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Department of Mining and Metallurgical Engineering, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
Industrial Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
H I G H L I G H T S
Risks associated with health and safety of coal miners were investigated.
A reliable methodology based on Fuzzy TOPSIS was developed to manage the risks.
Three underground mines in Kerman coal deposit were selected as case studies.
The model can help in taking appropriate measures before accidents can occur.
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 17 February 2014
Received in revised form 19 April 2014
Accepted 20 April 2014
Available online xxxx
Editor: Adrian Covaci
Keywords:
Risk management
Human health and safety
Fuzzy TOPSIS
Kerman coal deposit
Underground mining
a b s t r a c t
The scrutiny of health and safety of personnel working in underground coal mines is heightened because of fatalities and disasters that occur every year worldwide. A methodology based on fuzzy TOPSIS was proposed to
assess the risks associated with human health in order to manage control measures and support decisionmaking, which could provide the right balance between different concerns, such as safety and costs. For this
purpose, information collected from three hazardous coal mines namely Hashouni, Hojedk and Babnizu located
at the Kerman coal deposit, Iran, were used to manage the risks affecting the health and safety of their miners.
Altogether 86 hazards were identied and classied under eight categories: geomechanical, geochemical,
electrical, mechanical, chemical, environmental, personal, and social, cultural and managerial risks. Overcoming
the uncertainty of qualitative data, the ranking process is accomplished by fuzzy TOPSIS. After running the
model, twelve groups with different risks were obtained. Located in the rst group, the most important risks
with the highest negative effects are: materials falling, catastrophic failure, instability of coalface and immediate
roof, redamp explosion, gas emission, misre, stopping of ventilation system, wagon separation at inclines,
asphyxiation, inadequate training and poor site management system. According to the results, the proposed
methodology can be a reliable technique for management of the minatory hazards and coping with uncertainties
affecting the health and safety of miners when performance ratings are imprecise. The proposed model can be
primarily designed to identify potential hazards and help in taking appropriate measures to minimize or remove
the risks before accidents can occur.
2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
With regard to different occurrences that may lead to fatal or nonfatal injuries, underground coal mining has been recognized as one of
the riskiest operations worldwide (Lama and Bodziony, 1998; Sari
et al., 2004, 2009; Duzgun and Einstein, 2004; Joy, 2004; Duzgun,
2005; Grayson et al., 2009; Maiti and Khanzode, 2009; Paul, 2009;
Shahriar and Bakhtavar, 2009; Zhu and Xiao-ping, 2009; Khanzode
et al., 2011). Generally, work conditions in underground mining are different from surface mining. Special equipments in the stopes, working
Corresponding author. Tel.: +98 21 64542972; fax: +98 21 66405846.
E-mail address: satar.mahdevari@aut.ac.ir (S. Mahdevari).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2014.04.076
0048-9697/ 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
86
2011), the disasters are posing new challenges regarding the way managers assess and mitigate high-risk conditions.
Coal mining has many hazards that make it unique in the eld of industrial health and safety. The hazardous nature of coal mine operations
can easily be deduced from the national statistics of mine accidents and
injuries (Paul, 2009). Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010) underground coal mining is a relatively dangerous industry and employees
are more likely to be fatal or to incur a non-fatal injury or illness, and
their injuries are more likely to be severe than workers in private
industry as a whole.
It is true that underground coal mining is inherently more hazardous
than other industries, but this does not mean we should simply accept it
to be more dangerous. Allanson (2002) after investigating various
accidents demonstrated that in most cases sufcient information should
be collected to prevent an accident prior to taking place.
One of the main causes of deaths or injuries is working at stopes
which are considered unsafe as they have an unsupported roof.
Working with or nearby underground coal mining equipments is also
inherently hazardous due to the several sources of injuries and adverse
environmental conditions. The underground environment in a mining
operation is constrained by the absence of natural light, fresh air, open
space, etc., and moreover there is the undesirable presence of high temperature, humidity, dust, fumes, mist, noise, rock stresses, etc. In addition, working conditions in underground mining are associated with a
considerable number of health risk factors, such as high physical workload, noise pollution, vibration syndrome, radiation exposure, diesel exhaust, and exposure to coal and silica dusts or harmful gases. Due to
these constraints, the potential hazards associated with underground
coal mines may trigger accidents unless risk measures are taken to prevent them.
