Chapter 1

Civil Society Actors in Defence and

Security Affairs
Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri

Civil society has become an important term in contemporary political analysis.

A significant body of academic literature has developed around the concept,
and the key role it can play in consolidating and sustaining democracy
(Diamond 1994; Burnell and Calvert 2004; Burnell and Calvert 2005).
Democratisation processes in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe
have led experts to view civil society as a crucial factor in helping to limit
authoritarian government, strengthen the political participation of people,
mediate interests, and apply pressure for political accountability. A robust and
vibrant civil society is believed to hold the potential to improve the quality of
governance, at both the national and global levels (Cardoso 2003). As such civil
society has come to constitute a core element of democracy promotion
programmes of national, international and non-governmental actors (Carothers
and Ottaway 2000; Quigley 1997).
The emergence of security sector reform (SSR), a broad, holistic policy
approach aimed at improving both the effectiveness and the democratic control
and accountability of the various state institutions, ministries, and actors
involved in the provision of security, particularly in developing and transitional
states (Wulf 2005), recognises the important contribution of civil society actors
to democratic governance of the security sector, particularly through their
capacity to raise public awareness about security issues, articulate needs and
interests, provide specialised information and expertise to policy-makers, and
play a watchdog or monitoring role vis--vis the state (Ball 1998; DFID 2002,
pp.20-21). Donors have endorsed more inclusive approaches to policy-making
processes and good governance in order to ensure policies, including those in
the security sector, are widely representative and enjoy broad-based support
(UNDP 2003, pp.5-6). Civil society groups are seen as potential policy
interlocutors who can encourage local demand for security sector reform and
provide practical input on its implementation (OECD 2004, p.4).
Yet despite the increasing academic and donor attention to civil
society, literature and internet searches reveal surprising few studies specifically
examining security sector reform and governance from a civil society
perspective. Most studies focus on a particular element of the security sector,
such as the justice sector. One school of studies emphasises the bottom-up

perspective in which the safety and justice needs of ordinary people are
surveyed along with their perceptions of the effectiveness of the states policing
and justice systems (Asia Foundation 2001). A landmark study by the World
Bank, for example, documented how fundamental personal security issues
dominate the concerns of poor people throughout the world, linked to state
failure to provide essential services in public security and access to justice
(World Bank 2000, pp.478-9, 492). Such studies suggest ways in which citizen
needs can be more effectively put forward, such as through capacity-building
programmes for civil society organisations, to better influence the security
policy agenda and priorities of the state (Williams and Ocaya-Lakidi 2004).
Another initiative in security sector reform encourages a multilateral
approach among regional civil society organisations, or creating networks of
networks, in order to inject local perspectives and human security priorities
into the regional or international political agenda, which is perceived as being
influenced by multilateral agencies that subordinate the security and
development needs of a regions citizens to international security requirements
(Ratynska 2004). Regional networks of civil society in are also intended to
better inform civil society actors on regional experiences and good practices in
SSR, build relationships, and develop common approaches to further engaging
civil society in SSR (Global Facilitation Network 2004a and 2004b).
What remains under-explored is a more detailed understanding of how
civil society actors and the media engage with the state, and how effectively in
specific contexts they exert influence on political elites and policy-makers,
officials, media and the broader public on defence and security affairs. This
volume is a preliminary attempt to address this lacuna by exploring in a more
focused way through conceptual and empirical studies our understanding of
civil society actors and their impact on the sphere of security, with particular
attention to states that are undergoing transition towards, or consolidation of,
democracy in the post-communist region of Central and Eastern Europe.

What is Civil Society?

Civil society generally refers to voluntary associational groupings in a
society, and the public expression of the interests, priorities, grievances, and
values around which those associations are based. In other words, people
voluntarily form groups to advance their values and interests, and engage in
public life outside of the family and the marketplace. Although commonly
thought of as referring mainly to non-governmental organisations, civil society
organisations may also include advocacy groups, interest groups, churches and
religious groups, professional associations, academic associations, womens
groups, youth groups, sports groups, and any other form of voluntary
associational group. Civil society is often praised as a space where societal
diversity and pluralism can be expressed and by which public participation in
governance can be enhanced.

