Organizational Culture Change at A Military College From An Attritional/Adversarial Model To A Developmental Model

iii
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE AT A MILITARY COLLEGE FROM AN

ATTRITIONAL/ADVERSARIAL MODEL TO A DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL
Kevin Casey Dopf
A DISSERTATION
in
Higher Education Management
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Education
2014
Supervisor of Dissertation:
_____________________________________________
Lawrence Moneta, Adjunct Professor of Education
Dean, Graduate School of Education:

_____________________________________________
Andrew C. Porter, Dean and Professor
Dissertation Committee:
Lawrence Moneta, Adjunct Professor of Education
John Mathew Hartley, Associate Professor of Education
Kevin J. Dougherty, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, The Citadel
iii
ABSTRACT
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE AT A MILITARY COLLEGE FROM
AN ATTRITIONAL/ADVERSARIAL MODEL TO A DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL
Kevin Casey Dopf

Lawrence Moneta, Ed.D.
Military colleges have various points of commonality, such as some type of

fourth class system, which trains and indoctrinates new cadets and offers upper class
cadets leadership opportunities. Certain problems have accompanied these fourth class
systems, including physical and mental abuses of freshmen (hazing), an unproductive
first year experience that leads to high attrition and inferior preparation for future
collegiate demands, and the perpetuation of leadership techniques that are increasingly
inappropriate in the post-graduation environment. These challenges are inherent in the
attritional/adversarial model commonly associated with traditional military colleges. An
alternative is a developmental model, which fosters a positive environment, promotes
teamwork, and develops freshmen while maintaining a balance between caring for them
and ensuring that they meet the standards of followers. Various military colleges have
attempted to address the fourth class system through study and reform. To explore the
process of organizational culture change from an attritional/adversarial model to a
development model at military colleges, this research qualitatively examines two cases
studies West Point and The Citadel. The assumption of this research is that an
organizational change model, such as the one John Kotter describes in Leading Change,
iv
explains successful organizational culture change at a military college. If this is valid,
there should be a relationship between West Points adherence to an organizational
change model and its successful transition from an attritional/adversarial system to a
developmental one. Similarly, there should be a relationship between The Citadels
incomplete adherence to an organizational change model and its incomplete transition.
Analysis of this research suggests that there is a relationship between West Points
adherence to Kotters organizational change model and its successful transition.
Likewise, it suggests that there is a relationship between The Citadels incomplete
adherence to Kotters organizational change model and its incomplete transition. The
conclusion is that adherence to an organizational change theory is essential when
attempting an organizational culture change at a military college.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Research Questions
Assumptions
Structure
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Student Development and the First Year Experience
The First Year Experience at a Traditional Military College
13
Fourth Class Culture Change at West Point and The Citadel
18
Looking at Organizational Culture Change Through the Prism

of Organizational Change Theory
Summary and Applications
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
23
26
28
Overview
28
Rationale
30
Design
31
Data Collection
32
Instruments of Data Collection
32
Study Participants
33
Data Analysis
34
vi
Trustworthiness
35
Expertise and Background of the Researcher
36
Ethical Considerations
36
Limitations of the Study
37
CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY OF WEST POINTS FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM:

SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE
Call for Organizational Culture Change
Table 4.1: West Point Governance Organizational Structure
38
38
39
Historical Incremental Change
39
1976 to 1985: Enabling Change
41
Organizational Culture Change Inception
44
Facilitating a Leadership Development Model
46
Tactical Officer Education System
47
Cadet Schedule Modification
47
Establishing a Leadership Integration Team
49
Cadet Leadership Development System (CLDS)
49
Table 4.2: Cadet Development Under the Fourth Class System
51
Table 4.3: Cadet Development Under CLDS
52
Scrambling vs. the Cohort Model
55
Leadership Development Masters Degree
56
Adjustments for the Fourth Class
58
Leadership Change and Preserving Organizational Culture Change
61
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Major Strides in West Points Organizational Culture Change
61
Sustaining Organizational Culture Change
62
Effectiveness of Organizational Culture Change for West Point

and the Army
65
Resistance to Organizational Culture Change
67
A Lengthy Path to Full Implementation
69
Resources Needed for Organizational Culture Change
69
Leaders Leading Organizational Culture Change
70
Table 4.4: Changes in Values and Norms
71
CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY OF THE CITADELS FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM:

ATTEMPTING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE
72
72
1979-1997: Preserving the Status Quo
74
1997-2004: Enabling Change
79
2004-2006: Marching in Place
85
2006-Present: Incremental Change
86
Table 5.1: Organizational Chart for the Krause Center
89
Table 5.2: Timeline for Leadership Development
91
New Proposals Receive Little Traction
95
97
Table 5.3: The Citadels Governance Organizational Structure

Recognizing That Change is Still Needed
98
101
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS
102
Introduction
102
Kotters Eight Stage Change Process
104
Stage 1: Establishing a Sense of Urgency
104
Analysis of Stage 1
105
Stage 2: Creating the Guiding Coalition
107
Analysis of Stage 2
107
Stage 3: Developing a Vision and Strategy
110
Analysis of Stage 3
110
Stage 4: Communicating the Change Vision
112
Analysis of Stage 4
112
Stage 5: Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action
114
Analysis of Stage 5
114
Stage 6: Generating Short-Term Wins
116
Analysis of Stage 6
117
Stage 7: Consolidating Gains and Producing More Gains
119
Analysis of Stage 7
120
Stage 8: Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture
121
Analysis of Stage 8
122
Additional Hypotheses
124
Summary
127
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
129
Conclusions From My Research
129
Recommendations
132
Recommendations for The Citadels BOV and President
132
Recommendation 1: Act Now
132
Recommendation 2: Change Tactics from Incrementalism
133
Recommendation 3: Adopt and Maintain a Change Theory
134
Recommendation 4: More Resources Are Not Necessary
134
Recommendation 5: Educate All Stakeholders About the Change 135

Recommendation 6: Mobilize All College Organizations
135
Recommendation 7: Monitor the Change
135
Recommendation 8: Modify the Cadet Schedule
136
Recommendation 9: Evaluate Leadership Development
136
Recommendation 10: Follow a Best-Practice Model
137
Recommendations for the Commandant of Cadets
137
Recommendation 1: Educate, Train, and Certify TACs
137
Recommendation 2: Create a Cadet Leader Distribution Plan
138
Recommendation 3: Recognize that Change Begins at the Top
138
Recommendation 4: Rotate Cadet Ranks and Positions
139
Recommendation 5: Recognize Freshmen by Corps Day
139
Recommendation 6: Reduce Freshmen Mess Hall Requirements
140
Recommendation 7: Appoint a Regimental Tactical Officer
140
x
Closing
APPENDICES
141
142
Appendix A: The West Point Case Study Interview Protocol
142
Appendix B: The Citadel Case Study Interview Protocol
144
Appendix C: List of West Point Interviews
146
Appendix D: List of The Citadel Interviews
147
Appendix E: Coding and Triangulation Matrix
148
REFERENCES
150
xi
LIST OF TABLES
39
51
Table 4.3: Cadet Development Under CLEDS
52
89
Table 5.2: Timeline for Leadership Development at The Citadel
91
98
1
CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem

There are several types of higher educational institutions in the United States that
have adopted a military education model. These include the federal service academies,
such as the U.S. Military Academy in West Point and the U.S. Naval Academy in
Annapolis; state military colleges such as The Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, the
Military College of Georgia, the Corps of Cadets at Texas A&M and Virginia Tech;
private military colleges such as Norwich Military Academy; military junior colleges
such as New Mexico Military Institute, Marion Military Institute, and Valley Forge
Military Academy; and military high schools such as Fork Union Military Academy and
St. John Military School. For the purposes of this study, all such institutions will be
referred to as military colleges.
These military colleges have various points of commonality, including uniforms,
regulations, and a cadet chain of command. They also tend to have some type of fourthclass system, through which new cadets are trained and indoctrinated and upper class
cadets are given leadership opportunities. Certain challenges and problems have
accompanied these fourth class systems. They include physical and mental abuses of
freshmen, an unproductive first year experience that leads to high attrition and inferior
preparation for future collegiate demands, and the perpetuation of leadership techniques
that are increasingly inappropriate in the post-graduation environment. To one degree or
2
another, the various military colleges have attempted to address these issues by study and
reform.
The difficulties in administering the fourth class system are merely a symptom of
the attritional/adversarial model commonly associated with traditional military colleges.
In this model, which began almost with the inception of military colleges, both the
institution and cadets believe that the fourth class system should weed out cadets who
seem to lack the moral, mental, and physical fiber (Betros, 2012). Under this type of
system, some cadets use hazing to test other cadets, putting the military colleges at risk.
This attritional/adversarial model also produces a leadership culture that is unsustainable
in the military; it is very negative and fails to motivate soldiers (Betros, 2012). In this
model, cadets are allowed to sink or swim on their own, with little encouragement or
help from the upper class cadets.
An alternative is a developmental model, which creates an environment that is
positive, promotes teamwork and cohesion, and develops freshmen while maintaining a
balance between caring for them and making sure they meet the standards of followers
(Army Leadership, 2006). The developmental model uses teaching, coaching,
counseling, and mentoring. The model a military college adopts impacts not only its
freshmen, but all four classes, as well as the nature of the graduates it delivers.
Both the United States Military Academy (referred to in this study as West Point)
and The Citadel have attempted to transition to a developmental model. West Point is
generally regarded as having been successful in implementing this change. The Citadel,
on the other hand, has experienced difficulty and resistance to its attempts at change. It is
3
striking that West Point has succeeded in changing and The Citadel has not, because the
structure of each institution is similar. Organizational change theory offers a possible
explanation of this phenomenon.
All dissertations must begin with certain assumptions. This research study
accepts the idea that West Points transition has been successful and outlines the
documentation upon which this assumption is based. Likewise, the study assumes that
The Citadels transition has been incomplete and outlines the supporting documentation.
Proceeding from these assumptions, this study examines the process of organizational
culture change at these two institutions.
In Leading Change, John Kotter (1996) outlines eight steps required to change an
organizations culture. These eight steps are:
1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency: In an organization with 100 employees, at
least two dozen must go far beyond the normal call to duty to produce
significant change (p. 35). Complacency must be kept as low as possible
(p. 36).
2. Creating the Guiding Coalition: Building such a team is always an
essential part of the early stages of any effort to restructure, reengineer, or
retool a set of strategies (p. 52).
3. Developing a Vision and Strategy: In a change process, a good vision
serves three important purposes. First, by clarifying the general direction for
change. Second, it motivates people to take action in the right direction,
even if the initial steps are personally painful. Third, it helps coordinate the
actions of different people, even thousands and thousands of individuals, in a
remarkably fast and efficient way (pp. 68-69).
4. Communicating the Change Vision: But the real power of a vision is
unleashed only when most involved in an enterprise or activity has a common
understanding of its goals and direction (p. 85).
4
5. Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action: in this ever fastermoving world, I think the idea of helping more people to become more
powerful is important (p. 101).
6. Generating Short Term Wins: Running a transformational effort without
serious attention to short-term wins is extremely risky (p. 119).
7. Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change: Major change often
takes a long time, especially in big organizations. Under these
circumstances, short-term wins are essential to keep momentum going, but the
celebration of those wins can be lethal if urgency is lost. With complacency
up, the forces of tradition can sweep back in with remarkable force and speed
(p. 132).
8. Anchoring New Changes in the Culture: Anchoring change in a
culturecomes last, not first. New approaches usually sink into a culture only
after its clear that they work and are superior to old methods. Without verbal
instruction and support, people are often reluctant to admit the validity of the
new practices. Sometimes the only way to change a culture is to change key
people. If promotion processes are not changed to be compatible with new
practices, the old culture will reassert itself. (p. 157).
Kotters model offers one means of comparing and analyzing organization change at
West Point and The Citadel.
Research Questions
The questions this research study aims to answer are: How do two military
colleges approach an organizational culture change from an attritional/adversarial model
to a development model? What explains the different outcomes of their efforts?
Assumptions of the Study

My assumption is that an organizational change model, such as John Kotters, can
explain successful organizational culture change at a military college. If this is valid,
5
there should be a relationship between West Points adherence to an organizational
change model and its successful transition from an attritional/adversarial model to a
developmental model. Similarly, there should be a relationship between The Citadels
incomplete adherence to an organizational change model and its incomplete transition.
The research objective of this dissertation is to provide disciplined configurative
case studies on West Points and The Citadels efforts to transition from an
attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model and to test the theory that
adherence to an organizational change model contributes to a successful outcome.
This study is important to The Citadel because as a result of past studies, The
Citadel is under renewed pressure to transition to a development model. This dissertation
tests the theory that there is a relationship between adherence to organizational change
theory and successful organizational change at a military college. If the dissertation
confirms the validity of this theory, The Citadel should align future attempts at change
with an organizational change model, using West Points experience as a guide.
This study is also important to the discipline of student affairs, because there is
strong consensus that a systematic program of development, through all four years in
general and the first year experience in particular, are critical to a successful collegiate
environment that prepares graduates to enter their chosen profession.
Structure
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first chapter establishes the
relevance of the topic by placing it in the context of student development in higher
6
education in general and the first year experience in particular. The second chapter
reviews the abundant literature contending that a nurturing, supportive, and positive first
year experience contributes to improved overall student success and reduced
attrition. Conversely, an adversarial, detached, and abusive first year experience
contributes to poor overall performance and increases attrition. Hazing traditions are
highlighted as a particular feature of an adversarial environment. Building on this first
year experience, the remaining years of a students college career shape the character,
skills, and adaptability with which they will enter their chosen profession.
The second chapter then refines this generic first year experience by focusing on
its application within the military college setting. This particular subset of higher
education is unique in its traditionally adversarial approach to the first year experience,
known as the fourth class system. Over time, certain rituals become ingrained that, at
worst, amount to systematic hazing and, at best, are of marginal utility in preparing
cadets for the skills required of military officers.
The third chapter describes the methodology used in this research. The fourth
chapter presents West Point as a case study of a military college that stated a desire to
transition from an adversarial to a developmental model and succeeded in doing so. The
fifth chapter presents The Citadel as a case study of a military college that stated the same
desire but has, thus far, been markedly less successful in making the transition. The sixth
chapter uses Kotters organizational change theory to analyze why West Point was
successful in making the transition and The Citadel less successful. The seventh chapter
7
consists of recommendations for The Citadel that would make its effort to transition to a
developmental model more effective.
8
CHAPTER TWO:
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Student Development and the First Year Experience

The literature on student development and the first year experience provides clear
and unequivocal studies indicating that student development and a developmental first
year experience are critical. Several themes emerge from the literature on the role of
institutions. Vincent Tinto establishes the importance of the role of the institution,
especially in the first year. Colleges and universities have a responsibility and an
obligation to help a student stay and graduate. To do this, they must set the conditions in
which students are placed in the college or university and establish the institutions
expectations (Tinto, 2012).
Institutions should set high expectations, since student performance and success
have a direct relationship to the clarity, consistency, and level of expectations (Tinto,
2012). How students expect to be treated and their actual experience can make a huge
difference on student success and favorable outcomes (Moneta & Kuh, n.d.). An
institutions goals, values, policies, and procedures need to be communicated clearly to
students. When this does not happen, or when people in the institution present
conflicting goals, values and policies, retention suffers (Berger, 2001, p. 14). Students
need opportunities to participate in the decision-making process of the institution, and
when this happens, retention rises (Berger, 2001, p. 15).
9
Colleges and universities must also provide academic and social support,
especially during the first year (Tinto, 2012): When bureaucratic mechanisms (e.g.,
chain of command, rules, policies, and procedures) are the source of a problem for
students, they can have a negative effect on student adjustment at college (Berger, 2001,
p. 12). Collegial organizational behavior on campus has positive effects on student
persistence (Berger, 2001, p. 12), while highly politicized environments have negative
effects on student persistence. In addition, higher levels of symbolic behavior on campus
are associated with higher persistence (Berger, 2001, p. 13). These findings on the role
of institutions are significant, especially for military colleges, which are very bureaucratic
in their organization and not very collegial.
Institutions must also provide assessment and feedback frequently, so students
can adjust their behaviors so they are successful, and again, this is particularly important
during the freshman year. Berger (2001) finds that there is a balance needed between
structure and responsiveness. Students need to be provided advocates, and colleges and
universities must assess the nature of the institutional environment on campus (Berger,
2001, pp. 15-19).
Colleges and universities must insure student involvement academically, socially,
and with peers (Tinto, 2012). Seventy-five percent of college students who leave college
do so after the first semester (Davig & Spain, 2004, p. 305). Research has found that a
freshman orientation course is helpful and increases rates of retention, as do freshman
seminars. The development of social networks is essential to students integrating into the
10
institution; it also increases retention rates. The assimilation of freshmen into college life
is critical to students persistence rates (Davig & Spain, 2004, p. 306).
The literature on student development supports the need for colleges to provide
academic and social support, frequent assessments and feedback, and student
involvement on campus. This enables students to achieve clear and high expectations,
which will in turn create student success and lower attrition.
Colleges and universities have instituted developmental programs in a number of
different areas (Evans, et al., 2010). Leadership development, which incorporates ethical
development and the development of others, surfaces as a theme throughout the literature.
Successful colleges and universities use different models or a combination of models in
their leadership development. A summary of the different models shows the varied
approaches to student development.
The Relational Leadership Model is based on the relational and ethical
processes of people trying to achieve positive change (knowing, being, doing) (Komives,
et al., 2013). The Social Change Model of Leadership promotes values of equity,
social justice, self-knowledge, service, and collaboration. Servant Leadership
emphasizes that serving comes first and servant leaders put people and organizations
before themselves (Greenleaf, 2013). The Emotionally Intelligent Leadership Model
involves three areas: consciousness of context, consciousness of self, and consciousness
of others (Shankman & Allen, 2008). Leadership Identity Development has six stages,
Awareness, Exploration/Engagement, Leader Identified, Leadership Differentiated,
Generativity, and Integration/Synthesis (Komives, et al., 2006). Army Manual FM 6-22
11
from Army Leadership (2006) devotes an entire chapter to developing soldiers and
includes a sub-section titled Organizational Leadership. All of these leadership models
have the common theme of taking care of students and creating a positive environment.
Another theme that emerges from the literature on leadership development is
mentoring, an example of taking care of students. A good definition of mentoring can be
found in Army Leadership: Mentorship is the voluntary developmental relationship that
exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lessor experience that is
characterized by mutual trust and respect (2006). Seventy percent of students reported
that they were mentored by classmates or by the staff and faculty. For those who
received mentoring, 50% said they were mentored by student affairs staff and 33% by a
person in the community. Faculty and employer mentoring were strong predictors of
values. The conclusion is that mentoring in college truly makes a positive difference
(Dugan & Komives, 2007).
Coaching and counseling are other common themes in the literature on the
developmental model (Lawson, 2011). Coaching is teaching and guiding designed to
bring out the talents that already exist. Counseling occurs when the leader reviews the
subordinates performance (Army Leadership, 2006). The Trainers Handbook of
Leadership Development (2011), states that mentoring and coaching are critical
competencies for developing people. The Emotionally Intelligent Leadership model lists
coaching as a key feature in one of its three areas. The Servant Leadership model lists
nurturing the growth of employees as one of its important areas in its section Ten Areas
a Servant Leader Needs to Concentrate On.
12
Other common themes in the literature on the developmental model are character
and ethical behavior (Army Leadership, 2006). One of the seven Cs in the Critical
Values of the Social Change Model is congruence, which refers to acting with honesty
and within your values (Dugan & Komives, 2007). The Relational Leadership Model
also emphasizes ethics; it is a pillar of the model (Komives, et al., 2013).
Another important theme in the literature is creating a positive environment,
which includes the environments climate and culture. Creating a positive climate
includes fairness and inclusiveness, open and candid communications, and a positive
learning environment (Army Leadership, 2006). In the Social Change Model of
Leadership Development, the concept of citizenship includes the climate and culture
(Dugan & Komives, 2007).
The abundant literature on overall development, especially during the first year,
makes it clear that colleges and universities must create the conditions to foster a
nurturing, supportive, and positive first year experience. This then contributes to
improved student retention, especially during the first year. Conversely, an adversarial,
uninvolved, detached, and abusive first year experience contributes to poor overall
performance and increased attrition (Tinto, 2012). This is one of the main tenets of
Vincent Tintos work. Colleges and universities should minimize negative encounters,
which lead to attrition, and maximize positive encounters, which leads to retention
(Tinto, 2012).
13
The First Year Experience at a Traditional Military College
The review of literature reveals that most military colleges did not include much
student development when they were founded, especially for the important first year.
They also had very little leadership development, despite the fact that after graduation,
cadets were put in charge of leading soldiers. A common characteristic of military
colleges was that they put freshmen in a fourth class system, which evolved into an
attritional/adversarial system where cadets weak in academics, moral issues, and physical
strength were eliminated (Betros, 2012; Macauley, 2011). There was a complete lack of
leadership development of the freshmen cadets and throughout the Corps of Cadets,
especially at West Point and The Citadel (Betros, 2012; Macauley, 2011). Lance Betros
called it leadership through osmosis (2012). This attritional/adversarial model goes
against the current literature on student development.
One outcome of the attritional/adversarial model was that cadets believed their
role was to test freshmen. They had few other outlets to keep them busy, so they
substituted hazing (Ambrose, 1966, pp. 226-227). Hazing became the bane of
Superintendents, Presidents, and Commandant of Cadets for well over 100 years (Betros,
2012; Macauley, 2011). The attritional/adversarial model can become so culturally
engrained that even parents of cadets and alumni organizations support hazing (Student
Affairs Leadership Council, 2012).
The literature describing hazing in the military and at military colleges generally
applies a different meaning to the word than elsewhere. Civilian interpretations of hazing
fail to take into account military life (Nuwer, 2004, pp. 141-146). Much of military
14
training would be considered hazing by the StopHazing.org definition: Hazing refers to
any activity expected of someone joining a group (or to maintain full status in a group)
that humiliates, degrades, or risks emotional and/or physical harm, regardless of the
persons willingness to participate (2013). An article on the U.S. Air Force Academy in
Colorado Springs states of their fourth class system: Superficially the fourth class year
resembles a fraternity hell week of hazing, spread over eleven long months (You are
nobody here, 1961, p. 82). The question always comes back to what is beneficial to the
training of the military personnel and what is considered harassment and hazing? (Nuwer,
2004). The type of hazing that the literature on military colleges refers to falls outside
the boundaries of legitimate military training, which itself could be considered hazing at
civilian colleges and universities.
Hazing scandals relating to the fourth class system occurred in 1881, 1900, 1907,
1917, 1973, 1976, and in 1979 at West Point (Betros, 2012; Nuwer, 2004). The most
famous was a Congressional Inquiry ordered by the President of the U.S. A cadet had
died and Cadet Douglas McArthur was forced to testify before Congress as a witness
(Nuwer, 2004, pp. 141-146). Most of the West Point leaderships efforts to stop and
prevent hazing were fruitless (Crackel, 2002, p. 270). For most freshmen cadets, the
worst part of hazing was the isolation resulting from not being allowed to feel part of the
Corps (Ambrose, 1966, pp. 226-227).
West Point historian, Steve Grove, documented the history of the fourth class
system in his July 1989 publication. It provides a rich history of the fourth class system
15
since West Point was founded, pointing out some good elements, but primarily
emphasizing the multiple problems that the system has caused for about 180 years.
Reviews and studies of West Points fourth class system increased in the sixties.
Almost all of them concluded with comments like one 1969 study: It would seem that
from The Academys mission of developing mature and independent officers, this initial
effort is counterproductive (Grove, 1989). In 1976, abuses of the fourth class system
represent the greatest potential for future public embarrassment of the Military Academy.
We need to keep asking ourselves the rationale for everything we do within the fourth
class system (Grove, 1989). A 1979 study found that a more progressive and
educational approach was needed to develop freshmen. A 1988 study of the fourth class
system found that it seemed to conflict with developing the leader attributes (Grove,
1989).
The Citadel had similar issues. Abusive behavior there was detailed by Betty
Harper in her essay Welcome Sister Rats: Coeducation at Two Southern Military
Colleges. Harper states that VMI [Virginia Military Institute] considers itself more
civilized than The Citadel, and less prone to enforcing its lessons with violence (p. 3).
Harper also notes that The Citadel does not have the control they should have over its
cadets. Both schools require harsh physical and mental initiation. Hazing is an accepted
part of the initiation rite and alumni take great pride in having stuck it out and survived.
High attrition is a badge of honor and those that fail leave in disgrace (Harper, n.d., p.
10).
16
In Catherine Manegolds book (2000) on Shannon Faulkner, The Citadels first
female cadet, Manegold compares the freshmen to slaves, the upper class to plantation
slave masters, and the campus to that of the Charleston Center for Punishment of Slaves.
When The Citadel had issues with hazing after Shannon Faulkner attended, officials
insisted the hazing was not gender based but rather related to endemic problems in the
Fourth Class System (Manegold, 2000, p. 301). Indeed, the Commandant of Cadets
claimed that the women were so well accepted that male cadets treated them like any
other first year students. He noted that, like Shannon Faulkner, two male cadets also had
their shirts set afire after being doused with nail polish remover (Manegold, 2000).
Harvard Law Schools Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program reported their
findings in The Citadel, Dispute Resolution System Review (The Citadel, 2008) that
showed the outcome of The Citadels attritional adversarial system. The hazing activities
refer specifically to the fourth class system. The report states that cadets support hazing
in the fourth class system because they believe that hazing:
1. develops bonds within a class,
2. encourages teamwork,
3. develops leaders,
4. teaches individuals to overcome adversity, and
5. is an important part of tradition (The Citadel, 2008).
The report outlines a series of improvements that would enable changes in the
culture to occur, mainly related to the Corps of Cadets leadership (The Citadel, 2008). It
17
specifically outlines how hazing is a poor means of achieving the goals that the cadets
spoke of above:
1. Some cadets believe they are treated worst and resent classmates they
perceive as being treated better;
2. Some female cadets feel alienated because they are not hazed to the same
degree as their male counterparts: their better treatment spurs resentment
from other cadets;
3. Cadets tend to tune out certain kinds of hazing, rendering it ineffective;
4. Individuals who learn leadership through hazing are more likely to learn to
lead through intimidation instead of motivation;
5. Learning to overcome adversity can be taught more safely and effectively
without mental abuse (The Citadel, 2008).
The Lords of Discipline, a popular novel by Pat Conroy (2002), a Citadel

graduate, describes The Citadel and what it was like to go through the fourth class
system. The book points out the horrors of the system, but also the incredible bonding
between those cadets who survived it. It is a very popular perception of the system and
one that many alumni deem as significant in their lives. Only about 40% of graduating
cadets enter a military service, so for most alumni, the fourth class system is the only
military experience they have. To them, it represents a badge of courage and a positive
aspect of military schools. A significant portion of the alumni who resist change to the
fourth class system have an attitude of I made it through and turned out well (Conroy,
2002).
18
The literature has documented well the freshman year at military colleges. West
Point and The Citadel are just two examples of military colleges using an
attritional/adversarial model that fosters hazing.
Fourth Class Culture Change at West Point and The Citadel

