No.

___________________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------BRYAN J. BROWN,
Petitioner,
v.
THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT
and
THE INDIANA BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court of Indiana
-----------------------------------PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
------------------------------------

Bryan J. Brown
1304 Lakeland Cove
Fort Wayne, IN 46825
Tel: (260) 515-8511
E: brown1634@gmail.com
February 10, 2016

i
QUESTION ONE PRESENTED:

Does a state supreme court that forever denies

licensure (through the issuance of an order devoid of
findings of fact or conclusions of law) to a bar
applicant (without disciplinary history) hailing from
(and in good standing with) a sister state and this
Court, after said applicant passed both the denying
states bar examination and required ethics
examination, violate the federal constitution?
QUESTION TWO PRESENTED:

Does a state violate the federal constitution when

holding the practice of law to be a privilege contingent
upon an attorneys pledging of loyalty to the state uber
alles, repudiation of sincerely held beliefs, cessation of
petitioning the government for a redress of grievances
and acquiescence to ultra vires orders?
QUESTION THREE PRESENTED:

Does a state violate the Americans with Disabilities

Act when retaliating against a licensure applicant for
failing to comply with coercive orders demanding the
tender of self-funded psychological testing from
government-designated private practitioners as a
condicio sine qua non for character and fitness
evaluation when said orders are predicated upon the
government regarding the applicant in need of mental
health evaluations due to the labeling of his courtfiled allegations of government corruption as conduct
and behavior?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEEDING

Petitioner
Bryan J. Brown is a Kansas licensed attorney (Bar No.
17634 issued 1996) who is a citizen of the United
States formerly residing in Indiana with his family
but since January, 2015 residing and working in
Kansas.
Respondents
The Indiana Supreme Court is the court of final
adjudication in the State of Indiana, authorized by the
Constitution of 1851.
The Indiana Board of Law Examiners is an arm of the
Indiana Supreme Court chartered by statutory law
and authorized as to the matters at bar by rules of
court.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Respondent is an individual with no such interests.

iii
Table of Contents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .......................... x

OPINIONS BELOW .......................................................... x
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................................. x
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ............................... xi
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ......................................... xii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE (Context) ............................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................. 1
(Facts supporting Question One) ....................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................. 3
(Facts supporting Questions Two and Three) .................... 3
Denial and Banishment from Court in Perpetuity.............. 4
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Rebuffed? ........ 5
The 2013 Application Candidly Blew the Whistle ............ 5
The Four Frauds ................................................................. 6
Acid Testing Loyalty and Belief ........................................ 8
An off-the-record Inquisition ............................................. 9
An Ultra Vires Request or an Unconstitutional Demand?10
Rejected for Refusing to Knuckle Under .................... 12
Candid Communication or Contemptuous Conduct? .. 13
The never known standard ........................................... 15
The ever present burden ............................................... 15
The never happening investigation .............................. 16
The ever persistent informality .................................... 17
The never probative witnesses ..................................... 18
The ever present irony ................................................. 19

iv
The never brokered dissent .......................................... 20
The ever malleable language ....................................... 21
The never countenanced complaining ......................... 23
The ever present stigma ............................................... 24
REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION .......................... 25
Is it Summers time yet? .................................................. 26
The Privileges and Immunity Option ............................... 27
Right or Privilege? ....................................................... 28
Substantive Due Process (Overview)............................... 30
Substantive Due Process - Interests ............................. 30
Substantive Due Process Arbitrariness ..................... 31
Substantive Due Process Fundamentalism ............... 32
Procedural Due Process ................................................... 32
Equal Protection (Overview) ........................................... 32
Equal Protection Religion/Ideology.......................... 33
Equal Protection -- Class-of-One ................................. 34
First Amendment (Overview) .......................................... 34
First Amendment Conscience Rights (Free Exercise)
...................................................................................... 35
First Amendment Establishment ............................... 36
First Amendment Redress ......................................... 37
First Amendment Retaliation ....................................... 37
Americans with Disabilities Act (Overview) ................... 38
Americans with Disabilities Act Regarded As ............. 39
Americans with Disabilities Act Retaliation................. 40
Americans with Disabilities Act Coercion ................... 40

v
CONCLUSION (Paint it Black) .......................................... 41
Prayer for Constitutional Governance ............................. 42
Table of Contents: Appendix
S.C.R. 14(i)
Orders under review
Brown v. Bowman, 2011 WL 1296274
Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437 (2012)
Magistrates Character/Fitness Eval
Notice of bar exam passing
Request for psychological evaluation
Reconsideration of psych eval request
Sept. 22, 2014 denial of admission
Order quashing subpoena Dr. Ross
Order quashing subpoena Sudrovech/Harrell
Order quashing subpoena Dr. Bowman
Order denying Rule 9(b) notice
Board adoption of findings, concl., recomm.
July 15, 2015 findings, concl., recomm

App.1
App.3
App.6
App.10
App.12
App.13
App.14
App.15
App.16
App.17
App.18
App.19
App.20
App.21

S.C.R. 14(v)
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)
Ind. Admission and Discipline Rules

App.75
App.76

S.C.R. 14(v) & (vi)

April 27, 2015 suppressed affidavit
May 14. 2015 Applicant facts, concl, recomm
First Amendment reference
Arbitrary and capricious law
Presentation on DOJ & ADA
First Amendment reprise
Damages claim
August 13, 2015 Applicant filing with ISC
Federal constitutional reference

App.80
App.89
App.93
App.95
App.100
App.106
App.109
App.110
App.111

Appendix: S.C.R. 14(vi)

June 23, 2014 Applicant on psych eval

App.112

vi
November 15, 2013 application cover letter
Raising constitutional protections
Creedal submission
BLE to MO BAR in 2005
Form B-1 on Dr. Bowman
Bowman federal answer
Form B-1 on Dr. Alexy
Form B-1 on social worker Sudrovech
Form B-1 on Dr. Flueckiger
Flueckiger psychiatric report
November 18, 2015 BLE ADA exoneration

App.116
App.119
App.120
App.125
App.126
App.128
App.132
App.133
App.136
App.138
App.140

Cases
Amunrud v. Board of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571
(Wash.,2006) cert.dend, 549 U.S. 1282 (2007) ...... 29
Attorney Griev. Commn v. Reamer,379 A.2d 171, 176
(Md.1977) ....................................................................... 29
Attorney Griev. Commn v. Richardson, 712 A.2d 525
(Md.1998) ....................................................................... 29
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) ...... 26
Baker v. Keisker, 236 Ind. 617, 620, 142 N.E.2d 432,
434 (1957) ...................................................................... 28
Board of County Com'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) ........................... 35
Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488,
2494 (U.S.,2011) ........................................................... 37
Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437 (7th Cir.), cert dend
133 S.Ct. 176 (2012) .............................................. 21, 34
Brown v. Bowman, et al, 2011 WL 1296274,
N.D.Ind., Mar. 31, 2011 .............................................. 21
Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d
222, 230 (5th Cir.2015) ............................................... 39
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 51011 (1972) ............................................. 37

vii
Cambino v. Neal, 35 S.W.3d 792, 799 (Ark.2000),
cert.dend, 532 U.S. 1009 (2001) ............................... 29
Chalasani v. Daines, 2011 WL 4465564, adopted
2011 WL 4465408, (E.D.N.Y.) ................................... 31
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582-83 (1981 ..... 25
Chandler v. Martin, 433 S.W.3d 884 (Ark.2014) ...... 29
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) ........................... 37
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857
(1998) Kennedy, J., concurring ................................. 32
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) .......... 33
Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 375 (1855) ................. 35
Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591 (2008)
.......................................................................................... 34
Family Div. Trial Lawyers of the Superior Court-D.C.
Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 707 (D.C.Cir.1984)
.......................................................................................... 31
Friedman v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee,
824 A.2d 866, 879 appeal dismissed, 853 A.2d 496
(Conn.2003) ..................................................................... 5
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) .......... 38
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S.Ct. 2004 (1975)
.......................................................................................... 26
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)............. 30
In re Fogle, 221 N.E.2d 675 (1966). ............................. 20
In re Harrison, 231 Ind. 665, 667-68, I09 N.E.2d 722,
723 (1953) ...................................................................... 28
In re Keaton, 29 N.E.3d 103, 1 10 (Ind. 2015) ........... 28
In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971) .................................... 26
In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 578 (1945), Black, J.,
dissenting ...................................................................... 27
Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 236-37 (5thCir.2010)
.......................................................................................... 39

viii
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 467-68 (2006),
Stevens, J., dissenting ................................................ 33
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 874 (1961), Black,
J., dissenting. ............................................................ 1, 42
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154 (1971) ............................................................. 26
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) ....................... 28
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 615
(7th.Cir,2011) ................................................................. 33
Nichols v. Alabama State Bar, 2015 WL 1710125
(N.D.Ala.) ....................................................................... 31
Otrompke v. Skolnik, 2015 WL 4470673, at *4
(N.D.Ind.,2015) ............................................................. 30
Palko v. State of Connecticut, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152-53,
(1937) .............................................................................. 32
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) .............................. 40
Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp., 782 F.3d 331,
337 (7thCir.2015) ......................................................... 41
Roman-Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth.,
655 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2011), subsequent
appeal, 797 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2015) .......................... 40
Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 3 F.Supp.3d 313, 335-36
(E.D.Pa.,2014)............................................................... 41
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ....... 35
School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 231 (1963), Brennan, J. concurring ....... 36
Schware v. Board of Bar Exam. of N. Mex., 353 U.S.
232 (1957) ...................................................................... 30
Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387,1390 n.2 (11thCir.),
cert dend,524 U.S. 954 (1998) .................................. 29
Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) .... 32
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274 (1985) ...................................................................... 28

ix
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
.......................................................................................... 39
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000) .............................................................................. 33
Withers v. Johnson, 763 F.3d 998, 998-1005 (8th Cir.
2014) ............................................................................... 40
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) ........... 32
Statutes
154 Cong. Rec. H828603, 2008 WL 4240260 (Sept.
17, 2008)......................................................................... 43
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110325,
122 Stat. 3553 (Sept. 25, 2008) ................................. 42
Americans with Disabilities Act Coercion ....................... 45
Americans with Disabilities Act Regarded As ................. 44
Americans with Disabilities Act Retaliation..................... 45
Americans with Disabilities Act (Overview) ....................... 43
Other Authorities
The United States Investigation of the Louisiana
Attorney Licensure System Pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act ............................. 14
Treatises
Patrick L. Baude, An Essay on the Regulation of the
Legal Profession and the Future of Lawyers'
Characters, 68 IND. L.J. 647 (1993) ........................ 21
Constitutional Provisions
Equal Protection -- Class-of-One ......................................... 37
Equal Protection Clause Religion/Ideology ...................... 36
First Amendment Conscience Rights................................ 38
First Amendment Establishment ....................................... 40
First Amendment Redress ................................................. 41

x
First Amendment (Overview) .............................................. 38
First Amendment Retaliation ............................................... 41
Privileges and Immunities Clause ............................... 28
Procedural Due Process Clause ........................................... 35
Substantive Due Process Clause .................................. 31
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Bryan J. Brown petitions the Court for a Writ of
Certiorari to review a final judgment of the Indiana
Supreme Court (entered November 12, 2015) rejecting his
November 13, 2013-filed application seeking bar
admission.
OPINIONS BELOW

The final opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court is

included in the Appendix at page 1.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Having been filed within 90 days of the Indiana

Supreme Courts ruling of November 12, 2015, this
appeal is timely.
Federal claims were raised below, both before the
Board of Law Examiners and the Indiana Supreme
Court, as repeatedly presented in the Appendix, but
most directly at pages 88-92, 86-93, 100-111, and as
admitted by Respondent Board at Appendix page 67,
footnote 25, Appendix pages 55-57, and as found in the
following Board-admitted Exhibits: A, C, D, E, F.
(Appendix pages 22-23.)

xi
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to

all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.
Federal Constitution, Article IV, Section 2,
Privileges and Immunity Clause
No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States....
Federal Constitution, Bill of Rights, Amendment
XIV, Privileges and Immunity Clause
No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law;
Federal
Constitution,
Bill
of
Rights,
Amendment XIV, Due Process Clause
No State shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Federal Constitution, Bill of Rights, Amendment
XIV, Equal Protection Clause
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
Federal Constitution, Bill of Rights, Amendment I

xii
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)

Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.
42 USC 12102 Regarded As Appendix page 75
42 USC 12203 Retaliation
Appendix page 75
42 USC 12203 Coercion
Appendix page 76
Indiana Supreme Court Rules
Rule 12. Committee on Character and Fitness
Section 1. The State Board of Law Examiners
shall inquire into and determine the
character, fitness and general qualifications
to be admitted to practice law as a member of
the bar of the Supreme Court of Indiana. It is
a condition precedent to admission, whether
upon examination or upon foreign license,
that the Board report and certify to the
Supreme Court that the applicant, after due
inquiry, has been found to possess the
necessary good moral character and fitness to
perform the obligations and responsibilities of
an attorney practicing law in the State of
Indiana, and has satisfied all general
qualifications for admission.
Section 2
Section 3
Section 5
Section 9

Appendix page 77
Appendix page 78
Appendix page 78
Appendix page 78

1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE (Context)

At stake here is the interest of the individual

lawyers of [the individual states] in having
full freedom to think their own thoughts,
speak their own minds, support their own
causes and wholeheartedly fight whatever
they are against, as well as the interest of the
people of [the states] and, to a lesser extent,
the people of the entire country in
maintaining the political independence of
lawyers.
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 874 (1961), Black,
J., dissenting.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(Facts supporting Question One)

Petitioner, a Kansas-licensed attorney (with civil

rights and government attorney experience)1 was
duly admitted and qualified as an Attorney and
Counselor of the Supreme Court of the United States
in 2000 and similarly admitted to practice before both
the federal district court of the Northern District of
Indiana and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
1 Cases in which Petitioner served as lead counsel prior
to his 2007 application include, inter alia, Saxe v.
State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir.
2001); Bischoff v. Osceola County, 222 F.3d 874 (11th
Cir. 2000); Edwards v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 262
F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2001); In re contempt of Crawford,
329 F.3d 321 (2d Cir.2003); Firecross v. Municipality
of Ponce, 204 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.Puerto Rico 2002);
People v. Carroll, 322 Ill. App. 3d 221 (Ill.App. 2001);
Kansas v. Transmaster, 168 P.3d 60 (Kan. 2007).

2
2011.
Petitioner has never been disciplined as an attorney
nor allowed his law license to lapse. Petitioner
submitted an application to the Indiana Supreme
Court (hereinafter ISC) in November, 2013.
Twenty-three months later, after allowing the
Applicant to sit for its bar examination, the ISC
denied Petitioner (nee Applicant 24128) admission,
ordering him to never again apply in a one page order
that adopted no findings of fact and set forth no
conclusions of law.
Petitioner sought rehearing, arguing, inter alia, that
the Court should either [c]larify whether [it had]
adopted in full the factual findings and legal
reasoning of the Board [of Law Examiners], or
[c]larify that [it] had denied a law license [to an
applicant who had] passed both the Indiana bar
examination [eighteen months prior] and the
multistate ethics test [three months prior], and
ordered [Applicant] to never again apply to the
Indiana bar without the adoption of any findings of
fact or conclusions of law.
On November 12, 2015 the Court denied the motion
for rehearing without addressing the substance of
either the previous denial or the motion seeking
reconsideration.
This petition for certiorari is timely.

3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(Facts supporting Questions Two and Three)

This is a whistleblower case in the professional

licensure context.
The Indiana Board of Law
Examiners (hereinafter BLE), through pretense and
the cynical misuse of mental health resources,
punished a socio-political dissident by denying him
good character and/or mental fitness certification and
then banishing him from court for life.
Why? For, in the main, petitioning the government
for a redress of constitutional grievances -- as they
readily admit:
Throughout his application, discovery, and
pre-hearing motions, the Applicant insisted
on pursuing a theory of the case that he faces
a system that has proven itself, repeatedly
and over a matter of many years, both
arbitrary and capricious. Applicant filed a
letter of objections and proffers [raising]
particularized disputes which he claimed
required a hearing includ[ing] evidence of
fraud, retaliation and whistle blowing
support[ed] [in] his file and ... correspondence
and [sworn] attachments [and he then filed a
document entitled] Conclusions of Fact Given
the Controlling Law [which was] focus[ed] on
the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality
of the Boards actions
Indiana Board of Law Examiners Final Report of the
Proceedings and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommendation as to Bar Applicant No. 24128
(hereinafter
BFR
or
App.21-76*)

4
App.6191;3845;4871-72;73119;68102
from Applicants filings).

(quotes

The record below is robust. The Applicant, having

experienced similar Indiana court processing in 200709, painstakingly documented the same once familiar
headwinds appeared (soon after his November 2013
application was filed). See App.21-24.
Denial and Banishment from Court in Perpetuity

Beginning at the end, the Indiana Board of Law

Examiners (hereinafter BLE) final recommendation
was adopted by the ISC, even though the BLEs actual
findings of fact and conclusions of law were not
adopted. The Board recommended
denial of the application for the reason
that the Applicant has failed to satisfy his
burden to show he has the requisite character
and fitness in accordance with the standards
set forth in Admission & Discipline Rule 12.
The Hearing Panel further recommends to the
Board that, because of the history of the
Applicant, Petitioner be barred from applying
again for admission to the Indiana Bar.
App.74
The Boards final (substantive) word on the subject
justified its above recommendation with this
accusatory statement:
Due to the Applicant's complete refusal
to provide the Board with the
requested information, the Board was
left to consider only the Applicant's

5
conduct
and
his
contemptuous
behavior throughout his dealings with
the Board [to conclude that] the
Applicant lacks the requisite character
and fitness to practice law in the
Courts of Indiana.
App.74122
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Rebuffed?

Since the ISC failed to adopt the factual findings and

legal conclusions in the Boards Final Report their
value is limited. The BFR does demonstrate the
workings of the Indiana Board of Law Examiners.
Judicial decisions documenting bar applicant
processing are few and far between. The Honorable
Thomas Bishops dissent in Friedman v. Connecticut
Bar Examining Committee, 824 A.2d 866, 879 appeal
dismissed, 853 A.2d 496 (Conn.2003) is a rare
exception to that rule. The window it cuts into
contemporary bar applicant processing comports with
Petitioners experience.
The 2013 Application Candidly Blew the Whistle

Petitioner filed his third application to join the

Indiana Bar in mid-November 2013, having
previously filed in 1996 and 2007.2 The Examiners
2 The former application was abandoned when Kansas
approved Petitioner to join its bar in late spring,
1996. The latter application culminated in a petition
for certiorari to this Court and federal civil rights
litigation that likewise culminated in a petition for
certiorari.
See http://tinyurl.com/zq45su6 and
http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh

6
cite the cover letter accompanying Applicants third
application as evidence of obstreperous and abusive
behavior, which, according to the BLE, can be evinced
through a review of Applicants manner of
communicating and thinking. App.46-4866-70.
See Applicants allegedly disqualifying (for life)
correspondence at App.116-19.
The 2013 application required a detailed explanation
of any previous personal litigation or allegations,
regardless of date, implicating moral character or
professional fitness.3 Applicant 24128 therefore had
no choice but to address the elephant in the room, to
wit, his 2007-09 application and its legal aftermath.
The Four Frauds

Charged to be (first and foremost) candid to a fault,

Applicant was painfully honest with the BLE. A
subset of Petitioners 2013 application presented
allegations of fraud on the Indiana Supreme Court
(direct review) and this Honorable Court (certiorari
was filed).
These allegations broke along four main lines:
a. Ideologically-based inquisitions as a
predicate to bar admission, best evidenced by the
federal fact-finding at App.3-9, and;
3 The application is created by the Board, whose rules
demand candor and caution against incomplete
responses. Petitioner came to the law later in life
than most and is thoroughly dedicated to candor.
His three applications answering the Examiners
past history demands have all three been criticized
as to length. App.253;267;4564.

7
b. The misuse of mental health labeling,
evidenced by the analytical comparison of mental
health reports developed during the 2008
processing, and especially the comparison of the
government-mandated psychiatrist, Dr. Elizabeth
Bowman, and the Applicant-chosen psychiatrist,
Dr. Bryan Flueckiger, see App.126-140;
c. The material misrepresentation of a
mandated psychologists written report, ultimate
diagnosis and recommendation (all positive for the
Applicant, all represented as negative by the
governments psychiatrist). The government
psychiatrist subsequently admitted to this official
obfuscation (also implicating the government
social worker) in an answer filed in the underlying
federal civil rights action, App.128-131, and;
d. Impeachment of the BLEs allegations of
Applicants alleged failure to appear at a 1997
hearing (of which the BLE has no record prior to
2008), which had been a predicate for sending
Applicant out for a full psychiatric work up in
January, 2008. After the 2007-09 processing
Applicant discovered (in records from the Missouri
Supreme Court) an official BLE-authored
document from 2006 raising no allegations against
Applicant as to the allegedly ducked 1997
hearing, App125-26.
In each of these four instances (all in nascent form in
the record since 2011) Petitioner marshaled sworn
evidence supporting the allegations, all over his
signature as a Kansas-licensed practitioner and
attorney and counselor of this Honorable Court.

8
Acid Testing Loyalty and Belief

The BLE departed from normative processing soon

after receipt of the application and assigned a
magistrate judge to the initial interview.
The
magistrate found Applicant 24128 willing to take the
Oath and willing to abide by the principals [sic] of the
Oath. She complimented him for demonstrating a
thorough knowledge and understanding of the Rules
of Professional Conduct. App.10-11.
However, this BLE-appointed court officer was unable
to ignore the concerns that were raised by the Board
during the 2008 application process since the Boards
conclusions were serious and significant. 4 She thus
plied the Applicant with hypothetical conflicts
between his beliefs and federal and state law.
In the afterglow of that inquisition the magistrate
found she could not certify Applicant due to concerns
over his willingness to obey state and federal law even
when doing so violates his conscience.
The
magistrate was therein quoting directly from the
BLEs 2009 report rejecting Petitioner. Like the 2009
Panel, the magistrate firmly believed that Petitioners
ethical beliefs called his fitness to practice law into
question. App.10-11.
Thus the BLEs specifically-appointed (outside of
normative procedures) character and fitness
4 See App.45-4865-67,70n.17,n.21, BLE re-asserting
and adopting by reference its 2007-09 processing.
See BFR, Exhibit H, included due to BLEs belief
that 2007-09 is yet relevant to Applicants
processing. App., 10-11, 21-23.

9
evaluator ensured that the 2013-15 application
processing would track, in major theme, the 2007-09
application processing.5
An off-the-record Inquisition

Applicant 24128 was next summoned to stand before

the ten ISC-appointed Board of Law Examiners in a
rare full-board hearing. Applicant requested that the
hearing be held on the record. The BLE Executive
Director responded: There is no record made when an
applicant meets with the Board. In the event an
applicant disagrees with any determination by the
Board, he or she may request a hearing under
Admission & Discipline Rule 12, Section 9 which is on
the record.6
At the February 13, 2014 off-the-record hearing
Applicant was ask to detail how his religious views
informed his jurisprudence and probed as to
consistency and sincerity of belief.
Petitioners
subsequent correspondence re-iterated the focus of
this informal Board-initiated discussion of
religion, conscience and natural law jurisprudence.
App.3128,30 (The BLE never contradicted
Applicants tender of the informal transcript via
questions subsequently addressed.)
5 Petitioners representation that the magistrate failed
to certify him because she was concerned about his
"beliefs and loyalties" was cited to justify the
lifetime ban. App.66-67100.
6 Insight into why the BLE prefers off the record
hearings is at App.268 and 4051. Applicant has
his entire file, there is no report or transcript made
of off-the-record hearings. Such appearances can be
construed as needed down the road. App.71114.

10
At the conclusion of that mandated character and
fitness hearing Petitioner was informed that the BLE
had voted to allow him to sit for the bar examination
(in twelve days) but had not deemed him worthy of
certification as to moral character and fitness. He was
given the choice to sit or not sit. He wrote the
Examiners the day after, App.3128, and then began
studying in earnest.
An Ultra Vires Request or an Unconstitutional
Demand?

On April 29, 2014, Petitioner was informed that he

had passed the Indiana bar examination.
A few
weeks later Petitioners attorney was informed that
after
careful
and
deliberate
consideration, the Board voted to request
that Mr. Brown obtain updated
psychological testing from one of the
following [three] licensed clinical
psychologists [from the same firm].
The psychological testing should consist
of a battery of measures comparable to
prior assessments Mr. Brown has
undergone, testing the applicants
personality and current functioning. Mr.
Brown will be required to sign a release
allowing the [entire] Board access to the
raw testing data .
App.13
The BLE refused to reveal the careful and deliberate
consideration causing it to regard Petitioner in need

11
of psychological evaluation despite repeated requests.
The Board merely regarded Petitioner as obliged to
expend the estimated $4500 (estimate based upon the
2008 experience and never questioned by the BLE)
and spend many hours under a governmentdesignated psychologists care, just as he naively had
done in 2008.7
Petitioner raised constitutional concerns in response
to the States coercive and economically-ruinous
demand, building upon the analysis in the B-1 Forms
of his application. On August 15, 2014, Petitioner
wrote, If the ability to pay out thousands of dollars
for a psych eval is a conditio sine qua non for me
becoming an Indiana attorney, then my impoverished
economic situation renders me unable to become an
Indiana attorney. [T]he Board can simply deny me
based upon my economic impediment.
7 The battery of measures testing [his] personality
and current functioning were: "Millon Clinical
Multiaxial
Inventory-III
(MCMI-Ill);
Personality
Assessment
Inventory (PAI);
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
( MMPI-2) by Dr. Ross; Rorschach Ink blot Method;
Thematic Apperception Test; Rotter Incomplete
Sentences Blank by Dr. Alexy. According to the
three psychologists and one psychiatrist
Applicant 24128 passed all.
According to the
government-assigned
Dr.
Bowman
and
government social worker Tim Sudrovech such
was not the case. Both of these were most
concerned that Applicant 24128 had failed to
demonstrate sufficient empathy for ideologies
opposing his own Faith. App. pages 27,55,136.

12
Rejected for Refusing to Knuckle Under

The BLE brokered no dialogue as to constitutional

questions, refused to justify its request
and
demonstrated no concern as to the ADA.
On
September 22, 2014 the government responded:
[T]he Board previously deferred a
determination as to your character and
fitness and requested that you obtain
updated psychological testing [Y]ou
are unable to proceed with the updated
psychological testing needed by the
Board to render a determination as to
character and fitness. [Thus] you have
failed to sustain the burden of proof that
you possess the requisite character and
fitness As a result, the Board has
denied your application to practice law in
the state of Indiana.
App.15.8 The Board then coercively noted that per
Indiana law Applicant 24128s success on the bar
examination was extinguished if he was not admitted
by February, 2016.9
8 The BLE subsequently faulted Petitioner for
alleg[ing] that the BLE denied his application based
on the Applicant's economic impediment.
App.6597(c)
9 The BLE claims it can justify this mid-September
2014 denial for character and fitness based upon
then-evident incidences of conduct and
contemptuous behavior. Yet when the BLE
finally had to write on the subject (other than
through the magistrate) some nine months later,

13
Candid
Communication
Conduct?

or

Contemptuous

Petitioner sought the ISCs intervention in October

2014. He filed a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition
supported by a lengthy affidavit documenting his
concerns and memoranda raising state and federal
constitutional claims. The Court refused to file the
Writ on technical grounds, instead directing
Petitioner to utilize the court-created procedures for
review. That filing is part of the record below. App.23.
Soon thereafter the BLE resurrected Applicants
September, 2014-denied application (with citation to
no legal authority for such reverse processing).
App.4049. Rather than process the application
toward ISC review, the Examiners deigned to enter
into ultra vires negotiations in an attempt to coerce
the Applicant into acceptance of the regarded as
label and thus turn himself over to the governmentdesignated psychologist. Petitioner again raised
constitutional concerns.
His resurrected 2013
application was then denied a second time in six
months. App.110-111.
In both March and May 2015, Petitioner filed official
ADA complaints in keeping with the Courts published
policy. While the March 2015 letter has been purged
its report dealt, in the main, with Applicants
2007-09 processing and 2015 communications.
That said, once understood that by conduct and
contemptuous behavior the BLE means
whistleblowing, the application becomes the only
necessary exhibit.

14
from the appellate record (a matter worthy of judicial
investigation as that Applicant holds the purged
originals) the May 2015 letter remains of record. The
ISC investigated through BLE counsel and the
Boards Executive Director and found no ADA
violations.
In the months of processing that followed the second
denial of his 2013 application, Petitioner documented
numerous departures from ISC procedures. Many
rise to the level of coercive and/or retaliatory conduct
which the Department of Justice considers violative of
federal law. 10
While an exhaustive listing of these allegedly coercive
and retaliatory acts are beyond the reach of the
instant filing, many are revealed on the face of the
Boards Final Report.11 While any number of these
could be studied in greater depth (and are in
Applicants Rule 142 filing) the following are most
significant:

10 See The United States Investigation of the

Louisiana Attorney Licensure System Pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act, available at
http://www.ada.gov/louisiana-bar-lof.pdf.
Presented to the BLE and ISC at App.76,79,86-91.
The BLE publicly pledged to process per the DOJ
guidelines:App.92-92fn.1, but did not.
11 Inter alia, official reprisals for questioning
government agents or disagreeing with government
counsel on interpretations of law or law review
articles and/or for holding unwanted beliefs:
App.26,27n.6;App.2831,n.7;App.39-40;App.4853;App.4885.

15
The never known standard

Despite a quite definitive listing of criteria by which

to judge a candidate, the Examiners prefer insight.
Petitioners lack of insight is a common denominator
between 2009 and 2015. The 2015 BLE not only
adopted the 2009 report on this issue, they
emphasized:
Were there no other grounds on which to deny
the Applicant's application, this lack of
insight into his own conduct would be
independently sufficient to show that he lacks
the requisite good moral character for
admission to this bar.
App.22-2312(italics in original).
The BLE
repeatedly endorsed this finding to support lifelong
banishment from their bar.12,
The ever present burden

Applicant was put under a burden of persuasion upon

filing his application. App.59106. The BLE employs
this burden to keep the applicant ever making
his/her case, and never able to ask whether the Board
is actually keeping up with due process and the rule
of law itself. Applicant was faulted for not playing on
that chess board [d]espite multiple rulings and
12 Insight is a psychological term found nowhere in
the ISC standards allegedly governing bar
admission. See Rule 12, 2,App.65-66. Nor is
insight defined by Indiana law. Yet this dispositive
term appears seven times in the BFR:
App.2711;2812;4665;48n.17. But see
App.82@(h);128

16
reminders that he bore the burden of proof and that
the only issue was his fitness and character to
practice law, particularly in light of his refusal to
comply with the request for an updated psychological
evaluation App.6191.
While the Applicant must focus only on his burden to
persuade, and is penalized for questioning the BLEs
procedures, the BLEs mandate renders [a]ny facts
that bear, even remotely, upon the question of an
app1icant's character and fitness relevant to the
Board's inquiry. App.70109.
This deputization to run down any facts no matter
how remote emboldens the BLE: The Board has
within its power the ability to require an applicant to
submit additional information, evaluations or proofs
bearing on the issue of character and fitness.
Admission & Discipline Rule 12, 6. [sic] Thus the
requests which dare not be questioned and dare not
be disobeyed. (See Rule 12,5)
The never happening investigation

This one-way whistleblower-silencing burden is of

such paramount importance that it eclipses even the
concept of investigations (an idea foreign to at least
one Indiana Examiner):
[Applicants Counsel]: My understanding is
that the Board thoroughly conducts an
investigation of character and fitness before
ruling on an applicant's character and fitness,
so my question [is] why are these
investigations being done after the decision
has already been made to deny?