The growth in popularity of the concept of civil society in academic

and in policy circles is due in part to shifts in expectations and values
concerning democracy and governance. It has become more widely accepted
that democratic politics go beyond the periodic electoral contests that
characterise formal democracy, and are based on a culture of participation in
which citizens can seek to exercise their voice actively through multiple possible
mechanisms, such as an active civil society (NGOs, social movements, other
autonomous organisations), political parties and pluralistic media (Luckham,
Goetz and Kaldor 2003, p.20).
A vibrant civil society can perform an informal oversight role in
democratic systems and improve the likelihood of good governance through its
decentralised expertise and autonomous interests that are affected by, and may
seek to influence, various aspects of security policy. When civil society actors
are able to monitor and question government and its state agents in an
informed and knowledgeable manner, provide alternative analyses and options
for policy, and fulfil an informational educational role both to policy-makers
and the broader public on specific issues, they are held to contribute to the
quality of governance in a democracy.
Think tanks and public policy research institutes are of course but one
part of civil society. In the defence and security sphere, however, they are often
the most prominent civil society actors. This is in part because of the highly
specialised nature of defence and security affairs, and the expert knowledge that
is typically required in order to influence government policy in those areas. In
addition to influencing policy through the provision of information, analysis
and advice, security research and policy institutes can help to inform the media
and the broader public on policy issues.
The activities of civil society are believed to contribute to the quality of
democracy just as the pressures they exert on government help to keep elected
politicians and the state more generally accountable to the people in the period
between elections, when the will of the people is formally exercised and directly
expressed in the selection of their representatives. The growth in support and
endorsement of civil society as a political concept is based on the view that
people in a democratic polity also express their views and preferences between
elections in seeking to influence the conduct of public affairs and public policy,
and that this willingness to engage as groups in the social and sometimes
political life of the state are a fundamental component of democracy.
Therefore, the input of civil society actors in public policy is seen as a hallmark
of pluralistic liberal democracy.
Civil society organisations (CSOs) serve as channels for expressing the
diverse and sometimes contradictory or conflicting social interests in a
democracy. It is important to note that civic engagement is not always or
necessarily civil, as it may include demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, peaceful
protest, and sometimes even violent protest, as well as the more benign
elements of self-help, such as the volunteerism and constructive unpaid work in
communities that is usually thought of when civil society is mentioned.

Moreover, it has become widely accepted that not all civil society actors
espouse civic values and some civil society groups may even be exclusionary
and promote illiberal and undemocratic values or intra-communal conflict
(Chambers and Kopstein 2001). Certain autonomous groups in transitional or
developing states may have an interest in maintaining poor state capacities in
order that they can exploit and profit from the inability of the state to maintain
control and public order within its territory. Such actors as mafia groups,
warlord gangs, militias and paramilitary organisations have sometimes been
referred to as uncivil society (Kopecky and Mudde 2003). Similarly, in
advanced industrial democratic states some groups, such as segregationists or
white supremacists, could certainly be said to not advance democratic norms or
principles.
The existence of uncivil groups in society underscores the essentially
contested nature of the definition of civil society. Certain authors have
attempted to restrict the notion of civil society to those groups who accept
societal rules and act in a civil or mutually respectful nature (Schmitter 1997,
p.240). However, the role that civil society plays, whether in supporting
democratisation or undermining it, keeping the state accountable or being
forced to submit to a coercive state, appears to depend on the surrounding
political and economic context (Ehrenberg 1999, pp.247-8). Here, it is
sufficient to note that we are looking at a particular type of civil society actor,
one that helps to inform policy and seeks an informal oversight role, and thus
contributes to good governance of the security sector. The type of civil society
actor examined hence is predisposed to be of the good type, although this
does not deny the existence of other types nor of their potential impact on the
security policy domain.

