TheSeeminglyQuixotic,butRemarkablyEffective,

JourneyofaSmallBandofExtremeIslamists
AndWhyItSeemsAsIfTheyAreWinning,WhenTheyMayNotBe

InstituteForTheStudyofInsurgentWarfare
isiw.noblogs.org

TableofContents
Introduction

Background

FromAlQaedainIraqtotheAnbarAwakening

CivilWar,TheRiseofMalikiandtheInstitutionalizationofSectarianism

TheWithdrawalofAmericanTroops,theRevolutioninSyria,theArabSpringinIraq

10

TheCurrentSituationandItsMisconceptions

18

ImplicationsandPossibleScenarios

26

HowASmallOrganizationCanDestabilizeaRegionandtheFlawsIn
ThisApproach(forISILandtheAttempttoReimposeControl)

35

References

45

Introduction
OverthepastweeksthenewshasbeendominatedbythediscussionoftheadvancesoftheIslamicStateofIraqand
Levant(ISIL,alsoknownasISIS,TheIslamicStateofIraqandasSham/Syria)throughIraq,theapparenteasewith
whichthishasoccurred,andthevirtualabsenceofanyconcertedresistancefromanIraqimilitarythatwastrainedand
armedthroughanexpensiveandarduousUSmilitaryprogram.ThecommonnarrativeintheWesternmediahasbeen
centeredaroundtheextremismofISIL,theirsupposedmilitaryprowess,thethreatthattheorganizationposes
domesticallytotheUnitedStates,andthepotentialforUSmilitaryinterventioninresponse.Therehavebeenother
voices,largelyinthethinktankcommunity,thathavebeenattemptingtoinjectanelementofnuance,througha
discussionoftheconstellationoffightingforcesontheground,adiscussionofthepoliticalhistorybehindtherecent
uprising,andsomeofthepossibleregionaldynamicsatwork,butthesehavebeenlargelyignored.Thisseemstobea
resultoftheopacityoftheentirediscourse,thedensityoftherecenthistoryinthearea,andthecomplexityofthe
situationontheground.However,withoutthissortofbackgroundthecurrenteventsseemtohavesprungfrom
nothingness.

Asthedominantnarrativegoes,theUSmilitarydrewdownforcesfromIraqin2010aftersucceedingintheirmissionto
stabilizethepoliticalstructurethatresultedfromtheUSinvasionandoccupationofthecountryin2003.Thereare
clearlyissueswiththisnarrative,issuesthatarecleartoanyonethathasbeenfollowingeventsinIraqcloselyforthe
pastdecade,butevenwheredoubtaboutthisnarrativehaspersistedthereisstillasensethatthepastfewyearshave
beenrelativelystableinIraq.Hiddenbythisnarrativeisnotonlythepoliticalresentmentthathasbeenaccelerating
since2010,culminatinginaprotestandoccupationmovementthatwasviolentlydispersedintheearlypartof2014,but
alsothequietreorganizationthathasbeenundertakenbyanumberofinsurgentgroups,aswellasthedynamicsofa
regionthatischaracterizedbyfalsebordersthattraversevastswathsofopendesert,aregionthathasbeeninaprocess
ofpoliticalupheavalforthepastthreeyears,particularlyinSyriaandborderingregionsofIraq.

ToreallyunderstandthemediaphenomenathatisnowtermedISILwehavetofirstbeclearaboutsomepoints.
PrimaryamongtheseisthemultiplicityofforcesthatarearrayedwithinIraq,specificallythetribalcouncils,most
importantlyintheruralnorthandeastofthecountry,Kurdishgroups,andthemyriadoforganizationsparticipatingin
thecurrentinsurrection,whichhaslargely,thoughinaccurately,beenattributedcompletelytoISIL.Butbefore
discussingISILandthecurrentarrayofforcesaroundIraqwewillreturntoaperiodbeforeISILoranyofitsprevious

incarnationsexisted,toMay22,2003,whenPaulBremersignedCoalitionProvisionalAuthorityOrderNumber2
disbandingtheIraqimilitaryandplacing400,000peoplewitharmsandmilitarytrainingoutofwork.Thismoveis
widelyconsideredtohavesetthestagefortheIraqiinsurgencyagainsttheUSoccupationforces,beginningatrajectory
thatwouldmovefromresistancetooccupationthroughsectariancivilwar,thefoundingofAlQaedainIraqandthe
sectarianmilitias,thecollapseofAQIfromUScounterinsurgency,theAnbarAwakening(amovementwhichhad
muchtodowithAmericanfundingofemployment)andthebetrayaloftheAwakeningmembersbyfirsttheUSand
thentheMalikiregime.

Itisinthisbackgroundthatwecanunderstandhowasmallorganization,lessthan5,000fightersbymostestimates,
hascometobethemostdominantmilitaryforceinanarearoughlythesizeofIndianainwhichtherearetensof
thousandsofinsurgentsandanynumberofregimeforces,andhowtheycouldlaunchalightningstrikeofsuchspeed
andferocity.WithoutthisbackgrounditwouldalmostseemasifISILisaninvincibleforce,impervioustodefeat,with
unlimitedresourcesandnumbersthatvastlyoutweightheactuallevelsofforcethattheyareabletodeploy.ISILis
veryadeptintheuseofguerrillatactics,andmanyfighterswithintheirrankshavepreviousexperienceininsurgent
conflictinIraq,Syria,orChechnya,amongotherplaces,butitisnotpossibletounderstandthedynamicsofthecurrent
conflictwithoutexaminingtheirtacticsthroughoneessentiallens;theyarereallygoodatprojectingforce,expanding
capacityandmovingthroughspacequickly.Thisapproach,thoughhighlyeffectivecurrently,generatesawidely
dispersedforcedependentonotherelementsforitssuccess.Thestrategybecomesdifficulttomaintainafteracommon
objectivedissipates,andmakesimpossibletheinevitableattempttomoveontoconstitutethestate.Statebuilding
requiresoccupying,holdingandpolicingspace,andmuchhigherconcentrationsofforcethanISILiscurrentlyableto
mobilize.ButbeforemovingaheadinthisanalysisitisimportanttoestablisheventsstartingfromMarch19,2003,a
daymanyofuswhowereactiveatthetimeremember,thedaythatShockandAwebeganinIraq.

Background
FromAlQaedainIraqtotheAnbarAwakening
TounderstandtheriseofISILwemustbeginwithAlQaedainIraq,andtounderstandthatstoryitisimportantto
workthroughtwothreads,threadswhichconvergeinIraqin2003.OnefollowsthehistoryofUSsupportforIsrael,
involvementinarmingthemujahedeeninAfghanistanintheirfightagainsttheSoviets,thefirstGulfWarandthe
sanctionsthatfollowed,theinvasionofAfghanistanafterSeptember11,andtheinvasionofIraqin2003.Thisisawell
chronicledpath;ifonewouldliketolookfurtherIwouldsuggestreadingGhostWarsbyStephenColl.

Thesecondpath,deeplyentwinedwiththefirst,isthepathofamannamedAbuMasabalZarqawi,aJordanianformer
streetcriminalwho,uponhisreleasefromaJordanianprisoninthelateeightiesgoestoAfghanistantofightagainstthe
Soviets.OnhisreturntoJordanintheearlyninetiesheisarrestedonchargesofpossessingfirearmsandexplosivesand
imprisonedforsixyears.DuringthistimeinprisonZarqawibeginsorganizingSalafiprisoners,settingthestageforthe
paththatwillleadhimtoIraq.Uponhisreleasein1999hefoundsanorganizationcalledalTawhidwalJihadandis
quicklyimplicatedinanattempttobombahotelfrequentedbyAmericansandIsraelis,leadinghimtofleetoPeshawar,
Pakistan.InPakistanhebeginstoorganizefighters,andcrossestheborderintoAfghanistantostartatrainingcamp
alongthenorthwesternborderwithIran,whichbymostaccountsspecializesinbombmakingandpoisoningtactics.
WhentheUSinvasionofAfghanistancommencesZarqawifleesthecountry,likelyendingupintheKurdishareasof
northwesternIraq.InSeptember2002hereturnstoJordanforashortperiod,leavingquicklyafterLawrenceFoley,the
USambassadortoJordan,isassassinated,andcrossesbackintoIraq,settingupinFallujah.AftertheUSinvasionof
Iraq,andthebeginningofalowlevelinsurgencybyasmallnumberofIraqis,Zarqawiorganizesfighterstobeginto
escalateattacksagainsttheforeignoccupation.1

InAugustof2003ZarqawiandassociatesinalTawhidwalJihadbombtheUNheadquartersinBaghdadandbegina
campaignofkidnappingandbeheadingforeignoperatives,includingNicolasBerg,andfilmingtheexecutionsfor
propagandapurposes.AttacksalsobegintoescalateagainstIraqigoverningcouncilmembersandthenascentsecurity
forcesinthecountry.Duringthistime,theIraqimilitaryisdisbanded,withhundredsofthousandsofformersoldiers,
manystillinpossessionoftheirweapons,putoutofwork.This,combinedwiththeeconomiccollapsethatquickly
followedtheinvasion,generatesadesperatesituation,madeworsewhentheCoalitionProvisionalAuthorityends
1

Smith; Timeline: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/08/iraq.alqaida1

formerIraqigovernmentsocialserviceprograms,suchasthedisbursementoffoodrations,thathadbeenorganized
duringthesanctionsregimethatpersistedfromtheendoftheGulfWartothebeginningofthe2003invasion.This
leadstoamultilayeredinsurgency,withanumberoforganizations,smallmilitiasandtribalgroupsparticipatingin
overlappingways.Zarqawiandhisassociatesfunctionasacoreofspecializedfighters,oneofmany;whatsetsthem
apartistheirtargetset.Ratherthanattackingtrooppatrols,checkpointsandlowlevelenforcersoftheoccupation,al
TawhidwalJihadtargetstheinfrastructureofforeignoccupationthroughtheuseoftacticsthatgeneratepsychological
terrorratherthanmaterialdisruption,pressuringUNemployeesandsecuritycontractorstoeitherlimitoperationsto
moresecureareasorcurtailoperationsaltogether.2

ThepaceofconflictacceleratesdramaticallyduetoeventsinFallujahinAprilof2003.Fallujahhadrevoltedagainst
theHusseinregimeonanumberofoccasions,andtheUSstationedveryfewtroopsintheareaasaresult,assuming
thatanyinsurgencywouldbecarriedoutbylatentremnantsoftheBaathParty.Adetachmentoftroopsfromthe82 nd
AirborneentersthecityonApril23,2003andoccupiesaschooltouseasaforwardoperatingbaseandorganizational
center.Aroundnightfallagroupofdemonstratorsgathersaroundtheschooltodemandthatthetroopsvacatethe
buildingandallowittoopenasaschoolagain.Asthedemonstrationwearsonthetroops,nowoccupyingtherooftop,
begintofireteargasinanattempttodispersethecrowd.Somewithinthecrowdbeganthrowingrocksandfiring
weaponsattheschool,whichresultsinahalfhourlongexchangeofgunfire,killing17demonstratorsandwounding
over70.Threedayslaterademonstrationagainsttheoccupationofthecityisfiredon,leadingtothedeathsofthree
moredemonstrators.ByJuneAmericanpatrolsareunderfrequentattackwithinthecity,asarethelocalpolice,leading
toAmericantroopswithdrawingtofirebasesontheoutskirtsofthecitybythebeginningof2004.

Interestingly,averysimilardynamicisplayingitselfoutinMosularoundthesametime,acityunderthecommandof
GeneralDavidPetraeus,andthesiteoftheprimaryexperimentincounterinsurgencytacticsinIraq.Inbothsituations
theparadoxesofcounterinsurgencybecomereadilyapparent.Counterinsurgencyrequirescloseproximitybetweenan
occupiedpopulationandanoccupyingforce,aproximitythattheoccupiersusetobothgatherintelligenceonpossible
threats,andbuildallianceswithlocalpowerbrokersformutualbenefit.Thiscloseproximityalsogeneratesalevelof
conflict,avisibilityofoccupation,thepresenceofcheckpoints,convoys,patrols,etc.,leavingoccupyingtroopsopento
attack.Evenasingleattackforcesoccupationtroopstoadoptamoredefensiveposture,creatingdistancefromthe
2

Rosen, 2010

samepopulationfromwhichtheyareattemptingtoextractinformationandcoopt.Thisdistancenotonlycaststhe
streetasanopaquespace,onethatoccupationforceshaveadifficulttimepenetrating,butalsocreatesamaterial
conflict,aneasydifferentiationbetweenfriendsandenemies.Ascountermeasuresbegintobetakenbyoccupation
forces,therateofattacksincreases,leadingtoescalatedcounterattacks,feedingadynamicofconflictthataccelerates
andspreadsoutgeographically.InthecaseofMosulthisleadstothewallingoffofthecityfromtheoutside,the
settingupofcheckpointsandcameras,andtheconversionofthecityintoagiganticprison.InFallujahAmerican
troopsrespondbypullingoutofthecity,settingupfirebasesontheoutskirts,andlaunchinglightningraidsintothe
city,settingthestagefortheeventsofMarch31,2004.3

OnthisdayfoursecuritycontractorsfromBlackwaterareambushedastheyattempttomoveinanarmedconvoy
throughthecenterofthecity.Theirvehiclesareburned,thebodiespulledout,filmed,anddraggedthroughthestreets
beforebeinghungfromabridge.TheattackmakesinternationalnewsandpromptsadramaticAmericanmilitary
responsethatbecomesknownastheFirstBattleofFallujah,amilitarycampaignwhichinvolvestheblockadingofthe
city,theexpulsionofresidentsnotconsideredtobefightersbytheUSmilitary,andthesystematicbombingand
shellingofthecity,killinghundreds.Theseeventscatalyzethepublicriseoftwoorganizationsthatwillsoonplayan
integralroleinthewar,theMahdiArmy,aShiaextremistgroupledbyMuqtadaalSadr,andthegrowthand
metamorphosisofalTawhidwalJihadintoAlQaedainIraq4.Thisconcurrentrisehappensfordifferentreasons,but
centersonacommontrenddevelopinginIraq.TheinvasionanddestructionofmuchofFallujahissymptomaticofan
approachbecomingfashionablewithinUSmilitarycirclesusingoverwhelmingforcetocrushresistancemovements
thatarebasedinlocalizedstructuresandgrievances.Moreformalorganizations,suchasAlQaedainIraqortheMahdi
Army,aremoretheexceptionthantherule;butinthefalloutfromthestrategyofoverwhelmingforcebothgroups
begintogaintraction.

TheMahdiArmy,thelargestofanumberofsectarianShiaorganizations,whoalongwiththeBadrBrigadesand
Kata'ibHizbollah,amongothers,hadbeguntoengageinresistance,sometimesfundedandtrainedbyelementsofthe
Iranianmilitaryandintelligenceapparatus,almostimmediatelyaftertheinvasion.Thisresistancebeginsintensify
duringthefightinginFallujah,withtheclosingofaSadrownednewspaperinAprilof2004,beginningthetrajectory
ofeventsthatwillleadtoanarmeduprisingconsumingtheSadrCityareaofBaghdadandNajaf,amongotherplaces,
3
4

Kaplan, 2013
Rosen, 2010

largelysoutheastofBaghdadtotheIranianborder.Atthesametime,asadirectresultoftheassaultonFallujah,Sunni
dominatedorganizations,includingAlQaedainIraq,andorganizationstiedtotheformerBaathistregimebeginto
recruitmorefighters,andinsurgentactivityincreaseswithinSunnidominatedareasofBaghdadandthenorthandwest
ofthecountry.Thesetwoparalleltrajectoriesofresistancetakeonincreasingmagnitude,withthepaceofthe
insurgencyaccelerating,untilapointin2006whentheycollide,withhorrendousconsequences.5

CivilWar,TheRiseofMalikiandtheInstitutionalizationofSectarianism
InJanuaryof2005attacksarecarriedoutonpollingplacesandpoliticalcandidatesforthenewNationalAssembly,
whichistaskedwithdraftinganewIraqiconstitution.AmongthoseelectedtothisassemblyisNourialMaliki,a
politicianfromthesectarianShiaDawaPartyandmemberoftheDeBaathificationCommittee.Malikiwillgoonto
servenumerousstintsasPrimeMinister,arisethatwillbeexplainedasthestoryproceeds.InSeptemberofthatyear,
asthegovernmentbeginstoorganizetheOctoberreferendumonthedraftconstitution,AlQaedainIraqseizesthe
townofQaim,whichliesontheborderofSyriaandIraq,whichitintendstouseasamobilizationbaseforoperations
todisruptthereferendum.InacommuniqueAlQaedainIraqdeclareswarontheShiamajority,adeclarationthatit
wouldbegintoactonquickly.

