G.R. No.

81093 March 6, 1990

PORAC TRUCKING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifteenth Division), HON. EUGENIO S.
LABITORIA, In his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Macabebe, Pampanga (Branch
LV) and EMERENCIANA GUEVARRA, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in "Emerenciana
Guevarra, plaintiff-appellee v. Porac Trucking Inc., defendant-appellant," 1 promulgated on July
20, 1987, and the Resolution of the same court dated December 15, 1987, 2 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner Porac Trucking, Inc. [hereafter, simply PORAC
TRUCKING].
The case at bar arose from a complaint for damages filed by the private respondent
Emerenciana Guevarra in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LV at San Fernando,
Pampanga 3 against PORAC TRUCKING and Albert Mercado, in a joint and several capacity,
arising from a collision incident involving the truck owned by the petitioner while driven by a
certain Albert Mercado, and the mini Isuzu cargo truck of Guevarra.
The lower court issued summons directed to Albert Mercado and PORAC TRUCKING, ordering
them to answer the complaint. While Albert Mercado received the personal service of summons
on April 28, 1984, a certain Hermie Lansangan, according to the Sheriff, refused to receive the
copy of the summons for PORAC TRUCKING. Thus the Sheriff's return on PORAC TRUCKING,
dated April 28, 1984, remains unsigned.
On June 11, 1984, the lower court declared PORAC TRUCKING in default.
Later, a certain Atty. Rodolfo Macalin filed a "Motion for Leave to File Answer Beyond
Reglementary Period" attaching thereto the answer of the supposed defendants. Thereafter, the
lower court took this "appearance" of Atty. Macalino to mean the voluntary submission by
PORAC TRUCKING to its jurisdiction.
On June 21, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of Guevarra and against
defendants Mercado and PORAC TRUCKING.
A motion for execution was filed by Guevarra on August 14, 1985 and the writ was subsequently
issued on August 23, 1985.
It was only on November 12, 1985 that the petitioner, represented by its in-house counsel, filed
a "Petition for Relief from Judgment with Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction." This time, the lawyer was not Atty. Macalino. Although a restraining order was
issued against the implementation of the writ of execution, the lower court eventually issued a
resolution dismissing the "Petition for Relief from Judgment . . ."
On April 8, 1986, the petitioner appealed alleging that the defect in the service of summons was
never cured by the unauthorized appearance of Atty. Macalino. 4 On the merits, the petitioner

alleges that the appellee Guevarra has waived all claims from the accident with the execution of
her "Affidavit of Desistance."
In the said "Affidavit of Desistance" or "Release of Claim," it appears that Guevarra had
received from First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc. (FIBICI), insurer of her vehicle,
the amount of P19,579.80. This amount was in turn received by FIBICI from Rico General
Insurance, the insurer of PORAC TRUCKING, with the stated purpose that:
. . . this RELEASE may be pleaded in bar to any suit of (sic) proceeding which
I/WE or anyone in my/our behalf, may have taken or may be taken in connection
with the accident hereinbefore mentioned . . . 5
However, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the judgment appealed
from and dissolving the preliminary injunction it earlier issued enjoining the implementation of
the writ of execution, in effect granting the claim filed by Guevarra against PORAC TRUCKING.
On August 14, 1988, the petitioner filed this petition for review after its Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the respondent court on December 15, 1987.
The only issue for our resolution is whether or not the summons was properly served on the
petitioner so as to confer jurisdiction on the then Court of First Instance over PORAC
TRUCKING, the then defendant.
Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership If the
defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.
As held in Delta Motor Sales Corp. v. Mangosing 6 cited in the recent case of Rebollido v. Court
of Appeals: 7
The purpose of the rule is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the
summons may be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation
that such person will know what to do with legal papers served on him or in other
words to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.
In the present case, the summons was supposed to have been received by a certain Hermie
Lansangan who refused to acknowledge the receipt thereof. He refused to sign for the petitioner
corporation. And rightly so, for he was certainly not the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of the directors of PORAC TRUCKING. As a matter of fact, the capacity, if any, in
which Lansangan would bind the corporation was never established. It appears that the only
relationship Lansangan had with the petitioner corporation was that he acted as middle man for
specific delivery contracts. 8
In some cases, the Court has been liberal in bending this rule whenever the resulting
circumstance would facilitate the administration of justice, and in requiring only "substantial
compliance". 9 These exceptions were allowed only because of the peculiar circumstances

