estate Officer to be
exercised only on the guidelines prescribed by the statute.23

Estate Officer not a Judge

The Estate Officer would be both the prosecutor and the Judge which is hit by the ratio of
the Supreme Court decision in Gullappalli Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh 24, is
unconvincing and of no avail to the petitioner in the present case because the Estate Officer
does not appear to Court to be acting as a Judge in his own cause when he is disposing of
the proceedings initiated by the show cause notice under Section 4 of the Act. To say that
no one shall be a Judge in his own cause means that the Judge must not have anything like a
personal interest in the cause he is to adjudicate upon and not that an officer discharging his

22

N.D.M.C. v. M/s. House of Handicrafts, AIR 1993 Del 349 at pp. 350, 351: 1993 (2) Rent LR 768
Shri Krishna Investment v. Union of India, AIR 1976 Cal 333
24
AIR 1959 SC 1376
23

Page | 21

official functions must not start proceedings in a manner which he is, under the law
competent to adjudicate upon.25

Eviction Order
Whether the order for eviction as passed against the lessee by itself determines the lessees
title to realise rent from the sub-lessee and whether such an order even before its execution
can constitute eviction by title paramount. On a careful consideration of the point so raised,
it appears to Court that such a point is no longer res integra. Such a point was specifically
raised before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of National Jewellery Works v. D.P.
Works26, and this Court in express terms upheld the claim of rent of a lessee, who has
suffered a decree for eviction but yet had not been evicted in execution thereof. M, has
rightly drawn our attention to two other decisions supporting the same view. In the case of
Adya Nath Ghatak v. Krishna Prosad Singh27, the Privy Council held that a tenancy between
A and C stood determined not by the decree for eviction obtained in 1925 against A, but by
execution thereof in 1928. The view taken by the learned trial Judge is fully supported by a
decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Bhagavatula K. Rao v. Mungara Sanyasi.28

Natural Justice
The modern concept of the rule against bias is rooted on the well-known principle that
justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be
done. A man may be disqualified from sitting in a judicial capacity on one of two grounds.
First, a direct pecuniary interest in the subject matter; second, bias in favour of one side
or against the other. The bias may be actual bias or a real likelihood of bias and mere
surmise or conjecture is not enough. Professor Smith has written29:
A real likelihood of bias means at least a substantial possibility of bias. The Court, it has
been said, will judge of the matter as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the
conduct of his own business.

25

M.S. Oberoi v. Union of India, AIR 1970 P&H 407 at p. 410: 72 Pun LR 830
1959 (63) Cal WN 192
27
AIR 1949 PC 124
28
ILR 55 Mad 610 at pp. 605, 606: AIR 1932 Mad 298 at p. 299
29
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Second Edition, 1968 at p. 244
26

Page | 22

The test of real likelihood of bias which has been applied in a number of leading cases in
magisterial and liquor licensing law, is based on the reasonable apprehension of a
reasonable man fully apprised of the facts. It is no doubt desirable that all judges, like
Ceasers wife, should be above suspicion, but it would be hopeless for the courts to insist
that only people, who cannot be suspected of improper motives were qualified at common
law to discharge judicial functions, or to quash decisions on the strength of the suspicions of
fools or other capricious and unreasonable people.
Certainly, on the question of bias Court cannot proceed on the basis of suspicions of fools or
on the whims of unreasonable people. The Court must proceed on the reasonable suspicion
or on the real likelihood of bias. The tide of judicial opinion in the past was more on real
likelihood of bias rather than on reasonable suspicion. But, Lord Denning M.R. in
Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannoon30, interwove these principles with the
other test, saying:
The Court does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact
favour one side at the expense of the other. The Court looks at the impression which would
be given to other people. And he continued:
Nevertheless there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not
enough...There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or
probable that the Justice or Chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side
unfairly at the expense of the other. The Court will not inquire whether he did in fact, favour
one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain
enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when rightminded people go away thinking: the Judge was biased.
What Lord Denning was concerned with in his reference to a real likelihood of bias was
perhaps to emphasise the irrelevance of whether the Court or Tribunal was in fact biased.
Commenting on these principles, Professor Paul Jackson in his book Modern Legal Studies Natural Justice, writes at page 52:

30

1969 (1) QB 577

Page | 23

The antithesis between the two tests remain, it is suggested somewhat unconvincing, it is
hard to envisage a Court holding that a reasonable man might properly suspect the
existence of bias but refusing to interfere because it was not itself convinced of a real
likelihood of bias. In the end all turns on the view of the Court takes on the facts. The Judge,
who says there is no real likelihood of bias was unreasonable; a Judge, who is prepared to a
find a reasonable suspicion of bias is hardly likely to deny that there was a real likelihood of
bias. Perhaps, it is unfortunate that the courts ever tried to improve on Lord Carsons simple
test; was there such a likelihood of bias as entitled to the Court interfere?31
In Maniklal v. Premchand32, Gajendragadkar, J. said:
It is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be
able to act impartially, objectively and without say bias. In such cases the test is not whether
in fact, a bias has affected the judgement; the test always is and must be whether a litigant
could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have
operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often
said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.
In Nageshwara Rao v. A.P. Road Transport Corporation33, it was observed that the authority
empowered to decide the dispute must be one without bias by which is meant an operative
prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious towards one side or the other in the dispute.
In Kriapak v. Union of India34, thus:
From the above discussion it clearly follows that what has to be seen in a case where there
is an administrative Board or body is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that
he was likely to have been biased. In other words whether there is substantial possibility of
bias animating the mind of the member against the aggrieved party. From these decisions,
it appears that a likelihood of bias is given the meaning of possibility of bias rather than

31

Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath, JJ., 1926 AC 586, 618

AIR 1957 SC 425 at p. 429
33
AIR 1959 SC 308
34
AIR 1970 SC 308
32

Page | 24

probability. For it is always assumed that a reasonable man would suspect bias only on the
real possibility and not on probability.35
It all depends upon how the Court looks with the judicial hindsight at the adjudicating
authority, and in particular at his behaviour in conducting the proceedings, his attitude
towards the aggrieved party, his attachment to the cause and his frame of mind whether
preconceived or not. After getting the sum total of all these, the Court must ask whether it
would be enough to erode the detachment and impartiality of the adjudicating authority. If
there was any likelihood of such erosion the decision complained of must be struck down so
that the streams of justice may be kept clear and pure which is the basic requirement in the
administration of justice. It was Lord Hardwicke St. James Evening Post Case36, who said in
1742:
There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear
and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters.
The Estate Officer herein was none other than the Regional Officer of the Indian Bank. The
Branch of the Bank wanted the premises occupied by the petitioner for the purpose among
others, to accommodate the Regional Officer and his staff. Even before the Estate Officer
initiated the proceedings, the Bank called upon the petitioner to vacate the premises by
letter dated 1st March, 1978 followed by reminder letter, dated 11th July, 1978. In both the
letters it was stated:
We require the portion let out to you bona fide for locating our staff training centre to be
opened shortly and also for the Regional Managers Office and other requirements of our
own.
The notice issued by the Estate Officer reiterated the above grounds by referring to the said
letters. During the pendency of the proceedings the Manager of the Branch Office has
written letter to the Estate Officer to expedite the disposal of the matter. The Estate Officer
while reluctantly adjoining the case at the request of the petitioner, made it clear that the
Bank requires very badly the premises under the occupation of the petitioner for its own

35
36

Blaze and Central (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Kant 186 at pp. 189, 190
1972 (2) Atkins 469 at p. 472