As stated in the previous section, one of the outcomes of an attritional/adversarial
fourth class system is hazing. The literature reveals that as early as 1879, Superintendent
John M. Schofield was so concerned about the fourth class system that he wrote a
Definition of Discipline and required cadets to memorize it (The Citadel, 2009-2010):
The discipline, which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle, is not
to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is
far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart
instruction and to give commands in such manner and such a tone of voice to
inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite
manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to
disobey (The Citadel, 2009-2010).
Schofield became one of a long line of college Superintendents, Presidents, and

Commandants who tried to change the fourth class system. Over time, various leaders at
West Point started to introduce leadership into the fourth class system. They first
introduced the freshmen to leadership concepts and then allowed the upper classmen the
opportunity to put into practice the leadership concepts they had learned on freshmen
(Betros, 2012).
The concept of leader development started to be introduced at West Point in 1920,
but it would take until 1990 for the concept to overtake the attritional/adversarial model
(Betros, 2012, pp. 239-243). The leaders of these introductory concepts were
19
Superintendent Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur (1919-1922) and Major General
Maxwell Taylor (1945-1949) (Betros, 2012, pp. 243-249). Both tried introduce expanded
instruction in Psychology into the academic curriculum and both failed, due to resistance
from West Points Academic Board. Psychological disciplines studied leadership and
how humans could be lead, but Taylor was unsuccessful in getting the Academic Board
to teach Psychology, so he created the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership
(OMPL) and placed it under the Commandant of Cadets (Betros, 2012, p. 249).
MacArthur used the same tactic described above when he was Superintendent but in both
cases, when they departed the successors failed to carry on their efforts (Betros, 2012).
The literature also shows that The Citadel paralleled West Point in fourth class
issues. One of the most noted Presidents of The Citadel, General Charles P. Summerall,
summed up the system to Colonel John P. Thomas, Chairmen of the Board of Visitors
(BOV) in 1943 saying, The oppression exercised over fourth classmen is not discipline
but the antithesis of discipline. This is shown by the in-discipline of those who were
subjected to its so-called benefits as soon as they became oppressors (Summerall, 1943).
Starting in 1968, The Citadel appointed committees to study the fourth class
system about every eight years during the following 40-year period, which demonstrates
the magnitude of the issues The Citadel faced with the fourth class system (Macauley,
2011). These study reports are significant; they each document the serious nature of the
issues with the fourth class system which led to further cultural issues in the Corps of
Cadets. The 1968 report to the president and the Board of Visitors, known as the
Whitmire Report, contained 56 findings and seven recommendations that included a
20
complete overhaul of the fourth class (The Citadel, 1968). In 1980, another report was
commissioned on the fourth class system known as the Mood Report. It had 21
recommendations that again, included a complete overhaul of the fourth class system
(The Citadel, 1991).
The next report on the fourth class system came in 1992, named the Lane Report.
The Lane Report made five recommendations that also suggested overhauling the fourth
class system. In 1997, because there were huge issues with the admission of women to
The Citadel, the federal court had to step in to ensure a viable program that eliminated the
huge discriminatory issues The Citadel faced. The federal court and The Citadel decided
to review the fourth class system again. The federal court appointed outside investigators
to look into The Citadel. They recommended to the court that the fourth class system
was an adversarial system as it is run at The Citadel, but that the womens assimilation
should be treated differently (McDannell, 1997, pp. 2-3).
The Citadel appointed a new Commandant of Cadets in 1997, Brigadier General
Mace, who made changes to the Corps of Cadets regulations and to the fourth class
system (Macauley, 2011). These changes became known as the Mace Plan (The Citadel,
1997). The last committee to look into the fourth class system was the Institutional
Program Assessment Committee (IPAC) and was appointed in 2012; they produced the
IPAC Report (The Citadel, 2012). The IPAC Report discussed the entire Citadel
institution, but one sub-committee on hazing and training abuses examined the fourth
class system specifically. The IPAC Report recommended, once again, an overhaul of
21
the fourth class system. This sub-committee made nine recommendations to change the
system (The Citadel, 2012).
Each of these committees were appointed because of major issues with the fourth
class system in the last 40 plus years. They provide documentation of the issues and the
knowledge that a properly functioning developmental system is critical to the
development of healthy values and respect for the program at the college. They are a
reflection that one committee report called the seventeen (17) major and about
fourteen hundred (1400) minor Plebe Systems at The Citadel tied strictly to individual
personalities, attitudes and interpretations (The Citadel, 1968, p. 42).
Like The Citadel, West Point appointed various committees to review the fourth
class system and was making a modicum of progress (Betros, 2012). The Cadet
Counseling Center had a leadership component that was a vestige from previous
Superintendents attempts to add leadership into the curriculum. Being unsuccessful,
they followed MacArthur and Taylors precedents and established a leadership
component in the Cadet Counseling Center (Betros, 2012). The Cadet Counseling Center
reported to the Commandant of Cadets (Betros, 2012). The Cadet Counseling Center
made a number of changes related to the fourth class system, but the seminal change took
place when Lieutenant General Dave Palmer became Superintendent in 1986 (Betros,
2012).
Under Palmer, West Point took a huge turn in leader development that changed
the fourth class system. Palmer ordered a complete review of the fourth class system,
starting three reviews simultaneously (Betros, 2012). The staff and faculty committee
22
even recommended that the fourth class system be abolished (Betros, 2012, pp. 257-258).
Palmer prohibited many nonsensical definitions in required freshmen (plebe) knowledge
and changed other facets of the fourth class system (Crackel, 2002, p. 270).
Palmer decided to implement a four class system, in which each class would be
administered a demanding leadership model (Betros, 2012, p. 258). The new system was
called Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS, pronounced kleds). This new
system:
included a plebe experience that retained many of the traditional elements of
the old fourth class system and thus insured a challenging first year. For third,
second, and first classmen, however, the expectations were higher. The new
system described leadership responsibilities and developmental goals that grew
more demanding each year and focused on proper leader-subordinate
relationships (Betros, 2012, p. 258).
Palmer explained that the new system was a constantly progressive process that adds as
you go along: holds you more responsible; holds you more accountable; expects you to
know more; expects you to be more mature.When you start looking at things that way,
you start creating a system for all four classes (Betros, 2012, p. 258). Palmer also
decided to send his company tactical officers (TACs) to receive a graduate degree
specifically in leadership, rather than any graduate degree (Betros, 2012, p. 258). Three
areas seem to be the change agents that are responsible for the organizational culture
change to a developmental system at West Point. They were Palmers direction and
leadership, the change in the tactical officer graduate degree requirement, and the Cadet
Counseling Center (Betros, 2012).
The results of Palmers changes were immediate. In 1990, the first year of the
new four year leader development program, that bans upperclassmen from verbally
23
abusing freshmenand emphasizes positive leadership techniques only about 66
people or 5% of the institutions 1,248 freshmen left the academy during beast
weeks.Usually, about 10% of the freshmen leave (Dodge, 1991, p. A39). By 1993
the change in the fourth class system and the introduction of four class leader
development program was established and solidified (Donnithorne, 1993; Betros, 2012).
West Points Circular 1-101-1, Cadet Leader Development System for Cadets,
delineates a four class leader development program at West Point that included more than
freshmen (United States Military Academy, 2005). This is significant, as it confirms that
12-15 years after the transition to a developmental model, West Point still produced
documents that indicate that their organizational culture change from an
attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model was being sustained (United
States Military Academy, 2005).
The literature shows that West Point stated a desire to transition from an
adversarial to a developmental leadership model and succeeded in doing so (Betros,
2012). The Citadel has thus far been markedly less successful in making the transition
(Macauley, 2011).
Looking at Organizational Cultural Change Through

the Prism of Organizational Change Theory
Adrianna Kezar in her book titled, Understanding Change in the 21st Century
(2001), outlines models of change that shed light on successfully establishing
organizational culture change at a university. Kezar states that it is critical to understand
24
the nature of higher educational organizations in order for organizational culture change
to be successful (Kezar, 2001, p. v). She identifies six models of change in higher
education: evolutionary, teleological, life cycle, dialectical, social cognition, cultural, and
multiple methods (Kezar, 2001, pp. 79-111).
Understanding the institutional culture and the various sub-cultures is essential,
especially for leaders who are trying to make changes. Edgar Schein, in his book
Organizational Culture and Leadership (1996), defines culture as:
The culture of a group can now be defined as a pattern of shared basic
assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation
and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think,
and feel in relation to those problems.
Sub-cultures at military colleges have markedly different cultures than those at civilian
colleges and universities.
According to Schein, there are external and internal factors that affect an
organizations culture. The organization must have good communication internally and
externally in order to understand the culture fully. For an organizational culture change
to occur, a process called disconfirmation occurs, that first produces guilt and anxiety,
and then leads to resistance to the culture change. The way to avoid this problem is by
making the people at the organization feel psychologically safe. This means not
defining the issue as a culture change, but rather as a problem that needs to be
addressed (Schein, 1996). The people who still believe in the old culture need to be
eliminated. Culture change will be successful if the change leads to success and
25
satisfaction, but culture change will always require a period of unlearning that will be
psychologically painful (Schein, 1996).
William Pasmore, in his book Creating Strategic Change (1994) recommends that
when planning organizational changes, an organization should change all things at the
same time. Pasmore believes a complete redesign is absolutely necessary in order for
organizational culture change to be successful. According to Pasmore, an incrementalism
strategy will guarantee that nothing significant will ever change (1994, p. 264).
Incrementalism is a strategy that makes changes very slowly over a time period.
Another approach to organizational culture change, which is another methodology
considered by this research, is the five principle method discussed in the book Change
the Culture, Change the Game by Roger Connors and Tom Smith (2001). Connors and
Smith identify the first principle as accountability, both inside and outside of the
organization. Without accountability, there can be no culture change. The second
principle is getting people ready for the change. Change is hard and people are not
predisposed to change. Everyone in the organization must be prepared to make the
change. The third principle is to start at the top of the organization in order to be most
effective in accomplishing the change. A culture change that starts without involvement
of top leadership will be disastrous. The fourth principle is to ensure that there is a
strategy for staying on track. Every process needs controls, especially cultural changes in
an organization. The last principle is allowing for creativity and maximum participation.
For organizational culture change to succeed, everyone in the organization must be
involved (Connors & Smith, 2001).
26
John Kotters eight step change method, described in Chapter One, offers another
model for achieving organizational culture change (Kotter, 1996). It was developed as a
model for business and is relevant to culture change in bureaucratic organizations
(Kotter, 1996). In addition to measuring success in the eight steps, an organization can
measure the managements and leaderships ideas about the organizational culture
(Kotter, 1996). While support from management is important, it will not alone produce
change; only support from leadership will produce successful change, as it removes
inertia, changes behavior, and insures a sustaining change (Kotter, 1996, p. 30).
According to Kotter, leadership produces change, often to a dramatic degree, and has the
potential to produce extremely useful change (1996, p. 26).
Summary and Application

As stated in Chapter One, this study poses the following two research questions:
How did two different military colleges approach an organizational change from an
attritional/adversarial model to a development model? and What explains the different
outcomes of these efforts? The dependent variable here is the outcome of the attempted
change (success or failure); the independent variables are the degree of adherence to the
specific organizational change models selected.
The Citadel is still attempting to achieve the degree of success in its transition that
West Point has. If the study reveals that West Point successfully followed an
organizational change model and The Citadel did not, the study will make specific
recommendations concerning how The Citadel should structure its on-going efforts.
27
Furthermore, if the study supports the conclusion from Betros (2012), that the leadership
of Superintendent Lt. Gen. Palmer and his sense of urgency, the expanded role of the
Cadet Counseling Center, and the integration of a highly trained and empowered tactical
officers were essential to the change process, then this study will make additional
recommendations to The Citadel. Like West Point, The Citadel has a three-star chief
executive, a Cadet Counseling Center, and tactical officers. The organizational change
model used will hopefully explain why The Citadels execution of these assets has not
produced the change experienced at West Point.
28
CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY
Overview
Presented in this chapter are details about the methodology of this study. It will
discuss the different approaches within the methodology, the instruments used, the
selection process for participants, data collection methods, data analysis procedures, as
well as the trustworthiness and methods of verification. In addition, my role as
researcher is explained. The analysis of my research, when added to the current literature
on the topic, should help stakeholders at The Citadel and other military colleges who are
struggling with organizational culture change.
Through a qualitative mode of inquiry, the following research questions were
explored: How do two different military colleges approach an organizational change
from an attritional/adversarial model to a development model? and What explains the
different outcomes of these efforts?
My assumption is that an organizational change model can be used to explain
successful change at a military college. If this is valid, there should be a relationship
between West Points adherence to an organizational change model and its successful
transition from an attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model. Similarly,
there should be a relationship between The Citadels incomplete adherence to an
organizational change model and its incomplete transition.
29
Two case studies were compiled, one at West Point, which the literature review
suggests underwent a successful organizational cultural change, and the other at The
Citadel, which the literature suggests has had an incomplete transition from an
attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model in their fourth class system. Both
case studies were looked at through the lens of John Kotters (1996), Leading Change.
Kotters theory of organizational change was selected because it is a top-down business
model similar to the top-down bureaucratic model that military colleges follow. Kotters
theory offers a functional approach for analyzing organizational culture change at
military colleges. Interestingly, the U.S. Army War College just finished using Kotters
methodology in their 2013 top-down review.
This study examines the literature on organizational culture change in military
colleges and identifies the causes for the successful organizational change at West Point
and incomplete change at The Citadel. In addition, this study looks at three factors that
Brigadier General Lance Betros (2012) identified in his book as significant to West
Points organizational culture change to determine if they played a prominent role in the
change. The three factors that each case study analyzes are:
1. The sense of urgency and direction from the top leadership at West Point and
The Citadel.
2. The education and training of the Tactical Officers (TACs) at West Point and
The Citadel.
3. The role played by the Cadet Counseling Center in the organizational change
at West Point and The Citadel.
30
Rationale
The methodology used this study was qualitative. Qualitative research was
selected because, as John Creswell (2007) explains in his book Qualitative Inquiry
Research Design, qualitative research is best when a problem or issue needs to be
explored (Creswell, 2007, p. 47). Creswell goes on to say that if the issue or problem
requires a detailed understanding, then qualitative methods would be useful. If it is
important for individuals to put the issue or problem into perspective and hear their
interpretation of events, then qualitative methods should be used. Qualitative analysis
was also selected because using quantitative and statistical analyses would not easily
provide the answers to this studys research questions (Creswell, 2007, p.48). The case
study, after careful evaluation, was the qualitative approach that provided the researcher
with the best opportunity to collect and examine the data desired.
The first case study examined how West Point changed the organizational culture
from an attrition/adversarial system to a developmental system. This instrumental case
study was very significant to my overall research, because it is a best practice example of
a successful organizational culture change in a Corps of Cadets. Case study methodology
was chosen because the West Point fourth class organizational culture change required an
in-depth look at the instruments that caused the cultural change to take place. Other
qualitative approaches were reviewed, but the case study fit the parameters for obtaining
the best data from West Points organizational change.
The second case study focused on The Citadel. The case approach was used to
identify and codify issues that The Citadel has had in the past and continues to experience
31
today. The research included interviews and examining the past and current fourth class
system, and its findings were corroborated by documents such as committee reports, case
reports, press reports, etc. This study determined exactly where The Citadel was in terms
of its attempts to change the fourth class system. Case study methodology was chosen
because enabled the researcher to document the past of the fourth class system and better
understand where The Citadel was regarding their transition.
Design
The unit of analysis was at the institutional level. The specific sites for most of
the data collection were the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York
(West Point) and The Citadel, in Charleston, South Carolina. These two military colleges
have similar structures, histories, and internal models, such as a fourth class system.
There are, however, some significant differences between the two colleges: West Point is
a federal academy that produces officers for the Army. The Citadel is a state military
college, and only about 40% of cadets enter a military service.
The Citadel interviews were conducted in Charleston, South Carolina. The West
Point interviews were conducted by telephone, because many of their college
administrators have retired from the Army and relocated around the country. Qualitative
interviews were conducted because they provided the best technique for a complete
understanding of all the issues both colleges faced. This type of interview enabled
follow-up questions and gathering additional sources. Interviews were semi-structured to
allow for additional questions. Documents was also examined, such as committee
32
reports, position papers, regulations, publications, and memorandums, to corroborate data
collected in the interviews (Creswell, 2007).
Data Collection
Data was collected from one-on-one interviews that lasted from one to two hours.
The participants were asked a set of questions that helped define both the organizational
change from an attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model and the lack of
that transition, and also included the interviewees assessment of the reasons. All
interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. There was no confidentially given to the
participants.
Interview questions included both structured and unstructured questions. As a
staff and faculty member at both colleges and an Army Officer, I feel that I was able to
elicit constructive assessments from the participants interviewed.
Document analysis was performed to corroborate (triangulate) data collected from
the interviewed participants. Such documents included fourth class system manuals,
regulations, and memorandums.
Instruments of Data Collection

Interview protocols are included in Appendix A (p. 135) for West Point, and
Appendix B (p. 137) for The Citadel. These protocols were designed so the interviewee
would provide data on three areas this research analyzed along with Kotters eight stage
33
change methodology. In addition, the instrument provided further information on other
possible interviewees and written documentation. Each interview was audio-taped.
Study Participants
Participants were chosen based upon their positions in the decision-making
process relating to the fourth class systems. The West Point case study participants were
mostly involved with West Point during its period of change (1988-1993). The Citadel
case study participants were involved there from 2008 to the present. People in
leadership positions, such as Superintendents and Presidents, Provosts and
Commandants of Cadets were selected because they were knowledgeable about
leadership at their institution and the sense of urgency that existed regarding changing the
fourth class system. A list of all interviews conducted appears in Appendix C and
Appendix D (pp. 139-140).
Such participants included retired Lt. Gen. David Palmer (West Point); Maj. Gen.
Cliff Poole (The Citadel); retired Maj. Gen. John Grinalds (The Citadel); retired Lt. Gen.
John Rosa (The Citadel); Brig. Gen. Harry Carter (The Citadel); Provost and Brig. Gen.
Sam Hines (The Citadel); Commandant of Cadets retired Col. Leo Mercado (The
Citadel); and Commandant of Cadets retired Col. Greg Stone (The Citadel).
Counseling Center Head retired Col. William Wilson (West Point) and retired Lt.
Col. Bob Byrne (West Point) were interviewed because they were essential to testing the
hypothesis regarding the Cadet Counseling Centers role at both institutions. The
Citadels director of The Cadet Counseling Center refused to be interviewed for this
34
research. Other college officials at The Citadel were asked additional questions about the
Cadet Counseling Center.
Additional interviews were conducted about West Point with retired Brig. Gen.
Howard Prince, former Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences & Leadership;
retired Brig. Gen. Lance Betros, former Head of the Department of History; retired Brig.
Gen. Barney Forsythe, former Vice Dean for Academics; retired Col. Larry Donnithorne,
former Special Assistant for Strategic Planning; retired Col. Scott Snook and retired Col.
Joe LeBoeuf, both former Professors in the Behavioral Science & Leadership
Department; and retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart, former Head of Strategic Planning for the
Commandant of Cadets.
Interviews were also conducted about The Citadel with retired Col. Joe Trez,
Director of the Krause Leadership Center and former Commandant and Chief of Staff of
the college; Col. Steve Nida, Head of the Department of Phycology; retired Lt. Col. Jeff
Weart, former Director of the Krause Leadership Center; and retired Command Sgt. Maj.
Sylvan Bauer, Command Sargent Major for the Commandants Department.
Data Analysis
The data was analyzed using qualitative research methods described in Creswell
(2007). The data was further organized and read to get an entire picture. The next step
from reading and memorizing the data was to describe, classify and interpret data into
codes and themes. The findings were analyzed using John Kotters (1995) eight stage
change method. Data was then interpreted and represented in charts for analysis.
35
Additional evidence from the case studies was analyzed to determine if the three
areas thought responsible for the organizational culture change at West Point (leadership
of the institution, tactical officers, cadet counseling center) were, in fact, responsible. In
The Citadels case study, the same three areas were analyzed (leadership of the
institution, tactical officers, and cadet counseling center) to see what role they played in
its incomplete organizational culture change
This evidence was triangulated with institutional documents to corroborate if
these three areas precipitated the change at West Point and how these three areas
impacted The Citadels attempted change. The data was recorded into a matrix for
analysis; this matrix appears in Appendix E (pp. 141-142). The results of the two case
studies were then compared. From this comparison a detailed set of conclusions and
recommendations emerged on how best to accomplish an organizational culture change
of the fourth class system at a military college.
Trustworthiness
In Creswells book, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design (2007), he equates
trustworthiness to the term validation: I use the term validation to emphasize a process
(see Angen, 2000), rather than verification or historical words such as trustworthiness and
authenticity (Creswell, 2007, p. 250). In this study, data from interviews were
transcribed, which helped insure accuracy. Triangulation was used to verify data
obtained from interviews. Debriefing occurred immediately after each interview to also
verify data (Creswell, 2007, p. 250).
36
Expertise and Background of the Researcher
I have served at West Point as a company and battalion TAC officer, where I dealt
directly with the fourth class system. I also served there as the officer in charge of cadet
discipline on the Commandants staff and as Assistant Professor of American Politics in
the Department of Social Sciences. I am currently employed at The Citadel as Assistant
Commandant for Personnel, Logistics, and Cadet Life, a position that also avails me the
opportunity to observe the fourth class system. This personal experience has shaped my
research and provides this study with a level of credibility and verification. It is
important to note, however, that I may hold some biases based upon my two assignments
at West Point and my current position at The Citadel.
Ethical Considerations
This research was conducted according to ethical considerations for qualitative
research (Creswell, 2007, p. 58-59). Permission was obtained from both colleges and all
participants were informed of the general purpose of the study and how the data would be
used. All perspectives were considered, including contrary findings.
There were no known risks at West Point. There was some risk, which is defined
below at The Citadel. The risks concerning The Citadel were three-fold: that the analysis
of the culture would be incorrect, and that The Citadel might not be receptive to feedback
(Schein, 1992, pp. 195-196). Also the risk concerning those members of the college that
might not handle well the findings about their own culture, and they also might not be
aware that they could be at risk once information about their organizational culture is
37
known outside of the college (Schein, 1992, pp. 197-198). To mitigate these risks
caution was been taken at The Citadel to explain the research to each participant in the
study and that confidentiality would not be granted. Two college administrators at The
Citadel refused to participate in the research. There have been no ethical issues
concerning the study.
Limitations of the Study
This study looked at John Kotters eight stage change methodology and three
specific areas, institutional leadership, role and education of the tactical officers, and the
Cadet Counseling Centers role in successful organizational culture change or an
incomplete change. These three areas were chosen because they appear to be the change
agents in West Points successful transition from an attritional/adversarial model to a
developmental model. This was determined from the findings in a pilot study, personal
observations, and a review of relevant literature. As such, the results may not represent
the entire scope of what caused organizational cultural change at West Point or the entire
scope of a change that did not happen at The Citadel.
The study will not evaluate the effectiveness of the developmental model either in
the military services or military colleges, although it is apparent that both West Point and
The Citadel are convinced of the developmental models value.
38
CHAPTER FOUR:
CASE STUDY OF WEST POINTS FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM:
SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE

The United States Military Academy, more commonly known as West Point, has
a long history of an attritional/adversarial fourth class system. In addition to producing
unacceptable abusive behavior and hazing at West Point, one observer notes that this
dysfunctional style of leadership has followed cadets into their Army careers
(Donnithorne, 1993). Abusive behavior is defined as uncaring, unhelpful and
disparaging behavior that did not rise to the level of hazing. The adversarial fourth
class system, however, was deeply rooted at West Point. Indeed, given the repeated
failed attempts at change, it appeared that by the 1980s, the odds of success of any
future reform were quite low (Donnithorne, 1993). To reverse this trend, an
organizational culture change at West Point would be required.
Table 4.1 depicts the governance organizational structure at West Point in 1990
and is provided to better understand the structure of West Point before its organizational
culture change:
39
Historical Incremental Change

The Superintendents and Commandant of Cadets were dissatisfied and frustrated
with the attritional/adversarial model. Top leaders of the Army agreed that the system
was responsible for disciplinary issues and poor leadership skills that followed future
Army officers and deterred their success (L. Donnithorne, personal communication,
40
October 16, 2013). At West Point, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Vuono were among the
Army leaders supporting change in these areas (Betros, 2012). In 1949, Chief of Staff of
the Army, Gen. Eisenhower, directed Superintendent Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor to
change the way West Point taught leadership:
During the war, Eisenhower had been introduced to the work of social scientists
on the Army staff who had conducted attitudinal surveys of soldiers. Some of the
studies suggested that American soldiers did not respect their officers because of
the latters poor leadership skills. Believing that the behavioral sciences could
improve leadership instruction at West Point, he gave Taylor clear guidance
(Betros, 2012, p. 247).
Taylor was unsuccessful in getting the Academic Board to teach Psychology, so he
created the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership (OMPL) and put it under the
Commandant of Cadets (Betros, 2012, p. 249). The Academic Board is comprised of the
department heads of the major academic departments and the Superintendent. The Board
played a huge role in West Points governance before World War II, but gradually lost
governance to the Superintendent after the war (Betros, 2012, p. 32).
Over the years, West Point had been able to make incremental changes to the
fourth class system, such as doing away with bracing in 1969 (B. Forsythe, personal
communication, October 14, 2013). Bracing, a much exaggerated form of attention,
requires cadets to stand rigidly with their backs arched as if trying to make their shoulder
blades touch, with their chins tucked into their necks, and their arms straight against their
sides. This military brace is an abnormal posture, which can cause Erbs palsy (Lain,
1969). The only military college that still authorizes bracing is The Citadel.
In 1969, West Point also conducted a major review of the fourth class system
(called Preliminary Evaluation of the Fourth Class System) at the direction of the
41
Commandant of Cadets Brig. Gen. Bernard Rogers. This evaluation concluded that the
fourth class system needed to remain challenging and accomplish the following:
socialization of cadets; equalization of cadets; identification of unsuitable cadets; and
development of leaders. It also revealed that the fourth class system needed to be
oriented primarily towards development, so the cadets could achieve their full potential
and be supported in their efforts by the leadership. The report stated: It would seem that
from the Academys mission of developing mature and independent officers, this initial
effort is counterproductive (A Preliminary Evaluation of the Fourth Class System,
USMA, 1969). Most of the changes to the fourth class system occurred on the periphery,
and little of the core of the system changed (Betros, 2012). Despite many studies
indicating that change was needed, there was no effective major change from 1920 to
1976 (Betros, 2012).
1976 to 1985: Enabling Change

Brig. Gen. Walter Ulmer was sent to West Point in 1975 to assume duties as
Commandant of Cadets, and one of his directives from the Chief of Staff of the Army
was to change the fourth class system (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8,
2013). Ulmer said: abuses of the fourth class system represent the greatest potential for
future public embarrassment of the Military Academy. We need to keep asking ourselves
the rational for everything we do within the fourth class system (Grove, 1989). Major
Howard Prince, who was in charge of the Cadet Counseling Center, informed Ulmer that
a majority of cadets left West Point during their freshman year because of the
42
attritional/adversarial fourth class system (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8,
2013). Ulmer agreed with Prince, but unfortunately two major issues would derail Ulmer
from accomplishing his fourth class system directive: the Electrical Engineering 304 (EE
304) cheating incident, and Congressional mandate allowing women to be admitted to
West Point (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; L. Betros, personal
communication, October 18, 2013).
EE 304 was a Physics class required for juniors at West Point. Each cadet was
given a take-home project to complete individually, without assistance. A large number
of cadets collaborated on the project, resulting in 152 cadets being dismissed from West
Point (Betros, 2012, p. 57). This caused a national incident involving both houses of
Congress. It also led to a major investigation of West Point by the Secretary of the
Army, who appointed a committee lead by Frank Borman. The Borman Commission
findings dealt with issues on West Points governance, which prompted the Chief of Staff
of the Army to initiate a study, the West Point Study Group (WPSG) (Betros, 2012, p.
59). One of the areas examined at by the WPSG was the fourth class system. The WPSG
report of 1977 noted: the difficulty in eliminating abuse but also with some fundamental
aspects of the system itself (West Point Study Group Report, p. 115). The report
recommended positive leadership, phased development of freshmen cadets, and realistic
senior-subordinate relationships like those found in the Army (Superintendents Annual
Report of 1980, p. 33).
The other issue that challenged Ulmer, but ultimately eased the path for change,
was the 1976 Congressional mandate that women be granted admission to West Point, a
43
move that the Army and West Point opposed (Betros, 2012). The Army worried that the
presence of women would make West Points old fourth class system become even more
unacceptable to the country (L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013).
Despite creating challenges, both the admission of women and the EE 304 cheating
incident set the stage for future change at West Point.
About this time, West Point received a new Superintendent, Gen. Andrew
Goodpaster, who returned from retirement to make changes recommended by the WPSG.
Goodpaster accepted almost all 156 recommendations of the WPSG, 30 of which dealt
with leader development (Betros, 2012, p. 252). In 1979, another study of the fourth
class system was conducted, called the Fourth Class Working Group. This study led to
additional positive leadership that improved summer attrition rates in the freshman class
(cadets who left during the summer training of their freshmen year), reducing it from
10.5% to 7.5% between 1977 and 1983 (Betros, 2012). Crucial to these early leadership
development changes, including the institutionalizing and educating tactical officers
(TACs) and cadets, was the Cadet Counseling Center (H. Prince, personal
communication, October 8, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March 28, 2013).
Change agents like Lt. Col. Howard Prince, Chief of the Cadet Counseling
Center, continued to encourage positive leadership. Prince left the Cadet Counseling
Center to take over the new academic department of Behavioral Science & Leadership
(BS&L), now placed under the Dean of Academics (H. Prince, personal communication,
October 8, 2013). Lt. Col. Will Wilson took over the Cadet Counseling Center and
continued Princes work, while Prince implemented leader development from the West
44
Points academic side in the 1970s and early 1980s. Prince and Wilson, from 1981 to
1986, continued to introduce leadership development at West Point in both the academic
curriculum and in military training, especially during new cadet basic training (H. Prince,
personal communication, October 8, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March
28, 2013). Although the changes by Prince and Wilson were incremental, they set the
foundation for the larger changes that would occur years later.
Gen. Willard Scott took over as Superintendent of West Point from Gen.
Goodpaster in 1981. He stabilized West Point after the many changes that resulted from
the cheating scandal and the admission of women (W. Wilson, personal communication,
March 28, 2013). This continued to set the stage for an organizational culture change
that would follow when Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer took over as Superintendent in 1986.
Palmer described the 1976 crisis as:
the storm that nearly sank the ship called West Point. To continue his metaphor,
one could say that the ship did not sink, fortunately, due to rather desperate efforts
to save it; but, it came through the storm badly in need of repairs before it could
again be seaworthy. These sizable tasks saving and repairing the ship fell to
General Palmers predecessors, Generals Andrew Goodpaster (1977-1981) and
Willard Scott (1981-1986). Their successful efforts prepared the ship to set sail
once again. But, on what course? (Donnithorne, 1991).
Organizational Culture Change Inception

Lt. Gen. Palmer had as much as 18 months to prepare for his role as
Superintendent of West Point (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013). In
addition, he knew that this assignment would be his final one in the U.S. Army; this had
been one of Gen. Goodpasters recommendations, and it was approved by the Army in
45
1977. This gave Palmer a five-year term followed by retirement so he could make lasting
changes at West Point without fearing consequences for promotion or his next
assignment (L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013).
When Palmer assumed duties as the Superintendent, he received no specific
guidance, tasks or missions from the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Carl Vouno.
Palmer knew that he had a limited time to implement changes, not only because of his
fixed five-year term, but also because West Point was experiencing a calm period, both
internally and externally. The Army, too, was experiencing a calm period in the world.
Such times did not come often, and Palmer felt a sense of urgency (D. Palmer, personal
communication, October 9, 2013):
The time of calm, which had permitted a period of affirmation and change, drew
to a close in the early 1990s. The window of opportunity began sliding shut. A
rising number of issues in which the Academy found itself embroiled
downsizing the Army and the Military Academy, extending the active duty
service obligation, investigating the service academies costs, and others were a
signal that the time of calm was over. The possibility that the window would
close abruptly had imposed urgency on the planning and the change process from
the beginning. That urgency had proved itself essential by the end (Donnithorne,
1991, pp. 10-11).
Any changes Palmer made would have to be well established before his term ended.
Palmer directed yet another series of studies that dealt with the fourth class
system and leader development (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).
The studies were to determine the purpose of West Point. The studies revealed that West
Points overriding purpose was to produce officers who were leaders of character for the
U.S. Army (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).
46
Facilitating a Leadership Development Model
Lt. Gen. Palmer confirmed from the studies he directed that West Point was a
leader development institution (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).
Palmers knowledge of West Points history and the reasons why other leaders there had
attempted to reform the fourth class system and add leadership development suggested to
him that West Point was not offering development opportunities for the upper class
cadets (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013). This allowed the upper
class cadets to concentrate on the fourth class cadets.
Palmer wanted a system that challenged the upper class cadets more than the
fourth class cadets. Army officers needed to be skilled in developing subordinates, and
Palmer felt that teaching the upper class these skills would also relieve the pressure on
the fourth class. Palmer visited Col. Howard Prince, Department Head of BS&L, to ask
for ideas and help in establishing a leadership development program for all four classes.
He then told the subordinate leaders at West Point (Dean of Academics Brig. Gen. Roy
Flint, Director of Athletics Carl Ullrich, and Commandant of Cadets Brig. Gen. Fred
Gordon) that everything they did in their areas would have to relate to leader
development. If it did not, then they were to discontinue the program or activity (D.
Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal
communication, October 16, 2013). Palmer discussed leader development in all meetings
and demanded that this vision be communicated to all stakeholders in the West Point
nation: all cadet programs and activities are intended ultimately to contribute to one
objective, leader development (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 68).
47
Tactical Officer Education System
Gen. Palmer also asked for help in educating tactical officers (TACs). TACs
went to universities around the country to receive masters degrees in counseling, not
leadership development. Palmer wanted them to receive degrees in leadership
development and directed Col. Prince to make this happen. He also appointed Prince to
chair a committee for the entire college that would recommend solutions and tie together
the many disparate leadership programs at West Point (D. Palmer, personal
communication, October 9, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013).
Cadet Schedule Modification

As part of his efforts, Palmer examined carefully the 24-hour schedule of the
cadets. In a military college, the 24-hour schedule is the one document that controls
cadet time. Palmer rebalanced the cadet 24-hour schedule so that leader development
played a prominent role; everything that was not related to leadership development was
purged from the schedule. Palmer insisted that he be kept informed about every item,
existing or planned, on the cadet schedule that was not connected with leadership
development. Furthermore, he demanded to see anyone who added anything to cadet
time that could not be tied to leadership development. Some circles at West Point viewed
Palmer as a radical for challenging the current system and forcing the college out of its
comfort zone.
Palmer recalled that after a number of lower grade officers had to report to him,
word spread quickly around the campus that he was serious about implementing
48
leadership development. Once, after hearing that the Physics Department was opposed to
his policy of lights-out at 2300 hours, because they required several all-night assignments
during the semester, Palmer asked the Head of the Physics Department to come see him.
Palmer remembers telling the Department Head that he might not know much about
teaching Physics, but why was it important to have cadets stay up all night 2-3 times a
semester? The Department Head replied that the General may not have realized it, but
that was the way Physics was taught. Palmer responded that in that case, the course
syllabus should specify that in order to pass the course, cadets would be required to stay
up all night 2-3 times during the semester. He also said that he hoped the course would
meet accreditation standards with this requirement. The Head of the Physics Department
then said that he would modify the course to require no further overnight work (D.
Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).
Palmer completely revised the cadet 24-hour schedule. He reduced the
curriculum to 40 courses, reduced class periods, and eliminated Saturday class periods.
Palmer felt that the cadets were overwhelmed with requirements and had no opportunity
to effectively accomplish them, let alone develop leadership skills: He then protected the
newfound time for approved uses, including weekend trips, passes, and activities that
formerly competed with academics during the weekdays (Betros, 2012). These changes
were necessary in order to incorporate leadership development fully into West Point.
49
Establishing a Leadership Integration Team
Palmer realized he would meet resistance internally and externally to his planned
changes for leader development. He also recognized that he could not himself supervise
the changes throughout West Point. He created the Office of Leader Development
Integration (OLDI) and staffed it with two highly talented Colonels, Will Wilson and
Steven Hammond (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013). Col.
Donnithorne was supposed to become an Assistant Dean of Academics, but Palmer
changed that assignment to Special Assistant to the Superintendent for Plans and Policy
(SASPP) (L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013). These two
offices would later merge together (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 63). Col. Wilson, who had
supported leader development at West Point for more than 10 years, replaced Prince at
the Cadet Counseling Center. The Office of Leader Development Integration was
essential for keeping the entire campus focused on the transition to a leader development
system (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal
communication, October 16, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March 28,
2013).
Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS)

Prince, Department Head of Behavioral Science & Leadership, had his
department work with others at West Point to design a new four year leader development
program (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; B. Forsythe, personal
50
communication, October 14, 2013). The new program was called Cadet Leader
Development System (CLDS, pronounced kleds):
CLDS provides the organizing framework around which the four years of the
West Point Experience are designed to achieve this noble end. Provisions of the
CLDS are directive in nature. ALL USMA and United States Corps of Cadets
(USCC) publications pertaining to the development of cadets as leaders of
character are subordinate to CLDS (CLDS, USMA Circular, 1-101, 1 August,
1993).
The CLDS system marked a significant change in organizational culture; it
completely replaced the attritional/adversarial fourth class system with a system
consisting of four distinct classes (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).
For more than 100 years, the fourth class system had really recognized only two classes
the fourth class and the upper class (S. Snook, personal communication, October 16,
2013). The upper class interacted with the fourth class through an attritional/adversarial
system, leading to abusive behavior and hazing. The new CLDS system was designed to
engage all four classes by increasing expectations every year. Essentially, this replaced
the old attritional/adversarial system with a mandated four year leadership development
model (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal
communication, March 28, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16,
2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; B. Forsythe, personal
communication, October 14, 2013). Brig. Gen. Bramlett explained the Cadet Leader
Development System to the Board of Visitors (BOV) in this way:
The Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS) is an evolutionary program and
is an outgrowth of several studies done on the fourth class system during 1989.
General Bramlett pointed out that essentially CLDS codified the requirements for
each class in a single document. Not only is there still a fourth class system, but
there are also third, second, and first class systems. General Bramlett pointed out
51
that CLDS was more of a change for the upper classes than the fourth class. He
noted the Class of 1991 was exceptional in its acceptance and implementation of
CLDS. The Class of 1992 was uneven in its acceptance when they were the
second class but are much more positive now that they are leading the Corps. He
noted in conclusion that the plebe year remains tough and stressful, and by design
teaches self-discipline, subordination and selflessness. The remaining three years
build on that foundation with the development process intensifying as cadets
assume leadership roles by position and class (BOV Annual Report, 1991).
Table 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the changes in cadet development under the
attritional/adversarial fourth class system and the four class system under CLDS. It
clearly demonstrates that under CLDS, all classes are developed for a post-graduation
environment, as opposed to just freshmen under the fourth class system:
52
Table 4.3: Cadet Development Under the CLDS
.
(BOV Annual Report, 1991).
Under the new CLDS system, if an upper class cadet was not successfully
developing and caring for their subordinates, then that cadet might fail in their own
leadership development. This shifted the burden from the fourth class to the upper class,
which was challenged with increasing responsibilities as they progressed through West
Point (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal
communication, March 28, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16,
2013; B. Forsythe, personal communication, October 14, 2013). Developing and
caring were defined in CLDS as:
Subordinate development is a chain of command responsibility. Cadet leaders are
responsible for the accomplishment of developmental goals at each level within
53
the chain of command. This requires that all cadet leaders recognize their
responsibility to instruct, to coach, to counsel and to correct subordinates. Cadet
leaders must set the example. They must enforce standards and/or regulations.
They must help subordinates realize their developmental goals. And, when
necessary, they must learn how to make constructive, on-the spot corrections. In
addition to these general responsibilities shared by all cadet leaders, CLDS is
based on recognition that certain groups of cadets have specific responsibilities
that derive from their level within the rank hierarchy. Cadet officers, for example,
bear responsibility for the development of cadet non-commissioned officers
within their chain of command. Similarly, cadet NCOs exercise primary
responsibility for the development of Cadet Corporals, while Cadet Corporals are
responsible to develop Cadet Privates in their chain of command. The success of
this system rests on the extent to which leaders at each echelon do, indeed, set the
example. Subordinates cannot be held to higher standards than their leaders.
(CLDS, USMA Circular, 1-101, 1 August 1993).
CLDS was so thorough and detailed that even Superintendent Palmer was
involved at the lowest levels of the Corps of Cadets. Palmer, Prince, Wilson,
Donnithorne, and Forsythe all described the planning done for sophomores, which are
called yearlings at West Point. The yearlings were their biggest concern, since they
had no special responsibilities so they often bothered freshmen, referred to at West Point
as plebes. They designed a program in which every sophomore was promoted to
Corporal and assigned a number of freshmen as subordinates to develop, train, and
educate. Detailed expectations were provided to the sophomores. In order for them to
successfully pass, they had to meet high standards for tracking the successful
development of their subordinates.
The same conditions applied to the juniors, or second class cadets. They were all
promoted to Sergeants and had increasing responsibility for freshmen and sophomores.
All seniors, or first year cadets, were promoted to Cadet Officers and had increasing
responsibility for the development of the three lower classes (D. Palmer, personal
54
communication, October 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March 28, 2013;
L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013; B. Forsythe, personal
communication, October 14, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013).
USMA Circular 1-101 was a 79-page document that described specific
requirements for each class but concentrated on the upper class. This focused the
attention on the upper class to perform in a developmental system:
Information concerning leader development comes from two primary sources.
First, program directors evaluate cadet performance in their respective programs
(Academic, Military, and Physical). Scores in each program are combined by
prescribed procedures to produce a Cadet Performance Score that reflects relative
development performance. This score forms a basis for sequencing for branch
selection and for graduation sequence numbers. Second, whole person reviews of
performance across programs at specified checkpoints during Third Class
(sophomore), Second Class (junior), and First Class (senior) Year identify cadets
with particular developmental needs. These reviews culminate in identification of
Cadets of Concern (CLDS, USMA Circular 1-101, 1 August 1993).
The document also prescribed roles and responsibilities for everyone at West Point, not
just cadets.
The new CLDS system was briefed throughout the campus and everyone at West
Point was expected to understand and follow it. Prince observed that if he asked a Math
professor what his/her role at West Point was, the answer should be a leadership
developer (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013). The West Point
Board of Visitors (BOV) in its 1989 report approved the organizational culture change
and made the following statement:
The Board agrees that the adoption of a four-year development system will be
much more comprehensive than the old fourth class system and there is
consensus among the Board that the fourth class system focused disproportionate
attention on freshmen cadets at the expense of the upper three classes. Based on
presentations received from members of the staff and faculty, the Board concludes
55
that the proposed changes should inhibit demeaning and humiliating treatment of
subordinates and foster responsibility and maturity in upperclassmen, while
continuing to insure that the USMA experience is tough and challenging for all
cadets. We particularly commend the new system of leadership development,
which emphasizes increasing responsibility in the command structure as the cadet
advances during each of the upper three years (BOV Annual Report, 1989).
Scrambling vs. the Cohort Model

Scrambling is a term used to describe the random assignment of cadets from
one company to another company. From about 1960 until 1984, West Point usually
scrambled cadets after their freshmen year. After the Army began its cohort model, West
Point followed the Armys lead, and in 1985 began keeping cadets in the same cadet
company (Donnithorne, 1991). But the cohort model presented West Point with serious
issues that pressured Lt. Gen. Palmer to return to the scrambling model:
the sustainment in some companies of norms contrary to those of the
institution. Once begun, such dysfunctional norms tended to become entrenched
rather than to dissipate from year-to-year. That problem would be improved by
scrambling, as cadets would find themselves in new companies associating with
other cadets who had experienced dissimilar company norms and would be more
likely to fall back upon institutional norms as their common ground for behavior
(Donnithorne, 1991, p. 32).
Another reason for the strong push for to return to scrambling was because:
Under the cohort system, the friendships among upperclassmen in a company
developed over a long period and could conflict with the leader-subordinate
relationships. When cadets resolved the conflict in favor of the friendship, the
opportunity to gain in the practice of leadership was foregone. However, it was
noted that, by one scramble of a cadet class between their Third and Second Class
year, the relationships between all classes in a company at the beginning of the
academic year would be uncomplicated by former, long-standing friendships.
The First Class would not know the Second, the Second would not know the
Third, and none of them would know the Fourth (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 32).
56
Palmer made the decision to scramble the second class, calling this the Leader
Distribution Plan (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 32).
Leadership Development Masters Degree