Civil Society and Security Sector Governance

One of the most fundamental functions of the state is to provide for the
security of its citizens. Indeed, the notion of the Westphalian state is premised
on the monopoly of the means of legitimate force by the state, whether through
the application of coercive sanctions by police to regulate interpersonal
relations within a community, or through the protection provided to state and
society by armed forces against external enemies (see Bayley 1975, p.328). The
security sector comprises those state institutions and structures whose primary
function is to protect society. The term security sector expands the scope of
security from its traditional focus on the military to include public security, or
the safety of the individual from threats of crime, disorder and violence.
Because security sector reform (SSR) is focused on the use of public resources
to provide security for citizens, there is a necessary focus on state (often
executive) institutions and public policy. These institutions include military
forces, police and law enforcement services, paramilitary forces, border guard,
intelligence agencies, the judicial system and penal institutions, as well as the
government departments and ministries that exist to formulate policy and

manage these institutions. Most of the institutions that are part of the security
sector are authorised to use or threaten the use of force, if necessary, in order
to fulfil this function. Nevertheless the legitimate use of force against the states
citizens is strictly regulated in a democracy.
Of all the sectors of public policy, however, the security sector has
historically proven one of the most resistant to public input. This is in part a
function of the fundamental and over-riding importance of national security to
the continued existence of the state, and the traditional prerogative of the
executive arm of government to act to protect national security. The concept of
securitisation has been used to describe the process whereby policy-makers
apply the label of national security to otherwise contentious issues of public
policy in order to elevate them above the level of political debate (Waever
1998). International law recognises the right of states to restrict certain
fundamental human rights for legitimate reasons of national security or public
order. The requirements of secrecy also pose certain constraints on the types
and amount of information that is released by government elites and security
sector institutions to the public. National security is often treated as a special
domain which is less open than other policy domains and typically requires
special restrictions and exclusions concerning access to information (Roberts
2004). However, one danger of withholding information based on national
security reasons is that state secrecy can be used not only to protect national
security interests, but to conceal abuses of authority or mismanagement and
thus to avoid political embarrassment and accountability.
Civil society can play an important, albeit usually informal, role in the
oversight of government decision-making and behaviour in security affairs.
Civilian expertise is widely recognised as a vital element in democratic control
of armed forces and security structures in defence and security affairs through
the capacities it presents for independent monitoring, research, and assessments
of government and state performance. Non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and other elements of civil society are the crucibles in which civilian
expertise in particular aspects of defence and security affairs tends to exist, and
which often gives voice to that expertise. Civil society empowerment in SSR
concerns, first, the building up of civilian expertise and capacities to
independently evaluate, challenge, or endorse governmental decisions and
analyses of defence and security affairs and requirements on which policy is
based. Civil society organisations that are particularly relevant insofar as their
members may possess specialised expertise on some aspect of defence and
security affairs may include university departments and academic institutes,
professional associations, human rights and civil liberties groups, peace groups,
interest groups, journalists, and non-governmental organisations. Second,
empowerment also entails creating opportunities or space for the articulation
of independent perspectives and participation in a policy discourse or public
debate. At the most basic level, this requires a minimum standard of freedom
of expression so that citizens can freely voice their opinions about government
policy without fear of reprisal and sanctions. It also requires that information

about security policy is publicly available. At a practical level, when we are

considering a sphere as specialised as the security and defence arena, the
engagement of civil society actors often takes the form of public consultations
by the government of the day on major issues of public interest (such as during
a comprehensive foreign and defence policy review). It may more specifically
entail calling in recognised experts and representatives of interest groups to
appear before parliamentary committees or to be consulted during a policymaking process.
Civil society organisations can assist the government in finding answers
and approaches to public policy issues. Through the diversity of views and
experiences they represent, their input can help to make government policymaking more inclusive. Certain CSOs can also closely examine government
policy and approaches from their particular areas of expertise, drawing public
and political attention to aspects and approaches that have been ignored,
overlooked, or misunderstood. In this way, by serving as an additional source
of analysis and information on government decision-making and policy, public
scrutiny by non-governmental organsiations and other CSOs contributes to
good governance. Defence and security-focused CSOs can also help to spread
knowledge and create a climate of opinion that encourages accountable
government and wise policy.
But that is only one part of the equation of the relationship between
the state and civil society. It is also important to understand the role of the state
in encouraging civil society and facilitating the engagement of public in defence
and security affairs. What is the nature of the relationship between CSOs and
the state? Is it a cooperative partnership, or do the state actors and civil society
actors perceive themselves as opponents or opposites? Some civil society actors
may seek to act as a type of watchdog over the state and so function as a force
for accountability (requesting that officials inform about decisions concerning a
particular issue and explain what they are doing, thereby attempting to hold
them responsible for what they have decided), and may even challenge some of
its policies and decisions. More specifically, what is the role of the state in postsocialist contexts? What degree of state support for CSOs is considered
necessary and legitimate tends to be culturally determined; for example, US
expectations tend to be different in this regard to other Western democracies.
Underlying the role of civil society in public scrutiny and good
governance of the security sector is the existence of a press that is uncensored
and unconstrained in its ability to monitor government performance and
publicise abuses of power. A free press helps to compensate when other formal
oversight bodies fail or decline to address abuses and can draw public attention
to those abuses, putting pressure on government and politicians.
The security sector reform literature holds that civil society contributes
to good governance of defence and security affairs, largely through the
watchdog function of representative organisations, interest groups and NGOs.
Inclusion of civil society is adjudged to contribute to more effective and
equitable policy making and implementation by providing policy-makers with a

