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THE "CHINATHREAT"ISSUE
Major Arguments
Denny Roy
The futureof Chinais perhapsthemostpressingquestionin whatis becomingtheworld'smostimportant
region.The possibility
of a "Chinathreat,"
has becomea hotlydebatedtopic. This article
therefore,
has twomainobjectives.First,it surveysthemajorarguments
on bothsides
of the"Chinathreat"
to achievea balancedrepresenissue,makingan effort
tation. How one respondsto thesearguments
obviouslydependsin large
measureuponone's politicalorientation,
thatis, "pro-China"
or "anti-China."
Less obvious,butperhapsequallyimportant,
is the questionof theoretical
The article'ssecondpurposeis to showthata usefultheoretical
orientation.
in
distinction
can be made betweentwo classes of argument:arguments
whichthe intentions
of strategists
and policy makersmatterand those in
whichtheydo not. In additionto thesemainobjectives,thisarticlemakes
somegeneralpolicyrecommendations
forpowerscontemplating
howto best
respondto China's growingstrength.
Simplystated,the"Chinathreat"argument
maintains
thatan increasingly
powerfulChina is likelyto destabilizeregionalsecurityin the nearfuture.
This idea became highlytopical as China's economyposted exceptional
growthin theearly1990s. As manyanalystsnoted,a developedeconomy
could potentiallyturnChina's huge populationfroma weaknessinto a
and giveChinathebasis forworld-class
and technological
strength,
military
itcouldmakeChinaa superpower.The alarmist
capability.In short,
edgeof
muchof thiscommentary
was based (sometimesexplicitly,
sometimesnot)
on antipathy
towardtheChineseCommunist
Party(CCP) regimethathas
in 1989 by theTiananmenmassacre,which
deep rootsbutit was re-ignited
dramatically
endedtheSino-Western
honeymoon
of the 1980s duringwhich
Deng Xiaopingwas heldin highesteembecauseof his economicliberalizationprogram.
DennyRoy is ResearchFellow in theStrategicand DefenceStudies
NationalUniversity.
Centre,Australian
? 1996 by The Regentsof theUniversity
of California
758
DENNY ROY
759
and
tookshape,theChinesegovernment
As the"Chinathreat"argument
its apologists,includinga fair numberof Westernscholars,formulated
The "Chinathreat
counter-arguments.
issue,"as I use thetermhere,includes
of thedebatehas perhapsreachedits
bothsetsof arguments.The intensity
apogee withthepublicationof AmericanjournalistCharlesKrauthammer's
Chinaas a "bully"
characterized
essayand theChinesereply.Krauthammer
a
stratto expanditsreach,"andproposed two-pronged
that"triesrelentlessly
cultivating
by
China
to
"contain"
strive
egy. First,theUnitedStatesshould
U.S. (and Chinese)enemies,Vietnamand
withformer
securityagreements
a strongalliancewithJapan,even if thismeans
Russia,and by maintaining
overlookinga few inequitiesin the U.S.-Japantraderelationship.At the
Partyregime
theCommunist
sametime,Americashouldworkto undermine
pubChinesedissidents,
by supporting
and promotepoliticalliberalization
China's humanrightsabuses,and opposingBeijing'sefforts
liclycriticizing
extremeprescription
prestige.' Krauthammer's
to accumulateinternational
metan equallyextremeresponsetwo weekslaterin theChineseLiaowang
Liaowangdenounced
a "Cold War knight,"
weekly. CallingKrauthammer
and "an idiot'sgibberish."2
"preposterous,"
his "ravings"as "arrogant,"
forViewing
Arguments
Chinaas a Threat
in recent
Militarybuildup. Chinesedefensespendinghas risensignificantly
manyanalyststo
years(a 21% increasewas budgetedfor1995),prompting
fundingis increasingwhenexternalthreatsto thePRC's
ask whymilitary
modernization
China's military
are at an all-timelow. Furthermore,
security
has includedacquisitionof weaponssystemsthatboostthePeople's LiberatoprojectpowerbeyondChina's shores-RustionArmy's(PLA) capability
refuelingtechnology,
inflight
sian Su-27s, RussianKilo class submarines,
carriers.
in buyingor buildingone or moreaircraft
interest
and a continuing
is not the PLA's strongsuit and since China's armed
Since transparency
sources(e.g., armssales,
forcesget muchof theirfundingfromunofficial
of civiliangoods), some of theestimatesof Chiand marketing
production
nese armsspendingrunhigh. A Randstudy,forexample,used thepurchasfigureof $140 billionfor
approachto arriveat thestunning
ingpower-parity
China's 1994 defenseexpenditures.