AftertheDecemberparliamentaryelections,whichresultinamajorityfortheUnitedIraqiParty,aShiapoliticalbloc,
thesectarianwarthreatenedbyAlQaedainIraqbeginswiththebombingofsitesaroundKarbala,aswellasapolice
stationinnorthernBaghdad,killing130largelyShiacivilians.ConcurrentlywiththisoffensiveAlQaedainIraq
announcesthelaunchoftheShuraCounciloftheMujahedeen,acoalitionthatostensiblycombinesthelargelyforeign
forcesinAlQaedainIraqwiththemorelocalizedforcesofotherSunniIslamistorganizationsandtribalgroups.
Sectarianviolencebeginstoincreasearoundthecountry,culminatingintheactthatiswidelycreditedwithbeginning
themasssectariankillingsthatcharacterizedthecivilwarinIraq,thebombingoftheAlAskarimosqueinSamarraon
February22,2006.Theresultingfirestormquicklyengulfstheentirecountry,withsectarianmilitiasroutinelybombing
publicplaces,killingfamilies,andkidnappinghundredsoffthestreets,manyofwhomwouldturnupdeaddayslater
withclearsignsoftorture.ThereactiontothisbombingfacilitatestheriseofMaliki,leadstothesectariansegregation
oflargeareasofIraqthroughethniccleansing,andgivesbirthtothebattlefielddynamicsthatcharacterizetoday's
conflict.
5

Rosen, 2010

AlQaedainIraqmadethedecisiontobombtheAlAskarimosqueagainsttheadviceofOsamaBinLaden.Through
thepublicationofaseriesofletterscapturedinraidsandinterceptswegetaninterestingglimpseintotheinner
workingsandstrategicdifferencesofthenetworksofforeignfightersthatemergedfromtheconflictsinAfghanistan
andIraq,expandedintoYemen,Somalia,andpartsofnorthernAfrica,andusesthebrandofAlQaedaasanorganizing
andlogisticalhubandmoniker.Inoneoftheinterceptedcommunicationsisanexchangethatoccurredbetween
February2004andJune2005inwhichZarqawiandBinLaden,throughanaidegoingbythenameAtiyah(likely
AtiyahAbdalRahman),discussedthestrategiceffectivenessofgeneratingasectarianconflictinIraq.Zarqawiargues,
inaletterinterceptedinFebruary2004,thatthecreationofacivilwarwouldgenerateascenariowheretheUS
occupationforceswouldbecaughtinthemiddleofageneralconflagrationbetweenwarringfactions,unabletoact
withoutbeingseenastakingsidesandgeneratingmoreanimosity,animositywhichwouldfurtherfueltheinsurgency 6.
Inhisresponse,likelywritteninDecember2005andcapturedafterZarqawi'sdeathinJune2006,Atiyaharguesthat
thismaywellbethecase,butthatintheprocessAlQaedawouldloseanyhopeofgatheringpublicsupport,a
predictionthatwouldprovetoberemarkablyaccurate7.

Asthebodycountspiralsoutofcontrol,withhundredsturningupdeadeachmorning,dynamicsbegintoplayout
whichwillproveintegraltoboththeendingoftheUSoccupationandtheriseofNourialMaliki,besidessettingthe
stageforthecurrentcrisis.InApril2006PrimeMinisterIbrahimalJafaariisforcedtostepdownamidstaccusationsof
sectarianismbySunniandKurdishpoliticians.AfterhisdismissaltheCIAbeginstoscreencandidatesfromvarious
ShiapoliticalpartiesforconnectionstotheIranianregime.AttheendofthisprocessNourialMalikiistheoneleft
standing,andispromptlyappointedtobeJafaari'sreplacementasPrimeMinister.WiththeappointmentofMalikia
concertedcampaignagainstSunniinsurgentgroupsbeginsinearnest,throughacombinationofAmericanandIraqi
securityandmilitaryforces.ThisinitiativedrivesSunniinsurgentgroupsoutofmanyofthecitiesthattheyhadbeen
occupying,butalsobeginstwootherdistinctprocesses.Firstly,intheattempttobolsterIraqisecurityforcesMaliki
drawsfromelementshecancounton,thesectarianShiafightersoftheMahdiArmyandBadrBrigade.Thisresultsin
sectariankillingsacceleratingintandemwithcombatagainstSunniinsurgents.Maliki'snewrecruitscarryouta
campaignofethniccleansing,withmanypolice,soldiersandministersbeingdirectlycomplicitinkidnapping,torture
6
7

Letter, Zarqawi to Bin Laden, Intercepted and Translated By The Coalition Provisional Authority; Accessed
6/29/2014 from http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm
Atiyah's Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation), Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Accessed 6/29/14
from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/atiyahs-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2

andmurderonanabsolutelyserialscale.ThisdrivesmanySunniciviliansintoextremistresistanceorganizations,
includingAlQaedainIraq.TheseorganizationsthenexploittheirincreasingnumberstoimposecontroloverSunni
areas,oftenthroughtheintimidationandkillingofopponents.TheincreasingviolenceinSunnicommunities,coming
bothfromtheirownprotectorsandShiadeathsquads,resultsinabacklash,aninitiativethatbecomesknownasthe
SonsofIraq.8

TheSonsofIraqarisein2005onalocalizedlevel,withanapproachbyIraqitribestoalocalMarinecommander,
askingforassistanceinexpellingAlQaedainIraqfromtheareaafteraseriesofactionsthatwereperceivedas
disrespectful.Assectarianviolenceincreasesthroughout2006andinto2007theoccupationforcesnoticeadistinct
problem;theycannotfunctioninlocalareaswithoutexposingthemselvestoattack,andtheIraqisecurityforcesare
hopelesslysectarian.Theyneedanalternative.Atthistimecounterinsurgencydoctrineisgrowingmorepopular
withinUSmilitarycommandcircles,centeringontheattempttocooptlocalforces,bothtogeneratesupportforthe
occupationandtoidentifyboththereconcilableandirreconcilableelementswithintheresistance.Drawingfromlocal
initiatives,theUScreatesaprogramtoarmandpaylocalciviliansandformerinsurgentstofightagainstirredeemable
Sunnirebels,termedtheSonsofIraqortheAwakeningMovement.Thisstrategycarriesaninherentdangerforthe
generalprojectoftheUSoccupationofIraq,whichwasostensiblytocreatetheconditionsforasustainablestate
structuretofunction.AwakeningMovementfightersaremeanttofightotherSunnimilitants,whileignoringthe
atrocitiescommittedbyShiadeathsquads.Theirarmsandtrainingcouldbeturnedeasilyagainsttheverystatethatthe
USisattemptingtopropup,astatewhichisdirectlycomplicitinethniccleansingandmassmurderofciviliansin
Sunnineighborhoodsandtowns.Thisscenariowouldcometopassinthenottoodistantfuture.

IntheattempttoensuretheirloyaltytheAwakeninggroupsareguaranteedacertainvoiceinthepoliticalprocess,
placementinthesecurityforces,andguaranteedcommandpositionswithinamultiethnicmilitaryandsecurity
apparatus,butendupbetrayed.Thebeginningoftheerosionofthisagreement,andanothercentralingredientto
understandingthecurrentunrest,appearsatapivotalpointin2007.Between2006and2007Maliki'scontroloverthe
militaryissomewhatlimited.HedoesnotholdthepostofCommanderinChief,andisnotthefinalarbiterofdecisions
withinthemilitarystructure.Hecanhoweverappointsectarianministerstoleadgovernmentdepartments,whothen
formtheirownspecialforcesunits,allofwhichanswertoMaliki,andmostofwhichareusedtocarryoutsectarian
8

Rosen, 2010

killings,ofteninthebasementsofgovernmentbuildings.ThusMalikicontrolsasortofPraetorianGuardofhighly
trainedspecialforcesunits.Itsoonbecomesclearthatstateforcesarenotonlysectarian,butalsocorrupt,withmany
positionspurchased,fromlowrankingpoliceofficersallthewayuptogeneralsinthearmy.Graftisrampantwhile
militaryacumenandexperiencearealmostentirelyabsent.Tofurthersolidifythesechangesandexertevenmore
controloverthesecurityapparatusMalikimakesthreedistinctmoves;takingcontrolofheofficeofCommanderin
Chief,appointingaloyalgeneraltocommandtheOperationsCenter(acommandcenterforoperationsinprovinces
experiencingactiveinsurgency),andformalizingindividualspecialforcesunitsintoanelitenewunitcalledIraq's
SpecialOperationsForce,AmericantrainedcounterterrorismtroopsdirectlyunderMaliki'scontrol.ISOFexists
completelyoutsideofboththechainofmilitarycommandandanyparliamentaryoversight,completewithan
offthebooksblackbudget.LikesimilarstructuresinLibyaandSyria,theideaistomakeacoupalmostimpossible.
NotonlyarethoseinvolvedinthecommandandcontrolofmilitaryoperationsalldirectlybeholdentoMalikifortheir
positions,butanyattemptedcoupcouldonlydrawfromanunderstaffed,underequippedforceofinexperiencedtroops,
troopswhichwouldhavetogoagainstthewelltrainedandequippedISOF.Thisisafantasticstructureifyourgoalis
tostopacoup,butitcreatesalotofproblemsintheattempttostopanuprisingorfightoffaninsurgency,alessonthat
Gaddafilearnedthehardway9.10

ThecombinationoftortureandindiscriminateviolencebystatesecurityforcesandthecreationoftheAwakening
MovementbytheUSdoesachievethealmosttotaldestructionofAlQaedainIraq.AstheletterfromAtiyahwarned,
theindiscriminatekillingofcivilians,theuseofcoerciontomaintaincontrolandtheimpositionofastrictformof
Islamiclawgeneratesabacklash,bothfromAwakeninggroupsandhardlineShiamilitias,manyofwhichare
motivatedasmuchbysectarianismasasenseofselfdefense.Thisbacklashbeginstoclaimmembersoftheleadership
ofAlQaedainIraq,includingZarqawi,whowaskilledinaUSairstrikeonhissafehouseonJune8,2006,likelyafter
atipofffromaninformant.AfterthedeathofZarqawiAlQaedainIraqundergoesafundamentalshifttomorphinto
theISILoftoday.Therearetwophasesinthistransformation,bothcenteredaroundthedeathofZarqawiandtherise
ofAbuAyyubalMasri,anEgyptianmilitant,asthenewsheikoftheorganization.Concurrently,AlQaedainIraq
beginstotransformtheShuraCounciloftheMujahedeenintoanorganizationcalledtheIslamicStateofIraq,a
9

Gaddafi came to rely on a force that was comprised almost entirely of Tuareg mercenaries from Chad, Algeria and
Mali after large numbers of his formal military defected or deserted early into the conflict. But, as many empires
and dictators have found, mercenaries are not likely to fight to the death for their paycheck.
10 Keating, 2014: Iraq's Built To Fail Military,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/06/19/how_maliki_s_paranoia_created_iraq_s_dysfunctional_military
.html#lf_comment=179198084

coalitionbetweenAlQaedainIraqandotherSalafiorganizationsledbyAbuOmaralBaghdadi,anIraqi.Thesecond
transformationcomeswiththe2007UStroopsurgeandtheeliminationofmuchofthecoreofforeignfightersthathad
dominatedAlQaedainIraquptothispoint11.

The2007surgeinvolvesthedeploymentof20,000additionaltroopstoIraq,mostofwhicharesenttoBaghdad.But,
contrarytomediaaccounts,thesurgeisnotmerelyasmallincreaseintroopnumbers,butafundamentalrealignmentof
USmilitarystrategyandpriorities.AfactionledbyDavidPetraeushadbeenpushingforashiftinstrategyawayfrom
theattempttopatrolspace,withtroopsretreatingtotheirfirebasesandcedingspaceatnight,thusmaintaininga
distancefromapopulationthatwasopaquefromamilitaryoperationsstandpoint.Thesurgeinvolvesaseriesof
initiativesinBaghdad,beginningwithaconcertedoffensiveintoabeltofcitiesontheoutskirtsofBaghdadthat
AlQaedainIraq/IslamicStateofIraqwereusingaslogisticsbases.Intheseraidslargenumbersofforeignfightersare
killed,guttingthecoreoftheorganization.InthewakeoftheseoffensivepushesUSoccupationtroopsmoveintothe
coreofthecityspace,occupyingandfortifyingkeybuildingsandrunningpatrolsthroughneighborhoods.This
dramaticallyincreasesthenumberofUScasualties,concurrentwithanincreaseintheirexposuretoattackandthe
numberofengagements,butallowsthemtoconductoperationsonamoreregularbasisandoccupycentersofsocial
interactionsuchasmarkets,insertingthemselvesasbothanarmedforceandthecentralarbiterofallissues.Finally,
thesurgeincludesanelementoftheplanthatPetraeushadenactedinMosulfouryearsprior,theuseofwallstolimit
andchannelmovementwithinthecity.Theoccupyingforcessetaboutbuildingsuchwallsbetweenneighborhoodsand
settingupcheckpointstocontrolmovementintoandoutofareas.Thisseverelylimitstheabilityofinsurgentgroupsto
getsuppliesandmoveintooperationalzones,butalsoentrenchesthelinesthatweredrawnthroughmassmurderand
ethniccleansing,preventingmanyformerresidentsofneighborhoodsfromeverreturninghome.(RecentlyISILhas
takentotearingmanyofthesesamewallsdowninMosul,inapropagandamovetobuildpopularsupport.)Though
AlQaedainIraq/theIslamicStateofIraqwillcontinuetocarryoutbombingsofpublicspaces,theirpresenceonthe
groundismarginalized,andtheybeginaperiodofincreasinglyinfrequentactivityandorganizationalrestructuring 12.

TheWithdrawalofAmericanTroops,theRevolutioninSyria,theArabSpringinIraq
OnDecember14,2008GeorgeWBushsignstheStatusofForcesAgreementtobegintheprocessofdrawingdown
AmericanforcesinIraq.TheagreementcallsfortheremovalofallnonUSforcesfromIraq,mostofwhichare
11 Rosen, 2010
12 Kaplan, 2013

completelywithdrawnbeforeDecember31,2008,thewithdrawalofallAmericanforcesfromcitiesbeforeJune30,
2009andthecompletewithdrawalofremainingforcesbyDecember31,2011.Startinginearly2009Americantroops
beginpullingbackfromcitiesandlargelyoperatinginasupportandtrainingrole,patrollingareasandcarryingoutjoint
operations.LikemanyinsurgentgroupsalQaedainIraqbeginstoswitchstrategictargetingfromafocusonAmerican
forcestoafocusonthefunctioningoftheIraqistate,amovethatseesthegroupengageinanincreasingnumberof
actionsaimedatministrybuildings,Iraqimilitaryandpoliceactivities,aswellasattemptingtoperpetuatethecivilwar
throughattacksonShiitecivilians.Duringthistimeanothershiftbeginstooccur,withthedeathorimprisonmentof
manyoftheforeignfightersthatformedthecoreoftheorganizationinthepastthecompositionofthegroupbecomes
morebasedinIraqiSalafistmilitants.Thisshiftisduetotwofactors.Firstly,theSurgeledtothedeathand
imprisonmentofmuchofthecoreoftheorganizationbutsecondly,andpossiblymoreimportantly,thecentersof
gravityforextremeSalafistactivitybegantodiversify,movingintoareaslikeYemen,SomaliaandnorthernAfrica,
drawingmanyoftheremainingforeignfighters,andnewrecruits,tofieldsofconflictoutsideofIraq.Thisdispersion
offorceisaresponsetotheconcentrationofAmericanforceinlimitedspaces,primarilyIraqandAfghanistan,a
concentrationwhichleavesotherspacesopenforintervention.ThisdispersionleadstothereformulationofAmerican
militarystrategicframeworks,awayfromthecounterinsurgencyoperations,operationswhichhavelargeconcentrated
forcefootprintsinlimitedareasforlongperiodsoftime,toamoremobile,tactileformofcounterterrorismoperation
basedinlightningraidsbySpecialForces,theheavyuseofsurveillanceandattackdronesandthedeploymentof
limitedengagementforcesintoareastosupportlocalforces,sometimeswiththeuseoflargescale,butlimitedduration,
aircovercampaigns,aswesawinLibyaandarecurrentlyseeinginIraq 13.

