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in forms that tend, however, to become more and more complex and subtle with the
further development of
science.
3.
CRITICISM OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MECHANISM
We shall now review some of the most important criticisms that can be made again
st the philosophy of
mechanism.
First of all, the historical development of physics has not confirmed the basic
assumptions of this
philosophy, but rather, has continually contradicted them. Thus, since the time
of Newton, there have been
introduced, not only the whole series of specific changes in the conceptual stru
cture of physics that was
discussed in Chapter II, but also the revolutionary changes in the whole general
framework, brought about
by the theory of relativity and the quantum theory. Moreover, physics is now face
d with a crisis in which it
is generally admitted that further changes will have to take place, which will p
robably be as revolutionary
compared to relativity and the quantum theory as these theories are compared to
classical physics.
Secondly, the mechanistic assumption of the absolute and final character of any
feature of our theories is
never necessary. For the possibility is always open that such a feature has only
a relative and limited
validity, and that the limits of its validity may be discovered in the future. T
hus, Newton s laws of motion,
regarded as absolute and final for over two hundred years, were eventually found
to have a limited domain
of validity, these limits having finally been expressed with the aid of the quan
tum theory and the theory of
relativity. Indeed, as we saw in more detail in Chapter II, Sections 13 and 15,
the mechanistic thesis that
certain features of our theories are absolute and final is an assumption that is
not subject to any conceivable
kind of experimental proof, so that it is, at best, purely philosophical in char
acter.
Thirdly, the assumption of the absolute and final character of any feature of ou
r theories contradicts the
basic spirit of the scientific method itself, which requires that every feature
be subjected to continual
probing and testing, which may show up contradictions at any point where we come
into a new domain or to
a more accurate study of previously known domains than has hitherto been carried
out. Indeed, the normal
pattern that has developed without exception in every field of science studied t
hus far has been just the
appearance of an endless series of such contradictions, each of which has led to
a new theory permitting an
improved and deeper understanding of the material under investigation. Thus, the
full and consistent
application of the scientific method makes sense only in a context in which we r
efrain from assuming the
absolute and final character of any feature of any theory and in which we theref
ore do not accept a
mechanistic philosophy.