The Australian Mine Health and Safety Regulation (2010) requires
mines to conduct risk assessments in relation to certain high risk and
hazards associated with ground instability, inrush, atmospheric
contamination, excavation of mine shafts and galleries, slipping of
conveyors, earth moving machinery, re, explosives and electrical
works. Besides the main reason for conducting a risk analysis is to
support decision-making, so that it can provide an important basis for
nding the right balance between different concerns, such as safety
and costs (Aven, 2008).
Typically, a risk assessment starts with hazard identication
(Gransson et al., 2014). According to the international organization
for standardization (ISO Guide, 2009) a hazard is dened as a source
of potential harm, which can be a risk source. According to the denition
of the project management body of knowledge (PMBOK, 2008), risk is
an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has positive or negative
effects on at least one of the nine project objectives, such as integration,
scope, time, cost, quality, human resources, communications, risk and
procurement.
Risk is measured in terms of likelihood and consequence, and is
dened as the chance of something happening that will have an impact
upon objectives (Barnes, 2009). In this research, risk is the chance of
something happening in underground coal mines that will have
negative impacts on the health or safety of a miner.
Risk management is dened as all measures and activities carried
out to manage risk. In other words, risk management deals with
balancing the conicts associated with exploring opportunities on the
one hand and avoiding losses, accidents and disasters on the other
hand (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). Risk management aims to reduce the
likelihood and impact of mishaps of all kinds. In the mining industry,
with its inherent potential for major accidents which could lead to
injury, fatality, damage the environment and cause serious loss of
production and prot, there is a particular need for a safe and sound
approach to the process of risk management.
Risk assessment as the central part of risk management, is the
process used to determine risk management priorities by evaluating
and comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target
87
and other regulatory activities to estimate an econometrically sophisticated regression model of the connection between mine inspections
and mine safety outcomes. Duzgun and Einstein (2004) proposed a
risk and decision analysis methodology for management of risk associated with roof falls in underground coal mines using exponential and
Poisson distributions and cost benet analysis. Shahriar and Bakhtavar
(2009) employed a quantitative approach and decision tree in order
to assess and manage roof fall risks as a major geotechnical problem
in Iranian underground coal mines. Khanzode et al. (2011) presented
a methodology for evaluating and monitoring of recurrence characteristics of hazards in underground coal mines. Their methodology includes
a systematic procedure beginning from identication of hazards based
on Weibull and Poisson distribution models, to their quantication
and then periodic monitoring of hazards using control charting
principles.
Zhu and Xiao-ping (2009) investigated safety evaluation of human
accidents in coal mines using data mining approaches. They employed
ant colony optimization and support vector machine algorithms for feature extraction of inuencing factors and evaluation model of human
accidents.
Recently the fuzzy TOPSIS technique has demonstrated its capabilities and efciencies as a practical engineering and problem-solving
tool. Some of the applications of this technique in the eld of risk management are presented as follows. Wang and Elhag (2006) proposed a
fuzzy TOPSIS method based on alpha level sets and presented a nonlinear programming solution procedure for bridge risk assessment.
Yazdani et al. (2012) proposed a fuzzy TOPSIS framework to extend
conventional risk analysis and management for critical asset protection.
Zhang et al. (2013) developed a new evaluation model based on the
88
interval analytic hierarchy process and extension of TOPSIS with interval data to improve the reliability of risk identication on a hydropower
project. SoltanPanah et al. (2011) used fuzzy TOPSIS to assess risk for
planning the repair and maintenance of bridges. Fouladgar et al.
(2011) applied fuzzy TOPSIS approach in order to evaluate the existing
risk in a water conveyance tunnel project via extraction of eleven major
dimensions of risks associated with tunneling. Kutlu and Ekmekcioglu
(2012) applied fuzzy TOPSIS integrated with fuzzy analytical hierarchy
process to present fuzzy Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for
evaluation of the risk factors of each potential failure mode in linguistic
variables. Zhou and Lu (2012) employed fuzzy TOPSIS and fuzzy analytic network process for risk evaluation of dynamic alliances, which can
help enterprises to choose a coalition partner and make a reasonable
benet allocation plan. Finally, Lee et al. (2013) developed a new procedure that combines Delphi method with fuzzy TOPSIS technique for
ood risk and vulnerability management.
