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LTD CASES

1. CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
a. Krivenko Doctrine

KRIVENKO v RD, MANILA (1947 landmark case)


FACTS:
Alexander A. Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot
from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
1941, the registration of which was interrupted by
the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said
registration but was denied by the register of deeds
of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he
cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko
then brought the case to the fourth branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila by means of
a consulta, and that court rendered judgment
sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from
which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: W/N an alien under the Consti may acquire
residential land?
HELD:
This case was decided under the 1935 Consti. Art.
XIII, Sec. 1 (now Art. XII, Sec. 2) provides that:
All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time
of the inaguration of the Government established
under this Constitution.
3 main groups of lands of public domain:
Agricultural, timber, mineral lands
Public agricultural land those public lands
acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor
timber lands. And with respect to residential lands, it
has been held that since they are neither mineral nor
timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as
agricultural land. (Mapa v Insular Govt)

...where land is not mining or forestal in its nature,


it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agricultural land, not because it is
actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but
because it was originally agricultural and may again
become so under other circumstances.. (Ibanez
Aldecoa v Insular Govt)
TEST: in determining whether a parcel of land is
agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually
agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation
for agricultural purposes.
PROHIBITION. It must be observed, in this
connection that prior to the Constitution, under
section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could
acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial
or residential puposes, but after the Constitution
and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is
completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance
of the constitutional limitation
SHALL NOT BE ALIENATED; EXCEPTION: Sec. 5, Art.
XIII (now Sec. 7, Art. XII). This constitutional
provision closes the only remaining avenue through
which agricultural resources may leak into aliens'
hands. To wit:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
Thus, public agricultural land CANNOT be alienated
by aliens. However, when this land is already private
agricultural land and passed on by succession, aliens
can acquire only through hereditary succession.
PURPOSE: Conservation of national patrimony
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ART XIII (now ART
XII): "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural
resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the
Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved
for those under the sovereign authority of that
nation and for their posterity."
One of the delegates, Delegate Montilla opined:
Our independence will be just a mockery, for what
kind of independence are we going to have if a part
of our country is not in our hands but in those of
foreigners?
NO LAND. Refers to public or private lands.

TEMPORARY RIGHTS. Since their residence in the


Philippines is temporary, they may be granted
temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they
desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes
and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire.
RULING: ALIENS MAY NOT ACQUIRE PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL
LANDS.

HALILI v CA
FACTS:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died
sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the
Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son, David Rey Guzman,
both of whom are also American citizens. On August
9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim
assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey
all her rights, titles and interests in and over six
parcels of land which the two of them inherited
from Simeon.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said
parcel of land to defendant-appellee Emiliano
Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in
the latters name.
Petitioners (Celso and Arthur Halili), who are the
owners of adjoining lot, filed a complaint w/ the RTC
of Bulacan questioning the validity of the 2
conveyances between Helen and son, and the
latter and
Cataniag and claiming ownership
thereto based on their right of LEGAL REDEMPTION
under Art. 1621, CC (only refers to rural lands NOT
exceeding 1 hectare).
RTC: Dismissed Halilis complaint. Guzmans waiver
of inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to
the constitutional prohibition against sale of land to
alien. And on legal redemption, such land was urban
thus cannot be s.t such right.

HELD:
(1) Land was urban hence no right of legal
redemption. Located therein likewise were the
Pepsi-Cola Warehouse, the Cruz Hospital, three
gasoline stations, apartment buildings for
commercial purposes and construction firms. There
is no doubt, therefore, that the community is a
commercial area thriving in business activities. Only
a short portion of said road [is] vacant. It is to be
noted that in the Tax Declaration in the name of
Helen Meyers Guzman[,] the subject land is termed
agricultural[,] while in the letter addressed to
defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated October 3, 1991,
the Land Regulatory Board attested that the subject
property is commercial and the trend of
development along the road is commercial.
LEGAL REDEMPTION: both lands must be rural
(2) Sale to Cataniag VALID
True, Helen Guzmans deed of quitclaim -- in
which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the
property she had inherited from her husband -collided with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7
of which provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Krivenko doctrine was reiterated in Ong Ching Po v
CA where the COurt held:
The capacity to acquire private land is made
dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Private land may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or
entities qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain (II Bernas, The Constitution of the
Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
EXCEPTION. In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or
hold title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal succession.