OnMarch7,2010parliamentaryelectionsinIraqleadtoapoliticalcrisis.TheIraqiyyabloc,ledbyAyadAllawi,wins
apluralityoverMaliki'sStateofLawbloc,butfailstoobtainaparliamentarymajority,preventingthemfromforming
anactinggovernment.TheStateofLawblocalsofailstoformacoalition,causingapoliticalimpassethatwilllastfor
ninemonths.AfterinterventionbyIrantoconvinceMuqtadaalSadrtosupportthegovernment,aswellasprotracted
negotiationwithKurdishpoliticalparties,anIraqigovernmentisfinallyformed.Itseemsonthesurfacetobebasedon
concernforethnicbalanceandreconciliation,withmanyministerialpostssharedbymembersofSunniandKurdish
politicalparties,butunderlyingthissuperficialdiversitymanyoftheolddynamicspersist,particularlywithinthe
securityforces.
13 Kaplan, 2013

10

DuringthistimeanotherprofoundshiftoccursforAlQaedainIraq,thedeathofbothAbuAyyubalMasriandOman
alBaghdadiinajointUSIraqiraidinTikritonApril18,2010.ThisleadstotheriseofaformerlylittleknownIraqi
jihadibythenameofAbuBakralBaghdadi,thecurrentleaderofISIL.AlBaghdadiisasomewhatmysteriousfigure.
Therearefewrecordsofhisactivitybeforethisdate,andfewpictureshaveeverbeenreleased.Itissaidthatmany
withinhisownorganizationhavenoideawhathelookslike,havingonlyinteractedwithhimwhileheiswearinga
mask.(ThischangedonJuly5whenavideowasreleasedofaclericpurportingtobealBaghdadigivingasermonata
mosqueinMosul).BysomeaccountsalBaghdadiwasaclericofalocalmosqueduringthe2003invasionofIraq,and
wasdetainedbyAmericanforcesduringa2005sweepofthearea,inwhichlargenumbersofmenweredetained.
Initiallyheldasacivilianinternee,hewastransferredtoIraqicontrolunderthetermsoftheStatusofForcesagreement,
whichpreventedlongtermAmericandetentionofIraqicitizens,andthenpromptlyreleasedafterbeingdeemedamild
threat.Hisriseissomewhatvague,buthispositiononstrategywillfundamentallychangetheorganization.Hebegins
histimeattheheadoftheorganizationatalowpoint,whenattackshavebecomeinfrequentandtheorganizationhas
lostmuchofitsciviliansupport,operationalbases,funding,andsourcesforforeignfighters 14.

IntheperiodbetweentheriseofalBaghdadiandtherebuildingofAlQaedainIraqintofirsttheIslamicStateofIraq
andthenISIL,thepoliticalcalculusoftheentireregionchangesdramatically.Inearly2011theArabSpring
completelyreconfiguresthepoliticaldynamicsoftheMiddleEastandNorthernAfrica.Thisisnotjustduetothe
collapseoftheBenAli,MubarakandGaddafiregimesinTunisia,EgyptandLibya,butalsothealliancesthatthese
movementsbringtothesurface.AnewNATOpolicyofcounterterrorismemerges,onebasedontheuseofairpower
tosupportlocalforces,smallcontingentsofspecialforcestocarryoutraidsandtraintheselocalfighters,andtheuseof
armstransferstogainpoliticalinfluenceafterthecollapseofdictatorships.Thisshiftinpolicyisanattempttoperfect
thestrategyNATOemployedatthebeginningofthewarinAfghanistan.Thiswaristhoughtofasalongrunning,
largescale,militaryoccupationthatexiststopropupafailingKarzairegime,butthiswasasortofplanB.Theinitial
phaseofthewar,fromOctober2001throughtothemainforceinvasioninDecember2001,wasbasedonthe
deploymentofasmallcontingentofCIAandJointSpecialOperationsCommandpersonnelwhowereresponsiblefor
identifyingsympatheticlocalforces,andarming,training,andsupportingthem.ThisstrategyfailedwhenTaliban

14 Crompton, 2014; The Rise of the New Caliph; ISIS Chief Abu Bakr al Baghdadi,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2014/06/30/The-rise-of-the-new-caliph-ISIS-chief-Abu-Bakr-alBaghdadi.html

11

forceslefttheireasilyidentifiableandtargetedlogisticsbasesandgovernmentoffices,takingtothemountainsalong
thePakistan/Afghanistanborder.ThesmallcontingentofUSforcessupportingpoorlyequippedNorthernAlliance
mercenarieswasnotabletocontainthisspace,necessitatingthedeploymentof30,000NATOtroopstoAfghanistan 15.
IntheanalogousscenarioinLibyalocalforces,thoughoperatingonadifferentplaneofengagementfromtheirso
calledinternationalrepresentativesintheNationalTransitionalCouncil,weremotivatedbymorethanjustmoney,and
willingtoacceptNATOaircoverandmilitaryassistance16.

TwoothermajortransitionsoccurduringtheearlyphasesoftheArabSpring,bothcenteredoncrushinguprisings.The
firstistheriseoftheGulfCooperationCouncil,aneconomicandmilitaryallianceofGulfoilstates,whichundertakes
itsfirstmajormilitarycoordinationinsupportoftheLibyanrebelswithmilitarytrainingbyQatarispecialforces,but
reallycomestogetheraroundtheSaudiinvasionofBahraintoputdowntheuprisinginManama,centeredaroundthe
PearlRoundabout.TheotherblocthatbeginstobecomemorecoordinatediscenteredinIran,andencompassesthe
MalikigovernmentinIraq,theAssadregimeinSyria,andHezbollahinLebanon.ThisblocissupportedbyIran
economicallyandmilitarily.Aseventsbegintomoveforwardwewillbegintoseetheseblocsclashinafightover
regionalinfluence,withtheGulfCooperationCouncilnationssupportingvariousfactionsintheSyrianuprisingandthe
bloccenteredaroundIransupportingtheAssadregime,eithercovertly(theIraqigovernmentallowingsupplyflightsto
crossIraqiterritoryandgivingsanctiontoShiamilitiastocrossthebordertointervene)orovertly(Hezbollah
interveningdirectlywithIranianassistance).

WiththeuprisinginSyriathesedynamicsbegintoconverge.LikemanyoftheotherArabSpringuprisingstheonein
Syriabeginswithdemonstrationsthatareviolentlyrepressed.AsinLibya,thisleadstomassdefectionsfromthe
military.MuchlikethereconstructedmilitaryinIraq,manyofthecommandersoftheSyrianmilitaryaregenerally
inexperiencedregimeloyalists,withthegreatestconcentrationofforcemonopolizedintheMukhabarat(thesecret
police),whoaredirectlyunderthecommandofAssadhimself.AirForceIntelligenceandtheeliteRepublicanGuard
arealsorunbyregimeloyalists.UnlikeinIraq,thereisnofunctionalparliamentaryoversighttocircumvent,butvery
muchlikeinIraqthemainmilitaryforcesarepopulatedbyundertrained,underequippedtroopsthatareunabletofight
offinternalresistance.Thesedefectingforces,largelymadeupoffrontlinetroopsandlowrankingofficers,formthe
nexusoftheFreeSyrianArmyinthelatesummerandearlyfallof2011,beginningmostlyasadefensiveforcewhich
15 Kaplan, 2013
16 Prashad, 2012

12

servestoprotectdemonstrations.IncreasinglytheybegintoforceloyalAssadtroopsoutofcitiesandtownswherethe
uprisingisgainingmomentum.

StartinginJanuary2012anewforceentersthefrayinSyriaagainsttheregime,agroupcalledtheJabhatalNusra,or
theAlNusraFront,looselytranslatedasSupportFront.Theorganizationstemsfrommultipleroots.Firstly,duringthe
fallof2011theAssadregimereleasedmanySalafistsfromprisoninageneralamnestyforrebelswillingtorenounce
theuprisingandpledgeloyaltytotheregime.Manyoftheseformerdetaineestakethemselvesstraighttothefrontlines
tofightagainsttheregimethathadimprisonedandtorturedthem.SomefindtheirwaytoIraqandlinkupwiththe
IslamicStateofIraq.TheretheyconnectwithSyriansthathadenteredIraqinordertofighttheAmericanoccupation
forces,andgrouptogetherundertheleadershipofAbuMuhammadalJawlani,aformerdetaineeatCampBucca(atthe
sametimeasalBaghdadi)whowasreleasedin2008andpromptlyrejoinedtheIslamicStateofIraq.JabhatalNusra
alsodrawssupportfromexperiencedforeignfighterscomingintothecountryfromplaceslikeChechnya.They
maintainacompositionthatismajoritySyrianwhileallyingwithgroupsofforeignfighters.Thedecisionwillsowthe
seedsforsomeofthemorecomplicatedelementsofthecurrentsituation.

AsJabhatalNusraisforminginSyria,andtheIslamicStateofIraqbecomingmoreandmoreinvolvedintheSyrian
conflictAmericanforcescompletetheirwithdrawalfromIraq,withthefinaltroopsleavingonDecember16th,2011.
ThewithdrawalofAmericanforcesleadstoanimmediateincreaseinattacks,butittapersofffairlyquickly,withmany
oftheattacksbeingconfinedtosectarianviolencethatdoesnotthreatentheIraqistateinaseriousway.Earlierthat
yeartherehadbeenasomewhatsubduedArabSpringinspiredmovementinIraq,focusedonproblemsofcorruption
andthefailureofgovernmentservices,butthismovementwasrepressedandfizzledoutquickly.Throughout2012the
insurgencyinSyriakeepsexpanding,withinsurgentsthreateningtodrivethegovernmentoutofAleppoandbeginning
tothreatenDamascusitself.Aseriesofhighprofileattacksislaunchedfrominsidetheregime,includingthepoisoning
ofaSecurityCouncilmeetinginthePresidentialPalaceandbombingoftheNationalSecurityBureaubuildinginthe
MidandistrictofDamascus,whichtogethereliminatealmosthalfoftheregime'sinnercircle.AsAssad'smilitary
beginstowitherawaythroughdefectionandbattlefieldattrition,massivegapsinregimecoveragebegantoopenup,
gapswhichinsurgentgroupsexploitinordertosetuptrainingandlogisticshubs,whilestrengtheningsupplylinesinto
TurkeyandLebanon.OnesuchgroupistheIslamicStateofIraq,whichbeginstointervenedirectlyintheconflictin
easternSyriabylaunchingsuicideattacksinsupportofassaultsonregimemilitarybasesandmilitaryairports.This

13

interventioncreatesinternalconflictbetweenAlQaedaaffiliateorganizations,withJahbatalNusracharteredasthe
affiliatewithinSyriaandtheIslamicStateofIraqcharteredastheIraqaffiliate.Thisconflictwillsooncometoahead,
withprofoundconsequences.

Twootherdynamicsofprofoundimportancemustbediscussed.Thefirst,andpotentiallymostimportantinthecurrent
crisis,istherevivaloftheantiMalikimovementinDecemberof2012inAnbarprovince,primarilyinRamadiand
Fallujah,aswellasinTikritandMosul.Asthisconflictbeginstogainmomentum,withincreasinglyintensebattles
betweendemonstratorsandthestate,armedelementsallythemselveswiththedemonstrators,defendingcampsand
fightingbackagainstthepoliceandmilitary,includingreprisalattackswheneverdemonstratorsarekilledbystate
forces.ProminentinthisalliancearethreegroupsthathadsomepresenceduringtheresistancetotheUSoccupation,
butwhichwerelargelymarginalizedinthecontextofsectarianviolence.FirstamongtheseistheGeneralMilitary
CouncilforIraqiRevolutionaries,acoalitionofarmedgroupsandlocaltribalformationsformedforthesolepurposeof
defendingtheantiMalikidemonstrationsandcampsagainstgovernmentaction.TheGeneralMilitaryCouncilallies
withlatentelementsoftheBaathPartyregime,includingtheMenoftheNaqshbandiOrder,aBaathistSufi
organization,aswellassomemoderateIslamistorganizations,suchastheIslamicArmyofIraq.Alongsideofthese
moreformalorganizationstheincreasinglyarmedstruggleisjoinedbygrowingnumbersofveteransoftheAwakening
groups.Ifwerememberbackto2007theAwakeninggroupswereformedbycivilianswhohadrejectedthetacticsof
AlQaedainIraq,aswellasformerinsurgentswhohadreconciledwiththeUSoccupationforces.AstheUSforces
begantopulloutMalikilargelyviolatedtheagreementwiththeAwakeninggroups,thattheywouldbeincorporated
intothemilitaryinimportantways.DuringhisconsolidationofcontrolovertheIraqimilitaryMalikidiscardedthis
agreement,withmanyAwakeningmembersarrestedbyhissecurityforces,whileotherswereeitherleftoutofthe
militaryentirelyorrelegatedtolowrankingpositionsinwhichtheywerecommandedbypoliticallyloyal,militarily
ineptpoliticaloperatives.

BetweenJanuaryandMarchof2013eventsinIraqescalatequickly,withmilitaryunitsopeningfireondemonstrators
inMosulandFallujahandbeingforcedoutofbothcitiesasaresult.Securityoperationsinbothcitiesareundertakenby
morelightlyarmedfederalpoliceunits,andattemptstodispersedemonstrationsendforthetimebeinginbothcities.
EventsinSyriaalsobegintotakeanominousturn,withtheIslamicStateofIraqtakingcontrolofmoreofnortheast
Syria.OnApril8,2013theIslamicStateofIraqmakesanannouncementdeclaringthatJahbatalNusrahadbeena

14

frontorganization,andthatthetwoorganizationshadagreedtoamerger,resultinginwhatwenowknowasISIL.The
followingdayAbuMuhammadalJawlaniissuesastatementdenyingthemergerandaccusingalBaghdadiof
attemptingtoforciblytakecontroloftheSyrianconflictandtheassetsofJahbatalNusra.Thisinternalconflictleads
toasplitinbothorganizations,withalotofthelocalSyrianmembersofISILdefectingtoJahbatalNusraandmanyof
theforeignfighters,mainlyhighlytrainedandexperiencedChechens,joiningISIL.AymanalZawahiri,whotook
controlofAlQaedaafterthedeathofBinLaden,issuesarulingrejectingthemerger.ISILbecomesincreasingly
isolatedfromAlQaeda,andinsteadtakesontheroleofamoreextremecompetitor.ThissplitbeginsastringofISIL
attacksonotherinsurgentorganizationswithinSyria,includingtheassassinationofmilitaryofficersfromAhrar
ashSham,amoderateIslamistinsurgentgroup,andtheFreeSyrianArmy.TheinternalcrisisthatISILcreatedallows
themtofurthercarveoutspaceinSyriafromwhichtolaunchattacksandorganizelogisticalcapacity,pullingin
increasingnumbersofforeignfighters,includingmanyfromEuropeandNorthernAfrica.Theirnumbersarebolstered
throughaboldattackonAbuGhraibprison(thesameprisonwhereUSsoldierstookpicturesofthemselvestorturing
detainees)inwhichISILfighterspenetratednumerouswallsoftheprison,andwiththehelpofsomesympatheticprison
staffandariotamongtheinmates,liberatedhundredsoftheirfighters.SpiritedofftoeasternSyria,thenewlyfreed
combatantshelpseizethecityofRaqqa,thelargestcityinSyriacompletelyoutsideofregimecontrol,fromother
insurgentgroups,includingJahbatalNusra.AllalongthewayISILseizesmilitarybases,raidingrebelstrongholdsand
checkpoints,whilestockpilingweapons,ammunitionandcashforaneventualreturntoIraq.