3. Methodology
There are several ways of presenting the risk management process,
but most structures contain the three key elements of planning, risk
assessment (execution) and risk treatment (Aven, 2008).
The risk management procedure proposed in our research is
composed of six steps: establishing the context, risk identication, risk
analysis, risk evaluation, ALARP level and risk treatment associated
with the health and safety of workers at underground coal mines.
The main elements of the risk management process are shown in
Fig. 1 and the proposed framework is explained in detail in the next
subsections.
3.1. Establishing the context
The rst step of the risk management process is to dene the objectives of the analysis. Establishing the context denes the limits within
which risks must be managed and sets the scope for the rest of the
risk management process. The context includes the environment
and working conditions of the mine and the purpose of the risk management activity. When formulating the objectives, any limitations to the
scope of the analysis should be taken into consideration, such as lack
of available resources, time limits and lack of data.
3.2. Risk assessment
Risk assessment is a systematic use of available information to determine how often specic events may occur and the magnitude of their
likely consequences. As shown in Fig. 1, the risk assessment is the central part of the risk management process, which purposes to establish
a proactive safety strategy by investigating potential risks. In our
research, risk assessment is a process of assessing the likelihood of the
mining hazard causing or contributing to any harm to any miner; and
the consequence of the harm which may be caused.
The human health and safety risks can be considered or assessed at
various levels depending on the scope and purpose of the assessment.
The risk assessment will consider the relationship between the likelihood and potential consequence of the risk of hazards occurring, and
to review the current or planned approaches to controlling the hazards.
In essence, risk assessment includes three steps: risk identication,
risk analysis and risk evaluation. That means, to assess a risk, potential
sources of harm should be identied rst and then the likelihood and consequence of them occurring should be estimated to analyze the risk.
Thereafter risk should be evaluated which means comparing the estimated risks against risk criteria to determine the signicance of risk.
3.2.1. Risk identication
Once the context of the risk assessment is properly documented, the
next step in the risk management process is to identify the hazards
associated with any mining activities under consideration. Risk identication includes identifying the hazards and the situations that have the
potential to cause harm or losses, sometimes called unwanted events
(Joy, 2004).
In this step based on historical information of mine monitoring, a decision matrix is established to determine potential risk factors. This step
is the base of planning and executing phases, thus the information
should be detailed appropriately.
Presence of hazards in a work system is the main cause of occurrence
of accidents. Identifying hazards and compiling information about them
is the rst step in planning for safety. When a hazard is transformed into
a harmful event, an accident takes place (Khanzode et al., 2011). The
outcome of this hazard identication process should be a comprehensive and creditable list of human health and safety risks associated
with the mining activities being assessed, which forms the basis of
future risk management activities.
In general, qualitative risk assessment is typically used for most circumstances in the mining industry and quantitative risk assessment
may not even be possible because of the absence of reliable data. The
qualitative expressions are the same linguistic variables dened in the
fuzzy logic. Thus the calculation of the risk can be simplied by
converting the linguistic scales into Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs).
Fuzzy logic which was introduced by Zadeh (1965), can take into
account uncertainty and solve problems where there are no sharp
boundaries and precise values. A linguistic variable is dened as a variable whose values are not numbers, but words or sentences in a natural
language such as very weak, weak, moderate, strong, etc. The concept of
a linguistic variable provides a means of approximate characterization
of phenomena which are too complex or too ill-dened to be amenable
to describe in conventional quantitative terms (Zadeh, 1975).
A fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership. Such a set is characterized by a membership function, which
assigns to each object a grade of membership ranging between zero
and one. In other words, a fuzzy number belongs to the closed interval
0 and 1, in which 1 addresses full membership and 0 expresses nonmembership. By contrast, crisp sets only allow 0 or 1. Thus fuzzy sets
are a general form of crisp sets.