17
[EXAMINER] I have no idea what you're
talking
about,
"investigations."
Every
applicant that comes before the Board has a
burden of proving his or her character and
fitness and the Board rules based on the
showing that any applicant has made, that is
the process under the rules. I have no idea
what you're talking about "investigations."
App.91.
The ever persistent informality

When Petitioner confronted the Examiners as to

vagueness in procedures the Board President
confessed, We've fallen into an informal but bad
practice. App.95 (admission as to Rule 12, 9) The
Boards informalities are especially difficult on
unwanted applicants.
Rule 129(b) mandates that if hearing is scheduled
the applicant shall be informed of the substance of
the matter to be inquired into by written notice at
least ten (10) days before the date set for said
hearing.
Applicant moved, nine days prior to the April 27
hearing, for an order limiting the State from offering
new or novel theories, documents or accusations
against the Applicant pursuant to 9(b). The Board
President reasoned, a mere five days before the only
on-the-record hearing, that since [a] three-member
panel of the Board, not a jury, will hear the
Applicant's challenge to the Board's determination
that he did not carry his burden to demonstrate he has
the requisite character and fitness compliance with
Section 9(b) was unnecessary. (Of course, 9(b) is

18
never, by definition, used in a jury setting.)
Rather than follow the due process of rules, the Board
President offered that [i]f the Applicant believes the
State proffers evidence irrelevant to the proceedings,
he can object at that time. Thus Petitioner was left
to believe that post-hearing due process would guard
the record. And yet, immediately after the hearing,
the President ruled that no more objections, motions,
filings, evidential submissions or additions to the
record would be allowed. (She then allowed Board
counsel to add yellow-highlighted government briefs
to the record.)
The never probative witnesses

The BLEs application put the 2007-09 processing at

issue. The magistrate put 2008 at issue. The
request to self-fund updated psychological
evaluations a mere six years after evaluations by
Ross, Bowman and Sudrovech put their reports at
issue. Applicant thus subpoenaed Ross, Bowman and
Sudrovech, to the Rule 9 hearing as the rules allow.
App.79 After numerous threats by the ISCs ADA
coordinator failed to result in the recall of the
subpoenas, the Board President ruled that [a]ny
testimony to be offered by [these witnesses] would be
stale and irrelevant to the issue pending before the
hearing panel. But see App.51n.19;5583.
Ironically, the Board included in its Final Report
testimony of Dr. Stephen Ross as to matters from the
allegedly stale and irrelevant time period. This
testimony was submitted in mere letter form. It is in
footnote five of the Final Report. App. App.29n5. It
is not just any letter, but a letter seeking to quash a

19
subpoena. The subpoena was quashed, and then the
uncrossed, unsworn testimony in the letter was
received as substantive evidence against the interests
of the subpoenaing party on the very question at
issue.13 Such testimony is inadmissible under
Indiana evidentiary law.
The ever present irony
Adding to the irony, the Board refused to admit a sworn

affidavit from the Applicant tendered through counsel

at that very same hearing. Evidently unaware of any
inequity in this disparate treatment of the evidence,
the BLE harshly judged Petitioners objection to this
disregard of basic fairness:
Despite the fact that the Applicant has been
licensed to practice law in Kansas for nearly
twenty years, he is apparently either unable
to appreciate the difference between
testimony at a hearing and affidavit
testimony or believes the rules do not apply
to him.
App.6089. Additional irony is found in one of the few
Indiana opinions addressing Rule 129(f) (which
allows an applicant [to] be represented by counsel at
such a hearing). Counsel appeared at that on-therecord hearing to represent the non-present applicant.
13 Applicant identified the subpoena quashings, the
ruling on notice, and other seemingly hostile actions
by the Board as the reasons he chose to not appear
at the (arguably sham) hearing, App.68-75,
rendering
his
affidavit
an
exercise
in
whistleblowing. It was predictably suppressed by
the Board. App.4362.

20
In re Fogle, 221 N.E.2d 675 (1966). The ISC raised no
concern whatsoever. Yet when Petitioner adopted
Applicant Fogles hearing strategy it evinced either
unfitness (due to stupidity) or a character deficit.
App.21; 4462, 73119
The never brokered dissent

BLE counsel is also the ISCs ADA Coordinator, as

well as the High Courts General Counsel for both
Personnel and Operations.
Disagreeing with this
powerful, multi-hatted court administrator does not
advance an applicants cause. See App.4253(refusing
to accept regarded as label); 6192(a)(failing to defer
as to questions of relevancy); 5786 (audacity to
disagree with Board counsel as to the interpretation
of concurring opinion in a recently-released appellate
decision); 6088 (audacity to disagree with counsel as
to the interpretation of whistleblowing law review
article.)14
The BLEs official disdain of investigations is used
to sideline any evidence that does not fit the
Examiners end goal. A mere comparison of the short
shrift given the actual application at bar is proof. It is
rarely analyzed in the BFR, and then only negatively.
App.46-47 By comparison the Boards 2009 report is
referenced throughout, and repeatedly cited as the
reason to deny Petitioner again in 2015. App.2514 See Patrick L. Baude, An Essay on the Regulation of
the Legal Profession and the Future of Lawyers'
Characters, 68 IND. L.J. 647 (1993). (Former
President of Indiana Board of Law Examiners
revealing grave misgivings about the politicization
of character and fitness evaluations.)

21
28;App.45-4615
In similar fashion, the dissenting March 2, 2015
official ADA complaint was purged from both the
pending appellate record and Applicants ADA file,
and the dissenting whistleblowing affidavit
documenting a sham hearing was denied admission
and
then
ignored
in
the
Final
Report.
App.4563;App.97-98.
The ever malleable language

The Final Report contains a very creative reading of

Indiana case law while attempting to doom the
Applicant for a straightforward presentation of the
same, all while accusing the Applicant, in repeated ad
hominem attacks, of being either too ignorant or too
dishonest to be an officer of the Indiana Court.
The BLE attempted to build its case against
Petitioner on case law in which disciplined attorneys
stalked and screamed obscenities, threw soft drinks
and threatened to beat opposing counsel to death
(with a baseball bat). The Board well demonstrates
the fallacy of the undistributed middle by alleging,
with vituperative language (for the desired effect) that
Applicant 24128:

Engaged in obstreperous and abusive behavior

15 Given the stipulation as to Exhibit G at App.23, find

Brown v. Bowman, et al, 2011 WL 1296274,
N.D.Ind., Mar. 31, 2011 and Brown v. Bowman, 668
F.3d 437 (7th Cir.), cert dend 133 S.Ct. 176 (2012)
App.2-7. See also Brown v. Bowman petition for cert:
http://tinyurl.com/zq45su6

22

for instance by stating his level of

discontent with the Boards September 29, 2009
order and voicing his respect for the MyersBriggs Type Indicator and speaking of hope as
well as quoting from the Preamble of the Kansas
Rules of Professional Conduct. App.46-47 66
69.
These examples of obstreperous and
abusive behavior were taken from the
Applicants letter introducing his November
2013 application. (Applicant thought the same to
present a prima facia case of both character and
fitness.) App.116-19.
Attacked the government by continu[ing] to
disparage the honesty and professionalism of
the psychological and psychiatric evaluators
who were appointed as part of the proceedings
evaluating the Applicant's [2007] application.
App.51-52 74, 73. These so called attacks
are found in the whistleblowing documents
(alleging fraud on this Court) found at
App.125-140
Evince[d] incivility in his "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommendations"
("Proposed Findings') which speak for
themselves. Due to this BLE representation
Applicant has included most of this document in
the Appendix. App.89-111.

Having beaten the shield of the Bill of Rights into a

sword with which to slay the unwanted Applicant, the
Board then argues that it is the Applicant who is
either unable to properly read and interpret the law
(reflecting fitness) or is not honest (reflecting
character) based upon his alleged misrepresentation
of case law. App.74120. But compare App67101
(case citation context redacted by BLE) with App.95-

23
100 (arbitrary and capricious analysis presented
using Indiana case law).
The never countenanced complaining

Allegedly sanctionable conduct and contemptuous

behavior is evidenced by Petitioner complaining often
[to] the Board, the very tribunal that the Applicant
seeks to persuade, App.4972, by giving voice to oftrepeated complaints and allegations about the Board
[to the Board], App.6597 and, App.32n.6
(questioning a law-free, unsigned findings of fact
which banned Applicant for five years) and by filing
allegations of ADA violations. App.68102,n25.
Applicant furthermore mak[es] egregious false
claims and false assumptions [ s i c ] against a wide
variety of government representatives and third
parties. App.73116. In Indiana such some-mightcall-whistleblowing conduct
only reveals the
applicants lack of honesty, and trustworthiness, as
well as a lack of respect for the rights of others and
a lack of concern for basic fairness. Id.
Finally, at the end of the analysis contemptuous
behavior and conduct justifying a lifetime ban are
revealed as
euphemisms for petitioning the
government for a redress of grievances.
The
Applicant abused the process and showed his
contempt for these proceedings throughout the
pendency of his third application, including, but not
limited to, his baseless original action filed in the
Indiana Supreme Court . App.73119, but
compare BLEs acknowledgement of Petitioners
motivation at App.5685.

24
The ever present stigma

The ISCs ADA Coordinator moved to quash the

subpoenas issued to the report-writing mental health
agents, arguing them stale and irrelevant to any
issues at bar. Immediately after prevailing on that
point she rotated 180 degrees to vehemently opine, in
her testimony during the hearing, that: Mr. Brown
did not pass prior psychological evaluations, they
showed real concern. April 27, 2015 hearing, p. 61-62.
App.92fn.1. Board counsel continued:
But all of that is really moot because what we
have here is the current application, where, on
good grounds, the Board asked for him to give
a psychological testing that is updated and he
has utterly refused to do so without any good
cause.
Id.
Petitioner filed his third official ADA complaint in
response to Board counsels accusations. The Indiana
Supreme
Courts
federally-mandated
ADA
coordinator, aka Board counsel, then investigated
herself, weighing Petitioners complaint in her (and
only her) balances, and issued a non-appealable
ruling.
Unsurprisingly, she concluded Petitioner failed to
make a prima facia claim under the retaliation
prong. This ADA coordinator failed to consider the
regarded as analysis.
She found that since
Petitioner had declined a private, off-the-record
meeting with her, one on one (a meeting with none
other than her would be acceptable to the
government), then, given the unstated totality of the

25
circumstances, Board counsel (whose words were the
subject of the complaint) had no option other than
summarily dismissing the ADA complaint -- while
mandating no further review under the Courts
published policy.
Board counsel signed the dismissal of the complaint
as ADA Coordinator and copied the Board President,
Executive Director and her supervisors all the way up
to (but not including) Indiana Supreme Court Judges.
None copied took exception to the due process
demonstrated by her investigation and injudicious
decree. App.140.16
REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION

The Court should grant certiorari because this is a

case of national importance. Petitioner invites this
Court to return to themes that graced our nation with
some of its most ideologically focused and eloquent
opinions, inspiring bulwarks issued at a time when
political inquisitions visited much harm upon social
dissidents. 17
16 See also allegation at App.98. Is this a setting in
which a constitutional violation grants this Court
opportunity revisit the question of its supervisory
authority over state courts? Chandler v. Florida,
449 U.S. 560, 582-83 (1981).
17 See Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971);
In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Law Students
Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971),
all arguably called into doubt by Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 95 S.Ct. 2004 (1975)(In holding that
certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within
the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no
diminution of the authority of the State to regulate

26
Is it Summers time yet?

That line of cases as to bar applicants began with

Clyde Wilson Summers. That conscientious objectors
case has never been pronounced overruled.
Hypothetical conscientious reservations in the face of
actual statist demands moved the Illinois Supreme
Court to deny Mr. Summers a law license. This Court
upheld the rejection of bar applicant Summers -- but
not without dissent:
I cannot agree that a state can lawfully
bar from a semi-public position, a wellqualified man of good character solely
because he entertains a religious belief
which might prompt him at some time in
the future to violate a law which has not
yet been and may never be enacted.
Under our Constitution men are
punished for what they do or fail to do
and not for what they think and believe.
Freedom to think, to believe, and to
worship, has too exalted a position in our
country to be penalized on such an
illusory basis. West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
643-646 [1943].

its professions Id., at 2016)

That said, few
examiners the nation over would have the temerity
to deny licensure to a Marxist for being a Marxist. It
is the hobgoblins of religious doctrine that frighten
the contemporary gatekeepers.

27
In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 578 (1945), Black, J.,
dissenting, joined by Douglas, J. Murphy, J.,
Rutledge, J. Given the magistrate adopted similar
analysis to the Summers majority, thus renewing the
relevance of the 2007-09 processing, and given that
BLE, in its Final Report, builds much on the 2007-09
report, this Court is herein granted opportunity to
revisit both Mr. Summers crisis of conscience and the
constitutional concerns found in Petitioners previous
petition.18
The Privileges and Immunity Option

The Indiana Supreme Court has

long emphasized that a license to practice law
is a privilege . . .." In re Keaton, 29 N.E.3d 103,
1 10 (Ind. 2015) (citing Baker v. Keisker, 236
Ind. 617, 620, 142 N.E.2d 432, 434 (1957);
Baker, 236 Ind. at 620 ("'The practice of law is
a privilege rather than a natural or vested
right.") (quoting In re Harrison, 231 Ind. 665,
667-68, I09 N.E.2d 722, 723 (1953).
App.69104 According to Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), the
opportunity to practice law [is] a fundamental right
which falls within the ambit of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Id. at 281(citing Article IV, 2
while invoking the Fourteenth Amendments use of
citizen, 470 U.S.,275,n.6) A few paragraphs later

18

Feb.23,2010 Brown v. Board petition for cert:

http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh

28
this Court labeled the practice a protected privilege,
Id.,284.
The lower courts have found this seeming dichotomy
difficult to reconcile. Indiana deems the practice a
privilege without reference to the federal
constitution, a privilege that can be denied, in
perpetuity, without justification.
Indianas law
applicant processing is much more easily reconciled
with the Piper dissent, which instead stressed that
regulation of the practice of law generally has been
left exclusively to the States .... Id., 470 U.S. at 291,
Rehnquist, J. dissenting, citing Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S.
438, 442 (1979) (per curium ).
Right or Privilege?

This fundamental right versus mere privilege

debate animates state opinions. See Cambino v. Neal,
35 S.W.3d 792, 799 (Ark.2000), cert.dend, 532 U.S.
1009 (2001), re-affirming previous decisions dubbing
the practice a privilege while ruling that there is no
fundamental right to work as an attorney and that
government regulatory action affecting licensure is
only subject to the very lowest of review under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution. Id.,797,798; see also Chandler v.
Martin, 433 S.W.3d 884 (Ark.2014) re-affirming
Cambino.
See also Attorney Griev. Commn v.
Richardson, 712 A.2d 525 (Md.1998), noting the
Maryland Court had not characterized the practice of
law as a personal or liberty right; however, it has
recognized that the privilege of practicing law is a
valuable one Id.,511, citing Attorney Griev.
Commn v. Reamer,379 A.2d 171, 176 (Md.1977). See
also Amunrud v. Board of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571

29
(Wash.,2006) cert.dend, 549 U.S. 1282 (2007)([W]hile
it is clear that pursuing a lawful private profession or
occupation is a protected right under the state and
federal constitutions, it is equally clear that such right
is not a fundamental right, requiring heightened
judicial scrutiny, Id.,576-77); See also Schwarz v.
Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387,1390 n.2 (11thCir.), cert
dend,524 U.S. 954 (1998), stating there is no
fundamental right to practice law....
The Piper Court focused upon out-of-state attorneys.
The instant Petitioner is admitted to practice law
before the federal court in northern half of his home
state, but is so unacceptable to that states Supreme
Court (an out-of-state law school?) that lifetime
banishment from re-application is his fate, after
having been rebuffed on three separate attempts to
gain licensure over a twenty year period, none of
which resulted in officially-adopted findings of fact or
conclusions of law.
It is no extrapolation to conclude that the
fundamental right language of Piper has met with
some resistance below.19 The instant facts grant an
opportunity to clarify.

19 The current system escapes accountability through

the dual strategy of declaring fundamental rights
mere privileges in the state court and then
invoking Rooker-Feldman and/or standing in federal
district court. See App.2918; see also Otrompke v.
Skolnik,
2015
WL
4470673,
at
*4
(N.D.Ind.,2015)(Otrompke argues that [Indianas]
requirement is aimed at conduct commonly
associated with expressionreligious beliefs about
government and authority.)

30
Substantive Due Process (Overview)

A dozen years after Summers this Court issued

Schware v. Board of Bar Exam. of N. Mex., 353 U.S.
232 (1957), its central holding being, A State cannot
exclude a person from the practice of law or from any
other occupation in a manner or for reasons that
contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clause[s] of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.,23839.
Substantive Due Process - Interests
Nearly sixty years ago this Court declared that the right

to hold specific private employment and to follow a

chosen
profession
free
from
unreasonable
governmental interference comes within the liberty
and property concepts of the Fifth Amendment....
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) Yet still
consensus is lacking on whether a law license is a
liberty interest or a property interest, and the degree
of unreasonableness either can tolerate before
substantive due process is violated. See, e.g., Family
Div. Trial Lawyers of the Superior Court-D.C. Inc. v.
Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 707 (D.C.Cir.1984)(The D.C.
Circuit has instructed that under certain
circumstances, a property interest in a specialty
practice of law might be found.) See also Nichols v.
Alabama
State
Bar,
2015
WL
1710125
(N.D.Ala.)(liberty interests in law license are
narrow, subject only to rational-basis review Id.*5).
But compare Chalasani v. Daines, 2011 WL 4465564,
adopted 2011 WL 4465408, (E.D.N.Y.)(noting error of
attorney who had had mischaracterized his law

31
license as a liberty interest rather than a property
interest. Id.,*7).20
The instant Petition grants this Court opportunity to
further define the concepts of liberty interests and
property rights in the context of the allegedly
fundamental right (or privilege) to practice law.
Substantive Due Process Arbitrariness

Arbitrary, wrongful government actions, even if

merely departures from a status quo of alleged
procedural fairness, may violate substantive due
process, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990),
as can merely arbitrary actions and the use of
undefined terms in a manner seriously impacting
protected liberty interests.
Can bar applicant processing, denial or even
everlasting banishment shock the conscience of this
court? If the present content-free, post-examination,
inquisitional lifetime ban against a member of this bar
with nineteen years of active, non-disciplined practice
on a Kansas license and admission in the banning
states federal court does not so shock, then this
standard laden with subjective assessments may not
apply in the professional licensing context. County of

20

Petitioner filed a damages claim with the BLE,

App.93-94;App.57102. State organic law grants
the grievant a cause of action against the
government in such circumstances. Thus this case
cannot be mooted by a unilateral act of the BLE and
thus this Court could award damages under a
property rights theory.

32
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by OConnor, J..
Substantive Due Process Fundamentalism

Indiana is free to regulate the procedure of its courts

in accordance with its own conception of policy and
fairness, Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934), unless in so doing it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental. The instant
Petition grants this Court opportunity to determine if
Indianas processing of Petitioner violate[d] those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.'
Palko v. State of Connecticut, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152-53,
(1937).
Procedural Due Process
Did Respondents follow appropriate procedures when
its agents decide to deprive [Petitioner] of life, liberty,
or property. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)? The procedures are set forth in the Appendix
and the facts reveal how they are applied, and not
applied, when Hoosier judges fall into self-confessed
informal but bad practice[s].
Equal Protection (Overview)

The Schware Court pledged Equal Protection to bar

applicants. This clause secures every person within
the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents.
Village of

33
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Equal
Protection claims have proven difficult to process: We
note first that the district court's analysis of
McCauley's claim against the City suffers from some
analytical confusion; it conflates several distinct
strains of equal-protection doctrine. McCauley v. City
of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 615 (7th.Cir,2011).
Furthermore there is good reason to believe that law
applicants are classified as exempt from this
prophylactic allegedly protecting every person.21
Equal Protection Religion/Ideology
Petitioner, to the Examiners great displeasure, has
consistently alleged improper execution through duly
constituted agents. The 2007-09 processing, which
the Examiners ratified anew at the April, 2015
hearing, in the magistrates report and in their Final
Report, evinced hostility based upon religious
identity.

21 Feldman, a nonunanimous, 25page opinion written

by Justice Brennan in 1983, was incorrectly decided
and generated a plethora of confusion and debate
among scholars and judges. [ ] Last Term, the
Court finally interred the so-called Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. And today, the Court quite properly
disapproves of the District Court's resuscitation of a
doctrine that has produced nothing but mischief for
23 years. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 467-68
(2006), Stevens, J., dissenting. But see Brown v.
Bowman, 668 F.3d 437 (7th Cir.), cert dend 133 S.Ct.
176 (2012). Brown v. Bowman petition for cert:
http://tinyurl.com/zq45su6.

34
Equal Protection -- Class-of-One

While the Examiners were more nuanced as to such

discrimination in 2013-15, the most recent processing
hit squarely upon the hot button issue of Class of One
discrimination. In Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr.,
553 U.S. 591 (2008) this Court trimmed class-of-one in
a fashion that raised a spirited dissent: The majority
asserts that public-employment decisions should be
carved out of our equal protection jurisprudence
because employment decisions (as opposed to, for
example,
zoning
decisions)
are
inherently
discretionary. Olech, 528 U.S. 609, 612 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Souter, J and Ginsburg, J., dissenting.)
The majority opinion noted a crucial difference, with
respect to constitutional analysis, between the
government exercising the power to regulate or
license, as lawmaker, and the government acting as
proprietor, to manage its internal operations.
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598. Bar applicant processing
hits right in the middle of that continuum. It is
discretionary yet (allegedly) statutorily hemmed. The
instant Petition grants this Court opportunity to
further define Equal Protection analysis in the
professional licensure context.
First Amendment (Overview)

The courts modern unconstitutional conditions

doctrine holds that the government may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes [First
Amendment rights] even if he has no entitlement to
that benefit Board of County Com'rs, Wabaunsee
County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996).

35
Even in the pre-modern era the First Amendment
assure[d] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957).
First Amendment Conscience Rights (Free Exercise)

Does a bar applicant or any professional license or

permit seeker have the right to question ultra vires
orders cloaked as coercive requests? Individuals
are not the creatures of the State, but constitute it.
They come into society with rights, which cannot be
invaded without injustice. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S.
331, 375 (1855).
If one has not that right, then mere creatures of the
state (i.e. an agency) can order those with allegedly
inalienable rights to obey unconstitutional requests,
even irreligious requests, or suffer irreversible loss.
How long can freedom survive under such tyranny?22
[A] basic postulate of the relation
between
the
citizen
and
[our]
government [is] that the rights of
conscience are, in their nature, of
peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the
22 Consider this June 1, 2009, on-the-record demand
from one of the ISCs Examiners: My question is
direct do you firmly believe youre obligated as a
Christian to put obedience to Gods law above human
law? Thats my question to you . Is that
assessment correct?
The question is, is that
assessment correct? App.78, n.1. Applicant 24128s
refusal to apostate on command has now ripened
into lifetime banishment from court.

36
gentlest touch of governmental hand.
Representative
Daniel
Carroll
of
Maryland during debate upon the
proposed Bill of Rights in the First
Congress, August 15, 1789, I Annals of
Cong. 730.
School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 231 (1963), Brennan, J. concurring.
First Amendment Establishment

The BLEs inquisitional interviews of January and

February 2014 were off-the-record for good reason.
The intolerant content is, nevertheless, a matter of
record below. They violated this basic tenet of our
common secular faith:
The Free Exercise Clause commits
government itself to religious tolerance,
and upon even slight suspicion that
proposals for state intervention stem
from animosity to religion or distrust of
its practices, all officials must pause to
remember their own high duty to the
Constitution and to the rights it secures.
Those in office must be resolute in
resisting importunate demands and
must ensure that the sole reasons for
imposing the burdens of law and
regulation are secular.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)
Petitioner
previously warned that the Indiana High Court had
allowed the BLE to decree an Edict of Non-Toleration.

37
http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh The inquisitional powers
so granted are displayed at bar. Petitioner prays for
this Courts intervention.
First Amendment Redress

Petitioner dared to complain to state and federal

courts, as well as the BLE, as to perceived
unconstitutional acts.
Such complaining, such
attacks were once called petitioning the
government for a redress of grievances. The instant
facts allow this Court opportunity to revisit the
NoerrPennington doctrine See Cal. Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 51011
(1972) (extending the doctrine to activities before
administrative tribunals).
See also Borough of
Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2494
(U.S.,2011).
First Amendment Retaliation
Open speech by a private citizen on a matter of public
importance lies at the heart of expression subject to
protection by the First Amendment. Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006). When that speech
is [e]xposing governmental inefficiency and
misconduct [it] is a matter of considerable
significance. Id. Significantly revealing, some highly
placed government attorney and judges say:
Revealing of a lack of moral character and fitness to
be a Hoosier attorney. The speech of Indiana bar
applicants, even when exposing seemingly undeniable
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, enjoys no
protection. Rather, it can be severely punished as
conduct unbecoming an officer of the Indiana court
system.

38
It is likely that bar applicants in other states who dare
speak truth to power can drift into serious straits.
The Garcetti dissenters warned, speech addressing
official wrongdoing may well fall outside protected
whistle-blowing opening the whistleblower to much
that is unpleasant. 547 U.S. at 440, Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J.
The instant facts afford this Court the opportunity to
affirm the First Amendment rights of bar applicants,
granting whistleblowers much more protection than
they currently possess. (Or uphold the BLE and
ensure a purifying of the national bar in the (likely)
statist decades ahead.)
Americans with Disabilities Act (Overview)

Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,

Pub.L. No. 110325, 122 Stat. 3553 (Sept. 25, 2008),
manifesting a desire to extend broad coverage for
people with disabilities and people regarded as
disabled. 154 Cong. Rec. H828603, 2008 WL
4240260 (Sept. 17, 2008). The 2009 amendment
arguably rendered some portion of the pre-alteration
case law suspect.
The Department of Justice has recently addressed the
ADAs regarded as clause in the bar examiner context.
Petitioner presented that on brief. App. 100-105.
While the BLE ignored the ADA in toto, that briefing
may explain the seemingly retaliatory tone of the
BFR.

39
Americans with Disabilities Act Regarded As

There is general confusion across the circuits as to

regarded as claims. The Fifth Circuit recently
admitted to a dearth of precedent: Burton v. Freescale
Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 230 (5th
Cir.2015)([We] have yet to determine what it means
to be regarded as' impaired under the ADAAA) See
e.g., Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 236-37
(5thCir.2010), leveraging Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)(which has been abrogated by
the 2009 amendments). The lower courts of the Third
Circuit seem to be particularly vexed by the amended
ADA.23
Roman-Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 655
F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2011), subsequent appeal, 797
F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2015), employed pre-amendment case
law to determine that repeated demands for
psychiatric evaluation supports a regarded as claim.
The instant facts grant this Court the opportunity to
apply the ADAs regarded as clause in the
government licensing context.24
23 See Baughman v. Cheung Enterprises, LLC, 2014 WL
4437545, at *11 (M.D.Pa.,2014), building on preamendment Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108
09 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Aptaker v. Bucks County
Intermediate, 2015 WL 5179183, at *10 (E.D.Pa.,
2015), still building off Kelley; But see Rubano v.
Farrell Area School District, 991 F.Supp.2d 678, 693
(W.D.Pa.2014)(rejecting case law predating the
amendments for applying too stringent of a standard
for regarded as disability.)
24 The instant facts thus grant this Court opportunity
to revisit the question of professional stigma and
government animus. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693

40
Americans with Disabilities Act Retaliation

How and when to analyze an ADA retaliation claim is

an open question among the Circuits. See Withers v.
Johnson, 763 F.3d 998, 998-1005 (8th Cir.
2014)(allowing for a retaliation claim under the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act even though the textual
basis for these claims is unclear.); Reed v. Columbia
St.
Mary's
Hosp.,
782
F.3d
331,
337
(7thCir.2015)(ADA allows retaliation claims outside
the employment context.) The instant facts grant
this Court the opportunity to demonstrate the
analysis of an ADA retaliation claim in the
government whistleblower context.
Americans with Disabilities Act Coercion

Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 3 F.Supp.3d 313, 335-36

(E.D.Pa.,2014) correctly notes that there is little
jurisprudence interpreting this provision. Possibly
because such facts as the following are rarely
manifested: App.3434; App.3639; App.4049;
App.4253;
App.68n.25;
App.71111,
114;
App.74122.

(1976). Paul has not been uniformly interpreted

across the Circuits. Petitioner argues that the
Examiners filled their Final Report with
embarrassing aspersions and personal affronts to
minimize the likelihood that he would risk further
professional alienation and social stigma by openly
petitioning this Court for a redress of grievances
(against great odds and economic headwinds).

41
CONCLUSION (Paint it Black)

This Court is urged to reconsider principles animating

one of Justice Blacks most alarmed dissents:
I do not believe that the practice of law is a
privilege which empowers Government to
deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The
mere fact that a lawyer has important
responsibilities in society does not require or
even permit the State to deprive him of those
protections of freedom set out in the Bill of
Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the
independence of the individual against the
Government and those acting for the
Government. [ ]
The legal profession, with responsibilities as
great as those placed upon any group in our
society, must have that independence. If it is
denied them, they are likely to become
nothing more than parrots of the views of
whatever group wields governmental power at
the moment.
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 877, Black, J., dissenting.
Petitioners refusal to demonstrate a willingness to
mindlessly parrot those wielding government power
resulted in a mentally ill label, career assassination
and lifetime banishment from the privilege of ever
applying to the Indiana bar again. By so silencing
their perceived adversary the Examiners afforded this
Honorable Court opportunity to address the three
issues presented.

42

Prayer for Constitutional Governance

Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court
and/or the work product of its appointed Board of Law
Examiners.
Initially Submitted: February 10, 2016
Bryan J. Brown
Applicant 24128
Pro se attorney
KS Bar # 17634
Admitted SCOTUS
9/15/2000
1304 Lakeland Cove
Fort Wayne, IN 46825
(260) 515-8511
brown1634@gmail.com

App. 1

Appendix: S.C.R. 14(i)

In the Matter of
Applicant 24128
Supreme Court Case No.
94S00-1508-BL-476
[Seal of Indiana Supreme Court]
Filed Oct 6, 2015
Order
On August 13, 2015, Applicant No. 24128 petitioned
the Court to review a final action of the Board of Law
Examiners denying his application and barring him
from applying again for admission to the Indiana Bar.
On September 2, 2015, Applicant filed an amended
petition.
After review, the Court determines that the Boards
action should stand. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Applicants Amended Petition of Denied Applicant
Under Adm. & Disc. Rule 14, 2.
Done at Indianapolis, Indiana, on 10/6/2015
/s Loretta H. Rush
Chief Justice of Indiana
All Justices concur.

App. 2

In the Matter of
Applicant 24128
Supreme Court Case No.
94S00-1508-BL-476
[Seal of Indiana Supreme Court]
Filed Nov 12, 2015
Order
On October 6, 2015, this Court denied Applicant No.
24128s Amended Petition of Denied Applicant Under
Adm. & Disc. Rule 14, 2. The Applicant has filed a
petition for rehearing, and the Indiana Board of Law
Examiners has filed a brief opposing rehearing.
Being duly advised, the Court DENIES the
Applicants Petition for Rehearing/Reconsideration of
Denied Applicant Under Adm. & Disc. Rule 14, 2.
Done at Indianapolis, Indiana, on 11/12/2015
/s Loretta H. Rush
Chief Justice of Indiana
All Justices concur.