Manyobserversinferfromall thisthatChinaintendsto builditselfintoa
to enforcea regional
presumably
by earlynextcentury,
superpower
military
hegemony.Masashi Nishiharaof Japan's NationalInstitutefor Defense
"WhyWe MustContainChina,"Time,July31, 1995,p. 72.
1. CharlesKrauthammer,
SWB), FE/
2. Liaowang,August14, 1995, BBC, Summaryof WorldBroadcasts(hereafter
2382, August15, 1995,p. Gi1.
760
DENNY ROY
761
762
Argument
AgainstViewing
Chinaas a Threat
positionbeginswith
Constraints
againstassertivebehavior. The anti-threat
theargument
thatChinamightnotbe able to developintoa "threat"
evenifit
wantedto. Externally,
withtheir
theChineseare boundby interdependence
markets
and suppliers.Havingtrieditbothways,theCCP is nowconvinced
thatstronglinkswiththeoutsideworldwillbestfacilitate
theall-consuming
goal of economicdevelopment.This requiresthatChina have a peaceful
relationship
withits neighbors,
as seriousmisbehaviorwould destroythe
andopportunities
foreconomicdevelopment.
necessary
politicalenvironment
has insistedthat
GeneralSecretary
JiangZemin,amongotherCCP officials,
an aggressiveor hegemonicChina is out of the questionbecause "China
for its developenvironment
needs a long-lastingpeacefulinternational
ment."9
fortheforeseeable
Seriousinternal
problemswilloccupyChina'sattention
such
unfeasible.
One
problemis rising
future,
makingforeignadventurism
crime.GregAustinwritesthatwithDeng's economicreforms,
publicorder
insideChinahas deteriorated
to suchan extentthatthe"PLA willbe obliged
notexternal,security."Anto focusits attention
and resourceson internal,
is pollution.
otherkindof crisiswithpossibleforeignpolicyrepercussions
JamesL. Richardsonsays China's massive environmental
degradationis
likelyto precludeaggressiveexternal
policiesin one of twoways: one,stopping and reversing
thecurrent
arrayof damagingpracticeswouldconsume
vast resources,undercutting
fundingfor an expansionof power beyond
DENNY ROY
763
764
p. 10.
14. Yan, "China'sPost-ColdWar Strategy,"
DENNY ROY
765
Responses to a GrowingChina
766
ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
DENNY ROY
767
China: prosperous,
democratic,
andresponsible
(i.e.,pro-U.S.)in itsinternationalbehavior.
The enmeshment
schoolbelievesit is premature
to treatChina as an enemy;whether
a strongChinawillbe a constructive
partner
or a trouble-maker
is stilluncertain.Advocatesof containment,
however,expecttheworstand
see no pointin delayingthecountermeasures
whileChinacontinuesto grow
stronger.It is better,
in theirview,to getstartedwithCold War Two immediately.The containment
viewarguesthatChina'strading
partners
arestrategically short-sighted,
helpingto create what may well develop into a
superpowerthatcould ultimately
threatentheirinterests.21Fears about
angeringor isolatingChina are misguided;China will behavebadlyin any
case, andifgranted
anylatitude,
theChinesewillonlytakeadvantageof itto
betterpositionthemselves
formoreassertivemovesin thefuture.Insteadof
worrying
aboutoffending
China,therestof theworldshouldmaketheChinese fear to rock the boat. The heartof the containment
strategy,as
Krauthammer's
articlemadeclear,is therecruitment
of alliestojoin a coalitiontobalanceChinesepower.Manyhavespeculatedthatan assertiveChina
will rejuvenatethetroubledU.S.-Japanrelationship.An anti-Chinese
containment
strategy
wouldalso providea newrationaleforthemaintenance
of
U.S. forcesin East Asia.
theArguments:
Analyzing
The Questionof Intentions
wouldagreewiththeassertion
that"China'sintentions
ManyChina-watchers
are perhapseven moreimportant
thanits capabilities."22This view,howof
Whetheror nottheintentions
ever,shouldnotbe accepteduncritically.
greatpowers(or buddinggreatpowers)matter,
is, indeed,a keytheoretical
can be divided
issue. The arguments
advancedforor againsttheChinathreat
of the
whichconcerntheintentions
intotwo categories:"soft"arguments,
whichdownplaythe
and "hard"arguments,
Chineseand of theiradversaries,
but
of intentions,
significance
dealinginsteadwithcapabilitiesor anticipated
unintended
consequences.
In thecase of softarguments,
theproblemwouldbe solvedif one of the
involvedchangeditsattitude.Humanvolitionis pivotal.
partiesimmediately
The arguments
aboutwhatkindof foreignpolicytheChineseleadershipinChina Sets Off
"A Resurgent
engageChina" (my emphasis). Quotedin MichaelRichardson,
Herald Tribune,July7, 1995,p. 1.
