UST Faculty Union vs. Bitonio / BLR GR No.

131235 Case Digest

FACTS:
Private respondent Marinio et al were duly
elected officers of UST faculty. The union
has a 5-year CBA with its employer and is
set to expire on May 31, 1998. On October
5, 1996 various UST club presidents
requested a general faculty assembly thus
union and non-union faculty members
convened. New set of officers were elected,
violative of the CBL and that the GA was
held with non-union members present.
Union officers were served with a notice to
vacate the union office, and CBA was
ratified by an overwhelming majority. MedArbiter declared the election violative of the
CBL while BLR director Bitonio upheld the
decision with a ruling that the CBL which
constituted the covenant between the union
and its members could not be suspended
during the general assembly of all faculty
members, since it ha not been authorized
by the union.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to recognize the officers elected
during the general assembly.
RULING:
Self-organization is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution and the
Labor Code. Corollary to this right is the
prerogative not to join, affiliate with or
assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a
union member, an employee must not only
signify the intent to become one, but also
take some positive steps to realize that
intent. The procedure for union membership
is usually embodied in the unions CBL. An
employee who becomes a union member
acquires the rights and he concomitant
obligations that go with the new status and
becomes bound by the unions rules and
regulations.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST) vs
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST
(SM-UST)
G.R. No. 169940 (September 14, 2009)
Facts: Respondent Samahang Manggagawa
ng U.S.T. (SM-UST) was the authorized
bargaining agent of the non-academic/nonteaching rank-and-file daily- and monthlypaid employees (numbering about 619) of
petitioner, the Pontifical and Royal
University of Santo Tomas, The Catholic

University of the Philippines (or UST), a

private university in the City of Manila run
by the Order of Preachers. [The two parties
had attempted to have a CBA formulated,
containing salary increases, signing and
Christmas bonuses. They were not able to
come to an agreement, and the respondent
union voted to stage a strike. This was
promptly acted upon by DOLE, which
rendered a decision granting, among
others, reasonable increases and signing
bonus. This was questioned by the
respondents on appeal, which partially
granted the petition].
On appeal to SC, UST alleged that:
1. It began paying the wage adjustment and
other benefits pursuant to the May 31, 2002
Order of the DOLE Secretary; and that to
date, 572 out of the 619 members of
respondent have been paid. It argued that
by their acceptance of the award and the
resulting payments made to them, the said
union members have ratified its offer and
thus rendered moot the case before the
Court of Appeals.
2. The appellate courts award of additional
signing bonus (from P10,000.00 to
P18,000.00) is contrary to the nature and
principle behind the grant of such benefit,
which is one given as a matter of discretion
and cannot be demanded by right,[12] a
consideration paid for the goodwill that
existed in the negotiations, which culminate
in the signing of a CBA.[13] Petitioner
claims that since this condition is absent in
the parties case, it was erroneous to have
rewarded respondent with an increased
signing bonus.
Issue: [1. Whether or not the members of
private respondent voluntarily and
knowingly accepted the arbitral award of
the secretary of dole, amounting to
ratification or waiver..
2. Whether or not the increase of the
signing bonus was correct.]
Held: The question of whether respondents
members individual acceptance of the
award and the resulting payments made by
petitioner operate as a ratification of the
DOLE Secretarys award which renders CA
decision moot, we find that such do not
operate as a ratification of the DOLE
Secretarys award; nor a waiver of their
right to receive further benefits, or what
they may be entitled to under the law. The
appellate court correctly ruled that the
respondents members were merely
constrained to accept payment at the time.
Christmas was then just around the corner,
and the union members were in no position
to resist the temptation to accept muchneeded cash for use during the most
1

auspicious occasion of the year. Time and

again, we have held that necessitous men
are not, truly speaking, free men; but to
answer a present emergency, will submit to
any terms that the crafty may impose upon
them.
Besides, as individual components of a
union possessed of a distinct and separate
corporate personality, respondents
members should realize that in joining the
organization, they have surrendered a
portion of their individual freedom for the
benefit of all the other members; they
submit to the will of the majority of the
members in order that they may derive the
advantages to be gained from the
concerted action of all. Since the will of the
members is personified by its board of
directors or trustees, the decisions it makes
should accordingly bind them. Precisely, a
labor union exists in whole or in part for the
purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms
and conditions of employment. What the
individual employee may not do alone, as
for example obtain more favorable terms
and conditions of work, the labor
organization, through persuasive and
coercive power gained as a group, can
accomplish better.
A signing bonus is a grant motivated by the
goodwill generated when a CBA is
successfully negotiated and signed between
the employer and the union. In the instant
case, no CBA was successfully negotiated
by the parties. It is only because petitioner
prays for this Court to affirm in toto the
DOLE Secretarys May 31, 2002 Order that
we shall allow an award of signing bonus.
There would have been no other basis to
grant it if petitioner had not so prayed. We
shall take it as a manifestation of
petitioners liberality, which we cannot now
allow it to withdraw. A bonus is a gratuity
or act of liberality of the giver; when
petitioner filed the instant petition seeking
the affirmance of the DOLE Secretarys
Order in its entirety, assailing only the
increased amount of the signing bonus
awarded, it is considered to have
unqualifiedly agreed to grant the original
award to the respondent unions members.
[FYI.]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The signing bonus of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P18,000.00) per
member of respondent Samahang
Manggagawa ng U.S.T. as awarded by the
Court of Appeals is REDUCED to TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00). All other
findings and dispositions made by the Court

of Appeals in its January 31, 2005 Decision

and September 23, 2005 Resolution in CAG.R. SP No. 72965 are AFFIRMED.
Villar vs. Inciong
L-50283-84
April 20, 1983
FACTS:
AEU under FUR attempted to have a
certification election but due to the
opposition of AEU-PAFLU, the petition was
denied by the Med-Arbiter.
AEU-PAFLU then called a special meeting
among members and it was there decided
that an investigation of certain people
would be held pursuant to the constitution
and by-laws of the Federation, of all of the
petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for
"continuously maligning, libelling and
slandering not only the incumbent officers
but even the union itself and the
federation;" spreading 'false propaganda'
that the union officers were 'merely
appointees of the management', and for
causing divisiveness in the union.
A Trial Committee was then formed to
investigate the local union's charges
against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty.
AEU-PAFLU and the Company concluded a
new CBA which, besides granting additional
benefits to the workers, also reincorporated
the same provisions of the existing CBA,
including the union security clause reading,
to wit:
All members of the UNION as of the signing
of this Agreement shall remain members
thereof in good standing. Therefore, any
members who shall resign, be expelled, or
shall in any manner cease to be a member
of the UNION, shall be dismissed from his
employment upon written request of the
UNION to the Company.
The petitioners were summoned to appear
before the PAFLU Trial Committee for the
aforestated investigation of the charges
filed against them but they did not attend
and instead requested for a "Bill of
Particulars" of the charges which had been
formalized by the AEU-PAFLU officers; they
contend that their actions were merely
exercise of the right to freedom of
association.
Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over
their case, petitioners again refused to
participate in the investigation rescheduled
and conducted. Instead, they merely
2

appeared to file their Answer to the charges

and moved for a dismissal.
Based on the findings and
recommendations of the PAFLU trial
committee, the PAFLU President found the
petitioners guilty of the charges against
them and it was requested that they be
terminated in conformity with the security
clause in the CBA. Meanwhile, they were
placed under preventive suspension and
denied access to the workplace.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Minister acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed
the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge
allowing the preventive suspension and
subsequent dismissal of petitioners by
reason of the exercise of their right to
freedom of association.
HELD:
It is true that disaffiliation from a labor
union is not open to legal objection. It is
implicit in the freedom of association
ordained by the Constitution. However, a
closed shop is a valid form of union
security, and such provision in a CBA is not
a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution.
Here, the Company and the AEU-PAFLU
entered into a CBA with a union security
clause and the stipulation for closed-shop is
clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room
for doubt that the employer is bound, under
the collective bargaining agreement, to
dismiss the employees, herein petitioners,
for non-union membership.
Petitioners became non-union members
upon their expulsion from the general
membership of the AEU-PAFLU pursuant to
the Decision of the PAFLU national
president.
PAFLU had the authority to investigate
petitioners on the charges filed by their coemployees in the local union and after
finding them guilty as charged, to expel
them from the roll of membership under the
constitution of the PAFLU to which the local
union was affiliated.
According to the OIC: dtripped of nonessentials, the basic and fundamental issue
in this case tapers down to the
determination of WHETHER OR NOT PAFLU
HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE
OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL
THEM FROM THE ROLL OF MEMBERSHIP OF
THE AMIGOEMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU.

