LORENZO v. POSADAS JR., G.R. No.

L-43082, June 18, 1937

Facts:
The testator, Thomas Hanley, died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and
personal properties in the Philippines. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement
and distribution of his estate were filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zamboanga.
Said probate court admitted Thomas will to probate. The CFI considered it proper and for the
best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the
will, were to pass to the testators nephew, Matthew Hanley, ten (10) years. Moore acted as
trustee until he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
During plaintiffs incumbency as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR),
alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty and
personalty, claims delinquency in the payment of an inheritance tax. The defendant maintains
that it was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance tax before the delivery of the
decedents property to the trustee. Stated otherwise, the defendant contends that delivery to the
trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case, within the meaning of
the first paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an express trust.
Held:
YES.
A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust. The appointment of Moore as
trustee was made by the trial court in conformity with the wishes of the testator as expressed in
his will. It is true that the word trust is not mentioned or used in the will but the intention to
create one is clear. No particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust.
The words trust and trustee, though apt for the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use of
these two words is not conclusive on the question that a trust is created. To constitute a valid
testamentary trust there must be a concurrence of three circumstances:
(1) Sufficient words to raise a trust;
(2) A definite subject; and,
(3) A certain or ascertain object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so
providing.
There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that certain of
his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated purpose. The
probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in appointing a trustee to carry into effect the
provisions of the will.

ACAIN vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987.
Facts:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance
to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB
(Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his
brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were
instituted as heirs.
The oppositors are the respondents herein. Virginia A. Fernandez, the legally adopted daughter
of the deceased and the latter's widow, Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain, filed a motion to dismiss
on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited.
Issue:
Whether or not the oppositors are interested parties in the case, thereby allowed to intervene.
Held:
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as
a claimant of the estate. An interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee nor a legatee there being no mention
in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is
called upon to receive.
At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of
the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted
child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has
no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special
Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed.

DE LEON, ET AL. v. MOLO-PECKSON, ET AL., G.R. No. L-17809, DECEMBER 29, 1962
Facts:
Mariano Molo died leaving a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, Juana
Juan. This will was probated in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasay City, Rizal, which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. On May 11, 1948, Juana Juan in turn executed a will naming
therein many devisees and legatees, one of whom is Guillermo San Rafael, mother of the
plaintiffs and defendant Pilar Perez Nable. On June 7, 1948, however, Juana Juan executed a
donation inter vivos in favor of Emiliana Molo-Peckson and Pilar Perez Nable of almost all of her
entire property leaving only about P16,000.00 worth of property for the devisees mentioned in
the will. Among the properties conveyed to the donees are the ten parcels of land subject of the
present action. Juana Juan died on May 28, 1950.
On December 5, 1950, Emiliana Molo-Peckson and Pilar Perez Nable executed a document
which they called "MUTUAL AGREEMENT" which stipulates, among others, that the above
named parties mutually to sell at ONE (1) PESO each to the various persons and organization.
Issue:
Whether an express trust exists in this case.
Held:
YES.
That the document represents a recognition of pre-existing trust or a declaration of an express
trust impressed on the ten parcels of land in question is evident. A declaration of trust has been
defined as an act by which a person acknowledges that the property, title to which he holds, is
held by him for the use of another.
True it is that to establish a trust the proof must be clear, satisfactory and convincing. It cannot
rest on vague, uncertain evidence, or on a loose, equivocal or indefinite declaration, but here
the document in question clearly and unequivocally declares the existence of the trust even if
the same was executed subsequent to the death of the trustor, Juana Juan, for it has been held
that the right creating or declaring a trust need not be contemporaneous or inter-parties. It was
even held that an express trust maybe declared by a writing made after the legal estate has
been vested in the trustee. The contention, therefore, of appellants that the will and the donation
executed by their predecessors-in-interest were absolute for it did not contain a hint that the lots
in question will be held in trust by them does not merit weight because the fact that an express
trust was created by a deed which was absolute on its face may be shown by a writing separate
from the deed itself.
The fact that the beneficiaries were not notified of the existence of the trust or that the latter
have not been given an opportunity to accept it is of no importance, for it is not essential to the
existence of a valid trust and to the right of the beneficiaries to enforce the same that they had
knowledge thereof the time of its creation. Neither is it necessary that the beneficiary should
consent to the creation of the trust. In fact it has been held that in case of a voluntary trust the
assent of the beneficiary is not necessary to render it valid because as a general rule
acceptance by the beneficiary is presumed.

It is true, as appellants contend, that the alleged declaration of trust was revoked, and having
been revoked it cannot be accepted, but the attempted revocation did not have any legal effect.
The rule is that in the absence of any reservation of the power to revoke a voluntary trust is
irrevocable without the consent of the beneficiary. It cannot be revoked by the creator alone, nor
by the trustee. Here, there is no such reservation.