wider range of information, perspectives and alternatives. The input of civil

society is recognised as crucial for the process of democratising a security
sector, particularly through the development of independent civilian expertise
that governments, parliaments, the media and other actors can call on to
provide independent perspectives, analysis and advice on security policies and
issues. Alternative perspectives are valued as a counter to vested bureaucratic
interests that may inhibit reform or colour analysis and policy
recommendations made by members of security institutions or those closely
linked to them.

Civil Society in Post-Communist States

In post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, the idea of a civil society
developed as a means of focusing attention on the repressive system of state
socialism. As totalitarian repression lessened in the post-Stalinist era and was
replaced by less pervasive forms of state control and penetration through the
later stages of state socialism, space opened up in several CEE societies for
dissent. Civil society was a key element in the politics of anti-politics. However,
with the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the replacement of communist regimes
throughout the region, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the role and
meaning of civil society in CEE shifted and seemingly lost influence in public
discourse. It is widely believed to remain vital, however, for the successful
consolidation of democracy.
Even fifteen years after the end of state socialist regimes, civil society
throughout Central and Eastern Europe is acknowledged to be weak.,
characterised by very low levels of citizen membership and participation in
voluntary groups and associations relative both to levels in mature democracies
and post-authoritarian countries. Despite the differentiation that rapidly took
hold among post-communist countries in terms of their political and economic
structures and performances and their relations with other states, they possess
striking similarities in terms of their civil societies. High levels of citizen
mistrust of voluntary organisations are believed to stem from the shared history
of forced participation in communist-era organisations, lingering private
networks among close friends and family, and widespread disappointment with
the economic and political conditions of the post-communist state. These
factors help to explain the low rate of citizen participation in the public sphere
throughout post-communist CEE.1 It is important to note that the weakness of
civil society in CEE suggests that there is a different type of relationship
existing between citizens and the state.
The minor role that civil society has played in the particular area of
defence and security affairs in some regions is explained in part by the sheer
absence of members of civil society with sufficient interest or expertise in
security affairs. In various post-communist countries, for example, dismantling
1

Marc Morj Howard, The Weakness of Civil society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).

of the state socialist security apparatus, or its creation in newly sovereign states,
was a priority immediately after the transition and new democratic regimes were
in place. But there was very little public interest in dealing with police or
intelligence reform on a longer-term basis and in addition an aversion to
dealing with internal security issues.
On the donor side, civil society involvement was minimised by an
initial preoccupation with legal frameworks and institutional reforms and direct
military-military and police-police contacts and assistance. This trend largely
continues today through military assistance programs, co-location of
institutional experts, and twinning programs. More generally, the security sector
is traditionally one that is executive-dominated and characterised by a necessary
level of secrecy. It has traditionally not been very accessible, even to other
members of the political sector. Parliamentary oversight of intelligence
agencies, for example, is a relatively recent development in mature Western
democracies and is still far from adequate in most countries. The idea of
broader inclusion in the monitoring and control of security institutions, and
broad public input into security policy, is being very slowly accepted but still
encounters many obstacles. That extends to the role of the press, in particular
formal and informal curbs on media freedom to report on security-related
issues and corruption within the security sector, which remain formidable in
many states.

