TRADE

US-Relations Thumpers
Cyberespionage, political tensions, and national security
concerns hamper US-China S&T trade
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science,
Emeritus, at the University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development
issues in China, Trends in U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge
Production for the Twenty-First Century?, Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, September 11, 2014,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20US-China%20Science%20and
%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)

the government-to-government
relationship is not a conduit for the transfer of sensitive technologies ,
especially technologies embedded in physical artifacts. The fact that the relationship
does involve training and visits to U.S. laboratories, however, ensures that
knowledge transfers occur. U.S. concerns over the course of the last decade about deemed
exports and human embodied transfers of sensitive scientific knowledge or technology have
led technical agencies to put in place mechanisms to vet visiting scientists and
engineers. 74 Overall, however, the government-to-government relationship is much less
a conduit for technology transfer than commercial relations or academic channels .
Security concerns have become far more prevalent in the relationship now than in
the past, in large part due to various political tensions between the two countries
and Chinas rise as a commercial and potential military competitor .
Allegations of cyberespionage activities made by both sides against the other
further highlight the increasing prevalence of information security issues. In particular,
concerns over Chinese espionage and tech nology acquisition strategies have led to
greater wariness in the conduct of relations on the U.S. side in the face of reports
from several agencies that Chinese interests in scientific collaboration seem to be
targeted at specific fields and facilities where China hopes to enhance capabilities .75
A less-than-transparent state secrecy legal environment on the Chinese side has led
to limitations on data sharing under certain protocols. This has led to U.S. frustrations over the
Technology Leakage and Security Concerns For the most part,

conduct of field research in ways that are inconsistent with the culture of scientific openness with which U.S.

As a further sign of deepening security concerns on

the Chinese side, the recently formed Central National Security Commission has
included science and technology as one of 11 areas for which state security must be
strengthened. 77 How this development will affect U.S.-China cooperation remains to be seen. From a Chinese
officials and investigators are familiar.76

perspective, U.S. export controls and visa processes (though much improved) are also manifestations of a security

A recent controversy over

the prohibition of Chinese participation in the NASA Ames Research Center
meeting to discuss the findings from the Kepler interplanetary survey
mission illustrates this tension. 78 It has long been assumed by the U.S. side that Chinese
consciousness that is not always consistent with open scientific practices.

intelligence agencies play a key role in identifying technology acquisition targets, which are then shared with
civilian S&T agencies as well as national security agencies.79 Since this report is being prepared on an unclassified,
open source basis, it is not possible to determine the extent to which such technology acquisition targeting enters

U.S. agencies have

expressed concern during interviews with the author about what appears to be
into the S&T relationship under the Agreement other than to note that several

Chinese targeting of selected laboratories and fields of study for cooperative

activities.80 Several recent cases do illustrate that S&T cooperation, as discussed further below, is not immune
to espionage.81

Aff does not overcome S&T nationalism in dual-use tech

transfer- national security concerns
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science,
Emeritus, at the University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development
issues in China, Trends in U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge
Production for the Twenty-First Century?, Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, September 11, 2014,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20US-China%20Science%20and
%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)
But while the stakes are rising, questions about the modalities of relationships in S&T are also becoming more

Research and innovation today are frequently characterized by the shortened

time between scientific discovery and technological application. Scientific research is
complex.

therefore seldom far from commercial application and from the emergence of dual-use technologies having both

Concerns among business enterprises, universities, and

governments for protecting proprietary knowledge, or knowledge of relevance to
national security, have been heightened. Thus, the win-win, positive-sum
assumptions about cooperation in science have become complicated by the
fact that the development of commercial and national security applications of new
knowledge often introduce competitive pressures and the possibility of zerosum outcomes. National governments continue to adopt policies designed to
capture value from scientific and technological advances and enhance national
capabilities for research and innovation, even as they expand international
cooperation. Both China and the United States exhibit these tensions between
"science and technology nationalism" and "science and technology
globalism"; the relationship between the countries is an especially rich case of how
these tensions are managed.
commercial and military applications.

Alt Causes- Export Control

Alt causes to successful export control- the aff does not
reverse Chinese mindset
Goldman and Pollack 97 (Goldman, Charles A. and Jonathan D. Pollack. Engaging China
In the International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1997. http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB197. Also available in print
form.

China remained largely outside the export control process? First, China was
long excluded from this process. Its membership in export control regimes was
not sought by the United States or other powers. Second, there are questions of
national sovereignty and of nationalistic sensitivities; the Chinese remain
very wary of actions or policy requirements that appear intrusive in their own
decision-making process and policy-making procedures. Third, there is insufficient
support within China to connect export control to China's national security
interests. Fourth, weapons exports (including some sensitive weapons
technologies) remain alluring to Chinese institutions and policymakers for
financial as well as geopolitical reasons. Chinese enterprises, for example, have explicit sanction to
Why has

pursue hard currency earnings, given that the state is no longer fully prepared to subsidize the activities of these

The increasingly difficult financial straits of the Chinese defense

industries have compelled an export orientation in both military and civilian goods .
organizations.

There has been a wide array of activities both in the military and nonmilitary sector to enhance the attentiveness of
Chinese enterprises to market forces.