App. 3

Appendix: S.C.R. 14(ii)

United States District Court,
N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
Bryan J. BROWN, Plaintiff,
v.
Dr. Elizabeth BOWMAN, Terry Harrell, individually,
and in her official capacity as Executive Director of the
Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program, Tim
Sudrovech, individually, and in his official capacity as
Clinical Director of the Judges and Lawyers
Assistance Program, Dr. Stephen Ross, John Does and
Jane Roes, co-conspirators, and Randall Shepard, in
his official capacity as Chief Justice of the Indiana
Supreme Court, Defendants.
Cause No. 1:09CV346TLS. March 31, 2011.
2011 WL 1296274
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
[ ] OPINION AND ORDER
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, District Judge. [ ]
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 8, 2009, the Plaintiff filed a twenty-six
count Complaint [ECF No. 1], claiming, among other
things, violations of various constitutional and
statutory rights, and alleging a conspiracy to
discriminate against him that culminated in a denial
of his application for admission to the Indiana bar by
the BLE and the Indiana Supreme Courts approval of
the BLEs decision. [ ]
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff applied for admission to the Indiana bar
and alleges the following occurred after he submitted
his application to the BLE.1 After the BLE processed
the Plaintiffs application, it ordered a hearing on his
application, which occurred on January 25, 2008.
After the hearing, the BLE ordered the Plaintiff to
participate in the JLAP. The Plaintiff met with

App. 4

Defendant Ross, a psychologist, who performed three

psychological examinations over the course of two
meetings with the Plaintiff. On April 23, 2008,
Defendant Ross issued a report finding that nothing
should preclude the Plaintiffs application from going
forward, but he did note the possibility of a subclinical bipolar disorder of a hypomanic type. Doctors
that subsequently evaluated the Plaintiff, including
Doctors Sass, Flueckiger, Alexy, and Bowman, ruled
out the possibility of a sub-clinical bipolar disorder.
Six weeks after Defendant Ross issued his report,
Defendant Sudrovech directed the Plaintiff to see a
psychiatrist. The Plaintiff mailed letters on June 12
and 24, 2008, to Defendant Ross, and subsequently
copied them to Defendant Sudrovech, requesting that
Defendant Ross make changes to his report. The
Plaintiff sent a copy of his June 24 letter to the BLE
and expressed concern over the content (specifically
the religious content) of Defendant Rosss
psychological evaluations. Defendant Ross did not
make any changes to his report. On July 30, the
Plaintiff sent a letter to JLAP accepting Defendant
Sudrovechs June 4 offer to provide a mentor through
JLAP. The Plaintiffs June 30 letter also repeated his
request for a meeting with the JLAC.
On September 8, 2008, the Plaintiff sent a letter to
Defendants Sudrovech and Harrell, raising concerns
about the JLAP process being used to evaluate his
candidacy for admission to the Indiana bar. On
September 9, the Plaintiff requested that he be
permitted to submit an evaluation by a psychiatrist of
his own choosing. Defendant Sudrovech denied this
request because evaluations were to be provided by a
psychiatrist from the JLAP providers list. It appears
that on September 16 the Plaintiff met with Dr.

App. 5

Flueckiger for a psychiatric evaluation after the

Plaintiff presented himself to the St. Josephs Medical
Group. After a one-hour evaluation, Dr. Flueckiger
stated that he could recommend that the Plaintiff be
permitted to sit for the Indiana bar examination.
Defendants Harrell and Sudrovech continued to direct
the Plaintiff to see a JLAP certified psychiatrist in
order to avoid dismissal of his application. On October
13, Dr. Flueckiger evaluated the Plaintiff for another
hour and deemed that he passed under Rule 12 of the
Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and the
Discipline of Attorneys (Admission and Discipline
Rules). Dr. Flueckiger compiled a report on May 1,
2009, which reflects his analysis under Rule 12. The
Plaintiff had requested that someone from the JLAP
pre-brief Dr. Flueckiger before he re-evaluated the
Plaintiff. Dr. Flueckiger was not pre-briefed.
*3 In an effort to comply with JLAP requirements, the
Plaintiff scheduled an evaluation with one of the two
program-certified psychiatrists in Indianapolis,
Defendant Bowman. The Plaintiff met with
Defendant Bowman for testing over a period of time
during his application process. Part of Defendant
Bowmans evaluation involved the Plaintiff visiting
Dr. William Alexy, who conducted a psychological
examination during an interview. Dr. Alexys final
report concluded that he could see the Plaintiff
functioning adequately as a practicing attorney. On
December 24, 2008, Defendant Bowman issued a
report in which she did not reach a conclusion on the
Plaintiffs fitness under Rule 12, but concluded that
the Plaintiff suffered from a personality disorder, not
otherwise specified. After receiving Defendant
Bowmans report, Defendant Sudrovech prepared a
report on behalf of the JLAP to assist the BLE in
making its final determination on the Plaintiffs

App. 6

candidacy for admission to the Indiana bar. The BLEs

final determination was that the Plaintiffs
application should be denied and that he would not be
admitted to the Indiana bar or be able to seek
admission again until 2014. The Plaintiff sought
review of this decision by the Indiana Supreme Court.
The court issued an order stating that [a]fter careful
review of the submissions of the parties, it is the
Courts determination that the BLEs decision should
stand. Accordingly, Applicants Petition for Review is
DENIED. In re Bar Applicant 24128, No. 94S00
0910BL446, at 1 (Ind. Nov. 16, 2009).
[Material excerpted]
668 F.3d 437
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Bryan J. BROWN, PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
Elizabeth BOWMAN, et al., DefendantsAppellees.
No. 112164.
Argued Oct. 20, 2011.
Decided Feb. 2, 2012.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
Denied March 2, 2012.
Before CUDAHY, KANNE and SYKES
Opinion CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.
This case involves the scope of the Rooker
Feldman doctrine and whether the district court
properly applied that doctrine to appellants 42 U.S.C.
1983 claims. In April 2007, appellant Bryan Brown
applied for admission to the Indiana Bar. As part of
his application process, the Indiana Board of Law
Examiners (BLE) requested that Brown attend *439
hearings to investigate his application and also
required Brown to be evaluated by mental health
professionals. The BLE ultimately denied Browns
admission application and, after exhausting his

App. 7

appeals to the Indiana Supreme Court and the United

States Supreme Court, Brown brought suit in the
district court. His complaint, lodged against various
state actors involved in his application process,
alleged that the evaluation of his application focused
on his religious beliefs (ostensibly Roman Catholic)
and violated his constitutional rights. The district
court dismissed his complaint without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker
Feldman. The district court also found that the
defendants were immune from civil suit. On appeal,
Brown raises two issues: (1) whether the district court
erred in dismissing his federal suit under Rooker
Feldman; and (2) whether the district court erred in
finding that defendants were entitled to immunity.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district
courts finding that RookerFeldman applies and
decline to assess whether the district court was correct
in ruling in the alternative that the defendants were
immune from suit. [Materials excerpted]
In accordance with Rule 12, the BLE may refer
an applicant to the Judges and Lawyers Assistance
Program (JLAP) for evaluation. Rule 31 8(c).
The JLAP is designed to assist impaired
members in recovery; to educate the bench and bar;
and to reduce the potential harm caused by
impairment to the individual, the public, the
profession, and the legal system. JLAP Guidelines
2. JLAP is administered by a committee, which
provides assistance to judges, lawyers and law
students who are impaired by, among other things,
mental health problems. The Judges and Lawyers
Assistance Committee (JLAC) comprises qualified
personnel approved by the Indiana Supreme Court.
On request, the committee will issue a report of
evaluations made by its approved health providers for
the use of the BLE in reviewing a bar admission

App. 8

application.
[Materials excerpted]
In April 2007, Brown sought admission to the
Indiana Bar. On the basis of his application, the BLE
requested a hearing. After the hearing, the BLE
referred him to JLAP for evaluation. See Rule 31
8(c). Defendant Tim Sudrovech, the Clinical Director
of JLAP, referred Brown to psychologist Stephen
Ross, also a defendant. Ross met with Brown twice
over the course of several months and performed three
psychological examinations on him. Based on this,
Ross issued a report noting the possibility of a subclinical bipolar disorder of a hypomanic type but
concluding that nothing should preclude Browns
application from going forward. Order 4. Ross also
opined that Browns interpersonal style warranted
further consideration by a psychiatrist and a
psychiatric interview was arranged.
Brown then wrote two letters to defendant Ross
requesting him to change his report. These letters
expressed Browns concerns regarding the political
and religious content of Rosss questions, questioned
the scientific validity of the tests used and disagreed
with Rosss suggestion that he undergo further
psychiatric evaluation for a possible bipolar disorder.
Brown later sent another letter to defendants
Sudrovech and Terry Harrell, Executive Director of
JLAP. This letter also raised concerns about the
evaluation process and requested an independent
review of his case by state officers trained in
constitutional and civil rights law. Order 5. The
following day, Brown requested permission to be
evaluated by a psychiatrist of his own choosing.
Sudrovech denied this request stating that
evaluations were to be provided by a psychiatrist from

App. 9

the JLAP providers list.1 Id.

Brown eventually acquiesced to Sudrovechs
request that he see a JLAP-approved psychiatrist and
scheduled an appointment with Dr. Elizabeth
Bowman, who is also a defendant here. Id. Bowmans
evaluation of Brown involved his visiting Dr. William
Alexy, who conducted a psychological examination of
Brown. On the basis of several interactions with
Brown, defendant Bowman subsequently issued a
report, in which she concluded that Brown suffered
from a personality disorder, not otherwise specified.2
Order 6.
[Material excerpted]

1 Despite this denial, Brown went ahead and met with his
choice, Dr. Bryan Flueckiger, who issued a report on May
1, 2009 stating that Brown satisfied the requirements of
Rule 12 and recommended that he be permitted to sit for
the Indiana bar examination
2 Dr. Bowmans report specifically stated that Brown
firmly believes he is obligated as a Christian to put
obedience to Gods laws above human laws. Dr. Bowman
further noted that Brown expressed devaluing attitudes
towards pharmacological or psycho-therapeutic mental
health treatment and that he made sarcastic remarks
devaluing authority of all types, especially mental health
authority and the abortion industry.

App. 10

[Seal of Allen Superior Court] January 13, 2014

Mr. Bradley W. Skolnik. Esq. Executive Director
Indiana Board of Law Examiners
RE: Bar Applicant Interview of Bryan J. Brown
Dear Mr. Skolnik,
I conducted an in-person interview with
Bryan J. Brown on January 8, 2014. Mr. Brown
is a very intelligent person who is familiar with
the Rules of Professional Conduct. I posed
several ethical scenarios during our interview
answered them
correctly
and
and he
demonstrated a
thorough knowledge and
understanding of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Based upon our interview, I believe
that he has adequate knowledge of the
standards and ideals of the profession. Based
upon a review of his letters of reference, the
references all certified that based upon their
knowledge of and interactions with him, they
believe that he possesses the requisites of good
moral character. I note that M r. Brown is
presently in good standing with the Kansas Bar
and that he has not had any disciplinary
complaints filed against him since his last
application was filed and has not had any
arrests or convictions since he last applied for
admission to the Indiana Bar. A matter of
concern that arose during the application
process in 2008, was his fitness to practice law
in Indiana and concerns over his willingness to
obey state and federal law even when doing so
violates his conscience. During the interview, I
provided Mr. Brown with a copy of Admission and
Discipline Rule 22 and he advised me that he was
familiar with the Oath and was willing to abide
by the principals of the Oath. When asked how

App. 11

he would resolve a conflict between state or

federal law and his beliefs on any issue, he
confirmed the statement/ beliefs articulated in
his
Creedal
Statement
which
included
discussion of his religion and religious views. I
feel compelled to make it clear that during the
interview, the specific topic of his religious views
was brought up by Mr. Brown and not by me. My
question regarding the conflict between his
beliefs and federal and state law was not specific
to his religion or religious views.
Upon review of Mr. Brown's current
Application for Admission Upon Examination to
Practice Law, along with the information provided
by the Board as well as the Character & Fitness
Interview, I conclude that Mr. Brown is an
intelligent and articulate gen tleman who is
familiar with the Rules of Professional Conduct
and has expressed a willingness to be bound by
the rules. However, I cannot ignore the concerns
that were raised by the Board during the 2008
application process as their conclusions
were
serious and significant and I feel that part of my
responsibility in the current application process is
to determine whether the concerns have been
resolved. After a review of the information
provided to me, I do not feel that I am able to
determine whether they have been resolved. Out
of an abundance of caution, I feel that I must
defer this matter
to the Board with a
recommendation that the Board conduct the
personal inquiry it deems necessary in order to
fully determine his fitness to practice law in
Indiana. /s Lori K. Morgan, Magistrate

App. 12

Seal of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana

State Board of Law Examiners
April 29, 2014
Bryan John Brown [ ]
Notice of Successful Completion of Indiana Bar
Examination
On behalf of the Indiana State Board of Law
Examiners, I am pleased to inform you that you were
successful on the February 2014 Indiana Bar
Examination.
A successful result on the bar examination is
only one of the eligibility requirements to be admitted
to the bar of the Indiana Supreme Court. If an
applicant has not been approved as to character and
fitness or has otherwise not met all of the
requirements for admission, he or she will not be
admitted until such time as all requirements for
admission are fulfilled.
As you know, the Board of Law Examiners has
deferred a decision as to your character and fitness to
practice law in the state of Indiana. Accordingly, you
will not be eligible for admission to the bar of the
Indiana Supreme Court until such time as you have
been approved as to character and fitness by the
Board of Law Examiners and satisfied all other
requirements for admission. Once a determination
has been made on the issue of character and fitness,
or if the Board feels it is necessary to meet with you
in the future, we will be in further contact with you.
Please be advised that you are under a
continuing obligation to update your application
regarding any changes, including those which may
reflect on your character and fitness to practice law
as outlined in Admission and Discipline Rule 12.
Should you have any questions, please feel free
to contact me. Bradley W. Skolnik Executive Director

App. 13

Seal of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana

State Board of Law Examiners
May 27, 2014
Kevin P. McGoff Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP [ ]
Re: Application of Bryan J. Brown for Admission
Upon Examination
Dear Mr. McGoff:
Admission and Discipline Rule 12 requires the
State Board of Law Examiners to certify to the
Indiana Supreme Court that applicants for admission
to the bar have the requisite character and fitness to
practice law.
As you know, earlier this year, the Board
determined that while Mr. Brown may sit for the
February 2014 Indiana bar exam, it has deferred a
determination as to his character and fitness. At that
time, the Board indicated that if it is need of any
additional information pertaining to the issue of
character and fitness, it would be in further contact
with him.
Mr. Brown was successful on the February
2014 bar exam. Therefore, on May 20, 2014, the
Board met to consider Mr. Brown's pending
application for admission to the bar upon
examination. After careful and deliberate
consideration, the Board voted to request that Mr.
Brown obtain updated psychological testing from one
of the following licensed clinical psychologists at
Psychological Service Associates, Inc., 3421 E. State
Boulevard, Fort Wayne, IN [ ] to be selected by Mr.
Brown:
Jere W. Leib, PhD, HSPP
Rodney E. Timbrook, PhD, HSPP
Susan A. Dwyer, PhD, HSPP
The psychological testing should consist of a
battery of measures comparable to prior assessments

App. 14

Mr. Brown has undergone, testing the applicant's

personality and current functioning. :Mr. Brown
will be required to sign a release allowing the Board
access to the raw testing data and the testing
psychologist to have access to the applicant's filings
with the Board. Thank you for your attention to this
matter. Should you have any questions, please feel
free to contact me at any time. Sincerely,
Bradley W. Skolnik Executive Director
Seal of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana
State Board of Law Examiners
July 22, 2014
Dear Mr. Brown:
The Board of Law Examiners has had an
opportunity to consider your June 23, 2014
correspondence in which you request that you not be
required to obtain updated psychological testing.
Following consideration of this matter, the Board's
position remains unchanged. The Board, therefore,
renews its request that you proceed with the updated
psychological testing from one of the licensed clinical
psychologists at Psychological Service Associates
listed in my letter dated May 27, 2014. If you are
unable or unwilling to proceed with the requested
psychological testing at this time, please let me know
so that I can advise the Board. Thank you for your
attention to this matter. Bradley W. Skolnik Executive
Director

App. 15

[Seal of the Indiana Supreme Court]

Certified Mail, Return Recei pt Requested
Septem ber 22, 2014
[ ] Dear Mr. Brown:
Admission and Discipline Rule 12 requires the
Indiana State Board of Law Examiners to certify to the
Indiana Supreme Court that applicants for admission
to the bar have the requisite character and fitness to
practice law. On September 19, 2014, the Board met to
consider the status of your pending application for
admission to the Indiana bar upon examination.
As you know, the Board previously deferred a
determination as to your character and fitness and
requested that you obtain updated psychological
testing from one of the clinical psychologists at
Psychological Service Associates listed in my May 27,
2014 letter. By letters dated June 23, 2014 and August
15, 2014, you indicated, however, that you are unable
to proceed with the u pdated psychological testing
needed by the Board to render a determi nation as to
character and fitness.
Based upon the foregoing, the Board determined
that you have failed to sustain the burden of proof that
you possess the requisite character and fitness and
therefore, have not satisfied all of the qualifications
to be admitted to the practice of law. As a result, the
Board has denied your application for admission to
practice law in the state of Indiana.
The Board further determined that the earliest
the Board will accept a re-application for admission
from you will be when you are able and willing to
provide the updated psychological testing requested
by the Board. Please note that under Admission and
Discipline Rule 17, an applicant who successful1y
passes the bar examination must complete all
requirements for, and be admi tted to the practice of

App. 16

Jaw wi thin two years of the last date of the bar

applicants bar exam nation, or the bar exam nation
must be repeated. /s Bradley W Skolnik Executive
Director
BEFORE A HEARING PANEL OF THE INDIANA
STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
IN THE MATTER OF THE
BAR APPLICANT NO. 24128
ORDER ON MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
Date: April 20, 2015
Applicant 24128 issued a subpoena to Dr. Stephen
Ross to appear at Applicant's hearing before this
panel on April 27, 2015. Dr. Ross sent a letter
objecting to the subpoena which this panel deems a
motion to quash. The Applicant filed a response to the
motion to quash as well as a document entitled
"Justifications for Subpoenas Issued for April 27,
2015" which encompasses all the subpoenas he has
issued for the hearing.
The Applicant has the burden of proving that he
has the requisite character and fitness at the present
time to be admitted to the Bar of the State of Indiana.
Dr. Ross evaluated the Applicant as part of the
Applicant's 2007 application for admission that was
unsuccessful. By subpoenaing Dr. Ross, the Applicant
is attempting an impermissible collateral attack on
the Indiana Supreme Court's prior judgment of
November 2009. Any testimony to be offered by Dr.
Ross would be stale and irrelevant to the issue
pending before the hearing panel. Therefore, the
motion to quash subpoena filed by Dr. Ross is
GRANTED. Dr. Ross is released from any obligation
to appear at the hearing April 27, 2015.

App. 17

Any witness fee tendered to Dr. Ross shall be

returned to the Applicant within ten days of this
order.
SO ORDERED:
Honorable Barbara L. Brugnaux
Presiding Office
BEFORE A HEARING PANEL OF THE INDIANA
STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS ORDER ON
MOTION TO
QUASH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
Date: April 20, 2015
Applicant 24128 issued subpoenas duces tecum to
Terry Harrell and Tim Sudrovech, the executive
director and clinical case manager, respectively, of
the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP),
to appear at Applicant's hearing before this panel on
April 27, 2015 and to produce a significant amount of
documents. Deputy Attorney General Paulter filed a
motion to quash on behalf of the JLAP staff members,
arguing that that the subpoenas are unreasonable,
oppressive and unlikely to lead to the discovery of
relevant evidence. The Applicant filed a response to
the motion to quash as to Harrell and Sudrovech as
well as a document entitled "Justifications for
Subpoenas Issued for April 27, 2015" which
encompasses all the subpoenas he has issued for the
hearing.
The Applicant has the burden of proving that he
has the requisite character and fitness at the present
time to be admitted to the Bar of the State of Indiana.
The Applicant's involvement with JLAP occurred as
part of the Applicant's 2007 application for admission
that was unsuccessful. By subpoenaing Ms. Harrell
and Mr. Sudrovech, the Applicant is attempting an
impermissible collateral attack on the Indiana

App. 18

Supreme Court's prior judgment of November 2009.

Any testimony to be offered or documents produced
would be stale and irrelevant to the issue pending
before the hearing panel. Therefore, the motion to
quash subpoena duces tecum filed on behalf of Ms.
Harrell and Mr. Sudrovech is GRANTED. Terry
Harrell and Tim Sudrovech are released from any
obligation to appear at the hearing April 27, 2015,
and also released from any obligation to produce
documents relating to prior involvement with the
Applicant.
SO ORDERED:
Honorable Barbara L. Brugnaux
Presiding Officer
BEFORE A HEARING PANEL OF THE INDIANA
STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERSORDER ON
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
Date: April 21, 2015
Applicant 24128 issued a subpoena to Dr.
Elizabeth Bowman to appear at Applicants hearing
before this panel on April 27, 2015. Dr. Bowman, by
counsel, filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The
Applicant previously filed a document entitled
Justifications for Subpoenas Issued for April 27,
2015 which encompasses Dr. Bowmans subpoena.
The Applicant has the burden of proving that he
has the requisite character and fitness at the present
time to be admitted to the Bar of the State of Indiana.
As the motion to quash points out, Dr. Bowman
evaluated the Applicant in November 2008 as part of
the Applicants 2007 application for admission that
was unsuccessful. By subpoenaing Dr. Bowman, the
Applicant is attempting an impermissible collateral
attack on the Indiana Supreme Courts prior
judgment of November 2009. Any testimony to be

App. 19

offered by Dr. Bowman would be stale and irrelevant

to the issue pending before the hearing panel.
Therefore, the motion to quash subpoena filed by Dr.
Bowman is GRANTED. Dr. Bowman is released from
any obligation to appear at the hearing April 27,
2015. [ ]
SO ORDERED:
Honorable Barbara L. Brugnaux
Presiding Officer
BEFORE A HEARING PANEL OF THE INDIANA
STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS [ ]
ORDER ON MOTION [ ]
Date: April 22, 2015 [ ]
The first motion in limine to be addressed sought
to limit the State offering new or novel theories,
documents or accusations against the Applicant. A
three-member panel of the Board, not a jury, will
hear the Applicant's challenge to the Board's
determination that he did not carry his burden to
demonstrate he has the requisite character and
fitness. Hence a motion in limine is unnecessary. If
the Applicant believes the State proffers evidence
irrelevant to the proceedings, he can object at that
time. Accordingly, this Motion In Limine is DENIED.
[Materials excerpted]
SO ORDERED:
Honorable Barbara L. Brugnaux
Presiding Officer

App. 20

[July 17, 2015]

BEFORE THE INDIANA BOARD OF LAW
EXAMINERS
IN THE MATTER OF THE
)
APPLICATION OF
)
BAR APPLICANT NO. 24128
)
We, the undersigned
President
and
Secretary of the Indiana State Board of Law
Examiners, do hereby certify that the attached
"Final Report of the Proceedings and Findi ngs of
Fact, Concl usions of Law, and Recommendation as
to Bar Applicant No. 241 28'" were unanimously
approved and adopted by the Indiana State Board
of Law Examiners after review and consideration
this confidential to the extent it contains
information described above in paragraph 2. A party
must designate
/s Hon. Barbara L. Brugnaux, President
/s Cathleen M. Shrader, Secretary

App. 21

[July 14, 2015]

BEFORE THE INDIANA BOARD OF LAW
EXAMINERS
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
BAR APPLICANT NO. 24128
INDIANA BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
THE PROCEEDINGS AND FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS
OF
LAW,
AND
RECOMMENDATION AS TO BAR APPLICANT NO.
24128
This matter came before a Hearing Panel of
the Indiana Board of Law Examiners (hereinafter the
Board or BLE) on April 27, 2015 at the Board's offices
in Indianapolis. The Hearing Panel comprised Board
President Hon. Barbara Brugnaux, Board Secretary
Cathleen Shrader, and Board Member Michael
Jenuwine. The Applicant failed to appear for the
hearing and gave no prior notice that he would not
appear. Instead, the Applicant appeared by counsel,
Attorney Benjamin J. Bentrup, who entered his
appearance as counsel for the Applicant at the
commencement of the hearing. (Transcript of the
Proceedings of April 27, 2015 ("Trans.") at 2, 7 Ex.
E, Appeal 512). Attorney Bentrup withdrew his
appearance as counsel at the close of the hearing.
(Trans. at 66). The Board was represented by
Attorney Brenda Rodeheffer. (Id at 2).
The Board denied the Applicant's application
for admission to the Bar of the Indiana Supreme
Court, filed on November 18, 2013, due to the
Applicant's failure to carry his burden of
demonstrating that he possessed the requisite
character and fitness as required by Admission &
Discipline Rule 12. The Applicant timely requested a
hearing on the denial as provided for in Admission &
Discipline Rule 12, 9.

App. 22

The only witness at the hearing was BLE

Executive Director Bradley Skolnik, who was called
to testify by the Applicant. Al l exhibits were
stipulated to and admitted without objection. The
Exhi bits were presented in both hard copy and digital
form. The exhibits were organized and paginated by
the parties i n various prefixed sections, which the
Hearing Panel has denominated for sake of clarity as
Exhi bits A through G as follows:
Ex. A: Application of the Applicant filed November
18, 2013 (A 001 to A 255);
Ex. B: Character & Fitness Committee Mem ber
Report (C&F 001 to C&F 003);
Ex. C:
Selected correspondence between the
Applicant and Supreme Court agency employees and
representatives, dating from January 25, 2012
through March 19, 201 5 (C 001 to C 214);
Ex. D: The Applicant's filing with the Commission
for Race & Gender (R&G 001 to R&G 027):
Ex. E: Selected Motions, Discovery, and Orders filed
during the Applicant's hearing process before the
Board (Appeal 0011 to Appeal 4832);
1 The Applicant filed a written motion objecting to the
use of the word "'appear to characterize any of the
proceedings before the Board. The Board ruled in the
Applicant's favor on this objection. The Board made it
clear that to the extent any reference was made to these
proceeding as an appeal, that reference did not transform
the proceedings into an appeal.
(Trans. at 4-5).
Accordingly, to the extent any references are made to an
appeal in the motions, d iscovery, and orders entered in
this matter, such a reference carries no weight. The
motions, discovery, and orders issued in regard to this
proceeding are all part of the Applicant's hearing process
regarding his pending application.
2 Several motions and other papers that were filed or

App. 23

Ex. F: The Applicant's original action field with the

Indiana Supreme Court on October 20, 2014
(referred to by the parties as the "Original Filing")
(OF 001 to OF 190); and
Ex. G: The Applicant's federal filing related to his
otherwise submitted just before or at the time of the
hearing were not included in the parties' prepared
Exhibit E. Because the parties
intended for these documents to be part of the hearing
record, the Panel has added and paginated the additional
contents as follows:

Appeal 484-87 (Applicant 241 28's Notice of

Acceptance of Rule 12, Section 8 Processing dated
4/22/15);

Appeal 488-90 (Motion Seeking the Protection of

Audio Recording dated 4/22/1 5);

Appeal 492-93 (State's Response to Applicant's

Notice of Acceptance of Section 8 Process);

Appeal 494-96 (Applicant's Acceptance of

Stipu lations Contained Within Board Counsel's Response
to Applicant's Notice of Acceptance of Section 8 Process);

Appeal
497-501
(Panel's
Order
on
Motions/Objections Fi led April 21 , 22, and 23, 201 5);

Appeal 502 (Applicant 241 28' s Objection to

Record);

Appeal 503 (Appl icant 24128's Motion to Render

Record Selection as Exhibits);

Appeal 504-1 1 (Applicant's "Requests for

Admission (Updated)");

Appeal 512 (Appearance of Benjamin B. Bentru

p);

Appeal 513-14 (Order of Panel dated April 27,

201 5); and

Appeal 515-50 (Appl icant's Response to Panel

's Order That Exhi bits Be Exchanged - First Tender
(admitted at hearing)).
All additions to any of the Exhibits or additional Exhibits
are made part of the record of these proceedings.

App. 24

2009 Application with the Indiana Board of Law

Examiners (paginated L 001 to L 1633).
In addition, although not contained in the exhibit
notebooks, the parties informed the Board that they
intended the Septem ber 25, 2009 Findings of Fact,
Concl usions of Law, and Recommendation of the
Indiana Board of Law Examiners respecting a past
application filed by the Applicant to be an exhibit. It
was admitted and has been denominated by the
Panel as Exhibit H.4 Citations to the record will be
either to the record page number ( e.g., R&G 17) or
exhibit reference (e.g., Ex. D) or both (e.g., Ex. D,
R&G 17). To the extent that the Board relies on other
portions of the file relating to Applicant's
November 15, 2013 Application that were not part
of the stipulated exhibits, they are separately
marked as Exhibits and attached hereto.
A transcript of the hearing has been
prepared. As required by Admission & Discipline
Rule 12, 9(h), because the Board has made a
finding other than that the Applicant possesses
good moral character and fitness, its final report
as to the Applicant, including specific findings of
3 The parties agreed at the hearing that the decisions
rendered by the courts in the Applicant's federal
litigation should be i ncl uded in the record. See Trans. at
6. These proffered cases have been added to Ex. G and
marked pages L 1 64 to L 1 86.
4 Portions of Exhibit H were part of the A pplicant's
original action filed with the Indiana Supreme Court.
However, for reasons unknown to the Board, only certain
pages of the exhibit are contained in the exhibits
submitted by the parties relating to the original action and
those pages are not in order. See OF 1 1 1 to OF 1 17.

App. 25

fact, conclusions, and its recommendations to the

Indiana Supreme Court are made below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Before the Board is the Applicant's
third appl ication for admission to the Indiana Bar.
While the Hearing Panel has considered and makes
this Final Report and Recommendation based upon
the Appl icant's third application and his
submissions and appearance before the Board in
connection with that third appl ication, a recitation
of the Applicant's prior history before the Board
and before the Indiana Supreme Court is in order.
Facts Relating to the Applicant's Prior
Applications
The Applicant initially applied for
admission to the Indiana Bar in 1996.
3.
His lengthy application, which
included a record of multiple arrests related to the
Applicant's civi l disobedience, caused the Board
to require the Applicant to appear before the
Board. The Applicant thereafter informed the
Board that he would not be appearing, would not
be available to take the July 1996 bar
exami nation, and that he hoped to seek approval
in time to take the February 1997 bar
examination. (Ex. H at 4, Finding 14).
4.
The Applicant was later instructed to
appear before the Board i n advance of the
February 1997 bar examination. The Applicant
did not reply, did not sit for the examination, and
made no further contact with the Board until he
submitted a second application for admission to the
bar in 2007. (Id. at 4, 5, Findings 15, 19).
2.

App. 26

According to the Kansas Supreme

Court's Office of Attorney Registration, the
Applicant was admitted to the Kansas Bar on
September 27, 1996, and remains in active status.
6.
In 2005, the Applicant applied to the
Missouri Bar seeking reciprocity admission, but
was denied admission on the basis of Missouri 's
residency
requirements.
The
Applicant's
subsequent appeal of that decision was denied.
(Id. at 5, Finding 20; A 167).
7.
Ten years after his first application to
take the Indiana Bar Examination, in April 2007,
the Applicant submitted a second application for
admission to the Indiana Bar. That application,
with supporting documentation, comprised nearly
200 pages. (Ex. H at 5, Finding 19).
8.
The Applicant appeared before the
Board on January 25, 2008.
Based on the
Applicant's
history
and,
particularly,
his
appearance before the Board, the Board notified
the Applicant that he would not be permitted to sit
for the February 2008 bar examination and that he
was to contact the Judges and Lawyers Assistance
Program (JLAP) for a psychological evaluation.
(Id. at 7-8, 9-8, Findings 29, 35-36).
9.
JLAP referred the Applicant to a
psychologist, Dr. Steven Ross, who evaluated the
Applicant and who concluded that the Applicant
needed a comprehensive psychiatric
evaluation. (Id. at 10-1 1, Fi ndings 37- 41 ).
Although the Applicant vehemently resisted the
need for a psychiatric evaluation (including sending
a "'continuous stream of written communications''
containing ''thinly veiled threats to initiate civil
rights litigation against the Board, JLAP, and the
individuals with whom he was dealing'') (id. at 1 1
5.