Palmer wanted the tactical officers to attend graduate school in leadership
development (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; H. Prince, personal
communication, October 8, 2013). Col. Barney Forsythe was tasked by Prince to develop
a TAC officer masters degree in leadership development. After researching programs
throughout the country, Forsythe found no such degree at any college or university (B.
Forsythe, personal communication, October 14, 2013). He found leadership degrees at
universities, but none specifically in leadership development (B, Forsythe, personal
communication, October 14, 2013). Most leadership degrees in colleges were tied to a
MBA program or management degree and consisted of courses about general leadership,
pretty much just knowledge transfer (J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, November
27, 2013).
Palmer was informed of this problem and told Prince that West Point should
develop its own masters degree in leadership development (D. Palmer, personal
communication, October 9, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013;
L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013). West Point then designed a
masters program in leadership development that included curriculum in counseling,
student development, and leader development (J. LeBoeuf, personal communication,
March 21, 2013). Col. Joe LeBoeuf described the development of the program:
57
The challenge in this program was to insure that the students had a rigorous,
world-class, ACADEMIC experience [not just a trade-school experience], but an
experience that was also practically related to the mission of the Academy, and
the purpose for their roles to develop cadets as leaders of character an
educational process; not just a training mission. The TACs were the key engines
for driving a leader [intrapersonal: individual development], and leadership
[interpersonal: collective/collaborative] development culture at the Academy that
was in line with what we know about human development. (J. LeBoeuf, email,
February 22, 2014).
The most important courses in the masters program were: an advanced leadership
theory course, an organizational change theory course, an organizational culture course, a
course in moral/ethical/intellectual development and a course on the history of West
Point with the Department of History. In addition, many speakers came to talk to
students about their areas of expertise. This curriculum was designed to insure that TACs
understood leadership and development concepts so they could use these concepts to
change the culture in their cadet companies (J. LeBoeuf, personnel communication,
February 22, 2014). LeBoeuf explained that the TACs were viewed as change agents
who had to be able to assess human and organizational behavior, change the behavior as
required, and then affect a culture that would reinforce and sustain the changes and
desired behavior over time (J. Leboeuf, email, February 22, 2014).
In the early years of the program, students had to write a thesis and take a difficult
oral exam. Later, the thesis requirement was dropped, but the oral exam requirement was
retained. Students also had to conduct a major study of the cadet development culture
and summarize the results in a presentation to the Commandant. Throughout the program
the students had to demonstrate mastery of course materials through writing papers and
presentations. At times, there were TACs who failed to complete the program and were
58
not granted the degree or allowed to continue as TACs. (J. LeBoeuf, personnel
communication, February 22, 2014).
The program received accreditation and West Point started granting master
degrees for TACs. Palmer, Prince, Forsythe, Donnithorne, LeBoeuf, and Wilson all
considered this a seminal element in West Points new leadership development system.
Palmer even viewed this TAC officer education as training for future battalion and
brigade commanders (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013).
In 1992, Congress told the Army that they could no longer grant masters degrees
in leader development. West Point eventually developed a program with nearby
Columbia University to grant masters degrees in leadership development (L. Betros,
personal communication, October 18, 2013; J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March
21, 2013). Now called the Eisenhower Fellowship at West Point, this program is unique:
Columbia University teaches the counseling and the student development pieces and
West Point teaches the leadership development piece (J. LeBoeuf, personal
communication, November 27, 2013). Interestingly, the U.S. Air Force Academy, which
adapted nearly all of West Points leader development system, has a similar program with
the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (J. LeBoeuf, personal communication,
November 27, 2013).
Adjustments for the Fourth Class

Once Palmer had all of West Point focused on leader development, he then made
changes to the fourth class system traditions in the Corps of Cadets (L. Donnithorne,
personal communication, October 16, 2013). Under his instruction:
59
the Academy faculty explored every aspect of the cadets four year experience.
Each element was scrutinized and, in some cases, altered, to ensure that it
contributed to a coherent framework for leadership development. Examined
thusly, the shortcomings of the Fourth Class System became more and more
apparent and were reported in findings of two different review committees
(Donnithorne, 1993, p. 155).
Because of the new leadership development education and training, upper class cadets
began to experience a transformation in self-image (Donnithorne, 1993). For the
first time in West Points history, cadets began to think of themselves more as
developing leaders than purveyors of a harsh but necessary plebe system (Donnithorne,
1993). The fourth class system adopted new purpose:
1. to promote leader development (including followership),
2. to facilitate transition from civilian life into military life and organizations,
3. to promote development of military attributes (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 36).
Palmer then asked the Corps of Cadets to do away with everything in the
freshman year that had nothing to do with leader development (D. Palmer, personal
communication, October 9, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16,
2013). Such changes included plebe knowledge, where freshmen memorized facts about
the U.S. Army instead of useless data (Engen, n.d.). Plebe knowledge was just one of
many areas that were changed or eliminated from the fourth class system. The cadets
themselves recommended eliminating plebe traditions that played no role in leader
development.
In a July 1990 memorandum for activity directors and department heads,
Commandant of Cadets Gen. David Bramlett elaborated on five areas of changes that
related to the fourth class: bearing, duties, cadet dining hall, discipline, and knowledge.
60
Bramlett concluded his memorandum by stating: We owe it to our cadets and the nation
to provide a developmental experience that is consistent with the highest standards of
professionalism. I am confident that the initiatives addressed herein will help move us
closer to that objective (USCC Memorandum, 1990). The key to Palmers success in
making changes was that Instead of trying, as his predecessors had done, to force cadets
to obey rules they did not believe in, he instead led them to believe in the new rules
(Donnithorne, 1993).
Palmer also moved up the timing of fourth class recognition to before Spring
Leave. Recognition at military colleges is when the freshmen are officially
acknowledged by the other classes as being fully trained. This means knowing all the
duties and responsibilities of a member in the Corps of Cadets and being considered a full
members of the Corps. Recognition completely changes the tone and attitudes toward the
fourth class. After recognition, the fourth class system is no longer in effect, but fourth
class duties still must be performed (Donnithorne, 1993).
Finally, after 30 years of incremental change, the Corps accepted Palmers
changes, though it took about four years for full implementation of the leader
development system to take effect (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013;
L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013). In 1991, West Point reported to
the BOV that the new four class system was more successful than anticipated. West
Point based this on indicators such as counseling feedback, faculty observations, and
nightly reports written by commissioned officers in charge of the cadet barracks that
61
documented any issues in the Corps of Cadets during the night (BOV Annual Report,
1991).
Leadership Change and Preserving Organizational Culture Change

During times of any organizational culture change, sustaining the change is as
important as the change itself. Palmer knew this, and before his time as Superintendent
was finished, he talked with the Chief of Staff of the Army about the selection of his
replacement. He said that it was critical that his replacement understood the culture
change that had occurred at West Point from an attritional/adversarial model to a
leadership developmental model. He further requested that his replacement support and
sustain all the changes that were required to affect this organizational culture change (D.
Palmer, personnel communication, October 9,2013). The Army Chief of Staff agreed and
selected as the next Superintendent, Lt. Gen. Howard Graves, who supported and added
to the changes made during Palmers tenure (BOV Annual Report, 1995). Palmer also
ensured that the integration office (OLDI) remained after his departure to facilitate the
new Superintendent with sustaining the changes (D. Palmer, personal communication,
October 9, 2013).
Major Strides in West Points Organizational Culture Change

As Palmers tenure at West Point ended in 1991, several major strides in West
Points organizational culture change were in place:
1. the Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS) was introduced;
62
2. the new Tactical Officer Education System required company tactical officers
to obtain a masters degree in leadership development before starting the job;
3. the entire West Point community agreed that its main mission was that of
leadership development
(L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013; S. Snook,
personal communication, October 16, 2013; B. Forsythe, personal
communication, October 14, 2013; J. Weart, personal communication,
October 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March 28, 2013; J.
LeBoeuf, personal communication, March 21, 2013; H. Prince, personal
communication, October 8, 2013; D. Palmer, personal communication,
October 9, 2013; B. Byrne, personal communication, March 20, 2013; L.
Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013; G. Stone, personal
communication, September 13, 2013).
Sustaining Organizational Culture Change

It is important to learn if West Point was able to sustain its organizational culture
change. In a 1995 report to the BOV, Superintendent Lt. Gen. Graves maintained that:
The Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS), though less visible, is an equally
dramatic departure from past practices. It provides an overarching framework for
integrating and organizing cadet leader development experiences and, since leader
development is central to the Academys purpose, this change means that CLDS
affects every program at West Point. As perhaps its most noticed effect, it has
eliminated most of the demeaning and counterproductive features of the old
Plebe system (BOV Annual Report, 1995).
In the same year, the Commandant of Cadets Gen. St. Onge explained to the BOV how
CLDS focused on leader development: It is oriented on the cadets and the environment
in which they serve as young officers. I am convinced it is relative to the needs of the
Army (BOV Annual Report, 1995).
In 2003, the Cadet Leader Development System was still in place at West Point
and had been greatly improved upon since its beginning in 1990 (G. Stone, personal
communication, September 13, 2013). Col. Greg Stone, the Brigade Tactical Officer
63
(BTO) in 2003, noted significant changes from his time as a cadet in the 1970s, a TAC in
the 1980s, and upon returning as BTO in 2003. The CLDS system that had been in the
development stages when he left in the 1980s was fully operational when he returned in
2003, and improvements were made each year to keep it relevant (G. Stone, personal
communication, September 13, 2013). This view was confirmed by others, such as Lt.
Col. Jeff Weart, the first TAC officer to receive a masters degree in leader development;
Col. Joe Leboeuf, Special Assistant to the Commandant of Cadets and a Behavioral
Science and Leadership Professor who was in charge of the TAC masters education
program in 2003; and Lt. Col. Bob Byrne, Director of the Cadet Counseling Center (J.
LeBeouf, personal communication, March 21, 2013; J. Weart, personal communication,
October 9, 2013; B. Byrne, personal communication, March 20, 2013). All reported that
when they departed West Point around 2005, CLEDS was still going strong.
In addition, an April 2005 review of the West Point Circular 1-101-1 revealed that
the core concept started in 1990 was still present in 2005 (Cadet Leader Development
System, 2005). In the introduction of the circular, Superintendent Lt. Gen. William
Lennox called CLDS a developmental process that will prepare cadets to lead soldiers in
war and peace (Cadet Leader Development System, 2005). In 2013, retired Col. Art
Coumbe, a Social Science Professor, reported that CLDS was still successful, and there
was little evidence of the abusive behavior and hazing caused by the old fourth class
system (A. Coumbe, personal communication, March 3, 2013).
All those interviewed for this research noted that the change in tactical officer
education was one of the primary means of affecting and sustaining West Points
64
organizational culture change (J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March 21, 2013).
Retired Col. Joe LeBoeuf maintains that the tactical officer education program was
critical to the success of the leader developmental system (J. LeBoeuf, personal
communication, March 21, 2013). This also was confirmed in interviews with retired
Col. Greg Stone, retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart, and retired Col. Scott Snook. Even in 1992,
when Congress stopped West Point from granting masters degrees, West Point
recognized the critical importance of the program and arrangements were made for
Columbia University to offer the leadership development degree to future TAC officers
(J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March 21, 2013).
The Cadet Counseling Center (CCC) has also been also a key component in
sustaining West Points organizational culture change. This is particularly true during
new cadet basic training, when new cadets have their highest attrition. Lt. Col. Bob
Byrne said that the Center played a significant role in identifying and working with
cadets who had trouble in the initial stages of their cadet careers. During the summers,
the Center helped cadet commanders retain new freshmen cadets. The Center helped
cadets create conditions that fostered a positive environment, which focused on caring for
subordinate cadets and making the cadet company the best possible environment.
Lt. Col. Byrne also stated that the Cadet Counseling Center had always been a
developmental asset (B Byrne, personal communication, March 20, 2013). This view
was reiterated by other interviewees, including Gen. Prince, Col. Stone, and Lt. Col.
Weart). The Center was the one avenue that West Point used to introduce development
concepts to the Corps until CLDS was established (Will Wilson, personnel
65
communication, March 28, 2013). The Center continued to be a development asset after
the West Points organizational change. It became a place where all cadets would reflect
on how their leadership techniques could be further improved as well as address issues
such as mental wellness (B. Byrne, personal communication, 24 February, 2014).
Effectiveness of Organizational Culture Change for West Point and the Army
This case study has outlined and noted the benefits of West Points organizational
culture change from an attritional/adversarial system to a leader developmental system.
What, though, indicates that this organizational culture change is better for the U.S.
Army? As stated by Col. Scott Snook, a former Behavioral Science & Leadership
professor and now a professor at the Harvard Business School, it is difficult to counter a
Vietnam veteran who says that his attritional/adversarial freshman year was one of the
things that enabled him to survive in a prisoner of war camp in Vietnam (S, Snook,
personal communication, October 16, 2013). Despite this, all the behavioral sciences
research indicates that if your mission is to produce leaders of character, then a
developmental system will help you accomplish that. More specifically, there are three
compelling reasons that suggest that the leader development system implemented by
West Point in 1990 made significant positive changes in the Army.
The first is that the Army itself departed from the attritional/adversarial system of
leadership long ago. The Army had realized that the leadership learned by cadets under
this system would have to be unlearned as Army officers, because it was abusive and
would not command the respect of soldiers (D. Palmer, personal communication, October
66
9, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; W. Wilson, personal
communication, March 28, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13,
2013; J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March 21, 2013; J. Weart, personal
communication, October 9, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16,
2013).
Secondly, as Lt. Gen. Palmer maintained, the mere existence of the Cadet Leader
Development System after 22 years indicates its benefit to the Army, because no system
lasts that long in the Army if it is not successful (D. Palmer, personal communication,
October 9, 2013). Col. Scott Snook, who conducted annual assessments of West Point
officers by interviewing Army battalion and brigade commanders, stated that over a
period of years, abusive officer behaviors were not an issue among West Point graduates
(S. Snook, personal communication, October 16, 2013). In contrast, some of the best
leaders the U.S. Army ever produced, among them MacArthur and Eisenhower,
recognized the need for change among West Point graduates produced under the
attritional/adversarial system, because they were not satisfied with the leadership skills
the graduates displayed (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013). The
Army is the reason that West Point exists and thus, the fact that West Point functions
under a leader development system indicates that this system benefits the Army. All of
the West Point officers interviewed for this research agreed with this.
Thirdly, the benefits of the organizational culture change were apparent at West
Point almost immediately. Abusive behavior toward freshmen that was previously
deemed acceptable among the cadets under the attritional/adversarial system was now
67
considered unacceptable. Col. Donnithorne noticed that upper class cadets made
corrections among themselves, and peer pressure in the Corps itself was a positive
influence among cadets. He further noted that freshmen learned more quickly under the
new system, citing as an example the first day that new cadets arrive at West Point (L.
Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013). In the past, new cadets were
barely able to put on their uniforms on the first day, let alone march in the first days
parade. Under the new developmental system however, with the absence of yelling and
harassment, new cadets are able to concentrate on the tasks at hand and are almost in step
during the first days parade (Donnithorne, 1993, p. 157).
Interestingly, the data on freshmen who resigned during new cadet training also
supports the success of the new leader development system. In the past, many cadets
identified poor leadership as the key to their decision to leave, but after the
developmental system was in place, the rate of resignation during new cadet training
decreased from 40 to only two to three, thus reducing attrition (Donnithorne, 1993, p.
158).
Those interviewed for this research in the 2000s stated that there was little hazing
or abusive behavior that was ingrained in the Corps after the culture change. Col.
Coumbe related the same based on his discussions about the leader development system
among cadets in 2013 (A, Coumbe, personal communication, March 3, 2013).

When reading a summary of how organizational culture change occurred at West
Point, one might conclude that it was a smooth process and wonder why West Point did
68
not make the change 100 years earlier. The reality is that there was strong resistance
from staff, faculty, alumni, and cadets to organizational culture change during Gen.
Palmers tenure (D. Palmer, personal communication, October, 9, 2013; W. Wilson,
personal communication, March 28, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October
8, 2013).
Col. Wilson and Gen. Prince remember receiving letters from fellow alumni
saying that they no longer recognized them as classmates. Gen. Palmer stated that he had
to create a sense of urgency, since many did not agree with him that change was needed.
Many believed that West Point traditions and methods had produced outstanding officers
for the Army in the past 100 years. They viewed the changes as being soft and worried
that they placed in jeopardy the outstanding service to the nation that West Point
provided (D. Palmer, personal communication, October, 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal
communication, March 28, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013;
S. Snook, personal communication, October 16, 2013).
Palmer recalled dealing with Department Heads who resisted some of his
changes. He said that they acted with malice and forethought to undermine his
policies, and admitted that they were doing a fairly decent job of it (Betros, 2012).
Palmer threatened to use a tenure review process to look at professors who resisted the
organizational culture change. The tenure review process had been established by the
Chief of Staff of the Army in the late 1970s as part of reforms to West Point. The
previous Superintendent Gen. Scott did not use the process, but Palmer announced that he
would use it (Betros, 2012). As it turned out, Palmer never had to convene a review
69
board; many professors recognized the inevitability of change and retired, allowing
Palmer to retain professors who supported his changes (Betros, 2012).
A Lengthy Path to Full Implementation

As a 1992 General Accounting Office report states, the organizational culture
change at West Point did not take place overnight (Stokan, 1994). The report notes that
the new Cadet Leadership Development System did reduce inappropriate treatment, but
some forms of hazing continued. It further stated that this was partly because the cadets
did not accept all of the changes and that organizational culture change would take time
to become institutionalized (Stokan, 1994). Lt. Gen. Graves, the Superintendent after
Palmer, told the West Point community in 1994, at the five year mark of the Cadet
Leadership Development System, that maintaining it would require everyone at West
Point to keep working to support it (Stokan, 1994).
Resources Needed for Organizational Culture Change

Palmer recalls that West Point did not ask the Army for any extra resources, such
as money or people, to make the organizational culture change (D. Palmer, personal
communication, October, 9, 2013). Palmer stated, though, that he did have to realign a
few resources within West Point. He created the Office of Leader Development
Integration and staffed it with officers from other West Point offices. He also assigned
many extra projects and duties, such as having Col. Howard Prince, Department Head of
Behavioral Science & Leadership, head-up the four class leader development system and
70
develop the new TAC officer education program in leader development. This
realignment of internal resources allowed Palmer to introduce organizational culture
change at West Point.
Leaders Leading Organizational Culture Change

Brig. Gen. Betros summed up the organizational culture change at West Point by
saying that MacArthur, Taylor, Davidson, and Goodpaster all contributed to the change,
but if anyone would win the Nobel Prize, it would be Lt. Gen. Palmer, who brought the
change to fruition (L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013). Betros
added that while these initiatives were neither perfect nor a panacea, they allowed West
Point to become a true leader development institution, as opposed to an unforgiving
crucible in which to prove oneself fit for leadership (2012). Col. Donnithorne
maintained that all previous attempts to reform the attritional/adversarial fourth class
system at West Point were managerial, in contrast to Palmers leadership of the
organizational culture change from the top. Donnithorne added that most of the previous
attempts to change the culture at West Point focused on the rules rather than the culture,
and he noted that Palmer was well aware of this when he attempted the organizational
culture change (L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013).
The following Table summarizes the changes in values and norms that occurred
during Palmers 1990 attempt at organizational culture change at West Point:
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Table 4.4: Changes in Values and Norms
CADETS
AFTER
BEFORE
-
Challenge new cadets (adversarial)
Develop new cadets
Eliminate weak cadets (attritional)

Assumes some are not worthy to stay
Determined by cadets (paternal)
Develop all new cadets

Assumes all cadets who have been
accepted are worthy to stay and
succeed
One class developed (freshman/plebes)

All upper classes have adversarial and
attritional attitude toward the freshmen,
leading to dysfunctional, fraternal
behavior
Four classes developed (freshman,

sophomore, junior, senior)
All upper classes are held accountable
for their own development and
subordinates development
A culture of development established
Leadership development reinforced
An inward-focused West Point

leadership model
Determined by cadets
FACULTY AND STAFF

BEFORE TAC OFFICER EDUCATION
-
Masters Degree in Counseling
Only cadets and TAC Officers in

charge of 4th class system
A new external-focused Army

post-graduation leadership model
(CLDS)
AFTER TAC OFFICER EDUCATION

-
Masters Degree in Leader

Development
-All Staff and Faculty in charge of
extensive, comprehensive four class
system
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CASE STUDY OF THE CITADELS FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM:
ATTEMPTING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE

In its advertising and mission statement, The Citadel defines itself as a leadership
development institution: The Citadel takes pride in educating the Whole Person
mind, body, and spirit and the cadet lifestyle is an important aspect of this educational
processdeveloping principled leaders in all walks of life since 1842 (The Citadel,
http:///www.citadel.edu/ root/corps-of-cadets). In this statement, The Citadel clearly
articulates its responsibility to develop its cadets in areas other than academic. Fulfilling
this responsibility, however, has presented challenges to The Citadel (J. Rosa, personal
communication, November 14, 2013; J. Grinalds, personal communication, September
24, 2013; H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013; S. Hines, personal
communication, September 25, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13,
2013; J Weart, personal communication, October 9, 2013). Many maintain that the
fourth class system imposed on The Citadels cadets has created these challenges.
Like all military colleges, The Citadel requires cadets to live in a barracks setting
under a 24-hour schedule and separates them into a four classes. The incoming freshmen
are called fourth class cadets or knobs, sophomores are called third class cadets,
juniors second class cadets, and seniors first class cadets. Cadets receive privileges
based on this class system and their individual rank within the system. For example,
73
cadet rank holders administer 100-cadet companies each, and so have significant control
over the lives of their subordinate cadets (The White Book, 2013-2014).
According to the 2009-2010 Fourth Class Manual, the fourth class system was
designed to: provide a base upon which a fourth class cadet may develop those qualities
essential to a good leader. It is dedicated to the principle that no one is fit to lead who
has not learned to follow. The system requires mental preparedness, physical
conditioning, and self-discipline, and is conducted with impartiality. In order for this
type of system to succeed, however, it is essential that all cadets be treated with value and
respect. When this does not occur, the entire fabric of the institution changes (J. Rosa,
personal communication, November 14, 2013), causing a breakdown in cadet morale and
discipline (The Citadel, www.citadel.edu/root/corps-of-cadets). An attritional/adversarial
fourth class system enables abuse, such as hazing of freshmen, which in turn, leads to a
lack of value and respect throughout the Corps of Cadets (The fourth class manual,
2009-2010).
The Citadel has long had an attritional/adversarial fourth class system, enabling
abusive behavior and hazing throughout its history (Report to the President (Whitmire
Report), 1968; Report of the Fourth Class System (Mood Report), 1980; Report of the
Fourth Class System Inquiry (Lane Report), 1991; Jenkins Report, 1997; Enhancement
Initiatives (The Mace Plan), 1997; Institutional Program Assessment Committee
(IPAC) Final Report, 2012). The Citadel is not alone in this; all other U.S. military
colleges in the country have faced similar challenges.
74
In the 1950s, society became less tolerant of abusive behavior and hazing. This
created external and internal pressure at The Citadel, which acknowledged that the fourth
class system required study and change (H. Carter, personal communication, September
9, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Starting in the 1960s,
several fourth class system commissions (Whitmire, Mood, Lane, Jenkins, Mace Plan,
IPAC) were developed at The Citadel; they produced a series of reports on reforming the
fourth class system. Some changes were made to regulations, but there was little change
in the culture and behavior of the Corps of Cadets (Macaulay, 2011).
1979 - 1997: Preserving the Status Quo