This has been very relevant to the sales of arms in

South Asia and the Middle East, given that the Chinese have seen clear
opportunities to sell and that states have been willing to buy . Fifth, there are also
geopolitical motives. The Chinese hope to secure credible political ties with states
potentially useful to their long-term interests, and more generally to keep China's options
open at a very fluid time in the international system. China's weapons exports are
also related to internal political factors. The so- called "Princelings"the sons and daughters
of senior Chinese leaders who dominated Chinese national security policymaking in the early decades of
Communist rulewield substantial power in this area. The offspring of these leaders have had
extensive access to vital resources within the system . In the past, they have been able to exercise
a high degree of autonomy, both for personal financial gain as well as for the gain of the institutions that
they represent. Their activities have been subject to increasing restraint by senior
leaders, so the looming generational transition may exacerbate the kinds of
export control problems the United States has faced with China. It would
nonetheless oversimplify matters if too much significance is placed on this last factor alone. A
comprehensive understanding must rest on the full range of interests and
factors shaping Chinese attitudes toward export control and the People's Republic of
China's (PRC's) past and future dispositions in this area.

Aff alone fails- must address Chinese policy barriers first

Goldman and Pollack 97 (Goldman, Charles A. and Jonathan D. Pollack. Engaging China
In the International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1997. http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB197. Also available in print form

we described four principal policy goals for the United States: (1)
gaining Chinese adherence and full participation in international agreements;
Earlier in the briefing,

(2) improving the export control system in China; (3) gaining greater access to
and transparency into the Chinese military system, including military
enterprises; and (4) improving the enforcement of Chinese laws on Chinese
enterprises. This chart links the strategies we have identified to the primary policy goals. Although other
linkages exist, we judge that the ones above are of primary importance. As the chart makes clear, none of the
strategy options by themselves can address all four policy goals. Rather, a
combination of strategy options is required to subsume all the policy goals. In
particular, it is necessary to combine high-level strategies with working-level
strategies to advance all four policy goals.

Inclusion of China in international agreement negotiations is a

prerequisite to the aff
Goldman and Pollack 97 (Goldman, Charles A. and Jonathan D. Pollack. Engaging China
In the International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1997. http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB197. Also available in print form

The Chinese have been excluded from an important part of the international rulemaking process and denied a seat at the table in negotiating and working out
multilateral agreements for export controls. Although the United States has kept China informed
about the Wassenaar discussions, the Chinese have not been included formally in the
Wassenaar Arrangement discussions. Because they have not had much opportunity to interact with
the other national teams, the Chinese have not contributed to joint statements of principle
or other measures that could elicit increased Chinese participation . In addition, the
technical sessions in multilateral agreement negotiations are frequently staffed by Defense Department officials,
and these sessions are a principal means by which the Defense Department builds professional relations with

Since China has no seat at these negotiations,

there is no opportunity to develop fuller professional ties between the
participants in the U.S. and Chinese defense systems. U.S. restrictions on military
contacts and policy discussions with China following the Tiananmen Square
incident have had a profound impact on China's participation in
international export control discussions. While the restrictions on military contact
with China may have been motivated by sound political reasons in response to
events at Tiananmen, these restrictions have hampered the development of the
U.S.-China defense relationship as a whole. Without the foundation of early, ongoing discussions, it
is much more difficult to ensure subsequent compliance by China. Other countries also have a clear
role to play, especially in the domain of defense relations . The process of
developing working relationships in the defense area must necessarily be
a multilateral one, since China interacts with many countries in foreign and defense policy. U.S.
actions alone will not ensure successful policy outcomes .
defense officials from other nations.

Export Reform Fails

Repealing Export Controls is ineffective-lack of
understanding of PRC military-civilian relations
Cheng 10 (Dean- Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center as part of
the Heritage Foundation, Export Controls and the Hard Case of China, The
Heritage Foundation, 12/10/10,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hardcase-of-china)

One of the challenges of interacting with China is the opacity of its structures and
organizations. The interrelationship between the military and civilian industrial
baseswhich entities are associated or linked to other entitiesis poorly understood. Consequently,
business relations with Chinese companies are fraught with risk. A systematic effort
to gather and make available more detailed information on the organization and
structure of Chinas military-industrial complex would benefit both U.S. industry and
the government. This effort should pay special attention to businesses that are linked
to the militarys network of research institutions. Only with this information can U.S.
businesses engage Chinese corporations, while minimizing the risk of revealing key
technologies and procedures. Moreover, such information would be invaluable for other
purposes, such as imposing sanctions and monitoring technology and weapons
transfers to pariah states. Many Chinese companies, including state-owned enterprises,
interact with unsavory regimes, such as those in Sudan and Burma, but they often
do so through a variety of fronts and subsidiaries. Sanction regimes can only hope
to affect commercial interactions by identifying these various relationships and,
ultimately, the decision makers. This suggests a need to expand the budget for the
defense and intelligence communities to undertake longer-term studies of both the
Chinese military-industrial complex and its extensive ties to Chinas enormous
commercial sector. In the face of a retrenching defense budget, it would be penny-wise, but pound-foolish, to
reduce such longer-term analyses that are essential for both commercial and security purposes.