Otherdevelopmentsfrommid2013impactingthecurrentcrisisincludetheinterventionofHezbollahinSyriain
supportoftheAssadregime,alongwiththousandsoffightersfromsectarianShiamilitias,bothjumpinginatthebehest
oftheIraniangovernment.BythispointtheSyrianmilitaryhasbeenreducedtoasmatteringofhighlytrainedforces
supportedbyRussianandIranianweapons,andbackedbyanumberofinformalmilitiasorganizedamongSyrianShia
communitiesandtrainedbycommandersoftheIranianBasijMilitiaandtheRevolutionaryGuard.Hezbollah
intervenesfirstbysendingadvisers,andthenwiththeliteralinvasionofSyria,withanestimated5,000troopspouring
overthebordertotakethecityofQusayrfromtheFreeSyrianArmyinMayof2013.Thisisaccompaniedbythe
interventionbyIraqiShiamilitiasKata'ibHizbollahandtheBadrBrigades.ThismoveliterallysavestheAssadregime
fromoblivion,butleavesitlittlemorethanaplaceholderforIranianandproxyforcecontrol,completelydependenton
outsidesupportformilitaryandeconomicresources.

15

MeanwhileinIraq,themilitarylaunchesarenewedassaultagainstentrenchedprotestcampsinApril2013inthewest
andnorthwestareasofthecountry,withtheinitialassaultbeinginthecityofHawija.Over50demonstratorsareshot
bythemilitary,amovewhichtriggersescalatingattacks,initiallybytheNaqshbandiOrder,butsooninvolvingmore
generalizedarmedaction.OnDecember28themilitaryattemptstoarrestalocalSunniMPinthecityofRamadi,
generatingmassdemonstrationsthatleadspecialforcesunitsunderthedirectcommandofthePrimeMinister'sofficeto
attempttoevicttheprotesters'camp.Themilitarykills30to40intheensuingfirefightand40membersofParliament
resigninprotest.TheescalationofeventsinIraqcomestocollidewiththeincreasingpowerthatISILwieldsinthe
easternareasofSyria.Duetoaninsurgentcounterassault,ISIL'soperationsinSyriaarelimitedtoareasimmediately
alongtheIraqiborderandtheEuphratesRivervalley.Theircontrolisreinforcedbyanunnegotiatedmutual
nonaggressionpactforgedwiththeAssadregime,allowingthemtofocustheirattentiononotherinsurgentgroups,
evenpushingintotheincreasinglyautonomousKurdishregionsinnortheasternSyria.TheAssadregimeexploitsthis
tacitagreementsimilarly.ThesetrucelikeconditionsprevailuntiltheISILreturnstoIraqinstrength.Therelative
autonomyISILenjoysineasternSyria,combinedwithaninfluxofforeignfighters,thelootingofresourcesfromthe
citiesundertheircontrol,andthehundredsliberatedintheattackonAbuGhraibstrengthentheorganization
tremendously.ThisrenewedstrengthleadsISILtolaunchitsfirstmajorassaultintoIraqonJanuary2,2014,withan
attackonsomepolicestationsinFallujah.Thisattack,carriedoutwiththehelpoflocaltribesmen,quickly
metastasizesthroughoutAnbarprovince.ByJanuary8ISILandassociatedforceshavedriventheIraqimilitaryoutof
Fallujah,mostofRamadi,Karmah,Khalidiyah,AlQaimandAbuGhraib(thetownwheretheprisonislocated),and
arewithinstrikingdistanceofBaghdad.TheIraqimilitarylaunchesacounterattackanddrivesinsurgentsoutofmost
ofthetownsinAnbarprovince,butfailstotakebackFallujah,settingthestagefortheISILoffensiveofJune2.

16

TheCurrentSituationandItsMisconceptions
TheJuneISILoffensivemovedintoanareathatwasalreadyexperiencinglocalizedresistancetotheMalikiregime,
alongtwoprimaryroutes.OneroutedepartedfromtheareaaroundalBukamalinSyria,andareasinAnbarprovince
westofBaghdad,intoRamadiandFallujah.HavingsecuredthatroutetoBaghdadtheymovedbackalongthe
highwaysintoSyriainordertakealBukamalfromtheFreeSyrianArmyandthreatentotakeoverDeirezZor.They
alsoattackedthetownofHaditha,fightinglocaltribeswhohaveturnedonISILaswellasremnantsoftheIraqimilitary
thatwerethereguardingalargedamontheEuphratesRiver.Theyhavealsosincemovedalonghighwaystothewest
totakethetownofRutbaandbordercrossingsbetweenIraqandJordanandIraqandSyria.Theirsecondroutewent
fromthenorthwestofSyriadownthroughthecityofMosul.Atthispointthetwomainthrustsoftheoffensivesplit.
OnelineofmovementwentthroughArbilandthenKirkuk,townswhichwerelargelyabandonedbyIraqiforces,and
thenoccupiedbyKurdishPeshmergaafterISILmovedon,andapproachedBaghdadfromthenorth.Thesecondlineof
movementwentdirectlysouthfromMosul,throughTikritandSammara,cuttingoffBaghdadfromthenorthwest.

TheIraqimilitarycollapsedfrominternallackofcohesion,lackofpoliticalwillandgenerallackofsupport.Sincethe
fallofMosulinJunethegovernmenthasbeenattemptingtolaunchacounterattackthroughthreeseparatemechanisms.
Firstly,ShiamilitiathathadbeenfightinginSyria,wheretheyareaprimarysupportpillaroftheAssadregime,have
beenabandoningtheirpostsandreturningtoIraq.ManyifthesewerewelltrainedspecialunitsoftheIraqimilitary,
whohadbeenputonleaveanddeployedunderthenameofamilitia,orveteransofShiamilitias,suchastheMahdi
ArmyandKata'ibHizbollah.Secondly,thegovernmentandmanyShiamilitiaorganizationshavelaunchedspecifically
sectarianrecruitmentdrivesinordertobolstertheirrespectiveranks.Thirdly,theyhavebeenusingspecialforcesunits
thatarecommandeddirectlyfromthePrimeMinister'soffice,asdiscussedearlier.Theseforceshavelaunchedattacks
intotheareastothenorthofBaghdad,andhavebeenconcentratingonTikritasofJune28.Thishasbeen
complementedwiththemoveofKurdishPeshmergaforcestothesouth,inanattempttooccupyKirkukandArbil.

17

SincetheendofJunethelinesinIraqhavesolidifiedandISILhasshiftedtheirattentionbacktoSyria.This
demonstratesaninterestingfeatureofISIL'sstrategythatwillbediscussedlaterinmoredetail.Theytendtoavoid
centersofgravity,andmoveintoemptyspace,movingforceveryquickly,sometimesoverhundredsofmilesinanight,
andshiftingthekineticaxisinacompletelydifferentdirection,againstdifferentenemies.Thishasallowedthemto
accomplishtwodifferentthings.Firstly,itallowsthemtoavoidthemasscasualtiesthatoccupationsofspacetendto
generate,especiallywhenfightingagainstforcesthathaveaprofoundadvantageontheleveloffirepowerandtotalair
superiority.Byavoidingtheoccupationofspace,andleavingenoughforcebehindtofurtherdestabilizespaceand
mountdefense,ISILcanhitweakpointswithforceandspeed,whiledeprivingtheiropponentsoftheabilityto
counterattack.Thisdynamicwasbeingfacilitatedbyanynumberoforganizations,outsideoftheISILchainof
commandandhostiletotheirproject,butalliedwiththemintheimmediategoalofoverthrowingMaliki,whichactually
occupythespacesthatISILlargelymovesthrough.Thishighlykineticstrategyhasthesideeffectofoverwhelming
opposingforces,forcingthemtocapitulate,whichmeansalmostcertaindeathincaptivity,ordefecting,whichhasbeen
occurringmoreandmorefrequently,especiallyineasternSyria.Asthesedefectionsincreasedefensiveforcescan
increasinglybeleftbehindtoholdterritory.Secondly,inutilizingthisformofkineticstrategytheiropponentsare
deprivedoftheabilitytomountameaningfuloffensive.Theopponentcanmovethroughspace,butthatmeanslittle,

18

exceptthattheyhavejuststretchedtheirsupplylinesoutthroughpotentiallyhostileterraininwhichtheyareopento
ambush.Whattheyareneverabletodoisstrikeadecisiveblow,orcauseenoughcasualtiestoreallycripplethe
organization.Thisisatemporaryeffect,butintheshorttermthesheerspeedofISIL'smovementsmeansthatopposing
forcesarekeptperpetuallyoffguardinasituationoftotaluncertainty.ThishasallowedISILtocompensatefortheir
lackofnumbers,whichevenafterdefectionswasnomorethan10,000fighters,andtheirrelativelackoffirepower.
ExceptforsometanksandartilleryrecentlycapturedfromfleeingIraqiforcestheyhavebeenrestrictedtosmallarms,
theminingofroads,andtheuseofcarbombs,mostofwhichareweaponsthatcanonlybeusedincloseproximitytoan
enemy.

AsthelinesinIraqhavesolidifiedandtherateofexpansioninSyriahasslowedISILisattemptingtobuildlongterm
viability.Ontheleveloftheirowninternalimageandtheexternalprojectionofthisimagetheyhavedeclared,very
publicly,theestablishmentofacaliphate,andhaverenamedthemselvestheIslamicState,withalBaghdadimakinga
publicappearanceinwhichheappealedforfightersfromoutsideofthecountrytofloodintotheirnewlydeclared
statelet.TheyhavealsobeguntoestablishlongtermeconomicviabilitythroughtheseizingofoilfieldsinbothIraq
andSyriatoselloilontheblackmarket,muchofittotheAssadregime.Recentexpansionshavebeenaimedat
establishingafootholdtotakepartsofbothAleppoandBaghdad.InAleppoaninterestingdynamichasbeenplaying
itselfout.AsrebelfactionsinSyriahavehadtodevotemoreandmoreresourcestofightingISILtheAssadregime
usesthisopeningtoattackrebelsinAleppo,specificallytothenorthandwestofthecitywheretheyhavebeen
attemptingtoreclaimassetsforoverayear.WhenrebelsshifttheirfocustofightingAssadISILusestheopeningto
driverebelfactions,includingKurdishunits,outoftownstothenorthandeastofAleppo.Thisstrategyofencirclement
isnotonlyincreasingdefectionsasrebelunitsarecutofffromsupplylinesandforcedtosurrender,buthasalsocaused
aprofoundcrisiswithinrebelrankswithinAleppo,acitythattheywerepoisedtotakeoverasrecentlyasearlyMay.
ForawhileitseemedasiftheinformaltrucebetweentheAssadregimeandISILwascollapsing,astheSyrianairforce
hadbeguntobombISILtargetsinRaqqa,SyriaaswellasovertheborderintoIraq,likelyunderordersfromtheir
IraniansponsorswhoarebackingtheMalikiregime.Thisbrieflullinthistrucehassinceended,anditseemsclearthat
ifthereisnotovertcooperationbetweenISILandtheAssadregime,thenthereisatleastatacitagreementtoleaveone
anotheralonetoconcentrateontheircommonenemy,Syrianrebels.AsthesemovesarebeingmadeinSyria,ISIL
unitshavebeguntodriveIraqitroops,whoarelargelybeingdevotedtolaunchingattackstothenorthandeastof
Baghdad,fromtownstothesouthofBaghdad,specificallyMahmudiyah,whichcanbeseenattheverybottomofthe

19

abovemap.

IntheperiodsincetheinitialassaultonIraqbyISILattentionintheinternationalmediahaslargelyfocusedonthe
beheadingofWesternjournalistsandtheattemptedgenocideontheYazidicommunityinwesternIraq,whichprompted
theinitialwaveofUSairassaults.But,forasmuchastheseeventshavegrabbedtheheadlinesthisattentionhas
obscuredamorecomplexstrategicdynamicthathasfundamentallyshiftedtherelationshipofforceontheedgesof
ISIL'sareaofoperations.SincemidJulyISILhasmadetacticalshiftsinresponsetoaformoftacticalconstriction.In
responsetoincursionsintoIraq,andthelaunchingofISILattacksonBaghdad,mostlyintheformofsuicidebombings,
theIraqimilitaryaccelerateditsprocessofrebuilding.Aswasmentionedearlierthisrebuildingfocusedontheentrance
ofmembersofsectarianShiamilitiasintotheformalIraqimilitary,thecollusionwiththesenonofficialShiamilitias
andthereturnofShiafightersthathadbeenfightingtosupporttheAssadregimeinSyria.AsthisnewlyformedIraqi
forceorganizedandbecameactiveISILforceswerepushedoutoftheareaimmediatelyaroundBaghdadandtoward
thenorthandwestofthecity,atwhichpointitisreportedthattheseShiamilitiascarriedoutaseriesofatrocitiesin
ordertoremoveSunnipopulationsfromthetownsthattheyhadrecentlymovedthrough,followedbythebuildingofa
dirtbermthatcurrentlyformstheofficialfrontline.

InresponseISILbegantofocusitsattentionmoreonSyria,launchingoperationstotaketheoilfieldsineasternSyria,
aswellastopushmoreintoKurdishcontrolledareasinnortheastSyria.But,justasquicklyasISILwasabletotake
theseoilfieldsandpushintolightlydefendedareasofSyrianKurdistantheybegantorunintomoreandmore
concentratedresistancefromacombinationofKurdishforcesandSyrianinsurgentgroups.Itisthisresistance,
combinedwiththeeliminationoftheirabilitytopushclosertoBaghdadthathascreatedafundamentaltacticalshiftin
theapproachISILhastakentooffensiveoperations.UptothispointISIL'sstrategyhascenteredaroundtwodynamics,
themovementintospacethatwaseitherlightlydefendedornotdefendedatall,combinedwiththeuseoflocalized
forcestofacilitatemovementsthroughspace,andtheuseofthismovementtoconcentrateresources,botharound
immediatelogisticalrequirementsaswellaslongertermfinancialoperations.Thisentirestrategyreliesontheability
toremainfluid,tomovewithspeedandforce,andaconstantsupplyofresources,whethermaterialorhuman,to
continuetofuelthismobility.Astheirspacesofmovementhavebecomerestrictedthismovementhasnotbeenableto
continueinthesameways,andthishasledtotwospecificshiftsinoperations.

20

ThefirstshiftthatoccurredismoreofanexpansionofthestrategyISILattemptedtodeploywithinBaghdadearlierin
thesummer.DuringthisperiodoftimethecontractionofIraqimilitaryforceshadconcentratedaroundBaghdad,as
retreatingunitsreturnedtothecitytoregroup,andthiseliminatedtheabilityofISILforcestomovesmoothlythrough
thisspace.Atthispointtheirdisadvantageinmagnitudeofforce,bothnumericallyandonthelevelofweaponry,which
wasgenerallybasedinlightarmsandalimitedamountofarmoredvehicles,combinedtoeliminatetheirforward
movementintothecapital.AtthispointISILbegantosendsmallerunits,oftennomorethat510operatives,intothe
citytolaunchsingleattacksagainstmilitaryandpolicetargetsinanattempttogeneratelogisticalchaoswithinIraqi
militaryforcesthatwerealreadyinaprocessofreorganization.Theseattackshadsomeeffects,specificallyforcingthe
citytobelockeddownalmostentirely,furtherconcentratingIraqimilitaryassetsinthecityandincreasingtheamount
ofopenspaceavailabletomovewithin.ThroughouttheendofthesummerISILattemptedasimilarstrategyinwestern
Syria,specificallyintheareaswithintheQalamounMountains,borderingLebanon,aswellaswithinLebanonitself.In
earlyAugustISILcellsattackedapolicestationinArsal,LebanonandkidnappedanumberofLebanesesoldiers,
provokingaLebanesemilitaryattackonthemostlySunnicity,andhubforsuppliestoSyrianinsurgentgroups,aswell
astheadjoiningSyrianrefugeecamp.AsaresultofthisattackISILforceswereexpelledfromLebanonandthe
adjoiningQalamounMountainsbySyrianinsurgentgroups,butthisexpulsionforcedseveralforcesadversarialtoISIL
toshiftforcestowesternSyria,includingbothHezbollah,theIslamicFront,andtheFreeSyrianArmy,openingup
morespaceineasternSyria,whereISILforcesareconcentrated.InthewakeoftheseattacksinLebanonISIL
increaseditsoperationalpaceineasternSyria.