App. 27

-12, Findi ngs 43-45), the Applicant eventually

consented
to an evaluation by Dr. Elizabeth
Bowman, who observed that the Applicant
"consistently exhibited a grandiose sense of
importance," "displayed a sense of entitlement," and
d isplayed a lack of empathy. Dr. Bowman concl uded
that the Applicant had a '"personality d isorder NOS
with narcissistic, obsessive-compulsive, and some
borderline features;(id. at 13, Findi ng 47).
1 1.
Based on the two evaluations and the
Board's own observations of the Applicant and his
behavior, the Board found, among other things, that
the Applicant had a ""profound and chronic lack of
insight into how his actions have negative effects on
other people and negative reverberations on himself '
(id. at 23, Findi ng 68), that the Applicant's
communication with the Board and JLAP became
antagonistic and threatening (id. at 25-26, Finding
69(d), (e)), that the Applicant ignored and abused the
hearing process ''reflect[ing] either lack of
understanding or lack of respect for the bar admission
process" (id. at 26-27, Finding 69(f)), and that the
Applicant "was quick to demonize" the person who
had conducted his character and fitness interview,
questioning her objectivity given actions her husband
had taken eighteen years earlier, unaware when the
Applicant did so that the C&F interviewer had given
him a relatively favorable report (id. at 27-28,
Finding 69(g)).
12.
The panel concl uded:
The Applicant's conduct in pursuing
admission to the Indiana bar demonstrates
that he would engage in the same kind of
conduct toward all who disagree with him,
including not only litigants and opposing
counsel, but judges and other judicial officers.

App. 28

The Applicant is oblivious to the negative

effect his conduct has on others whom he
believes are adverse to him. Were there no
other grounds on which to deny the
Applicant's application, this lack of insight
into his own conduct would be independently
sufficient to show that he lacks the requisite
good moral character for admission to this
bar.
(Id. at 28, Finding 70) (emphasis added).
13.
Based on its findings and conclusions,
the Panel recommended no change to the Board's
decision to deny the Applicant's application and to
prohibit the Applicant from reapplying for admission
for a period of five years. (Id. at 1 (Findi ng 1), 32).
14.
On October 19, 2009, the Applicant
appealed the Board's decision to the Indiana Supreme
Court.
15.
On November 16, 2009, the Indiana
Supreme Court denied the Applicant's Petition for
Review and determined that the Board 's decision
should stand. See In re Bar Applicant No. 24128, No.
94S00-0910-BL-00446 (Order dated Nov. 16, 2009).
16.
On December 8, 2009, the Applicant
filed a twenty-six count complaint against Dr.
Elizabeth Bowman, Dr. Steven Ross. Terry Harrell
and Tim Sudrovech of JLAP, Randall Shepard i n his
capacity as Chief Justice of Indiana, and unidentified
"John Does and Jane Roes, co-conspirators'' seeking
redress for alleged violations of his constitutional,
statutory, and common law rights i n the processing
of his application. See [Applicant 24128) v. Bowman,
No. 1 :09-CY-346-TLS, 201 1 WL 1296274, at *1 (N.D.
Ind. March 31 , 201 1); (L 173).
17.
On February 6, 2010, the Applicant
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S.

App. 29

Supreme Court seeking review based on alleged

violations by the Board of his rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court denied the
Petition on March 29, 201 0. [Bar Applicant No.
24128] v. Indiana Board of Law Examiners, Docket
No. 09-969.
18.
On March 31 , 201 1 , the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed
the Bowman case in its entirety5 finding the
Applicant's constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.
1983 were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
that other counts were not ripe, and that, as an
additional ground for dismissal, the Defendants
enjoyed either immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment or as court-ordered witnesses
See
Bowman, 201 1 WL 1296274 at *10, * 13-*15) (L 18083).
19.
On April 5, 2011, the Applicant filed
with the Indiana Supreme Court an "'Admission of
Regrets,
Apology
and
Plea
for Equitable
Consideration," which the Board moved to strike. See
In re Bar Applicant No. 24128, No. 94S00-091 O-BL00446 (Entries of 4/5/11 and 4/25/11)
20.
On May 24, 201 1, the Indiana Supreme
Court entered an order dismissing the Applicant's
April 5, 2011 filing as a "procedurally inappropriate
attempt to re-litigate the matter . . ." See id. (Entry of
5 One of the Bowman defendants, Dr. Stephen Ross,
represented to the Board i n connection with his request
to quash a subpoena served by the Applicant on him in
connection with the Applicant's most recent application
that Dr. Ross and his malpractice carrier incurred fees
and expenses in excess of $40,000 in connection with the
Bowman litigation. (See Appeal 031 -32).

App. 30

512411 1 ).
On February 2, 2012, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the Applicant's claims i n the Bowman
case. See [Applicant 24128) v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437,
444-45 (7th Cir. 2012); (L I 70-71 ). The Applicant's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court was denied on October 1, 2012. See {Applicant
24128} v. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. I 76, 184 L. Ed. 2d 37
(2012); (L 164)
21.

22.

Facts Relating to the Applicant's Third and

Most Recent Application
23.
The Applicant filed his third application
for admission to the Indiana Bar on November 18,
201 3.
24.
Included in his third application were
a cover letter, a "milestones" chart, the Applicant's
'"Creedal Statement,'' eight current reference letters
from attorneys, a 1996 letter of reference from nowJudge Daniel Heath, two 2009 references from clergy,
a 2009 psychological assessment, and extensive
responses to questions on the standard form. It
also included multiple exhibits in response to the
questions, incl uding parts of the Amended Answer
of Elizabeth Bowman, M.D., filed in connection
with the Bowman litigation and extensive exhibits
from his second application to the Indiana Bar. (A
001 to A 255).
25.
During the process, the Applicant
periodically filed updates to his application.
(See C 012-21, C 037-59, C I 1 1-31, C 133-55, C 197200).
25.
The Board notified the Applicant by
letter dated January 29, 20 I 4, that he was required
to appear before the Board on February 13, 2014,

App. 31

in order for the Board to make a determination as

to his character and fitness. (C 022).
26.
Applicant No. 241 28 appeared before
the Board on February 13, 2014, with counsel,
Michael J. Cork. At the conclusion of the meeting,
the Board approved the Applicant's sitting for the
February bar examination. However, the Board
deferred a decision as to the Applicant's character
and fitness. (C 036).
27.
Nine of the ten Board members were
present at the February 13, 2014, meeting. Of those
nine members, four were not members of the Board
when the Applicant's second application was
denied.
28.
On February 14, 2014, the day after
his February appearance before the Board, the
Applicant sent a thirteen-page letter to the Board.
(C 023-35). In that letter, the Applicant informed
the Board that he had terminated the services of
his attorney Mr. Cork. He also set out what he
characterized as his further responses to questions
that had been asked of him during his February
13, 2014, appearance, including a question
respecting whether the Applicant could allow for
the possibility that the Board could have been
acting in good faith in connection with the
Applicant's second application. Much of the letter
is devoted to the Applicant's opinion respecting the
decision rendered by the Board and the Indiana
Supreme Court in 2008 and 2009 on his second
application (what he repeatedly termed his
"processing") and demonstrates the Applicant's
continued derision for JLAP and for those he
describes as JLAP's mental health agents'(C 024)
or "government agent[s]" (C 030). The Applicant's
conclusion was that, with respect to his second

App. 32

application, "some, on the Board or off, colored

outside constitutional lines in the processing of his
application." (C 031).
29.
On March 5, 2014, the Applicant sent an
email message to the Executive Director of the
I ndiana Board of Law Examiners, Bradley Skolnik,
complementing the staff for its
professional
administration of the bar examination and stating
that he was surprised and impressed by the
"apolitical nature of the essay questions.' The
Applicant then questioned the controls in place to
ensure that his exam answers were graded
anonymously.
See Email Correspondence from
Applicant to BLE Executive Director dated March 5,
2014 (attached as Ex. J).
30.
On April 1, 2014, the Applicant sent a
twenty-two page letter to Executive Director
Skolnik. (C 037-59). The stated purpose of the letter
was to address further questions the Applicant
stated were posed to him during his February 13,
2014, Board appearance and to plea for equitable
treatment. (C 037). As to whether it was possible
the Board could have been acting i n good faith
respecting the Applicant's second application, the
Applicant further opined the possibility that the
three Board members who sat on the 2009 hearing
panel sent their conclusions to some "hypothetical
designated editor (who, if real, is most likely no
longer associated with the Board)" and that this
editor crafted the findings based on whether the
editor or anyone on the Board "would ever consider
hiring one as ideologically distasteful as the
applicant as an attorney.6 (C 039). In defending
6 The A pplicant also questioned the authorship of the
Board 's findings in his February
14, 2015

App. 33

what
the Applicant characterized
as his
jurisprudence, the letter includes titled sections
such as "'Me and General Holder" (parts 1 and 2)
(C 045-47, 048) and "Michelle Obama and Me"
(C047-48).
The Applicant charged the Board and
the Indiana Supreme Court with requiring him to
renounce his allegiance to God in order to be
licensed in Indiana. (See C 051 ("'I hope that the
IBLE is not offended when I state that it is my
considered opinion that the Indiana judiciary has
demanded a similar pledge from me [to renounce al
l allegiance to God] as a condition precedent to bar
admission.'.); id. ("I am asked, again and again, in
essence, at least by my interpretation of the record,
if I will 'abjure and renounce all allegiance and
subjection to all and every foreign king, prince,
potentate, and State in all matters, ecclesiastical as
well as civil.' I will not. I should not be asked to.'')
(quoting N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. XLI I); id.
(asserting his belief as to this point is "an objectively
reasonable interpretation in light of why I was
denied certification on September 25, 2009.")).
31.
In a postscript to his April 1 , 2014,
letter, the Applicant noted his hope that his letter
correspondence when he stated that he did not think a
particular Board member who sat on the panel had
much to do with his "processing" since the Applicant did
not think that Board member 'would have approved a
ruling denying bar admission on ideological grounds
that included no legal precedent and almost no
statutory authority." (C 027). The Applicant also
complai ned about "'[Former BLE Executi ve Director]
Linda Loepker and whoever worked with her to frame
the final report.'' (C 030)

App. 34

not come across as ''bitter'' or that he come across

as "unduly upset with the Board," since "the Board
has only enriched me in the Age to Come by
punishing me for choosing faithful allegiance to my
Risen Lord during this present decayi ng age.' (C
059). The Applicant also reiterated his call to add
religion to the Indiana
Supreme Court's
Commission on Race and
Gender since the Applicant had grave concerns
that ideological inquisitions leading to Christian
persecution would result given "announced plans
to mandate that all Indiana lawyers and judges
undergo JLAP7 eval uation . . . every five years to
'prove up' their ongoing character and fitness to
practice.,.
32.
On April 29, 2014, the Applicant was
informed that he successfully completed the bar
examination. (C 061).
33.
By letter dated May 9, 2014, Attorney
Kevin McGoff notified the BLE that he was
representing the Applicant. (C 062).
34.
At its May 20, 2014, meeting, the Board
again considered the issue of the Applicant's
character and fitness. On May 27, 2014, the Board
sent a letter to the Applicant's counsel, Mr. McGoff,
informing him that, after del iberation, the Board
voted to request that the Applicant obtain and
provide to the Board updated psychological testing
from a l icensed clinical psychologist for consideration
by the Board in maki ng its determination as to the
7 JLAP, the Applicant believes, could be used "'as a tool
for the advancement of ideological uniformity and
political conformity." (C 059)

App. 35

Applicant's character and fitness. The testing was to

be completed by a psychologist selected by the
Applicant from a list the Board provided. The Board
selected psychologists from Fort Wayne in order to
accommodate any travel considerations for the
Applicant. (C 063-64).
35.
By letter dated June 9, 2014, Attorney
Kevin McGoff notified the BLE that he was no longer
representing the Applicant. (C 066).
36.
On June 23, 2014, the Applicant
personally replied by letter to the Board to the
request that he obtain updated psychological testing.
(C 067-74). The stated basis for the Applicant's
objection included the cost of the testing, the
Applicant's financial condition, and the Applicant's
belief that his "'pending application amply documents
[his] good moral character and fitness for practice,
precluding the need for further psychological testing.''
(C 067).
37.
The Board responded by letter dated
July 22, 2014, that it was still requesting that the
Applicant obtain the testing and asked that the
Applicant inform the Board if he was unable or
unwilling to proceed with the Board's request. (C
075).
38.
On A ugust 15, 2014, the Applicant filed
a twenty-one page response letter with attachments
"on the question of ability.'. (C 076-1 10). In his
letter, the Applicant addressed his ability to obtain
the requested testing and stated that he was unable
to proceed due to financial hardship. (C 076-79). The
majority of the Applicant's letter is d irected to his
unwillingness to meet with any other "mental health
authorities/' which included a recitation of his prior
processing, his assertion that professionals consider
such testing to be "once in a lifetime assessments'(C

App. 36

083), his opinions respecting Dr. Bowman (C 084-90),

his opinions respecting "Government Social Worker
Tim Sudrovech'' (C 091 - 093), and the belief that Drs.
Ross and Bowman were "'pre- and post-briefed by the
government," (C 094).
39.
By letter dated September 22, 2014,
the Board notified the Applicant that the Board had
determined that the Applicant failed to sustain the
burden of proving that he possessed the requisite
character and fitness as required by Admission &
Discipline Ru le 12 and, therefore, it denied the
Applicant's application. (C 132). The Board further
informed the Applicant that the Board would not
accept a reapplication until the Applicant had
obtained the requested psychological testing. (Id.).
40.
On October 20, 2014, the Applicant
tendered to the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court
a letter, a "'Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus
and Prohibition'd irected at the Board and the
Board's President, the Hon. Barbara Brugnaux,
seeking nine specific ''Relief Orders" directed at the
Board, 8 a fifty-three page supporting Affidavit, an
8 These incl uded orders barring the Board from inqui ring
into an applicant's religious or political beliefs, from
requesting that applicants complete mental health
evaluations i n order "to accede to ultra vires requests of
the government," from ordering impoverished applicants
into programs to evaluate their character and fitness, and
from ordering the Applicant to enter into a doctor-patient
relationship with one of the Board-selected doctors. In
addition, the Applicant requested that the Court strike
portions of his second application (Dr. Bowman's report
and Tim Sudrovech 's report), prepare a redaction of the
Board's 2009 Findi ngs to remove any references to Dr.
Bowman or Mr. Sudrovech, and order the Board to accept
the evaluations of Drs. Sass and Flueckiger, individuals

App. 37

eleven-page Brief. a Request to Waive Filing Fee, and

numerous supporting exhibits. (OF 001-1 89).
41 .
On October 21, 2014, the Applicant
wrote the Board and requested a hearing on the
denial of his application under Admission &
Discipline Rule 12, 9. (C 133-34).
42.
On October 24, 2014, the Indiana
Supreme Court denied the Applicant's Request to
Waive Filing Fee, held that the remedy he sought was
'unquestionably inappropriate," and ordered that his
application papers be returned to him unfiled. (OF
190). The Court also denied the Applicant's Request
to Waive the Filing Fee because the Applicant's
"Affidavit of lndigency Seeking Waiver of Filing
Fee'was not sufficient to establish that the fee should
be waived. (OF 190 (finding the Affidavit stated the
Applicant has a master's degree, recent employment,
a Kansas license to practice law, $1,700 in the bank,
and the Applicant did not state whether or not he had
equity i n the real estate he owns)).
43.
On November 21, 2014, the Applicant
wrote to the Board. (C 149-55). Among other things,
i n that letter the Applicant requested that the papers
constituting the original action he attempted to file
with the Indiana Supreme Court be included in his
BLE file. The Applicant stated that his "'theory was
that [he has] suffered government retaliation as a
whistleblower since May 20, 20 I4 . . . .' (C 150). He
also requested information concerning the Boards
process. (C I5 I-52).
who had also evaluated the Applicant during the pendency
of his second application for admission to the Indiana Bar.
(OF 006-07).

App. 38

On November 26, 20 I 4, the Board

notified the Applicant that it had again met and
considered his application and had concl uded that,
because the evidence respecting the Applicant's
ability or willingness to provide additional
information to the Board was not in dispute, that it
would be more expeditious to submit the matter on
written findings to the Court under Admission &
Discipline Rule 12, 8. (C 156). The Applicant had,
on n umerous occasions, voiced concerns over the
speed of the process. (E.g., C 034, 058, 095).
45.
On January 15, 201 5, the Applicant
filed a twel ve-page letter of objections and proffers
with the Board in response to what the Applicant
characterized as the Board's "denying [him] a hearing
pursuant to Admission & Discipline Ru le I 2, Section
9." (C 157).
Incl uded in his letter were eleven
particularized "disputes" which he claimed required
a hearing.
These included "'evidence of fraud,
retaliation and whistle blowing,'' i n apparent support
of which the Applicant poi nted to his file and his
correspondence and attachments thereto. The letter
also included various identified disputes the
Applicant had with the Board, such as the Applicant's
assertion that the Board had no justification for
seeking additional testing, the fact that the Board
had not offered to remove the Applicant's financial
impediment to obtain such testing, the Applicant's
assertion that he received a "'clean bill of mental
health" five years earlier, the Applicant's assertion
that only one psychologist in the state of Indiana was
acceptable to the Board, the Applicant's assertion
that the Board seemingly refused to acknowledge the
fraud perpetrated by Dr. Bowman on the Applicant,
and that, accordi ng to the Applicant, the Board was
deferring its determination as to character and
44.

App. 39

fitness to "'hand-picked mental health authorities' ..

and had refused to contact any of the Applicant's
witnesses as to his moral character. (C 158-59).
46.
The Applicant also raised what he
characterized as a "gestalt objection' that asserted he
had been the subject of improper processing that had
no recourse. (C. 160-61 ). The Applicant also stated
that his fami ly was destitute. (C 160).
47.
The Applicant further made a proffer of
evidence which he stated he would have attempted to
bring had the Board allowed him a Section 9 hearing:
(a) the testimony of five witnesses as to his good
moral character (C 166);9 (b) evidence through the
testimony of BLE Executive Director Brad Skolnik
and former Executive Director Linda Loepker that
the Applicant faced unusual processing; and (c)
evidence to prove the 2009 psychological evaluations
did not show him to suffer from any legitimate
mental health condition. (C 166-68).
48.
The Applicant further stated that he
resisted the temptation to add a fourth proffer which
he identified as evidence "to support the allegation
that the Indiana Board of Law Examiners are [sic]
decidedly partisan, rather than non-partisan, and
have allowed partisanship to play a major role in
their processing of Applicant 21428, including
visiting bureaucratic hostility upon the Applicant . .
. in response to whistle blowing as to the weighing of
worldview,
jurisprudence
and/or
ideology,
associations, both religious and political.'' (C 168).
According to the Applicant, naming names would not
9 The Applicant did not call any of these witnesses at his
Section 9 hearing held on April 27, 2015.

App. 40

be in his best interest: "'[I]t is not my place to visit it

here upon the individual Examiners, who indeed bear
the signet ring, at least while in session." (Id.).
49.
On January 20, 201 5, the Board
responded by letter and informed the Applicant that
it had considered the matter further and, given his
statements that he was unable to proceed with any
updated psychological testing, the Board had agreed
to pay for the costs of the requested psychological
testing.
The Board then again listed three
psychologists who could provide the requested
testing. (C 169-70).
50.
The Applicant responded to the Board
on January 22, 201 5, with a seven-page letter. (C
204-1 0). The letter contai ns an extended argument
repeating much of the Applicant's criticisms of the
Board and its process and demanded to know "'Who
is picking up the tab for my psychological
assessment?" (C 208). The Applicant then posits five
payment scenarios, including that some nongovernmental person or persons have agreed to fund
the examination, and demanded further information
on just who or what was footing the bill. (C 209).
51.
The Board responded by letter dated
February 2, 201 5, to the Applicant providing further
information as to the need for and procedure for the
updated psychological testing, and requiring an
acknowledgement by February 12, 201 5, that the
evaluation would be obtained. (C 201-03). I n
addition, the Board again addressed the Applicant's
stated concern that he did not have his entire file,
and reminded the Applicant that the Board had
previously provided the Applicant with a full copy of
his 2007 application and that the Board would
provide him copies of the documents he had
previously filed with the Board respecting his

App. 41

present application. (C 201 -03).

52.
On February 9, 201 5, the Applicant
)
sent a letter to the Indiana Supreme Court
Commission for Race and Gender Fairness. The
letter expounds at length on his own genetics and
fami ly history, argues with the focus of the
Commission, and alleges he was discriminated
against in the processing of his bar application due to
his religion (Catholic), ideology (conservative),
ethnicity,12
minority gender (male10 , race,11
mental health allegations,13 and in retaliation for his
whistle-blowing activities. 14 (R&G 002-26).
10 The Applicant pointed out that all of the State's
appellate courts are now presided over by women, noted
that it was cited as evidence of "institutionalized sexism"
when men occupied the top spots on the court, and
questioned whether the same held true when the opposite
was the case. (R&G 6). In addition, the Appl icant pointed
out that in 2007-2009 more women than men were
involved in the decision to deny him a law license. (R&G
14).
11 Although the Applicant notes he is "'mostly white in
appearance" but with some "Melungeon blood," (R&G 5),
the Applicant asserted discrimination based upon his
being white and being treated unfai rly due to racial
preferences (R&G 12-I 4).
12 The Applicant identified his ethnicity as "Catholic,
pro-life, pro-natural law, homeschooling, patriarchal,
traditionalist, and constitutionalist." (R&G 15).
13 The Applicant maintained, "'I am, in fact, quite sane.
Just, it seems to me, too darn conservati ve to allow some
BLE members who stand between me and a law license
to vote for my approval to practice. What a scary Star
Chamber-like system Indiana mai ntai ns!'. (R&G 18).
14 These, the Applicant asserted, were contained in his
53-page affidavit of October 2014 in which he asserted he
documented what he considered to be the unconstitutional

App. 42

The Applicant did not respond to the

Board's February 2, 20 I 5, notice with an
acknowledgment that he would obtain the requested
testing. Instead, the Applicant wrote letters to the
Board dated February 11 and February 12, 201 5,
setting forth his arguments in opposition to the
Board's determination.
Consistent with other
communications by the Applicant, the letters are
sarcastic, accusatory, and repetitive. (C 184-200).
54.
I n his February 12, 20 I5, letter, the
Applicant characterized himself as "'a religiously
moti vated political dissident.'. (C 184). He reiterated
his position that in 2009 he was forced to choose
"between [his] allegiance to Church teaching on the
Social Kingship of Jesus Christ or an Indiana license
to practice law." (C 185).
55.
The Applicant also questioned the
"mysterious source" funding his testing that the
Board wished to keep secret and speculated it could
be the Cosa Nostra, George Soros (through his highly
placed agents in Indiana), a ''high-ranking former
jurist," Dr. Ross, Dr. Bowman, the abortion
i nd ustry, an order garnishing Tim Sudrovech's
salary, or that the Board worked out a quid pro quo
deal with the psychologist to funnel clients to him in
the future. (C 1 88).
56.
The Applicant concl uded by stating, '"I
will not put myself on the couch of another
psychologist hand-picked by the Board and paid for
using moneys that are mysterious to me (but not
mysterious to this Board) as to their origin.'' (C 190).
57.
On February 17, 201 5, the Board
informed the Applicant that the matter had been set
53.

and fraudulent actions of Dr. Bowman, Dr. Ross, and Tim

Sudrovech. (R&G 20).

App. 43

for a heari ng under Admission & Discipline Rule 12,

9 on March 10, 201 5. (C 181 ; Appeal 002).
58.
The Applicant responded by letter dated
February 18, 201 5, with an acknowledgement that
contained opinions, a number of questions, subpoena
requests and other matters, including demanding
that certain papers be included in the Board's record.
(C l 71-80).
59.
On February 27, 201 5, the Applicant
requested a continuance of the hearing, which was
granted. Notice was sent of the new hearing date of
April 27, 201 5. (Appeal 010- 014).
60.
Prior to the hearing, and as part of the
heari ng process, the Applicant made numerous, often
vol uminous filings with the Board (in excess of 370
pages) which had to be addressed by the Board's
attorney or by subpoenaed third parties and which
then had to be reviewed and ruled upon by the threemember panel constituted to conduct the heari ng. (C
171- 80; Appeal 004-009, 015-23, 035-43, 045-1 18,
196-99, 207-54, 257-365, 375-82, 388-409, 420- 81 ;
Ex. J). I n just the week prior to the hearing, the
Applicant filed nineteen separate motions and
objections to the Board's rulings, i ncluding on April
22, 201 5 a "'Notice of Acceptance of Rule 12, Section
8 Processing," in which he offered, subject to certain
stipulations, to waive his right to a hearing under
Rule 12, 9 and present a record to the Indiana
Supreme Court. (Appeal 375-82, 388-409, 420-81, 48490, 494-96, 502- I I ).
61.
In addition, the Applicant propounded
voluminous discovery,15 most of which was
15 As the Board 's attorney pointed out in her filing, the
Applicant propounded, counting subparts, approximately
115 requests for admission, numerous Trial Rule 30(B)(6)

App. 44

completely irrelevant, that resulted in the State's

filing a Motion for a Protective Order (Appeal 1 1995) which itself generated a Motion to Strike (later
denied) filed by the Applicant (Appeal 196-99)).
62.
The Hearing Panel did not accept the
Applicant's April 22, 2015 offer to forego a Section 9
hearing and conducted the hearing April 27, 2015.
(Trans. at 1-68). Although the Applicant
represented himself as late as April 25, 20 I5 (the
Saturday before the Monday
morning hearing) when he emailed a document titled
"Requests for Admission (Updated)" to Attorney
Rodeheffer and BLE Executive Director Skolnik (Ex
E., Appeal 504-1 1), on the morning of the hearing,
Attorney Benjamin Bentrup was present and entered
an appearance for the Applicant. (Trans. at 6). The
Applicant did not appear. (Id. at 3).
The Applicant attempted to testify i n absentia by
having his attorney offer into evidence a lengthy
affidavit prepared by the Applicant.
(See Ex.
I(tendered affidavit)). On objection by the Board's
attorney, Ms. Rodeheffer, the Applicant's counsel
stated that the Applicant relied upon statements
made by Ms. Rodeheffer that he would not be
requi red to be present as a witness to justify his not
examination notices directed at issues such as the ability
to bind the BLE, the policies and procedures of the BLE,
and the civil rights investigators for the Indiana Supreme
Court, numerous interrogatories directed at the BLE's
deliberative process, and an in-person review of the
Applicant's file at the offices of the BLE from 8:15 a.m. to
5 p.m. on the last business day before the hearing, despite
the fact that the Applicant had been provided copies of
his file on numerous prior occasions. (Appeal 121-22).

App. 45

appearing and testifying via affidavit. (Trans. at 2021 ). Ms. Rodeheffer contested this account of the
facts, and cited her actual filing i n which she stated,
"'Counsel has no objection if applicant does not wish
to testify or call witnesses and rest on the record." (Id.
at 21 -23) (emphasis added). The Panel then stated
it would mark the affidavit as an exhibit, but refused
to admit the affidavit into evidence. (Id. at 23).
63.

Assessment of the Applicant' s Efforts in Carrying

His Burden to Demonstrate that He Possesses the
Requisite Character and Fitness under Rule 12
64.
Both the Board and the Indiana
Supreme Court admonished the Applicant about the
extraordinary length and number of his filings in
connection with his second application. The Applicant
did not heed these admonitions. The filings and other
submissions made in connection with his third
application (itself 255 pages long) (A 001-255) are
thousands of pages.
65.
In its 2009 Findings, the Board noted:
throughout this application's lifespan, the Board's
attention has been continuously drawn to the
Applicant's profound and chronic lack of insight into
how his actions have negative effects on other people
and negative reverberations on himself. More than
simply isolated annoyances, incidents involving this
lack of insight were so pervasive to induce the Board
to requi re evaluations as directed by J LAP. H is
conduct during and after his evaluations merely
confirmed this view. (Ex. H, Finding 68). The Board
also noted in its 2009 Findings specific examples of
such lack of insight including:

The Applicant's alternating between

admitting and denying that there was deception i n
his use of his former employer's letterhead;

App. 46

The Applicant's claiming he was treated

unfairly during the process due to the time involved,
but then admitting that was largely due to his
pending Kansas disciplinary charge;

The Applicant's antagonism to the JLAP

staff and the professionals who evaluated him;

The Applicant's continual submission of

documents after the Board had specifically ordered
that no more submissions would be accepted;

The Applicant's arguing with a member of

the hearing panel regarding whether the Board's
deadline for submission of documents was
mandatory; and

The Applicant's accusing his character and

fitness examiner of bei ng biased against the
Applicant due to the examiner's husband's
representation of a cl ient in a case eighteen years
earlier. (Id., Findings at 23-27).
66.
Despite being put on notice by the 2009
decision of the Board's concerns, and despite five
years having passed, the Applicant has continued to
engage in the same obstreperous and abusive
behavior. His communications are consistently
abrasive, condescending, self- aggrandizing, and
accusatory. His positions and legal arguments are
often tortured. Examples are set forth throughout
these findings, and although numerous they are only
a sampling of a consistent manner of communicating
and thinking on the part of the Applicant.
67.
For instance, on the second page of his
application, the Applicant sets forth the "highlights"
of his activities since he was denied admission to the
Indiana Bar, starting with his petition to the United
States Supreme Court seeking review of his
character and fitness denial by this Board. He
stated that his briefing "reveals my level of

App. 47

d iscontent with the Board's September 16, 2009

order . . . .'' (Ex. A, A 002).
68.
On the same page of his 201 3
application, the Applicant stated i n "highlight" No.1
1
After thousands of dollars spent in JLAP's
system generating professional reports that
agreed on only one thi ng-that I should have
been certified for good character and
fitness- . . . I have found a mental health
aide that I consider well worth the money. It
is the Myers Briggs assessment, 16 and I
report on my
findings through the use of that powerful
Socratic tool on a B 1 form. I think the fact I
am an ENTP well trained in constitutional
law who takes as his mission in life
confronting
government
overreaching
explains everything in myfile from 2007 2012.
(A 002) (emphasis added).
69.
On the third page of his application, the
Applicant wrote, "It is my hope and prayer that no
Christian again faces the processing that I faced i n
2008-2009." He also implied in "'highlight'' No. 12
that he was denied admission due to "'injustice,
inequality, biases and parochial ism in the
16 The Applicant fails to distinguish between the MyersBriggs Type Indicator (MBTI), and other psychological
assessment techniques (such as those which comprise
traditional psychological testing) designed to measure
traits, abilities, and character. The Applicant incorrectly
uses the MBTI to support his contention that the
A pplicant possesses "good character" as well as the
Applicant's assertion that he is "sane.'' The MBTI does
not claim to measure either.

App. 48

administration of justice." (A 003).