There are various types of fuzzy numbers that can be utilized based
on the situation. In practice, TFN is the most interesting due to intuitive
and computational simplicity. As shown in Fig. 2, a TFN can be dened
e l; m; u or M
e l ; m , where l, m, and u respectively
as a triplet M
m
denote the smallest possible value, the most promising value, and the
largest possible value that describe a fuzzy event.
e has linear representations on its left and right sides
Each TFN, M,
such that its membership function, e x, can be dened as:
M
8
if
< xl=ml
e x ux=um if
M
:
0
lxm
m xu
otherwise
where, l, m, and u denote the smallest possible value, the most promising value, and the largest possible value, respectively as shown in Fig. 2.
e is a convex normalized fuzzy set of the real line
A fuzzy number M
R [0, 1] such that (Buckley, 1985; Zimmermann, 1992):
o e x is piecewise continuous.
M
o e x is normalized, that is, there exists xR with e x 1 (x is
M
M
e
called the mean value of M).
3.2.2. Risk analysis
Risk analysis includes analyzing the magnitude of risk that may arise
from the unwanted event. The objective of a risk analysis is to describe
risk, that is to present an informative risk picture (Aven, 2008), which
can be illustrated in the form of a bow-tie diagram.
The bow-tie diagram is a synergistic adaptation of fault tree analysis
and event tree analysis that shows how a range of causes, controls and
89
The TOPSIS method is based on six computation steps. The rst step
is the gathering of the performances of the alternatives on the different
criteria. These performances need to be normalized in the second step.
The normalized scores are then weighted and after determination of
the positive and negative ideal solutions, the distances to the ideal and
anti-ideal points are calculated. Finally, the closeness is given by the
ratio of these relative distances (Hwang and Yoon, 1981; Lai et al.,
1994).
The classical TOPSIS method operates in a deterministic context and
evaluation process which involves judgments precisely dened and
crisp values. However, under some conditions crisp values are inadequate to model real world decision problems, because actual problems
usually involve uncertain, imprecise and subjective data, which make
the decision-making process more complex and challenging. On the
other hand, human judgment and preferences are often ambiguous
and cannot be estimated with exact numerical values.
Therefore, the fuzzy TOPSIS method is proposed where the consequence and likelihood are evaluated by linguistic variables represented
by fuzzy numbers to address such uncertainty and vagueness in the
traditional TOPSIS.
3.2.3.2. Fuzzy TOPSIS. Fuzzy logic is a powerful mathematical tool for
handling the existing uncertainty in decision making. Overcoming the
uncertainty of qualitative data, the ranking process may be accomplished by the fuzzy TOPSIS method. The mathematical concept of
fuzzy TOPSIS proposed by Chen (2000) can be summarized as follows.
After identication of the consequence and likelihood, the fuzzy
numbers should be calculated corresponding to each linguistic variable.
Before analyzing and modeling, the data have to be normalized to keep
them in the prescribed range of 0 and +1. The normalization of fuzzy
numbers is accomplished by using linear scale transformation to
convert the different units into a comparable unit.
er ij
!
lij mij uij
;
;
;
uj uj uj
er ij
lj lj lj
;
;
;
uij mij lij
u j max uij ; j
l j min lij ; j :
i
Fig. 3. Hierarchy procedure of risk control (Applied Manual, 2007; Barnes, 2009).
90
di
xij lij ; mij ; uij .
where, r ij is the normalized value of e
The weighted normalized value e
vij is calculated by multiplying the
e j of criteria with the normalized fuzzy decision matrix er ij .
weights w
e for each criterion is calculated
The weighted normalized decision matrix V
through the following relation:
h
i h i
e w
e jerij e
vij
V
n j
i 1; 2; ; m j 1; 2; ; n:
v1 ; e
v2 ; e
v3 ; ; e
vn max vij ji 1; 2; ; m; j 1; 2; ; n 6
A e
i
j1
nm
n
X
d e
vij ; e
vj
di
n
X
d e
vij ; e
vj
j1
where, d+
i and di are the primary and secondary distant measures, respectively. The distance measurement between two TFNs of (l1, m1, u1)
and (l2, m2, u2), can be calculated by the vertex method as follows:
e n
e
dv m;
r
i
1h
2
2
2
l l m1 m2 u1 u2 :
3 1 2
10
d
i
di
d
i
C i 1 if Ai A
11
C i 0 if Ai A :
+
As d
i 0 and di 0, then clearly Ci[0, 1].