Farfromasimpleskirmishstrategythisstrategyseemstobebasedmoreinanapproachthathaslongbeenusedby
SyrianinsurgentgroupsagainstAssadregimeforces,thecoordinationofattacksinanareafarfromanintendedareaof
operationsinordertopullenemyforcesawayfromtheareaoffutureattack.ThroughouttheSyrianrevolution
insurgentforceshaveusedthisstrategy.Forexample,duringtheSyriangovernmentoffensiveintotheQalamoun
Mountainsduringthefallof2013insurgentforceswereabletoentrapAssadforcesbyallowingthemtomoveintoan
areaandattackingbehindthem,cuttingtheircommand,controlandsupplylines,whileatthesametimelaunching
offensiveinotherareastodrawsupportingforcesawayfromthearea.Afterthesecounterassaultsinsurgentswould
routinelyabandontheareastheyhadmovedinto,infavorofotherareasthatAssadforcescouldbedrawninto.This
strategyisnotbasedsomuchinmovingintoandmaintainingoperationsinanarea,butrathertoreconfigurethe
dynamicsofforcewithinanareatoachievealevelofoperationalpaceandstrategicadvantage.Thisisclearifwetake

21

alookattheuseofthisapproach,onebasedindiversionandseizingtheoperationalpace,asdeployedbyISIL.Itisnot
relevanttosaythattheseapproachesfailedduetotheirfailuretotakeBaghdadorArsal,thiswasclearlynottheir
purpose;ifitweremoreforceswouldhavebeendedicated.Rather,whatoccurredinbothareaswasthecommitmentof
asmallnumberofforcesthatthroughalimitednumberofoperationscouldhavemaximumtacticalimpactonthe
dynamicinacompletelydifferentarea.IntheattacksonBaghdadISILwasabletoforceIraqimilitaryassetsto
concentrateinthecity,drawingthemawayfromtheperipherywhereISILoperates,whileinArsaltheywereableto
drawbothSyrianinsurgentandHezbollahforcesawayfromeasternSyria,whereISILwasattemptingtoexpandtheir
areaofoperations.Inbothsituations,afteraverylimitedperiodoftimeISILceasedoperationsintheseareas,toa
largeextent,andshiftedtheirassetselsewhere.

Thesecondandconcurrentshiftthathasoccurredisthebeginningoflargeforcecontingentoperationsonalevelthat
hadnotbeenseenuptothispoint,specificallyinRaqqaandDeirezZorprovincesinSyria,aswellasKurdishregions
ineasternSyriaalongtheTurkishborder,especiallyinKobani.WithinSyriaISILhasbeenbasingmanyofitsmain
forceoperationsoutofRaqqacity,whichsitsalongtheEuphratesRiver,andhasbeenattackinglargelyalongthe
EuphratesRiverValley.ThispathwayofmovementhasleftlargeconcentrationsofAssadregimeforcesisolatedand
suppliedprimarilybyairlift.WiththeconstrictionofISILlinesofmovementtothewestoftheEuphratesRiverValley,
withtheexceptionofthedesertstothesouthofthevalley,includingnumerousoilfieldstakenbyISILoverthesummer,
ISILwasforcedintoapositionwhichnecessitatedthelaunchingofconcentratedassaultsontheseconcentratedbut
isolatedforces.TheseassaultsbeganinearlyJulywiththeattempttoexpelinsurgentfactionsfromDeirEzZorcity,
whichhadbeenheldbyinsurgentgroupssince2011,andwassurroundedbyISILforcestotheeastandAssadregime
forcestothewest.Asinsurgentforcesbecameisolatedinthecity,cutofffromsupplies,somedefectedtoISIL,while
othersfoughttheirwayoutofthecity,pasttheringofAssadforcesconcentratedattheDeirezZorMilitaryAirbase
andintosafeareasaroundAleppo,tothewest,allowingISILtocapturethecityonJuly15andcreatingatensestandoff
betweenISILforcesandAssadregimeforcesaroundtheairbaseinthewestofthecity17.

WhatfollowedwasaseriesofmainforceoperationslaunchedbyISIL,beginningwiththelaunchingofanassaulton
theDivision17militarybasenorthofRaqqaonJuly23,whichwastakeninafewdaysofconcentratedassault.This

17 Islamic State Expels Rivals from Syrian City, Al Jazeera, July 15, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/state-expels-rivals-from-syria-city-2014714134248239815.htm
l

22

wasfollowedbyanassaultontheTabqaAirbaseimmediatelytothewestofRaqqabyastrikeforcethatincluded
potentiallythousandsofISILtroops.However,unlikepriorISILassaults,whichincludedalimitednumberoftroops
assaultinglightlydefendedareas,andunliketheassaultonDivision17,whichonlytookafewdaystocomplete,the
assaultonTabqaAirbaseexactedacompletelydifferenttollonISIL.Theassaultitselftookaroundtwoweeks,
beginningonAugust9andendingonAugust24,toactuallycomplete,involvedatleastthreeconcentratedassaultson
thebase,andresultedinthedeathofaround400ISILfighters,bysomereports,andmuchhighertollsbyotherreports,
notcountingthenumberthatwerewounded.

AftertheassaultonTabqaAirbase,whichresultedinISILobtainingtanksandalargeamountofsmallarms,they
begananassaultontheDeirezZorMilitaryAirbase,anassaultwhichhasnotbeencompletedasofOctober4.With
theneutralizationofAssadforcesinbothDeirezZorandRaqqaProvinces,andtheconcentrationofinsurgentforcesto
thewestofRaqqaProvince,aroundAleppoandHama,ISILhasbeguntofocustheiroperationalforceontheKurdish
areastothenorthoftheEuphratesRiverValleywithanassaultonKobani,whichliesontheSyrianTurkishborder.
ThoughtheseISILassaultshavetendedtobesuccessful,andresultedinthemobtainingalargeamountofmilitary
resources,theseassaultshavegeneratedtwoeffectsthathavefundamentallychangedISILmilitaryoperations,andthe
structureoftheirmovements.Firstly,asISILbeganitsassaultsearlierinthesummerforcesadversarialtoISILbegan
toconcentratetheirnumbersandmoveintoadefensiveposture.ThislimitedthelinesofmovementthatISILcould
relyon,andforcedthemintotheselargescalefrontalengagements.IntheseengagementsISILtookcasualtiesthat
werefargreaterthanforcesthattheywerefightingwithinanysingleengagement,resultinginthelossofalmost1,000
fightersintheinitialengagementsandanuntoldnumberintheirrecentassaultsonKobaniandtheDeirezZorMilitary
Airbase.Thelossoffighters,combinedwiththenecessityofconcentratingforcesfortheseengagements,hasalso
slowedtheiroperationalpacedramatically,leadingtoadynamicinwhichlargeamountsofresourcesareexpendedon
assaults,resourceswhichtheymaynotbeabletorecoup.UptothispointtheentiretyofISIL'sstrategyhascentered
aroundfastmovementandtheobtainingofresourcesthroughthismovement,andthishaschangedduetothe
compressioneffectthattheygeneratedthroughtheirearlyassaults.Secondly,ISILforceshadtobegintomoveinlarge
groups,usuallyinconvoys,makingthemeasytargetsfromthesky,adynamicthatwouldbecomehighlydetrimental
withthebeginningofconcentratedUSairstrikeswithinSyriaonSeptember22.

ThisconcentrationofforcehasaseriesofprofoundimpactsinISILpoliticalobjectivesandmilitaryoperations.

23

ThroughoutthesummerISILwasdealingwithaparadox.Ontheonehandtheywereattemptingtolaunchassaultsas
quicklyandaswidelyaspossible,pushingsmallconcentrationsofadversarialforcesoutofareas,andallyingwithlocal
forcesinIraqintheirfightagainsttheMalikiregime.But,thisstrategy,especiallyafterthereplacementofMalikion
August24,becameuntenable.Inordertofunctionasastate,whichistheirultimatepoliticalproject,itisnotenoughto
eliminateadversarialforcesfromanarea,onemustconsolidatecontroloveranareaandpolicethatspaceinall
momentstothedegreethatthisislogisticallypossible.Thisconsolidationandpolicingofspacerequiresforcestobe
inertinspace,andinasufficientsaturation,whichISILhadattemptedtoachievethroughdeterrentactions.These
deterrentactionshowever,generatedresistancefromlocalizedgroups,resultinginlocalizeduprisingsand
demonstrationsthroughoutthesummer.ThisforcesISILtofaceachoice,toeitherentrenchandpolicespace,limiting
theirareaofoperationandthespeedofassault,ortocontinuetooperateinadecentralizedway,formingtheirstrategy
aroundmobility.Inthecompressioneffectthatwasgeneratedbytheirearlyassaultsthisdecisionwassomewhatmade
forthem,andtheywereforcedtoconcentrateforcesforlargeassaults.However,thisconcentrationofforcesbecamea
liabilityintheearlydaysofUSairstrikes,inwhichconvoysandcentersofoperationweretargetedfromthesky,
resultinginalargenumberofcasualties.TheirvulnerabilitytoairstrikeshasforcedISILforcestoredisperse,with
manyreportsindicatingthattheyhaveagaindecentralizedcommandandcontrolandhaveceasedlargeconvoy
movements,withtheexceptionbeingtheareasimmediatelyoutsideofKobani,wheretheyareengagedinalargescale
operation.

Asthesituationcurrentlysits,inlateOctober,thereareaseriesofveryopenquestionsthatexistinrelationtothe
dynamicsofISILoperations.Firstly,andprimarily,thereisatensionthatcurrentlyexistsbetweenISILpoliticalgoals
oforganizingthestate,andISILstrategicimperatives,whichrequiresdispersingforces.Thissituationhasreemerged
withtheUSairstrikes,afteraperiodofhiatus,butisthecentraltensionintheprojectISILisattempting.Secondly,the
abilitytocompensatefortheeffectsofairstrikesdependsonwhetherISILcanrecruitenoughforcestoexpand
dispersedoperationsandtomultiplythenumberoftargets,whichcouldpotentiallyoverwhelmtheabilityofairstrikes
tohavemuchofaneffectinthelongrun;thisisthedynamicthatoccurredwiththeTalibanforcesinAfghanistan,
whereforcedispersalmultipliedtargetstosuchadegreethatairstrikesareoftenlaunchedagainstindividualvehiclesor
individuals,anapproachthatisnothavingmuchofanimpact.ItisthecasethatISILforceshaveexpanded
dramatically,fromaround10,000inJulytoasmanyas37,000inOctober,butthiscomesatacost.Withtherapid
expansionofISILforces,combinedwiththelargenumbersofcasualtiesthathavebeentakeninrecentlargescale

24

engagementstheforcequalityofISILforceshasdiminished;manyoftheexperiencedfightersfromtheinitialassaults
havebeenkilledorwounded,andhavebeenreplacedwithlargelyinexperiencedfighters.Thisdeclineinforcequality
iscoupledwiththeincreasedstressthatisplacedonISILlogisticalcapacity,theabilitytocommandandsupplyaforce
thatismanytimesgreaterthanitwasinthepast,andtheabilitytomaintainenoughresourceflowtomakethispossible.
Itisthisdynamicthatisincreasinglyshapingthesituationontheground,andthesedynamicsthatwilllikelybecome
decisiveinthelongterm.

25

ImplicationsandPossibleScenarios
ForassmallaforceasISILisonapracticalscale,comparativetootherforcesintheregion(e.g.the100,000troopsof
theIslamicFrontnetworksinSyria),theiractionshavehadprofoundimplicationsinaveryshortperiodoftime.This
ispartiallyaresultofthetacticsthatISILhasbeendeploying,andtheirabilitytoremainnebulous,fastandmobile,but
alsoasaresultofthespeedinwhichopposingforceshavefoldedinlightofthesemovements.Therapiddegradation
offormalmilitaryforcesinIraq,andthethreatthatthishasplacedtheIraqiregimeunder,hasrecalibratedtheentirety
ofthedynamicinthatregion,specificallyinrelationtotheSyriaconflict.

Tounderstandthisshiftitisimportanttoremembertheblocsthatareinvolvedhere,especiallythoseintheIranian
sphereofinfluence.AtthebeginningoftheSyrianrevolutionIransentmilitaryadviserstheretoattempttosupportthe
Assadregime,traintroopsandorganizeinformalforces,whicharealsoacornerstoneoftherepressiveapparatuswithin
Iranitself.AtthesametimetheyareattemptingtosupporttheIraqiregimeinsimilarways,butatalowerlevel,largely
throughthetrainingofparastatemilitiasratherthandirectaid.AstheAssadregimebegantolosecontrolofthe
situation,andastheSyrianmilitaryevaporatedthroughdefectionsandlossesduetocombatwithanincreasinglyarmed
resistance,theQudsForceoftheIranianRevolutionaryGuardmadeanimportantdecision.Ratherthanfighting
directlythroughthedeploymentoflargenumbersoftroops,theywouldattempttoleveragetheirpatronageofinformal
nonstateorganizations,specificallyHezbollahandanumberofsectarianIraqimilitias,tofightinSyriainsupportof
theregime,andtheywouldincreasemilitaryandeconomicaidtotheregimetokeepthesetroopsarmedandtheSyrian
economyafloat.ThisbeganaprocessinwhichIran,andbyextensionHezbollah,wouldbecomeincreasinglydrawn
intoanincreasinglyregionalconflict,andtheIraqimilitiaswouldbecaughtinthemiddle,withsomeoddimplications
fortheAssadregime.

AstheMaliki18regimebegantobecomedestabilized,andastheIraqimilitarycollapsedinMosulandTikrit,theQuds
Forcewasfacedwithachoice.OntheonehandtheyneededtoremainengagedinSyria,otherwiseitwouldbelikely
thattheregimewouldcollapsequickly.Ontheotherhand,iftheydidnotshiftforcedramaticallyitwaslooking
increasinglyliketheMalikiregimewouldcollapse,andIraqsharesalongandporousborderwithIran.AsISILbegan
toacceleratethroughIraqtheIraqimilitiasthathadbeenfightinginSyriabeganamassexodusbacktoIraqtosupport

18 Maliki was replaced as Prime Minister in a political agreement on September 8 th, 2014 by Haider al-Abadi, another
member of the Islamic Dawa Party, while Maliki became Vice President of Iraq.

26

theIraqistate,whichledtoamomentarysurgeinrebelmovementswithinSyria.Hezbollahwasthencalledonto
committhousandsmoretroops,whichincreasestheirvulnerabilitywithinLebanon.NotonlyhaveHezbollah
controlledareasbeenunderaconsistentbarrageofreprisalattacksbySyrianrebelgroupsandallieswithinLebanon,
butthevolumeofcasualtiesthattheyhavesufferedhasalreadybeeninthethousands,includingthelossofmanyhigh
ranking,experiencedcommanders.TheselosseshaveerodedtheirpoliticalsupportwithinLebanonasShiafamilies
increasinglyquestionwhytheirchildren,whosigneduptofighttheIsraelis,aredyinginawarinSyria. 19

ParadoxeshavealsobeguntosurfaceinrelationtothetacittrucebetweenAssadregimeforcesandISIL.EarlyinISIL's
Syrianincursiontheydirectlyfoughtregimeforces,especiallyinAleppo,wheretheycontrolledseveralneighborhoods.
ButasconflictbetweenrebelfactionsandISILacceleratedandISILunitsweredrivenoutofAleppoandintoeastern
Syriaatacittrucetookhold.TheSyrianregimehad,atthattime,littlepresenceoutsideofisolatedcitiesineastern
Syriasinceearlyonintherevolution,withapresenceinDeirezZor,Palymryaandafewbasesscatteredinthedesert,
allofwhicharelargelysuppliedbyhelicopter.ThesesmallgarrisonsweremorethancontenttoallowISILtofunction
ineasternSyriaaslongastheywerefightingotherrebelfactionsinthearea.Thistacittrucebegantobecomemore
symbioticwhenISILbegantotakeoversmalleroilfieldsandselloiltotheregime,whichhadbeenunderinternational
sanctionsforsometime.Thisbegantocreateaproblem,however,whenISILbegantofocustheiroperationalcapacity
oncarryingoutattacksinIraq,leadingtoaphenomenathathadnotbeenseeninoverayear,aSyrianairforcestrikeon
anISILtarget,aheadquartersbuildinginRaqqa.AfterthisattackAssadregimeforces,whichhadbeenbesiegingrebel
troopsinDeirezZorfromoneside,whileISILcutthemofffromtheoppositeside,begantobeattackedbyISILunits,
atthesametimethatIraqimilitiaswereabandoningtheirpositionswithinSyriatoreturntoIraq;sincethisinitial
bombingalloftheseregimeheldareasinEasternSyria,withtheexceptionofthegarrisoninDeirezZor,hasfallento
ISILforces.ThisgeneratesaprofoundproblemforthealliancethathasbuiltupwithintheIraniansphereofinfluence.
TheSyrianregimeisreliantonISIL,notonlyforsomeoftheiroilsupply,butalsotodiverttheirenemies,yetISILis
alsoattackingtheirsponsorsandsupportorganizations.Thiscouldleadtoanyofanumberofscenarios,butthemost
likelyatthispointisthattheAssadregimewillabandontheeasterndeserts,whichhadalreadybeguntohappenasof
earlyJuly,andallowISILfreereignsotheycanconcentratetheirforcesaroundAleppo,creatingapincerinnorthern
centralSyriawiththepotentialtogenerateseriousproblemsforrebelfactionsinthearea.Thisalsomeansthatthe

19 Ignatius, 2014; Iran Overplays Its Hand,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-iran-overplays-its-hand-in-iraq-and-syria/2014/07/03/132e
1630-02db-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html

27

Assadregimeistacitlyconsenting,forthetimebeing,toallowingISILtobaseoperationsoutofeasternSyria,
essentiallysecuringISIL'srearflanksotheycanconcentrateonoperationsinIraq.AtthesametimeAssadis
acknowledgingthathisregime'sareaofoperationshasjustshrunkdramatically.TheAssadregimeisessentially
preservingitsabilitytosurviveintheshortterm,andintheprocesshassacrificedtheMalikiregime,althoughthat
collapsemayhavebeenunavoidable.Therealquestioniswhetherthiscompletelyfragmentsthisblocornot.