Recognized and salutary is the principle

that when a labor union affiliates with a
mother union, it becomes bound by the
laws and regulations of the parent
organization.
When a labor union affiliates with a parent
organization or mother union, or accepts a
charter from a superior body, it becomes
subject to the laws of the superior body
under whose authority the local union
functions. The constitution, by-laws and
rules of the parent body, together with the
charter it issues pursuant thereto to the
subordinate union, constitute an
enforceable contract between the parent
body and the subordinate union, and
between the members of the subordinate
union inter se.
'Due process' simply means that the parties
were given the opportunity to be heard. In
the instant case, ample and unmistakable
evidence exists to show that the oppositors
were afforded the opportunity to present
their evidence, but they themselves
disdained or spurned the said opportunity
given to them.
Inherent in every labor union, or any
organization, is the right of selfpreservation. When members of a labor
union, therefore, sow the seeds of
dissension and strife within the union; when
they seek the disintegration and destruction
of the very union to which they belong, they
thereby forfeit their rights to remain as
members of the union which they seek to
destroy.
We, therefore, hold and rule that
petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate
from their union and form a new
organization of their own, must, however,
suffer the consequences of their separation
from the union under the security clause of
the CBA.
SALUNGA VS CIR
SUMMARY:
Salunga resigned from the Union but was
advised by SMB that Section 3 of the CBA
with NBAILUP-PAFLU (a closed shop
agreement) existed. Salunga revoked his
resignation in order to keep his job but the
Union did not allow his membership to be
reinstated, hence his termination from his
job which was regretfully made by SMB. The
Court held for Salunga, stating that the
Union was guilty of ULP as unions are not
entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified
applicants for membership, and a closed3

shop provision would not justify the

employer in discharging, or a union in
insisting upon the discharge of, an
employee whom the union thus refuses to
admit to membership, without any
reasonable ground therefor.
DOCTRINE:
ULP - a closed-shop provision would not
justify the employer in discharging, or a
union in insisting upon the discharge of, an
employee whom the union thus refuses to
admit to membership, without any
reasonable ground therefor.
FACTS:
[NOTE: taken and derived from earlier Labor
2 digests from last years pool]
San Miguel Brewery (SMB) entered into a
CBA with the National Brewery and Allied
Industries Labor Union of the Philippines
(NBAILUP-PAFLU, otherwise known as the
Union). Section 3 of the CBA (a Closed
Shop Agreement) reads:
The company agrees to require as a
condition of employment of those workers
covered by this agreement who either are
members of the UNION on the date of the
signing of this agreement, or may join the
UNION during the effectivity of this
agreement, that they shall not voluntarily
resign from the UNION earlier than thirty
(30) days before the expiry date of this
agreement as provided in Article XIII hereof,
provided, however, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to require the
company to enforce any sanction
whatsoever against any employee or worker
who fails to retain his membership in the
UNION as hereinbefore stated, for any
cause other than voluntary resignation or
non-payment of regular union dues on the
part of said employee or worker.
Petitioner Francisco Salunga was a member
of the Union since 1953. Due to a falling out
with the Union, he tendered his resignation
from the Union, which accepted it and
transmitted it to the Company with a
request for the immediate implementation
of said section 3. SMB informed Salunga
that his aforementioned resignation would
result in the termination of his employment,
and in view of said section, Salunga wrote a
letter to the Union withdrawing or revoking
his resignation and advising the Union to
continue deducting his monthly union dues.
He, moreover, furnished a copy of this
communication to SMB. The latter, in turn,
notified the Union of the receipt of said
copy and that "in view thereof, we shall not
take any action on this case and shall

consider Mr. Francisco Salunga still a

member of your union and continue
deducting his union dues."
However, on September 8, 1961, the Union
told SMB that Salungas membership could
not be reinstated and insisted on his
separation from the service, conformably
with the stipulation above-quoted. SMB sent
a reply clarifying the instructions of the
Union to terminate the employment of
Salunga. The Union reiterated its request for
implementation of said section 3, for which
reason, SMB notified Salunga that, in view
of said letter and the aforementioned
section, they have to terminate his
employment, although with regret.
Meanwhile, Salunga sought the intervention
of PAFLU's National President, Cipriano Cid,
to which the Union was affiliated, for a
review of the latter's action. PAFLU gave
due course to petitioner's request for
review.
On October 6, 1961, Cid advised Salunga
that PAFLU had found no ground to review
the action taken by the Union and that, on
the expiration of the 15-day grace granted
to him by the Company, the decision
thereof to terminate his services would take
effect.
Salunga then notified the PAFLU that he was
appealing to its supreme authority the
PAFLU National Convention and
requested that action on his case be
deferred until such time as the Convention
shall have acted on his appeal.
Furthermore, he asked SMB to maintain the
status quo, in the meantime. This
notwithstanding, at the close of the
business hours, on October 15, 1961,
Salunga was discharged from the
employment of the Company, through its
assistant-secretary and vice-president,
herein respondent Miguel Noel. Hence, the
complaint in the CIR.
CIR decided in favor of Salunga. Defendants
(including SMB) all guilty of ULP. Ordered
Union to readmit petitioner as member, and
Company to reinstate him with backwages.
ON Motion for Reconsideration, CIR reversed
its earlier decision. Hence, this appeal by
the petitioner.
ISSUES/HELD:
1.
WON the Union is guilty of ULP. YES.
2.
WON SMB (the employer) is guilty of
ULP. NO.
RATIO:
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1. In the case of the Union, it was found that

NBAILUP-PAFLU acted arbitrarily. Although
Salunga had resigned from the Union and
the latter had accepted the resignation,
Salunga had, soon later upon learning
that his withdrawal from the Union would
result in his separation from the Company,
owing to the closed-shop provision above
referred to revoked or withdrawn said
resignation, and the Union refused to
consent thereto without any just cause
therefor. The Union had not only acted
arbitrarily in not allowing petitioner to
continue his membership but the trial Judge
also found said refusal of the Union officers
to be due to his critical attitude towards
certain measures taken or sanctioned by
them.
The record is clear that, feeling dejected by
the inaction of the union officials on his
grievances and objections to what he
believed were illegal disbursements of
union funds, coupled with the fact that he
was later removed from his position as a
union steward without his knowledge, as
well as the fact that the union did not honor
the power of attorney executed in his favor
by Alejandro Miranda, a co-worker, for the
collection of Miranda's indebtedness of
P60.00 to him, he submitted his letter of
resignation from the union on August 18,
1961.
Indeed said officers tried to justify
themselves by characterizing said criticisms
as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of
course, is not true, not only because the
criticism assailed, not the Union, but certain
acts of its officers, and, indirectly, the
officers themselves, but also because the
constitution and by-laws of the Union
explicitly recognize the right of its members
to give their views on "all transactions
made by the Union." As a consequence, the
resolution appealed from cannot be
affirmed without, in effect, nullifying said
right which, independently of the
constitution and by-laws of the Union, is
part and parcel of the freedom of speech
guaranteed in the Constitution of our
Republic, as a condition sine qua non to the
sound growth and development of labor
organizations and democratic institutions.
Although, generally, a state may not compel
ordinary voluntary associations to admit
thereto any given individual, because
membership therein may be accorded or
withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is
qualified in respect of labor unions holding a
monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a
given locality, or as regards a particular

employer with which it has a closed-shop

agreement. The reason is that:
The closed shop and the union shop
cause the admission requirements of trade
union to become affected with the public
interest. Likewise, a closed shop, a union
shop, or maintenance of membership
clauses cause the administration of
discipline by unions to be affected with the
public interest.
Consequently, it is well settled that such
unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude
qualified applicants for membership, and a
closed-shop provision would not justify the
employer in discharging, or a union in
insisting upon the discharge of, an
employee whom the union thus refuses to
admit to membership, without any
reasonable ground therefor.
Needless to say, if said unions may be
compelled to admit new members, who
have the requisite qualifications, with more
reason may the law and the courts exercise
the coercive power when the employee
involved is a long standing union member,
who, owing to provocations of union
officers, was impelled to tender his
resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or
revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke
the rights of those who seek admission for
the first time, and cannot arbitrarily be
denied readmission.
2. For SMB, however, it was held that it did
not engage in ULP. It was shown that SMB
itself was even reluctant if not unwilling
to discharge the petitioner. When the
Union first informed SMB of Salungas
resignation and urged implementation of
section 3 of the bargaining contract, SMB
advised Salunga of the provision, thereby
intimating that he had to withdraw his
resignation in order to keep his
employment. Besides, SMB notified the
Union that it (SMB) would not take any
action on the case and would consider
Salunga "still a member" of the Union.
When the latter, thereafter, insisted on
petitioner's discharge, SMB still demurred
and explained it was not taking sides and
that its stand was prompted merely by
"humane" considerations, springing from
the belief that petitioner had resigned from
the Union without realizing its effect upon
his employment. And, as the Union
reiterated its demand, SMB notified
petitioner that it had no other alternative
but to terminate his employment, and
dismissed him from the service, although
with "regret".
5