International
AlarmsOver 'Containment',"
Se21. DennyRoy,"ConsequencesofChina'sEconomicGrowthforAsia-PacificSecurity,"
as
his positionsomewhat,
curityDialogue, 24:2 (June1993),pp. 189-90. Roy latermoderated
Security,19:1 (Summer1994),pp. 166-67.
in "Hegemonon theHorizon?"International
22. FrankChing,"China'sMilitarySpursConcern,"Far EasternEconomicReview,May 11,
1995,p. 40.
768
ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
DENNY ROY
769
makes
muchof thePRC's foreignpolicyappearsto be overdetermined-it
perspectives.
Regainingcontrol
sensefrombothunit-level
and system-level
popuof Taiwan,forexample,wouldincreasetheBeijingregime'sterritory,
military
lation,and wealthwhile at the same timeremovinga significant
of theCCP faction
rival,butit wouldalso enhancethedomesticlegitimacy
could plausiblyexplainBeithataccomplishedit. Thus,eitherperspective
jing's strongreactionto Lee Teng-hui's1995 U.S. visit.
are largelyirreleFroma systems-level
perspective,
the"soft"arguments
vant. All countrieshave basicallythe same intentions:to maintainor, if
Theirforeign
policiesaim to
possible,increasetheirsecurity
andprosperity.
and dangersin the internapursuetheseobjectivesbased on opportunities
policiesamongcountries
arebased
tionalenvironment.
Variationsin foreign
not on differing
relativecapabilities.All states
intentions
but on differing
wish to controltheirenvironment
but thisis feasibleonly forthe strong.
Increasedeconomicand military
capabilitiesbroadenthe rangeof options
andlowerthecostsof usingforce.Therefore,
in thecompetition
amongconflictingnationalinterests,
strongcountriesare inevitablytemptedto force
theirwill upontheirweakerneighbors.Furthermore,
since strongcountries
arepotentially
to eachother,theirinterrelations
tense
aregenerally
dangerous
unlesstheyare allies againstanother,morethreatening
power. Fromthis
itis to be takenforgranted
thatChinawilluse itsneweconomic,
standpoint,
andmilitary
to dominateitsregioninsofaras possible,
technological,
strength
and thattheUnitedStateswill seek to thwartthegrowthof thisnew rival.
Any two otherstatesin thepositionsof China and theU.S. wouldbehave
becauseit is theinternational
systemthatdrivesforeign
policy,not
similarly
a particular
baggage.
state'sculture,ideology,or historical
If intentions
don'tmatter,
poor Sino-U.S.relationswouldseem likelyas
long as theU.S. remainsa greatpower,as long as China is perceivedas a
thirdpartyemergesto drivethemtorisinggreatpower,and no threatening
arecorrectto labelChinaa
getherin a security
alliance. Americanstrategists
and Chinese
"threat"
in thesenseof a likelyaspirantto regionaldominance,
For China's neighbors
fearU.S.-sponsored
containment.
strategists
correctly
and potentialadversaries,
theworstis to be expected.The onlyquestionfor
politithem,assumingChinacontinuesto growrapidlyand to holdtogether
cally,is how to prepareto meetChina's bid forhegemony.
On theotherhand,evenassumingthatthebasic goals of nationalgovernmentsare security
and wealth,itis possibleto envisageforeign
policyorientationsin particular
statesas rangingfromaggressiveto conciliatory.If so,
a
Undersomecircumstances,
the"soft"arguments
becomevitallyimportant.
statemayjudge thatan assertiveforeign
policywillbringthegreatestsecurityand/orprosperity.In such a case, the state'sbehaviorwill growmore
assertiveas itsrelativecapabilitiesincrease.In othercases,however,a state
770
ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
maydetermine
thatitsinterests
are bestservedby a non-threatening
posture
(e.g., postwarJapan). The keyissue,then,is whether
thegovernment
of a
strongstatebelievesa domineering,
coerciveapproachwill fulfillits goals
betterthancooperation
andcompromise.This maybe called "intention"
but
it is reallya matter
ofperception.Factorsuniquetoparticular
societies,such
as worldviewand historicalexperience,
maystrongly
influence
thisperception. In someinstances,
thestate'sforeign
policymightnotbe comprehensible withoutaccounting
fortheseunit-level
factors.
Conclusion:Respondingto
the Possible"Threat"
thetheoretical
of intentions
Understanding
significance
exposessome of the
underpinnings
of thearguments
involvedin theChinathreatissue,and may
help students
of Chinaand of international
affairsdetermine
forthemselves
thatsome of thesearguments
are moresubstantial
thanothers.The distinctionbetween"soft"and "hard"arguments
also carriesimportant
ramificationsforpolicy.