CA: Denied. Land had passed on to a qualified


person.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT SALE OF AN


ALIEN TO A FILIPINO?

ISSUE: (1) W/N Land is urban; and (2) W/N


conveyance of land from Helen to son; and the latter
to Cataniag void

Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly


transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the

original transaction is considered cured and the


title of the transferee is rendered valid.
The rationale of this principle was explained
in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:
x x x [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only
agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by
this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nations lands for future generations of Filipinos, that
aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.
RULING: Accordingly, since the disputed land is now
owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino
citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be
assailed. The objective of the constitutional
provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands -- has
been served.

GREGORIO AND BELINDA LLANTINO v CO LIONG


CHONG (aka JUAN MOLINA)

The lower court correctly ruled that the defendantappellee Chong had at the time of the execution of
the contract, the right to hold by lease the property
involved in the case although at the time of the
execution of the contract, he was still a Chinese
national
NO OPTION TO BUY. In the present case, it has been
established that there is only one contract and there
is no option to buy the leased property in favor of
Chong. Neither is there under the terms of the said
contract to indicate that the ownership of the
Llantinos of the leased premises has been virtually
transferred to the lessee
Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a
reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an
alien the right to buy real property on condition that
he is granted Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not
completely excluded by the Constitution from use of
lands for residential purposes. Since their residence
in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted
temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they
desire to remain here forever and share our fortune
and misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible
to acquire.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs (Petitioners) leased to defendant who was
then a Chinese National and went by the name of Co
Liong Chong for a period of 13 years for P6, 150.00
for whole period.
However, respondent informed petitioners that he
had already constructed a commercial bldg on the
land worth P 50,000.00 and that lease contract was
for a period of 60 years counted from 1954 ; and
that he was already a Filipino.
This claim of Co Liong Chong came as a surprise to
the petitioners because they did not remember such
agreement of lease.
Hence, Llantinos filed a complaint to quiet title w/
damages w/ RTC of Catanduanes.
Chong was naturalized in 1961 and new name was
Juan Molina.

NOTE: The only instance where a contract of lease


may be considered invalid is, if there are
circumstances attendant to its execution, which are
used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition.
IF GIVEN OPTION TO BUY. If an alien is given not only
a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land,
by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or
otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50
years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement
is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the
owner divests himself in stages not only of the right
to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus
fruendi, and jus abutendi) rights, the sum of which
make up ownership. It is just as if today the
possession is transferred, tomorrow the use, the
next day the disposition, and so on, until ultimately
all the rights of which ownership is made up are
consolidated in an alien.

ISSUE: W/N the contract of lease entered into was


valid

Despite the prohibition of conveying title to land to


aliens, it was held that sale of a residential land to an
alien which is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino citizen is valid.

HELD:

RULING: AFFIRMED

RTC: Contract of lease was valid.

ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF


DAVAO v LRA, RD

had. In this sense, the king is a sole


corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct
from their several chapters

FACTS:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino
citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed
a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same
city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in
favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc., corporation sole
organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
When deed of sale was presented to RD, the latter
required said corp sole to submit an affidavit
declaring 60% of the members thereof were Fil
citizens. (Note, the totality of the Catholic
population of Davao would become the owner of
the property bought to be registered.

SEC. 154 of the Corp law leaves no room for doubt


that the bishops or archbishops, as the case may be,
as corporation's sole are merely administrators of
the church properties that come to their
possession, in which they hold in trust for the
church
NOTE; Through this legal fiction, however, church
properties acquired by the incumbent of a
corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his
death not his personal heirs but to his successor in
office.
Who own the church properties? Ownership of
these temporalities logically fall and develop upon
the church, diocese or congregation acquiring the
same.

When RD entertained some doubts as to the


registerability of the doc, the matter was referred to
LRA Commissioner en consulta for resolution.

According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No.


1549, approved April 1, 1906, a corporation sole.

LRA: Denied registration in the absence of proof of


such 60% ownership by Filipinos.

is organized and composed of a single


individual, the head of any religious society
or church, for the ADMINISTRATION of the
temporalities of such society or church. By
"temporalities" is meant estate and
properties not used exclusively for religious
worship.