70.
Even though the Applicant has
frequently accused the Board of judging him based on
his religious and political beliefs and argues that the
same should not be considered,17 it was and has been
the Applicant himself who has injected the
Applicant's stated religious and political beliefs into
the proceedings relating to his third application. In
connection with that third application, the Applicant
submitted a three-page creedal statement (A 006009), which he asserted he submitted in anticipation
of being questioned about his views of Church and
State (A 003).
71.
.The Applicant also makes unfounded
assumptions that disparage the Board, the Court, and
the Indiana Bar. After bei ng informed there was no
Character and Fitness committee member i n
Kosciusko County and that his interview would take
place in his county of residence, Allen County, the
Applicant wrote:
I am concerned that a blind interview with an
Indiana attorney in a county in which it is
17 The A pplicant makes these allegations despite the
Board's finding in 2009 that "[f]or purposes of the Board's
findings and concl usions, the Applicant's acts of civil
disobedience and contact with the criminal justice system
are generally explained and do not, in and of themselves,
merit a finding that he lacks the requisite good moral
character to be admitted to this bar'' (Ex. H at 4, Findi ng
16) and the Board's finding that the Applicant's "lack of
insight into his own conduct would be independently
sufficient to show that he lacks the requisite good moral
character for admission to this bar.' (Id. at 28, Finding
70).

App. 49

commonly held that there are too many

attorneys could create a subtle and subjective
bias. Add to this subtle bias my basic political
incorrectness
and
obvious
history
"questioning Authority" and the case could be
made that Indiana's system of evaluation by
an elite group of not-necessarily-county based
evaluations could seemingly create a due
process and equal protection concern.
(C 015). The Applicant then offered to pay for an
evaluation by the "professional and nonpartisan
National Conference of Bar Examiners if the Board
accepted the evaluation as dispositive." (Id.). The
Applicant did not assert any inability on his part to
pay for such an assessment.
72.
In addition to the examples set out
above, throughout the current application process, the
Applicant complained often of the Board, the very
tribunal that the Applicant seeks to persuade:

"My closest advisors, my family, my friends,

my parish, church and community leadership all see
that I was allowed to sit for the bar exam but not
entered upon the rolls of the court. Most gather that
something is quite suspect, and know that this
Board attempted to pin the 'mentally ill' label on me
the last turn of the wheel. This Board's continual
branding of this religiously-motivated, sociopolitical dissident from the secularist status quo
with a scarlet L (loser, loony, lost cause, etc.) is less
than subtle." (C 159).

"(It is] my sincere belief that this Board has

not done right by me, but has instead allowed
sectarian interests, anti-religious biases, partisan
politics and my viewpoint on controversial issues to
trump its statutory duties, to vitiate oaths of office
and to mow down constitutional bulwarks erected to

App. 50

protect dissidents such as myself." (C 160).

"[T]his Board has utterly failed to ensure

that my rights to be a lawyer and critic of the
modern order were preserved. . . . [T]he Board has
utterly failed at evidence-based decision making as
to the processing of my application, which certainly
should have resulted in my licensure on May 20,
2014." (C 160) (footnote omitted).

[T]his Board sits as a 'checkpoint Charlie' to

seemingly ensure that those of my worldview never
make it into the Indiana Bar . . . ." (Cl 61).

"[T]he Indiana Board of Law Examiners are

decidedly partisan, rather than non- partisan, and
have allowed partisanship to play a major role in
their processing of
Applicant 24128, including visiting bureaucratic
hostility upon the Applicant, me, in response to
whistle blowing as to the weighing of ideology,
worldview, jurisprudence and/or associations, both
religious and political." (C 168).

"The Board of ten 'super lawyers' and lessthan-super-lawyers

actually defers to [Tim
Sudrovech], an anti-Catholic social worker
practicing telepsychiatry (without a license) to make
the call of this Catholic social activist's character
and fitness under Rule 12 -the very decision that the
Board was charged, under oath, to make in this
allegedly peer-policed profession . . . ." (C 187).

'"Trust me, I am from the Board of Law

Examiners' appears to be my 2015 Valentine's Day
card. To quote the poet Poe, 'Nevermore.['] As I
have written previously, my trust in the BLE is at
an all time low." (C 188).
73.
Rather than focus on demonstrating to
the Board that he now possesses the requisite
character and fitness to practice law under Rule 12,

App. 51

much - if not most - of the Applicant's focus remains

firmly rooted in 2009, as he continues to disparage
the honesty and professionalism of the psychological
and psychiatric evaluators who were appointed as
part of the proceedings evaluating the Applicant's
second application:

"I spent almost one year in the JLAP system,

and believe that much of the trouble in my file arises
out of that year and the seeming unconstitutional and
unfair processing that I was subjected to during that
time." (C 025).

"I have attached Dr. Bowman's federal courtfiled answer in full for any willing to review it. I
believe that answer, along with my correspondence
to JLAP . . . in my file demonstrate that something
was far from professional and unbiased in my
processing. " (C 026).

"[JLAP's] Tim Sudrovech did not report to this

Honorable Board what Dr. Bowman allegedly
communicated to him verbally (since he asked that
she not put the same in writing). Her opinion was
that I did pass muster as the [sic] character and
fitness. Sudrovech communicated the opposite to this
Honorable Board in a report that he held for more
than three weeks, causing it to be file stamped
January 22, 2009."18 (Id.).

"'Dr.
Bowman
misrepresented
the
conclusions of Dr. Alexy to the IBLE as to the
ultimate issue before the Board . . . . Evidence of this
is found in the attached answer (paragraphs 17079)19 '' (C026).
18 See Finding 83, infra.
19 The Panel has reviewed the cited portions of the
Amended Answer. The conclusions the Applicant draws
from it -that Dr. Bowman, apparently driven by personal

App. 52

"Did the Board . . . [order] Dr. Bowman to

underwrite the costs [of the psychological testing
requested by the Board in 2014] as penance for her
admittedly shoddy (or worse) work in 2008? (That
would be justifiable, actually.)" (C l 88).

"Did the Board . . . [o]btain a garnishee order

against Tim Sudrovech's salary? (Also quite
justifiable.) Raided JLAP's budget to pay the piper
for Sudrovech's intentional acts and [Terry]
Harrell's negligent supervision of him and his work
product? (Again justifiable) (Id.).
74.
Examples are given here for the
purpose of providing a citation and reference point in
a voluminous record. However, the full import of the
attacks can only be fully assessed by reading some of
the Applicant's complete letters.
75.
Although
the
Applicant
stated
repeatedly that he believes the actions taken against
him by the Board are due to his religious beliefs,
even in perhaps the most mundane actions of
compliance with the law - e.g., wearing a seatbelt the Applicant shows himself as one who acts above
the law. I n his application, he self-reported that he
was cited for violating the law

animus against the Applicant or his views, del iberately

falsified her report and the conclusions of Dr. Alexy
respecting the Applicant and perpetrated a fraud on the
Board and the Indiana Supreme Court - simply do not
fol low. Whi le Dr. Bowman admitted certain statements
were not contained in Dr. Alexy's written report, Dr.
Bowman affirmatively stated i n her Amended Answer
that the statements she attributed to Dr. Alexy were
made by Dr. Alexy to her i n a telephone call. (E.g.,
Appeal 327-29).

App. 53

requiring the wearing of seatbelts while driving twice

in July 201 0, in November 20 I 0, in June 201 1 , and
in May 2013. All these violations occurred during the
period that he was planning to apply for the Indiana
Bar again. (A 227).
76.
The Applicant's own reports of his
reaction to the tickets for seatbelt violations he
received are significant because they show that his
reaction to the Board is not a singular one, but a
pattern in attitude toward the law and authority.
77.
The Applicant reported that when he
was first stopped for failing to use a seatbelt - a stop
he attributed to a "dragnet" prompted by the federal
government's encouraging "click it or ticket" - he
asked the police officer nonsensical and irrelevant
questions, such as what the officer would have done
if the Applicant did not have a license and only spoke
Spanish, why the government did not seek to save
the Applicant from himself since he was overweight
and planned to eat lunch at a Chinese restaurant,
and why the government was so dedicated to getting
him to wear a seatbelt when it permitted a
motorcyclist to ride without a helmet. (A 228).
78.
In reporting a second seatbelt violation
to occur in a single day, the Applicant opined that his
earlier "questioning authority" led to the second
ticketing and he complained that seatbelt violations
targeted those who were not rich, like himself, since
older cars did not have the warning reminders to
drivers that newer cars have: He wrote:
The second seat belt violation . . . . I think
[the officer] knew i [sic] was questioning
authority a few hours earlier and so gave me
the Hoosier hard press for that. Yet still I
wonder . . . i [sic] am decidedly impoverished,
driving cars so old and so broken as to not

App. 54

have warning light, bells, whistles or other

such convenience reminding me to buckle up
or else. . . . Rich men and women are limited
in their choices by smart cars that know so
much better than mine, cars that simply will
not go if the belts are not clicked. This second
ticket in one day for seat belt nonuse, third
ticket in one month, truly caused me to
reflect on the inherently disproportionate
scope of the mandatory seat belt law that
only older vehicles drivers can break.(A 230).
79.
In disclosing another ticket received
two months later, and in apparent complete disregard
of fact that wearing seat belts in Indiana has been
the law since 1985, see Hopper v. Carey, 716 N .E.2d
566, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing P.L. 122-1985,
1, currently codified at Ind. Code 9-19-1 0-2)), the
Applicant complained again that his inability to
comply with the law was visited upon him due to his
poverty:
I asked [the officer] if he had picked up on the fact
that it was only those persons driving older vehicles,
like me, that he had to focus his gaze upon. All of the
new shiny cars, of the beautiful people who could
afford 2008, 2009, 2010 models they could be
ignored, since their vehicles did not have broken
seats, or burned out "buckle up" flashers or obnoxious
bells and noises to drive them to buckle up. I did not
have such a technological advantage, I had to merely
count on my memory which was not good and which,
even still, struggled with a libertarian edge.(A 232).
80.
As to another seat belt violation, the
Applicant complained,
Neither one [of my vehicles] minds much at all if I
drive in the unsafe condition of not buckled up. It
will start fine without me buckled, will not blink or

App. 55

flash or tone or speak to me in a sultry female voice

advising me to buckle up or face the imminent
shutdown of the vehicle. The wealthy have such cars,
which is why
they do not have my driving record. Only a poor man
can amass the series of seat belt tickets that I have.(A
234).
81.
While the multiplicity of safety belt
violations may not be a significant concern, the
Applicant's attitude and reaction, including an
unfounded sense of persecution and discrimination
parallels his attitude and reaction to the bar
application process. The possibility appears wholly to
have escaped the Applicant that he is not, in fact,
being persecuted, but is simply experiencing the
negative consequence of his own actions.
82.
The Applicant also repeatedly assumes
(and therefore asserts) that he is being refused
admission because he is a Catholic and because he is
politically conservative, while presenting no evidence
whatsoever that Catholics or conservatives have been
denied admission more often than any other group.
83.
This mindset has manifested itself in
the A pplicant, on a number of occasions, reading
anti-Catholic or anti-religious animus into the fact
that certain actions were taken on certain days. For
instance, the Applicant stated in a letter to the Board
that "the juxtaposition of my rejection to the filing
of the Sudrovech 'no recommendation' report on the
anniversary of Roe v. Wade caused me to conclude
that I had been denied admission for failing to
demonstrate the sought-after empathy for progressive
causes, as well as failing to convince Tim Sudrovech
that I would embrace psychotherapy for my illadvised religious and political opinions with sufficient
zeal to render my mind washed clean of such

App. 56

unwelcome beliefs." (C 093; see also C 042; A 062

(noting Dr. Bowman dated her report on Christmas
Eve); C 186 (asserting the Board ''caus[ed] the
Bowman report to be file stamped January 22, 2009
- the anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision.
Message received.'") (emphasis in original); R&G 14
("The report that was used to deny me a law license
in 2009 was inexplicably delayed weeks to be filed
stamped January 22- the well-known anniversary
of the Roe v. Wade decision.")).
84.
The entire letter that the Applicant sent
to the Indiana Supreme Court's Commission for Race
and Gender Fairness displays the A pplicant's
exaggerated sense of self- importance, a belief that
he is being persecuted, facetious claims of
discrimination, and faulty reasoning. The document
seems to flow in a stream-of-consciousness form from
the Trail of Tears to the Irish-English conflict to the
"'powerlessness'' of white males to an imaginary
proceeding of a black female in South Africa trying to
be admitted to the bar. Yet, he fails to make a single
comparison to another applicant to show how being a
white male with his (unknown) fami ly history caused
him to be treated differently from those with other
genetic markers, or how white males in general are
less likely to be admitted to the bar. (R&G 002-026).
85.
Similarly, in the Applicant's original
action, allegedly prompted at least in part, by the
Applicant's '"patriotic duty to help 'maintain the legal
profession's
i ndependence
from
government
domination," (OF 022), the Applicant claims to
demonstrate
the IBLE's organizational habit of: (I )
Defining acted-upon religious beliefs as
evidence of mental illness; (2) Labeling the
citation of constitutional safeguards and case

App. 57

law as evidence of mental issues; (3)

Crediting
pro-life
sentiments
and/or
traditionalist religious or social beliefs as
evidence of mental illness; (4) Decreeing
Szaszian psychiatric opinions as evidence of
mental illness; (5) Suspecting underemployed,
less-than-empathetic (toward progressivism),
homeschooling fathers of mental illness; (6)
Culling out as mentally ill those who think in
opposition to Dr. Elizabeth Bowman, dare
demonstrate attitudes deemed arrogant by
her lights, or utter remarks, while in session
and under her interrogation, that she deems
"devaluing"
or
otherwise
politically
incorrect.20 (OF 048).
86.
The Applicant's legal arguments at
times show either a misunderstanding
of the
principles set forth in cases or a deliberate
misstatement. For example, in support of a Motion
in Limine regarding mental health reports,21 the

20 This ''litany," as the Applicant descri bed it, was, he

claimed, "presently chilling [him] from pursuing a zealous
prosecution of [his] Indiana admission v ia a hearing
request filed pursuant to Rule 12, Section 9." (OF 48).
Given the sheer volume of the filings by the Applicant, the
Board wonders what the Applicant might visit upon
another litigant or court as a "zealous'' advocate.See
Wisner v. Laney, 984 N .E.2d 1201 , 1212 (Ind. 201 2) ('"'The
duty to zealously represent our clients is not a license to
be unprofessional.").
21 The Applicant asked for "instructions estopping the
State from arguing that any of the [2008- 2009 mental
health] reports are irrelevant due to the operation of time
when called upon to defend Applicants 24128's bar
worthiness.'' (Appeal 420).

App. 58

Applicant cited (again) the case of Holleman v. State

of Indiana, 27 N.E.3d 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 201 5), for
the proposition that no additional psychological
testing was needed and that the older psychological
evaluations
(which
the
Applicant
asserted
demonstrated his mental fitness) were sufficient to
satisfy any question the Board has respecting his
mental health. But the case says nothing of the kind.
In Holleman, a prisoner, Holleman, sought postconviction relief based on the fact that the Parole
Board denied him parole from a life sentence for
felony murder. Id. at 345. Although Holleman
underwent
psychiatric
and
psychological
assessments in 1997, the parole board did not seek a
more current report on Hol leman's psychological
condition before the 2010 hearing, and a 2013 report
indicated Hol leman had progressed in some areas
that were of concern in 1997. Hol leman raised the
failure to obtain updated testi ng as a ground for
appeal, but the Court of Appeals rejected his appeal.
The Applicant construes that rejection as an
affirmation
that updated
psychological
or
psychiatric testing is not requi red. But even a
cursory examination of the case - the second
paragraph - reveals the Court found the alleged
error "harmless." Id. The Parole Board had refused
parole on grounds completely unrelated to Holleman
's current psychological condition. Id. at 347.
Further, in a concurri ng opinion, Judge Barnes
expressed his opinion that when a prisoner serving
a sentence such as Holleman's comes before the
parole board, "the least the parole board could do
would be to have a psychological report on the

App. 59

prisoner that is relatively recent." Id. at 348

(Barnes, J., concurring). The Appl icant is either
unable or unwilling to review and accurately
represent case law to the Board.
87.
The Applicant also has repeatedly
misstated a response made by the State of Indiana to
the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE)
respecting the Applicant's 2005 attempt to become
licensed in Missouri. For instance, in a letter to the
Board dated August 15, 2014, the Applicant makes
the following statements:
Contrary to the Board's opinion, I did enjoy
such an "all clear" status from this
Honorable Board in 2005, before my 2007
application was filed. . . . I recently located,
buried deep in the 2005 Missouri
application, a document that proves that my
reputation and status were both all clear
with this Board in 2005. The Supreme Court
of Missouri inquired of my character and
fitness, even uti lizing such leading
questions as 'was the applicant requi red to
attend any hearing or inquiry before any
board?" and "did the application withdraw . .
. after questions arose about character and
fitness?" Two years before my 2007
application, this Honorable Board raised no
allegation against my character, reputation
or past
deal ings with the Board.(C 095).
The cited document is a verification form sent by the
NCBE as part of its standard background
investigation. In requesting a verification of the
statement by the Applicant that he applied to the
bar of Indiana in 1997 the only information provided
by the BLE to the NCBE was that the Applicant's

App. 60

"Application was dismissed 2/1997." (C 107). None

of the yes/no questions respecting whether the
Applicant was required to appear or whether the
application was withdrawn after a question arose
about character and fitness were answered. Despite
this, the Applicant has taken the position that in
2005 he enjoyed an "all clear" status with the Board
(C 095), even though the only statement made by the
BLE was that the application had been dismissed.
88.
Similarly, the Applicant has, on
numerous occasions, cited a law review article
written by the now-deceased Professor of Law Patrick
Baude. According to the Applicant, in the article
"IBLE-insider Professor Baude blew the whistle on
the IBLE, accusing it of acting capriciously,
arbitrarily, and unconstitutionally.
Baude was
concerned that the IBLE consciously endeavored to
destroy the careers of political and religious
dissidents." (OF 25-26). A review of this article
reveals the Applicant's complete mischaracterization
of the piece. Indeed, the article never even mentions
the Indiana Board of Law Examiners, other than to
say the Professor was a member of the Board, but was
a broader critique of the history and future of
character and fitness inquiries. See Symposium of
the Future of the Law, Patrick L. Baude, An Essay
on the Regulation of the Legal Profession and the
Future of Lawyers' Characters, 68 IND. L.J. 647
(1993).
89.
Similarly, the Applicant misstated
written statements made by Ms. Rodeheffer
respecting the Applicant's right not to appear for
hearing and rest on the record. (Trans. at 21-23
(referencing Appeal 491-93)). Despite the fact that
the Applicant has been licensed to practice law in
Kansas for nearly twenty years, he is apparently

App. 61

either unable to appreciate the difference between

testimony at a hearing and affidavit testimony or
believes the rules do not apply to him.
90.
The Applicant also demonstrated an
inability to grasp the difference between the opinions
and actions of the attorney for the Board, the
i ndi vidual members of the Board, and the Board as
a decision-making body. (Appeal 207-1 6).
91.
Throughout his application, discovery,
and pre-hearing motions, the Applicant insisted on
pursuing a theory of the case that "he faces a system
that has proven itself, repeatedly and over a matter
of many years, both arbitrary and capricious."
Despite multiple rulings and reminders that he bore
the burden of proof and that the only issue was his
fitness and character to practice law, particularly in
light of his refusal to comply with the request for an
updated psychological
evaluation, the Applicant
persists even now in pursuing his grievances with
the 2009 application process.
92.
The Applicant has also demanded that
others perform the services he requests and provide
the information he seeks, when he has no right to
seek the same. Examples are:

Even after Board counsel objected to the

Applicant's subpoena requests because he sought to
subpoena witnesses who would have no relevant
evidence, the Applicant insisted "It is thus my
conclusion that the State should/must fill out the
subpoenas, serve the subpoenas, enforce the
subpoenas and pay any fees associated with the
subpoenas, even the subpoenas that I request. (The
Board can explain to Dr. Bowman why she cannot be
paid $200 per hour to appear, or, in the alternative,
so pay her, if that can be justified under the Jaw."
(Appeal 021 ; see also C 175-79).

App. 62

'The Applicant thus seeks an order that

Attorney Rodeheffer and Tina Hopson continue
assembling the Record, in keeping with 'the Board's
practice to allow all documentation into evidence
without objection that the applicant wishes to
admit.' Such is the policy that frames due process in
this instance. The Applicant seeks only the process
that he is rightly due, no more, no less." (Appeal 076).

The applicant served a Notice of 30(B)(6)

Examination, seeking the designation of a witness
regarding the investigations undertaken by the
Board in response to the Applicant's allegations
against JLAP and the BLE itself, a11egations he set
out
in his Petition for Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, investigations regarding the
allegations in his federal lawsuit against Dr. Bowman
and others, etc. (Appeal 161-63).
93.
The Applicant varies between asserting
that his opinions should be respected as an attorney
admitted to the Kansas Bar and federal courts, and
demanding special treatment as an unrepresented
litigant because he is not a member of the Indiana
Bar:

"Counselor Rodeheffer did not, in response to

a clear request as to which rules governed, inform the
Applicant that he enjoyed rights to discovery."
(Appeal 051).

"So 'reason on' I must, for I am an attorney--a constitutional litigator and seasoned appellate
attorney . . ." (C 189).
94.
The Applicant filed numerous motions
and other pleadings that were entirely improper and
outside the scope of any legitimate practice of law.
For example, in his "Second Motion in Limine," the
Applicant "offer[s] to recall,'" meaning withdraw,

App. 63

Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission

Executive Secretary G. Michael Witte as a witness if
the Panel made certain admissions it could not
possibly verify and make. (Appeal 382).
95.
As noted above, the Applicant generated
an extraordinary number of filings (which prompted
responses and rulings by the Panel) and vol uminous
improper discovery. In the week prior to the hearing,
the Applicant filed eighteen separate motions and
objections to the Board's rulings. I n one of these
filings, it appears the Applicant recognized that his
demeanor and behavior have been perceived
negatively by those with whom he interacts. (The
Applicant himself is steadfast in his assertion that
there is no truth i n these perceptions: 'I do not
believe my motion practice, my discovery tenders, my
correspondence or my email evince any lack of civility,
decorum or the proper view of government.'" (Appeal
488) (emphasis added)). Rather than attempt to alter
his behavior for the April 27, 201 5 heari ng, the
Applicant filed a "Motion Seeking the Protection of
Audio Recording," asserti ng he needed "the
protection of audiotape" since ''a bare transcript does
not preserve intonation, vol ume. snark, and a host
of other accruements incident to the subjective
weighing of 'respect' or 'civility' . . . .' (Id. at 48890). The Hearing Panel denied the Applicant's
request:
An audio or video recording of an attorney's
actions is the exception, not the rule.
Accordingly, in representing clients, an
attorney must comport himself or herself,
whether in written or oral submissions before
a court or other adjudicatory or regulatory
body, in the best interests of the client, which
may require an attorney to temper such

App. 64

things intonation, volume, or "snark'" if the

attorney believes it may negatively reflect on
the client or on himself or herself as a member
of the bar. The Applicant seeks admission to
the bar of the State of Indiana. It is expected
that, if admitted, he would be able to govern
himself accordi ngly in the representation of
clients.
(Appeal 489).
As the prior panel of this Board
concl uded, the Applicant does not feel he should
abide by the rules governing all other lawyers: "The
Applicant follows his own rules.'" (Ex. H. at 31).
96.
It can only be assumed that, as with all
of his previous motions, correspondence, and other
interactions, the Applicant believes his "Findings of
Fact, Concl usions of Law and Recommendations"
("Proposed Findings') (attached as Ex. K) evince no
i ncivility on his part. These Proposed Findings, as
do the Applicant's other written submissions, speak
for themselves. I f the Applicant cannot comport
himself in a way that can be perceived by others to
be civil and respectful (especially those whom the
Applicant seeks to persuade to his own cause), the
Board has grave concerns that the Applicant's lack of
self-restraint would hurt rather than help the clients
he seeks to represent, not to mention the impact it
would have on courts, opposing counsel, opposing
parties, and third parties, as it has in these
proceedings. 22
22 Considering only the amount of time the Board and this
Panel have had to dedicate to this one applicant's most
recent application, including the Applicant's nearly
innumerable filings and correspondence with the Board
regarding that application (as well as his filings with the
Indiana Supreme Court and its other agencies), the time

App. 65

The
Applicant's
inability
or
unwillingness to follow the rules is evident in his
Proposed Findings. Although the Applicant stated on
the first page that he would use the Board's 2009
Findings (Ex. H) to "advise as the style and format
herein," Proposed Findings at I , the document does
not purport to set out findings, legal concl usions, or
any possible recommendation that this Board could
ever make. What purports to be factual findings are
approximately fourteen pages of the Applicant's oftrepeated complaints and allegations about the Board
and his "processing," rather than a demonstration of
the Applicant's own character and fitness. These
i ncluded,

An allegation that the BLE, through

Executive Director Skolnik, deliberately refused to
permit the Applicant to have a character and fitness
interview with someone in Kosciusko County (the
Applicant's "only reasonable choice," id. at 6), id. at
7;

An allegation that the BLE "targeted" the

Applicant for "investigation'' because he was a
"whistleblower" with respect to Dr. Bowman, id. at
9, 1 1; and

An allegation that the BLE denied his

application based on the Applicant's economic
impediment, id. at 13.
98.
The Applicant's so-called "Conclusions
of Law" span pages fourteen to forty-four of his
97.

spent on this single application is without precedent, save

perhaps only the time the Board and the Indiana
Supreme Court devoted to the Applicant's second
application.

App. 66

submission. In those conclusions, the Applicant

proposes that the Hearing Panel--charged to make
findings, conclusions, and a recommendation as to
the Applicant's ability to
demonstrate his own character and fitness- instead
render multiple concl usions related to the Board's
alleged unconstitutional,23 unlawful, erroneous, and
discriminatory processing of the Applicant. These
include a request that the Board "admit, in writing,
that it simply cannot deny bar admission on religious
or political belief, or, more craftily, send one out for a
psychological inventory of their 'personality' due to
their beliefs, in true Soviet fashion.' Proposed
Findings at 23.
99.
The Board's concl usion that the
Applicant failed to carry his burden to demonstrate
he has the requisite character and fitness before the
Board was not made for any of the reasons the
Applicant posits. It was not made because the
Applicant is a Catholic. Catholic applicants are
routinely licensed each year in Indiana. The
concl usion was also not made because the Applicant
is conservative or political. Many of the State's most
prominent politicians are licensed attorneys who
self-identify as conservative.
100.
The Applicant asserts that the member
of the Committee on Character and Fitness who did
the initial interview in connection with his 2013
application, Magistrate Judge Lori Morgan, failed to
certify him because she was concerned about his
"beliefs and loyalties." Proposed Findings at 26.24
23 The Applicant cites the followi ng provisions of the Indiana
Constitution: Art. 1, 2, 3, 5, 12.

24 Magistrate Morgan 's report noted, "I feel compelled

to make it clear that during the interview, the specific

App. 67

The Applicant goes on to assert that Magistrate

Morgan's failure to certify him for a law license,
"standing alone, is sufficient to justify a finding that
the Board has erred. Grievously so." Id. at 21 . The
Applicant makes this assertion despite the fact that
the Board is not bound by the findings or
recommendations of C&F Committee members.
Pursuant to Admission & Discipline Rule 12, 6(a),
it is the Board - and not a member of the Committeewho certifies an applicant to the Indiana Supreme
Court as possessing the requisite character
and fitness. This fact was made clear in a prior Order
issued in response to one of the Applicant's prehearing filings. (Appeal 489).
101 .
The Applicant makes it very clear what
his opinion of the Board is:
I believe an honest review of the record could
cause one to concl ude that the most concise
reason Applicant 2421 28 [sic] is not an
Indiana licensed attorney today could be
comm unicated by at least one of the following
adjectives: A Board lacking in adequate
determining principles or reasoned judgment;
a Board that rules depending on the
subjectivist will alone; A board without fair,
solid, and substantial cause; A Board lacking
topic of [the Applicant's] religious views was brought up
by [the Applicant], and not by me: (C&F 003). In the
Applicant's "metanarrative;contai ned within his
Proposed Findi ngs, the Applicant mischaracterizes
Magistrate Morgan 's evaluation as containing "the
accusation that [the Applicant's] Christian worldview
renders his loyalty to the government suspect . . . .'
Proposed Findings at 45.

App. 68

cause based upon the law; A Board whose

decisions are not governed by any fixed rules
or standards; A Board given to whim or fancy.
I will not push my luck by using the final two
terms in such a hypothetical
sentence:
tyrannical, despotic.
Proposed Findings at 39.
102.
The Applicant then suggests that the
Board enter "Conclusions of Fact Given the Controll
ing Law," which, again, focus on the alleged i llegality
and unconstitutionality
of the Board's actions,
propose recommendations specific to the Board, and
propose specific recommendations respecting the
Applicant, such as l icensing him and paying him
compensatory damages i n the amount of $234,500.
Proposed Findings at 49-50.
Alternatively, the
Applicant offers essentially to settle his claims,25
walk away, vow never to speak about his application,
never to apply to the Indiana Bar again, "execute
"hold harmless' agreements with anyone and
everyone involved in his processing," and "to make
no public comments about the Indiana judiciary or
its processes in any context; all for the payment of
$469,000. Id. In short, far from actual findings and
concl usions as to the issue before the Hearing Panel
and Board, the Applicant's Proposed "Findings of
Fact, Concl usions of Law and Recommendations' are
nonsensical and improper, beg the question, and
25 These alleged claims would presumably encompass the
complaint filed against '"the Board of Law Examiners and
its agents," filed on May 15, 201 5 with the ADA
Coordinator for the Court, and referenced in those same
Proposed Findings.

App. 69

further justify the grave concerns the Board has

expressed as to the Applicant's character and
fitness to practice law in the State of I ndiana.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
103.
The Indiana Supreme Court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the
admission of attorneys to practice law in this state.
IND. CONST. ART. 7 4; Ind. Code 33-24- 1-2;
Matter of Fletcher, 655 N.E.2d 58, 59 (Ind. 1995)
(citing In re Kesler, 272 Ind. 161, 163, 397 N.E.2d
574, 575 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829, 101 S.
Ct. 96, 66 L. Ed. d 34 (1980)). Members of the bar
are admitted by the Indiana Supreme Court
pursuant to such jurisdiction. Id. (citing Admission
& Discipline Rules 1 , 3).
104.
"[The Court has] long emphasized
that a l icense to practice law is a privilege . . .
." In re Keaton, 29 N.E.3d 103, 1 10 (Ind. 2015)
(citing Baker v. Keisker, 236 Ind. 617, 620, 142
N.E.2d 432, 434 (1957)); Baker, 236 Ind. at 620
("'The practice oflaw is a privilege rather than a
natural or vested right.") (quoting In re Harrison,
231 Ind. 665, 667-68, I09 N.E.2d 722, 723 (1953)).
I05.
It is a condition precedent to
admission to the Indiana Bar that the Board certify
to the Indiana Supreme Court that an applicant,
after due i nqui ry, has been found to possess the
necessary good moral character and fitness to
perform and obligations and responsibilities of an
attorney practicing law in the State of I ndiana.
Admission & Discipline Rule 12, 1.
106.
The Applicant has the burden of
proving that he possesses the requisite good moral
character and fitness to practice law. Admission &
Discipline Rule 12, 2.