Outline of the Book

The first section of the book examines the various conceptual dimensions of
civil societys relationship to the security sector. Johanna Mendelson Forman
examines donor approaches, in particular the shift from traditional civil
military relations to security sector reform, and the implications for support and
involvement of civil society actors. She notes that the shift towards SSR in
developing states often requires a strengthening of state capacities to be carried
out in tandem with democratisation. There must also be a broadening beyond
the traditional civilmilitary relations preoccupation with political and security
elites and more attention paid to citizen security. Similarly, approaches must
move beyond institutional re-engineering and seek to change attitudes and
create a democratic culture in which the security needs of average citizens,
including marginalised groups, take on greater importance and influence.
Donors need to improve their methods, avoiding the one-size-fits-all approach,
and better tailoring their programmes to the specific context. They have also
tended to treat civil society as a means rather than an ends, and have created an
elite group of civil society leaders internationally to advance their own agendas,
contributing to entrepreneurial tendencies among those civil society elites and a
disconnect between civil society organisations and the local constituencies for
whom they claim to speak.
Ian Leigh focuses on the relationship between civil society and the law
in a democratic state. He traces the various overlapping interpretations of civil

society, from embodying distrust of the state and acting as counterweight to the
state, to acting as mediating institutions between citizens and the state, and
even constituting potential partners for the state in delivery of certain public
services. Civil society enables the wider inclusion of people, especially the
marginalised, in the democratic politics through consultative processes.
Through its independent expertise and its capacity to monitor the performance
of state actors, civil society can play an important role in the policy process.
Certain constitutional and legal preconditions must exist if a dynamic civil
society is to emerge, including protections for freedom of association and
freedom of expression. More generally, the democratic state must exercise selfrestraint in allowing independent and autonomous groups to form, in
protecting their rights to meet and to express their opinions, including protest
against the policies of the government. Leigh thereby underscores that a robust
civil society that plays a role in good governance is in important ways
dependent on the state to facilitate its capacity to play that role.
Nicole Ball sets out the clear link between poverty and lack of security,
and hence the need for effective and accountable security institutions in order
for sustainable economic, political and social development to be achieved.
Professionalising the security forces and making them subject to oversight is
intrinsically linked to democratisation, specifically the establishment of check
and balances, including legal, institutional, procedural and societal factors. Ball
also points out that civil society and norm-setting can function at various levels
local, national, regional and international and that this multiplicity should be
incorporated into donor approaches in supporting security sector governance.
Moreover, there are significant differences between developing regions in the
role that civil society actors are playing in SSR, with the most active
participation seen in Africa. That said, there are common obstacles impeding
civil society involvement in SSR, including lack of expertise, failure to use
expertise in non-security-related areas, mutual suspicion of civil society actors
with government/security actors, and donor prioritisation of building efficiency
of security services without concomitant attention to their democratic oversight
and accountability.
Dusan Reljic examines the role of the media in scrutiny of government
and in particular the security sector. His analysis warns of the many obstacles
undermining and obstructing that role today. He notes that the extent to which
journalists can play this role is limited by the war on terrorism, and the
restrictions on access to information, free expression and other human rights
that have been introduced by governments of mature democracies as in
transitional states. In the present environment, government-media relations are
under strain and media in various countries are engaging in self-censorship and
suspending critical examination of government policies. Further, the
concentration of media ownership in Western states has had a negative impact
on the quality of journalism. Reljic further discounts public perceptions of
media ability to hold government and the security sector to account as largely a
romantic myth investigative journalism, he says, is the exception not the rule