attending the case, namely that: 1) there was actual receipt of the summons by the person
served, meaning the possession of the copy of the summons was transferred from the Sheriff to
the person served; 2) there was a signature on the Sheriff's return or receipt by the person
served; and 3) there was actual receipt of the summons by then defendant corporation, now
petitioner, through the person on whom the legal papers were actually served.
In the case at bar, none of these requisites is present, nor do they appear to have been
complied with. Hence the case should be returned to the trial court for the proper hearing on the
merits in order to preclude any possible infringement of due process.
And who is Atty. Rodolfo Macalino? He is the lawyer of Rico General Insurance Corporation, the
insurer of PORAC TRUCKING. Rico General Insurance Corporation worked for a settlement of
the claim arising from the said accident with First Integrated Bonding and Insurance, the insurer
of Emerenciana Guevarra.
And that is where Atty. Macalino's role begins and ends as far as this case is concerned.
Certainly, the lawyer of the insurance company did not ipso facto become the lawyer for the
insured in all subsequent litigations arising from the accident. And this is as it should be,
notwithstanding the claims of one Edgardo Simon, Manager of Rico General Insurance, who
declared under oath that when he learned of the pendency of the civil case against the driver
and the PORAC TRUCKING, he himself had instructed their house counsel, Atty. Macalino, to
represent PORAC TRUCKING. Simon, however, specifically stated that he never informed
PORAC TRUCKING about the move. Neither was Atty. Macalino ever hired by PORAC
TRUCKING to represent it in any case.
It would seem now that this elaborate scheme was devised to insure the right to subrogation of
Rico General Insurance in case a judgment favorable to PORAC TRUCKING were to be
rendered. And yet as an officer of the court, Atty. Macalino should have known better than to
appear in a case on behalf of another at the mere prodding of his client.
However we leave the hearing of the merits of the case to the trial court since the private
respondent had failed to comment 10 on the veracity of the called "Release of Claims."
Nevertheless this document must be presented in evidence and litigated on by the parties to
establish once and for all the extent of their interests for a full satisfaction of their claims.
In any case, the unsolicited appearance of Atty. Rodolfo Macalino, in the absence of a clientlawyer relationship with the petitioner corporation, is unbecoming of a member of the bar, to say
the least. The remanding of the case must be without prejudice to the investigation of his
actuations. The presiding judge of the court a quo is hereby ordered to undertake this
investigation and report to the court his findings and recommendations within thirty days from
receipt hereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. L-840

