1. VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C.

PAO
FACTS:
1. On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died and it was alleged that he
owned property in Calamba, Laguna.
2. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with CFI Laguna a petition for
letters of administration and ex parte appointment as special administratix
over the estate. Motion was granted.
a. there was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio
3. Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and in behalf of their child:
Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI.
a. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere
illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeed from him
4. CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule.
a. Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.
ISSUES:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the
present case?
b.) What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section
1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?
HELD/RATIO:
a.) Under RULE 73, SECTION 1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled
at the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in
which he had estate.
The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in

the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in
QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4), but Preciosa did not waive
it, merely requested for alternative remedy to assert her rights as
surviving spouse.
However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is conferred by
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to be with CFIs independently from the
place of residence of the deceased.
RULE 79, SECTION 2, demands that the petition should show the existence
of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of
assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin,
creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
b.) The doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires

bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones

domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.
c.) Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix.
The New Rules RULE 80 SECTION 1 broadened the basis for appointment of
special administrator (temporarily) to take possession and charge of the
estates of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided
and (regular) executors or administrators appointed.
Old rules basis ay: appeal of allowance of disallowance of a will;
New: added - xxx delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause (includes parties cannot agree among
themselves) including an appeal of allowance of disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a xxx
The discretion to appoint a special administrator or not is with the probate
court, the paramount consideration is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent.
In re: Fule, it is not required that the administratrix be entitled to share in
the estate of the decedent only that one is entitled to the administration;
but the preference of Preciosa is with sufficient reason the widow would
have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership.
For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.
DISPOSITION: Fules petition DENIED.
2. Cuenco vs. CA
FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his

widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the
first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first
marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila
but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the
second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will
and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted
on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI
Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition
and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of
Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over
the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings
HELD: The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without
bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were
otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction
over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
3. Gerona, et al. vs. De Guzman, et al., L-19060, May 29, 1964
Facts: Petitioners all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the
legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman.
Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife,
Teodora de la Cruz.
After the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila
Ramos, who begot him several children, namely the respondents.
Marcelo de Guzman died and subsequently, respondents executed a deed
of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only
surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well
knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding
that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of
Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his
second wife, Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already
prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. On
appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, with costs against them.

ISSUS: WON Petitioners are entitled to their share

Held: No. Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed
of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution
thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in
the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
4. BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ
FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate children.
Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial
will, which was written in English. In that will, Leodegaria declared that it
was her desire her properties should not be divided among her heirs
during her husbands lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied
out of the fruits of her properties. She devised and partitioned the conjugal
lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her
husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will.
There after, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and
renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate in favor of their 6 children.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity,
and in declaring it void.
RULING: The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate
of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void.

But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if
it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The
distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr.
In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the
children and the surviving spouse.

5. Maloto vs. Maloto

Facts:
Adriana Maloto died on October 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence.
On November 1963, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo
Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews respectively, of Adriana
Maloto commenced an intestate proceeding in the CFI of Iloilo that was
docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 1736. They executed an intestate proceeding
and divided the estate in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each.
The CFI judge approved the partition.
Subsequently, on April 1, 1967, a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the CFI of Iloilo. Aldina
et al. were all named as heirs but Aldina and Constancio appeared to have
bigger shares in the will than what they received in the extrajudicial
partition. There were also dispositions in favor of Asilo de Molo, the Roman
Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldino and Constancio, along with the other devisees and legatees, filed a
motion in S.P. No. 1736 for, among others, the allowance of the will of
Adriana Maloto. The CFI judge denied the motion on the ground that the
said motion had been filed out of time. The petitioners (Aldino et al.) filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC but it was denied on
the ground of improper remedy.
The petitioners then commenced S.P. No. 2176 in the CFI of Iloilo for the
probate of the alleged last will and testament. The probate court dismissed
the petition on the basis of the finding of said court in S.P. No. 1736 that
the alleged will sought to be probated had been destroyed and revoked by
the testatrix.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of S.P. No. 2176 by the CFI of Iloilo was
proper?
Held: No. The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto in S.P. No. 1736.
Indeed, the motion to reopen the proceedings was filed out of time.
Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding that
the discovered will has been revoked. In fact, the probate court in S.P. No.
1736 stated in its order that Movants should have filed a separate
actionfor the probate of the will. Even this Court, in dismissing the
petition for certiorari, said that the more appropriate remedy is a separate
proceeding for the probate of the alleged will.
Thus, the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 1736 is not a bar to the
present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.
Doctrine: It is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding
regarding the validity of an alleged will.