Under these circumstances, SMB was not

"unfair" to the petitioner. On the contrary, it
did not merely show a commendable
understanding of and sympathy for his
plight. It even tried to help him, although to
such extent only as was consistent with its
obligation to refrain from interfering in
purely internal affairs of the Union. At the
same time, SMB could not safely inquire
into the motives of the Union officers, in
refusing to allow Salunga to withdraw his
resignation.
Inasmuch as the true motives were not
manifest, without such inquiry, and Salunga
had concededly tendered his resignation of
his own free will, the arbitrary nature of the
decision of said officers was not such as to
be apparent and to justify the company in
regarding said decision unreasonable. Upon
the other hand, SMB cannot be blamed for
assuming the contrary, for Salunga had
appealed to the National Officers of the
PAFLU and the latter had sustained the
Union. SMB was therefore justified in
presuming that the PAFLU had inquired into
all relevant circumstances, including the
motives of the Union Officers.
In finding the company guilty of ULP, the
trial Judge felt that San Miguel should have
waited for the action of the national
convention before issuing the notice of
dismissal. However, the record does not
show that petitioner was prejudiced by San
Miguels failure to maintain the status quo,
after the Union had been sustained by said
officers. In fact, petitioner did not even try
to establish that he had submitted to San
Miguel as he has not introduced in the
lower court satisfactory proof that an
appeal had really been taken by him to the
aforementioned Convention.
July 26, 2010
ATTY. ALLAN S. MONTAO vs. ATTY.
ERNESTO C. VERCELES
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
SUMMARY: Atty. Montao, union president
and federation employee, was nominated
for FFW National Vice President. FFW
COMELEC disqualified him pursuant to FFW
Constitution and By Laws Sec. 76 which
prohibits federation employees from sitting
in its Governing Board. Still, he was allowed
to run by Convention delegates during the
national election despite protests of Atty.
Verceles and he subsequently won. Verceles
wrote to FFW COMELEC then filed a petition
for nullification of Montanos election. BLR
ruled that there were no grounds to hold
Atty. Montao unqualified to run for National
Vice-President of FFW under Sec. 26 w/c

enumerates the qualifications. CA reversed

and held that Atty. Montao did not possess
the qualification requirement under par. (d)
of Section 26 that candidates must be an
officer or member of a legitimate labor
organization (when FFW Staff Assoc. is not).
Held: FFW Constitution and By-laws are
clear that no member of the Governing
Board shall at the same time perform
functions of the rank-and-file staff. Thus,
Atty. Montao is disqualified to run for the
position of National Vice-President in view of
such proscription. At the time of his
nomination and election for the position in
the Governing Board, he was the head of
FFW Legal Center and the President of FFW
Staff Association. Even after he was elected,
he continued to perform his functions as
staff member of FFW and no evidence was
presented to show that he tendered his
resignation. Accordingly, his election as FFW
Vice-President is null and void.
FACTS:

Oct. 1, 94: Atty. Montao worked as

legal assistant of FFW Legal Center and
subsequently joined the FFW Staff
Association, the union of rank-and-file
employees, and eventually became the
employees' union president in July 1997. He
became the OIC of FFW Legal Center in Nov.
1998.

During the 21st National Convention

and Election of National Officers of FFW,
Atty. Montao was nominated for the
position of National VP.

However, FFW COMELEC informed

him that he is not qualified for the position
as his candidacy violates the 1998 FFW
Constitution and By-Laws, particularly Sec.
76 of Article XIX and Sec. 25 (a) of Article
VIII, both in Chapter II thereof.
o
Sec. 76. Except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, no Member of
the Governing Board shall at the same time
be an employee in the staff of the
Federation.
o
Sec. 25. A Candidate/Nominee for the
position of Governing Board Member,
whether Titular or Deputy shall, except as
otherwise provided in this Constitution,
possess the following qualifications: a.
he/she must be a bonafide member of the
Federation for at least 2 consecutive years
and a member of an affiliated organization
which is up to date with its monthly dues to
the Federation.

Atty. Montao filed an Urgent MR

praying that his name be included in the
official list of candidates.

May 26-27, 2001: Election ensued in

the National Convention held at Subic Intl
Hotel. Convention delegates allowed Atty.
Montao's candidacy despite the pending
6

MR, and strong opposition and protest of

Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles, a delegate to the
convention and president of UE Employees'
Assoc. (UEEA-FFW) which is an affiliate
union of FFW and a member of latters
Governing Board
o
Atty. Montao emerged victorious
and was proclaimed as the National VP.

Atty. Verceles wrote to Chairman of

FFW COMELEC reiterating his protest over
Atty. Montao's candidacy and also sent a
follow-up letter to the President of FFW
requesting for immediate action on his
protest.

Atty. Verceles then filed before the

BLR a petition for the nullification of the
election of Atty. Montao as FFW National
Vice-President w/ prayer for injunctive relief
o
As already ruled by the FFW
COMELEC, Atty. Montao is not qualified to
run for the position because FFW
Constitution and By-Laws prohibits
federation employees from sitting in its
Governing Board.
o
Atty. Montao's premature
assumption of duties and formal induction
as VP will cause serious damage.

Atty. Montao filed his Comment

with Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that:
o
Regional Director of DOLE and not
the BLR has jurisdiction over the case
o
Filing of the petition was premature
due to the pending and unresolved protest
before the FFW COMELEC
o
Atty. Verceles has no legal standing
to initiate the petition not being the real
party in interest.

Meanwhile, FFW COMELEC sent a

letter to FFW National President, Bro. Jabar,
in reference to the election protest filed
before it by Atty. Verceles and intimated its
firm stand that Atty. Montao's candidacy
contravenes the FFW's Constitution.
o
The decision of the convention body
in allowing Atty. Montao's candidacy is not
valid in view of the fact that it runs counter
to the FFW Constitution and the body at
that time was not acting as a Constitutional
Convention body empowered to amend the
FFW Constitution on the spot.
o
Conducting the election does not
depart from the fact that FFW COMELEC did
not change its decision disqualifying
candidates such as Atty. Allan S. Montao.
o
The National Convention as a coequal constitutional body of the COMELEC
was not given the license nor the authority
to violate the Constitution. It cannot reverse
the final decision of the COMELEC with
regard to the candidacy of Atty. Montao.

BLR: Did not give due course to Atty.

Montao's Motion to Dismiss but ordered
the latter to submit his answer to the
petition pursuant to the rules. The parties

thereafter submitted their respective

pleadings and position papers.

BLR: Dismissed petition. While it

upheld its jurisdiction over the intra-union
dispute case and affirmed, as well, Atty.
Verceles' legal personality to institute the
action as president of an affiliate union of
FFW, there were no grounds to hold Atty.
Montao unqualified to run for National
Vice-President of FFW.
o
The applicable provision in the FFW
Constitution and By-Laws to determine
whether one is qualified to run for office is
not Sec. 76 of Article XIX but Sec. 26 of
Article VIII 20 thereof.
o
Sec. 26. A candidate for the position
of National President, National VicePresident, and National Treasurer shall
possess the following qualifications:

a. a candidate must be a bonafide

member of the Federation for at least 2
consecutive years;

b. a candidate must be of good moral

character and has not been convicted by a
final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude before a candidate's election to
office or during a candidate's incumbency;

c. except the Treasurer, a candidate

must serve the Federation full time for the
period of his/her incumbency;

d. a candidate for National President

and National Vice-President must be or
must have been an officer or member of a
legitimate labor organization in the FFW for
at least 3 years. A legitimate labor
organization shall mean a duly registered
labor union as defined by the Labor Code as
Amended.
o
There was sufficient compliance with
the requirements laid down by this
applicable provision and, besides, the
convention delegates unanimously decided
that Atty. Montao was qualified to run for
the position of National VP.

Atty. Verceles filed MR but it was

denied by the BLR.

Atty. Verceles thus elevated the

matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari
arguing that the Convention had no
authority under the FFW Constitution and
By-Laws to overrule and set aside the FFW
COMELEC's Decision rendered pursuant to
the latter's power to screen candidates.

CA Decision: Set aside the BLR's

Decision. Granted the petition and nullified
the election of Atty. Montao as FFW
National Vice-President.
o
It agreed that jurisdiction was
properly lodged with the BLR, that Atty.
Verceles has legal standing to institute the
petition, and that the applicable provision of
FFW Constitution and By-Laws is Sec. 26 of
Article VIII and not Sec. 76 of Article XIX.
7

o
However, Atty. Montao did not
possess the qualification requirement under
par. (d) of Section 26 that candidates must
be an officer or member of a legitimate
labor organization.
o
Since Atty. Montao, as legal
assistant employed by FFW, is considered
as confidential employee, consequently, he
is ineligible to join FFW Staff Association,
the rank-and-file union of FFW.

Atty. Montao filed MR claiming that

the CA seriously erred in granting Atty.
Verceles' petition on the ground that FFW
Staff Association, of which he is an officer
and member, is not a legitimate labor
organization.
o
The legitimacy of the union was
never raised as an issue.
o
The declaration of the CA that FFW
Staff Association is not a legitimate labor
organization amounts to a collateral attack
upon its legal personality, which is
proscribed by law.
o
There is lack of jurisdiction and lack
of cause of action due to a pending protest.
o
There is violation of the mandatory
requirement on certification against forum
shopping and mootness of the case due to
the appointment of Atty. Verceles as
Commissioner of NLRC, thereby divesting
himself of interest in any matters relating to
his affiliation with FFW.

FFW Staff Association, through its

president, Danilo A. Laserna, sought
intervention believing that it will be
prejudiced by the CA Decision since its legal
existence was put at stake.

CA Resolution: Denied both Atty.

Montao's MR and FFW Staff Association's
motion for intervention/clarification.