Retired Vice Admiral James Stockdale became The Citadels President in 1979.
Stockdale, a Vietnam prisoner of war, a Medal of Honor recipient recognized for his
leadership in the prison camps, and a published scholar, came to The Citadel after serving
as President of the Naval War College. He quickly realized that the fourth class system
had been blown up in the minds of mature men to be the prime status symbol of the
college (Macaulay, 2011). Stockdale came to The Citadel hoping to improve academics,
but spent most of his energy as President trying to eliminate the hazing that grew out of
the fourth class attritional/adversarial system (Macaulay, 2011).
In 1980, Stockdale commissioned a study of alumni that recommended many
changes; the report was named after its Chairman, Dr. Frank Mood. The Mood Report
recommended 21 modifications to the fourth class system. This report caused great
controversy among the alumni, many of whom were state legislators (Macaulay, 2011).
75
The report recommended that the fourth class system be academically and physically
demanding and rigorous, but should be predicated on individual interest, respect, and
goodwill, and should scrupulously avoid discrimination, harassment, physical abuse and
obscenity/vulgarity (1980). The Mood Reports most controversial recommendations
were the following:
Completely reevaluate the purposes and the content of the fourth class
indoctrination week with a view to decreasing its tempo and concentrating on
those relatively few requirements which must be handled early in the freshmen
experience. Many of those requirements now crammed into that first week could
very easily be handled at a later date. Terminate the Fourth Class System at
Corps Day and incorporate a formal recognition ceremony as part of the Corps
Day activities. Eliminate all Fourth Class System activities in the mess hall, with
the exception of instruction in good manners. We consider that the upper
class/fourth class relationship in the mess hall should be one which produces an
atmosphere conducive to relaxed dinning. Limit the time prior to scheduled
formations that fourth classmen must fall in to two minutes prior to assembly.
This should be sufficient for proper inspection and issuance of such instructions
as are deemed necessary (Fourth Class System (Mood Report), 1980).
Stockdale supported the recommendations and was able to convince a reluctant
Board of Visitors (BOV), comprised of South Carolina residents and graduates of the
college, to approve the recommendations. Doing this, though, cost Stockdale all his
political capital with the BOV. Despite their approval, the BOV was concerned about
Stockdales governance of The Citadel (Macaulay, 2011). Their dissatisfaction spread to
the Corps of Cadets. Stockdale made some changes to the fourth class system and tried
to change the culture, but was overcome by resisters.
Walter Fraser, a former professor at The Citadel, summarized the schools attitude
at the dawning of the 1980s by stating that Stockdales failure to minimize hazing, to
change the schools macho image, to attract scholarly students and to reorganize the
76
command structure stemmed largely from his inability to overcome the fact that he was
neither a graduate of the institution nor a southerner (Macaulay, 2011). Stockdale
resigned as President in less than a year, citing issues with the BOV: Ive resigned, and
the reason is simple. Im just tired of hassling with the Board of Visitors over every
change in status quo Ive tried to makeThe forces of the status quo were marshaled and
they won. Stockdale furthermore commented that The Citadel was locked in pre-Civil
War concrete (Macaulay, 2011).
Major General James Grimsley replaced Admiral Stockdale as President in 1980,
and he dismantled many of the changes that the Mood Report recommended for the
fourth class system. This ensured that the fourth class system at The Citadel would
remain attritional/adversarial, thus no major changes occurred during Grimsleys
presidency. The stakeholders of The Citadel were satisfied with the status quo
(Macaulay, 2011).
Maj. Gen. Grimsley retired in 1989 and was replaced by retired Lt. Gen. Claudius
Watts as Interim President. The Citadel that Watts inherited enjoyed a good reputation
externally, but internally was plagued by racial tension, resistance to the admission of
women, and problems stemming from the fourth class system. Watts commissioned
another fourth class study, the Lane Report (Macaulay, 2011). Like the Mood Report,
this report recommended modifying the fourth class system (Report of the Fourth Class
(Lane Report), 1991). The most significant changes recommended were:
The Fourth Class System must emphasize positive leadership, gentlemanly
conduct, and the mature exercising of responsibility for subordinates under ones
authority Practices which are basically demeaning to fourth classmen must be
eliminated; The Fourth Class System needs adjusting to ensure that freshmen
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cadets receive ample food, sleep, and study time. The information gathered by
the Committee from cadets, TAC officers, medical staff, and faculty reveals that
the current system results in freshmen operating in a deficit in these important
categories Eliminate such extra duties for freshmen as the painting of company
banners and the company area in the barracks The Committee feels that Hell
Night serves no apparent constructive military purpose as it now exists. The
overzealous activity of upperclassmen on the freshmen by yelling and punitive
physical training set a negative tone for the remainder of the year and teaches a
style of leadership inconsistent with The Citadels ideal (Report of the Fourth
Class System (Lane Report, 1991).
Lt. Gen. Watts Presidency soon became consumed by fighting the admission of women,
and the recommendations implemented were incremental and resulted in little, if any,
substantial change to the fourth class system (Macaulay, 2011). Watts retired in 1995
because he opposed the federally mandated admission of women to The Citadel; he felt
the college needed a clean start with a new President (C. Poole, personal communication,
October 8, 2013).
Lt. Gen. Watts, Interim President, was replaced by Maj. Gen. Roger Cliff Poole.
Poole had formally served as Provost and Dean of Academics (C. Poole, personal
communication, October 8, 2013). Poole graduated from The Citadel in 1959 and
noticed immediately upon his return in 1995 that the fourth class system had problems.
Poole observed that the system had become very mean-spirited, filled with abuse and
hazing (C. Poole, personal communication, October 8, 2013). He stated that when he
attended The Citadel in the 1950s, there was hazing by the current definitions in the
college regulations, but the hazing was good-natured and was never meant to abuse
cadets (C. Poole, personal communication, October 8, 2013). Poole also observed an
overall breakdown in the discipline of the Corps of Cadets. He had little time to devote
to the fourth class, though, although the outcomes of abusive behavior and hazing were
78
rampant. The admission of women and the subsequent hazing of women triggered
lawsuits against The Citadel; Poole acknowledged that women received the same
treatment as men. Poole spent most of his time involved with this issue; the federal court
ended up stepping in to monitor the integration of women into The Citadel (C. Poole,
personnel communication, October 8, 2013).
The Commandant of Cadets under Poole was retired Col. Joe Trez, who authored
an article in 1996 for the Homecoming edition of The Brigadier, the cadet newspaper (J.
Trez, personal communication, September 6, 2013). In the article, Trez states:
I am committed to the vision communicated by the former Presidents of The
Citadel and the Board of Visitors who directed the changes to our system over the
last 28 years. Every committee that has studied our system in depth has found
abuses that run counter to the stated goals, principles, and objectives of the Fourth
Class System as found in College publications. These abuses are rooted in what
in the mind of some were traditions Those traditions which are not authorized
and, in particular, those that do not support the goals and objectives of the system
are abuses that have no place in a military organization (The Brigadier, 1996).
Trez was never able to change anything about the fourth class system and observed that
to his mind, the system remained much as it was 1996 (J. Trez, personal communication,
September 6, 2013). Poole transferred Trez to the college staff in 1997 to assist him with
the coed integration, and he hired a new Commandant, retired Brig. Gen. Emory Mace
(C. Poole, personal communication, October 8, 2013).
The Army, Navy, and Air Force Professors of Military Science (ROTC) they
called themselves the Jenkins Committee because their offices were located in Jenkins
Hall wrote to the BOV in February 1997:
The Fourth Class System, as currently implemented, is largely a rite of passage.
It does not produce the basically trained, self-disciplined, motivated third
classmen we expect. Fourth classmen are abused by immature members of the
79
Corps; they know they are not receiving good leadership; and in the end many
only want to hold rank so they can in turn repeat the abuse, and many more want
to assume the role of third class senior privates (The Corps of Cadets,
Memorandum for the BOV, 1997).
The Jenkins Committee outlined a plan for correcting the fourth class system and
concluded:
the ideas presented in this Memorandum have the potential to break the cycle
of abuse in the current system. We could argue details, but fixing the little things
will never be effective until there is a decisive intervention in the way the Corps
does business It will not be easy or cheap. We believe you must commit the
dollars to survive this storm. There can be no sacred cows What we propose is
radical, audacious, and will be hard to swallow by the alumni. We believe it will
be easier to sell to the Corps, largely because most young men of the caliber of
ours do respond to good leadership (The Corps of Cadets, Memorandum for the
BOV, 1997).
1997 - 2004: Enabling Change

Retired Maj. Gen. John Grinalds became President in 1997, and Poole returned to
his former position of Provost and Dean of Academics (C. Poole, personal
communication, October 8, 2013). Grinalds initial assessment was that The Citadel was
undisciplined as a Corps, and he expressed grave concerns over the fourth class system
and the cadet honor system, which stated a cadet would not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate
anyone who would. Grinalds observed excessive abusive behavior and a good deal of
hazing in the fourth class system (personal communication, September 24, 2013). At the
time, some college administrators called the fourth class system life threatening due to
the brutal nature of the hazing (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).
After his assessment of the Corps, Grinalds clearly saw the need for an organizational
culture change (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013).
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Grinalds began his Presidency facing both internal and external pressures.
Internally, The Citadel embraced the problematic fourth class and honor systems, which
led to an undisciplined Corps of Cadets. In Grinalds view of the fourth class and honor
systems, he compared some cadets in the Corps to extortionists (J. Grinalds, personal
communication, September 24, 2013). As an example, Grinalds remembered that it was
common for an upper class cadet to enter a freshmens room and take anything they
wanted.
Externally, The Citadel was still under high profile federal court supervision on
coed-integration. Maj. Gen. Grimsley appointed a committee on the integration of
woman into the Corps of Cadets. The resulting Grimsley Report made 13
recommendations. One of those concerned the fourth class system. It recommended a
reaffirmation of zero tolerance of a system abuse, continuous monitoring at all levels,
selection of a female admission-supportive training cadre, withholding sophomore rank
until second semester, and application of the system uniformly regardless of gender
(Alumni News, 1997).
The BOV recognized these internal and external pressures and wanted them
resolved (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013; S. Bauer, personal
communication, October 2, 2013). This presented a rare opportunity to bring
organizational cultural change to The Citadel. The BOV gave Grinalds and Mace the
power and authority to make decisions, especially regarding the fourth class system (S.
Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013). Grinalds developed a three-part plan
to facilitate organizational culture change in the fourth class system. Although written
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documentation of this plan cannot be found, evidence of parts of it exists in the Alumni
magazine, Winter and Summer of 1998. The plan consisted of three tasks to be
accomplished over five to six years:
1. Clear enunciation of the new philosophy. This new philosophy required the
Corps of Cadets to shift their thinking, from simply surviving to striving to
achieve high standards. Cadets would be challenged by high standards rather
than adversarial treatment.
2. Develop a set of new cadet regulations that align with the new philosophy.
3. Establish a supervisory structure for the Corps of Cadets. Tactical Officers
(TACs) were needed in every company to coach, teach, and train cadets (J.
Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013).
Grinalds tasked Mace to implement the three components of his plan (J. Grinalds,
personal communication, September 24, 2013). The plan was called the Mace Plan and
was considered a jump start covering Grinalds overall plan. Significantly, the Mace
Plan was published in the Summer, 1997 Alumni magazine. The plan would create a
Citadel Leadership Development Center, whose goal would be to develop and teach the
Corps of Cadets positive leadership. It would also develop a formal program of
instruction on leadership, complete with lesson plans and training materials
(Enhancement Initiatives, Mace Plan, 1997). The Mace Plan included 23 specific
provisions dealing with the fourth class, including these significant ones:
The fourth class will join the Corps during an early September date (The usual
date was MID OCT). Hell night is eliminated. Unauthorized solicitation of funds
from the fourth class will be dealt with severely. The fourth class system will end
during the Corps Day weekend (March rather than May). Fourth class cadets will
have the option of remaining at the mess after second rest with their schedule
being the only time constraint. Money will not be solicited from fourth class
cadets without the Commandants approval in writing and without the fourth class
cadet receiving a direct benefit from the solicitation (Enhancement Initiatives,
Mace Plan, 1997).
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Additional recommendations were planned for the Corps on cadet rank, cadet leaves,
privileges, mess hall, haircuts, publications, ring night activities, and physical training
(Enhancement Initiatives, Mace Plan, 1997).
There were significant resource issues, primarily monetary, associated with the
Mace Plan. In fact, some of the Mace Plan was never implemented due to these
constraints (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013). Other parts of
the plan never came to fruition, such as The Citadel Leader Development Center and the
associated leadership classes (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013). The
Mace Plan brought about conditions for change, but never went far enough to actually
cause change (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).
Grinalds then developed a strategic plan, Goals 2000, that focused on
leadership development. The plan was to:
establish a formal four year undergraduate program of leadership development
based on achievement; establish an undergraduate community service program for
all sophomores to serve in meeting Charleston community needs; establish an
undergraduate internship program for all juniors to serve in Charleston public or
private sector enterprises (Office of External Affairs, 2000).
The plan, however, does not mention the fourth class system or a culture change in the
Corps, and was not comprehensive enough to change the system (H. Carter, personal
Another criticism of Grinalds overall plan, of which The Mace Plan was a part,
was that it involved only the Commandants Department and the Corps of Cadets, thus
lacking the involvement of the entire college. Without engaging the entire college
community, there were not enough change agents to affect any major change (J. Weart,
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personal communication, October 9, 2013). Grinalds and Mace proposed little in the way
of fourth class changes from 2002-2004, except for a rehash of proposals that were not
completed in the Mace Plan. Small changes to reduce screaming and yelling in the
barracks and review knob knowledge requirements were the only fourth class changes
proposed (BOV Minutes, June 2002).
Grinalds established a leadership initiative called the Krause Initiative, named
after a major donor who contributed money allocated for leadership:
Envisioned as an institutional dialogue to improve The Citadels ethics and
leadership programs, the Krause Initiative was a unique strategic step for the
college. A series of internal, cultural issues and incidents, along with external
environmental factors, called for the college to do something different in these
areas. Though the actual details and desired end state for this type of institutional
changes were not solidified, The Citadels leadership committed to creating a giftfunded position for an individual to start the process (Report of Krause
Initiative, 2004).
The Krause Initiative enabled a director to be hired, retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart. His jobs
were to fund, coordinate, and facilitate leadership programs on campus to change the
culture from an attritional/adversarial model to a leadership developmental model, in
coordination with the honor system (J. Weart personal communication, October 9, 2013).
A major problem with The Krauss Initiative was that unless other departments
agreed to the Centers recommended changes, the Krause Center had no authority to
direct any change; it also had limited resources to help implement any changes. (J.
Weart, personal communication, October 9, 2013). Grinalds stated in a memorandum to
the faculty and staff that the Krause Initiative would:
1. Establish a Citadel Development Model and Supporting Documentation,
2. Develop and Refine Instructional Efforts to Promote Ethical Leadership,
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3. Improve and Expand Opportunities for Interaction to Promote Ethical

Leadership Development (Implementation of the Krause Initiative, 2004).
Grinalds purposely did not establish a leadership center, because he felt this would
encourage the responsible parties of The Citadel to delegate their responsibility to
leadership and honor development to the Center, and would not remain involved with
funding and coordinating these efforts themselves. He wanted the entire college to be
engaged in developing principled leaders (J. Grinalds, personal communication,
September 24, 2013).
Grinalds believed his plan to be well aligned to the issues that he encountered
when he assumed the Presidency. He acknowledged that the situation in the Corps was
constantly changing and so his plan required constant adjustments (J. Grinalds, personal
communication, September 24, 2013). The Corps of Cadets discipline and the
functioning of the fourth class system improved dramatically under Grinalds and Maces
leadership. Although The Citadel kept no data on the different levels of hazing, brutal
physical hazing was stopped during the Grinalds/Mace era. Some examples of brutal
hazing were putting fourth class cadets into wall lockers and throwing them down the
stairs, and duct-taping a sophomore cadet from each company to a chair in the quadrangle
so the seniors could brand them with their rings on Ring Night (S. Bauer, personal
communication, December 18,2013).
Despite this, Grinalds overall plan and the Mace Plan were not able to achieve an
organizational culture change of the fourth class system from an attritional/adversarial
system to a developmental system (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013;
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H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013). Their efforts never went far
enough to make the changes recommended by the many commissions over 40 years that
had studied the fourth class system (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013;
H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013).
2004-2006: Marching In Place

When Grinalds retired as President in 2005, Poole was once again appointed as
Interim President to lead The Citadel. For the second consecutive presidential transition,
there was no permanent incoming President to replace an outgoing one. Grinalds has
stated that there was little opportunity to ensure continuity of his plan during the
transition, except to note that Poole was familiar with his policies, despite not serving in
The Citadels administration since he left the Office of Provost and Dean of Academics
three years earlier (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013). Poole
acted as Interim President until the arrival of Lt. Gen. Rosa in 2006. The Commandant of
Cadets, Brig. Gen. Mace, also retired in 2005 and was replaced by an Interim
Commandant (The Citadel, www.citadel.edu/history). The loss of continuity during this
time period prevented the gains in leadership from being sustained, necessitating many of
the efforts to be started over again (S. Hines, personal communication, September 25,
2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).
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2006 Present: Incremental Change
Retired Lt. Gen. John Rosa arrived at The Citadel from the United States Air
Force Academy (USAFA), where he had been Superintendent. He was selected by the
Air Force to be their Superintendent as a non-graduate to mend the image of the Air
Force Academy, which had been marred by sexual assaults and sexual harassment. He
also was given the mission of putting the Air Force back into the USAFA (J. Rosa,
personal communication, November 14, 2013). Rosa stated that as Superintendent of the
USAFA, he had asked for 75-100 people to be assigned to the USAFA to help with a
culture change on sexual assault and to develop a four year officer development system
called Officer Development System (ODS). These requests were implemented within six
months. Rosa added that as of 2013, the ODS was still currently in effect at the USAFA,
although improvements had been added (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14,
2013).
When Rosa arrived at The Citadel, he was very familiar with the problems
relating to values and respect among the Corps of Cadets. In his previous position at the
Air Force Academy, Rosa had worked to instill values and respect to remedy the sexual
assault and harassment issues the USAFA faced (J. Rosa, personal communication,
November 14, 2013). In his inauguration speech at The Citadel on April 21, 2006, Rosa
proposed five key questions that required attention. The top two addressed the issue of
values and respect among cadets:
1. What is the process we use to ensure that every cadet receives the training and
experience he or she needs to develop into a principled leader?
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2. How can we change the culture at The Citadel so that respect respect for
others and respect for self is a trait that each and every cadet internalizes and
personifies? (Rosa Inauguration Speech, 2006).
Rosa soon signaled to various college administrators that he would act rapidly on
the issue of values and respect and would temporarily hold off on fixing the fourth class
system. He told Command Sgt. Maj. Bauer that, The last guy who messed with the
fourth class system was fired, and I will not be fired (S. Bauer, personal communication,
October 2, 2013). Brig. Gen. Harry Carter, the Provost under both President Grinalds
and President Rosa, said he never saw a plan to change the system, even incrementally
(personal communication, September 9, 2013).
Rosas first hire was retired Col. Greg Stone, who came to The Citadel from West
Point, where he was the Brigade Tactical Officer (BTO). As the BTO, Stone was in
charge of all tactical officers and directly responsible for the Corps of Cadets in the
barracks (G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Upon hiring Stone,
Rosa informed him that his job was to help establish a culture change within the Corps of
Cadets. In Stones opinion, hazing, lack of respect in terms of diversity, the treatment of
women, and the fourth class system were the prime issues hindering values and respect.
He was, however, given no plan, guidance or direction by President Rosa or the BOV (G.
Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Stone left The Citadel in 2010.
Stones replacement, Col. Leo Mercado (2010-present) has also maintained that a
comprehensive integrated strategy is needed to make an organizational culture change at
The Citadel (personal communication, September 18, 2013).
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Rosa decided to develop a four year leadership development program at The
Citadel a few years after assuming the presidency. Nearly all of the people interviewed
for this research agreed that The Citadel had a two class system. The freshmen who
survived were well trained in followership, but there was little to no leadership
development of the upper class cadets (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14,
2013; S, Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013; L. Mercado, personal
2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013; J. Trez, personal
communication, September 6, 2013; S. Nida, personal communication, November 4,
2013). A system that recognized clearly all four classes was needed before any changes
could be made to the current fourth class system. Rosa decided to accomplish this
through the Krause Initiative, which he soon renamed the Krause Center for Leadership.
Table 5.1 depicts the Krause Centers organizational chart:
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(Trez, 2013).
In a letter to Weart, Rosa described why a center for leadership was needed:
Any further evolution of the Krause Initiative must address three essential areas:
Leader Development related programs, the organizational design and institutional
relationships to conduct these programs, and a facility or space to help house this
new entityEstablishing a center for leadership and ethics would provide the
additional structure to develop, conduct, and assess these programs in concert
with the other key college organizations (e.g. Commandants office and Provost)
(The Krause Initiative, 2008).
The BOV approved the Krause Center in October, 2008. Except for the gift from Mr.
Krause and some other endowments, though, the new Krause Center had few resources
(J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013; J. Weart, personal
communication, October 9, 2013; J. Trez, personal communication, September 6, 2013).
90
The great recession of 2008 put the brakes on any four year leadership
development program (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013). As of
September 2013, the Krause Center still did not have the staff or money it needed to
develop a complete four year leadership development program; it relied heavily on
funding from outside sources (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013; J.
Trez, personal communication, September 6 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication,
September 18, 2013; Trez, 2013). According to Trez, the Krause Centers resource
constraints could delay an organizational culture change from an attritional/adversarial
system to a developmental system for 10 more years (J. Trez, personal communication,
September 6, 2013).
The leadership development program is just beginning at The Citadel. It could
take another five years before a four year development program is in place (J. Rosa,
personal communication, November 14, 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication,
September 18, 2013). Mercado, the Commandant of Cadets, is currently waiting for the
Krause Center to develop a comprehensive plan for leadership development. Mercado
also sees the need for someone to monitor the plan and keep the various college
stakeholders on track to ensure that the plan is executed in a coordinated manner (L.
Mercado, personal communication, September 18, 2013).
According to the Krause Center, though, change is well underway. Table 5.2
illustrates a timeline for leadership development at The Citadel. The information comes
from the Krause Center in 2013.
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Table 5.2: Timeline for Leadership Development
(Trez, 2013).
This table reflects the same information as the Path for the Future plan described to the
BOV in 2006. The five arrows correspond to the five phases to the 2006 plan. The chart
shows a timeline that is not supported by those interviewed for this research. Most
interviewees agreed that the culture at The Citadel has not changed. Many saw the
Krause Center as having little influence on leader development or behavior in the
barracks (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).
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Under Lt. Gen. Rosa, The Citadel has embarked on an incremental organizational
culture change, with no set timetable, due to historical presidents (Admiral Stockdale),
pressure from parents, alumni, and state legislators, and resource constraints (J. Rosa,
personal communication, November 14, 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication,
September 18, 2013). Rosa has maintained that in The Citadels case, an evolutionary
approach to change has a chance to succeed, but a revolutionary approach does not,
mainly due to strong stakeholder resistance (J. Rosa, personal communication, November
14, 2013). Former Provost of the College, Brig. Gen. Carter, agreed with Rosa that an
incremental approach would be the most successful, as long as a number of steps are
completed every year according to a master plan. The Citadel, however, has no master
plan (H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013).
According to Rosa, The Citadel is perhaps halfway to making an organizational
culture change. He bases this on his assessment of what still must be done to implement
a four year leader development program. In his view, one thing that has to change is that
every component of the institution (faculty, staff, TACs, cadet leadership) needs to
reinforce standards in the college. Rosa also notes that the culture among the staff and
faculty of The Citadel differs from the federal service academies, particularly in terms of
work schedule. The Citadel employees operate more on a work-week schedule rather
than a cadet schedule; consequently, they are not always present at all critical times in the
cadet schedule (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013).
There are some who say that conditions at The Citadel over the past four years
have gotten worse under Rosas incremental approach; it has allowed the
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attritional/adversarial system to become more entrenched (S. Bauer, personal
communication, October 2, 2013). Some believe that little progress toward a
developmental system has been made, and there is no visible sense of urgency to change
a system that breeds abusive behavior and hazing (S. Bauer, personal communication,
October 2, 2013).
Col. Stone, the first Commandant under Rosa, observed that since the college had
no comprehensive plan, changes instituted by the Commandant received very little
support from the faculty. According to Stone, both Brig. Gen. Carter and Brig. Gen.
Hines provided little support and would not include more leadership development
education on the cadet schedule. Stone asserted that the cadet schedule remained
unbalanced. There was little coordination on leadership development and no agreement
to assess a four year academic grade for a cadets leadership development. Furthermore,
leadership development efforts were not integrated across the campus; various
components existed separately. For example, the Cadet Counseling Center staff seldom
assisted with leadership development or new cadet training (G. Stone, personal
Almost all interviewees at The Citadel agreed that Tactical Officers (TACs) were
a critical component for changing the organizational culture to a development model.
The Citadel now has a TAC in every company, an effort that has just been completed in
the last three years. Rank and education requirements for TACs have been significantly
raised. TACs are now required to have a masters degree in any subject or be willing to
earn one in three years (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013; G. Stone,
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personal communication September 13, 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication,
September 28, 2013).
In spite of this, most agreed that the current TACs require more training on leader
development (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013; G. Stone, personal
communication, September 13, 2013; J. Weart, personal communication, October 9,
2013; H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013). Some hold that the
institution has failed to provide TACs the education and training to be successful at their
jobs. They feel TACs would benefit from additional education in student affairs,
specifically around student development (H. Carter, personal communication, September
9, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013; L. Mercado, personal
Most also agreed that there must be standards developed to train TACs in
leadership development. There was general consensus that current TACs vary greatly in
how they accomplish their jobs. Rosa commented that the current training and
performance of the TACs is uneven, and this prevents certain programs from being
implemented that require evaluative standards (J. Rosa, personal communication,
November 14, 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication, September 18, 2013; G.
Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Rosa agrees that this area needs to
be fixed, but currently the college has no plan to do so (S. Bauer, personal
communication, October 2, 2013). Brig. Gen. Hines went as far as to say that some
TACs needed to be removed from their positions for not carrying out their
responsibilities, and cited poor personnel management as the only reasons they have not
95
been removed (S. Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013). The lack
professionalism of TACs has been holding back the organizational culture change at The
Citadel (G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013).
New Proposals Receive Little Traction