June 30, 1969

JOAQUIN G. GARRIDO, CARLOS UY, JR., and, FRANCISCO R. ACHACOSO, petitioners,

vs.
NORBERTO QUISUMBING, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioners Joaquin G. Garrido, Carlos Uy, Jr. and Francisco R. Achacoso seek either the
disbarment or the suspension of respondent Attorney Norberto Quisumbing, upon the ground
that he filed Civil Case No. 73668 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as counsel for the
plaintiffs therein, including among them one L. Garcia Pastor, who had not, in fact, authorized
respondent to institute said action on his (Garcia Pastor's) behalf. Copy of an alleged affidavit of
Garcia Pastor to this effect was annexed to the complaint of petitioners herein, which was filed
on September 30, 1968.
In his answer thereto, respondent alleged that he filed the complaint in said case No. 73668 at
the request of one of the plaintiffs therein, namely, Julio Muoz, who claimed to have authority
to act on behalf of L. Garcia Pastor in connection therewith. In support of this allegation,
respondent submitted a photostatic copy of an affidavit of said Muoz, dated July 12, 1968,
which had allegedly been submitted in Civil Case No. 73091 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1968, respondent filed a "manifestation" annexing
thereto another affidavit of Muoz, made in Barcelona, Spain, on November 11, 1968, in further
support of said allegation. Thereafter, petitioners filed their reply, which was the object of a
rejoinder on the part of respondent. The aforementioned pleadings and the annexes thereto
sufficiently establish the facts necessary for the determination of this administrative case.
It is the contention of Muoz, a Spanish citizen, residing in Barcelona, Spain, that he is the
controlling shareholder or the representative of the controlling shareholder of Carmun Trading
(N.Y.), Inc., Carmun Trading (Philippines), Inc., Safintex, S.A. and Sociedad Europea de
Financiacion, S.A. hereafter referred to, respectively, as Carmun (N.Y.), Carmun (Phil.),
Safintex and SEF; that Carmun (N.Y.) gave Antonio V. Rocha, a businessman in the Philippines,
the sum of $400,000, with which, in 1949, he constituted and funded the Capital Insurance and
Surety Co., Inc., hereafter referred to as Capital; that in 1958, Rocha, who successfully
managed the Capital, as its president, and held the shares therein in trust for Carmun (N.Y.),
transferred said shares to Carmun (Phil.); that thereafter Rocha was replaced, as president of
Capital, by petitioner Garrido, who had only 16 out of the 10,000 shares of Capital; that L.
Garcia Pastor and Jaime Amat, both Spanish citizens and residents, the former of Madrid,
Spain, and the latter of Pasay City, Philippines, hold 10 shares each of Capital, which Muoz
caused to be assigned to them to qualify them as members of the Board of Directors of Capital,
of which he (Muoz) is the Chairman; that Carmun (Phil.) transferred its shares in Capital to
Safintex, which, in turn, transferred the shares to SEF; that between 1964 and 1966, there had

been an impairment in the financial condition of Capital owing to alleged mismanagement by

petitioner Garrido, involving the juggling of accounts, the falsification of records and other
irregularities, committed in connivance or with the cooperation of herein petitioners Achacoso
and Uy, Vice-President and Accountant General, respectively, of Capital; that, as a
consequence, substantial assets of Capital were fraudulently transferred by the petitioners to
the Property and Liability Insurance Corporation, which was organized and is owned by
petitioners Garrido and Achacoso; and that, accordingly, he (Muoz) asked respondent herein to
file, on his behalf and that of Capital, SEF, Garcia Pastor and Amat, said Civil Case No. 73668
against petitioners herein, to oust them as president, vice-president and accountant,
respectively, of Capital, and to recover damages.
Although Garcia Pastor had not personally authorized respondent herein to file said case on his
(Garcia Pastor's) behalf, as one of the plaintiffs therein, respondent had no reason to doubt the
veracity of the information furnished by Muoz regarding his power to grant such authority, in
representation of Garcia Pastor. Indeed, the latter seemingly claims to have returned his shares
in Capital to Muoz, thus impliedly admitting that he (Garcia Pastor) held the shares on behalf of
Muoz. At any rate, Muoz knew nothing about said alleged return, he being in Japan, at the
time of the filing of Case No. 73668, whereas Garcia Pastor was then in Barcelona. Moreover,
the records of Capital were in the possession of petitioners herein, and respondent felt that the
Complaint in Case No. 73668 should be filed without delay, owing to the urgency of the relief
prayed for.
In other words, when respondent's services were engaged in connection with said case, Muoz
informed him that he (Muoz) was the controlling stockholder of Capital and that Garcia Pastor
was his alter ego in its board of directors. Accordingly, Muoz authorized respondent to file the
action, not only in his (Muoz) name, but, also, in that of Garcia Pastor. Under the
circumstances, it is clear that respondent has not committed any act of malpractice. In fact,
Garcia Pastor has not complained against respondent for having acted as he did. The present
administrative proceeding has been instituted, not by Garcia Pastor, but by the defendants in
the aforementioned civil case.1awphil.nt
WHEREFORE, the complaint herein is hereby dismissed. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35830 July 24, 1990
FORTUNATA MERCADO, BASILIA CUEVAS MERCADO, SOTERA MERCADO and
TRINIDAD MERCADO,petitioners,
vs.
Hon. ALBERTO Q. UBAY as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXXII, LUCINA SAMONTE and TRINIDAD M. SAMONTE, respondents.
Gregorio M. Familiar for petitioners.
Alfredo I. Molo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners seek to enjoin and restrain
respondent judge from further proceeding with Civil Case No.
C-2442 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Regional Trial Court) on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction to annul a final and executory judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Cavite (now Regional Trial Court) in Civil Case No. TM-223.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 18, 1966, petitioners filed an action for partition with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. TM-223, against Antonio, Ely and respondents
Lucina and Trinidad, all surnamed Samonte and who are brothers and sisters.
On June 27, 1966, the defendants were served with a copy of the complaint and summons thru
their co-defendant Antonio Samonte who acknowledged receipt thereof.
On July 11, 1966, all the defendants in the above-numbered case, thru counsel, Atty. Danilo
Pine, filed their answer to the complaint. Later, on January 4,1967, the said defendants, thru the
same counsel, filed their amended answer.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Cavite (now RTC) rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioners and against all the defendants in the civil case, including private respondents.
Since no appeal was made by any of the defendants from the decision of the trial court, the
same became final and executory and the court issued the corresponding writ of execution.
However, before the writ could be carried out by the provincial sheriff, all the defendants, thru
the same counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court