e
v1 ; e
v2 ; e
v3 ; ; e
vn
min vij ji 1; 2; ; m; j 1; 2; ; n :
i
Once the risks have been identied and evaluated, proper risk control and treatment strategies should be made to deal with the potential
risks in the mines. The aim of risk control and treatment is to remove as
Code
Event
Geo-mechanical
GM1
GM2
Outburst/rock burst
Struck by materials (rock, wood, etc.)
falling off from roof or rib
Windblast
Catastrophic failure
Collapse or slump of wall
Flyrock occurrences
Spalling of ribs or sides
Instability of pillars
Instability of coalface
Instability of galleries
Trapping/entanglement in caved area
Floor failure/heave
Instability of immediate roof
Subsidence
Incomplete stowing
Coal and sulde ore dust explosion
Firedamp explosion
Emission of gases such as H2S, CO, CO2, NO, etc.
Electrocution
Dealing with misre
Power disruptions
Dead bulbs/uorescent tubes
Energy from switches, power boards,
generators, etc.
Blasting with non-standard wire/ring line
Electricity problems of water pumps
Tearing of pressure vessels
Acute jolts and whole body vibration
via machines
Unintended operation of equipment
Water pressure from pump stations
and reticulation
Hazards during maintenance and repairs
Slipping belt conveyor
Stopping of ventilation system
Tearing of towing wire
Wagons separation in inclines
Technical defect of machines
Jackshaft of the locomotive
Old vehicle seats and poor seating
Inappropriate ring
Unbalanced oxygen of blasting
Non-standard explosives
Hazardous fuels and chemicals
Slippery oor
Poorly lit areas and illumination problems
Caught between moving parts
Inrush of water, mud, gas, etc.
Drowning
Tire explosion
Asphyxiation due to inspiration of coal dust
and toxic gases
Radiation, reection and excessive glare
Thermal heat sources
Bacteria in water
Noise pollution
Release ammable gases such as acetylene
and methane
Hearing loss
Poisoning due to re and carbon monoxide
Misty and fumy conditions
Smoking during refueling
Inattention to safety signs
Not using safety garment
Using compressed air to clean clothes
Handling batteries without caution
Slip/trip while entering or leaving equipment
Slip, trip or fall during operation
and/or maintenance
Falling from heights
Vehiclepedestrian collisions
Lightning strike on stored explosives
Fatigue or illness
Injuries due to contiguity with equipment
Putting detonator in pocket
Geo-chemical
Electrical
Mechanical
GM3
GM4
GM5
GM6
GM7
GM8
GM9
GM10
GM11
GM12
GM13
GM14
GM15
GC16
GC17
GC18
E19
E20
E21
E22
E23
E24
E25
M26
M27
M28
M29
Chemical
Environmental
M30
M31
M32
M33
M34
M35
M36
M37
C38
C39
C40
C41
EN42
EN43
EN44
EN45
EN46
EN47
EN48
EN49
EN50
EN51
EN52
EN53
Personal
EN54
EN55
EN56
P57
P58
P59
P60
P61
P62
P63
P64
P65
P66
P67
P68
P69
91
Table 1 (continued)
Risk type
Social, cultural
and managerial
Code
Event
P70
P71
P72
P73
S74
S75
S76
S77
S78
S79
S80
S81
S82
S83
S84
S85
S86
many negative impacts as possible and to assure that the risks are As
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This principle means that
the benets of a measure should be assessed in relation to the disadvantages of the measure. The ALARP principle is based on reversed
burden of proof, which means that an identied measure should
be implemented unless it cannot be documented that there is an
unreasonable disparity between disadvantages and benets (Aven,
2008).
The mining activities at a mine should be regularly monitored and
evaluated to conrm that the recommended risk control practices are
adequate to ensure risks are kept at acceptable levels. Records of the
monitoring programs are to be kept and must include details of
specic controls, equipments, procedures, engineering barriers or
other measures to be in place for management of the activities with
an unacceptable level of risk.
92
Table 2
Qualitative description of the likelihoods (Applied Manual, 2007; Barnes, 2009).