in the industry. Ultimately, the state sets the parameters for accountability and
transparency, and it is up to government and state authorities to determine to
what extent they will enable the media to play a role in good governance of the
security sector.
Biljana Vankovska presents an informed recipients view of Western
democracy promotion activities in the Balkans. Various problems have
presented in the Western rush to intervene and facilitate democratisation:
Western actors have not orchestrated their approach, they have often sent
personnel on mission who are uninformed about local history and
circumstances and fail to acknowledge or make use of local knowledge and
experts, offer simplistic approaches and basic principles, and there is much
competition that exists among donors as well as recipients. Civil society in
transitional states often shows a deceptively high number of formally registered
associations, where in fact most citizens distrust joining any organisation. While
Vankovska notes the politicisation of civil society in post-communist Balkan
countries as some civil society leaders move into the high political or state
administrative sphere, many local NGOs are often no more than one-man
shows with little real political or social influence. State actors tend not to
involve local civil society actors in the security sphere, although in the hopes of
gaining a good international image and NATO/EU membership, they have
courted international NGOs. Western actors have tended not to recognise the
leverage they could exert in building up support for state cooperation with local
NGOs. They have concurrently tended to ignore the dark side of civil society
in transition states ie. those elements such as criminal gangs and paramilitary
groups that may maintain close links to the state structures. Additionally, they
have tended not to recognise that SSR and democracy promotion can be a
dangerous endeavour for their local partners.
Turning to the country chapters, the Central and Eastern European
states are examined together first, specifically case studies of civil society
involvement in security affairs in Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Ukraine. The second cluster of states examined are drawn from South East
Europe, namely Bulgaria, the Balkans with a focus on Macedonia, Romania,
Serbia and Slovenia. There is more focus on media in this cluster of states.
The authors of the Estonian study point to the very weak condition of
civil society generally in the country, and as an element of democratic control
and oversight of the defence and security sector more specifically. Despite rapid
growth NGOs and other civil society organisations reflected in high official
numbers, these organisations exist mostly on paper. Moreover, defence and
foreign policy-making remains a preserve of the political and administrative
elite, a tendency that was reinforced by the lack of public debate over defence
and foreign policy throughout the 1990s since a society-wide consensus existed
on the priorities of gaining EU and NATO membership, obviating the need for
advocacy NGOs in this area. Few grassroots movements exist in this sphere.
Those research and policy institutes that do exist in Estonia in defence and
security affairs tend to be elite or cadre NGOs, or pro-EU/NATO groups,

and are partially funded by the state and by foreign donors. As such, they tend
to endorse government policy choices rather than critically assessing them.
Governmental actors are not yet actively consulting or engaging with Estonian
defence and security-focused CSOs, although the small size of the country
means that many individuals writing or working in the defence and security
policy field know each other. While it is relatively easy for research institutes
and think tanks to get commentaries published in the local media, the declining
attention paid to foreign and international affairs has led at least one CSO to
start publishing its own newsletters.
Ferenc Molnar examines the role that civil society has played in the
transformation of civil-military relations in Hungary. Molnar notes that civil
society was the primary source of opposition to the communist regime, and
similarly served as the primary source of members of the new democratic
government. Once the first stage of institutional reforms had been enacted, it
became apparent that the horizontal aspect of civilmilitary relations needed
to be addressed, including the building up of civilian expertise in defence both
inside and outside government. The issue of NATO membership had an
important impact on civil society activity in the defence and security-related
sphere in post-communist Hungary, giving rise to new NGO initiatives and
protest movements, but also efforts by the state to gain more control over civil
society activities in the defence sphere. While defence ministry cooperation
with civil society organisations has grown, mainly those organisations
supporting state policy have benefited from this development, giving rise to a
sort of clientelism which has not facilitated transparency or accountability of
the defence sector. Groups that were outspokenly against government policy,
as in the case of compulsory military service, were omitted from relevant fora
where such issues were debated. Nevertheless, the Hungarian case
demonstrates that protest groups and NGOs have on occasion been able to
force government and political parties to publicly identify and clarify their
positions on key issues.
Agnieszka Gogolewska goes beneath the surface of the apparently
diverse and active civil society organisations that are engaged with the security
sphere and assesses them to be fragmented, often linked to special and elite
interests, sometimes engaged in suspect or even corrupt activities, and having
limited effectiveness in facilitating public scrutiny. While security issues enjoyed
much public attention in the lead-up to Poland joining NATO and raised hopes
that civil society was becoming more engaged with the security sector, this died
off once NATO membership was gained and the public now shows very little
interest in national security and defence affairs. The lack of public interest is in
part a reflection of the low level of public engagement generally in voluntary
organisations, but also low feelings of efficacy in influencing public affairs, as
well as low levels of public trust in security-related professions like the military
and policing. Lack of sustainable funding and absence of working partnerships
with government agencies further constrains the potential of genuine civil
society groups to influence security policy. Given the traditionally highly