App. 70

I07.
"'The term 'good moral character;
includes, but is not limited to, the qualities of
honesty,
fairness,
candor,
trustworthiness,
observance of fiduciary responsibility, and of the
laws of this State and of the United States, and a
respect for the rights of other persons and things, and
the judicial
process . . . . In satisfying the
requirements of good mora] character and fitness,
app1icants should be persons whose record of
conduct justifies the trust of c1ients, adversaries,
courts and others with respect to the professional
duties owed to them, and whose record
demonstrates
the
qualities
of
honesty,
trustworthiness, diligence, or re1iability." Id.
108.
Both physical and mental or emotional
suitability must be considered in determining
whether an applicant possesses the character and
fitness to practice Jaw. Id.
109.
"In the determination of good mora]
character and fitness, relevant considerations may
include, but are not limited to, the following: unlawful
conduct; academic misconduct; making of false
statements, inc1uding omissions; misconduct in
employment; acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation; abuse of lega1 process; neglect
of financial responsibilities; violation of an order of a
court; evidence of mental or emotional instability;
evidence of drug or alcohol dependency; denial of
admission to the bar in another jurisdiction on
character and fitness grounds; and discip1inary
action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or other
professional disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction. "
Id.
110.
Any facts that bear, even remotely,
upon the question of an app1icant's character and
fitness, are relevant to the Board's inquiry. Id.

App. 71

1 1 1. The Board has within its power the ability to

require an applicant to "submit additional
information, evaluations or proofs" bearing on the
issue of character and fitness. Admission & Discipline
Rule 12, 6.
112.
The determination of character and
fitness is an inquiry made respecting a particular
app1icant at the time of licensure. The Court has
recognized that a person's character and fitness can
change over time. See, e.g., Petition of Kalamaras,
232 Ind. 535, 539, 114
N.E.2d 768, 769 ( 1953) ("'It would seem to require no
argument to sustain the proposition that one who is
mentally qualified to practice law in 1935 might not
be qualified to do so eighteen years later, and one
whose character and fitness could not be challenged
in I 935 might well be vulnerable in that regard in
1953.").
The fact that the Applicant was not
permitted to reapply for five years is consistent with
this recognition - some persons do change in time.
Unfortunately, the Applicant presents with the very
same issues.
1 13.
Based on the body of evidence before it,
the Hearing Panel concludes that the Applicant has
not met his burden to demonstrate that he has the
good moral character and fitness to practice law and
that the Board's previous denial should be affirmed.
I 14.
The Applicant's history, the materials
presented with his application, and his appearance
before the Board prompted the Board to request
updated psychological testing from the Applicant.
The Applicant's subsequent actions, including his
barrage of correspondence and communications with
the Board, standing alone, are sufficient to justify the
Board's denial and this Panel's recommendations. I
n addition, the Applicant's uncivil and abusive

App. 72

reaction to the Board's request, even when the Board

later agreed to defray the costs associated with the
tests (an offer met with wild speculation and
nefarious assumptions on the part of the Applicant)
did nothing to allay the fears of the Board that the
Applicant's treatment of the Board, like his treatment
of others that have been involved in the process,
would carry over into his treatment of other litigants,
courts, tribunals, or third parties.
1 15.
The issue of an attorney's civility is no
small matter. As the Indiana Supreme Court has
observed,
all attorneys in Indiana take an oath and each
and every statement i n the oath is sacred.
One particular statement is, "'I will abstai n
from offensive personality and advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of
a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which I am charged.
Professionalism and civility must be the
foundation of the practice of law. Upon this
foundation we lay competency, honesty,
dedication to the rule of law, passion, and
humility. Every lawyer and every judge is
charged with the duty to mai ntain the
respect due to the courts and each other. Our
clients and the public expect it. Our
profession demands it.
Wisner v. Laney, 984 N .E.2d 120 I, 1207 (Ind. 2012)
(quoting Admission & Disci pline Rule 22);
see also In re Rocchio, 943 N.E.2d 797, 801-02 (Ind.
201 1) (attorney's actions during the discipli nary
process, which incl uded filing invective-laden briefs
and correspondence, were substantial aggravating
circumstances to warrant suspension from the
practice of law).

App. 73

1 16.
The Applicant displays a lack of
honesty, and trustworthiness, as well as a lack of
respect for the rights of others and a lack of concern
for basic fairness by his making egregious false claims
and false assumptions against a wide variety of
government representatives and third parties.
1 17.
As the Court held in Zavodnik v
Harper. 17 N.E.3d 259 (Ind. 2014), "[e]very resource
that courts devote to an abusive litigant is a resource
denied to other legitimate cases with good-faith
litigants. There is no right to engage in abusive
litigation, and the state has a legitimate interest in
the preservation
of valuable judicial
and
administrative resources. Id. at 264 (citing Sumbry
v. Boklund, 836 N.E.2d 430, 432 (Ind. 2005); Parks
v. Madison Cnty., 783 N.E.2d 71 1, 724 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002), trans. denied.).
1 1 8.
As the Indiana Supreme Court has also
held, '[e]ffective, professional representation does
not include abusive, insulting, and threatening
behavior . . . . It [is] contrary to the Oath of Attorneys
which
requi res
abstention
from
offensi ve
personality; it undermines public confidence i n and
respect for the legal system; and it is prejudicial to
the administration of justice.' Matter of Burns, 657
N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ind. 1995) (finding violation of Prof.
Conduct R. 8.4(d) engagi ng in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice where attorney made
physical threats to an opposing party during a pretrial conference).
I I 9.
The Applicant abused the process and
showed his contempt for these proceedings
throughout the pendency of his third application,
including, but not limited to, his baseless original
action filed in the Indiana Supreme Court and his
attempt to substitute an affidavit in lieu of

App. 74

personally appearing for his own hearing.

120. The Applicant either is not honest (reflecting
character) or is unable to properly read and i nterpret
the law or other source materials (reflecting fitness),
based on the numerous instances where he has
misinterpreted or misrepresented case law, statutes,
or other matters.
121 .
If the Applicant represented clients in
the same manner that he has represented himself,
he would be doing a grievous disservice to those
clients, the Indiana Bar, the judiciary, and the publ
ic.
I 22.
It was the Applicant's conduct and his
numerous written filings with the Board that
prompted the Board to seek additional information
respecting his mental and emotional stability. Due
to the Applicant's complete refusal to provide the
Board with the requested information, the Board
was left to consider only the Applicant's conduct and
his contemptuous behavior throughout his dealings
with the Board. Duri ng this time, the Applicant has
done nothing to assuage the Board 's grave concerns
that the Applicant lacks the requisite character and
fitness to practice law in the Courts of Indiana.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, the Hearing Panel, having
reviewed the record, the evidence, and the arguments
presented at the Applicant's hearing, hereby
recommends that the Board affirm its denial of the
Applicant's application as previously rendered, for
the reason that the Applicant has failed to satisfy his
burden to show he has the requisite character and
fitness in accordance with the standards set forth in
Admission & Discipline Rule 12. The Hearing Panel

App. 75

further recommends to the Board that, because of the

history of the Applicant, Applicant 24128 be barred
from applying again for admission to the Indiana Bar.
SO RECOMMENDED TO THE FULL BOARD THIS
14TH DAY OF JULY, 2015:
/s Hon. Barbara L. Brugnaux, President
/S Michael J. Jenuwine
/s Cathleen M. Shrader
Appendix: S.C.R. 14(v)
Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)
42 USC 12132. Discrimination,
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.
ADA 42 USC 12102 Regarded As
(3) Regarded as having such an impairment
(A) An individual meets the requirement of
being regarded as having such an
impairment if the individual establishes that
he or she has been subjected to an action
prohibited under this chapter because of an
actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the impairment
limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity.
ADA Retaliation 42 USC 12203
(a) Retaliation

App. 76

No person shall discriminate against any

individual because such individual has opposed
any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter.
ADA 42 USC 12203 Coercion
(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any individual in
the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of
his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his or her having aided or
encouraged any other individual in the exercise
or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected
by this chapter.
Ind.Admission and Discipline
Rule 12. Committee on Character and Fitness
Section 1. The State Board of Law Examiners shall
inquire into and determine the character, fitness and
general qualifications to be admitted to practice law
as a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of
Indiana. It is a condition precedent to admission,
whether upon examination or upon foreign license,
that the Board report and certify to the Supreme
Court that the applicant, after due inquiry, has been
found to possess the necessary good moral character
and fitness to perform the obligations and
responsibilities of an attorney practicing law in the
State of Indiana, and has satisfied all general
qualifications for admission.

App. 77

Section 2. The applicant must be at least 21 years of

age and possess good moral character and fitness to
practice law. The applicant shall have the burden of
proving that he or she possesses the requisite good
moral character and fitness to practice law. The
applicant has the absolute duty to inform the Board
with full candor of any facts which bear, even remotely,
upon the question of the applicant's character and
fitness and general qualifications to practice law,
which obligation continues from the date of application
to the time of admission, and includes the obligation to
promptly and to fully inform the Board of any such
facts occurring or discovered prior to admission. The
term good moral character includes, but is not
limited to, the qualities of honesty, fairness, candor,
trustworthiness,
observance
of
fiduciary
responsibility, and of the laws of this State and of the
United States, and a respect for the rights of other
persons and things, and the judicial process. Anyone
who has been convicted of a felony prima facie shall be
deemed lacking the requisite of good moral character
as defined in this section. The term fitness includes,
but is not limited to, the physical and mental
suitability of the applicant to practice law in Indiana.
In satisfying the requirements of good moral character
and fitness, applicants should be persons whose record
of conduct justifies the trust of clients, adversaries,
courts and others with respect to the professional
duties owed to them, and whose record demonstrates
the qualities of honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or
reliability. In the determination of good moral
character and fitness, relevant considerations may
include, but are not limited to the following: unlawful
conduct; academic misconduct; making of false
statements, including omissions; misconduct in
employment; acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit

App. 78

or misrepresentation; abuse of legal process; neglect of

financial responsibilities; violation of an order of a
court; evidence of mental or emotional instability;
evidence of drug or alcohol dependency; denial of
admission to the bar in another jurisdiction on
character and fitness grounds; and disciplinary action
by a lawyer disciplinary agency or other professional
disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction.
General qualifications are those requirements to be
admitted to the practice of law established by these
rules, other than those dealing with examinations and
character and fitness.
Section 3. No person who advocates the overthrow of
the government of the United States or this state by
force, violence or other unconstitutional or illegal
means, shall be certified to the Supreme Court of
Indiana for admission to the bar of the court and a
license to the practice of law.
Section 5. The Board may, upon its own motion,
require an applicant to appear before the full Board, or
a committee composed of members of the Board, for
inquiry into the applicant's character and fitness. The
Board may continue such appearance and require that
the applicant submit additional information,
evaluations or proofs before concluding such
appearance.
Section 9. If the applicant or conditional admittee
timely requests a hearing, or if the State Board of Law
Examiners in connection with further inquiry shall
deem it advisable to hold a hearing, the State Board of
Law Examiners will schedule a hearing pursuant to
the provisions of this Section. [material excerpted]

App. 79

(b) If, in connection with said further inquiry, the

State Board of Law Examiners shall deem it advisable
to hold a hearing, the applicant or conditional admittee
shall be informed of the substance of the matter to be
inquired into by written notice served on the applicant
or conditional admittee by mailing such notice to the
applicant or conditional admittee at such person's last
known address as shown by the Board's record by
certified mail, return receipt requested, at least ten
(10) days before the date set for said hearing. [material
excerpted]
(f) The applicant or conditional admittee shall have
the right to attend such hearing in person, to examine
and
cross-examine witnesses
and
otherwise
participate in said hearing and to require the
attendance of witnesses and production of
documentary and other evidence by subpoena. An
applicant or conditional admittee may be represented
by counsel at such person's expense.

App. 80

Appendix: S.C.R. 14(v) & (vi)

BEFORE THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
****************************
Rule
12, Section
9
In Re Applicant 24128
Hearing on April 27, 2015
*****************************
AFFIDAVIT OF APPLICANT 24128
I, Bryan J, Brown, Kansas Licensed Attorney #
17634, United States Supreme Court admitted since
2001, admitted to practice before the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals and the federal court of the
Northern District of Indiana (2011, both), do
hereby affirm and attest the following as true and
correct, to the best of my knowledge:
I . This affidavit is sworn out in response to the
hearing set for this day and addresses only matters
incident to the hearing. I reference and re-affirm,
all previous affidavits in the record as well as the
Application that I filed incident to this attempt to
become a licensed Indiana attorney.
2.
This original notarized affidavit and five
copies is being delivered to my Rule 12, Section 9(f)retained counsel, Ben Bentrip [sic], for service upon
the Hearing Panel in my name, with the request
that this affidavit's content be read into the record
at the hearing and received as testimony at this
hearing.
3.
This affidavit was rendered advisable and
even necessary by a series of events and
developments incident to this hearing which
include, but is not limited to, those enumerated in
the following paragraphs.
As I prepared for this hearing, five areas of grave
concern came to light, areas which frustrated my

App. 81

ability to prepare to defend my character and

fitness and impeach the Board's mistaken decision
of September 19, 2014. Those concerns fall into five
categories:
Procedural Concerns
Substantive
Concerns - Witnesses Substantive Concerns Discovery Substantive
Concerns
-Relevance
Accountability and Record Concerns Each concern is
addressed in this briefing.
Procedural Concerns
a.
On April 22, 2015, the Hearing Panel
denied a motion to limit the government based upon
the operation of Rule 12, Section 9(b), to wit, "If, in
connection with said further inquiry, the State Board
of Law Examiners shall deem it advisable to hold a
hearing, the applicant or conditional admittee shall
be informed of the substance of the matter to be
inquired into by written notice served on the
applicant or conditional admittee by mailing such
notice to the applicant or conditional admittee at such
person's last known address as shown by the Board's
record by certified mail, return receipt requested, at
least ten ( 10) days before the date set for said
hearing."
b.
The Record for the hearing that was
delivered to Applicant on Friday, April 24 contains
new material representing issues not previously
brought to Applicant's attention, a seeming violation
of Section 9(b).
c.
On February 24, 2015, the Panel ruled
that "relaxed" rules of evidence, as set forth in the
2009 email of Chuck Kidd and utilized at the June 1,
2009 hearing, apply at the April 27, 2015 hearing.
These rules are unwritten and unknown.
d.
On February 24, 2015, the Panel rules
that no post-hearing motions of any kind would be
allowed. Only proposed findings of facts and

App. 82

conclusions of law will be allowed. This allows no post

hearing objections to admissions or denials as to
evidence adduced or procedures utilized.
e.
Applicant's application was clearly
denied on September 19, 2014.
f.
Applicant's application was somehow
reanimated on January 16, 2015, under a rule not
clearly evident on the face of Rule 12, Admission and
Discipline, only to then be denied for a second time on
February 17, 2015.
g.
Even though the fatal decision to deny
Applicant character and fitness certification was
made on September 19, 2014, thus ending his 2013
application, Applicant has repeatedly been informed
that the sole focus of the April 27, 2015 hearing is that
he currently "carries the burden at all times to prove
that he has the requisite character and fitness to be
admitted to the Indiana bar. This burden is misplaced
once the application has been denied. Such an
emphasis serves only to place the applicant in the
unenviable position of facing ethical charges, as
Board counsel has leveled, if Applicant alleges that it
was the government who erred in the previous
character and fitness assessment.
h.
Based upon Applicant's previous experience,
failing to agree with the Board as to the proper scope
and issues results in the allegation of a lack of
insight, which proved fatal to Applicant in 2009.
i.
For the above concerns regarding processing
and procedure Applicant is chilled and frustrated in
his ability to prepare for the April 27 hearing.
Substantive Concerns - Witnesses
a.
According to Rule 12, Section 9(f),
Applicant enjoys a right to subpoena witnesses and
documents.

App. 83

b.
According to Board Counsel, Applicant
24128 is the first bar applicant in Indiana history to
attempt to subpoena witnesses to the Panel hearing.
c.
On April 20, 2015, the Panel denied
Applicant the benefit of the subpoena duces tecum of
Dr. Stephen Ross, who, after testing Applicant using
three objective and powerful mental health
assessment tools, found Applicant sane and
admission worthy in 2008, a mere six years before the
Board demanded retesting of the Ross conclusions at
the Applicant's expense. Ross was likewise
considered a witness relevant to the Board's request
that Applicant turn himself over to the firm of Dr.
Jere Lieb, an allegedly close associate of Dr. Stephen
Ross.
d.
On April 20, 2015, the Panel denied
Applicant the benefit of the subpoena duces tecum of
Social Worker Tim Sudrovech of the Judges and
Lawyers Assistance Program, who supervised the
testing of Applicant under Dr. Ross, Dr. Elizabeth
Bowman, and by implication, Dr. William Alexy and
wrote reports on the aforementioned testing a mere
six years before the Board demanded retesting of the
Applicant. Sudrovech was likewise considered a
relevant witness to the question Applicant's sanity
due to the 2010 Bowman answers filed in federal
court alleging that Sudrovech was involved in
potentially fraudulent activity incident to the 2008
testing. Sudrovech was also considered potentially
relevant as a witness due to the Board's request
that Applicant turn himself over to the firm of Dr.
Jere Lieb, an allegedly close associate of Dr. Stephen
Ross.
e.
On April 20, 2015, the Panel denied
Applicant the benefit of the subpoena duces tecum
of Executive Director Terry Harrell of the Judges

App. 84

and Lawyers Assistance Program, who supervised

Sudrovech as he directed the testing of Applicant
under Dr. Ross, Dr. Elizabeth Bowman, and by
implication, Dr. William Alexy and as Surovech
wrote reports on the aforementioned testing a mere
six years before the Board demanded retesting of
the Applicant. Harrell was likewise considered a
relevant witness due to the Attorney General's
representations that she yet maintains ''three
boxes" of records of a highly sensitive and personal
nature as to Applicant 24128, without any
indication that such government surveillance has
abated. to the question Applicant's sanity due to the
2011 Bowman answers filed in federal court
alleging that Sudrovech was involved in
potentially fraudulent activity incident to the 2008
testing. Harrell was also considered potentially
relevant as a witness due to the Board's request
that Applicant turn himself over to the firms of
Drs. Jere Lieb or Dr. Bart Ferraro, allegedly close
associates of JLAP.
f.
On April 21, 2015, the Panel denied
Applicant the benefit of the subpoena duces tecum
of Dr. Elizabeth Bowman, who reviewed the testing
of psychologists Drs. Ross and William Alexy and
authored a report on both a mere six years before the
Board demanded retesting of the Applicant.
Bowman was likewise considered a relevant
witness due to her 2011 answers filed in federal
court alleging that she and Sudrovech was involved
in potentially fraudulent activity incident to the
2008 testing. Bowman was also considered
potentially relevant as a witness due to the Board's
request that Applicant repeat the testing of Ross
and Alexy. Bowman was also considered a relevant
witness due the allegations that Personality

App. 85

Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified was scrapped by

the DSM V as a political tool, and allegations that
she misused it when applying it to Applicant's
great disadvantage in 2008.
g.
Without these crucial fact and expert
witnesses Applicant was unable to prepare for the
April 27 hearing in a fashion that he deemed
informed or adequate.
Substantive Concerns - Discovery
a.
On or about March 16, 2015 Board
counsel served 18 requests for admission upon
Applicant pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 36.
b.
Applicant questioned the use of
discovery in this process and was informed that he
had the right to profound under Rules 26 - 37.
c.
Applicant did so upon the Board's
invitation, propounding under Rules 30, 33, 34 and
36.
d.
Applicant answered all 18 of the Rule
36 requests demanded of him.
e.
The Board's counsel sought a
protective order as to most all of Applicant's
discovery under Rule 26(c) without first engaging in
the process demanded by Rule 26(t).
f.
In that motion Board's counsel
accused Applicant of gross ethical violations, as well
as ignorance of the Rules governing discovery.
g.
The Hearing Panel refused to strike
this seemingly scandalous and untimely Rule 26(c)
motion.
h.
Applicant, in keeping with Rule 26(t),
recalled nearly 65% of his propounded discovery
after he initiated dialogue with the Rule 26 (c)-filing
counsel.
i.
Board counsel agreed that a

App. 86

subset of Applicant's requests for admission would

be helpful to Applicant in preparation for the April
27 hearing, and thus agreed to answer said RFA's.
j.
Those RFA's that Board counsel
agreed to answer are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
k.
The Hearing Panel ordered Board
counsel to answer none of the propounded discovery.
1.
Attached hereto are core questions
from the RFA's (Exhibit B), Interrogatories (Exhibit
C) and Rule 30(b)(6) (Exhibit D) notice that
Applicant needed to have to adequately prepare for
the April 27 hearing.
m. Without answers to this discovery Applicant
unable to prepare for the April 27 hearing
in a fashion that he deemed informed or adequate.
Substantive Concerns -Relevance
f.
Applicant was warned, as set forth in
the cover letter to his application, that his religion
would again be a focus of the processing in 2013.
g.
Applicant also brought forth serious
and substantial allegations of fraud on the Board in
his previous processing, as reported by JLAPappointed psychiatrist Elizabeth Bowman in her
federal answer filed in 2011 incident to Brown v.
Bowman.
h.
The Hearing Panel has accepted and
seemingly built upon the character and fitness
evaluation of Magistrate Lori K Morgan on the
question of belief.
i.
The Hearing Panel has never inquired
into the federal answer of Elizabeth Bowman.
j.
While the Hearing Panel adjudges all
inquiries incident to the Bowman issue irrelevant,
Board's attorney advances the idea that the very
same lawsuit is relevant evidence of Applicant's

App. 87

alleged propensity for frivolous litigation.

k.
While the Hearing Panel has not
disclaimed the Morgan report, it has refused a
simple instruction making this question from the
June 1, 2009 hearing off limits in April 27, 2015 "Do
you firmly believe you're obligated as a Christian to
put obedience to God's law above human law?"l
l.
While the Hearing Panel has not
disclaimed the concept that Applicant had a duty to
tender a psychological work up in 2014, it ignores
recent Indiana case law (finding 11 year old repots
sufficient to deny parole) when stating that the
psychological reports of psychologists Ross, Alexy,
and Sass and the psychiatrist reports of Drs.
Flueckiger and Bowman, and the social worker
report of Sudrovech are "stale" and "irrelevant" to any
questions at bar.
h. Given these pre-hearing rulings, Applicant was
unable to prepare for the April 27 hearing since his
best evidence had been ruled off limits before the
hearing.
Accountability and Record Concerns
m.
Government counsel leveled serious
allegations of ethical impropriety against Applicant
based upon Applicant's propounding of discovery and
citation to counsel's directions on procedures to be
used in preparation for the hearing in a motion for
protective order filed with the Board.
n.
Applicant moved to strike the document
containing those serious and substantial allegations
predicated on a misunderstanding, by government
counsel, of the operation of discovery and Rule 26(t).
The Panel refused to strike those allegations.
o.
Government counsel further voiced her
concern about a future conflict based upon

App. 88

Applicant's citation to government counsel's direction

as to the discovery and upcoming hearing, directives
very crucial since the government has repeatedly
departed from the text of Rule 12 in the processing of
Applicant.
p.
[]
q.
Applicant moved that the hearing be
videotaped to assure that the best evidence of tone,
manner and presentation were preserved in light of
Applicant's previous experiences with such a hearing
and the representations of government counsel. This
motion was denied.
r.
Applicant then moved that the hearing be
audio taped, at Applicant's expense, to assure that
the nearly best evidence of tone, manner and
presentation were preserved in light of Applicant's
previous experiences, which were presented on
motion. This motion was also denied.
s.
Applicant fears that without some
objective record to cabin discretion a bare transcript
can result in nonobjective weighing of intangibles
such as "civility" and "respect" in presentation style.
This fear chills Applicant in his rights under Rule 12,
Section 9(f) given his experience in 2009 and since
February, [2014]. [Material excerpted]
WHEREFORE ...
Given all of the above frustrations, chilling and
concerns, and Given the inability to prepare for the
Hearing due to the pre-emptive rulings against core
evidence and pre-determination that Applicant's lead
argument was irrelevant on its face, and Given Board
counsel's prior allegations against Applicant and
concerns for future disagreements on the record and
what she has stated on the record, and Given Board
counsel's stipulation of "no objection ... to Applicant

App. 89

not testifying" (Para 6, April 23, 2015 filing on

Board's behalf), and Given that the Board chose to not
subpoena Applicant as a witness, and Given that Rule
12, Section 9(f) allows Applicant to retain counsel and
be represented by counsel .... Applicant has retained
Ben Bentrip [ s i c ] to represent him as the hearing,
[Material excerpted] I certify, with testimonial
intent, that all averred on the preceding pages are,
to the best of my knowledge, true and correct, so
help me God. /s [Notarized]
[May 14, 2015]
BEFORE THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
In Re Applicant 24128
Post Rule 12, Section 9 Hearing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
RECOMMENDATIONS
Comes Now Applicant 24128, incident to the Hearing
Panels April 27, 2015 Order, to file his rendition of the
operative facts, justified conclusions, and reasonable
recommendations in light of the past eighteen months
of processing of Applicants motion to join the Indiana
bar. [Material excepted]
Of great potential consequence to the pending
application, on February 5, 2014, one week before my
meeting with the Board, the United States
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division released a
forty-five page letter (most of my bar letters are brief
by comparison). That formal letter is entitled The
United States Investigation of the Louisiana Attorney
Licensure System Pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, DJ No. 204-32M-60, 204_32-88,
204_32-89, available at http://www.ada.gov/louisianabar-lof.pdf

App. 90

[Material excepted]
An aggrieved party at an administrative hearing
seeking judicial relief [will succeed only upon a
showing of] prejudice by an agency action that is:
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(2) contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(4) without observance of procedure required by
law; or
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence.
Ind.Code 4-21.5-5-14(d). [Materials excerpted].
ERROR #1
The Boards September 19, 2014 decision (and
post-September attempts to defend the same) is
unsupported by substantial evidence
It appears that the only evidence that the Board
needed to justify its September 2014 denial was
communicated in Skolniks November 26, 2014 letter:
the evidence that you are unable or unwilling to
proceed with the updated psychological testing needed
by the Board to render a determination as to character
and fitness is not in dispute.
Thus the Board believed that the mere inability of an
applicant (suspected of harboring the wrong beliefs) to
shell out $4500 for psychological testing is adequate
grounds for denial, even after allowing said applicant
to sit for the bar exam. No investigation other than
financial wherewithal is necessary.
[Material
Excepted]
Some might argue that the Board had a duty to
investigate the 2013 application. Applicants counsel
made this argument on April 27, 2015, and drew the

App. 91

following rebuke from an Examiner:

3 MR. BENTRUP: I guess there's an implication
4 there. My understanding is that the Board
thoroughly
5 conducts an investigation of character and fitness
6 before ruling on an applicant's character and
7 fitness, [Material Excepted]
12 MS. SHRADER: I have no idea what you're
13 talking about, "investigations." Every applicant
14 that comes before the Board has a burden of proving
15 his or her character and fitness and the Board rules
16 based on the showing that any applicant has made,
17 that is the process under the rules. I have no idea
18 what you're talking about "investigations." P 42
[Material excerpted]
ERROR #2
The Boards September 19, 2014 decision (and
post-September attempts to defend the same) is
contrary to constitutional right
Magistrate Morgan failed to certify me due to her
concerns about my beliefs and loyalties. No other
reason is cited all else in her report is glowing.
C&F001-002.
While many other constitutional
infirmities could be analyzed, her January 8, 2014
report, standing alone, is sufficient to justify a finding
that the Board has erred. Grievously so.
Soon after the Morgan report, and against a
record that contained no evidence of concern other
than hers, I was informed that the Board would not
process my application until and unless I tendered, at
a great cost to my family, a full psychological workup,
-- a redo, if you will, of what I had suffered through,
and passed, in 2008.
Given what the Board had overlooked in 2008,
2009, 2011 and 2013, I declined to run that same

App. 92

statist gauntlet again.1 I rather informed the Board

1 In 2008 the Board overlooked the inquisitions of Drs. Ross

and Bowman, and in 2009 the work of Sudrovech and this

June 1, 2009 interrogation, where I was asked by the
government in an official court proceeding, in persistent
voice, My question is direct, is that correct do you
firmly believe that youre obligated as a Christian to
put obedience to Gods law above human law? Thats
my question to you? Is that assessment correct? The
question is is that assessment correct? C138 In 2011
the Board resisted my bid to re-open and re-visit the five
year ban in light of the federal answer of Bowman. In 2013
the Board seemingly ignored my whistleblowing in the
application, and, at the February 11, 2014 hearing, one
Examiner asked me to re-affirm this erroneous statement
from the 2009 BLE Order: Based upon extensive testing
and interviewing by mental health professionals, the
Applicant was determined to have a personality disorder
with narcissistic and obsessive traits that are
unacknowledged and unmanaged by the Applicant. P. 31.
Lest government counsel allege that I am wrongly pulling the
2009 experience into the 2013 processing, merely consider
this reputation shredding argument from counsel at the
April 27, 2015 hearing, p. 61-62.
24And, of course, the big [misstatement of Applicants
counsel]
25 one is that Mr. Brown did not pass prior
psychological evaluations, they showed real concern.
2 But all of that is really moot because what we have
3 here is the current application, where, on good
4 grounds, the Board asked for him to give a
5 psychological testing that is updated and he has
6 utterly refused to do so without any good cause.
The astute reader will note that Board counsel did not state
what good cause supported the request that Applicant
24128 tender a $4000 psych exam in May, 2014. I have
checked the total record and find no document detailing

App. 93

that they lacked the legal ground to so act against me.

At that point I became a bird of the feather with the
putative Marxist Sara Baird. [ ] Baird v. State
Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 3, 91 S. Ct. 702, 706-07, 27 L.
Ed. 2d 639 (1971). [Constitutional arguments
excepted]
It is interesting to compare these civil war oaths
to the culture war oath that was demanded of me in
20092 - an oath which I, in refusing to so pledge, called
that good cause. I suspect that the good cause boils down to
because the State told him to good cause, requested after
our Executive Director publicly pledged to uphold the ADA
in light of the DOJs February 5, 2014 Louisiana letter.
Unless this mental health disorder is my Evangelicallyexpressed Christian faith and that argument can be built
on the face of the Sudrovech and Bowman reports, see C049050 the Board holds no such evidence, and especially in
the wake of Bowmans federal court filing alleging fraud
against Sudrovech and after Bowman admitted to filing a
false report herself. See A058 -073. What the Examiners
have done, in effect, is order me to admit that I am mentally
ill (against a dearth of evidence supporting that allegation,
and much evidence supporting the notion that I am not
mentally ill, see A051, A054, A057, A074, C079-095), with
the test being that if I resist that is proof of my narcissism
and obsession. I choose to resist anyway, and must, with all
due respect, inform the state that constitutional resistance
is not, ipsi dixit, proof of mental illness, no matter what the
Boards mental health advisors (who do not deal with
constitutional law attorneys enough) might claim. And, for
the record, I still firmly believe that I am obligated as
a Christian to put obedience to Gods law above
human law in certain circumstances. I am well positioned
in Kansas and prepared to revisit Mr. Summers case.
2 [Applicant 24128] testified at the hearing to his obligation
to disobey laws that contradicted his religious beliefs
under certain circumstances. The Hearing Panel

App. 94

down upon myself Magistrate Morgans inability to

certify in 2014. [Constitutional arguments excepted]
Magistrate Morgan failed to certify me for a law
license due to her on the record concerns about my
beliefs and loyalties. While many other constitutional
infirmities could be located in the processing of my
2013 application and the 2007-09 processing (given the
Boards admission of its continued relevance to my
current denial) the Morgan denial, standing alone,
suffices to open the door to constitutional analysis of
great moment. These facts present a rare opportunity
to the Indiana High Court.
ERROR #3
The Boards September 19, 2014 decision (and
post-September attempts to defend the same)
violates procedures required by law [Material
Excepted]
The Indiana Supreme Court has defined the objective
procedures that it wants the Board to utilize to
evaluate bar applicants. [ ] Rule 12 contains the
procedures to be utilized by the Examiner while
evaluating the applicant and the applicants
application. [Material Excepted]

believes that a member of the Indiana bar must obey

Indiana law and federal law, even when doing so
violates an attorneys conscience, and that an avowed
willingness not to do so is disqualifying. 2009 BLE
Order, pp. 29-30. I would be happy to edit this
paragraph into a test oath and submit it if that would
move my application forward at this time. I would
simply affirm the first clause, and brief the second
clause in the hope of rescuing this Honorable Board from
the throes of German Positivism, circa 1941.