Likelihood
Linguistic expression
Description
L1
L2
L3
L4
L5
Almost certain
Likely (probable)
Possible
Unlikely
Rare
Linguistic expression
Description
C1
Severe (catastrophic)
C2
C3
C4
C5
Major (considerable)
Moderate
Minor (tolerable)
Insignicant
Consequence
Likelihood
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
L1
L2
L3
L4
L5
93
e er ij
. Therefore, as the fuzzy linguistic ratings, presented in
by R
nm
Table 4, preserve the property that the ranges of normalized TFNs belonging to the closed interval [0, 1], the normalization procedure is not
necessary.
Based on the TFNs presented in Table 5, A+ and A are determined
as (0.4125, 0.63, 0.85) and (0.00, 0.03, 0.1125) using Eqs. (7) and (8),
which indicate the most and the least preferable alternatives,
respectively.
For evaluating and ranking risks on the basis of the Ci index, the
results of calculation of the Ci index are shown in Table 6. According to
Eq. (11), the Ci is calculated simultaneously based on the distance d+
and d to both A+ and A using Eqs. (9) and (10). Finally a preference
order can be ranked according to the order of the Ci index.
According to the basic principle of the fuzzy TOPSIS method, the high
risk event is the one which has the shortest distance from the fuzzy
positive ideal solution and farthest distance from the fuzzy negative
ideal solution. Therfore based on the results, the ranking of the events
are determined so that risks having Ci value closest to 1 is ranked highest
risk, while risks having Ci value farthest from 1 is ranked lowest risk.
The results shown in Table 6, are arranged in descending order in
Table 7. As can be seen from this table, twelve groups with different
risks are obtained, which are shown from A to L. Group A has the highest
risk and group L has the lowest risk affecting the health and safety of the
miners.
94
Table 5
Risk calculation by fuzzication of the likelihoods and consequences.
Code
Likelihood
TFN of likelihood
Consequence
TFN of consequence
TFN of risk = L C
GM1
GM2
GM3
GM4
GM5
GM6
GM7
GM8
GM9
GM10
GM11
GM12
GM13
GM14
GM15
GC16
GC17
GC18
E19
E20
E21
E22
E23
E24
E25
M26
M27
M28
M29
M30
M31
M32
M33
M34
M35
M36
M37
C38
C39
C40
C41
EN42
EN43
EN44
EN45
EN46
EN47
EN48
EN49
EN50
EN51
EN52
EN53
EN54
EN55
EN56
P57
P58
P59
P60
P61
P62
P63
P64
P65
P66
P67
P68
P69
P70
P71
P72
P73
S74
S75
S76
L4
L1
L5
L2
L3
L3
L1
L5
L2
L3
L2
L3
L1
L1
L1
L3
L2
L1
L4
L2
L2
L2
L2
L4
L5
L4
L2
L5
L4
L5
L2
L2
L4
L2
L2
L3
L2
L4
L2
L5
L2
L4
L2
L5
L4
L5
L5
L1
L5
L3
L2
L1
L2
L4
L3
L1
L5
L3
L3
L2
L5
L3
L2
L2
L3
L5
L3
L2
L4
L3
L5
L4
L4
L3
L3
L5
C1
C2
C1
C1
C4
C2
C5
C3
C1
C2
C2
C4
C2
C4
C3
C1
C1
C2
C1
C1
C3
C4
C3
C2
C4
C2
C3
C3
C5
C4
C4
C1
C1
C1
C3
C2
C5
C2
C2
C1
C3
C3
C2
C2
C2
C4
C3
C2
C4
C2
C4
C3
C2
C3
C3
C3
C1
C1
C2
C4
C3
C2
C3
C2
C2
C1
C1
C3
C1
C2
C1
C1
C2
C2
C2
C2
95
Table 5 (continued)
Code
Likelihood
TFN of likelihood
Consequence
TFN of consequence
TFN of risk = L C
S77
S78
S79
S80
S81
S82
S83
S84
S85
S86
L2
L3
L3
L3
L5
L2
L2
L4
L3
L2
C2
C2
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C4
C1
Table 6
Calculation of the Ci index for each hazard.