centralised nature of administration, the secretive nature of the security

services, and the dysfunctional nature of civil society organisations in the
security sector, Gogolewska maintains that the Polish security sector will
remain only under limited civilian control, lack transparency and be prone to
corruption.
Slovak civil society organisations are assessed by Vladimir Tarasovic,
Elemir Necej and Matus Korba and are found to be few in number, and like
the Polish case, not up to the standards of Western counterparts, lack working
contacts with government agencies, and consequently do not play a significant
role in public oversight of security institutions or in the innovation of new
policy ideas. Notable in the Slovak case was the role of the administration in
the new independent state, specifically the foreign and defence ministries, in
initially establishing research and policy institutions, but then undermining their
development by interfering with their structures and personnel. The traditional
secrecy that characterised security affairs was another limiting factor and
government actors were slow to embrace a more open policy-making style.
Another constraint in the development of civil society was the 1994-98
government of Vladimir Meciar, which lacked any interest in cooperating with
civil society organisations in this sphere and had generally antagonistic relations
with CSOs. While this antagonism disappeared with the advent of a new
government in 1998, there remain few routes for the development and
education of expertise on security affairs in civil society. CSOs lack the
domestic funding and institutionalised cooperation with government agencies
that would enable them to undertake independent studies and thus serve as a
source of independent public scrutiny of defence and security affairs.
According to Leonid Polyakov, numerous defence-related civil society
organisations, and in particular policy think tanks, have emerged in Ukraine,
have gradually acquired more expertise in defence and security affairs as well as
more personnel with direct experience in these areas, and their products are
gaining increased attention from government, the armed forces, media and the
public. Not receiving substantial state support for projects, their successful
emergence is due in part to grants of Western donor organisations, and in part
to defence and security issues not being politically and economically sensitive
issues, thus enabling the think tanks to escape the attentions of politicised law
enforcement and tax authorities. Ukrainian think tanks have had a discernable
impact, for example, successfully drawing public attention to the gap between
the governments ambitious defence reform plans and the inadequate economic
resources earmarked for that reform. While politically independent, experts and
journalists in the defence and security sphere nevertheless continue to practice
self-censorship, especially regarding high level corruption and criminal activities
of members of the security forces. He ends on a note of optimism that as the
Ukrainian state will likely seek more cooperation with NGOs in the future and
support their work through contracts and requests for studies, this aspect of
Ukrainian civil society will mature even further.

The second cluster of states concerns civil society and the security
sector in South East Europe. Emil Tsenkov begins by setting out the main
directions of Bulgarias defence policy and internal security reforms, and notes
the emergence of a serious organised crime problem facilitated by the conflicts
in the Western Balkans and embargo regimes. While civil society was a new
concept for post-communist Bulgaria, the sector appeared to grow rapidly after
the change in regime. Nevertheless, many NGOs are inactive or do not employ
staff on a regular basis. Tsenkov identifies three types of non-governmental
organisations relevant to Bulgarian security sector reform: professional
associations, human rights watchdog organisations, and think tanks/policy
institutes. The latter have proven especially influential in shifting public
attitudes towards NATO membership, and through cooperation with the
defence ministry, in influencing military reform and defence conversion. In
comparison, interior ministry cooperation and openness to civil society took
longer to develop, and was only established with joint anti-corruption and antiorganised crime efforts dating from the late 1990s. Foreign assistance to
Bulgarian civil society organisations derives from a variety of sources, and has
created a cooperative triangle between foreign donors, local NGOs and
Bulgarian state authorities. This he considers a positive development because it
facilitates cooperation both domestically and with international actors, while
building capacity and support for greater openness and transparency. Problems
however may arise from disagreements among the partners over priorities,
inadequate civil society experience in security affairs, the problems of
integrating former military and security personnel into NGO structures because
of differing values and mindsets, and lack of donor coordination.
Marian Chiriac explores the role of the Romanian media in reporting
on security sector issues, focusing in particular on the issue of Romania joining
NATO. With the violent demise of the Ceausescu regime, a new media
environment emerged that was highly dynamic, although it took time for more
neutral and objectively reported news to become the standard. During the first
few years, the media in practice substituted at times for weak institutions such
as the political opposition or the judiciary. It only began to seriously address
defence issues with Romanian membership of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program in 1994, especially in view of that programs emphasis on transparency
and democratic control, and with the emergence of Romanian membership in
NATO as a key foreign policy priority from 1995. A huge publicity campaign
organised by the government in the lead-up to NATOs first wave of
enlargement in 1997 attracted extensive media coverage, although Romania did
not receive its much desired invitation to join. After 1997 the publics proNATO leanings remained but were tempered by the unpopularity of the
NATO stance on the Kosovo crisis and sympathy for Romanias traditional ally
Serbia. The lead-up to the April 2004 enlargement of NATO was marked by
calmer and more composed coverage. However, informed and critical security
journalism has generally been lacking, not surprising given the limits on free
expression such as the prohibition against defaming the country or nation