of Appeals seeking to annul the writ of execution issued by the trial court in Cavite in Case No.
TM-223. On July 9, 1971, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
On May 27, 1972, respondent Lucina Samonte and Trinidad Samonte brought an action before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) docketed as Case No.
C-2442, for the annulment of the final judgment rendered by the trial court in Cavite in Case No.
TM-223, alleging the following matters: that they did not authorize anyone including Atty. Danilo
Pine to file an answer in their behalf as defendants in Case No. TM 223, and that the filing of the
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the writ of execution in the same case
was without their knowledge and participation.
Petitioners' motion to dismiss the action was denied by the CFI of Rizal. Thus, the instant
petition was filed.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
RTC) committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in denying the
petitioners' motion to dismiss the action for annulment of the final and executory judgment
rendered by the CFI of Cavite.
The applicable law is Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Act
of 1948," which was the law in force when the disputed action for annulment was filed on May
27, 1972 in the CFI of Rizal. This is based on the principle that the facts alleged in the complaint
and the law in force at the time of commencement of action determine the jurisdiction of a court
(Lum Bing v. Ibanez 92 Phil. 799; Rodriguez v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172; Salao v. Crisostomo, No.
L-29146, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 17; Tolentino v. Social Security Commission No. L-28870,
September 6, 1985, 138 SCRA 428; Philippine Overseas Drilling, etc. v. Minister of Labor, G.R.
No. 55703, November 27, 1986, 146 SCRA 79).
Section 44(a) of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948 then vested original jurisdiction in the Courts
of First Instance over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of
pecuniary estimation and an action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of
justice belongs to this category (Vda. de Ursua v. Pelayo, 107 Phil. 622). A court of first instance
or a branch thereof has the authority and the jurisdiction as provided for by law to annul a final
and executory judgment rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the
same court. This was the ruling laid down in the cases of (Dulap v. Court of Appeals, No. L28306, December 18, 1971, 42 SCRA 537; Gianan v. Imperial, No. L-37963, February 28, 1974,
55 SCRA 755 and Francisco v. Aquino, Nos. L-33235-36, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 149 which
overturned the contrary rulings in Mas v. Dumara-og No. L-16252, September 29,1964,12
SCRA 34; J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Torres, et al., No. L-24717, December 4, 1967, 21 SCRA 1169;
and Sterling Investment Corporation, et al. v. Ruiz, etc. et al., No. L-30694, October 31, 1969,
30 SCRA 318). Thus, in an action to annul a final judgment or order, the choice of which court
the action should be filed is not left to the parties; by legal mandate the action should be filed
with the Court of First Instance. The question is in what place (with what particular court of first
instance) the action should be commenced and tried (Dulap, supra). The issue therefore to be
resolved in the instant case is not one of jurisdiction but of venue-whether it was properly laid in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the CFI of
Cavite.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Court fixes the venue in Courts of First Instance, as
follows:

SEC. 2. Venue in Court of First Instance (a) Real actions. Actions affecting
title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the
province where the property or any part thereof lies.
(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants besides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
The complaint filed by respondent with the CFI of Rizal for the annulment of judgment states
that they reside at Caloocan City and that petitioners, as defendants, reside at Cavite (p.
48, Rollo). Since the action for annulment of judgment is a personal one, the venue of the action
in this case should be either CFI of Caloocan or CFI of Cavite at the election of the plaintiff.
Clearly, venue was improperly laid in the CFI of Rizal and respondent judge should have
dismissed the action for annulment of judgment on the ground of improper venue.
It is significant to state at this point that although the prevailing rule before B. P. 129 was that
courts of first instance and their branches have jurisdiction to annul each other's final judgments
and orders as ruled in Dulap and subsequent cases, fundamental principles still dictate that the
better policy, as a matter of comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance and
the branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried by the same court or branch which
heard the main action sought to be annulled (Gianan v. Imperial, supra).itc-aslMoreover,
despite the re-examination by this Court of the old ruling in Mas v. Dumara-og, supra, recent
decisions still uphold its rationale that pursuant to judicial stability, the doctrine of noninterference should be regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any
court of concurrent jurisdiction (Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, No. L-45825, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA
237; Republic v. Reyes, Nos.
L-30263-65, October 30, 1987; Parco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, 111
SCRA 262).
While the foregoing discussion may no longer find any application at this time with the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa, Blg. 129, enacted on August 10, 1981, which transferred the jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgment to the Court of Appeals, it was deemed necessary if only
to bring light and settle the existing confusion and chaos among judges of the different courts of
first instance and their branches concerning the application of the old laws on jurisdiction and
venue over this kind of action. Probably, this confusion was the underlying reason of the
Legislature behind the transfer of jurisdiction over annulment of judgments from the trial courts
to the Court of Appeals under B.P. 129.
Even if We were to disregard, for the sake of argument, the issue on jurisdiction of and venue in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the annulment suit, We found, upon perusal of the records,
that no sufficient grounds exist to justify the annulment of the final judgment of the Cavite court.
Certain requisites must be established before a judgment can be the subject of an action for
annulment. A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want
of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud (Santiago v.
Ceniza, No. L-17322, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 494).

None of the aforementioned grounds was shown to exist to support the annulment action. The
contention of private respondents that they were not served with summons in Case No. TM-223
in the Cavite court is untenable. In their memorandum filed with this Court, they admit that they
were served with summons thru their co-defendant Antonio Samonte who acknowledged receipt
thereof. The receipt of summons is shown by the return submitted by the sheriff to the Court of
First Instance of Cavite. Apart from the presumption that the sheriff had regularly performed his
functions, records amply show that all the defendants, including private respondents had filed
their answer in Case No. TM-223 thru counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine. And when final judgment had
been rendered by the CFI of Cavite against respondents and a writ of execution issued by the
trial court, the private respondents, thru the same counsel, Atty. Pine even instituted a petition
for certiorari and mandamus to enjoin the execution of the judgment of the Cavite court.
Respondents now allege that they have not authorized Atty. Danilo Pine to appear in their behalf
as defendants in Case No. TM-223 or to file the petition for certiorari with the appellate court.
Such allegation is devoid of merit.
An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears,
and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client
(Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court). The fact that private respondents had not personally
appeared in the hearings of Case TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The filing of the answer
by and appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are sufficient to give private respondents
standing in court. It is hard to believe that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case
would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he had not been authorized or
employed by the party concerned. It is obvious that since the appellate court had decided
adversely against private respondents in their petition for certiorari, the latter filed the annulment
suit for a second chance at preventing petitioners from enforcing the decision rendered by the
Cavite court in favor of the latter.
It is an important fundamental principle in Our judicial system that every litigation must come to
an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigant's
rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be
granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be
harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, unscrupulous
litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice (Ngo Bun Tiong v.
Sayo, supra; Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 52498, July 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 117).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (now Regional Trial Court) is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. C-2442.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.