InIraqthecollapseofthemilitaryhasforcedachangeinitsorganizationandcomposition,whichislikelytobea
drivingforceforcontinuingconflict.As800ISILfightersrolledtowardMosulatthebeginningofJune,30,000Iraqi
governmenttroopswokeuptoabsolutepanic.Theircommanders,mostlyappointedpoliticaloperatives,hadfled,as
hadthegovernoroftheprovinceandthemayor.TheaverageIraqisoldierwasleftwithoutorders,direction,orevenan
understandingofwhatunithewasinanymore.Asthegravityoftheirsituationsankintheybegantoflee,atfirst
slowly,buttheninaflood,withmanyofthemgoingnorthintoKurdishterritory.TherehadbeenfightinginMosulfor
severaldaysalreadybetweentheIraqimilitaryandSunniparamilitarygroups,butfunctionallytheIraqimilitary
collapsedinthefaceof800fightersbeforeashotwasevenfired.Themassdefectionsthatfollowedguttedtheranksof
themilitaryandleftthepathtoBaghdadlargelyopenforthetaking.InapanicMalikibegantomobilizeShiamilitias,
includinghavingunitscalledbackfromSyria,aprocesshelegitimizedbyopeninguprecruitmenttothemilitaryto
anyonewillingtosignup.Thepreviouslydiscussedstructureofcoupproofinghadthepredictableresult.Inthefaceof
concertedresistancethemilitarycollapsed,butinitsrebuildingMalikiwasaffordedtheopportunitytobuildanew
militarythatispoliticallyloyalandwelltrained,drawingfromtheranksofalreadyorganizedinformalforces,and
trainingnewrecruitsintheirmethods.SincethefallofMalikiinSeptemberthisdynamichasnotchanged.Thenew
PrimeMinister,HaideralAbadi,ismorethanwilling,seemingly,tocontinuetousethisnewIraqimilitary,complete
withUSmilitaryadvisers,andworkingalongsidesectarianmilitiastoholdtheareaaroundBaghdad.Theattemptat
inclusivityhasseeminglyended,whichplaysintotheIraqiregime'sfavorintheimmediatesense.However,asthe
sectarianmilitiasbecomemoreintegratedintothemilitaryfabricthegulfthatseparatesthestatefrommanyofthose
thatliveinthezoneofconflictwilllikelywiden.Thissectarianizationofthemilitarycarriesthethreatthattheconflict
willbecomeintractable,thattheIraqimilitarywillbeabletoholdontoareasthattheycurrentlycontrol,butthatother
partsofthecountrycouldmoveincreasinglybeyondtheirinfluence,fragmentingthenationandconfiningthe
government'szoneofoperationstoBaghdadandtheareassouthandeastofthecity.

28

ItisthroughthesedynamicsthatasmallmilitaryforcelikeISILmayactuallysucceedincarvingoutanIslamicstate
foraperiodoftime,althoughholdingitorfunctioningasastate,astheyintend,isadifferentquestionthatwillbe
discussedlater.WiththecontractionoftheSyrianstate'szoneofoperationsintothecentralandwesternareasofSyria,
andtheincreasingsectarianismoftheIraqistate,itmayjustbethecasethatISIL,alongwithothergroups,cancreatea
spaceoutsideofthecontrolofeitherIraqorSyria.Thisiswheretherealquestionsbegin,andwherewecanreallysee
thefundamentalflawinISIL'slongtermstrategy.Theseimmediatetacticalimplicationshavetobethoughtofwithin
thewidercontextoftheconstellationofforcesintheregion,includingbutnotlimitedtothestrangephenomenonof
boththeIranianandUSgovernmentsattemptingtopropupthefailingIraqistate.Beforebeginningtoanalyzehow
ISILwasabletocausesuchaprofoundcrisisintheentiretyofthepoliticaldynamicsoftheMiddleEast,andwhythey
willlikelyfailultimately,wehavetothinkthroughthepoliticalcontext,thelinesofsupplyandcommandandcontrol,
forthestateforces,pseudostateforcesandotherinsurgentforcesthatISILiscurrentlylockedinconflictwith.From
thispointanynumberofpossiblescenariosmayplaythemselvesout,allofwhicharecompletelyunpredictable,some
ofwhichwecanalreadyseedeveloping,noneofwhicharemutuallyexclusive.

Themostlikelyscenario,andonethatisbeginningtotakeshape,stemsfromtheStateofLawblocagainwinningonly
apluralityofseatsintheAprilelectionsandfailingtoformamajorityvotingblocwithinParliament,leadingto
Maliki'soustingasPrimeMinister.Itisnotanaccidentthatthecurrentuprisingacceleratedneartheendoftheelection
cycle,atapointwheretheIraqistatehastraditionallybeenweakest,atatimewhenpoliticalcompromiseshavetobe
struck.InallyingthemselveswithISIL,otherSunniinsurgentgroupshavetakenagamble.TheywereabletouseISIL
tobolstertheirattempttoamplifythelatentcrisisthatexistsatthecoreofIraqipolitics,atatimewhenthestateis
particularlyvulnerable,buttheyareplayingadangerousgame.ThusfarISILhasbeenabletouseotherinsurgent
groupstoholdspacewhiletheircorefightersmoveontothenextattack,allowingthemtoconcentrateforceatpoints
wheretheirenemiesareweakestorthathaveresourcesthattheycanscavengeorcontrol,likemilitarybasesandoil
fields.But,attheendoftheday,itisclearthatthesealliancesaretemporary,andwereholdingonlyaslongasMaliki
remainedinpower.NowthatMalikihasbeenoustedthisentirestructureofalliancesmaychange,andtherearealready
signsthatthisisoccurring.TherehavebeenreportsofSunnitribalforcesfightingwithISILunitsinwesternIraq,as
wellasmeetingsamongSunnitribalfigurestodecidewhethertheycancarryonwithoutISIL,andwhatthatmeans.
TherehavealsobeenreportsofuprisingsinareasthatISILclaimscontrolover,aswellastheformationofantiISIL
guerrillagroupsthathavebeenassassinatingISILcommandersineasternSyriaandwesternIraq.Therealquestionis

29

nothowmuchspaceISILcanclaim,orhowlongtheycancontinueastrategybasedentirelyonnebulousmovementto
decisivepoints.Therealquestionforanorganizationthataspirestobecomethestate,thataspirestotheroleofpolice,
iswhethertheycanholdthisspaceinthefaceofanonslaughtfrommultipledirections.Uptothispointtheyhavebeen
abletodeflectthisdangerthroughamixoftemporaryalliancesofconvenienceandaspeedofmovementthathas
preventedforcesopposingthemfromcounterattackinginanorganizedway.Theirrateofmovementthrewtheforces
thattheywerefightingagainstintototaldisarray.Thequestionatthispointbecomeswhethertheycanconcentrate
fightersandweaponssufficientlytodefendagainsttheinevitableendingofthesealliancesofconvenience,whenthey
willfaceforcesthatvastlyoutnumberthem,attackingfromallsides.Aswillbediscussedlater,asISILmovements
forcedadversariestocontracttheirareasofoperationsISILforcesbegantofaceincreasedresistance,andthisforces
themtoconcentratenumbers.But,asaresultofUSairstrikesandthemountingassassinationcampaignstheyhave
beenobligedtokeeptheseforcesfragmented,concentratingonlyforattacks,andleavingthemvulnerableinareasthat
forceshadtobepulledfrom,andfromtheair,whereconcentratedforcesmakeeasiertargets.

WithMalikioutofofficeitislikelythatmanyinsurgentgroupswillturnonISIL,whotheyhavelittlepoliticalaffinity
with.ThisoffersanopportunityforSyrianrebelstoattackISILfrombehind,whichalsoplacesregimeforcesina
precariousposition,devoidofaprimarycrutchfortheirmilitarystrategy.TheplainfactofthematteristhatISILhas
expandedfarbeyondtheirpresentcapacitytoholdspace,andisnowattemptingtocompensate.Recentlysomeof
ISIL'sgainshavebeguntoberolledback,especiallynorthandwestofBaghdad,andtheirspeedofmovementhas
sloweddramaticallyinIraq,aswellasinKobani.ItislikelythatifISILholdsontoanyspaceatallbythetimethisis
overitwillbeaverymuchsmallerspacethantheyclaimtooperatewithinnow.Itisimportanttokeepinmindthat
anyclaimtocontrolspaceisalwaystenuous.Thereisneversuchathingasatotaloccupationofspace,therearealways
contingencies.Thisismuchmorethecasewhenthecontrollingentityisvastlyoverstretched,reliantonmovementand
speedratherthanconcentrationsofforceinspace,andlightlydispersedoutsideofimmediatezonesofconflict.The
onlywaythatISILholdsontoanything,ratherthanmilitarilycollapsingoutofsheerattrition,isiftheyareableto
consolidatethespacetheyoperatein,andbuildupresourcesandfightersmorequicklythentheyexhaustlogistical
capacity.Thiscouldoccurthroughavarietyofmechanisms.Firstly,fightersinSyriathatarebeingengulfedinthe
ISILadvancearebeginningtodefecttoISIL.Itisimportanttokeepinmindthatthesedefectionsarelessfor
ideologicalreasonsthanmotivatedbypurestrategiccalculation.ISIListhestrongestforceinvastswathsoftheeastern
Syriandesert.Ifonedoesnotdefectthenoneislikelytobecapturedandtortured,ifnotkilledoutright.Material

30

considerationsalsoplayarole.ManyinsurgentfactionsinSyriahavelittleaccesstoweaponry(themythofvast
westernsupportisexactlythat,amyth,outsideofafewfactions),andISILhasbeenconsolidatingweaponry,either
throughpurchasesorappropriation.Secondly,ISILdoesrunanumberofsocialprograms,includingsocialservices,
foodsupport,conflictmediation,andevenaconsumerinterestofficethattakescounterfeitordamagedgoodsoutof
marketsandexactsretributionforfraud.This,combinedwiththefearbaseddeterrenteffectthatdecapitatingpeoplein
publicplacesandcuttingoffthehandsofthievesgenerates,hasactuallybeenimportantingeneratingwhatever
grassrootssupportthattheyhave,whichissomewhatsignificant,thoughnotdecisive.Thirdly,ISILcanpayfighters
andsupporttheirfamilies.ThisnotonlycreatestheideaofISILasanoddsortofemploymentprogram,butalsoallows
foreignfighterstoconcentratewithinazoneofsafetywiththeirfamilies,andfindhousingandasourceofincomeupon
arrival.Iftheseinitiativescangeneratesufficientfightersandresourcesbeforethecounterattackbegins,thenitis
possiblethattheywillholdontosomespace,likelyinthedesertborderregionsofIraqandSyria.

ThispossibilityofasmallISILcontrolledstateleadstoanotherpossibilitythathasbeenhangingonthemarginsofthis
entiresituation,thefragmentationoftheWesternimposedbordersbetweenIraqandSyria.Theseborderswerelargely
theresultofagreementsmadebetweenFranceandGreatBritainintheearlytwentiethcenturythatdividedtheMiddle
EastintozonesofinfluenceintheeventualityofthecollapseoftheOttomanEmpire,whichoccurredattheendof
WorldWarI.Thesebordershavealwaysbeensomewhatartificial,andthatartificialityisbeginningtocomeinto
focus.ThroughtheresistanceinSyria,KurdishpopulationshavegatheredanddeclaredtheexistenceofaKurdish
autonomousregionthere.TheKurdishregionofIraq,whichalreadyhadadegreeofpoliticalautonomy,hasbeguna
pushtowardareferendumonindependence.Thisreferendumislikelytopass,leadingtofusionwiththeSyrian
KurdishregionintothecoreofanattemptedindependentKurdishstate.ThiscombinedwithwhateverterritoryISIL
maintainscontrolover,whichislocateddirectlysouthoftheseautonomousKurdishregions,mayfragmentthecurrent
spacesoccupiedbytheSyrianandIraqistate,turningthemintosmaller,moresecure,sectarianstatesthatoperateas
satellitestateswithintheIraniansphereofinfluence.Thiswouldconcentratetheconflictintheborderingregions,
outsideofSyrianorIraqistatecontrol,andprimarilybeawarbetweenISILandinsurgentgroupsinbothIraqand
Syria.Thistooisalreadybeginningtotakeshape,withIraqimilitarypushesmostlyconcentratedintheareas
immediatelysurroundingBaghdadandaroundSamarraandTikrit,whiletheSyrianstatehasbeguntopulltroopsoutof
theareasaroundDeirezZor,andawayfromisolatedgarrisonsinthedesertsofeasternSyria,movingtheseforcesinto
theareasnorthofAleppotolaunchalikelyassaultonrebelpositionswithinthecity.Thoughthesedevelopmentsmay

31

notleadtoaninternationallyrecognizedshiftinborders,thedynamicsoftheconflictaresuchthatthisisbecomingthe
defactosituationontheground.

Shortofacompletelyunforeseenevent,theIraqiandSyrianstateswillremainunfragmentedonlyiftheIranian
militarylaunchesanabbreviatedoccupationofIraqandSyriainsupportofgovernmentforces.Suchanoccupation
wouldbeunlikelytouseregularIranianunits,butratherproxyforces,asinSyria,throughacombinationofinformal
foreignfighterstodefendthestate,andtheuseofQudsForcepersonneltofundandtrainsectarianShiamilitias.There
isasignificantdangerinthisapproachhowever.ThiswouldrequiretheQudsForcetopullforcesandsuppliesoutof
Syria,alongwithIraqimilitias,leavingHezbollahastheprimarysupportingforcefortheSyrianregime,whichwill
eventuallycollapse.ThoughHezbollahhasthousandsunderarms,onlyafractionofthemarefulltimefighters,with
theremainderbeingreserveswhoarelesslikelytoplacetheirlivesonholdtogofight,andwholacktrainingand
experience.ThishasalreadybecomeaprobleminthemountainousQalamounregionborderingLebanoninSyria,
whereinMay2014Hezbollahandtheregimedeclaredavictory.Butalltheywereabletodowasdriveinsurgentsout
ofcities.Theycouldnotfollowthemintothecountryside,andeventakingthecitiescosttheregimeanditssupport
forcessubstantiallyincasualties,materiel,andtime,whileopeningthemuptoattacksinotherplaces.Hezbollahhas
beensendingtroopsintotheregion,buthasadmittedthattheywouldneed5,000to10,000moretoactuallypatrolroads
andclearinsurgentsfromtheareaeventemporarily20.InthispossiblescenarioHezbollahisfacedwiththechoiceof
continuingtosupportAssadontheground,acampaignwhichhasresultedinhighcasualtyratesandanerosionof
politicalsupportwithinLebanon,andpotentiallycollapselogisticallyasaresult,orwithdrawandallowAssadtofallin
arelativelyshortperiodoftime.