App. 95

Finally, we must keep in mind the general principle

that if the State imparts a due process right, then it
must give that right. A.P. v. Porter County, 734 N.E.2d
at 1112. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011)
(But see Appeal 045-053) [Material excepted]
5 JUDGE BRUGNAUX: In fact, there is a
motion
6 or an order, rather, clarifying that, I
believe that
7 was in the last order of April 24th
clarifying it.
8 Technically this is not an appeal.
[ ]
18 MS. RODEHEFFER: Yeah, labeling it
"Appeal"
19 is not an argument -20 JUDGE BRUGNAUX: We've fallen into an
21 informal but bad practice.
Hearing transcript, pp. 4-5.
The Boards misapprehension as to the proper focus of
the Section 9 hearing was one of the reasons that I
did not attend the April 27, 2015 hearing, as was
explained in the affidavit that I submitted in lieu of
attendance. While Board counsel has expressed
grave concerns about both my use of discovery and
motion practice before the Hearing Panel, I believe
this admission by Judge Brugnaux recommends that
I be thanked for bringing needed clarity to applicant
processing.
ERROR #4
The Boards September 19, 2014 decision (and
post-September attempts to defend the same) is
arbitrary and capricious, and thus constitutes
an abuse of discretion. [Material excepted]
An arbitrary and capricious decision is one which is
patently unreasonable and is made without

App. 96

consideration of the facts and in total disregard of the

circumstances and lacks any basis which might lead a
reasonable person to the same conclusion. City of
Indianapolis v. Woods, 703 N.E.2d 1087, 1091
(Ind.Ct.App.1998). An act that is willful and
unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard
of the facts or circumstances in the case is rightly
dubbed arbitrary and capricious. State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs v. South Shore Marina 422 N.E.2d 723, 727
(Ind.App.,1981).
In this section I focus upon actions of the Board
between 2013 and 2015 that are not presented infra or
supra but which are alleged to be either arbitrary or
capricious.
a.
Arbitrary actions of the Board
According to State ex rel. Indiana Dep't of Conservation
v. Barber, 246 Ind. 30, 37-38, 200 N.E.2d 638, 641-42
(1964), arbitrary acts are those lacking adequate
determining principle or reasoned judgment;
depending on the will alone; or not governed by any
fixed rules or standard.
Fixed rules and standard are usually considered the
condicio sine qua non of due process: The usual due
process constraint is that courts cannot abandon
settled principles. [citations omitted] Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
560 U.S. 702, 738, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2615-16 (2010)
Kennedy, J. concurring, jointed by Sotomayer, J.
The following acts are alleged to have been arbitrary
on the part of the 2013-15 Board:
1.
Refusal of the Board to be bound by counsel:
[Material excepted]
2.
[T]he Hearing Panel back pedaled away from
counsel and refused to honor counsels offer:
[Material excepted]

App. 97

3.
[ ] I did not receive the Morgan evaluation until
late February, 2015, and that only due to the grace of
government counsel in a most arbitrary fashion. [ ]
4.
Government counsel came right out and stated
that rather than follow the subpoena policy of Section
9, or the subpoena policy that I documented from 2009,
she had decided it better to borrow policy from Rule
23 governing attorney discipline. Appeal 035
5.
Government counsel found a right to discovery
in Rule 12 where none exists, and, when asked,
referenced agency law that clearly states that judicial
boards are exempt. Appeal 046-053, 057-060 It was
quite clear that the government was making rules on
the go, as I noted at C172, 179, 194, 197.
b.
Capricious actions of the Board
According to State ex rel. Indiana Dep't of Conservation
v. Barber, 246 Ind. 30, 37-38, 200 N.E.2d 638, 641-42
(1964), acting capriciously is according to whim or
fancy, tyrannical, despotic. Without fair, solid, and
substantial cause; that is, without cause based upon
the law. I believe that my status as a whistleblower
who was asking the Board to review the alleged fraud
on the court evidence contained in Dr. Elizabeth
Bowmans federally filed admissions brought on a
capricious response to my 2013 application.
1.
Early in the Section 9 process I was threatened.
I was told that subpoenaing those witnesses who could
best prove my fitness in the face of the governments
allegations that I was unfit would show lack of
character. Appeal 017 (A classic Catch-22, often the
hallmark of arbitrary or capricious governance.)
2.
The government propounded admissions on me,
and then invited me into a discovery process. Upon my
acceptance of that invitation government counsel
accused me of scathing ethical allegations for seeking
information necessary to defend my fitness. Appeal

App. 98

119-131 (but especially 124, n.1, going to the ultimate

issue in a Rule 26(c) motion that was filed outside of
the rules itself.) See also Appeal 196-198.3
3.
The Board has refused to acknowledge repeated
calls for civil rights investigation, including the March
2, 2015 letter (which is not included in the record,
despite an agreement that all letters to Skolnik be
included) the October, 2014 original action filing, the
February Race and Gender Fairness filing and notes in
letters requesting as much. Appeal 023. When pressed
the government claimed that it had no duty to
investigate civil rights complaints. C161. [ ]
4.
All my discovery was quashed but not until I
first answered all propounded by the government,
without objection. All of my discovery was quashed
even after Board counsel stipulated that I would
benefit, as an applicant pending a Section 9 hearing,
from receiving responses to a subset of the requests for
admission. The Hearing Panel overruled its counsel
after annulling counsels stipulation. Appeal 255, 370.
5.
All witnesses incident to Application Question
23 and the question of fitness were quashed in the face
of much evidence of their relevance. See relevance
presentations at Appeal 064 072, 209, 211, 220 223,
273-281, 410, 445-448.4
3 Another Catch-22, this one potentially lethal to both my
pending Indiana application and my now 18 year old
Kansas license, as well as my current employment.
(The allegations are abuse of process leveled by a high
ranking attorney of the Indiana Supreme Court.) I
have repeatedly asked government counsel that these
allegations be either better defined or recalled, and
have been told that any further discussion of the
ethical allegations would be inappropriate.
4 Dr. Bowman was especially relevant, due to her review
of the reports of Ross and Alexy, her own DSM V

App. 99

6.
I was denied the protection of a video recording,
and then sought merely an audio recording [ ] My
request for an audio recording at my cost was denied.
7.
My motion in limine asking that the religious
and progressivist questions asked of me in 2008-09
(and duly noted by the Seventh Circuit, C052, n.8) not
be again asked was denied, Appeal 432, April 24 Order,
causing me to believe that I could be asked those
questions once more, as I have been warned by a JLAPinsider. C007-09, A003.
8.
Due to the quashing of all my witnesses as to the
question of my fitness, and the quashing of all
discovery, and given government counsels tender of
baseless allegations of perjury and ethical impropriety,
and for other reasons enumerated in my affidavit, I
determined it best to not attend the April 27, 2015
hearing (other than through counsel). I tendered an
affidavit presenting a reasoned argument as to why I
did not attend the hearing. That affidavit further
bolsters this analysis of capricious acts. It is my
understanding that this affidavit was denied as an
exhibit and thus not received into evidence at the April
27, 2015 hearing for reasons unknown.
Conclusion of Arbitrary and Capricious Analysis
I believe that an honest review of the record could
cause one to conclude that the most concise reason
Applicant 242128 is not an Indiana licensed attorney
today could be communicated by at least one of the
following adjectives: A Board lacking in adequate
questioned diagnosis, her 2011 federal admissions
alleging fraud against Sudrovech and admitting to
misrepresentation on her part, and the Boards great
use of her questionable report. See 2009 BLE Order,
pp 13 18, 25 26, 30 -32

App. 100

determining principles or reasoned judgment; a Board

that rules depending on the subjectivist will alone; A
Board without fair, solid, and substantial cause; A
Board lacking cause based upon the law; A Board
whose decisions are not governed by any fixed rules or
standards; A Board given to whim or fancy. I will not
push my luck by using the final two terms in such a
hypothetical sentence: tyrannical, despotic.
If true that any one of the aforementioned adjective
phrases fit the above facts, then a fatal dose of abuse
of discretion has been documented in the 2013
processing of Applicant 24128. [ ]
ERROR #5
The Boards September 19, 2014 decision (and
post-September attempts to defend the same) is
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right
[Material excepted]
While I believe that the above request (which was, in
fact, a poorly communicated demand) violated all of
the afore-briefed law, and was an arbitrary, capricious
and ultra vires act lacking factual or legal predicate,
the most serious and substantial claim that can be
raised against the May 27, 2014 request, (especially
in light of Skolniks media statement two months prior
to its tender to a pending applicant accused of mental
illness) is the Department of Justices investigation
into Louisianas bar application practices in light of
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. 12132 et seq.
According to the DOJ,
Pursuant to Congressional directive, the
Department has issue[d] several regulatory
provisions that govern the Courts policies and
practices for attorney licensure. A public
entity may not directly or through contractual

App. 101

or other arrangements, utilize criteria or

methods of administration that have the effect
of subjecting qualified individuals with
disabilities to discrimination on the basis of
the disability.
Persons with disabilities
include those who do not actually have a
disability, but who are misclassified or
regarded as having a disability by a public
entity and thus faces limitations due to the
attitudes of others toward the impairment. 42
USC 12102. One so regarded has a claim to
advance under the ADA if he faces
discrimination based upon mere speculation,
stereotypes,
or
generalizations
about
individuals with disabilities. 28 CFR
35.130(h). Emphasis added.
Rather than focus on a strict legal briefing, I will
borrow heavily from the DOJs Louisiana letter, for it
has much applicability to what the Board and JLAP
have been doing in Indiana since 2008, at least as far
as my processing reveals.
Judge Brugnaux noted that my status as a returning
bar applicant ensured that I would appear before the
Board, and not just before Magistrate Morgan. After
my off-the-record interview with the Board I was
requested to tender a full psychological workup with
no explanation as to why, and to sign releases allowing
all Examiners, regardless of training or experience, to
view my raw reports. The DOJ believes that such
decrees based upon an applicants status as a person
with a mental health diagnoses do not serve the
Courts worthy goal of identifying unfit applicants, are
in fact counterproductive to ensuring that attorneys
are fit to practice, and violate the standards of
applicable civil rights laws. DOJ Letter, pp.1-2. I
certainly agreed, which explains the federal civil rights

App. 102

litigation filed on December 8, 2009.

The DOJ lists six areas in which the Louisiana
authorities discriminate against individuals on the
basis of disability, in violation of the ADA. I can
document five of those six in the record of my 2013
application processing, to wit: (2) requesting
burdensome supplemental investigations triggered by
status as revealed during screening; (3) making
discriminatory decisions based on stereotypes; (4)
imposing financial burdens due to disabilities; (5)
failing to provide for confidentiality;5 (6) implementing
burdensome, intrusive, and unnecessary conditions on
admission that are improperly based on individuals
mental health diagnoses or treatment. DOJ Letter,
p.2.
(2) requesting burdensome supplemental
investigations triggered by status as revealed
during screening;
The conduct/diagnosis problem much troubles the
DOJ, to wit:
In several instances, the only
justification given by the Admission Committee to the
applicant for its decision to conduct further
investigations was the applicants diagnosis, rather
than any problematic conduct by the applicant. DOJ
Letter, p. 7. In the facts at bar, the Board cites no
conduct, and denied the application, based upon a
controverted personality disorder that is in the
5 The DOJ also faults Louisiana for mandating that
Committee members be granted access to notes of an
extremely personal nature which seem to include the
raw testing data demanded of me. Like the situation
in Indiana, see my processing in both 2008 and 2014,
failure to comply with all requests is counted as
grounds for denial. 2009 BLE Order, para 39, 46, 47;
C063, C075, C132.

App. 103

process of being purged from the DSM V. A063-066

Both the 2009 BLE Order and the present processing
run far afoul of the Louisiana letter.6
(3) making discriminatory decisions based on
stereotypes;
The DOJ faults Louisiana for recommending five year
conditional admissions based upon a mere diagnosis,
that is, a persons alleged mental health status or
label. DOJ, p. 11. One can only wonder what the DOJ
would make of a denial and five year ban from reapplication based on a controverted diagnosis? Or a
ban that lasts as long as an applicant with an alleged
diagnosis (but no bad conduct) refuses to be rediagnosed under the DSM V (since his DSM IV
diagnosis was scrapped as junk science).7
After reviewing many fact patterns less egregious than
my own, the DOJ concluded that when states
predicated even mere further inquiry on the nature
of the diagnosis, that impermissible stereotyping has
taken place -- bias of the kind that is prohibited by the
ADA. DOJ. p. 26.
If Louisianas practices violated the ADA, then what I
6 The text at footnote 23 of the DOJ report closely tracks
the process at bar. Based only upon a diagnosis (in
that case of Bi-Polar Disorder), further inquiry will be
necessary in order to make an appropriate assessment
regarding ... fitness. DOJ, p. 8. If this is a violation
of the ADA, how much more the request served upon
Applicant 24128 in 2014 and the mandated processing
of 2008?
7 See Sudrovech & Bowman analysis in Application, A058073, the core of my whistleblower claim of 2013. I
believe that the subsequent cover-up of that claim has
granted me whistleblower status in 2014 and 2015, as
this report attempts to communicate to the proper
authorities.

App. 104

have documented in both 2008-09 and 2014-15 may

have set a record for ADA violations.
(4) imposing financial burdens due to
disabilities;
When it comes to expenditures, Indiana tops Louisiana
by far. I forked out nearly $4500 in 2008, and when I
used that figure repeatedly in 2014, the Board neither
flinched nor corrected me. The Board was fine with me
absorbing that cost in 2008, though unemployed, and
denied me in September 2014 for unwillingness to take
the hit once again, a mere six years later, again while
unemployed. Looking back in 2015, Skolnik wrote,
You have steadfastly represented that you do not have
the financial wherewithal to pay for the costs of the
independent psychological evaluation required by the
Board. C205. True that, and on September 19, 2014
the Board counted that steadfast poverty as the hatch
to use to push me out of the bar applicant queue. C132.
The DOJ found it troubling that Louisiana bar
applicants were forced to pay out $560 and $800. DOJ,
p.8. Had I complied as demanded of me throughout
2014, my out-of-pockets would have been ten times as
much.
(5) failing to provide for confidentiality;
I questioned why the full board needed to review my
raw psychological reports, especially since most on
the Board boasted no credentials recommending them
as diagnosticians. See quashed discovery, Appeal 171172. The only Examiner with such credentials seemed
to argue at the hearing that getting him that data was
worth any privacy invasion due to his concerns that the
Boards hand-picked psychologist just might turn out
to be malevolent quite an admission in and of itself.
My own similar questioning [of] the integrity of the
[governments] evaluation process and seeking out a
second
(nongovernment
psychiatriast)
opinion

App. 105

seemingly brought on denial and a five year

banishment. See 2009 BLE Order, pp.13, 16-18, 25-26,
30. [Material excepted]
(6) implementing burdensome, intrusive, and
unnecessary conditions on admission that are
improperly based on individuals mental health
diagnoses or treatment.
The DOJ found Louisiana in violation of the ADA for
recommending conditional admission for applicants
with mental health diagnoses who have not engaged in
any conduct indicating that they are unfit to practice
law. DOJ Letter, p. 4. Yet Indiana has been found, in
this instance, recommending conditional [denial] for
[an] applicant [regarded as having a] mental health
diagnoses who [has] not engaged in any conduct
indicating that [he is] unfit to practice law, [and who
has, in fact, been doing just that, practicing law, with
much success, since 1996].
The DOJ found it troubling that [e]ven when
applicants have demonstrated their ability to practice
law successfully in other jurisdictions without
oversight,
the
Admissions
Committee
has
recommended that they be conditionally admitted
based on their mental health diagnosis. DOJ. P.10.
How much more egregious my situation, where I was
not admitted conditionally, I was denied admission,
albeit conditionally and this, six months after the
Board agreed to abide by the ADA while publicly
commenting on the Louisiana investigation.
By contrast, the DOJ intones, others who
have engaged in substantial misconduct relevant to
their practice of law and some who have even
committed felonies have been admitted to the
Louisiana bar without any condition or oversight
whatsoever. DOJ, p. 10. This is exactly the point that
I was making in my February 14, 2014 letter, received

App. 106

by the BLE about the same time that they would have
received a copy of the DOJs February 5, 2014 letter.
Yet not having access to the cleared files, as the DOJ
did, I could not press this point with the verve that the
DOJ did and could, were they invited to scrutinize
the Indiana system as they did the Louisiana system.
Showing much more compassion than the Board, the
DOJ notes that which Applicant 24128 has put before
this Board repeatedly: Attorneys whose conditional
admission is predicated on mental health diagnosis
have experienced professional difficulties. DOJ, p. 16.
I borrowed $30,000 gaining a Master of Science degree
in a highly specialized field and expected, based upon
my knowledge of the governing law, that my 2013
application would be viewed a prima facia case of
character and fitness and I would be entering the
Kosciusko County workforce as a licensed attorney in
2014. Many others, especially my managerial and
legal contacts in the medical device field, expected the
same. When the Board damned my application for
mental health reason, it pretty much laid my Master
degree to waste as well. I am left only with the loan to
pay and little hope of gainful employment due to the
very stigma that the DOJ reports. [Material excepted]
Speaking to public policy concerns in light of the
serious allegations of professional malfeasance
leveled above, I believe that this Boards overarching
problem may be that it has historically taken too
much upon itself. The bar of the Indiana Supreme
Court is not, contrary to what this Honorable Board
seems to assume, a guild system which only the most
desirable, ideologically acceptable or otherwise
obeisant might enter.
The Baird Court re-affirmed a concept that I believe
this Board must internalize. The Highest Court
(which this Board seems to resist, but see 2009 BLE

App. 107

Order, p. 31) built upon a case older than me,

Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam. of State of N.M., 353
U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957), and a case as old as the War
between the States, Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333,
18 L.Ed. 366 (1867), using a likely Marxist (who was
politically incorrect at the time) and former Johnnie
Reb (who was politically incorrect at the time) to
enshrine this Board-discounted principle into
American law:
The practice of law is not a matter of grace,
but of right for one who is qualified by his
learning and his moral character.
I seek not this Boards friendship, nor its tolerance,
nor its blessing. I am too politically incorrect to ever
expect such kindness from inside the system. I seek
only to practice my craft as a slaughter[er] of sacred
cattle, which I most enjoy when I am pleading
constitutional cases against overreaching government
actors -- for paying clients. See June 1, 2009
transcript at 228-239 (my defense of my own
character and fitness and experience at law, yet
relevant six years on).8 I am the kind of attorney

8 Board counsels rejoinder to all of this, and to the

denial of my 2013 application, will likely be the
accusation that I write too much, and too often, and
that my discovery was over the top, and that I filed
too many motions, and that I filed a civil rights case
in 2009, and that I appealed the former denial to
the United States Supreme Court, and that I asked
the Indiana Supreme Court, in 2011, halfway
through my five year banishment, to reconsider in
light of the Bowman admission. (See governments
requests for admission, Appeal 233-249, April 27,
2015 transcript, p. 62:
12 I have a lot of other grave concerns about

App. 108

that sues governments and government agents, as I

openly confessed in my former hearing. There is a
13 the motions, I think this speaks for itself that in
a
14 Board of Law Examiners hearing we have this
much
15 volume of pleadings, history, the incredible
amount
16 of motions that have gone on in this cause.
Consider: The State is, for the most part, unlimited in
resources.
Denied applicants are usually
nonattorneys and poor. They usually lack the skills
to put up much of a struggle, and soon discover that
Indianapolis counsel willing to fight for their
admission believe that they deserve $400 an hour to
do so. That does not buy much fight, it instead
purchases surrender on terms favorable to the
Board. Thus the Board rarely pushes an applicant
out of queue who can push back. Indeed, Board
counsel informed me that I was the only applicant to
ever, in the 80 year history of the BLE, request
subpoenas under Section 9. And I have done so twice
such an honor. Constitutional litigation is my
passion, it is in my blood. I descend from American
patriots who have defended our Republics from
enemies foreign and domestic I am on the domestic
front. Rather than allow Board counsel to complain
about the amount of words of my arguments, or
number of times I wrote over the eighteen months
that the Board has held me captive, or my use of
standard litigation motions in a bid to prove myself
fit to litigate, I would ask that Board counsel identify
any frivolity in my arguments, addressing
substance, not mere size or count. I must also
caution that claims that my past litigation filings
were frivolous, when no party so moved and no court
so found, could be considered unethical -- and
certainly should be counted as unprofessional.

App. 109

place at table, and at bar, for those of my ilk -- even if

this Honorable Board thinks otherwise.
I seek neither this Boards grace, nor its "noblesse
oblige." I seek only the application of the due process
of the law, both procedural and substantive. Both
have been denied me by this Honorable Board.
I now pray for both, as well as just compensation for
the official mistreatment that I have suffered due to
this Boards seeming dereliction of constitutional and
statutory duties.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO
APPLICANT 24128
1. Recall the September 19, 2014 denial.
2. Certify Applicant 24128 as possessing good
moral character and sufficient fitness to be
licensed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
3. Pay compensatory damages to Applicant 24128
since he was subjected to discrimination during
the bar application process.
Applicant 24128 seeks compensation for his year
delay in certification in light of the ADA and against
the following pledge from the organic document
founding the Indiana Supreme Court:
Section 12. All courts shall be open; and every
person, for injury done to him in his person, property,
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.
Justice shall be administered freely, and without
purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily,
and without delay.
For injury done to his property, to wit, his
professional standing and right to practice his chosen
profession, and for injury done to his reputation, to
wit, the harm visited upon Applicant when he was
not able, after April 29, 2014, to market himself as an
Indiana attorney, there must be a remedy at law.

App. 110

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

STATE OF INDIANA ON THE RELATION OF
BRYAN J. BROWN, v. THE BOARD OF LAW
EXAMINERS
Amended Petition for Review
Pursuant to Adm & Disc. Rule 142
Filed August 13, 2015
[Materials excerpted]
Overarching Issue as to errors of law
Did the Indiana Board of Law Examiners look with
such an evil eye as toward a whistleblowers ideology
while working an unequal hand toward minorityviewpoint and rights of conscience while processing
Petitioners bar application against an allegedly
arbitrary standard lacking in fundamental
fairness as to violate the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as
well as the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
of the First Amendment as well as Rules of the
Indiana Supreme Court, and the Indiana Bill of
Rights [Materials excerpted]
Abbreviated Summary of the Applicants
Argument (Statement)
After failing to recognize a prima facia case of good
moral character and fitness fully meeting the burden
of Rule 12 2, the Examiners processed the
application in a fashion which was:
(1) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law;
(2) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity;
(3) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right;
(4) Without observance of procedure required by law;
and/or
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence.

App. 111

The Examiners July 17, 2015 filing continues this

mode of processing, as is revealed by factual and
legal analysis herein.
Abbreviated Statement of the Case
Application filed November 13, 2013. Applicant
reviewed by character and fitness member January 8,
2014. Applicant appeared before Board as ordered,
February 13, 2014. Applicant approved for and
passed bar exam, sat February 25 & 26, 2014, notified
he passed April 27, 2014. Applicant then requested
to tender psychological report to Board on May 20,
2014. Applicant refused and raised constitutional,
prudential and financial objections. Board denied
admission pursuant to Rule 12 6, September 22,
2014. Applicant filed for hearing pursuant to Rule 12
7, October 21, 2014. Board noticed matter for Rule
12 8 processing November 26, 2014.
Board
attempted to re-animate denied application January
20, 2015 and invited Applicant to tender psychological
report under more favorable financial terms.
Applicant refused and raised constitutional and
prudential objections. Board set for Rule 12 9
hearing three weeks out. Applicant moved for
continuance March 10, 2015. Board set for April 27,
2015 hearing, which was had. Applicant filed
proposed findings May 14, 2015. Board counsel filed
proposed findings June 9, 2015. Board filed Final
Report denying certification and recommending
lifelong ban on re-application on July 17, 2015.
Petition to this Court filed August 13, 2015; Amended
petition allowed to be filed by September 2, 2015.
STATEMENT: Constitutional Issues
VIOLATION OF LAW ALLEGED (Federal Const)
First Amendment:
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection)
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process)

App. 112

Appendix: S.C.R. 14(vi)

June 23, 2014
Indiana State Board of Law Examiners
Re:
Response by applicant Bryan John Brown to
May 27, 2014 Letter from the Board
Board of Law Examiners,
Executive Director Bradley Skolnik's May 27,
2014 letter informed me that, "After careful and
deliberate consideration, the Board voted to request
that Mr. Brown obtain updated psychological testing
from ... Psychological Services Associates, Inc." I write
to briefly respond to this request and to suggest
viable alternatives.
Please
realize
that
if
this
request
communicates a legally binding condition precedent
then it constitutes a bar to my admission to the
practice of law in Indiana. I simply do not have the
financial resources to pay for additional psychological
testing. I am nearly indigent due to my inability to
obtain gainful employment over the past years.
Attached to this correspondence find my tax records
for the past years, my return from 2013, a loan
deferment and a recent bank statement.
The harsh economic truth communicated by
these documents is that my family has lived on
student loans and retirement savings rather than
income the past year. I will tender more details on
my present economic situation upon request.
Using the cost that I had to pay out for very
thorough psychological testing during my 2008
experience for guidance, I project
that the
psychological testing the Board now requests would
cost in excess of
$4,000. This is about 15 times Indiana's bar
application fee. These are funds that I simply do not

App. 113

now have and am unlikely to have in the near future

given my present "under employed" status.
I thus appeal to the Board of Law Examiners to
help me find an affordable path to certification.
Toward that goal, I humbly submit that my
pending application amply documents my good moral
character and fitness for practice, precluding the
need for further psychological testing. I submit that
an unbiased reading of my former testing (both
psychological and psychiatric) reveals no grounds on
which to predicate supplemental testing. I further
submit that neither the record nor case law supports
the notion that the 2008 testing is "stale." A portion
of my analysis as to this question was tendered with
my November bar application. I have drafted further
analysis of that former testing and the evaluation
process that I would gladly tender to the Board upon
the Board's request.
My record with the Board contains numerous
mental health opinions vouchsafing both my good
moral character and my mental fitness for the
practice of law, as well as an absence of any
properly-framed clinical diagnoses to the contrary
(discounting opinions predicated upon fraud or open
disagreement with my beliefs, empathies, ideology
and/or viewpoint). My recent Master's degree in
clinical management allows me to speak to the issue
of properly-framed clinical practice with some level of
expertise.
In addition, I respectfully submit that a battery
of additional psychological testing of such an intrusive
and subjectivist manner is not warranted in the
context of the bar admission of a licensed practitioner
lacking any felony arrests (ever) or any misdemeanor
convictions (nor even arrests) in the past 22 years.
(Those previous arrests (and a few convictions with

App. 114

fines) arising in the context of religiously-motivated

and arguably constitutionally-protected civil rights
protests nearly a quarter century ago.) The above
offered "further analysis" would address these
principled objections as well, and especially as they
relate to my processing through the Judges and
Lawyers' Assistance Program from January 25, 2008
to January 22, 2009.
As for the question of my current functioning,
please see my two page cover letter to my November
application, the timeline referenced in it, and my
vocational updates on February 14 and April 1, 2014.
It was my intent to present therein my activities over
the past years. Those accomplishments reveal my
current level of functioning as I "pended" the five years
as ordered, as well as my claim to whistleblower status
arising out of my status as a Kansas-licensed attorney.
Again, I would submit more on this subject if the Board
were interested, but am attempting to keep my
correspondence succinct and directly on point. (While
offering viable alternatives to my family laying out
$4,000 we simply do not have.)
More than seven years has now elapsed since
my 2007 application; more than seven months since
my 2013 application. I yet stand prepared to take the
oath of attorneys (without exception or caveat) binding
me to the faithful execution of all laws as an officer of
the Indiana court. I have never been disciplined by the
Kansas or federal authorities in my nearly 18 years of
practice in good standing in the Kansas bar and before
federal courts across the country. I have furthermore
submitted numerous statements of recommendation
(including recent statements from Indiana attorneys
and judges). I have compiled an inventory of those
witnesses and statements, and would gladly set forth
that prima facie case (as I understand the law) as to

App. 115

my character and fitness if requested to do so by the

Board.
I hope that my November 2013 application and
the letters answering the questions raised on February
13, 2014 have provided adequate and sufficient
responses to all of the Board's inquiries. It is my goal
to approach the Board in full candor, since such is the
standard set upon me by the Rules governing this
process. The bar application mandated that I disclose
all prior interactions with mental health authorities
and explain, in detail (using supplemental pages), any
past instance in which I was denied "good moral
character" or "fitness to practice law." I reasonably
feared that any response lacking full candor ( i.e.,
complete transparency) could doom my application,
since (by my study) "lack of candor" is the most
common reason for which applicants are denied. Ifany
believe that I have been insufficiently forthcoming
then I would gladly tender more analysis on most any
subject of the Board's choosing.
It is my hope that the record that I have already
filed with this Honorable Board (supplemented as
needed with the additional materials offered above)
affords the foundation for certification in this
instance. I remain hopeful that I can add an Indiana
license to my recent Master's degree and thus escape
the reputational fall-out and economic hardships
currently impacting my family and career at law.
Thank you for your service to the Indiana Court and
Constitution,
/s Bryan J. Brown

App. 116

November 15, 2013

Indiana State Board of Law Examiners
Stamped received by Board: Nov 18, 2013
Re:
Applicant Bryan John Brown
Board of Law Examiners,
Thank you for your service to the State of
Indiana and especially as it now falls upon you to
reconsider my renewed bid to become a licensed
attorney of the State of Indiana. I have served my
five year sentence decreed in the September 25,
2009 order that was upheld by the Indiana
Supreme Court on November 16, 2009 and then
denied review by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
[Material excerpted]
The second weakness is hopefully remedied
by me offering more letters than are asked of me.
Find attached recent letters from Indiana
attorneys As for additional attorney evaluations,
please note t hat my previous files contain more
than a dozen, as well as many elected office holders.
I have stayed quite busy in the years since I
was denied character and fitness certification bv this
august board.
The highlights of my activities
include:
1.
A petition to the SCOTUS seeking review
of the previous denial, which was served on the
Board and should be available in your records. My
briefing in that document, as well as my briefing to
the Indiana Supreme Court, reveals my level of
discontent with the Board's September 16, 2009
order should such a review be of interest.1 A
1 I advanced the argument, on brief, that I should have
enjoyed a presumption of good moral character and fitness
given my eleven years of successful lawyering under a Kansas

App. 117

portion of the petition for cert is posted here:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/
109518279/Brownvind-S-ct-BoardLawExams
2.
A civil rights case filed against the Judges
and Lawyers Assistance Program and its associated
agents. The complaint, which was verified, is
posted
here:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/23961843/Brown-vBowman-complaint- l 2-09
3.
The above case was taken from the District
Court to the Seventh Circuit, to Seventh en banc,
to a petition for certiorari before the SCOTUS. The
latter
document
can
be
reviewed
here:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/ l 06665469/Briefinchiefbrown-brown-l l - l 456-PDF
4.
Both the Seventh Circuit and the District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana admitted
me to practice after reading the civil lawsuit and its
ancillary submissions, which included the 31 page
report of this Board.
5.
I also taught 450 students in thirteen
separate sect ions (classes) over four semesters at
the University of Saint Francis between 2010-2013.
6.
The Diocese of Fort Wayne/South Bend
cleared me to substitute teach in their school
system, which included a background check of my
criminal record.
7.
I was admitted to the Grace College Masters
of Science program in Orthopedic Regulatory and
Clinical Affairs and was graduated from that
program, with honors, in May, 2013.
license. I renew that argument, noting that I have now held
my Kansas license for seventeen years without discipline.