Code
d+
Ci
Code
d+
Ci
GM1
GM2
GM3
GM4
GM5
GM6
GM7
GM8
GM9
GM10
GM11
GM12
GM13
GM14
GM15
GC16
GC17
GC18
E19
E20
E21
E22
E23
E24
E25
M26
M27
M28
M29
M30
M31
M32
M33
M34
M35
M36
M37
C38
C39
C40
C41
EN42
EN43
0.356
0.000
0.523
0.000
0.473
0.268
0.523
0.571
0.000
0.268
0.126
0.473
0.000
0.356
0.178
0.178
0.000
0.000
0.356
0.000
0.268
0.410
0.268
0.410
0.598
0.410
0.268
0.571
0.598
0.598
0.410
0.000
0.356
0.000
0.268
0.268
0.545
0.410
0.126
0.523
0.268
0.473
0.126
0.248
0.598
0.087
0.598
0.129
0.333
0.087
0.031
0.598
0.333
0.474
0.129
0.598
0.248
0.422
0.422
0.598
0.598
0.248
0.598
0.333
0.193
0.333
0.193
0.000
0.193
0.333
0.031
0.000
0.000
0.193
0.598
0.248
0.598
0.333
0.333
0.062
0.193
0.474
0.087
0.333
0.129
0.474
0.411
1.000
0.142
1.000
0.214
0.554
0.142
0.052
1.000
0.554
0.790
0.214
1.000
0.411
0.703
0.703
1.000
1.000
0.411
1.000
0.554
0.321
0.554
0.321
0.000
0.321
0.554
0.052
0.000
0.000
0.321
1.000
0.411
1.000
0.554
0.554
0.102
0.321
0.790
0.142
0.554
0.214
0.790
EN44
EN45
EN46
EN47
EN48
EN49
EN50
EN51
EN52
EN53
EN54
EN55
EN56
P57
P58
P59
P60
P61
P62
P63
P64
P65
P66
P67
P68
P69
P70
P71
P72
P73
S74
S75
S76
S77
S78
S79
S80
S81
S82
S83
S84
S85
S86
0.545
0.410
0.598
0.571
0.000
0.598
0.268
0.410
0.178
0.126
0.473
0.370
0.178
0.523
0.178
0.268
0.410
0.571
0.268
0.268
0.126
0.268
0.523
0.178
0.268
0.356
0.268
0.523
0.356
0.410
0.268
0.268
0.545
0.126
0.268
0.178
0.268
0.571
0.000
0.126
0.473
0.473
0.000
0.062
0.193
0.000
0.031
0.598
0.000
0.333
0.193
0.422
0.474
0.129
0.231
0.422
0.087
0.422
0.333
0.193
0.031
0.333
0.333
0.474
0.333
0.087
0.422
0.333
0.248
0.333
0.087
0.248
0.193
0.333
0.333
0.062
0.474
0.333
0.422
0.333
0.031
0.598
0.474
0.129
0.129
0.598
0.102
0.321
0.000
0.052
1.000
0.000
0.554
0.321
0.703
0.790
0.214
0.384
0.703
0.142
0.703
0.554
0.321
0.052
0.554
0.554
0.790
0.554
0.142
0.703
0.554
0.411
0.554
0.142
0.411
0.321
0.554
0.554
0.102
0.790
0.554
0.703
0.554
0.052
1.000
0.790
0.214
0.214
1.000
human health and safety, each must be controlled or eliminated if possible, and if not they should be reduced to the ALARP level.
In addition, in the philosophy of risk management, the fatalistic acceptance of accident occurrence has been replaced by the realization
that impending loss, in most cases, is predictable and therefore preventable (Allanson, 2002). In the context of the risk management process,
this is valuable in mitigating and reducing risks to the maximum extent
possible.
According to the results of the risk assessment obtained from this research, the events GM2, GM4, GM9, GM13, GC17, GC18, E20, M32, M34,
EN48, S82 and S86 are high-risk hazards (group A in Table 7) and need
the most attention, while E25, M29, M30, EN46 and EN49 pose the least
risks (group L in Table 7). The whole twelve groups of the risks arranged
in Table 7, are depicted in Fig. 7.
Some risks are more manageable than others in the sense that there
is a greater potential to reduce them. Thus among the risks those which
have a Ci index more than 0.5, i.e. groups A, B, C and D, are more important than others, hence appropriate risk measures should be suggested
for them.
Table 7
Arrangement of the Ci index in descending order.