Many proposals have been advanced, such as scrambling a class in the Corps of
Cadets. Since its existence, The Citadel has always kept cadets in the same company
throughout their careers. This has resulted in the same issues discussed in the West Point
case study companies develop their own dysfunctional norms and these norms become
entrenched, creating 21 fraternal cadet companies, each with their own standards of
behavior. The company then becomes the most important element in a cadets life, more
important than anything else at the college (S. Bauer, personal communication, October,
2, 2013; g. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). The cadets think that
the worst punishment they could receive is a transfer from their original company. Bauer
describes it as a perfect confederacy, since cadets are more loyal to their own company
norms than the regulations of the Corps of Cadets (S. Bauer, personal communication,
October 2, 2013). An example of this is that when graduates meet, the first thing they ask
is what company they were in, rather than the year they graduated (S. Hines, personal
Proposals made by the staff and faculty, such as scrambling cadets, never seem to
move forward; resistors (alumni and cadets) either view them as threatening traditions or
too difficult to implement (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).
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The President initiated an Institutional Program Assessment Committee Review
(IPAC) in 2012 to determine risk areas at The Citadel. One of the areas the Committee
recommended changing was the fourth class system (IPAC Report, 2012). The
committee reviewed the work of previous committees (Whitmore, Mood, and Lane) and
was surprised that their recommendations mirrored those from previous committees:
we began by looking at three major studies of that system which the institution
had conducted since 1968. The Panel was struck by the fact that all three of these
studies repeatedly identified some of the same concerns (for example, an
atmosphere of stress in the Mess Hall which prevents Freshmen from eating
properly, and a variety of factors that lead to sleep deprivation for Freshmen),
even though the studies collectively covered the period from 1968-1991 (IPAC
Report, 2012, p. 56).
The committee presented nine recommendations for the colleges consideration:

1. Eliminate all Fourth Class System activities in the Mess Hall other than
instruction in good table manners (recommended by previous committees);
2. Reduce the length of time for the Fourth Class Training Period, having
freshmen be recognized at Corps Day at the latest, but possibly even as early
as the beginning of the second semester (recommended by previous
committees);
3. Limit sophomore rank to administrative positions only but allow sophomores
to have no interaction with or authority over freshmen (recommended by
previous committees);
4. Consider using teams of seniors selected in their companies through secret
ballot to administer the Fourth Class System in a manner similar to that
suggested in the Whitmire Report (Recommended by previous committees);
5. Consider annual scrambling of company assignments in an effort to (1)
promote Corps identity and loyalty over Company identity and loyalty, and
(2) widen the circle of a cadets friendships over the course of four years
(recommended by previous committees);
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6. Eliminate morning PT for all freshmen and perhaps for all cadets, moving
that activity to afternoons if ROTC programs require it;
7. Consider implementing some degree of rank rotation within the school year
(recommended by previous committees);
8. Eliminate morning PT for all freshmen;
9. Restrict physical exercise as a form of punishment to groups no smaller than a
squad, to be held only outdoors in the daytime under the direct supervision of
at least three responsible upperclassmen (IPAC Report, 2012, pp. 57-58).
None of these nine recommendations have been implemented or seriously considered by

the leadership of The Citadel (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).

Typical of military colleges, resistance to change exists, but The Citadel faces
even greater challenges due to its governance structure (J. Rosa, personal communication,
November 14, 2013; S. Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013; H. Carter,
personal communication, September 9, 2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October
2, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013; J. Weart, personal
communication, October 9, 2013; J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24,
2013). Table 5.3 depicts The Citadels Governance Organizational Structure in 2014,
taken from The Office of Institutional Research, Fact Book, 2013.
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The BOV must be Citadel graduates living in South Carolina. They are appointed
by the State Legislature, the Governor, or are elected by the Alumni. They are political
99
creatures by nature (S. Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013). And The
Citadel alumni have become the main external source of resistance to changing to a
developmental system.
Strong bonds exist between The Citadels alumni; these strong bonds exist
because they are survivors of an attritional/adversarial system that condones abusive
behavior and hazing (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013; H. Carter,
personal communication, September 9 2013). The survivor concept as described in Pat
Conroys book, The Lords of Discipline, is alive and well among some alumni and cadets
(J. Trez, personal communication, September 6, 2013). A good number of alumni
believe that surviving the attritional/adversarial system has enabled them to deal with
anything they might encounter for the rest of their lives. There may be some truth to this
belief, but the attritional/adversarial system works against developing principled leaders,
which is The Citadels mission (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013;
H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013; S. Hines, personal
2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013; J. Weart, personal
communication, October 9, 2013). The alumni who believe this are using cognitive
dissonance to rationalize their position (H. Carter, personal communication, September
9, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Cognitive dissonance
is having two conflicting beliefs, which creates a feeling of discomfort. In order to
remove the discomfort or dissonance, something must change (Cherry, n.d.).
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In the case of the fourth class system, cadets come to The Citadel expecting
principled leaders in the Corps, but soon discover that this is not the case. In order to
rationalize remaining in the somewhat dysfunctional attritional/adversarial fourth class
system, cadets exaggerate the value of staying. Some alumni can be powerful advocates
of the status quo; they want no change to the long line of Citadel traditions. They
become a powerful block and elect peers to the BOV who share their views. They are
interested in preserving The Citadel the way it was when they attended, most likely with
zero leadership training. These same alumni still oppose women in The Citadel, some 17
years after they were first admitted (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14,
2013; J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013; H. Carter, personal
communication, September 9, 2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013;
G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013; S. Hines, personal
Even further complicating matters in attempting to change to a four class
developmental system is The Citadels method of assigning a cadet to one company for
the cadets entire time at The Citadel. This has led to 21 fraternal-like organizations that
have bred 21 different sub-cultures, which makes culture change even harder. Some
alumni want cadets assigned to the same company that their grandfather or father were in
20 or 50 years earlier, thus reinforcing that the company is administered in the same
manner as it was then (S. Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013).
The main internal source to change has been the cadets. Some cadets felt that
there was no real support from the academic side of the college because the
101
administrators refused to rebalance the academic schedule to increase time devoted to
leader development education and training. This was in addition to refusing to grant any
academic credit towards a practicum in the barracks (J. Weart, personal communication,
October 9, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013).
Rosa did state that most alumni and cadets understood that in order to develop
principled leaders, the fourth class system must change into a four class developmental
system, but there was still a large and very vocal resistant minority (J. Rosa, personal
communication, November 14, 2013).
Recognizing that Change is Still Needed

All interviewees acknowledged that the attritional/adversarial fourth class system
must be transitioned to a four year developmental model. They also all agreed that The
Citadel advertises a developmental system to current and prospective cadets in its stated
educational and training goal of developing principled leaders. Parts of the college have
started working towards accomplishing this goal. Despite this, all interviewees contend
that there is currently no integrated, coordinated, comprehensive, or synchronized plan
for The Citadel to change from an attritional/adversarial system to a four year
developmental system (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013; H Carter,
personal communication, September 9, 2013; S. Hines, personal communication,
September 25, 2013; J. Weart, personal communication, October 9, 2013; S. Bauer,
personal communication, October 2 2013).
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CHAPTER SIX:
ANALYSIS
Introduction
This research used John P. Kotters organizational culture change theory, outlined
in his book Leading Change (1996), to analyze the case studies at the United States
Military Academy (West Point) and The Citadel. Kotter developed an eight stage change
model that makes a distinction between leadership and management. Kotter describes
management as processes that keep complex systems running in good condition (2012),
while:
Leadership defines what the future should look like, aligns people with that
vision, and inspires them to make it happen despite the obstacles. Managing
change is important But for most organizations, the much bigger challenge is
leading change. Only leadership can blast through the many sources of corporate
inertia. Only leadership can motivate the actions needed to alter behavior in any
significant way. Only leadership can get change to stick by anchoring it in the
very culture of an organization (Kotter, 2012, p. 25, 30).
The case studies at West Point and The Citadel were analyzed through the lens of
Kotters theory because his is a top-down business model similar to the top-down
bureaucratic model that military colleges follow. Kotters change theory has been used in
the U.S. Army, most recently by the U.S. Army War College for a complete top-down
review of the college (L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013).
Kotters change theory offers a functional approach to analyze organizational
culture change at military colleges. In Leading Change, Kotter (1996) outlines eight
stages required to change an organizations culture. These eight stages are:
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1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency: In an organization with 100 employees, at
least two dozen must go far beyond the normal call to duty to produce
significant change (Kotter, 1996, p. 35). Complacency must be kept as low
as possible (Kotter, 1996, p. 36).
2. Creating the Guiding Coalition: Building such a team is always an
essential part of the early stages of any effort to restructure, reengineer, or
retool a set of strategies (Kotter, 1996, p. 52).
3. Developing a Vision and Strategy: In a change process, a good vision
serves three important purposes. First, by clarifying the general direction for
change Second, it motivates people to take action in the right direction,
even if the initial steps are personally painful. Third, it helps coordinate the
actions of different people, even thousands and thousands of individuals, in a
remarkably fast and efficient way (Kotter, 1996, pp. 68-69).
4. Communicating the Change Vision: But the real power of a vision is
unleashed only when most involved in an enterprise or activity has a common
understanding of its goals and direction (Kotter, 1996, p. 85).
5. Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action: Im still not enthusiastic
about using faddish words, but in this ever faster-moving world, I think the
idea of helping more people to become more powerful is important (Kotter,
1996, p. 101).
6. Generating Short-Term Wins: Running a transformational effort without
serious attention to short-term wins is extremely risky (Kotter, 1996, p.
119).
7. Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change: Major change often
takes a long time, especially in big organizations Under these
celebration of those wins can be lethal if urgency is lost. With complacency
up, the forces of tradition can sweep back in with remarkable force and speed
(Kotter, 1996, p. 132).
8. Anchoring New Changes in the Culture: Anchoring change in a
culturecomes last, not first. New approaches usually sink into a culture only
after its clear that they work and are superior to old methods. Without verbal
instruction and support, people are often reluctant to admit the validity of the
new practices. Sometimes the only way to change a culture is to change key
people. If promotion processes are not changed to be compatible with new
practices, the old culture will reassert itself (p. 157).
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Kotters model offers one means of comparing and analyzing the experiences at West
Point and The Citadel.
This research delved into the area where the literature on this subject ended and
identified the factors in the successful organizational change at West Point and the
incomplete change at The Citadel. In addition, this research looked at three factors that
Brig. Gen. Lance Betros (2012) identified in his book as significant in the organizational
culture change at West Point to determine if they played a prominent part in the
organizational culture change. The three factors that were analyzed in both case studies
were:
1. The sense of urgency and direction from the top leadership of West Point and
The Citadel.
2. The education and training of the Tactical Officers (TACs) at West Point and
The Citadel.
3. The role of the Cadet Counseling Center in the organizational change at West
Point and The Citadel.
Kotters Eight Stage Change Process

Stage 1: Establishing a Sense of Urgency
Kotter describes the first stage, establishing a sense of urgency, in detail:
Establishing a sense of urgency is crucial to gaining needed cooperation. With
complacency high, transformations usually go nowhere, because few people are
even interested in working on the change problem. With urgency low, its
difficult to put together a group with enough power and credibility to guide the
effort or to convince key individuals to spend the time necessary to create and
communicate a change vision. In those rare circumstances in which a committed
group does exist inside a canyon of complacencyno matter how much they
threaten, if many others dont feel the same sense of urgency, the momentum for
change will probably die far short of the finish line. People will find a thousand
ingenious ways to withhold cooperation from a process that they sincerely think is
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unnecessary or wrongheaded. If top management consists only of cautious
managers, no one will push the urgency rate sufficiently high and a major
transformation will never succeedboards of directors have a responsibility to
find leaders and to place them in key jobs. If they duck that responsibility, as they
sometimes do, they are failing to do the boards most essential work (Kotter,
1996, pp. 36-45).
Analysis of Stage 1
The contrast between West Point and The Citadel becomes vivid when looking at
the two institutions through the lens of stage one. Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer came to West
Point as Superintendent and found a calm period that existed with no major internal or
external threats. He saw this as a small window of opportunity to create change that had
eluded many past Superintendents and Commandants of Cadets. Palmer wanted to act
before a crisis overtook the calm period that existed at West Point when he arrived. He
also knew his appointment was a short time period of five years as Superintendent.
During calm periods complacency reigns and Palmer had to create a sense of urgency to
transition to a four year leader development system and away from an
attritional/adversarial fourth class system. As the leader of West Point he could do that,
and he created a strong sense of urgency there, as outlined in Chapter 4, the West Point
case study.
This contrasts sharply with The Citadel. Maj. Gen. Grinalds also established a
sense of urgency in his plan to lead The Citadel out of its major issues with the fourth
class system, the honor system, and the coeducation of women. The problem, however,
was that his plan was not comprehensive; it did not involve all college stakeholders and
did not go far enough to achieve an organizational culture change. Any sense of urgency
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developed slowly and had evaporated by the end of his term and during the transition to
the interim President, Maj. Gen. Poole in 2005.
A sense of complacency returned by 2006, when Lt. Gen. Rosa began his term as
the new President. Although Rosa came to The Citadel and created a sense of urgency in
terms of a values and respect program, the same type of program he instituted at the U.S.
Air Force Academy, he chose not to take this same approach to the fourth class system
mainly due to resistance from the alumni and a perceived lack of resources. Instead,
Rosa chose an incremental approach to changing the fourth class system, which
according to Kotter, almost guaranteed an impossible path for change. Many of The
Citadels administrators were frustrated by Rosas approach. They tried to deal
themselves with the abusive behavior and hazing caused by the attritional/adversarial
fourth class system, essentially attempting to change The Citadels organizational culture.
A culture change could not occur, however, without sense of urgency from the leadership
of the college. To date, Rosas incremental approach has yielded only an incomplete
change of the fourth class system at The Citadel.
Clearly, West Point and The Citadel took different approaches to Kotters stage
one, establishing a sense of urgency. West Point established a sense of urgency and The
Citadel did not. Palmer chose to lead the change process at West Point despite a history
of unsuccessful attempts and formidable complacency. His strong leadership created the
sense of urgency that overshadowed the complacency that would have existed under any
ordinary managerial attempt.
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Maj. Gen. Grinalds initially created a sense of urgency, but it slowly died before
his term was complete, due to his lack of leading the change at the Citadel. The sense of
urgency was completely lost during the interim presidency of Maj. Gen. Poole. Rosa
developed no sense of urgency at The Citadel, due to the political climate of the BOV,
previous unsuccessful efforts, formidable complacency from all stakeholders, a perceived
lack of resources, and his own unwillingness to take leadership of the change.
Stage 2: Creating the Guiding Coalition

Major transformations are often associated with one highly visible
individualone might easily conclude that the kind of leadership that is so
critical to any change can come only from a single larger-than-life person. This is
a very dangerous belief. No one individual, even a monarch-like CEO, is ever
able to develop the right vision, communicate it to large numbers of people,
eliminate all the key obstacles, generate short term wins, lead and manage dozens
of change projects, and anchor new approaches deep in the organizations culture.
Weak committees are even worse. A strong guiding coalition is always needed
one with the right composition, level of trust, and shared objective. Building such
a team is always an essential part of the early stages of any effort to restructure,
reengineer, or retool a set of strategies. Leadership is particularly important.
You need both management and leadership skills on the guiding coalition, and
they must work in tandem, teamwork style (Kotter, 1996, pp. 51-52).
Analysis of Stage 2
When there is no sense of urgency, it can be difficult to develop a guiding
coalition. Lt. Gen. Palmer was able to assemble a guiding coalition of leaders and
managers at West Point amidst the sense of urgency he developed. The Dean of
Academics, Brig. Gen. Roy Flint (1985-1990) and Brig. Gen. Gerald Galloway (19901995); the Commandant of Cadets, Brig. Gen. Fred Gordon (1987-1989) and Brig. Gen.
David Bramlett (1989-1992); the Director of Athletics, Carl Ullrich (1980-1990) and
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retired Col. Albert Vanderbush (1990-1999), were all great leaders; even though they had
not seen a need for change, they were able to communicate the desired change throughout
West Point because they were accomplished leaders who knew how to execute a
commanders guidance and directives.
To compliment these skilled leaders, Palmer put three skilled managers into the
Office of Leader Development: Col. Larry Donnithorne, Col. Steve Hammond, and Col.
Will Wilson. Wilson had been introducing leader development concepts at West Point
for almost 15 years, and he knew what it would take to manage an organizational culture
change. Donnithorne was one of the most highly regarded officers, returning to West
Point after receiving his Ph.D. Hammond was also a highly regarded officer who had
received his Ph.D. in leadership. Palmer assigned Col. Howard Prince to lead and design
the new development system at West Point that would eventually replace the fourth class
system. This team of leaders and managers served as the guiding coalition that enabled
the change to take place at West Point. They were the change agents who managed the
organizational culture change.
During the presidency of Lt. Gen. Rosa at the Citadel, the major organizations of
the college recognized a need for change and began working on leadership development
in different areas. The Commandants, Col. Greg Stone and Col. Leo Mercado, had a plan
to increase the number of TACs and increase their education requirements. The Provost
and Dean of Academics, Brig. Gen. Sam Hines, introduced mandatory academic
leadership courses to all four classes. The Krause Leadership Center, Lt. Col. Jeff Weart,
Brig. Gen. Cliff Poole, Brig. Gen. Harry Carter, and Col. Joe Trez, put together a
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leadership symposium and made improvements to the symposium over the years. There
was, however, no integrated coalition that was working cohesively to make a change in
the fourth class system at The Citadel. The best that could be said was there may have
been some loose coupling of ideas. Many staff and faculty were unaware that the college
needed to change because there had been little communication about it. There was little
leadership from the top leaders at The Citadel to build a sufficiently powerful guiding
coalition. Different parts of the college were working on various leader development
projects, but there was no direction or plan, thus no guiding coalition, at The Citadel.
Kotters stage two illuminates clear contrasts in how the two colleges approached
organizational culture change. West Point developed a guiding coalition while The
Citadel has yet to establish a guiding coalition, which reflects on the leadership of the
college. Palmer carefully selected the personnel he wanted to lead the change at West
Point. He also monitored them and eliminated opposition to his change goals. By
leading the guiding coalition and then evaluating how the coalition lead their respective
areas, Palmer was able to form a cohesive coalition to effect change.
Rosa did not clearly establish a sense of urgency, nor did he establish a coalition.
He lacked a plan on how to change the fourth class system at The Citadel. Guiding
collations are only successful if the leader sees the need for transformation to occur. In
the Citadels case, it is uncertain whether Rosa believed that a change to the fourth class
system was necessary, or that he needed a strong team to direct the change.
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Stage 3: Developing a Vision and Strategy
Vision refers to a picture of the future with some implicit or explicit commentary
on why people should strive to create that future. First, by clarifying the general
direction for changeit simplifies hundreds or thousands of more detailed
decisions. Second, it motivates people to take action in the right direction, even if
the initial steps are personally painful. Third, it helps coordinate the actions of
different people, even thousands and thousands of individuals, in a remarkably
fast and efficient way. Effective vision is: Imaginable: conveys a picture of what
the future will look like; Desirable: appeals to the long-term interests of
employees, customers, stockholders, and others who have a stake in the
enterprise; Feasible: comprises realistic attainable goals; Focused: is clear enough
to provide guidance in decision making; Flexible: is general enough to allow
individual initiative and alternative responses in light of changing conditions;
Communicable: is easy to communicate; can be successfully explained within five
minutes (Kotter, 1996, pp. 68-72).
Analysis of Stage 3
Both West Point and The Citadel each developed an excellent end vision for their
organizational culture changes. West Points vision was articulated as a Leader of
Character and The Citadels vision was articulated as a Principled Leader. West Point
developed a strategy to make the vision a reality, but The Citadel has been unsuccessful
doing the same.
Lt. Gen. Palmer, after numerous studies that involved all West Point stakeholders,
cadets, staff and faculty, the Army, and alumni, decided that the development of leaders
for the Army was the mission of West Point. Palmer used leader development as the
focal point for all areas at West Point academics, military, and athletics. West Point
developed a clear vision and a strategy to implement it successfully. The three factors
that enabled organizational culture change at West Point were the Cadet Leader
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Development System (CLDS), the new TAC education, and the involvement of the entire
college in CLDS.
The Citadel has an outstanding vision that is incorporated into its strategic and
operational plans. The major difference between West Point and The Citadel is that The
Citadel has no strategy to implement their vision. This presents a challenge to The
Citadel, because the college advertises a vision that is not a reality. The Citadel
advertises its vision as making principled leaders, but the current fourth class system
and leader education do not contribute to the this vision.
Both institutions developed well-articulated visions, but only West Point had an
operational strategy for implementing their vision. The implementing strategy contained
numerous changes, which included a four year leadership development system, a revised
TAC education masters program, a modified cadet schedule, a cadet leader distribution
plan, and the scrambling of the junior class from a cohort model. The strategy adhered to
Kotters organizational change theory and was implemented over a five-year period,
however the conditions leading to change were set over decades of work by dedicated
officers. Some of those past strategies failed due to resistance and complacency. Some
were successful, but failed to be sustained.
The Citadel, like West Point, determined their end vision but could never put together
an operational plan to achieve the vision. Various organizations in the college took
action unilaterally to make the vision a reality, but there was not enough coordination,
integration, or synchronization to achieve a synergy toward the vision. The lack of
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synergy is directly attributed to a lack of leadership from The Citadels top administrators
to develop a strategy or plan.
Stage 4: Communicating the Change Vision

the real power of a vision is unleashed only when most of those involved in an
enterprise or activity have a common understanding of its goals and direction.
That shared sense of desirable future can help motivate and coordinate the kinds
of actions that create transformations. Key elements in the effective
communication of vision: Simplicity: All jargon and technobabble must be
eliminated; Metaphor, analogy, and example: A verbal picture is worth a thousand
words; Multiple forums: Big meetings and small, memos and newspapers, formal
and informal interaction all are effective for spreading the word; Repetition:
Ideas sink in deeply only after they have been heard many times; Leadership by
example: Behavior from important people that is inconsistent with the vision
overwhelms other forms of communication; Explanation of seeming
inconsistencies: Unaddressed inconsistencies undermine the credibility of all
communication; Give and take: Two way communication is always more
powerful than one-way communication (Kotter, 1996, pp. 85-90).
Analysis of Stage 4
In this stage there are stark differences in how the colleges communicated their
visions and built their strategies to bring their visions to fruition. The organizational
culture change at West Point included a complex set of changes that needed to be
communicated to a diverse set of stakeholders. At The Citadel, there was a vision but no
implementation plan across the college. Without an implementation plan, there could be
no plan for communicating the culture change, despite various organizations working
independently on components of a change.
Lt. Gen. Palmer first involved all West Point stakeholders in a series of 10-12
studies on the mission of West Point and the fourth class system. The studies were
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conducted by different stakeholders, including alumni and cadets. These studies helped
with the two-way communication that enhanced the visions acceptance. Once results of
the studies were analyzed, it was clear that the mission of West Point was to produce
leaders of character. The way to achieve this vision was clear to all at West Point:
leadership development. Palmer would accomplish this through many other actions, but
the overarching vision was leadership development, whether in academics, military or
athletics. Palmer used leader development in all meetings and memorandums. He
demanded that this vision be communicated to all stakeholders in the West Point nation:
all cadet programs and activities are intended ultimately to contribute to one
objective, leader development (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 68). Palmers leadership
communicated clearly the West Points mission of leader development.
Although a lot of work went into establishing The Citadels vision, there was little
strategy developed for how the vision would be executed (stage three of Kotters model).
A number of people interviewed for this research saw no evidence of a plan for the
change, so they could not communicate much information to their employees about the
vision (stage four of Kotters model). Employees in the Commandants Department,
which included 26 TACs, knew surprisingly little about the vision or how it would be
implemented. There was little communication to the entire campus, because there was no
clear strategy for implementing the vision.
Stage 5: Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action