Page | 25

use and also to locate the office of the Regional Manager. The final order made by the
Estate Officer also gives the same reasoning stating that the Office of the Regional Manager
had to be shifted to a more spacious building and the premises under the occupation of the
petitioner were required for that purpose. In other words, he as the adjudicating authority
decided that he wanted the premises for his own use. These facts and circumstances clearly
prove that he was vitally interested in the cause.
It was, however, urged for the contesting respondents that the Estate Officer had no
personal interest in the matter and he was required to discharge his statutory authority, he
could not said to have acted both as the Prosecutor and the Judge. In support of the
contention, reliance was placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in M.L. Joshi v.
Director of Estates, Government of India, New Delhi.37 The decision therein proceeded on
different facts which are far remote from those of the present case. In the present case,
from the very start of the proceedings the impression gained was that the dice were loaded
against the petitioner. No amount of evidence or argument for the respondents could
remove that impression or establish affirmatively, that the end result of the Estate Officer
was a product of detachment and impartiality. The likelihood of bias animating the mind of
the Estate Officer was inevitable and its exercise was very much conscious and not
unconscious.
This takes the Court to the second contention relating to the denial of natural justice.
Counsel for the petitioner urged that the Estate Officer did not record the statements of the
witness produced for the Bank in the presence of the petitioner and he did not even furnish
a copy of the statement of that witness in spite of a specific request made for the purpose.
The District Judge has summarily rejected the latter part of the contention on the ground
that there is no provision under the Act to furnish copies of the statements recorded in the
proceedings. This reasoning would be leading into the trap of legalism of the 17th century.
The Act need not provide for all the minor details how an enquiry should be conducted by
the Estate Officer. The Estate Officer must hold an enquiry as required under Section 4 of
the Act, read with the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1971.
Rule 5 of the Rules provides that the Estate Officer shall record the summary of the

37

AIR 1967 Del 86

Page | 26

evidence and any relevant documents filed before him shall form part of the record of the
proceedings. Exercise of the power under the Act is undoubtedly quasi-judicial. The petioner
has a right to be heard before the Estate Officer and if the right to be heard is to be a real
right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right to know the evidence of the
opposite side. The petitioner must, therefore, be told what evidence has been given or what
statements have been made by the opposite side. The other words, to put it shortly, the
petitioner must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict the statements recorded
or the evidence collected in his presence or absence. This one principle uniformly appears in
all cases commending from the celebrated judgement of Lord Loreburn L.C. in Board of
Education v. Rice38, wherein the following passage appears:
Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not ficers of State the duty of
deciding or determining questions of officer of State the duty of deciding or determining
questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in many others, what comes for
determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by discretion, involving no law. It will, I
suppose usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter of law
alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to
ascertain the facts. I need not ass that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly
listen o both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone, who decides anything. But I do not
think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power
to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any
way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those, who are parties in the
controversy or correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.
Since then, Judges and writers have expanded the procedure laid down by statutes and laid
down the obligation to observe the principles of natural justice where it is not plainly
contrary to the intention of the legislature. The courts recently have also resorted to such
alternatives to natural justice as fairplay in action or fairness in procedure or the
fundamental principles of fair trial, while discouraging a tendency to subject hearing to
legal strait-jackets. Sometimes, fairness has been understood to impose a higher

38

1911 AC 179 at p. 182

Page | 27

standard than that required by natural justice. In a historic decision of our Supreme Court in
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India39, Bhagwati, J., who spoke for the majority view observed:
The principles of reasonableness must be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful
or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all.
A tribunal or a person to whom judicial or quasi-judicial functions are entrusted is thus,
presumed to have an obligation to act with fairness, that is not only the obligation to
observed the principles of natural justice but, on the contrary, to observe a higher standard
of behaviour than that required by natural justice.40

Proceedings for eviction

If the petitioners tenancy still subsists, in the eye of law, then there can be little doubt as to
the outcome of the proceedings intended against the petitioners. If the petitioners are in
lawful possession of the premises in question then no valid order of eviction under Section 5
of the Act can be passed against them. The question as to whether the petitioners continue
to be in lawful occupation or not is, however, essentially a question of fact. In the present
case, it will have to be seen, after examining all the evidence, whether the tenants has
exercised their option under clause 6 of the lease agreement. Furthermore, if such option
had been exercised, the next question which will arise for consideration is whether any of
the terms of the agreement have been violated by the tenants which alone would give the
respondent jurisdiction to terminate the lease agreement. In the notice terminating the
lease two infringements of the lease agreement are alleged against the petitioners.
Whether these two infringements exist or not is again a question of fact. In Courts view,
therefore, R is right in submitting that these questions of fact ought not to be determined
in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of his contention, he
has relied on certain observations of the Division Bench of this Court in Mirchandanis
case41, in that case also it was sought to be contended that the tenant was in lawful
occupation of the premises. While declining to adjudicate on this issue, this Court observed
as follows:
39