found in the Romanian Penal Code. Romanian journalists tend to merely report
government statements and policies without becoming more educated on these
issues, or questioning them or the assumptions on which they are based.
Moreover, Chiriac notes that security reporting is today marked by continuing
government efforts to control, centralise and manipulate media coverage of
security policy issues, seeing the media as a sort of extended public relations
machinery. Given the medias constrained commercial and professional
resources, the concentration of media ownership that is serving to homogenise
news coverage and avoid controversy, and the increasingly corrupt working
environment of poorly paid media workers, it is not surprising when Chiriac
asserts that the mass media have made only a minimal impact on accountability
of the Romanian security sector.
The role of the Serbian media is then considered by Vlada Milic.
Reviewing the nature of the Yugoslav media under communism, he underlines
their function as having been chiefly a subservient megaphone for the party.
With the decentralising reforms, space opened for more critical coverage, yet
given their past conditioning, the media used that space to attack other
ethnicities and political rivals of their clientelistic masters. In uncritically
relaying inflammatory information that was provided by the ubiquitous security
services, the media played a role in the downward spiral to war. Both under
communism and during the Milosevic regime, the Serbian media was controlled
and infiltrated by members of the State Security Service. Independent media
were especially subject to various pressures to bring them to heel. Milic draws a
clear link between those areas where independent media struggled to operate
and the emergence of civic opposition to the regime. In post-Milosevic Serbia,
the State Security Service, organised crime and paramilitary groups continue to
influence government and society, as demonstrated in the assassination of
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003. Under current conditions, journalists
are subject to intimidation and suspicion when reporting on security-related
matters. Milic maintains that until the state successfully severs the ties between
military, intelligence and police structures on the one hand, and organised
criminal groups on the other, the media will not be able to fulfil its function as
watchdog.
Ljubica Jelusic looks back to developments under the socialist state
which strongly influenced the character of civil society in Slovenia, namely the
creation of a decentralised system that engendered greater autonomy of
individuals and firms through the idea of self-management. Fearful of losing its
privileged position, the Yugoslav military antagonised civil society especially in
non-Serbian regions including Slovenia, and triggered various peace, advocacy
and protest movements criticising discriminatory military practices and its
intervention in civilian affairs, and even the military presence in Slovenia. With
independence and the creation of a new Slovenian armed forces, civil society
acted as an innovator of ideas and progressive approaches for the armed forces,
including the introduction of conscientious objection and the entry of women.
However, immediately following the establishment of the independent state,

Jelusic notes that Slovenian civil society was actually weakened as many leading
figures became political actors in the first government of former dissidents, or
joined the state administration.
While several civil society groups now exist in Slovenia that deal with
security sector issues, most of these concern defence and security policy, while
there are very few actors in civil society who scrutinise the police, intelligence
or interior ministry. They are active in pre-election campaigns as critics of
platforms or policies, organise events to present findings and debates, and
engage in broad educational activities involving the public and members of
security forces. The media in Slovenia is also open to presenting critical
perspectives of government policy. While civil society activities are mostly
funded domestically and do not have to rely on external funding, certain
constraints appear when government consultancies are accepted, such as public
perceptions that such organisations are functioning as a loudspeaker for the
government, or having restrictions imposed on the publication of data, or even
having a study shelved when its findings undermine the government position.

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