Major internal transformation rarely happens unless many people assist. Yet
employees generally wont help, or cant help, if they feel relatively powerless.
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Hence, the relevance of empowerment. What are the biggest obstacles that
often need to be attacked? Four can be particularly important: structures, skills,
systems, and supervisors. StructuresSometimes we become so accustomed to
one basic organization design, perhaps because it has been used for decades that
we are blind to the alternatives. TrainingPeople are expected to change habits
built up over years or decades with only five days of educationSome training
could be required at this stage in transformation, but it needs to be the right kind
of experience. Throwing money at the problem is never a good idea, nor is
talking down to people. Systemsunaligned systems also block needed
action. Supervisorsconfront supervisors who undercut needed change:
nothing disempowers people the way a bad boss can (Kotter, 1996, pp. 108-115).
Analysis of Stage 5
Lt. Gen. Palmer and West Point had to create a new structure, the new four class
system or The Cadet Leader Development System (CLEDS), in order to eliminate the old
attritional/adversarial fourth class system. The entire West Point community had to be
educated on CLEDS since it involved everyone on campus. Some of the most important
change agents, the TACs, received new education and training (masters degrees in leader
development). The TACs gave West Point a trained base of administrators closest to the
cadets to help coach, teach, train, and mentor them in a four class development system.
TACs became a cadre of true believers in change, because of the time and effort they and
the Army had put into their education. This education empowered the TACs as change
agents for the new developmental system.
Changes in cadet personnel systems empowered cadets by giving each of the
upper classes, sophomores, juniors, and seniors, developmental responsibilities and
making them accountable to a leader development standard. West Point achieved this
empowerment by promoting all sophomores to cadet corporals, all juniors to cadet
sergeants, and all seniors to cadet officers. This empowered them by giving them not
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only a rank and privileges, but also the responsibility to develop subordinates to high
standards. The Cadet Leader Distribution Plan (scrambling juniors) empowered cadets
not to rely on friendship of fellow company mates, but to act professionally with other
members of the Corps who had not been their buddies for four years. This empowerment
raised professional standards. The academic realignment of required cadet courses
enabled more time for leadership development in the Corps, which in turn empowered
those responsible for developing the new system by demonstrating the importance West
Points leadership placed on the new four year development model. Palmer had to
confront those at West Point who opposed his vision. He did this by personally talking
with them and threatening to hold a tenure review board for faculty. Although he
monitored their progress, Palmer clearly empowered his subordinate leaders to make
widespread changes across West Point in the name of leader development and the four
class system.
There was general consensus that The Citadel failed to remove the obstacles, both
real and perceived, that blocked their vision from becoming a reality. The obstacles were
traditions, resistors from all stakeholder groups, and resource constraints (in people,
money, and time). Due to a perceived lack of resources, The Citadel has yet to develop a
four year leader development program or to give TACs a base-line education program.
The Citadels leadership has not made leader development a priority, thus the cadets and
TACs are aware of The Citadels vision of Principled Leadership, but have not been
empowered to achieve this vision.
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Part of empowering people is giving them the means, guidance and direction on
how to proceed. The Citadel has not realigned the cadet schedule to allow more time for
leadership development, due to parochial interests by the academic part of the college.
The Citadels leadership refused to consider a Cadet Leader Distribution Plan, because it
feared resistance from alumni, despite the fact that most administrators believed this to be
a critical component to achieving change. The leadership has also neglected to consider
other changes, such as cadet rank to empower the upper class, because that would break
the tradition of The Citadel, despite recognizing that this change would bring much more
good than harm and would facilitate an organizational culture change as it did at West
Point. Some of The Citadels administrators do not want to change and see the vision as
a far-off future goal or a faade that is only there as window dressing to make the college
look good. In this case, empowering people is not going to be an option for The Citadel.
The absence of a plan coupled with the lack of guidance by The Citadels leadership has
not empowered either the TACs or the cadets to change.
Stage 6: Generating Short-Term Wins

Major change takes time, sometimes lots of time. Zealous believers will often
stay the course no matter what happens. Most of the rest of us expect to see
convincing evidence that all the effort is paying off. Nonbelievers have or need
even higher standards of proof. They want to see clear data indicating that the
changes are working and that the change process isnt absorbing so many
resources in the short term as to endanger the organization. Running a
transformation effort without serious attention to short-term wins is extremely
risky. Sometimes you get lucky; visible results just happen. But sometimes your
luck runs out. The role of short-term wins: Provide evidence that sacrifices are
worth it: Wins greatly help justify the short term costs involved; Reward change
agents with a pat on the back: After a lot of hard work, positive feedback builds
morale and motivation; Help fine-tune vision and strategies: Short-term wins give
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the guiding coalition concrete data on the viability of their ideas; Undermine
cynics and self-serving resisters: Clear improvements in performance make it
difficult for people to block needed change; Keep bosses on board: Provides those
higher in the hierarchy with evidence that the transformation is on track; Build
momentum: Turns neutrals into supporters, reluctant supporters into active
helpers, etc. (Kotter, 1996, pp. 119-123).
Analysis of Stage 6
Both West Point and The Citadel were able to generate short-term wins, but only
West Point was effective in this stage due to an overall strategy. At West Point, gains
were achieved through a top-down plan, while at The Citadel, gains were driven from
bottom-up attempts, with separate departments trying to make needed culture changes
from their own individual positions. The problem at The Citadel was that none of the
short-term wins achieved were coordinated, integrated, or synchronized.
West Point rewarded its change agents by promoting them to jobs that had more
influence and greater responsibility. Col. Will Wilson was promoted to head the Leader
Development Integration Office under the Superintendent. Col. Howard Prince was
selected to lead the Department of Behavioral Science & Leadership Department. The
large number of assessments (10-12) that Lt. Gen. Palmer conducted, involving all
stakeholders at West Point, enabled large numbers of stakeholders to see progress being
made on their recommendations. Four important short-term wins occurred in a relatively
short period of time: a four year cadet development system was created, essentially
transitioning the fourth class system from an attritional/adversarial system to a leadership
development system and changing about 140 years of culture; a new TAC education
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program was developed; the fourth class regulations received a complete overhaul; and
Palmer decided to scramble the rising Second Class.
Positive feedback was received both internally and externally at West Point about
the initial rollout of the change, which reinforced the legitimacy of the plan and had
primary, secondary, and third order effects on West Point, which Kotter considers to be
very important in this stage. Internally, the BOV report summed up the findings of the
feedback:
The expanded leader development initiatives directed by the Superintendent and
unanimously approved by the Policy Board provided for the incorporation of the
Fourth Class system into a broader, more challenging, four year framework called
the Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS). Academic Year 90-91 marked
the first year for the Corps under CLDS. Implementation of CLDS has proceeded
much more successfully than anticipated. Indicators from several sources
suggest that cadets are beginning to grasp the developmental objectives of CLDS
and are integrating them into their outlook on leadership. Resistance to the new
system seems to be on the wane with each passing month, as cadets learn that the
rigor, demand, and challenge of the West Point Experience are protected under
CLDS. As the Academy heads into academic year 91-92, our focus will be on the
continuing education of the Corps to ensure broad understanding of CLDS and
why it is central to their development as leaders of character. The Department
of the Army concurs (BOV Annual Report, 1991, pp. I-2-I-3).
The external feedback was also positive. A large number of newspapers ran
articles that had a balanced perspective, but reflected positively on West Points change.
An example was an article in The Christian Science Monitor that stated:
Alumni gathering for fall events at the United States Military Academy here find
that its not like it was in the old days. Many cadets agree. West Point is striving
to change its tradition-bound training system by modifying the way plebes and
cadets at the academy are treated by one another. Both faculty members and
cadets say revision is difficult but necessary. Its a change sponsored from the
top. Tomorrows leaders must be more flexible, creative, and able to relate to
their personnel says Superintendent Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer. With divisions
scaling back in size, officers will command smaller light-infantry units and elite
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Special Forces, for which these demands are critical, he says. And West Point
was not doing the job, he acknowledged in an interview. General Palmers
concerns are heightened by the crisis in the Middle East and the demand for
skilled combat troops. Four years is the minimum success or failure window
time for one class to go through the new system (West Point plebes, n.d.).
The Citadel also created many short-term wins: creating the Krause Center for
Leadership; the Provosts designing an academic program for a four year leadership
development system; developing various leadership assessments; improving the
Leadership Training Program; establishing a principled leadership vision; hiring of a
TAC for every cadet company; and improving TAC education. Each of these was a
significant short-term win for The Citadel. The problem was that short-term wins were
not tied to an overall plan or strategy, therefore employees did not recognize them as
progress in a plan. Consequently, their impact was diminished. Different departments at
The Citadel had no idea what other departments were working on. The Citadel had failed
in Stage Four, Communicating the Change Vision.
Stage 7: Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change

Major change often takes a long time, especially in big organizations. Many
forces can stall the process far short of the finish line: turnover of key change
agents, sheer exhaustion on the part of leaders, bad luck. Under these
celebration of those wins can be lethal if urgency is lost. With complacency up,
the forces of tradition can sweep back in with remarkable force and speed.
Resistance: Always waiting to reassert itself; one cardinal rule: Whenever you
let up before the job is done, critical momentum can be lost and regression may
follow. What Stage 7 looks like in a successful major change effort: More
change, not less: The guiding coalition uses the credibility afforded by short-term
wins to tackle additional and bigger change projects; More help: Additional
people are brought in, promoted, and developed to help with all the changes;
Leadership from senior management: Senior people focus on maintaining clarity
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of shared purpose for the overall effort and keeping urgency levels up. Project
management and leadership from below: Lower ranks in the hierarchy both
provide leadership for specific projects and manage those projects. Reduction of
unnecessary interdependencies: To make change easier in both the short and long
term, managers identify unnecessary interdependencies and eliminate them.
Without sufficient leadership, change stalls, and excelling in a rapidly changing
world becomes problematic (Kotter, 1996, pp. 132-144).
Analysis of Stage 7
Stage 7, Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change, is the pivotal stage in
organizational culture change. This is when the forces of change are strong enough to
produce further change and overpower any resistance and complacency. Although the
culture change is not yet fully anchored in the organization, it builds a synergy that is
increasingly hard to contain. The majority of the organization, in this case the cadets,
staff and faculty, has now accepted the change.
The change in the TAC officer education program was one of West Points key
moves to consolidate gains and produce more change. This cadre of officers with
masters degrees in Leader Development formed a bastion of knowledge that directly
influenced cadets; they were also enthusiastic change agents ready to counter any
resistance. The TAC education program provided a steady stream of officers skilled in
leader development who continued to refine and produce more change. The new changes
produced were increased acceptance by the Corps of Cadets, and enhanced development
of the Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS). CLDS was refined and upgraded; it
added additional requirements for the entire West Point community. Palmers
replacement, Lt. Gen. Graves, led the sustainment of the organizational culture change
and continued to develop and refine the CLDS under his administration. Every year that
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passed, the probability of resistance decreased, and CLDS acceptance continued to rise
among all stakeholders.
The TAC education program at The Citadel has not been developed, due to an
inattentive leadership and the lack of an overall plan to change the fourth class system.
The failure to establish a credentialing program for leadership development has caused
the TACs to have little standardization in leader development. Not having a strategic or
operational plan caused issues about the TACs role. TACs were confused about whether
they should develop leadership in the cadets or discipline them. The lack of a fully
developed four year leader development program has prevented any substantial change
from occurring. In addition, the many leadership transitions at The Citadel have
prevented any continuity of changes that have been made. Since there has been an
incomplete change and no articulated plan presented, resistance and complacency remain
high at The Citadel.
Stage 8: Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture

Whenever you hear of a major restructuring, reengineering, or strategic
redirection in which step 1 is Changing the culture, you should be concerned
that it might be going down the wrong path. Both attitude and behavior change
typically begin early in a transformation process. These alterations then create
changes in practices that help a firm produce better products or services at lower
costs. But only in the end of the change cycle does most of this become anchored
in the culture. Anchoring change in a culture comes last not first: Most alterations
in norms and shared values come at the end of the transformation process;
Depends on results: New approaches usually sink into a culture only after its
clear that they work and are superior to old methods. Requires a lot of talk:
Without verbal instruction and support, people are often reluctant to admit the
validity of new practices; May involve turnover: Sometimes the only way to
change a culture is to change people; Makes decisions on succession crucial: If
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promotion processes are not changed to be compatible with the new practices, the
old culture will reassert itself (Kotter, 1996, pp. 156-157).
Analysis of Stage 8
West Point changed from a fourth class system to a four class system and named
it CLDS. Over a period of time, CLDS enabled West Point to create an organizational
culture change. To insure that this culture change would become anchored, a number of
other enabling changes had to occur. The leadership transition from one Superintendent
to another at West Point had to be executed so that there would not be a decline in
support or urgency. The TAC education program had to be sustained. New staff and
faculty had to be educated about their roles in CLDS. This final stage of culture change
was not accomplished until 1995, after the last class under the old fourth class system
departed and a four year period of the new developmental system could be analyzed.
Like other colleges and universities, military colleges have a repetitive cycle.
Twenty-five percent of the United States Corps of Cadets are new every year. The entire
leadership of the Corps is turned over every year, so leadership of the cadets is critical.
Maintaining a solid anchor in leader development is largely accomplished by the TACs,
with the help of the entire staff and faculty. Entering new cadets have norms and values
that change every year, so education and training are essential. At military colleges, once
a pattern of behavior can be sustained for at least four years, it becomes ingrained into the
culture. Over the years, this process leads to a stronger culture as graduates return to
West Point to occupy administrator positions. In this way, improvements and
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modifications are continually made to the system, creating more change and keeping it up
to date.
All people interviewed for this research acknowledge that The Citadel has made an
incomplete culture change, so it is impossible to analyze how they have accomplished
stage eight of Kotters theory since they have not completed the first seven stages.
Although incomplete, many positive changes in The Citadels culture have occurred.
Portions of a four year leader development system are in place. The academic leader
development classes for each year has been approved, developed, and are being taught.
Leader development training has been upgraded by the hiring of additional personnel and
an improvement in instruction quality. TACs with a minimum standard of some type of
masters degree have been hired for every company and battalion. Ethical reasoning
education will be introduced next year for all classes. Honor education has been
substantially upgraded. Peer evaluations, training records, and e-portfolios have been
added and counseling requirements for TACs have increased. All these positive changes
are critically needed to enable a culture change at The Citadel. They have, however,
occurred in a bottom-up process, and The Citadels culture change remains incomplete
and unanchored due to the absence of an overall strategic and operational plan.
The reason there has been no overall plan is lack of leadership by senior leaders
due to their perceived fear of resistors led by alumni. Senior leaders have also perceived
a lack of resources that would prevent a plan from succeeding. The lack of a plan has
prevented the completion of a four year leader development system and the associated
changes, such as TAC certification on leader development, Cadet Leader Distribution
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Plan, cadet ranks adjustments, and cadet schedule modifications. All these incomplete
areas have caused the attritional/adversarial fourth class system to continue at The
Citadel. While the system as it exists today is better than what Maj. Gen. Grinalds
encountered in 1997, it is still not the development system that is needed. Only pieces of
change at The Citadel are being anchored, which is not enough to cause an organizational
culture change.
Additional Hypotheses
Three additional factors were studied to see if they played a role at each military
colleges attempts at organizational change. The first was whether the sense of urgency
and direction from the top leadership of West Point and The Citadel was a contributing
factor in organizational cultural change at military colleges. The research on this
hypothesis showed the difference between the leadership approaches taken by the
Superintendent of West Point in 1988 and the President of The Citadel in 2006.
All people interviewed for this research, as well as the literature reviewed, stated
that it was the leadership of Lt. Gen. Palmer that was the driving force behind the
organizational culture change at West Point. If Palmer had not masterfully led the first
seven stages of Kotters change theory, it is doubtful that the organizational culture
change would have occurred at West Point in the early nineties. Palmers leadership
assured successful completion and set the conditions for the final stage of Kotters model.
In March 1990, Palmer wrote: To remain unchanging in changing world risks decay
from irrelevance (Donnithorne, 1991 p. 10). Palmer, himself, stated that he started and
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led this change as the Superintendent of West Point, and this is supported by
overwhelming evidence in the West Point case study (Chapter Four).
Only two of those interviewed at The Citadel thought that in order for culture
change to occur at The Citadel, it was critical to have the President lead the change
efforts by creating a sense of urgency and direction. The other interviewees identified
various other components of the college as the most important change agents, including
Lt. Gen. Rosa. A number of administrators at The Citadel named the cadets themselves
as the primary change agents in a culture change of the fourth class system. This
contrasts with West Point, whose interviewees did not list the cadets in their top five
change agents considered most important to a culture change. Almost all college
administrators are waiting on guidance and direction from The Citadels leadership.
The second factor was whether the education and training of the Tactical Officers
(TACs) at West Point and The Citadel would be a contributing factor in organizational
cultural change at military colleges. The research on this hypothesis revealed that all
interviewees at West Point agreed that the education and training of the TACs was a
critical component to organizational culture change. The TACs, more than any other
element of the staff and faculty, were considered the primary change agents to make and
sustain the change. The TACs new masters degree in leadership development at the
West Point was a critical step that enabled TACs to fully understand and implement the
change to the four class developmental system (CLDS) from the attritional/adversarial
fourth class system. The degree gave TACs credibility; they became a cadre of experts
on leader development who coached, taught, trained, and mentored cadets in a four class
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developmental system, CLDS. The TACs were able to sustain this change as new
educated and trained TACs replaced those who moved on with their Army careers.
Similarly, all those interviewed at The Citadel felt that the TACs and their
education and training were critical to creating the conditions for organizational culture
change, supervising the change, and sustaining the change at The Citadel. While all
agreed that education and training were essential, all also agreed that there still remains a
large amount of education and training the TACs need in order to successfully perform
their mission to facilitate culture change at The Citadel. Currently there are no plans to
address this deficiency.
The third factor was whether the role of the Cadet Counseling Center in the
organizational change at West Point and The Citadel would be a contributing factor in
organizational cultural change at military colleges. The research on this hypothesis
revealed that the Cadet Counseling Center (CCC), although very important, was not
regarded by the interviewees as one of the top four change agents in West Points
organizational culture change. The CCC did, however, play an important role in setting
the conditions for change and assisting in all areas of the change process, including
sustaining the culture change. The CCC played a contributory part of the overall change
strategy at West Point.
None of those interviewed at The Citadel mentioned The Cadet Counseling
Center as a critical or necessary change agent for their fourth class system change. By
neglecting the CCC as an important potential change agent, The Citadel has lost a key
organization that could have positively impacted their incomplete culture change.
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Summary
John Kotters theory of organizational change was not published until 1996,
however from this research, it appears that West Point achieved some measure of success
in all eight stages of Kotters theory. Some stages aligned with their efforts better than
others, but every step in West Points successful organizational culture change from an
attritional/adversarial fourth class system to a four class developmental system was
consistent with Kotters stages. The area that Kotter emphasized the most was leadership
of the organizational culture change; Lt. Gen. Palmer provided that for West Point.
The Citadels incomplete transition from an attritional/adversarial fourth class
system to a four year developmental system seems be attributed to their incomplete
adherence to Kotters eight stages. The Citadel has not successfully proceeded through
Kotters eight stages and significantly, they lacked strong leadership in their attempt at
cultural change.
According to those who were interviewed and my analysis, the three additional
factors appear to play a role in the successful transition at West Point. It is important to
note that there was universal agreement from those interviewed at West Point that the
leadership and a sense of urgency was the number one factor that contributed to the
change of the fourth class system. In contrast, among those interviewed at The Citadel,
there was no consensus about the number one factor that contributed to successful
change; three or four different factors were mentioned, none of which included the
importance of leadership and a sense of urgency.
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The TACs at each institution were identified as the second most important factor
in successful culture change. This was the only area of agreement between the two
colleges of the factors affecting change. The third important factor in culture change at
West Point was the Behavioral Science & Leadership Department, while at The Citadel,
three or four different areas were mentioned. The reason for this discrepancy was that at
West Point, there was a systematic plan that all stakeholders could identify with, and thus
a consensus about the important factors in the change. This was not the case at The
Citadel, where stakeholders were not united by an overall strategic plan and
consequently, had very different ideas about what was an important factor for change.
The assumption that Kotters organizational change model could be used to
explain successful change at a military college suggests that there is a relationship
between West Points adherence to Kotters organizational change model and its
successful transition. The research also suggests that there is a relationship between The
Citadels incomplete adherence to Kotters organizational change model and its
incomplete transition.
The three additional factors that were identified by Brig. Gen. Betros (2012) in
the organizational culture change were also found as important factors by this research in
the successful culture change at West Point. The absence of these factors in the case of
The Citadel seems to suggest that these factors could have played a positive role in The
Citadels incomplete organizational culture change of it fourth class system.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions from My Research