Order
Code
Ci
Order
GM2
GM4
GM9
A
GM13
GC17
GC18
E20
M32
M34
1.000
P65
P68
P70
GM11
C39
EN43
S74
S75
S78
EN56
0.703
P58
P67
S79
GM6
GM10
E21
G
0.554
Code
Ci
EN51
P60
P73
0.321
0.554
H
E19
M33
P69
P72
EN55
E22
E24
M26
M31
C38
EN45
GM5
GM12
EN42
EN54
S84
S85
GM3
GM7
C40
P57
P66
P71
0.214
0.142
M37
J
GM1
GM14
S83
Order
S80
0.790
GM15
GC16
EN52
M36
C41
EN50
P59
P62
P63
EN48
S82
S86
EN53
Ci
E23
M27
M35
P64
S77
Code
0.102
GM8
0.411
K
0.384
0.321
EN44
S76
M28
EN47
P61
0.052
S81
E25
M29
M30
EN46
EN49
0.000
96
The results of risk ranking in our cases are depicted in Fig. 8 in the
case of fuzzy numbers. This gure shows that all risks affecting human
health and safety are in an uncertain context because the corresponding
fuzzy numbers are considerably overlapping.
The amount of uncertainty in the fuzzy ranking is obtained and represented by the spread of the triangles. This means that when two triangles overlap, a weak rank can be established and the related uncertainty
can be associated to the ordinate of the intersection between the two
triangles. A wide overlapping area translates a high uncertainty related
to the ranking, which ultimately means the uncertainty in the input data
is too high to obtain a clear preference.
The merit of using the fuzzy TOPSIS approach is to determine the importance or preference of alternatives using fuzzy numbers to be more
adapted to the real world cases instead of crisp numbers. Fuzzy models
using TFNs proved to be very effective for solving decision-making
problems where the available information is imprecise. Moreover, one
of the other benets of our methodology is its avoidance of a complex
structure and/or a black box algorithm. In addition, the proposed approach may allow taking into account not only the uncertainty related
to qualitative judgments but also the uncertainty that may reside in
the measurement of quantitative parameters.
According to Fig. 3, the best way to control the risks, starts at the top
of the hierarchy of controls, i.e. investigate if the risk can be eliminated
rst. This is the most effective way to control a hazard. If this method is
not possible, it may use the other measures especially engineering or
administrative controls to reduce or minimize them. In the following
subsections some recommended measures for each one of the most important risks, located at group A, are presented to control or reduce
these risks.
5.1. Control measures for GM2
Being struck by materials is of considerable concern because of the
serious consequences of rock falling injuries. Control measures put in
place to reduce this risk include improvement of the efciency of the
support system and isolation of miners from unsupported places. In
this regard, studies of Maiti and Bhattacherjee (1999) showed that
coalface workers are at risk more than at other locations. In these situations, the probability of adverse events is dramatically reduced by the
practice of roof meshing. The provision of protective cabs on vehicles
also reduces the probability of injury from falling materials further.
5.2. Control measures for GM4, GM9 and GM13
The risks of catastrophic failure, instability of coalface and instability
of immediate roof are impressed by strata control. Roof failure is always
a serious problem affecting safe production in coal mines, so that in underground operations the main cause of death is roof falling (MacNeill,
2008). Also roof failure is almost always the main cause of accidents in
the Kerman coal mines, which results in death, disability, injury, equipment damage and nancial losses, so that during 20032008, about 60%
of accidents and 30% of fatalities in the Kerman coal mines had been
caused by roof collapse.
The often soft, faulted and folded sedimentary strata make roof
movement a risk to safe and economic coal extraction. There should
be in place strata control plans to support the sides and roofs of mines
and they should be updated regularly when a new mining area is
entered.
Several factors have contributed to occurrences of roof falls in underground coal mines, such as geological conditions, openings and stope
geometry, mining method, mine layout, in situ and induced stresses
state, abutment load and mine environment (Iannacchione et al., 2001;
Deb, 2003; Phillipson, 2003; Duzgun, 2005; Maiti and Khanzode, 2009).
Among the factors affecting the roof fall hazards in coal mines, stress
condition and mine layout are somewhat controllable by appropriate
mine design. However, it is relatively more difcult to control the effect
97
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