AIR 1978 SC 597 at p. 624

Blaze and Central (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Kant 186 at pp. 190-192
41
ILR 1980 (1) Del 329
40

Page | 28

These contentions have been traversed in the counter-affidavit where the reference is also
made to the merits of the case as to whether the tenant-petitioner has or has not
contravened the terms of the lease and the prohibition contained in the lease of the land
held by respondent No. 1 from the lessor. We have entertained the writ petition only
because of the constitutional and legal contentions urged by the petitioner as set out above.
As for the merits of the question, whether on the proper interpretation of the lease
between the parties the tenants have been guilty of such contravention of the lease as
would entitle the landlord to re-enter, the proper procedure is for the tenant to show cause
against the notice issued to him by the landlord and then contest the proceedings for
eviction before the Estate Officer with the benefit of a right of appeal to the Additional
District Judge. It would not be proper for us to deal with the merits of the question in this
writ petition and we have informed the parties that we would not do so.
To the same effect is the decision of the single Bench of this Court in the case of M.L. Joshi v.
Director of Estates42, and M/s. Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt. ) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of
India43. The question in issue in the present case, therefore, whether the petitioners are in
lawful occupation of the premises or not, is one which can be raised before the Estate
Officer and, it may be even by initiating any independent action in a Court of competent
jurisdiction. That by virtue of Section 15 of the said Act such an action would not be
maintainable but it is not necessary for Court to go into this contention because no such suit
has been filed so far. If such a suit is filed the Court will, if called upon, adjudicate on the
point in issue. One thing, however, is clear that as far as this Court is concerned, the
consistent view has been that the question as to whether the occupant is an unauthorised
occupant or not is a question of fact which will not be adjudicated upon in proceedings
under Article 226 of the Constitution. In view of the aforesaid, the question of Courts
determining this question of fact would, therefore, not arise.44

42

AIR 1967 Del 86

AIR 1983 Del 409
44
Baij Nath v. Bank of Maharashtra, AIR 1987 Del 231 at pp. 234, 235: 1987 (1) Rent LR 561: 1987 (1) Ren CR
684: 1987 (4) IJ Rep 275

43

Page | 29

Unauthorised occupant
Apart from the question of discrimination, consideration of the dehiring by the Government
under its dehiring policy would arise only when the petitioner vacates the premises. As of
now admittedly petitioner has not vacate the premises. Only after this is done, the question
of dehiring the premises will be considered. In the event of Government declining to dehire,
the petitioner would become entitled to agitate this issue of discrimination and not
before.45
It was contended that as huge amount is due to him from the employer on the count of
retirement benefit, no order of eviction could be passed. The contention is devoid of any
merit. As the petitioners are ex-employees cannot have premium over the premises in
question merely because some of their dues might be pending with their employer. Once
the order of eviction has been passed on valid grounds, the same has to be given effect to
and the petitioners are bound to vacate the premises.46

45

Komalam Vardarajan v. Union of India, AIR 1997 Bom 57 at p. 64: 1997 (1) Bom CR 428: 1997 (2) Mah LJ 632:
1997 (1) Mah LR 664: 1996 (4) All Mah LR 545
46
Goura Mohan Giri v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Ori 158 at p. 161

Page | 30

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Dr. S.K. Awasthi, Law of Public Premises, First Edition, 2010, Ashoka Law
House, New Delhi
2. P.S. Narayana, Law of Public Premises, 2005, Universal Publishing Co. Ltd.
3. S.P. Gupta, Commentaries on Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971, Third Edition, 2004, Eastern Book Company

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