Hence this petition for review on

Certiorari; CA erred in:
o
In granting the petition to annul his
election as FFW National VP on the ground
that FFW Staff Association is not a
legitimate labor organization

When this was not even raised by

Atty. Montano

When FFW was not given a day in

court
o
Upholding the exercise of jurisdiction
by BLR, despite express provision of law
granting said jurisdiction over cases
involving protests and petitions for
annulment of results of elections to the
Regional Directors of DOLE
o
Not dismissing the petition a quo, in
that:

The filing of the petition for

nullification of the result of election is
premature, in view of pendency of Atty
Verceles protest before FFW COMELEC at
the time of the filing of said petition, hence,
he has no cause of action

Atty Verceles has no certification

against forum shopping
o
In not ordering the dismissal of the
case for having been rendered moot and
academic by a supervening event that
was, when Atty. Verceles sought
appointment and was appointed
Commissioner of NLRC, he divested himself
with any interest with matters relating to his
former membership and affiliation with
FFW, hence, he is no longer a real party
interest as he does not stand to be injured
or benefited by the judgment in the instant
case
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Montano is not
qualified to run as FFW National VicePresident in view of the prohibition
established in the 1998 FFW Constitution
and By-Laws? (YES)
RATIO:
Resolution of Case Despite Mootness

During the pendency of this case, the

challenged term of office held and served
by Atty. Montao expired in 2006, thereby
rendering the issues of the case moot. Also,
Atty. Verceles' appointment in 2003 as NLRC
Commissioner rendered the case moot.

However, in a number of cases, SC

still delved into the merits notwithstanding
supervening events that would ordinarily
render the case moot, if the issues are
capable of repetition, yet evading review.

CAB: Atty. Montao ran and won as

FFW National Pres. after his challenged term
as FFW National VP had expired. However,
the only issue for resolution is his
qualification to run as FFW National VP
during the May 26-27, 2001 elections. It is
necessary and imperative to resolve this
issue not only to prevent further repetition
but also to clear any doubtful interpretation
and application of the provisions of FFW
Constitution & By-laws in order to ensure
credible future elections in the interest and
welfare of affiliate unions of FFW.
Atty. Montao: Disqualified

Atty. Montao is not qualified to run

as FFW National VP in view of the
prohibition established in Sec. 76, Article
XIX of the 1998 FFW Constitution and ByLaws. Sec. 76 provides that no member of
the Governing Board shall at the same time
be an employee in the staff of the
federation.
o
Atty. Montao, at the time of his
nomination and election for the position in
the Governing Board, is the head of FFW
Legal Center and the President of FFW Staff
Association. Even after he was elected, he
continued to perform his functions as staff
member of FFW and no evidence was
8

presented to show that he tendered his

resignation.

BLR and CA erred in their findings

that Sec. 26 is the applicable provision
when FFW COMELEC based its decision on
Sec. 76.

FFW COMELEC is vested with

authority and power, under the FFW
Constitution and By-Laws, to screen
candidates and determine their
qualifications and eligibility to run in the
election and to adopt and promulgate rules
concerning the conduct of elections.

Under the Rules Implementing the

Labor Code (Book V, Rule XV, Section 2 (b)
and (i)), the Committee shall have the
power to prescribe rules on the qualification
and eligibility of candidates and such other
rules as may facilitate the orderly conduct
of elections. The Committee is also
regarded as the final arbiter of all election
protests (Book V, Rule XV, Section 2 (g)).

FFW COMELEC has sufficient

authority to adopt its own interpretation of
the explicit provisions of the federation's
constitution and by-laws and unless it is
shown to have committed grave abuse of
discretion, its decision and ruling will not be
interfered with.

Atty. Montao is not qualified to run

for the position but not for failure to meet
the requirement specified under Sec. 26 (d)
of Article VIII of FFW Constitution and ByLaws.

However, CA's declaration of the

illegitimate status of FFW Staff Association
is proscribed by law, owing to the preclusion
of collateral attack (SMC v. San Miguel
Packaging Products Employees Union).
Nonetheless, CA's finding that Atty. Montao
is disqualified to run for the position of
National VP in view of the proscription in the
FFW Constitution and By-Laws on federation
employees from sitting in its Governing
Board is affirmed. Accordingly, the election
of Atty. Montao as FFW Vice-President is
null and void.
BLR Jurisdiction over Intra-union disputes of
Federations

Montano: It is the Regional Director of

the DOLE and not the BLR who has
jurisdiction over election protests.

SC: BLR has jurisdiction over the

instant dispute involving member-unions of
a federation arising from disagreement over
the provisions of the federation's
constitution and by-laws. Sec. 226 of the
Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR
and the Regional Directors of DOLE have
concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and
intra-union disputes. Such disputes include
the conduct or nullification of election of
union and workers' association officers
(Book V, Rule XI, Sec. 1).

Rule XVI lays down the decentralized

intra-union dispute settlement mechanism.
Sec. 1 states that any complaint in this
regard 'shall be filed in the Regional Office
where the union is domiciled.' The concept
of domicile in labor relations regulation is
equivalent to the place where the union
seeks to operate or has established a
geographical presence for purposes of
collective bargaining or for dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions
of employment.

The matter of venue becomes

problematic when the intra-union dispute
involves a federation, because the
geographical presence of a federation may
encompass more than one administrative
region. Pursuant to its authority under
Article 226, BLR exercises original
jurisdiction over intra-union disputes
involving federations.

FFW, having local unions all over the

country, operates in more than one
administrative region. Therefore, BLR
maintains original and exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes arising from any violation of
or disagreement over any provision of its
constitution and by-laws.
Petition: Not Premature

Montano: Petition should have been

immediately dismissed due to a pending
and unresolved protest before the FFW
COMELEC.

SC: It is true that under the

Implementing Rules, redress must first be
sought within the organization itself in
accordance with its constitution and bylaws. However, this requirement is not
absolute but yields to exception under
varying circumstances (Villar v. Hon.
Inciong).

CAB: Atty. Verceles made his protest

over Atty. Montao's candidacy during the
plenary session before the holding of the
election proceedings. FFW COMELEC,
despite protests, allowed Atty. Montao's
candidacy and proclaimed him winner for
the position.

Under the rules, COMELEC shall

endeavor to settle or resolve all protests
during or immediately after the close of
election proceedings and any protest left
unresolved shall be resolved by the
committee within five days after the close
of the election proceedings.

A day or two after the election, Atty.

Verceles made his written/formal protest
over Atty. Montao's
candidacy/proclamation with the FFW
COMELEC. He exhausted the remedies
under the constitution and by-laws to have
his protest acted upon by the proper forum
and even asked for a formal hearing on the
9

matter. Still, the FFW COMELEC failed to

timely act thereon.

Atty. Verceles had no other recourse

but to take the next available remedy to
protect the interest of the union he
represents as well as the whole federation,
especially so that Atty. Montao,
immediately after being proclaimed, already
assumed and started to perform the duties
of the position.

Consequently, Atty. Verceles properly

sought redress from the BLR so that the
right to due process will not be violated. To
insist on the contrary is to render the
exhaustion of remedies within the union as
illusory and vain (Diokno v. Cacdac).
Certification against forum shopping: This
issue was only raised for the first time in
Atty. Montao's MR of CA Decision, hence, it
deserves no merit. New issues cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal or on MR
(Arceo v. GSIS).
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. CA Decision
nullifying the election of Atty. Allan S.
Montao as FFW National Vice-President
and Resolution denying MR AFFIRMED
TOPIC: DISQUALIFICATION CANDIDATE
MANALAD VS. TRAJANO
FACTS
The parties are employees of United
Dockhandlers, Inc, rival groups in the
Associated Port Checkers and
Workers'Union (APCWU) Petitioner led by
Ricardo R. Manalad, with respondent Pablo
B. Babula heading the group of private
respondents. Although qualifications have
been earlier questioned, Manalad et al won
the elections for APCWU officers on
November 26, 1984. Babula et al filed
petition for review and on July 3, 1985, the
court promulgated a resolution to dismiss
petition for lack of merit and have petitioner
Babula et al vacant APCWU offices and
turnover management to Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, all for immediate
execution, to be followed by a specia
lelections to be held on July 20, 1985 (to be
held under the personal supervision of
Director Trajano and his staff).Babula et al
were alleged to refuse compliance with the
above resolution as documented in the
petition filed byManalad et al. The July 20
1985 special election was held having
Babula et al as winners and duly elected
officials of APCWU .Manalad et al filed
petition to disqualify Babula et al as winners
due to their non-compliance to the July 3
1985resolution, but Director Trajano
dismissed their petition and proclaimed
Babula et al as the winners of the July

20,1985 special elections. Manalad et al,

then, filed petition to SC to reverse
resolution of Trajano, have Babula et al
disqualified and annul the July 20 1985
elections/conduct re-elections.In 1988,
when 3-year term for the disputed 1985
election expired, a new set of officers for
ACPWU has been elected despite motion for
RTO. Manalad et al prayed for the
annulment of 1988 elections.
ISSUE
Whether or not motion for annulment of
1988 elections is moot and academic
RULING
Yes. The court found the motion for
annulment of the 1988 ACPWU elections
moot and academic for the ff reasons:- It is
pointless and unrealistic to insist on
annulling an election of officers whose
terms had already expired. We must
consequently abide by our consistent ruling
that where certain events or circumstances
have taken place during the pendency of
the case which would render the case moot
and academic, the petition should be
dismissed.
19
- The court respects the will of the majority
of the workers who voted in the November
28, 1988elections.- Contentions of
petitioners do not adequately establish the
basis for contempt but respondents have
satisfactorily answered the averments
thereon.- Obtaining the second highest
number of votes does not mean that they
will thereby be considered as the elected
officers if the true winners are disqualified.
TANCINCO vs CALLEJA
FACTS: Private respondents are the prime
organizers of ITM-MEA. While said
respondents were preparing to file a
petition for direct certification of the Union
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of ITM's bargaining unit, the union's VicePresident, was promoted to the position of
Department Head, thereby disqualifying
him for union membership. Said incident,
led to a strike spearheaded by Lacanilao
group, respondents. Another group
however, led by petitioners staged a strike
inside the company premises. After 4 days
the strike was settled. On May 10, 1986 an
agreement was entered into by the
representatives of the management,
Lacanilao group and the Tancinco group the
relevant terms of which states that all
monthly employees shall be united under
one union, the ITM Month Employees
Association (ITM-MEA) to be affiliated with
ANGLO. The management of ITM recognizes
10