This research indicates that military colleges should not support an
attritional/adversarial fourth class system that leads to abusive behavior and hazing. All
military colleges ostensibly educate and train cadets in leader development. The outdated
fourth class system is the antitheses of todays leader development model. Military
colleges that allow this antiquated system to survive are educating their cadets in the
wrong leadership methods, which often result in leadership and job failures when the
cadet graduates. If former cadets enter the military or civilian occupations, their poor
treatment of subordinates will not be tolerated.
Military colleges that continue this system could risk both the future failure of
their graduates and losing their reputation for producing qualified leaders. An antiquated
fourth class system leads to high attrition especially in the freshmen year, poor morale
that affects the entire college, poor performance including academics, and less than
adequate values and respect. At its worse, this outdated fourth class system could
increase the colleges risk for bad publicity and lawsuits. The lawsuits fall into two
areas: lawsuits from the victims of abusive behavior and hazing, and lawsuits from those
seeking compensation for a product that was advertised but not delivered. More risk
could also assumed from college regulatory agencies, which increasingly have reviewed
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administration performance on student behaviors. All these factors should provide a
sufficient sense of urgency for military colleges to change.
A highly successful paradigm exists that can be duplicated by following West
Points organizational culture change as a best practice model. This model, coupled with
Kotters organizational change theory, described in his book Leading Change, offers
military colleges a successful example for planning and executing a cultural change of
their attritional/adversarial fourth class system. West Points innovative four year Cadet
Leader Development System (CLDS), along other improvements that compliment CLDS,
can be applied to any military college and will create the conditions for a successful
organizational culture change in the fourth class system. Failure to act and use a
successful best practice model could be construed as a lack of leadership, negligence, and
an ethical failure. Future cadets and parents who send their sons and daughters to
military colleges expect the latest in military leader education. A military college that
does not adapt to the best practices, like those that occurred at West Point 24 years ago, is
accepting unnecessary risk in a number of different areas.
This research has shown that there are some key principles that enable military
colleges to position themselves for success when attempting an organizational culture
change from an attritional/adversarial fourth class system to a leadership development
system. The first principal is that a military college have a four class system developed
and in place. This four class system will impose well-defined development standards on
the upper three classes. The upper class developmental standards will shift the upper
class focus from the freshmen to the development of goals for their own class, which
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includes developing freshmen. The four class development system is one of the key
principles that needs to be up and running before working on other principals.
The next principal is selecting an organizational culture change model such as
Kotters. A model is necessary as a guide though the culture change process. It allows
the college administrators to evaluate where the college is and make any necessary
adjustments. It also allows the development of nested strategic, operational, and tactical
plans to be developed. Education, training, and communication are a necessary principle
that synchronizes all stakeholders so that everyone is aware of and supports the mission
and plan objectives. More education and certification for certain college administrators,
such as TACs, is needed because they have an influential role to play in the change
process.
The final principal is a breakdown of the old paradigms of ethos in cadet culture
and structure to ensure that the new systems become accepted and integrated into the
Corps. New programs must be introduced that replace past structure, traditions, and
company norms to reduce resistance and to foster acceptance of the new system.
Programs such as Cadet Leader Distribution Plan for the second class (scrambling) and
empowering upper class cadets through rank changes are a few of the necessary
additional programs that should occur alongside the four year cadet leader development
system. The final principal will be the adjustment and enforcement of the new fourth
class rules and regulations. Together, these principles enable a military college to set the
conditions for success as it strives to transition the culture of the fourth class system.
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Recommendations
Although these recommendations are directed at The Citadel, they are broadbased recommendations that apply to any U.S. military college trying to create an
organizational culture change in their attritional/adversarial fourth class system to a
developmental system. Since all military colleges have very similar structures and
regulations, almost all of these recommendations will be applicable. Kotters change
theory is also applicable for cultural changes at military colleges.
In January 2014, there was a consensus at The Citadel that an organizational
culture change from the attritional/adversarial fourth class system to a four year
developmental system was still needed. The Citadel has been attempting serious
organizational culture change since the arrival of Maj. Gen. John Grinalds as President in
1997. For a variety of reasons outlined in The Citadels case study (Chapter 5), The
Citadel has had an incomplete transition to date. The following recommendations, if
implemented, will enable The Citadel to complete the culture change to a four class cadet
development system and eliminate their attritional/adversarial fourth class system.
Recommendations for The Citadels BOV and President

Recommendation 1: Act now
The American public no longer tolerates abusive behavior and hazing as it has in
the past. The behavioral standards for student conduct at colleges and universities are
much higher in 2014 than 1950, even at military colleges like West Point and The
Citadel. The Citadel advertises to prospective students and parents that the college will
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educate and develop a cadet into a principled leader, yet the institution is well aware
that it has been unable to transition from their attritional/adversarial fourth class system
to the four year developmental system that would enable them to do this.
This puts the college in a quandary, as it advertises a product that it is not able to
deliver. This then causes ethical concerns, since parents and cadets do not chose The
Citadel to risk being abused or hazed; they choose The Citadel to be developed into
principled leaders. They believe The Citadel would use the very latest leader
development techniques. Countless lives are unnecessarily disrupted due to The
Citadels current system and its inability to change it. It is ironic that the Quality
Enhancement Plan (QEP) for the 2014 Southern Association of Colleges and Schools
(SACS) accreditation of The Citadel is focused on ethical reasoning as The Citadel
knowingly has a fourth class system that continues to abuse current cadets.
Recommendation 2: Change Tactics from Incrementalism

The Citadel currently uses an incrementalism strategy towards their fourth class
organizational change, which has failed. Incrementalism involves planning and
executing many small tasks over a long period of time. Incrementalism has been The
Citadels approach since the late 1960s. Their persistence with incrementalism, with only
minor adjustments, is uninspired approach that has failed and will continue to fail. This
strategy has not proven successful in reforming the fourth class system at any military
college. There is, however, decades of evidence of this strategys failure, as noted in the
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two case studies conducted for this research. The Citadel needs to adopt a fast-paced
model, and even that will take a minimum of five years to fully implement.
Recommendation 3: Adopt and Maintain a Change Theory

The Citadel would do well to follow the fast-paced organizational culture theory
discussed in Kotters Leading Change (1996). It is a business organizational change
model, but the military and military colleges work much like bureaucratic top-down
businesses. It is notable that the U.S. Army War College used Kotters model in their
recent top-down review. Any organizational change will take five to seven years to fully
implement. West Points organizational culture change to a four class leadership
development system can be used as a paradigm for The Citadel. There are also other
organizational culture change models that could be used as a guide for this process.
Recommendation 4: More Resources Are Not Necessary

More resources (people, money, time) are always more desirable, but not
necessary for an organizational culture change at The Citadel. College administrators
should not think they need additional resources before beginning a major attempt at
change. Most of the people interviewed at The Citadel felt that their current resources
were more than adequate to start the change. The Citadel should be reminded that West
Point did not use additional resources in its successful culture change.
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Recommendation 5: Educate All Stakeholders about the Change
Among The Citadels stakeholders, many will resist any organizational culture
change. The majority of these resistors do not understand what the changes will do or the
context within which the changes are being made. This will require extensive education
and communication plans, both internally and externally. Once properly educated about
the change, most will support it. The Citadel may have to deal with internal resisters, but
they should be advised to simply ignore external resistors. This is well within the
capability of the colleges External Affairs Department.
Recommendation 6: Mobilize all College Organizations

It will take the entire campus, all stakeholders, and all available expertize at The
Citadel to affect change. Academic departments, like Psychology and Education, must
help with TAC and cadet education and training and assist with drafting a four year
comprehensive leadership development plan. The Alumni Center must be responsible for
educating and communicating with the alumni, which includes some of the strongest
resistors at military colleges. The Cadet Counseling Center needs to be engaged, as it
was at West Point. Every department and organization on campus must be involved in
the culture change for it to succeed.
Recommendation 7: Monitor the Change

The Citadels Krause Center seems to be the ideal organization to monitor the
change process, but it needs to report directly to the President, which it currently does
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not. As Kotter (1996) continually states in his book, leadership of the change must come
from the head of the organization. The head of a college or university is the President.
The President also must establish a guiding coalition to help implement the change.
Whatever organization is dealt the responsibility of monitoring the change process, it
needs to be empowered and have the Presidents authority to act.
Recommendation 8: Modify the Cadet Schedule

To have an effective four year leadership development program, the cadet
schedule needs to be rebalanced so that more leadership development time is available.
The current schedule at The Citadel only includes one dedicated hour per week to
conduct leader development education. The time for leader development needs to be
doubled, at a minimum, in order to facilitate a fully functional four year development
system.
Recommendation 9: Evaluate Leadership Development

Cadets must be held accountable for their performance in the four year leadership
development program just as they are held accountable in the academic program.
Evaluation is a method for holding the cadets accountable. This could be accomplished
by assigning an academic grade, as West Point does, or by requiring a cadet to pass a
grade standard before moving up to the next class year or graduating. The current system
at The Citadel has few consequences for cadets who perform poorly in leader
development.
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Recommendation 10: Follow a Best-Practice Model
Military colleges are faced with strikingly similar situations in cadet behavior.
The military part of all military academies and colleges, whether federal, state, or private,
consist of exactly the same functional systems. The excuse that the fourth class system
cannot be changed because of minor differences between military colleges is not a valid
position. Military colleges are vastly more alike than different, making it advisable to
adapt a best-practice model, such as West Point. The employees at The Citadel need to
be educated about their mission in the organizational change. They also need to
understand that they will be held responsible for their part in the organizational change,
regardless of the number of hours it takes to accomplish the change.
Recommendations for the Commandant of Cadets

Recommendation 1: Educate, Train, and Certify TACs
Tactical Officers (TACs) are critical change agents necessary for successful
organizational culture change at any military college. Their education and training at The
Citadel must be designed to include a solid background in leader development. TACs
must be able to meet minimum certification standards that ensure that they all operate
from a common basis of leader development. Their education should also include a
leader development sustainment education program while they are employed at The
Citadel. This should be tied to a tiered compensation system that provides additional pay
for additional skills in leadership development.
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Recommendation 2: Create a Cadet Leader Distribution Plan
The Citadel should establish A Cadet Leader Distribution Plan that would
scramble the rising junior class. This will break the cycle of friendship that occurs with
cadets in the current model, in which 21 company fraternal organizations create their own
rules and regulations:
When cadets resolved the conflict in favor of the friendship, the opportunity to
gain in the practice of leadership was foregone. However, it was noted that, by
one scramble of a cadet class between their Third and Second Class year, the
relationships between all classes in a company at the beginning of the academic
year would be uncomplicated by former, long-standing friendships. The First
Class would not know the Second, the Second would not know the Third, and
none of them would know the Fourth (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 32).
Scrambling will eliminate the cycle of fraternal companies, where unwritten company
rules prevail, creating a much stronger Corps of Cadets who will follow the Corps
regulations.
Recommendation 3: Recognize that Change Begins at the Top

Organizational culture change must begin at the top rather than with the cadets.
Research substantiates this. Organizational change at West Point, a best-practice model,
began with a plan that involved change agents who directed, coached, taught, educated,
and mentored cadets about the organizational culture change. Change at the Citadel will
never occur if left to cadets. Waiting for 18 to 22 year old cadets with little experience in
leadership development to become change agents is fruitless. As in academics, the cadets
must be led, educated, and trained on what the organizational culture change is before
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they will understand and embrace it. The leaders of The Citadel need to initiate
organizational culture change.
Recommendation 4: Rotate Cadet Ranks and Positions

In a developmental system, all upper class cadets need the opportunity to develop
subordinates. Its impossible to become a principled leader without having led anyone
during your cadet career. It is recommended that all sophomores be promoted to corporal
and assigned freshmen cadets. These sophomores would be graded on how well they
developed their subordinates. In the same way, all juniors would be promoted to
sergeants and assigned sophomores and freshmen to develop, and all seniors would be
promoted to officers and assigned juniors, sophomores, and freshmen cadets to develop.
Cadets with discipline issues would lose rank and return to freshmen privileges.
Leadership positions would be rotated each semester in order to evaluate and develop
cadets in a number of different Corps of Cadets positions. Currently the Corps
leadership remains the same throughout the year, affording cadets with few opportunities
to learn various leadership positions in the Corps. The current model also results in burnout of those selected to lead the entire year.
Recommendation 5: Recognize Freshmen By Corps Day

The Citadel should follow the recommendations of most of the fourth class
committees appointed by Citadel Presidents to investigate and improve the fourth class
system. Almost all recommended moving Recognition Day to Corps Day:
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Corps Day is the birthday of the South Carolina Corps of Cadets, and is one of the
most highly attended weekends at The Citadel. Attractions include dress parades,
awards presentations, special cadet performances and athletic events. A highlight
is the mess hall birthday celebration in which the oldest alumnus and the youngest
cadet share cake-cutting honors (The Citadel, 2013).
Corps Day is usually held on a weekend in March. Almost all other military colleges
have studied the issue and moved up their Recognition Day to earlier in the second
semester of the freshmen year. This makes sense, since the freshman year goals and
objectives have clearly been met by Corps Day; it also raises morale. Celebrating
Recognition Day later in the freshmen year provides few, if any, benefits.
Recommendation 6: Reduce Freshmen Mess Hall Requirements

All military colleges, including The Citadel and West Point, have had issues with
the Mess Hall. The only way to effectively deal with the Mess Hall issues is to reduce
the freshmen requirements in the Mess Hall to just one the ban on talking. Then, The
Citadel must enforce this regulation.
Recommendation 7: Appoint a Regimental Tactical Officer

When The Citadel had only eight TACs, it was feasible for the Commandant of
Cadets to supervise the TACs. The Citadel now has twenty-six TACs in addition to five
battalion TACs as supervisors. Consequently, the Commandants Department and the
Corps of Cadets have grown too large for the Commandant to effectively manage the
daily operations of the TACs. The Commandant needs to be engaged in the strategic and
operational aspects of the department and the college, and does not have adequate time to
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supervise the tactical control of the TACs. Appointing a Regimental Tactical Officer
would enable the TACs to receive more effective guidance and direction. Since TACs
are one of the critical change agents for the Corps of Cadets, this recommendation is vital
to ensure successful organizational culture change.
Closing
West Point has demonstrated that despite more than 150 years of tradition, an
attritional/adversarial system can undergo a successful organizational culture change to a
four class leadership development system. The resulting improvements included
improved and more realistic leadership skills learned by the graduating cadets; a better
first year experience for cadets, creating a more positive environment; less attrition of
freshmen cadets, and a significant decrease in abusive behavior and hazing.
The Citadel has a moral and ethical responsibility to both their current and future
parents and cadets to study similar fourth class systems that existed for a long period of
time that underwent a successful organizational culture change, such as West Points.
Failure to study the proven strategies or to follow a best-practice model of organizational
culture change would be a moral and ethical failure on the part of the institution.
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APPENDIX A: THE WEST POINT CASE STUDY INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Organizational Cultural Change of the Fourth Class System at West Point

Time of Interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewee:
Questions:
1. Would you please describe the fourth class system that existed in the 70s and
80s at West Point?
2. Would you please describe the fourth class system in the 90s at West Point?
3. Did a change take place at West Point?
4. Who were the main actors who caused this change?
5. Specifically, what did they change?
6. How were actors who resisted the change handled?
7. Can you describe the sense of direction provided by the leadership at West
Point? The Superintendent? The Commandant?
8. Was there a sense of urgency?
9. What was the role of TACs in this change?
10. What was the importance of TAC officer education in this change?
11. How were the cadets approached about this change?
12. What was the importance of cadet education in the change?
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13. What role did the counseling center play in this change?
14. How is this change working today at West Point?
15. Who should I speak to in order to find out more about this cultural change?
16. Where could I find documents that would substantiate West Points policies on
this change?
17. Thank you for participating in this interview.
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APPENDIX B: THE CITADEL CASE STUDY INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Past and Present Status of The Citadels Fourth Class System

Time of Interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewee:
Questions:
1. Would you please describe the fourth class system that existed at The Citadel in
the 70s and 80s?
2. Would you please describe the fourth class system in the 90s at The Citadel?
3. Would you please describe the fourth class system today at The Citadel?
4. Who were the main actors in the fourth class system?
5. Specifically, how were the actors involved?
6. How were actors who resisted the change handled?
7. Can you describe the sense of direction provided by the leadership at The
Citadel? The President? The Commandant?
8. Was there a sense of urgency?
9. What was the role of TACs in this change?
10. What was the importance of TAC officer education in this change?
11. How were the cadets approached about this change?
12. What was the importance of cadet education in the fourth class system?
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13. What role has the counseling center played in the fourth class system?
14. How is the fourth class system working at The Citadel today?
15. Who should I speak to in order to find out more about the fourth class system at
The Citadel?
16. Where could I find documents that would substantiate The Citadels policies on
the fourth class system?
17. Thank you for participating in this interview.
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF WEST POINT INTERVIEWS
1.
Retired Brig. Gen. Lance Betros, US Army, Ph.D, Department Head of History
(2005-2012), 18 October 2013.
2.
Retired Lt. Col. Bob Byrne, US Army, Ph.D, Head of the Cadet Counseling
Center (1998-2004), 20 March 2013. **
3.
Retired Col. Arthur Coumbe, US Army, Professor of Social Sciences (2011present), 10 April 2013.
4.
Retired Col. Larry Donnithorne, US Army, Ph.D, Chief of Leader Development

Integration (1989-1993), 16 October 2013.
5.
Retired Brig. Gen. Barney Forsythe, US Army, PhD, Professor of Behavioral

Science & Leadership, Vice Dean for Education (1994-2005), 14 October 2013.
6.
Retired Col. Joe LeBoeuf, US Army, Ph.D, Professor of Behavioral Science &
Leadership, Director of the Eisenhower Tactical Officer Education Program
(1993-2003), 21 March 2013.
7.
Retired Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer, US Army, Superintendent (1986-1991),

9 October 2013.
8.
Retired Brig. Gen. Howard Prince, US Army, Ph.D, Head of Behavioral

Sciences & Leadership, (1976-1993), 8 October 2013.
9.
Retired Col. Scott Snook, US Army, Ph.D, Professor of Behavioral Science &
Leadership (1995-2002), 16 October 2013.
10.
Retired Col. Gregory Stone, US Army, Brigade Tactical Officer (2004-2007),

13 September 2013. **
11.
Retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart, US Army, Head of Strategic Planning for the
Commandant of Cadets (1993-2003), 9 October 2013. **
12.
Retired Col. Will Wilson, US Army, Ph.D, Head of the Cadet Counseling
Center (1978-1993), 28 March 2013.
** denotes assignment at West Point and The Citadel
147
APPENDIX D: LIST OF THE CITADEL INTERVIEWS
1.
Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Sylvan Bauer, US Army, Command Sergeant Major
(1996-present), 2 October 2013.
2.
Brig. Gen. Harry Carter, Unorganized Militia of South Carolina, Provost (19992005, 2006-2007), Director of Krause Leadership Center (2010), 9 September 2013.
3.
Retired Maj. Gen. John Grinalds, US Marine Corps, President (1997- 2004), 24
September 2013.
4.
Brig. Gen. Sam Hines, Unorganized Militia of South Carolina, Provost (2008present), 25 September 2013.
5.
Retired Col. Leo Mercado, US Marine Corps, Commandant of Cadets (2009present), 18 September 2013.
6.
Col. Steve Nida, Unorganized Militia of South Carolina, Department Head of

Psychology (2002-2009, 2012-present), 4 November 2013.
7.
Retired Maj. Gen. Cliff Poole, US Army, Interim President (1996-1997, 2005),
Provost (1993-1996), Director of Krause Leadership Center (2011), 8 October
2013.
8.
Retired Lt. Gen. John Rosa, US Air Force, President (2006-present), 14 November
2013.
9.
Retired Col. Greg Stone, US Army, Commandant of Cadets (2006-2009), 13

September 2013. **
10.
Retired Col. Joe Trez, US Army, Commandant of Cadets (1997), Director of Staff
(1999-2012), Director of Krause Leadership Center (2012-present), 6 September
2013.
11.
Retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart, US Army, Director of Krause Leadership Initiative,
Director of the Krause Center (2003-2010), 9 October 2013. **
** denotes assignment at West Point and The Citadel
148
APPENDIX E: CODING AND TRIANGULATION MATRIX
A-1
A-2
A-4
A-5
A-6
A-7
A-8
A-9
A-10
A-11
A-12
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$L X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
Col. Will Wilson
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
Col. Scott Snook
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
Col. Larry Donnithorne
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
L
X**$
L
X**$
L
X**$
L
X**$
L
X**$
L
X**$
L
X**$
L
X**S
L
Brig. Gen. Howard

Prince
Brig. Gen. Lance Betros
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
Brig. Gen. Barney

Forsythe
Col. Joe LeBoeuf
X**$
West Point
Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer
Col. Gregory Stone
X**$
Col. Arthur Coumbe
X**$
Lt. Col. Bob Byrne
A-3
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
149
A-1
The Citadel
Lt. Gen. John Rosa
Maj. Gen. John Grinalds
Maj. Gen Cliff Poole
Brig. Gen. Sam Hines
Brig. Gen. Harry Carter
Col. Leo Mercado
Col. Steve Nida
Col. Gregory Stone
Col. Joe Trez
Lt. Col. Jeff Weart
CSM Sylvan Bauer
CODES:
A-1:
A-2:
A-3:
A-2
A-3
A-4
A-5
A-6
A-7
X$
X**$
X**$
X$
X$
X$
X$
X$
X$
X$
X$
X**
A-8
A-9
A-10
A-11
X**$
X$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
X**$
The sense of urgency and direction from the top leadership of West Point/The Citadel
The education and training of the Tactical Officers (TACs) at West Point/The Citadel
The role of the Cadet Counseling Center in the organizational change at West Point/The Citadel
KOTTERS STEPS:
A-4:
Establishing a Sense of Urgency
A-5:
Creating the Guiding Coalition
A-6:
Developing a Vision and Strategy
A-7:
Communicating the Change Vision
A-8:
Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action
A-9:
Generating Short Term Wins
A-10:
Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change
A-11:
Anchoring New Changes in the Culture
A-12:
Management versus Leadership
SYMBOLS:
**: Confirmed by document (triangulation)
$:
Confirmed by separate interview
M: Management
L: Leadership
A-12
M
L
L
M
M
M
M
150
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Organizational Culture Change at A Military College From An Attritional/Adversarial Model To A Developmental Model

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iii

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE AT A MILITARY COLLEGE FROM AN

Dean, Graduate School of Education:

Kevin Casey Dopf

Military colleges have various points of commonality, such as some type of

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Student Development and the First Year Experience

The First Year Experience at a Traditional Military College

Fourth Class Culture Change at West Point and The Citadel

Looking at Organizational Culture Change Through the Prism

Instruments of Data Collection

Expertise and Background of the Researcher

Limitations of the Study

CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY OF WEST POINTS FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM:

Historical Incremental Change

1976 to 1985: Enabling Change

Organizational Culture Change Inception

Facilitating a Leadership Development Model

Tactical Officer Education System

Cadet Schedule Modification

Establishing a Leadership Integration Team

Cadet Leadership Development System (CLDS)

Table 4.2: Cadet Development Under the Fourth Class System

Table 4.3: Cadet Development Under CLDS

Scrambling vs. the Cohort Model

Leadership Development Masters Degree

Adjustments for the Fourth Class

Leadership Change and Preserving Organizational Culture Change

Sustaining Organizational Culture Change

Effectiveness of Organizational Culture Change for West Point

Resistance to Organizational Culture Change

A Lengthy Path to Full Implementation

Resources Needed for Organizational Culture Change

Leaders Leading Organizational Culture Change

Table 4.4: Changes in Values and Norms

CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY OF THE CITADELS FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM:

Call for Organizational Culture Change

1979-1997: Preserving the Status Quo

1997-2004: Enabling Change

2004-2006: Marching in Place

2006-Present: Incremental Change

Table 5.1: Organizational Chart for the Krause Center

Table 5.2: Timeline for Leadership Development

New Proposals Receive Little Traction

Resistance to Organizational Culture Change

Table 5.3: The Citadels Governance Organizational Structure

CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS

Kotters Eight Stage Change Process

Stage 1: Establishing a Sense of Urgency

Stage 2: Creating the Guiding Coalition

Stage 3: Developing a Vision and Strategy

Stage 4: Communicating the Change Vision

Stage 5: Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action

Stage 6: Generating Short-Term Wins

Stage 7: Consolidating Gains and Producing More Gains

Stage 8: Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture

Conclusions From My Research

Recommendations for The Citadels BOV and President

Recommendation 1: Act Now

Recommendation 2: Change Tactics from Incrementalism

Recommendation 3: Adopt and Maintain a Change Theory