Any,all,ornoneofthesescenariosarelikelytoplayout,butinthefaceofuncertaintyonethingisclear;itisthe
uncertaintyofthesituation,theprofoundreconfigurationofthecalculusofforceonthegroundthathasthusfarbeen
thelargestimpactoftheseeventsuptothispoint.Thisnecessitatesthatwefinallybegintoaddressthecentralquestion
thathasbeenhangingontheedgesofthisanalysishowisitthatasmallforceoffightershascometogeneratethe
sheerconcentrationandescalationofcrisisthatISILhasinsuchashortperiodoftime?Tounderstandthiswehaveto
breakdownthecompositionofISILforces,thetacticstheyhavebeenusingandthewaysthattheycanmoveforce

20 Al-Fakih, 2014; Border Rebels Resist Hezbollah, Regime,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jul-08/263005-border-rebels-resist-hezbollah-regime.ashx#
axzz36rVnCE8J

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aroundtoachieveobjectivesinrapidsuccession.Herewecanalsoexaminewhatwe,asanarchists,canlearnfromthis
process(ifweareabletoseparateourtacticalanalysisfromtheutterrevulsionthatweshouldfeeltowardISILand
theirpolitics),whatthesetacticaldynamicscanteachusaboutthestructureofthestate,andwheretheshortcomingsare
inthisprocess,whereISILwilllikelyfail,andwhy.

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HowASmallOrganizationCanDestabilizeaRegionandtheFlawsInThisApproach(for
ISILandtheAttempttoReimposeControl)

Really,thecentralquestioninallofthisishowasmallorganizationwithalimitednumberoffightersthatwasalready
logisticallystretchedmanagedtodestabilizethemilitarybalanceofpowerforanentireregioninamatterofdays.The
currentmedianarrativeislargelybasedontheiruseofpublicexecutionsortheirfightingskill,withthecentralfocus
beingonhowterrifyingtheirindividualfightersare,theirvarioussuicidebombingsandexecutions,andtheir
sectarianism.Alloftheseelementsplaysomerole,butarefarfromthemostimportantdynamicsoftheconflict.
Rather,thisisastoryofwhathappenswhenasmallgroupofverydeterminedpeopleunderstandsterrainwelland
comestotermswiththeirtacticallimitationswithinaframeworkofruthlessandwellgroundedstrategy.Atthecoreof
ISIL'sstrategyaretwoelementsthatarenotbeingdiscussed,thecompositionofforceandthechoosingofmoments,
bothelementsthatarediametricallyopposedtothewaysthatbothnumbersandterrainarethoughtofwithinthe
Westernradicalmilieu,andthederivationoftheseframeworksfromabackgroundinsocialactivism.

ItisimportanttounderstandthatthegoalofISILisnottoattractconverts,oreventobringallfightingunitswithintheir
ranks.Rather,alloftheirstrategicmovespointtotwofundamentalobjectives,improvementinforcequalityandthe
sustainabilityoftheirresourcebasetocontinuefighting.Theseobjectivesexistatatensionwithoneanother.A
casualtyinwarfareisnotonlyimportantbecauseonefighteriseliminated,butrathertakesonimportancebasedonthe
levelofexperience,skillsandimportanceofafighterwithintheinternaldynamicsofafightingforce.Oftheoriginal
10,000ISILfightersthatexistedatthebeginningofthesummeronly1,000orsowerewellconnectedandexperienced
fighters.Thesethousandfightersnotonlycommandaccesstoresources,butarealsolargelyveteransofprevious
conflicts,inChechnya,Afghanistan,Iraq,andYemen.ManyofthemarrivedinSyriaoverayearago,andhavehad
timetodevelopcommunicationsinfrastructureandagroupdynamic.Withinthistiertherearealsoformerhighranking
officersthatservedintheIraqimilitaryunderHussein,specificallyAbuAlialAnbari,aformermajorgeneralwhois
nowincommandofISILoperationswithinSyria,andAbuMuslimalTurkmani,anexcolonelinIraqimilitary
intelligenceandformerspecialforcesofficernowinchargeofISILoperationsinIraq.Inthistierwereallyseea
convergenceofdifferentforcesandpersonalities,comingtogetherforsometimesideologicalreasonsandsometimes
practicalreasons,anditisinthislightthatwecanunderstandsomethinglikeBaathistformermilitarycommanders

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beinginvolvedinaSalafistorganization.AtthebeginningoftheinsurgencyagainsttheAmericanoccupation,the
statesponsoredFadayeenmilitias,numerousBaathPartyorganizations,andmilitarypersonnelthathadbeenputoutof
workbydeBaathificationworkedwithinacommandstructurethatwasstillbasedinBaathPartychainsofcommand,
withSaddamHusseinatthetopofthishierarchy.Asfighterswithinthisnetworkbegangettingpickedoff,andas
numerousotherinsurgentgroupsarose,thenetworkfragmented,withmanyjoiningtheNaqshbandiArmyandother
Islamistgroups,includingtheorganizationallineagethatwouldleadtoISIL.21

Thereisasecondtier,largerthanthefirst,thatiscomprisedofSyrianandIraqifightersthathadnoexperiencebefore
theSyrianconflictwhonowhavesomeexperienceinthisspecificterrain,manyofwhomhavedefectedtoISILfrom
otherrebelunits.Finally,thereisagrowingnumberofISILfightersthatarenewrecruits,somefromoverseas,
includingalargecontingentofEuropeanyouth.Thislargeouterlayeroffightersisaugmentedbyanumberof
employeesthatISILmaintainstoruntheirstatebureaucraciesandsocialservicesprograms.Thesetierscombinedadd
uptoover35,000personnel,manyofthemdrawingsalaries22.ThoughISILhasbeenabletorecruitalargenumberof
fightersintotheirranksasmallportionofthesefightersaredefectorsfrominsurgentgroupsineitherSyriaorIraq,and
thevastmajorityareunconnectedandinexperiencedfighters.ThisbecomescombinedwiththemethodsthatISILmust
relyoninordertoobtainresources,whichinvolvesassaultsonadversarialforces.AsforcesadversarialtoISILhave
concentrated,havecompressed,theseassaultshavebecomemoreandmorecostly,andISILhaslostmanyofthisinitial
groupofexperiencedfighters.Now,theselosseshavegenerallysparedtheupperechelonofISILleadership,butthere
havebeenanumberoffieldcommanderslost,andanevenlargernumberofexperiencedfightersthathavebeenkilled
inrecentengagements.Thismeansthatintheattempttogainresources,whichisrequiredtorecruitandsustainmore
troops,thequalityofthefightingforceandthecohesivenessoftheiroperationalstructureisdegraded.

WhatwasinterestingaboutISIL'sforceallocationisthatthisexperiencedcoredrivesmostofthefighting,butnotinthe
waythattraditionalmilitaryunitsoperate.Theydonotstayinalocalizedarea,anddidnot,untilrecently,concentrate
largenumbers.Rather,theytendedtomovequickly,coveringlongdistances,movingfighterstosupportother
detachmentsinengagementswithenemyforces.Forexample,OmaralShishani,aGeorgianmilitant,isaformer
memberoftheGeorgianmilitary,whereheissaidtohavespecializedinweaponryandmapping.Afterhisreleasefrom
21 Weiss, 2014; Saddam's Ghost, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/555169-saddams-ghost
22 Sherlock, 2014; Inside the Leadership of Islamic State,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956280/Inside-the-leadership-of-Islamic-State-how
-the-new-caliphate-is-run.html

35

aGeorgianprisonwherehewasconfinedonweaponscharges,heleftthecountry,arrivinginSyriaalongsideaunitof
Chechenfighters.Earlyin2013hejoinedasmallminorityofChechensintakinganoathofloyaltytoISIL.Invideos
fromtherecentfightingShishaniisoftenseenalongwithacolumnofvehicles,sometimesinFallujah,sometimesat
bordercheckpointsalongtheSyriaIraqborder,sometimesinRaqqa,andmostrecentlyduringthesermonalBaghdadi
gaveinMosul.Theselocationsarehundredsofmilesapart,andtendtoalternateintheintensityoffighting.Shishani
oftenappearsnearwherefightingisoccurring,evenifthatmeanscoveringgroundrapidly.Thereareotherfightersthat
canbetrackedthroughvideosinthisway,allofwhomtravelwithnumbers,allofwhomtendtoappearintheheaviest
combat,andallofwhomseemtocoverhundredsofmilesinveryshortperiodsoftime.Thisphenomenonishighly
indicativeofISILstructureandstrategy.WecantellthatISILcommanderstendtomovewiththeirtroops,meaning
thatcommandandcontroltendstobeaverylocalizedstructure.ThiscontrastswiththestructureoftraditionalWestern
militariesandpolice,inwhichcommandandcontroloccursfromacentralsite,oftenhundredsofmilesaway.This
localizationofcommunicationallowsISILunitstooperatewithahighdegreeofautonomy,whilestillclearlyallowing
themtocoordinatebetweenfightingforces.

ThisstructureallowedISILunitstomovequickly,concentrateforceatdecisivepoints,andavoidcounterattack,but
alsosetsthestagefortheprimarytacticsthattheyhavebeenemployingtosuchdramaticeffect.Prominentamong
theseisatendencytolaunchmovementsofforcesthroughemptyspaceorspacethathasonlyalightconcentrationof
opposingforces,andavoidingdirectconfrontation.Thistacticiscommonamongforcesthatoperateatadisadvantage
innumbers,anditisimportanttonotethatISILunitshaveconsistentlybeenoutnumberedinmajorconfrontations,and
thattheyoftenopposeforceswithaircapabilityandlargecontingentsofarmoredvehicles.Contrarytothetendencyof
manywithintheradicalmilieutoruntothepointofconcentratedconflict,ISILunitstendedtoavoidconcentrationsof
forceunlesstheconditionsareconducivetoattack,astheywereinMosul.There,upto30,000Iraqitroopsfledinthe
faceofanattackby800ISILfighters.Thisincident,thoughcatastrophicforIraqimilitarylogistics,wasnotdueto
someunimaginablepowerofISILunits.Rather,theIraqimilitaryhadalreadybeenfendingoffsporadicattackswithin
thecityfordays,largelylaunchedbyBaathistorganizations,andfoundthatonthemorningofthemainISILattackthat
theircommandershadfledthecity,leavingthemwithoutorders,communicationsorsupplies,sotheytoofled 23.
WhenconditionswerenotfavorableforamoveintoacityISILunitstendedtoavoidthespace,movearoundit,cutoff
supplylines,eliminatecheckpointsontheperiphery,andmoveon.ThisallowedISILtokeepfightersmobileand
23 Vice News, 2014; The ISIS Uprising: The Battle for Iraq (Dispatch 2), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=tdTNm54UHkA

36

fluid,attackingdeepintooppositionspace,disruptingprimarylogisticalsupportmechanismsandseizingspecific
targetsthathavestrategicimportance,butmaybelightlyguarded.MuchlikeGermanblitzkriegtactics,ISIL
infiltratedareas,degradingsupplyandcommunicationslogisticsinsmallunits,movingasdeeplyaspossibleinto
enemyheldareas.Bymovingdeeplybehindfrontlinestocarryoutactionsagainsttheenemy,notonlydothey
preservemobilityandpreventconcentratedcounterattack,butalsoforcetheopposingfrontlinetoeithercollapseinto
thecenter,atwhichpointtheperipheryisopentoattack,orbecutofffromitssupportmechanisms.

TheextrememobilityofISILunitsallowedthemtoidentifyandtakekeyobjectiveswithintheterrainbasedontheir
strategicgoals.Uptothispointthisstrategyhasfocusedonseizingdifferentsortsofsites,whilealsobuildingthe
capacitytoscaleuptheiroperationsandholdthatspacelongerterm.Thefocusonsustainabilityandlogistical
expansionhasconcentratedalotofISILactivityonperpetuatingandexpandingtheirfinancialbase.Organizationsthat
precededISILreliedheavilyonoutsidefunding,andtobecertainISILhastootoapoint,butoutsidemoneycomesata
cost.Tomaintainforeignfundersonemustrespectthelimitstheyimposeorrisklosingessentialfinancialsupport;this
isaprecariousposition.ISILhasdevelopedtheirownsourcesofinternalfundingthroughtheblackmarketoiland
weaponstrade,thesellingofantiquitieslootedfrommuseumsandhistoricsitesintotheinternationalmarket,the
ransomingofkidnappingvictims,highwayrobbery,extortion,andlargescalebankrobbery.(WhenISILmovedinto
Mosultheyrobbedbanksalloverthecity,includingtheIraqiCentralBank,stealingaround$400millioningoldand
currency).IfwetakealloftheseillicitenterprisesintoaccountISILhasraisedaboutabilliondollarsthisyearalone.
Manyoftheseenterprisesinvolvetheabilitytomovegoods,requiringaccesstosafetransitroutesandcontrolover
crossroads,whichoftenfallinthecenteroftowns,aswellasaccesstotheresourcesinvolved.Theseeconomic
objectives,includingthetakingoverofsomeofthelargestoilfieldsintheregion,havecombinedwiththeabilityto
movetroopsquicklyandexpandtheirgeneralcapacitytoachieveshorttermobjectives.Thoughthisapproach,
deployingforcetotheplacethatservesthegreateststrategicpurpose,seemsintuitive,itisaverydifferentconceptof
warfarethantheonethatweseeintheradicalmilieu,orintraditionalunderstandingsofwarfareandlandconquest.In
theseanalysesthestrategicgoalsseemtobeprimarilymotivatedbysymbolicimperatives,theclaimingofspaceand
theattempttoattacksomefocalpoint.IntakingthisapproachISILisabletoavoidacommonproblemthattheseother,
moresymbolic,understandingsofterraintendtogenerate,theimpetustorushtothecentralpointofconflict,where
resistancewillbethemostacute(downtownareasatsummitdemonstrationsforexample).ISIL'sconcentrationon
immediatestrategicimperativesnotonlygeneratesaprocessinwhichfightingincreasesthecapacitytocontinueto

37

fight,butalsooneinwhichdevelopingthelongterminfrastructureoffightingiscentraltotheirmovementsthrough
terrain.

ISIL'sabilitytomovethroughspaceandfocusonstrategicobjectivesisfusedwithanabilitytomakestrategicalliances
inordertoexpandtheirnumericalforceandfreeupunitsforoffensiveactions.Thisapproachoftenhasitspitfalls.
Alliescanbecomeenemiesquicklyandunexpectedly,andnooneunderstandsthisbetterthananarchists,whoare
routinelystabbedintheback.However,suchtemporaryalliancescanaffordsomeadvantages.Byallyingwithlocal
forcesISILisabletofocusonoffensiveactionswithouthavingtodevotemanypersonneltothepolicingofspace.This
approachhascreatedweaknessesaswell,especiallyforanorganizationthatisattemptingtobecomeastateandpolice
space,whichwillbediscussedlater.Atthispoint,itisimportanttorecognizethatmuchofthemovementISILhas
beenabletoundertakehasbeenbasedontheirallianceswithlocalforces.Whatisbecomingclearisthattheydosofor
purelystrategicreasons.Unlikemanyoftheorganizationsthattheyareallyingwith,ISILwasnotnecessarilyanymore
interestedinoverthrowingMalikithaninoverthrowingAssad,buttheuseoflocalizedforcesnotonlylendstheir
actionsanairoflegitimacy,butalsopositionsthemtogainthebenefitofinertia.Inmovingthroughspaceasquicklyas
theyhave,withthesupportofalliedforces,theyhavebeenabletoamassanamazingamountofresources,manyof
whicharedevotedtotherecruitmentoffighters,whichisthenchanneledbackintoexpansion,whichyieldsmore
resources,etc.Inthisapproachstasisisliterallydeath.Eventuallytheresourceswillrunout,andnoamountofblack
marketfinaglingwillgeneratetheincomenecessarytopayaneverexpandingnumberofpersonnel.BeforeISILhits
thispointofeconomiccollapsetheyhavetoneutralizetheverysamealliesthattheyarecurrentlyfightingalongside.
Thisprocesshasalreadybegun,withanumberofBaathistsbeingrecentlyarrestedbyISILinKirkukandMosul.By
gaininginertiaISILhasbeenabletomovetothecenterofresistanceineasternSyriaandwesternIraq,andusethe
resourcesthattheyhaveaccumulatedtoexpandtheircapacitytofight.