ANGLO as the sole and exclusive bargaining

agent of all the monthly-paid employees;
However, during the pre-election
conference attended by MOLE officers,
ANGLO through its National Secretary,
made a unilateral ruling excluding some 56
employees consisting of the Manila office
employees, members of Iglesia ni Kristo,
non-time card employees, drivers of Mrs.
Salazar and the cooperative employees of
Mrs. Salazar. The election of officers was
conducted, the 56 employees in question
participated but their votes were
segregated without being counted.
Lacanilao's group won. Lacanilao garnered
119 votes with a margin of 3 votes over
Tancinco prompting petitioners to make a
protest.
BLR ruled holding the exclusion of the
56 employees as arbitrary, whimsical, and
wanting in legal basis but set aside the
challenged order on the ground that 51 **
of 56 challenged voters were not yet union
members at the time of the election per
April 24, 1986 list submitted before the
Bureau.
ISSUE: WON the 56 employees have the
right to vote even though some of them are
not included in the list of union members
submitted to the Bureau.
HELD: YES
RATIO: Submission of the employees names
with the BLR as qualified members of the
union is not a condition sine qua non to
enable said members to vote in the election
of union's officers. It finds no support in fact
and in law. Per public respondent's findings,
the April 24, 1986 list consists of 158 union
members only wherein 51 of the 56
challenged voters' names do not appear.
It is true that under article 242(c) of the
Labor Code, as amended, only members of
the union can participate in the election of
union officers. The question however of
eligibility to vote may be determined
through the use of the applicable payroll
period and employee's status during the
applicable payroll period. The payroll of the
month next preceding the labor dispute in
case of regular employees and the payroll
period at or near the peak of operations in
case of employees in seasonal industries.
It can also be shown that their act of joining
the election by casting their votes is a clear
manifestation of their intention to join the
union. They must therefore be considered
ipso facto members. Said employees having
exercised their right to unionism by joining
ITM-MEA their decision is paramount. Their
names could not have been included in the
list of employee submitted on April 24, 1986
to the Bureau of Labor for the agreement to

join the union was entered into only on May

10, 1986. Indeed the election was
supervised by the Department of Labor
where said 56 members were allowed to
vote. Private respondents never challenged
their right to vote then.
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWANG
PINAGYAKAP (KMP) v. TRAJANO
G.R. No. 62306, January 21, 1985;
Relova, J.
Digest prepared by Jackie Canlas
FACTS:

A request for accounts examination

of the financial status of the Kapisanan ng
Manggagawang Pinagyakap Labor Union
(KMP), the existing labor union at Franklin
Baker Company in San Pablo City, was filed
by Union members Catalino Silvestre and
(13) other employees (Silvestre et al.).

Union Account Examiner Vicedo of

the Ministry of Labor and Employment
conducted the necessary investigation and
submitted a report, with the following
findings:
A. Disallowed expenditures P1,278.00;
B. Non-production of the books of accounts
for the years 1977-79;
C.
Failure to maintain segregated
disbursement receipts in accordance with
the 5 segregated union funds (general,
educational, mutual aid, burial assistance
and union building) for which they
maintained a distinct and separate bank
accounts for each;
D. Non-ratification of the constitution and
bylaws by the general membership.

Thus, Silvestre et al. filed with the

QC Reg Office of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, for the expulsion of the Union
officers on the ground of:
o
gross violation of the Labor Code 242
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), (h), (j) and (k); and,
o
gross violation of the Union
constitution and bylaws, particularly Secs. 6
and 7 thereof.

Union officers:
o
The disallowed expenditures were
made in GF and for the benefit of the
members, and that they are willing to
reimburse the same from their own
personal funds.
o
They should not be held accountable
for books of accounts for 1977-79 since
they were not the officers then and not one
of the former officers had turned over the
records in question.
o
The non-ratification of the
constitution and bylaws and the nonsegregation of the Union funds occurred
before they became officers and that they
have already been correcting it.
11


MedArbiter ordered the holding of a
referendum to decide whether to expel or
suspend the Union officers.

Union officers appealed to BLR Dir.

Trajano, reiterating their defence. Silvestre
et al. also appealed, reiterating that the
appropriate action should be expulsion, not
referendum. Both were dismissed, and the
MedArbiter Order was affirmed.

Subsequently, a general election was

wherein all the Union officers (except Dela
Cruz and Celerio), were elected by the
overwhelming majority of the members,
while Respondents Silvestre and Alfaro who
also ran for the position of Auditor, lost.
Thus, the Union officers moved for the
dismissal of the appeal for having been
rendered moot and academic by their reelection.
ISSUE/RULING/RATIO:
WON the petition for expulsion of the Union
officers is already moot and academic by
their re-election YES

If the Union officers were guilty of the

alleged violations, Silvestre et al., pursuant
to Labor Code 242 and Duyag vs. Inciong,
should have meted out the appropriate
penalty on them, i.e. to expel them from the
Union, and not call for a referendum to
decide on it.

The alleged falsification and

misrepresentation of herein union officers
were not supported by substantial evidence.
The expenditures appeared to have been
made in good faith and the amount spent
for the purpose mentioned in the report is
reasonable.

The repudiation of Silvestre and

Alfaro to the highly sensitive position of
auditor at the re-election is a convincing
manifestation and demonstration of the
union membership's faith in the Union
officers leadership, and a clear condonation
of an act they had allegedly committed.

The Court should never remove a

public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right
to elect their officers. When the people
have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge
of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the court, by reason of such faults
or misconduct to practically overrule the
will of the people.
Teodorico Miranda, Jr. v. Asian
Terminals, Inc. (ATI)
G.R. No. 174316, June 23, 2009

Facts :
Petitioner was employed by
respondent as Checker I and a member of
the company union. On April 1992,
petitioner was then the VP of the union and
appointed to the position of Shop Steward
which is a union position under the payroll
of the company. The CBA between the
union and company provided for the
appointment of a Shop Steward from among
the union members upon recommendation
of the union president. The Shop Steward
is a field representative of both the
company and the union and acts as an
independent arbiter of all complaints
brought to his attention.
On December 1993, the union
president wrote a letter to the petitioner
regarding his recall as a Shop Steward due
to loss of trust and confidence. After
investigation, the company recommends
the recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward
and reversion to his former position as
Checker I in accordance with CBA.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE.
In an order, the Med Arbiter ordered the
reinstatement of petitioner as Shop
Steward. The order of Med-Arbiter was
affirmed by the Secretary of Labor.
Petitioner again filed a complaint with
Med-Arbiter involving money claims in the
form of allowances, etc., The complaint was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
filed a series of complaints with NLRC one of
which is for ULP which later amended to
illegal demotion. The LA dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action. While
the cases filed were pending, a second
complaint for ULP was filed, the LA
dismissed the same for lis pendencia. On
third complaint, the same is dismissed for
res judicata. Petitioner appealed the
decision to NLRC which NLRC remanded the
case.
Upon remand, the LA ruled that the
demotion was for cause but was effected
without observance of procedural due
process and ordered the respondent to pay
petitioner indemnity. Confusion followed,
petitioner filed a motion to be reinstated to
the position of Shop Steward which was
resolved in his favor. Respondent filed a
Petition for Prohibition, Issuance of TRO
and/or Writ of Permanent Injunction
claiming that petitioner should be
reinstated to his previous position of
Checker I.
The NLRC issued a TRO.
Petitioner filed a petition before the CA.
The CA took note of the reinstatement of
12

the petitioner to the position of Checker I.

Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner should be
reinstated to the position of Shop Steward.
Ruling:
Since the Shop Steward is a union
position, the controversy surrounding his
recall from his position as Shop Steward
becomes a dispute within the union. As
Internal Union Dispute or intra-union
conflict refers to a conflict within or inside a
labor union. It includes all disputes or
grievances arising from any violation of or
disagreement over any provision of the
constitution and by-laws of a union,
including any violation of the rights and
conditions of union membership provided
for in the Code.
The Med Arbiter, as affirmed by the
Secretary of Labor, ruled that there was
neither cause nor due process in the recall
of the petitioner from the position of union
Shop Steward. He found that the claim of
loss of trust and confidence due to the
petitioners alleged absenteeism was not
substantiated and that the recall was not
approved by the Board of Directors of the
union, as required by the APCWU
Constituion and By-Laws.
The Petion is dismissed for being
moot and academic
Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employee
Union vs Coca Cola Bottlers Phil
GR 164302-03
Facts:
The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees
Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the regular
daily paid workers and the monthly paid
non-commission-earning employees of the
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.
(Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union
informed the Company of its desire to
renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings
commenced on July 26, 1999, where the
Union and the Company discussed the
ground rules of the negotiations. The Union
insisted that representatives from the
Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be
allowed to sit down as observers in the

CBA meetings. The Union officers and

members also insisted that their wages be
based on their work shift rates. For its part,
the Company was of the view that the
members of the Alyansa were not members
of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a
mere aggregate of employees of the
Company in its various plants; and is not a
registered labor organization. Thus, an
impasse ensued.
On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers,
directors and six shop stewards filed a
Notice of Strike with the NCMB.
The Union decided to participate in a mass
action organized by the Alyansa in front of
the Companys premises. Thus, the Union
officers and members held a picket along
the front perimeter of the plant on
September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the
14 personnel of the Engineering Section of
the Company did not report for work, and
71 production personnel were also absent.
As a result, only one of the three bottling
lines operated during the day shift. All the
three lines were operated during the night
shift with cumulative downtime of five (5)
hours due
to lack of manning, complement and skills
requirement. The volume of production for
the day was short by 60,000 physical cases
versus budget.
On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a
Petition to Declare Strike Illegal
Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner
as picketing, is illegal.
Held:
Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines
strike as a temporary stoppage of work by
the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute. In
Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that the
fact that the conventional term strike was
not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, will be
deemed to be controlling.
Picketing involves merely the marching to
and fro at the premises of the employer,
usually accompanied by the display of
placards and other signs making known the
facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied
to a labor dispute, to picket means the
stationing of one or more

13

persons to observe and attempt to observe.

The purpose of pickets is said to be a
means of peaceable persuasion.
The basic elements of a strike are present in
this case. They marched to and fro in front
of the companys premises during working
hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a
concerted activity which already affected
the companys operations. The mass
concerted activity constituted a
strike.
For a strike to be valid, the following
procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of
the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a
notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days
before the intended date thereof, or 15
days in case of unfair labor practice; (b)
strike vote approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining
unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in
a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice
given to the DOLE of the results of the
voting at least seven days before the
intended strike. These requirements are
mandatory and the failure of a union to
comply therewith renders the strike illegal.
It is clear in this case that petitioners totally
ignored the statutory requirements and
embarked on their illegal strike.
Petition denied.

Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)

Facts:
The cases involve disputes regarding claims
for overtime of more than five hundred bus
drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. The
disputes were eventually settled when the
contending parties reached an Agreement
where the Administratrix would transfer to
the employees the title to a tract of land in
Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of land was
eventually registered in the name of the
Union.
The Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an
urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE) requesting for
authority to sell and dispose of the property.
Atty. Espinas, (the original counsel)
established the award of 897 workers'
claim. When Atty. Pineda appeared for the
Union in these cases, still an associate of
the law firm, his appearance carried the
firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates,"
giving the impression that he was the
principal lawyer in these cases.

Atty. Pineda, without authority from the

Supreme Court but relying on the earlier
authority given him by the Ministry of
Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying
that the Union be authorized to sell the lot.
The sale was finally consummated, resulting
in the execution of an escrow agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter
Valenzuela should be held in contempt.
Held:
YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the
authority, justice or dignity of the court;
such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigant or their witnesses during
litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings
and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of
justice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
for any conduct on his part showing his
unfitness for the confidence and trust which
characterize the attorney and client
relations, and the practice of law before the
courts, or showing such a lack of personal
honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence.
In the case, the expeditious manner by
which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty.
Pineda's motion for such authority to sell
the property makes the entire transaction
dubious and irregular.
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a
motion praying for authority to sell was by
itself an admission on his part that he did
not possess the authority to sell the
property. He could not and did not even wait
for valid authority but instead previously
obtained the same from the labor arbiter
whom he knew was not empowered to so
authorize.
Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect
contempt of court for which he is sentenced
to imprisonment and directed to show
cause why he should not be disbarred.
Abaria vs NLRC
December 7, 2011
J. Villarama
Facts:
MCCHI,presently known as Visayas
Community Medical Center, is a non-stock,
non-profit corporation. MCCHI is owned by
14

the United Church of Christ. Rev. Iyoy is its

administrator.

personality to negotiate with MCCHI for

collective bargaining purpose.

The National Federation of

Labor(NFL) is the exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and- file
employees of MCCHI. In the CBA, Nava, the
president, signed the proof of posting.

Pacific Banking Corp. v. Clave

G.R. No. 56965 | March 7, 1984 | J.
Aquino

On December 6, 1995, Nava wanted

to renew the CBA but MCCHI returned the
CBA proposal to secure first the
endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as
the official bargaining representative. But
NFL said that it has not authorized any
person. Thus, the collection of union fees
was suspended by MCCHI because of the
conflict. Subsequently, it advised Nava that
there is not recognized by NFL. Moreover, it
suspended their union membership for
serious violation of the Constitution-and-bylaws.
Nava and several union members
launched a series of mass actions marching
around the hospital premises to compel
MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain
collectively.
Subsequently, the DOLE stated that
NAMA-MCCHI-NFl is not a registered labor
organization. Thus, their strike is illegal. The
Executive Labor Arbiter found no basis for
the charge of unfair labor practice. The
termination of the union leaders was held
as valid. Complainants appealed before the
CA but they were denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issues:
1. WON MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor
practice.
2. WON petitioners were illegally
dismissed.
Held:
1. No. This is provided uder Art 253 of
the Labor Code. Moreover, records of the
NCMB and DOLE confirmed that NAMAMCCHI-NFl is not a registered labor
organization. Thus, it is not entitled to those
rights granted to a legitimate labor
organization under Art 242 of the Labor
Code.
2. No. Since the strike is illegal
because they are not a legitimate labor
organization, the termination was said to be
valid. The Officers knowingly participated in
the illegal strike. They were persistent in
holding picketing acts even if they are not a
legitimate labor organization. Also, their
filing of Notice of Strike has no lega

FACTS
Since January 1979, there had been
negotiations between the Pacific Banking
Corporation and the Pacific Banking
Corporation Employees Organization
(PABECO) for a CBA for 1979 to 1981.
Because of a deadlock, the Minister of Labor
assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.
The Deputy Minister rendered a decision
directing the parties to execute a CBA in
accordance with the terms and conditions
set forth in his decision
The union was represented in the
negotiations by its president, Paula S. Paug,
allegedly assisted as consultant by Jose P.
Umali, Jr., the president of the National
Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) with
which it was formerly affiliated. Lawyer
Juanito M. Saavedras earliest recorded
participation in the case was on July 15 and
27, 1979 when he filed a motion for
reconsideration and a supplemental motion.
No action was taken on said motions.
The parties appealed to the Office of the
President of the Philippines. The CBA
negotiations were resumed. The union
president took part in the second phase of
the negotiations. Saavedra filed a
memorandum. He claimed he exerted much
effort to expedite the decision. The Office of
the President issued a resolution directing
the parties to execute a CBA containing the
terms and conditions of employment
embodied in the resolution.
The CBA was ultimately finalized on June 3,
1980. Monetary benefits of more than P14
M were involved in the three-year CBA,
according to the banks counsel.
Even before the formalization of the CBA,
Saavedra filed in the case his notice of
attorney s lien. The banks vice-president in
a reply to the letter of the union president
stated that he had serious doubts about
paying the attorneys fees.
The union officials requested the bank to
withhold around P345,000 out of the total
benefits as 10% attorneys fees of
Saavedra. At first, the bank interposed no
objection to the request in the interest of
harmonious labor-management relations. In
theory, the actual 10% attorneys fees may
amount to more than one million pesos.
15

For nearly a year, the Office of the President

in four resolutions wrestled with the
propriety of Saavedras ten percent
attorneys fees.
1st resolution: Refused to intervene in the
matter payment of attorneys fees was a
question that should be settled by the union
and its lawyer themselves
2nd resolution: Directed that the attorneys
fees may be deducted from the total
benefits and paid to Saavedra in
accordance with LC.
3rd resolution: Held that it is the legal
obligation of the bank to turn over to the
union treasurer 10% of the award as
Saavedras fees.
4th resolution: Ordered the bank to pay the
union treasurer the said attorneys fees less
the amounts corresponding to the
protesting employees. LC 222 as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1691, effective
May 1, 1980 (before the formalization of the
CBA award) had no retroactive effect to the
case:
ART. 222. Appearances and Fees. . . . (b)
No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or
similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining negotiations or
conclusion of the collective agreement shall
be imposed on any individual member of
the contracting union: Provided, however,
that attorneys fees may be charged against
union funds in an amount to be agreed
upon by the parties. Any contract,
agreement or arrangement of any sort to
the contrary shall be null and void.
The bank assailed in this Court the said
resolutions by means of certiorari. On
February 5, 1982, the NUBE and thirteen
members of the PABECO intervened in this
case and prayed that the said resolutions
be declared void and that said sum of
P345,000 be paid directly to the employees
or union members.
ISSUES
1) W/N the President had jurisdiction to
adjudicate on Saavedras attorneys fees
2) W/N Saavedra is entitled to attorneys
fees (and who should pay)
HELD
1) NO. The Office of the President had no
jurisdiction to make an adjudication on
Saavedras attorneys fees. The case was
appealed with respect to the CBA terms and
conditions, not with respect to attorneys
fees. Although the fees were a mere