App. 118

8.
The Kansas Supreme Court suspended
former Attorney General Phill Kline 's law license
for an indefinite period starting October 2013. It is
worth noting that I was not mentioned once in the
154 page decision. Jared Reed was mentioned more
than twenty times. I explain the significance in my
B-2 statement on the dismissed (on the merits)
disciplinary complaint involving Reed.
9.
The ArchAngel Institute came to a corporate
end in 2012, and my family sold 827 Webster Street
in July 2013.
l 0. I continued my study of the processes and
program that the Judges and Lawyers Assistance
Program utilized to "size me up" for the IBLE, and
discovered that the DSM V has scrapped the
ominous sounding "Personality Disorder, Not
Otherwise Specified." I also received evidence that
Dr. Elizabeth Bowman truly did, as I alleged,
misrepresent the findings of Dr. William Alexy.
These findings are material and consequential, and
are discussed in B 1 reports on Bowman, Alexy and
Sudrovech included with this submission.
11. Socrates recommended that we all get to know
ourselves. After thousands of dollars spent in JLAP's
system generating professional reports that agreed
on only one thing - that I should have been certified
for good character and fitness (Ross and Alexy and
Sass and Flueckiger all stated as much, Bowman
reported i n her federal answer that such was her
recommendation to Sudrovech, who had asked her
not to so report on paper, and failed to pass this
message onto the
IBLE) 3 -- I have found a mental health aide that I

consider well worth the money. It is the

Meyers Briggs assessment, and I report on my

App. 119

findings through the use of that powerful Socratic

tool on a B 1 form. I think the fact that I am an
ENTP well trained in constitutional law who takes
as his mission in life confronting government
overreaching explains everything in my file from
2007 - 2012.
12. Having now applied to over 150 positions and
landing none - I find t he explanation as to why I am no
longer an attorney to be a real deal breaker, no matter
how much nuance I add to the naked facts of character
and fitness denial - I have given my processing much
thought from an employment perspective. Most all
employers make a promise that the IBLE does not
extend, to wit, : "[Insert company] is committed to
equal employment opportunity without regard to
race, color, creed, religion, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, marital status, age or disability."
My Kansas law license saddles me with the welcome
task of pointing out sources of injustice, inequality,
biases and parochialism i n the administration of
justice. I note that the Indiana Supreme Court has a
standing committee to investigate and address gender
and race biases, and I imagine that includes orientation
and ethnicity biases. But what of religious biases? If it
can be proven that such biases haunt the halls of justice,
should this committee enlarge its scope to protect even
those who swear allegiance to Laws higher than the
State? I recommend this question be considered in light
of what is documented herein.
It is my hope and prayer that no Christian again faces
the processing that I faced in 2008 - 2009.
Finally, I have been informed by an attorney
of some standing in the legal community that I should
expect to be questioned once again as to my views of
Church and State, since the co1mnittee found my views
so troubling in 2009. While I am usually quite ready for

App. 120

such discussions, I believe that in this case the better

practice is for me to simply submit a succinct creedal
statement. I have attached that three page credo
hereto. I would ask that any questions about this
statement in light of the practice of law be directed to
my references cited herein, and especially to Professor
Charles Rice, United States Congressman Keith
Rothfus, J.D.4 and United States Congressman Dr.
Tim Huelskamp. All are my co- religionists and all
should find the Board's inquiries of much interest.
Sincerely /s Bryan J. Brown, Esq. Kansas License #
17634
Applicant Bryan J. Browns creedal statement
These three pages are responsive to pages 29 - 30
from the Indiana Board of Law Examiner's
September 25, 2009 final report concluding that I
lacked fitness due to my views on God, conscience
and the State. [Excerpted below]That report
followed questions put to me by government
assigned mental health agents as to my political and
religious views and the question asked of me on the
record at my June 2009 hearing, to wit, whether I
would place God's law above man's law or rather the
opposite. I have been informed by an Indiana
attorney of high standing to be prepared for
subsequent questions regarding my world view and
perspective on God versus government. This is my
statement on that question - I intend to give no
other.
The Applicant now has obtained an order
vacating the federal district court judgment
requiring him to pay $61,000. He no longer is
under that legal obligation. But he made
clear to the Hearing Panel that he would not

App. 121

pay that judgment even if" collection efforts

were made because he could not provide
financial support to the plaintiffs in that
lawsuit, who were providers of abortions. He
testified at the hearing to his obligation to
disobey laws that contradicted his religious
beliefs under certain circumstances. While
he spent several years using the federal
courts to vindicate his clients' rights. at the
same lime he flouted a judgment against
himself and indicated that he would not
obey certain [29] court orders and judgments
he believed to be unjust. The Hearing Panel
believes that a member of the Indiana bar
must obey Indiana law and federal law, even
when doing so violates an at1omcy's
conscience, and that an avowed willingness
not to do so is disqua1ifying.
The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church
(Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace) rather
teaches:
399. The right to conscientious objection
Citizens are not obligated in conscience to
follow the prescriptions of civil authorities if
their precepts are contrary to the demands of
the moral order, to the fundamental rights of
persons or to the teachings of the Gospel.
Unjust laws pose dramatic problems of
conscience for morally upright people: when
they are called to cooperate in morally evil
acts they must refuse. Besides being a moral
duty, such a refusal is also a basic human
right which, precisely as such, civil law itself
is obliged to recognize and protect. "Those who
have recourse to conscientious objection must
be protected not only from legal penalties but

App. 122

also from any negative effects on the legal,

disciplinary, financial and professional plane".
I am duty-bound as a Roman Catholic to uphold and
pass on to my children this ancient teaching,
including the following:
It is a grave duty of conscience not to
cooperate, not even formally, in practices
which, although permitted by civil legislation,
are contrary to the Law of God. Such
cooperation in fact can never be justified, not
by invoking respect for the freedom of others
nor by appealing to the fact that it is foreseen
and required by civil law. No one can escape
the moral responsibility for actions taken, and
all will be judged by God himself based on this
responsibility (cf. Rom 2:6; 14:12).
The 1994 Catechism of the Catholic Church is the
second major catechism in the 2000 year history of
the Church. I am pledged in solemn obedience to
follow these dictates, as are all of my fellow
Catholics:
2242 The citizen is obliged in conscience not
to follow the directives of civil authorities
when they are contrary to the demands of the
moral order, to the fundamental rights of
persons or the teachings of the Gospel.
Refusing obedience to civil authorities, when
their demands are contrary to those of an
upright conscience, finds its justification in
the distinction between serving God and
serving the political community. "Render
therefore to Caesar the things that are
Caesar's, and to God the things that are
God's." "We must obey God rather than
men"::!.2
When citizens are under the oppression of a public

App. 123

authority which oversteps its competence, they

should still not refuse to give or to do what is
objectively demanded of them by the common good;
but it is legitimate for them to defend their own
rights and those of their fellow citizens against the
abuse of this authority within the limits of the
natural law and the Law of the Gospel. [Citation]
2256 Citizens are obliged in conscience not to
follow the directives of civil authorities when
they are contrary to the demands of the moral
order. "We must obey God rather than men"
(Acts 5:29).
2257 Every society's judgments and conduct
reflect a vision of man and his destiny.
Without the light the Gospel sheds on God
and
man,
societies
easily
become
totalitarian.
I am currently reading Worshipping the State: How
Liberalism Because our State Religion by Benjamin
Wiker, Ph.D. The dedication page of this scholarly
work reads as follows:
But the truth is that it is only by believing in
God that we can ever criticise the
Government. Once abolish the God, and the
Government becomes the God. The fact is
written all across human history; but it is
written more plainly across that recent history
of Russia; which was created by Lenin. There
the Government is the God, and all the more
the God, because it proclaims aloud in accents
of thunder, like every other God worth
worshipping, the one essential commandment:
"Thou shalt have no other gods before Me."
...The truth is that irreligion is the opium of
the people. Wherever the people do not
believe in something beyond the world, they

App. 124

will worship the world. But, above all, they

will worship the strongest thing in the world.
And, by the very nature of the Bolshevist and
many other modern systems, as well as by the
practical working of almost any system, the
State will be strongest thing in the world.
- G.K. Chesterton,, Christendom in Dublin
(1932)
Against a State claiming such strength I must stand
opposed. Such was the duty of my ancient fore
bearers against pagan Rome, against dialectical
materialism and against statist secularism.
To quote a well respected Christian leader of
centuries past who was caught in a similar dilemma,
"Here I stand, I can do no other. God help me.
Amen."
All of that said, I do stand prepared to swear the oath
incumbent upon Indiana attorneys and fulfill the
same and defend the Indiana constitution, without
reservation. IC 33-43-1-1 Version a Oath
Note: This version of section effective until 7-1-2014.
See also following version of this section, effective 7-12014.
Sec. 1. (a) A person, before proceeding to discharge the
duties of an attorney, shall take an oath to:
(I) support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of lndiana; and
(2) faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of an
attorney at law. The oath taken under subsection (a)
must be entered in the order book of the court.
As added by P.L.98-2004, SEC.22.
IC 33-43-1-1 Version b Practice of law by attorneys;
officer of the court [Amended law excerpted]
I can swear this oath without violating my
conscience or jeopardizing my religion. I have been
licensed to practice law by the State of Kansas since

App. 125

1996 without any conflict between my religion and

my service to the government. I applaud the
Founders of the State of Indiana for their (less than
completely successful) attempt to ensure that those
of my religious persuasion are not discriminated
against on the basis of religion.[Citations excepted
Letterhead and Seal
Supreme Court of Missouri
Office of the Board of Law Examiners
Executive Director Kelly R. Early
October 12, 2005
Date Stamp: Oct 14, 2005 [ ]
Indianapolis, IN 46204-3417
RE: Bryan John Brown [ ]
The person named above has submitted an application
pursuant to the rules governing admission to the bar,
and we are conducting a background investigation on
behalf of the Missouri Supreme Court. To assist us,
please answer the following questions. Please provide
all relevant information and give us the names and
addresses of others we should contact. Enclosed is a copy
of the applicant's Authorization and Release.
Applicant states application was made to the Bar of
your state in 1996. [ Material excerpted]
Was the applicant required to appear for a
hearing or inquiry before any board, committee.
or admissions authority because of a character
and :fitness concern?
[ ] YES [ ] NO
If "YES," please provide relevant information.
Did the applicant withdraw an application after
questions arose about character or fitness?
[ ] YES [ ] NO
If "YES," please provide relevant information.
If the application was denied, give reason(s) and send
copies of documentation pertaining to the denial.

App. 126

/s Leslie Vickous Admin. Asst. 10/18/05 [ ]

Note in same cursive hand as Vickous signature:
Application was dismissed 2/1997
Missouri Court fax stamp: Received Time Oct. 18 3:45
PM
Indiana Bar Application Form B-1
Redacted from Source: A062-070
Dr. Elizabeth Bowman is the only Indiana-based
mental health authority to diagnose me with a
"problem, condition, impairment, diagnosis" and to
suggest a treatment. In her ten page report (Ex
47B) she labels me with some anxiety on Axis 1 (not
bipolar, which is Axis 1). (And note Axis 4,
explaining, in large degree, the anxiety.) This
comports with Valeo, and is not a reason to deny
one character and fitness, especially since the
anxiety was traced to having to struggle so much to
establish character and fitness.
Dr. Bowman is the only mental health authority to
ever diagnose me with a "problem, condition,
impairment, diagnosis" on Axis 2, or to recommend
treatment. Dr. Bowman determined that I suffered
from Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified.
(PDNOS)
Dr. Bowman's report is troubling on a series of
fronts. My wife and I both submitted statements of
concern, found at Ex 70 and Ex 65V. (Note Ex 70
finds common agreement with Dr, Bowman in
My greatest concerns with the
many areas.)
Bowman report are as follows:
l . In her Christmas Eve-dated report Dr. Bowman
wrote that she "reviewed Dr. Alexy's [November 30]
written report and discussed his findings with him
via telephone." She then proceeded to state the
very opposite of his concl usions in her governmentfiled report that was quoted at great length in the

App. 127

IBLE's final report denying me character and

fitness certification.
10. Dr. Bowman borrowed across "clusters" to
cobble together her diagnosis of PDNOS. This is not
accepted practice among psychiatrists.
11. PDNOS is a highly disfavored diagnosis
fraught with rampant subjectivity and sociopolitical biases. Report continues on addendum
pages ...
[Material Excerpted]
Fact: Dr. Bowman's unique and "hand crafted"
diagnosis of me parallels gender and creedal biases
clearly and unequivocally communicated in her
publications, including this one -- a revealing
broadside that should have moved her to recuse
herself [ ]
In her final chapter, Dr. M ollenkott quotes M
artine Rothblatt's description of a society that
encourages freedom of gender. M y response to
such a society is "sign me up!" To me, this genderfree society would be a safer, more just, and more
happy place for women. It would be nirvana;
heaven on earth. In it , the salary discrimination
I suffered at Indiana University and the religious
sexual discrimination of my childhood would be
unknown. Jesus would be comfortable in such a
society but conservative religion, the church
included, would either be non-existent or would
be horrified beyond words.7
In Dr. Bowman's utopian society I would be either
completely excluded or "horrified beyond words."
Thus was it ethical for her to weigh my worldview,
my religious perspectives, my creed to determine
my sanity? And conclude that I was, based upon
my viewpoints and "religious preoccupation" (Ex
478, p.6) unwell, that is, psychologically disturbed?

App. 128

Since she had already pre-judged those of my ilk as

having "offensive spirituality" and of being idolaters
within an "unhealthy religious system" (Ex 57 and
69) -- shouldn't she have passed on weighing my
character and fitness to practice law? Especially
when that involved the application of the
controversial PDNOS?
After much study I have come to view my case as
a (hopefully)"last gasp" of a subjectivist
psychoanalyst misadventure operating under DSM
IV - a mere three years before PDNOS was tossed
into the dustbin of psychiatric history.
As to Dr. Bowman, it gets even worse. Not only is the
"disease" suspect, not only is the diagnosis method
suspect, not only is your application of those suspect
methods suspect (the clusters question), not only is
the entire model now scrapped, as could have been
predicted -- eclipsing all of this, her report on me was
most lethal in its troubling allegation that two
doctors found me mentally ill and in need of a
specialized form of therapy.
That was blatant misrepresentation of another
doctor's written report. (Yes, I realize that these are
fighting words, this is a most serious allegation and
I do not level it due to a lack of insight -just the
opposite, in fact.)
I allege that the most lethal portion of Dr. Bowman's
report, written on Christmas Eve and filed with the
government on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade, was
a total misrepresentation of what Dr. Alexy had put
in a written report three weeks earlier.
I can prove this since Dr. Bowman admitted her
misrepresentation before the federal court in her
answer to my verified complaint:

174. Dr. Bowman asserted in her final report

that Dr. Alexy felt Mr. Brown would benefit

App. 129

from individual psychotherapy with a

woman therapist.... This statement is
nowhere found in Dr. Alexy's report.
Answer: While the allegations in this
paragraph are technically c01 rec Dr.
Bowman did speak with Dr. Alexy on
November 25, 2008, and du ring her
conversation with Dr. Alexy, Dr. Alexy
stated that he :felt Mr. Brown would benefit
from individual psychotherapy with a
woman therapist.
Sadly this admission of misleading both JLAP and the
IBLE did not cause Dr. Bowman to recall her
erroneous report.
This misrepresentation of what psychotherapy
I needed was quite disconcerting, and not just
because Dr. Alexy did not recommend that I meet
with a female psychotherapist. It was most
disconcerting because Dr. Alexy did not find me
needing psychotherapy at all!
Yet, as troubling as the above was, the following
was many, many times worse. Dr. Elizabeth Bowman
blatantly misrepresented, to my great harm, the
Alexy report that I paid $600 and gave a day of my
life to obtain. And not a minor misrepresentation but rather she communicated to JLAP and then to the
IBLE through Tim Sudrovech the total opposite of
what Dr. Alexy concluded. She miscommunicated, it
would seem prevaricated, as to the ultimate issue,
pinning the donkey's tale to the soft end of its nose:

177. Dr. Bowman asserts in her final report

that or. Alexy's testing concluded that Mr.
Brown likely has Personality Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified." This statement is
nowhere found in Dr. Alexy's report. Dr.

App. 130

Alexy instead offers no diagnosis as to a

mental illness or personality disorder.... in his
report. Dr. Alexy like Dr. Flueckiger,
[assigned] no label from the DSM IV
applicable to Plaintiff.
Answer: While the first .four sentences of
this paragraph are technically correct, Dr.
Alexy did inform Dr. Bowman over the
telephone that be felt Mr. Brown did suffer
from a personality disorder not otherwise
specified. Therefore, the last sentence of this
paragraph is denied.
Sadly this admission of misleading both JLAP and the
IBLE did not cause Dr. Bowman to recall her
erroneous report. Neither did my pointing it out
while my case was in process cause Tim Sudrovech or
Terry Harrell to recall the Bowman report. Instead
the IBLE was allowed to base much of its reasoning
against me on long passages of the Bowman report,
long passages edited to bypass any positive comments
and highlight the most negative and to highlight the
diagnosis of PDNOS.
As Dr. Bowman's utopian dreams seek, I was
"horrified beyond words" when I discovered that
that paragraph 177 above is completely true. I
simply did not think this could happen in America,
even with a less than acceptably positive view of
the "mental health authority."
I called Dr. Alexy after reading Dr. Bowman's
report. He informed me that he did not diagnose
me mentally ill in his written report simply because
he did not believe me to be such. He told me that he
diagnosed me with no "condition" or "disorder" or
"dysfunction" or "illness" because he believed that I
had none. He told me that he did not recommend

App. 131

any psychotherapy or follow up, because he believes

that none is needed. And, he added, if he did believe
that I needed such services he would not have
ever designated the gender of the person be
assigned, since he rejects gender stereotyping.
Dr. Alexy was nearly speechless when I told him
what Dr. Bowman had put in his mouth in her
government-filed report. He reiterated to me what
his report clearly states: He can recommend that I
be licensed by the Indiana authorities. He told me
that he stands by his written report, and issued no
oral report. Had he granted an oral report he
assured me that it would comport, in full, with his
written report, and especially as to the ultimate
issue of diagnosis and treatment plan.
Bowman recommended psychologist Dr. William
Alexy DID NOT find me mentally ill. Ross/Fawver
recommended psychiatrist Dr. Bryan Flueckiger DID
NOT find me mentally ill. Neither did Valeo
(Topeka}, neither did Dr. Ross, neither did Park
Center, neither did Dr. Sass. All professionals who
reviewed me, other than Elizabeth Bowman, gave me
a clean bill of mental health and adjudged me fit to
practice law. As did the 70 persons (including many
of my past clergy, all of my past managers, many
of my past co-workers, and even a Catholic Bishop)
who tendered statements supporting my character
and fitness.
Only Dr. Flueckiger's report demonstrates a
proper briefing, that is, a briefing in light of Rule
12. JLAP did not brief Ross, Bowman or Alexy on the
Rule 12 standards.
Official bias against those who "claim the
Name" without caveat is running rampant, as is
official prejudice against those who affirm
traditional morality, as is official disapproval of
those who revere the constitutional republic. I have

App. 132

openly advanced all three of these most of my adult

life -- which is why, I think the evidence is
compelling that Dr. Bowman deemed me mentally
ill in the first place.
Indiana Bar Application Form B-1
Redacted from Source: A057
After my initial two meetings with psychiatrist Dr.
Elizabeth Bowman ordered me to obtain a ($600)
report from psychologist Dr. William Alexy. Dr.
Bowman ked Dr. Alexy was asked conduct "a
comprehensive psychological evaluation for the
purpose of drawing conclusions regarding Bryan
Brown's personality functioning, his ability to cntrol
impulses, and any suggestion of the existence of
Bipolar Disorder." Alexy found these normative:
emotional functioning, cognitive functioning,
cognitive processing. No suggestion of a significant
thinking disturbance was found.
Dr. Alexy tested my using different instruments than
Dr. Ross. We spent about half a day together, and he
concluded 111 can certainly see Bryan functioning
adequately as a practicing attorney." Ex 45. Alexy
further stated that "under usual and familiar
situations it can be expected that Bryan would be in
control of his impulses" and that Dr. Alexy failed to
"see any compelling evidence of Bipolar Disorder. 11
Ex 45. Dr. Alexy refered to me as an "interesting
gentleman" in closing, and, it must be noted,
diagnosed me with no mental illness, no condition, no
label whatsoever. Especially not with any label
cognizable under the
DSM IV, not even general anxiety. Nor did Dr. Alexy
recommend any therapy or treatment, and of special
notice, he did not recommend that I be placed in
therapy under the care of a therapist.
Dr. Alexy tendered his written report to Dr. Bowman

App. 133

on November, 30, 2008, a full three weeks before she

authored her own report on me on December 24,
2008. Neither Dr. Bowman nor Dr. Alexy copied me
on Dr. Alexy's report. I rather requested a copy of
Dr. Alexy's report after the Bowman report issued,
and then tendered the Alexy report to the IBLE
myself on May 11, 2009. Dr. Bowman failed to
accurately report Dr. Alexy's conclusions in her
report, doing just the opposite, in fact.
Indiana Bar Application Form B-1
Redacted from Source: A058-061
Tim Sudrovech and I have never met in
person. I repeated requested a meeting with him and
then with
Terry Harrell, his supervising attorney, and him. No
such meeting was granted - I have never met either
of them. Sudrovech offered me a mentor through the
JLAP processing. I accepted. None was ever
assigned to me. Federal judge Theresa Springmann
later noted this: "On July 30, the Plaintiff sent a
letter to JLAP accepting Defendant Sudrovech's June
4 offer to provide a mentor through JLAP. The
Plaintiff s June 30 letter also repeated his request for
a meeting with the JLAC."
Despite me having never met with Sudrovech,
he still took it upon himself to psychoanalyze me,
and thus this report is filed at this time. On June 3,
2008, Sudrovech weighed the Ross report and wrote,
"Dr. Ross recommends that Mr. Brown be further
assessed by a psychiatrist to look into these issues
and to ascertain an appropriate diagnosis and
treatment plan." (Ex 24A) Sudrovech is not
professionally positioned to so concur professionally,
and, more troubling, his report assumes that a
diagnosis and treatment plan were both appropriate
in my circumstance.

App. 134

Despite being ordered to brief Dr. Flueckiger

by his supervisor, Terry Harrell, Sudrovech refused
to brief Dr. Flueckiger so that he could tender a
psychiatric report on me to JLAP. This despite the
fact that Dr.Jay Fawver, the psychiatrist designated
by Dr. Ross and Sudrovech, recommended Dr.
Flueckiger. Sudrovech closed his June 3 analysis
with the pledge that he would assign a "JLAP
mentor/volunteer" upon my request. I requested,
none was assigned.
The social worker Tim Sudrovech crossed the
line into the practice of medici ne in his January 21,
2009 report that caused Dr. Bowmans' report to be
filed with the IBLE on January 22, 2009. Sudrovech
wrote that "JLAP concurs with Dr. Bowman 's
evaluation and diagnosis." Again, Sudrovech never
even met me, refused to do so repeated ly in fact.
Sudrovech points out that "A
diagnosis such as this implies that an individual does
not meet the diagnostic criteria for any specific
disorder, but that features or traits of those disorders
are evident." 1 Sudrovech does not detail that Dr.
Bowman lept across clusters while making her
diagnosis, misusing a paradigm that is itself
questionable according to Dr. Sharon Freeman
Clevenger.
While quoting directly from the Bowman
report, Sudrovech failed to pickup on her complete
fabrication of elements from the Alexy report.
Despite her revealing that there was a written Alexy
report, it appears that Sudrovech either did not
review it or simply decided that Dr. Bowman's
misuse of it was unworthy of mention.
While Sudrovech concurs, for JLAP, with the
unique Bowman diagnosis, he cannot quite concur
with the Bowman treatment recommendation. This
social worker who purposely refused to meet with me

App. 135

or assign me a mentor, who knew that Ihave selfpresented to Valeo, to Park Center, to Dr. Flueckiger
and to Dr. Sass, still diagnosed me as follows as it
relates to treatment plans: JLAP questions how
much Mr. Brown would value the experience of
psychotherapy, how appropriately engaged in the
therapeutic process he would be." (Emphasis in
original) This constitutes the practice of medicine
on non-doctor Sudrovech's part, as does the
following statement: "JLAP does not believe that Mr.
Brown is a good candidate for any type of
monitoring/supervision for these very same reasons.
JLAP believes that Mr. Brown's character structure,
as described in Dr. Bowman's evaluation, would
interfere with both of these resources." Yet Bowman
did recommend such therapy, and she even reported,
in error, that Dr. Alexy did as well. Dr. Bowman's
report also noted that Dr. Ross recommended a
mentor. Thus Sudrovech, without ever meeting me,
issued a mental health diagnosis that trumped Drs.
Ross, Alexy and Bowman while completely rejecting
Drs. Sass and Flueckiger.
The above must explain why Sudrovech never
assigned the offered (by him and Ross) and accepted
(by me) JLAP mentor. He was evidently concerned,
even before the Bowman report, just how
appropriately engaged Iwould be with a mentor, and
so, evidently in anticipation of the Bowman report,
simply determined that Iwas unworthy of the
allocation of such resources fro my trip through
JLAP. There exists, evidently, a threshold for the
allocation of such resources, even after offered by
Sudrovech and Ross, that Isimply did not meet.
But could it have been that Iwould have been
more appropriately engaged had Ibeen assigned the
offered mentor that Ihad clearly accepted and
requested? Sudrovech decided, sua sponte, "no".

App. 136

[Materials excerpted]
A slow reading of the Bowman and Sudrovech
reports reveals this syllogism. Sudrovech handpicked
for highlighting this sentence from the Bowman
report, "I find his personality disorder has caused
him to lose perspective on the ethics of his behaviors
and to be arrested for civil disobedience," yet failed to
appreciate or report that Dr. Bowman's conclusory
statements include: "Mr. Brown has moral integrity.
His moral integrity has been expressed in a manner
that led to principled civil disobedience based upon
his religious beliefs." Ex 47B, p9, #5.
So it is my religious beliefs that are my
personality disorder. So wrote Dr. Bowman, so
concurred non-doctor Sudrovech. Sudrovech also
countenanced unconstitutional processing when he
determined this to be a problem the government
should take note of: "[Brown] showed lack of
empathy about issues associated with his beliefs."
The logical inference is that Indiana's judiciary is
prepared to enforce empathy based upon beliefs, in
my case, religious belief. That is a step that even
Star Chamber seemed to find over the top. My
beliefs, as well as my subjective level of "empathy"
(or Love for Big Brother) should not be weighed by
the State while deciding whether to issue me a law
licence.
Yet it clearly was five years ago. At the end of
the JLAPpian trip, Sudrovech used his sizable
discretion to weigh the Ross report, weigh the
Bowman report, weigh my character structure, weigh
my level of appropriateness, weigh my empathy
index and weigh whatever else he chose to weigh to
then opine, as his final answer (after repeatedly
refusing my request that we meet), that "JLAP is
therefore forwarding no further recommendations for
Mr. Brown."

App. 137

The IBLE dubbed this non-recommendation a

very rare and profoundly disturbing event, and
labeled Sudrovech' s non-recommendation
dispositive as to my non-fitness to practice law in
Indiana. A five-year banishment followed the two
years of processing. (I filed on April 19, 2007.)
I report on Sudrovech's psychoanalysis of me
herein because he clearly did just that, and clearly
did so without the medical degrees customarily
associated with such practice. It, nevertheless, a very
consequential mental health report as far as my life
and career was concerned.
Indiana Bar Application Form B-1
Redacted from Source: A054-056
After meeting with Dr. Sass, Father Seculoff,
Pastor Allen and discussing the situation with legal
counsel and Bishop Conley I was convinced that a
second opinion on my mental health by a psychiatrist
of my own choosing was wise. I wrote Terry Harrell,
Chief Counsel of JLAP, a lenghthy letter (Ex 37)
explaining my concerns as to the processing that
Sudovech was demanding, and seeking to open
dialogue, attorney to attorney. It did accomplish
that, at least to a degree.
While Tim Sudrovech agreed to pre-brief Dr.
Flueckiger, per my request, he did not do so.
Troubling (at least I find them so) details as to this
are recorded at Ex B7-2-J. Despite JLAPs refusal to
brief Dr. Flueckiger, I still met with him and
requested a written report from him. I tendered the
Rule 12 criteria to him days before the meeting -- I
do not think Ross, Alexy or Bowman were every
tendered the Rule 12 criteria by JLAP.
Dr. Flueckiger concluded that "Brown DOES
MEET" the good moral character standard "without
question." Dr. Flueckiger concluded "Brown DOES

App. 138

MEET" the fitness standard as well.

Dr. Flueckiger found me to suffer from no
mental illness, condition or other malady of mind or
spirit. Dr. Flueckiger reviewed the testing done by
Dr. Ross before issuing this clean bill of mental
health.
Dr. Ross and Dr. Jay Fawver both
recommended Dr. Flueckiger. I have attached both
Dr. Flueckiger's report and Dr. Fawver statement
(Fawver was deemed an expert by both Dr. Ross and
JLAP) recommending Flueckiger.
Both JLAP and the IBLE discounted Dr.
Flueckiger's conclusion as to my mental health since
he was not selected and pre-briefed by the
government.
Letterhead from St. Josephs Medical Group, Fort
Wayne, Indiana
Date Stamped by BLE May 11, 2009
May 1, 2009
Re:' Bryan J. Brown
To Whom It May Concern:
Mr. Bryan J. Brown has asked me to provide a
summary of my psychiatric evaluation of him
relative to his upcoming judgment by the Judges
and Lawyers Assistance Program. He has
provided me with the criteria against which he will
be reviewed.
My sessions with Mr. B rown occurred on 9-16-08
and 10-13-08 at his request. have also reviewed
additional psycholog ical testing results which he
provided to me.
Regarding "good moral character," it is my opinion
that Mr. Brown DOES MEET this standard
without question. He appears to hold to his
personal and spiritual convictions without
wavering. He expresses a clear respect for the law

App. 139

and the judicial process. However, his actions have

apparently brought him into conflict with some
legal entities in the past, but I believe it was not
his primary intent to break the law.
Regarding "fitness," it is my opinion that Mr.
Brown DOES MEET this standard .
I am not qualified to comment on his interactions
with the legal process or his fiduciary
responsibilities.
However, based on my
evaluations, Mr. Brown possesses the mental
stability required by your guidelines. I found him
to have very strong opinions, which he based on
extensive evidence gathered from multiple sources.
He is passionate about his faith, family and work.
He is highly energetic and very focused on his
goals, and these characteristics appear to be very
consistent. He approaches his goals in a logical
fashion and does not appear to be impulsive,
delusional, or grandiose...:
I hope this information is helpful to you in
considering Mr. Bryan J . Brown for admission to
the Indiana Bar.
Sincerely,
/s Bryan J. Flueckiger, M.D.

App. 140

[Letterhead of the Indiana Supreme Court]

November 18, 2015
Re: Alleged ADA Retaliation claim
Dear Bryan Brown:
This is in response to your letter and packet of
materials dated November 5, 2015 labeled "An
official ADA complaint." On its face, your letter
does not' state an ADA retaliation claim. Further,
you were invited to meet with me as ADA
Coordinator and you declined to do so. Due to the
totality of the circumstances, there will be no
opportunity for a meeting with an Executive Director
and this is a final action.
Yours truly,
Brenda F. Rodeheffer
ADA Coordinator
cc: Lilia Judson
Bradley Skolnik
Adrienne Meiring
Hon. Barbara Brugnaux
David Remondini