WhathasbecomeclearfrompreviousISILoperationsisthattheirentirestrategicoutlookwasbasedonthemovement
offorcethroughspace,theprojectionofthatforceasquicklyaspossible,withtheconsolidationofresourcesandthe
policingofspacebeingasecondaryobjective.Thisstrategicframeworkisexcellentatacceleratingconflictandcrisis
withintheforcelogisticsofthosethattheydeemtobetheenemy,particularlyifthisenemyisadefinedstatewitha
hierarchicalmilitaryform.Wecanlearnalotfromthisapproachinrelationtothewaysthatinsurgencyisapproached
withintheradicalmilieu.Withinthismilieuthereisatendencytoreduceterraintoasymbolicspace,whichbecomes

38

nothingbutaspacetomovethrough,withterrainvariancesatmostplayingtheroleofinertobjectsintheattemptto
strikeasymbolicblowagainstasymbolicenemy.Thishasledusintoaproblematictendencytoignorethestrategic
importanceofcertainconcreteelementswithinaterrain,andtomovetowardthecenterofgravity,ratherthantotake
actionsthatmaximizeourtacticaladvantage.Thisisbornfromseveraldynamics.Firstly,actionwithintheradical
milieutendstobethoughtofasexistingwithinahopelesstacticalimbalanceinwhichthepoliceareunderstoodtobe
strongandwellarmed,andwearethoughttobeweakandgenerallyunarmed,butthisisareductionistviewpoint.The
concentrationofforcewithinlargelogisticalstructures,likepolicedepartments,allowsfordramaticconcentrationof
forceatspecificpoints,andeventhemovementofforcetothatpointquickly,ifinaterrainwheretheydonotface
resistance,butthisaloneisnotthemostimportantelement.Weshouldrememberthatthisstructuresacrifices
importantadvantages.Itrequiresconcentratingforce,thuslimitingtheprojectionofforceacrossspaceandallowing
gapsincoverage.Also,thissortofstructurerequiresalongsupplychainthatiswellstockedfromproductionsites,
limitingtheabilityofunitstooperateautonomously,whileatthesametimeopeningtheselinesuptopossibleattack.
Magnitudeofforceisnottheonlypossiblestrategicconsideration.Onegainsadvantageintherecognitionthatevery
strategyhasweakpoints,operatesonlyincertainareasatcertaintimes,leavingallapproachesopentosomeformof
exploitation.Tomovetowardthecenterofgravitywhenfacinganenemythatcarriesadvantagesinforceand
personnelissuicidalatworst,andjustbadstrategyatbest.Yetwhatdowedo?Werushtothepointofgreatest
confrontation,thespacewherethepoliceareconcentratedthemostheavily,ratherthaneitherattemptingtodisperse
thisconcentrationthroughindirectmeansoractingontheperiphery.

Secondly,actionwithintheradicalmilieutendstobethoughtofinrelationtoremoved,largelysymbolic,goals.For
example,thediscussionofaffirmingsubjectivityinthefetishizingofpropertydestruction.Thisimpetusisbornmore
outofpassionthananactualfocusonstrategy,andthisleadsustoattempttoactagainstabstractenemies,ratherthan
themoreimmediateattempttounderstandanimmediateandmaterialobjective,understandthelogisticalfunctioningof
theenemy,andpotentiallyengaginginindirectways.Weseethisfrequentlyatpoliticalconventiondemonstrations.
Ratherthanseeingtheconventionasaprocessthatplaysoutovertime,andthathasafuturitytoit,amomentthatit
occursandafuturethatextendsbeyondit,andorientingourobjectivesaroundwhatmightbegainedfromthesituation
strategically,theobjectivebecomesmerelymakingapoint,registeringdiscontent,orelseattemptingtoblockadethe
convention.Asmuchasthisapproachhasdonetobringanarchistresistancetotheforefrontofpublicdiscourse,ithas
donelittletorearrangetheterrainonanimmediatelevelaftertheconvention,atleastnotpreferably.Ratherthan

39

lookingforthestrategicopeningsinthisscenario,onethatresidentsofthehostcitycannotavoid,thefocusfallsonthe
eventitselfasanisolatedhistoricalsingularity,aconflictbetweenanarchistsandpoliceinadeserteddowntownarea,
andnotasastrategicsituationthathasadvantageousanddisadvantageouselementstobemanagedorexploited.This
dramaticallycontrastswiththewaythatISILapproachesspacestrategically,inwhichthereareshiftingimmediate
strategicgoals,allofwhicharebasedonsustainingtheabilitytofight,andmostofwhicharebasedonmaximizing
advantageimmediatelyorreconfiguringtheterraintomaximizeadvantagelater.Thisapproachissignificantlymore
material,moregroundedintheactualcontingenciesandimmediaciesoffighting,andaimedatstrategicallyimportant
victoryratherthansymbolicvictory.

Thirdly,thetacticsISILhasbeendeployinghavebeencompletelyantitheticaltoWesternconceptsoftheconnection
betweeninsurgencyandmass.Largescalesupportconferstheabilitytobuildadispersedinfrastructureofconflictthat
cansustainconsistentengagement,aswellasgeneratenumericaladvantage.AsthescenariowithISILdemonstrates,
neitherarenecessary.ByhidingforcesanddevelopingcovertallianceswithotherfactionsISILhasbeenabletoarray
forcestofacilitatetheircurrenttrajectoryofattacks.This,combinedwitharapidescalationinforceinascenario
conducivetosuchescalationgeneratedadynamicinwhichthecollapseofstatelogisticsacceleratedastimewenton,
notonlygeneratinganimmediateeffect,butcausingaprofoundcrisisintheentiretyofageopoliticalandmilitarybloc.
Itwastheirabilitytoexploitgapsinmilitaryoperationalcoverage,combinedwithsurpriseandtheuseofavarietyof
ideologicallyvariedforcesthatcreatedthecurrentscenario.Thisprovidesanimportantcounterpointtothealmost
religiousinsistencethatsomewithintheradicalmilieuexpresswhenthequestionofmassmovementsarises.Within
thisdiscussionthereisapervasiveassumptionthatnumericalmassisimportantinitself,butclearlythatisnotthecase.
Notonlyhavewewitnessedsituationsinwhichlargenumbersofpeoplefailedtoachieveanyrealobjectives(the
antiwarmovementwasbothacomedyandfarceinthisrespect)butwealsohavewitnessedsituationsinwhichsmall
numbersofmoreexperienced,morewellorganized,moredisciplinedelementswereabletoachieverelatively
significantimmediateobjectives.Whenwethinkofmass,justaswhenwethinkofterrainorobjectives,wehaveto
considertacticaladvantage,whatitgivesusandwhatitprecludes.AsmanysawduringOccupythemassmovementis
anoftendangerousplaceforthemoremilitantamongus,completewithanabsurdinsistenceontransparencyandthe
unofficialpoliceliaisonworkinggroupsthatwouldformamongtheselfrighteousliberalsinanumberofcamps.In
attemptingtomaintainnumericalsupportmanylocalnetworkscompromisedtheirabilitytoactinfavorofsome
abstractconceptofbuildingagreementamongthepublic,theanonymousothersthat,accordingtoeverypacifist,are

40

obsessedwithactionsthatarenotdisruptive,wherenofightingactuallyoccurs,andwhicharerelegatedtomere
complaint.Atthesametime,departingfromthesmallgroupclandestinemodeloforganizingcangenerateadvantages
increatingpotentiallyvolatilesituationsandtheabilitytoresistpoliceactionoverthelongterm.Relianceonthesmall
groupallowsISILtofunctionwithspeed,butalsorelegatesthemtoacertainpoliticalisolationthathasforcedthemto
developtheirownmeansofsustainability,andwhichhasledtotheveryrealpossibilityofuprisingsagainstISILrule
withintheterritorytheyclaimtocontrol.

ThedownfallofISILwilllikelybebasedonthesamedynamicsthathaveledtotheirstrategicsuccess,andthisirony
centersaroundthecompletedivergencebetweentheirtacticalstrengthsandtheirpoliticalgoals.Thefluidityof
movementandthedispersalofforcewilllikelygeneratetheconditionsfortheirdemiseasafightingforceinthefuture,
andwilldefinitelyunderminetheirpseudostateproject,whichrequiresapoliticalunityonaprofoundandexistential
level,butthesedynamicscanbeavoided.Therelianceonmobilityandmaximumprojectionnecessitatesthedispersal
offorces,especiallyforcesaslimitedasthoseISILcanreliablycounton.Thismakesthepolicingofeverydaylife,
whichallstatesnecessitatetofunction,impossible.Themorethatoneattemptstodefineeverydaylife,andISIL'sbrand
ofShariaattemptstopoliceallaspectsofeverydaylife,thegreaterquantityofforcehastobekeptinaspace,
somethingISILisunabletodo,notonlyduetonumericallimitation,butalsotoacuteconflictzonesexistingonall
fronts.UptothispointISILhasbeenabletosubstituteterrorforpolicing,whichiseffectiveforshortperiodsbutfails
inthefaceofanyconcertedresistance.BythiswemeanthatISILhasbeenabletomovethroughareas,cutoffthe
handsofsomethieves,hangsomethataredeclaredhereticsinapublicsquare,executedozensduringaraidandmove
on.Thisissufficientto,withenoughconsistency,generateadeterrenteffect,onethatisamplifiedtothedegreethat
ISILalsoplaysasocialsupportrole.However,witheverytownthattheytakeover,witheverymileofterritorythat
theyclaimtocontrol,theynotonlyhavetoincreasetheircapacitytofendoffcounterattack,buttheyalsohavetopolice
thatspace,evenastheyareinactivecombatontheperiphery.

Thisdynamicbetweenforceconcentrationandforcedispersionasbecomeallthemorecomplexinrecentmonths,as
thecompressionofforcesadversarialtoISILhavegeneratedacountervailingdynamictotheonegeneratedthroughthe
effectsofairstrikes.;andthispresentsnotonlyproblemsforISILbutalsoforUSstrategyintheregion.AsISILas
beenforcedtoconcentrateforcetheyhavelefteverlargergapsinpolicingcoverage.Thesegapsaremarkersoftheir
inabilitytoorganizeacomprehensivepolicelogistics,toactuallypolicespace,aswellasspaceswereresistancecan,

41

andinsomecaseshas,becomeorganized.Inanyscenariowhereoneentityisattemptingtoholdspace,andthisisthe
coreofthestatewarmachine,forceconcentrationlimitstheprojectionofforceacrossspacewhileforcedispersion
limitsforceconcentration;insituationsofoffensiveactionorconcentrateddefenseorpolicingoperations,force
concentrates,anddispersedforceisoftenunabletosustaindefenseagainstfocusedattack.WiththeadventofUSair
strikesISILforceshavebeenforcedtodisperse,butwithanimportantcaveat.Beforetheywereabletodisperseand
stillconcentrateforcestolaunchassaultswhennecessary,whilemaintainingbasesofoperationintownsandcities
whennoteithermobileorconcentratedatapointofattack.Itwasinthisformthattheywereabletomaintain
movement,butalsopolicespace,butonlyifneitheroccurredwithmuchconcentrationofforceatanyonepoint,which
woulddrawdispersedforcesawayfromtheirlogisticalpointsandtosomecentralpoint.Withtheadventoftheair
strikesISILforceshavedispersedagain,buthavenotbeenabletoreturntotheirlogisticalbases,oftenincities,dueto
theirknownlocations,whichhavebeentheprimarytargetofstrikesthusfar.

WhatthishasgeneratedisasituationinwhichISILforcesarecompletelymobileand,whentheydofindaplaceofrest,
theyareonlyconcentratinginsmallnumbersforlimitedperiodsoftime.Thisisverysimilartothedynamicthatwas
seeninAfghanistanintheearlystagesoftheUSinvasion,atwhichpointtherewerelessthan1,000totalSpecialForces
personnelonthegrounddirectingairstrikesonTalibangovernmenttargetsandusinglocalforcestodotheactual
fighting.Inthisphasetheearlyairstrikeswereeasytotarget,thelocationsofbaseswereknown,theywerelarge
targetsthatwereeasilyidentifiablefrom30,000feetorcouldbespottedfromtheground,atleastifthespottersknew
thelocationsaheadoftime.But,afterthisinitialphaseTalibanforcesleftthebases,dispersedtheirforcesand
equipment,andbegantoengageinasymmetrictactics,whichmadethetargetingofairstrikesimpossible,therewereno
targets.EvenasairstrikesbecameimpossiblesodidtheabilityoftheTalibanregimetooperateasthestate,which
requirespolicinglogisticsthatarebothdispersedacrossthetotalityofthespaceofoperations,butalsosufficiently
concentratedinsingularspacestofunctionlogisticallyandconstantly.Policingisnotonlyaspacequestion,anability
tomovethroughasmuchspaceaspossible,butalsoatemporalquestion,anabilitytodosoasconsistentlyaspossible.
Whenforceisdispersedandmadeentirelymobile,asisoftenthecaseduringairstrikes,theconstancyofpresenceinan
area,whichisrequiredforpolicingtofunctionlogistically,becomesimpossible.So,atthesametimethattheTaliban
statecollapsedtheTalibaninsurgencywasborn,throughthesameprocessofdispersingforce.Notonlydoesthispoint
toaflawinUSstrategy,inwhichtheeliminationofthetargetstatealsofacilitatesthegrowthofaspecificformof
protostatewhichengagesinasymmetricformsofresistanceforpotentiallylongperiodsoftime,butthisalsopointsto

42

afundamentalparadoxinallformsofmodernistpositivisticpolitics,inwhichthebreakingdownofthestate,the
dispersionofthestatebecomesequatedwithsomesingularpoliticalfutureorvision.

Forcedispersionandtheuseofspeedasastrategyisincrediblysuccessfulincreatingcrisisinopposingpolicing
structures,overwhelmingtheircapacityinalocalizedarea,drivingquicklyintotheirsupplyareas,andcuttingtroops
offfromcommandandcontrolandsupply.Butthisapproachfailsinthesecondstepthatisrequiredfrompositivistic,
ideologicalinsurgentmovements,theattempttoredefineeverydaylifewithinasingularvision,toeliminatepolitical
multiplicityandimposesomeformoforderthroughamaterialpolicing.Thisisaproblemthatanarchistsdonot,and
shouldnot,have.Thissecondstepisoftenassumedinconceptsofinsurgency,thatthelogisticsofthestatewill
collapse,andthatsomenewdefinitionoflifewillarisefromtheashes.Ithasbeenthisassumptionthathasledtothe
generalizedterrorthattendstocharacterizetheendingofinsurgencyandtheestablishmentofsomeattemptat
constructingorder.ItisatthispointforISIL,inattemptingtoendtheinsurgencyandbecomethestate,thattheweak
alliances,thevastdispersalofforce,andthespeedwithwhichtheymoveallbegintobecomeliabilities,ratherthan
advantages.Toavoidthisproblemrequiresareimaginingofinsurgencyasanopeningupprocess,agenerationof
possibilities,ratherthanadefinitionofexistence,amovebeyondthemodernistparadigmofthegrandnarrativeand
towardaconceptofconflictwhichtakes,asitsprimaryintent,aformofcriminality,ahostilitytowardthemateriality
ofthestate.Itisherethatanarchistscanpotentiallylearnfromastrategicanalysisoftheactionsoforganizationsthat
wefindpoliticallyreprehensible.Thequestionherebecomestwofold.Firstly,extractinginformationfromconflicts
involvingdetestablecombatantsrequiresaseparationbetweenthedynamicsoffightingandthepoliticsofthefighters.
Inotherwords,thereistremendousvalueinfocusingonthedynamicsofconflictitself.Secondly,thisnecessitatesa
movebeyondthefundamentalassumptionsthatcharacterizeinsurgentmovements.Inthesingularsense,theattemptto
endthesameconflictthatisunleashed,istoendtheproliferationofexistentialpossibilitiesthatarereleasedinthe
breakdownofthestate.Withoutthisparadox,assumedwithinmodernistpositivism,thatrevolutioncreatesasingular
newworld,theproblemofpolicingcanbeavoided,anditisthisavoidancethatformsthecoreoftheanarchistproject.
Itisalsothisavoidancethatallowsustolearnfromtacticsofmobilityandforcedispersal,movementandspeed,the
rejectionofholdingspaceandamentalityofstrategicintervention,ratherthanpassiondrivenactivism,whileatthe
sametimeavoidingthefundamentallyfascistattempttoeliminatethepossibilitythatisunleashedinresistance,thatis
unleashedinthedestructionofthepoliceasalogisticalentity.

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