incident, nevertheless, the jurisdiction to fix

the same and to order the payment thereof
was outside the pale of Claves appellate
jurisdiction. He was right in adopting a
hands-off attitude in his first resolution.
2) YES, UNION SHOULD PAY.
The case is covered squarely by the
mandatory and explicit prescription of
article 222 which is another guarantee
intended to protect the employee against
unwarranted practices that would diminish
his compensation without his knowledge
and consent:
(n) No special assessment or other
extraordinary fees may be levied upon the
members of a labor organization unless
authorized by a written resolution of a
majority of all the members at a general
membership meeting duly called for the
purpose. The secretary of the organization
shall record the minutes of the meeting
including the list of all members present,
the votes cast, the purpose of the special
assessment or fees and the recipient of
such assessment or fees. The record shall
be attested to by the president;
(o) Other than for mandatory activities
under the Code, no special assessment,
attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any
other extraordinary fees may be checked off
from any amount due an employee without
an individual written authorization duly
signed by the employee. The authorization
should specifically state the amount,
purpose and beneficiary of the deduction;
Saavedra is entitled to the payment of his
fees but LC 222 ordains that union funds
should be used for that purpose. The
amount of P345,000 does not constitute
union funds. It is money of the employees.
The union, not the employees, is obligated
to Saavedra.
G.R. No. 174179 : November 16, 2011
KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA AT KAWANI SA MWCEAST ZONE UNION and EDUARDO
BORELA, representing its members,
Petitioners, v. MANILA WATER
COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
The Union is the duly-recognized bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of the
respondent Manila Water Company, Inc.
16

(Company) while Borela is the Union

President. On February 21, 1997, the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) entered into a Concession
Agreement (Agreement) with the Company
to privatize the operations of the MWSS.
Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement provides that
"the Concessionaire shall grant [its]
employees benefits no less favorable than
those granted to MWSS employees at the
time of [their] separation from MWSS."
Among the benefits enjoyed by the
employees of the MWSS were the
amelioration allowance (AA) and the cost-ofliving allowance (COLA) granted in August
1979, pursuant to Letter of Implementation
No. 97 issued by the Office of the President.
The payment of the AA and the COLA was
discontinued pursuant to Republic Act No.
6758, otherwise known as the "Salary
Standardization Law," which integrated the
allowances into the standardized salary.
Nonetheless, in 2001, the Union demanded
from the Company the payment of the AA
and the COLA during the renegotiation of
the parties Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA). The Company initially turned down
this demand, however, it subsequently
agreed to an amendment of the CBA on the
matter, which provides that the "Company
shall implement the payment of the
Amelioration Allowance and Cost of Living
[A]llowance retroactive August 1, 1997
should the MWSS decide to pay its
employees and all its former employees or
upon award of a favorable order by the
MWSS Regulatory Office or upon receipt of
[a] final court judgment."
Thereafter, the Company integrated the AA
into the monthly payroll of all its employees
beginning August 1, 2002, payment of the
AA and the COLA after an appropriation was
made and approved by the MWSS Board of
Trustees. The Company, however, did not
subsequently include the COLA since the
Commission on Audit disapproved its
payment because the Company had no
funds to cover this benefit.
As a result, the Union and Borela filed on
April 15, 2003 a complaint against the
Company for payment of the AA, COLA,
moral and exemplary damages, legal
interest, and attorneys fees before the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
the petitioners and such ruling was affirmed
by the NLRC albeit removing the award for
AA.
The Court of Appeals (CA) modified the
assailed rulings by deleting the order for

MWCI to pay attorneys fees equivalent to

10% of the judgment award since the same
was not based in anything under the
binding MOA between the Company and the
Union. The CA noted that the award is
without basis under Article 111 of the Labor
Code which provides that attorneys fees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
amount of wages recovered may be
assessed only in cases of unlawful
withholding of wages, which is not the case
here.
The petitioners seek a reversal of the CA
rulings on the sole ground that the
appellate court committed a reversible error
in reviewing the factual findings of the NLRC
and in substituting its own findings an
action that is not allowed under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the CA can review the factual
findings of the NLRC in a Rule 65 petition
II. Whether the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in awarding ten percent (10%)
attorney's fees to petitioners
HELD:
(1) We agree with the petitioners that as a
rule, the CA cannot undertake a reassessment of the evidence presented in
the case in certiorari proceedings under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, the
rule admits of exceptions. InMercado v. AMA
Computer College-Paraque City, Inc., we
held that the CA may examine the factual
findings of the NLRC to determine whether
or not its conclusions are supported by
substantial evidence, whose absence
justifies a finding of grave abuse of
discretion.
(2) Article 111 of the Labor Code, as
amended, governs the grant of attorney's
fees in labor cases. We explained in PCL
Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that there are two
commonly accepted concepts of attorneys
fees the ordinary and extraordinary. In its
ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer
by his client for the legal services the
former renders; compensation is paid for
the cost and/or results of legal services per
agreement or as may be assessed. In its
extraordinary concept, attorneys fees are
deemed indemnity for damages ordered by
the court to be paid by the losing party to
the winning party. The instances when
these may be awarded are enumerated in
17

Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically in

its paragraph 7 on actions for recovery of
wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but
to the client, unless the client and his
lawyer have agreed that the award shall
accrue to the lawyer as additional or part of
compensation.
Moreover, Article 111 of the Labor Code
contemplates the extraordinary concept of
attorneys fees and that Article 111 is an
exception to the declared policy of strict
construction in the award of attorneys fees.
Although an express finding of facts and law
is still necessary to prove the merit of the
award, there need not be any showing that
the employer acted maliciously or in bad
faith when it withheld the wages. In
carrying out and interpreting the Labor
Code's provisions and implementing
regulations, the employee's welfare should
be the primary and paramount
consideration.
In the present case, we find it undisputed
that the union members are entitled to their
AA benefits and that these benefits were
not paid by the Company. That the
Company had no funds is not a defense as
this was not an insuperable cause that was
cited and properly invoked. As a
consequence, the union members
represented by the Union were compelled
to litigate and incur legal expenses. On
these bases, we find no difficulty in
upholding the NLRC's award of ten percent
(10%) attorney's fees.
G.R. No. 115949 March 16, 2000
EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C.
LUALHATI, EVELYN SIA, RODOLFO
EUGENIO, ISAGANI MAKISIG, and
DEMETRIO SALAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON
SARMIENTO et. al (AND ALL OTHER
SOLID BANK UNION MEMBERS)
FACTS: Petitioners comprise the Executive
Board of the SolidBank Union, the duly
recognized collective bargaining agent for
the rank and file employees of Solid Bank
Corporation. Private respondents are
members of said union.
The unions Executive Board decided to
retain anew the service of Atty. Ignacio P.
Lacsina (now deceased) as union counsel in
connection with the negotiations for a new
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA);
majority of all union members approved and
signed a resolution confirming the decision

of the executive board to engage the

services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel.
As approved, the resolution provided that
ten percent (10%) of the total economic
benefits that may be secured through the
negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as
attorneys fees. It also contained an
authorization for SolidBank Corporation to
check-off said attorneys fees from the first
lump sum payment of benefits to the
employees under the new CBA and to turn
over said amount to Atty. Lacsina and/or his
duly authorized representative.
The bank then, on request of the union,
made payroll deductions for attorneys fees
from the CBA benefits paid to the union
members in accordance with the
abovementioned resolution.
Private respondents instituted a complaint
against the petitioners and the union
counsel before the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of
attorneys fees as well as for quantification
of the benefits in the 1992 CBA.
Med-arbiter granted the complaint;
Secretary partially granted and the Order of
the Med-Arbiter dated 22 April 1993 is
hereby modified as follows: (1) that the
ordered refund shall be limited to those
union members who have not signified their
conformity to the check-off of attorneys
fees; and (2) the directive on the payment
of 5% attorneys fees should be deleted for
lack of basis. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the deductions made by
petioner-company is valid.
HELD: NO
Private respondents contention: claim that
the check-off provision in question is illegal
because it was never submitted for
approval at a general membership meeting
called for the purpose and that it failed to
meet the formalities mandated by the Labor
Code.
In check-off, the employer, on agreement
with the Union, or on prior authorization
from employees, deducts union dues or
agency fees from the latters wages and
remits them directly to the union. It assures
continuous funding; for the labor
organization. As this Court has
acknowledged, the system of check-off is
primarily for the benefit of the union and
only indirectly for the individual employees.