The implication
of thesoftor intention-intensive
arguments
is thata range
of possibilitiesremainsopen forfutureChineseforeignpolicy. The postDeng successioncrisismayindeed,as manyobservershave speculated,explain muchof China's recentprovocativebehavior.OfficialChinesestatementsabouttheregime'sacceptanceof interdependence
and lack of interest
in establishing
a post-ColdWar hegemony
to
mightbe consideredovertures
be builtupon insteadof propaganda.If intentions
are malleable,the goal
shouldbe to createand maintain
peaceful,cooperativeintentions.
Apparent
rather
CCP belligerence
senseof insecurity
mightstemfroma fundamental
thanfroma desireformaximumdominance.If so, concessionsaimed at
makingChinafeelmoresecuremightreciprocally
spawna moreaccommodatingattitudein Beijing. ScaringChina, on the otherhand, would be
counterproductive.
Takingthesoftarguments
seriouslyleads one to excludethetwoextreme
forresponding
to a growingChina. It is possiblethatBeijing's
strategies
is therefore
intentions
arerelatively
long-term
strategic
benign.Containment
thepossibility
of a constructive
unattractive
because it forfeits
relationship,
movingdirectlyto a worst-casescenariothatmightotherwisebe avoided.
shouldalso be rejected;thereis no needto givethegameaway
Appeasement
whileBeijing's intentions
remainuncertain.A mildformof enmeshment,
withemphasison rewardsrather
thanpunishments,
wouldseemthemost,and
reallytheonlysatisfactory
option.The objectivewouldbe to convinceBeijing thatconciliationpays and heavy-handed
unilateralism
does not-to
"zoneofpeace" nowoccupiedbyNorth
bringChinaintothemuch-theorized
America,WesternEurope,Japan,Australia,and New Zealand.
DENNY ROY
771
Based on thehardarguments,
whichpresumethatpolicy-makers
follow
geopoliticalimperatives,
theChinesewill likelybehavemoreassertively
as
theygrowstronger
and will probablyconcludethattheyhave moreto gain
fromdomination
thanfromcooperation.If sucha trenddevelopsunchecked,
it will eventually
makethemitigating
hardarguments
(thata strongChina
represents
moresecurity
benefits
thandangersandthatChina'smilitary
is not
presently
capableof seriouspowerprojection)obsolete.
Fromthisstandpoint,
therangeof appropriate
policyoptionsis limitedto
containment
at one end and a hard-nosed
formof engagement
at the
outright
other.The latteris preferable
becauseit wouldallowpoliticaltensionsto be
low levelforthetimebeing,whileat thesametimelaying
keptat a relatively
thegroundwork
forbuildingan anti-China
security
coalitionifthisprovesto
be necessary.A gatekeeping
approachwouldbe ideal: generalsupportfor
Chinesedevelopment,
withrewardsfordesirabletypesof Chinesebehavior
through
increasedinternational
assistanceandrecognition,
butwithcriticism
andpunishment
forundesirable
behavior(e.g.,Japan'sreduction
ofeconomic
aid aftertheChinesemissiletestsin theEast ChinaSea). A concurrent
campaignof peacefulevolution(i.e., subversion)wouldalso be consistent
with
thisapproach.
Althoughthisarticlehas avoidedtakinga clearpositionon eitherside of
the China threatissue,it does yielda clear conclusionon the questionof
responsesto a growingChinaby theotherAsia-Pacificpowers: of thethree
possiblestrategies
describedabove,Segal's enmeshment
is preferastrategy
ble to containment
or appeasement.Withinthe generalframework
of enwithBeijingmight
meshment,
thereremainssignificant
leeway;negotiations
be generousor demanding.It is significant
thatbothhardandsoftarguments
lead to similarpolicyrecommendations.
is a sensiThe enmeshment
strategy
ble compromise
in thefaceof uncertainty.
It neither
trusts
undulyin a rising
norincreasestensionshastilyandunnecessarily;
majorpower'sself-restraint,
nordoes itprecludetougher
actionin thefuture.Rather,it offersthechance
and disina structure
of incentives
to "discipline"Chinesebehaviorthrough
of theinternational
economicand politcentivesthatis a naturaloutgrowth
ical tiestheChinesenow welcome. The desiredmessageshouldbe thatthe
worldwelcomesand will assistChina's development
as long as China remains peacefuland cooperative,but bullyingor defianceof international
and theemergenceof an
normswillresultin decreasedgrowth
opportunities
alliance.
anti-China