Then the corp sole filed a petition for mandamus


alleging that under the Corp law, deed of sale was in
favor of the Catholic Church qualified to acquire
private land for the establishment and maintenance
of worship places.
ISSUE: W/N a corp sole may acquire and register
private agricultural land?
HELD:
A corporation sole is a special form of corporation
usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and
introduced into the common law by sheer necessity,
this legal creation which was referred to as "that
unhappy freak of English law" was designed to
facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership
carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of the
church which was regarded as the property owner.
-

consists of one person only, and his


successors (who will always be one at a
time), in some particular station, who are
incorporated by law in order to give them
some legal capacities and advantages,
particularly that of perpetuity, which in
their natural persons they could not have

Corporations sole can purchase and sell real estate


for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational
purposes, can they register said real properties? Yes.
NOTE: Sec. 159 of the Corp Law expressly authorized
the corp sole to purchase and hold real estate for its
church, charitable, benevolent or educational
purposes, and to receive bequests or giftsfor such
purposes;
It can be also maintained without fear of being
gainsaid that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
in the Philippines has NO NATIONALITY and that
the framers of the Constitution, as will be
hereunder explained, did not have in mind the
religious corporations sole when they provided that
60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by
Filipino citizens. (Hence, the 60% requirement does
not apply)
RULING: Properties or assets of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. is actually

owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, and denying


the registration of the deed of sale in the absence of
proof of compliance with such requisite, is hereby
reversed. Consequently, the respondent Register of
Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the
deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc.

RD OF RIZAL v UNG SUI SI TEMPLE


FACTS:
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal
refused to accept for record a DEED OF DONATION
executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus
Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of
residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as in
favor of the unregistered religious organization
"Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three
trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was
duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality,
founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in
representation and in behalf of the latter and its
trustees.

ensure that corporations or associations allowed to


acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural
resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the
spirit of the Constitution demands that in the
absence of capital stock, the controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino
citizens.
To permit religious associations controlled by nonFilipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to
drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious
land holdings in this country. We can not ignore the
historical fact that complaints against land holdings
of that kind were among the factors that sparked the
revolution of 1896.
NOT VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION. We are
by no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that
land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that
one may not worship the Deity according to the
dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held
in fee simple.
RULING: DONATION NOT REGISTRABLE
DE CASTRO v TAN

RD elevated en consulta to CFI Manila

FACTS:

RTC: Sustained refusal of reg.

A residential lot was sold by petitioner Filomena De


Castro to Tan Tai, a Chinese, who died leaving herein
respondents-heirs, his widow and children. In an
extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale executed
by the respondents after Tan Tais death, the parcel
of land in question was allotted in its entirety to
Joaquin, one of Tan Tais sons who became a
naturalized Filipino before the latters death.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondents,
contending that the sale be annulled for violation of
the 1935 Constitution, to which respondents moved
to dismiss.

CONTENTION: Act No. 271 of the old Philippine


Commission, providing as follows:
SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious
associations, of whatever sort or denomination,
whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in
the name of other country, or not incorporated at
all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which
to build churches, parsonages, or educational or
charitable institutions.
ISSUE: W/N a corporation with foreign citizenship
can register land donated by Filipino
HELD:
Our Constitution made No exception in favor of
religious associations.
The fact that the appellant religious organization has
no capital stock does not suffice to escape the
Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its
members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of
the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to

ISSUE: Whether or not a contract of sale can be


annulled on the basis that it is in violation of the
1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to
aliens.
HELD: No, independently of the doctrine of pari
delicto, the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled.
While the vendee was an alien at the time of sale,
the land has since become the property, of
respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine
citizen, who is constitutionally qualified to own a
land.

REPUBLIC v IAC, GONZALVES

RELLOSA VS. GAW CHEE HUN

FACTS:

FACTS:

The chief question presented in the appeal at bar


concerns the validity of a conveyance of residential
land to an alien prior to his acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.

On 1944, Dionisio Rellosa, a Filipino, sold to Gaw


Chee Hun, a Chinese, a parcel of land with a house
erected on it, located in Manila. Both parties entered
into a lease contract, whereby Rellosa, the vendor,
occupied the land under the condition that Gaw
Chee obtain the approval of the sale by the Japanese
Administration. Gaw Chee did not obtain such
approval. Rellosa now seeks to annul the sale and
the lease. Gaw Chee, meanwhile, contends that such
sale was absolute and conditional, the same not
being contrary to law, morals and public order. He
further states that Rellosa is estopped from asserting
his ownership over the land, after having leased the
same from Gaw Chee, and thus, recognizing Gaw
Chees title over the property.

Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be, who became a naturalized


Filipino citizen, taking his oath as such, on January
1
7,1977. He was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes
Uy Un.
Subsequently, Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, and his
adopted son, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng, took possession
of the property.
Chua Kim then filed a petition for issuance of decree
of confirmation and registration in Land Reg. case.
LRA: Registrable
Republic appealed, but RTC denied.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
HELD:
Plainly, the conveyances (Sps. Gaspar and Marquez
to Chua Kims adopted parent) were made before
the 1935 Constitution went into effect, i.e., at a time
when there was no prohibition against acquisition of
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private agricultural lands by aliens. Gregorio Reyes
Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands thus
purchased by him, and his ownership was not at all
affected either (1) by the principle subsequently
enunciated in the 1935 Constitution that aliens were
incapacitated to acquire lands in the country, since
that constitutional principle has no retrospective
19
application, or (2) by his and his successor's
omission to procure the registration of the property
prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution.
The litigated property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a
disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized
citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the
subject property. There would be no more public
policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to
recover the land as it is already in the hands of a
qualified person
RULING: PETITION IS DISMISSED.

ISSUES: WON Rellosa can have the sale declared null


and void and recover the property considering the
effect of the law governing rescission of contracts.
HELD: The sale in question is null and void, but
plaintiff is barred from taking the present action
under the principle of pari delicto.
RATIO: A party to an illegal contract cannot come
into court to have his illegal objects carried out. This
is the doctrine of In Pari Delicto. Rellosas sale of the
land to Gaw Chee, an alien is against the
Constitution and is thus illegal. The Commonwealth
Act provided that such sale is not only unlawful but
also null and void ab initio, that such will effect the
annulling and cancelling of the title originally issued,
and reverting the property and its improvements to
the State.
PHIL BANKING CORP. v LUI SHE
FACTS:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister
Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of
land
in
Manila.
The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong
Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the
restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a
portion of the property, having a monthly rental of
P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the

owner of the entire property as her sister died with


no other heir. Then already well advanced in years,
being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an
invalid, she was left with no other relative to live
with, but she was taken care of by Wong.

offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides


that "the contract must bind both contracting
parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to
the will of one of them."
ISSUE: W/N Filipino may recover land sold to alien

"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal


services of the Lessee to her," Justina Santos
executed on November 15, 1957, a contract of
lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then
already leased to him and another portion fronting
Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years,
although the lessee was given the right to withdraw
at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental
was P3,120. Ten days later (November 25), the
contract was amended so as to make it cover the
entire property, including the portion on which the
house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional
monthly
rental
of
P360.
On December 21 she executed contract giving Wong
the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000,
payable within ten years at a monthly installment of
P1,000. The option was conditioned on his obtaining
Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other
contracts, one extending the term of the lease to 99
years, and another fixing the term of the option at
50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog. In
two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she
bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had
entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later
date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a
change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts
were made by her because of machinations and
inducements practised by him, she now directed her
executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.
Both parties however died, Wong Heng on October
21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964.
Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other
defendant in this case, While Justina Santos was
substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the
Philippine Banking Corporation that the lease
contract should have been annulled along with the
four other contracts because it lacks mutuality,
among
others
Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The
lessee may at any time withdraw from this
agreement." It is claimed that this stipulation

HELD:
Yes. The contract of lease, as in this case, cannot be
sustained. However, to be sure, a lease to an alien
for a reasonable period was valid, so was an option
giving an alien the right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
NOTE: article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an
exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely
prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed
for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public
policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has
paid or delivered." Also, the original parties who
were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter
have died and have since been substituted by their
administrators to whom it would be unjust to
impute
their
guilt.
POLICY WOULD BE DEFEATED IF GENERAL RULE ON
PARI
DELICTO
SHOULD
BE
APPLIED.
But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also
an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which
the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose
of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
became clear that the arrangement was a VIRTUAL
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP WHEREBY the owner
divested himself in stages not only of the right to
enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus
fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to
dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total
of which make up ownership. It was just as if today
the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use,
the next day, the disposition, and so on, until
ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made
up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this was
just exactly what the parties in this case did within
this pace of one year, with the result that Justina
Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a
hollow concept. If this can be done, then the
Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines,
is
indeed
in
grave
peril.
RULING: The contracts in question are annulled and
set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts

was ordered returned to the estate of Justina


Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking
Corporation.

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