18

The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs

are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241
(o) of the Labor Code.
Art. 222 (b) states:
No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or
similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining negotiations or
conclusions of the collective agreement
shall be imposed on any individual member
of the contracting union: Provided, however,
that attorneys fees may be charged against
unions funds in an amount to be agreed
upon by the parties. Any contract,
agreement or arrangement of any sort to
the contrary shall be null and void.
(Emphasis ours)
Art. 241 (o) provides:
Other than for mandatory activities under
the Code, no special assessment, attorneys
fees, negotiation fees or any other
extraordinary fees may be checked off from
any amount due to an employee without an
individual written authorization duly signed
by the employee. The authorization should
specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction. (Emphasis
ours).
Art. 241 has three (3) requisites for the
validity of the special assessment for
unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees
and representation expenses. These are: 1)
authorization by a written resolution of the
majority of all the members at the general
membership meeting called for the
purpose; (2) secretarys record of the
minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual
written authorization for check off duly
signed by the employees concerned.
Clearly, attorneys fees may not be
deducted or checked off from any amount
due to an employee without his written
consent.
After a thorough review of the records, we
find that the General Membership
Resolution of October 19, 1991 of the
SolidBank Union did not satisfy the
requirements laid down by law and
jurisprudence for the validity of the ten
percent (10%) special assessment for
unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees
and representation expenses. There were
no individual written check off
authorizations by the employees concerned
and so the assessment cannot be legally
deducted by their employer.
From all the foregoing, we are of the
considered view that public respondent did
not act with grave abuse of discretion in

ruling that the workers through their union

should be made to shoulder the expenses
incurred for the services of a lawyer. And
accordingly the reimbursement should be
charged to the unions general fund or
account. No deduction can be made from
the salaries of the concerned employees
other than those mandated by law.
Petition is DENIED.
Vengco vs Trajano GR 74453 May 5,
1989
Facts: The Management of the AngloAmerican Tobacco Corporation and the
Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa AngloAmerican Tobacco Corporation (FOITAF)
entered into a compromise agreement.
-The company is to pay the union members
150k for their claims arising from unpaid
emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA)
and other benefits which were the subject
of their complaint before the Ministry of
Labor.
-Timbungco (Union President) received the
money in instalments and distributed it
among the members. Vengco et al (union
members) aver that Timbungco was not
authorized to get the money and that 10%
attorneys fees had been deducted from the
150k without their written authorization in
violation of 241 (o). They demanded
accounting from Timbungco which the latter
did not give.
-Vengco et al filed a complaint against
Timbungco with the Ministry of Labor.
- Timbungco alleged among others, that he
was authorized by a resolution signed by
the majority of the union members to
receive and distribute the 150k among
workers; that the 10% attorney's fees was
in relation to the claim for payment of
ECOLA before the MoL which is totally
distinct and separate from the negotiation
of the CBA; and that the deduction was in
accordance with Section II, Rule No. VIII,
Book No. III of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Labor Code and
therefore, no authorization from the union
members is required.
-Med Arbiter dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit
-Vengco et al appealed to the Bureau of
Labor Relations
-Director Trajano of the Bureau of Labor
Relations granted the appeal and ordered
Timbungco to render a full accounting of
the 150k and to publish in the unions
bulletin board the recipient union mems and
the respective amount they received
-Timbungco filed a MfR. Vengco et al filed
opposition to said motion.
19

-Officer in Charge Calaycay set aside the

decision and ordered an audit examination
of the Books of Account of the union.
-Vengco sought recon contending that the
examination of the books of accounts of the
union is irrelevant considering that the issue
involved in the case does not consist of
union funds but back pay and that
Timbungco did not remit the money to the
union treasurer so the amount was not
entered in the records of the union.
-Trajano denied the motion for recon and
affirmed the audit of the Books of Account.
-Hence this petition
Issue: W/N Timbungco can deduct the 10%
attorneys fees from the backwages.
Held: No. The deduction of 10% for
attorney's fees is illegal and void for failure
to comply with the requirements of the law.
-Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code provides:
Rights and conditions of membership in a
labor organization. The following are the
rights and conditions of membership in a
labor organization.
x x x.
(o) Other than for mandatory activities
under the Code, no special assessment,
attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any
other extraordinary fees may be checked off
from any amount due an employee without
an individual written authorization duly
signed by an employee. The authorization
should specifically state the amount,
purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
x x x.
-It is very clear that attorney's fees may not
be deducted or checked off from any
amount due to an employee without his
written consent except for mandatory
activities under the Code.
-A MANDATORY ACTICTY has been defined
as a judicial process of settling dispute laid
down by the law.
-In the instant case, the AMICABLE
SETTLEMENT entered into by the
management and the union CAN NOT be
considered as a mandatory activity under
the Code. It is true that the union filed a
claim for emergency cost of living allowance
and other benefits before the Ministry of
Labor. But this case never reached its
conclusion in view of the parties'
agreement. It is not also shown from the
records that the lawyer was instrumental in
forging the said agreement on behalf of the
union members.
-Timbungco maintains that the
"Kapasiyahan" gave him the authority to
make the deduction. This contention is
unfounded. The Kapasiyahan was defective
for it is undated and the signatories were
not properly apprised of the purpose for
which it was prepared. There is truth in
complainant's contention that they never

authorized and they had no knowledge of

the deduction of 10% attorney's fees until it
was actually effected. Consequently, the
deduction was not valid. The second
Kapasiyahan does not show that he was
authorized to receive the sum of 150k on
the mems behalf.
Moreover, the law is explicit. It requires the
individual written authorization of each
employee concerned, to make the
deduction of attorney's fees valid.
-Book III, Rule VIII, Section II of the
Implementing Rules cited by Timbungco
which dispenses with the required written
authorization from the employees
concerned does not apply in this case. This
provision envisions a situation where there
is a judicial or administrative proceedings
for recovery of wages. Upon termination of
the proceedings, the law allows a deduction
for attorney's fees of 10% from the total
amount due to a winning party. In the
herein case, the fringe benefits received by
the union members consist of back
payments of their unpaid emergency cost of
living allowances which are totally distinct
from their wages. Allowances are benefits
over and above the basic salaries of the
employees. In addition, the payment of the
fringe benefits were effected through an
amicable settlement and not in an
administrative proceeding.
Continental Cement vs CCC
GR# 51544
Facts:
On April 21, 1975, the NLRC issued an
arbitration award in NLRC Cases No. 2406
and No. 3053 resolving certain demands of
the petitioner respecting the working terms
and conditions that should be observed in
the establishment of private respondent.
However, due to disagreement on the
interpretation of the provisions of the award
concerning vacation, sick leaves and
standardization of wages, compliance
therewith was delayed. In order to compel
private respondent to immediately
implement the award, petitioner staged a
strike on October 25, 1975. It was, however,
lifted after the private respondent agreed to
pay the disputed employees leaves during
the period July 1, 1974 to June 30, 1975 in
three installments, that is, 50% on
December 20, 1975, 25% on February 25,
1976 and 25% on March 15, 1976. Private
respondent sought clarification from the
entitlement to the proportionate payment of
vacation and sick leave benefits. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of the workers. The
ruling was appealed by the private
respondents, the petitioners filed a notice of
strike and carried it out. The strike was
20

settled and the respondent 91 workers with

P25,000 for humanitarian reasons.
respondent, however, reserved the right to
seek clarification of its obligations under the
NLRC award. Prior to the payment becoming
due, private respondent negotiated with
petitioner for a staggered form of payment
as before due to its financial difficulties and
planned shutdown of the plant in July.
Petitioner at first insisted that its members
be paid full; however, it subsequently
agreed to installment payments but gave
warning on July 11, 1976, a Sunday, to the
private respondent that payment of 50% of
the benefits should be made not later than
July 12, 1976 and the remaining 50%., not
later than the end of the month. Private
respondent requested an extension up to
July 13, 1976 within which to consider the
counter-proposal but this was rejected by
petitioner. Petitioner staged a strike but the
Minister of Labor issued an order for the
employees to resume work. Only 11
reported to work out of 120 employees.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
on the return to work order, picketing
resumed. The dispute was ordered to be
entered under the compulsory arbitration in
NLRC. Some 110 employees did not return
to work. The President and 7 officers were
terminated, the commission held that they
are separated from the company.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal from the
service of the officers and the suspension of
some members of petitioner union by the
public respondent and the National Labor
Relations is valid?

contends that the separation from work of

the officers of the union is quite severe. The
officers had the duty to guide their
members to respect the law. Instead, they
urged them to violate the law and defy the
duly constituted authorities. Their
responsibility is greater than that of the
members. Their dismissal from the service
is a just penalty for their unlawful acts. The
officers of petitioner misinformed the
members and led them into staging an
illegal strike. If the NLRC is to attain the
objective of the Labor Code to ensure a
stable but dynamic and just industrial
peace6 the removal of undesirable labor
leaders must be effected. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED as it has not been
shown that the public respondent
committed any grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the orders dated March 6, 1979
and August 1, 1979 affirming the decision of
the NLRC dated March 10, 1977.

Held:
The non-compliance by the private
respondent with the said award did not
threaten the existence of petitioner or that
of its members. The dispute did not concern
the right of the Union to organize nor the
employees right to work. It merely involved
the non-payment of the vacation and sick
leaves of the employees for the past years
services. Furthermore, petitioner could have
applied with the Bureau of Labor Relations
for a writ of execution to enforce the award
that was already final and executory. As to
the second issue, petitioner assails as too
harsh the suspension meted out by the
NLRC to its members. The strikers in
question did not only violate the no-strike
policy of the state in regard to vital
industries; instead, they repeatedly defied
the orders of the Director of Labor Relations
and the Minister of Labor for them to return
to work. Their dismissal was recommended
by the labor arbiter. However, out of
compassion, the NLRC and the Minister of
Labor only suspended them. Petitioner then
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