Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. Vs. Hon. Albert A. Lerma, et al. , G.R. No. 143581.

January 7, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner KOGIES and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder
Manufacturing Plant for respondent. Respondent unilaterally cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had
altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered. Petitioner opposed
informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the
machineries and equipment on mere imagined violations by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance against respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting
that it had the full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full
as stipulated in the contract. KOGIES filed a motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims arguing that when PGSMC
filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its
failure to do so was a fatal defect. The RTC dismissed the petitioners motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims as
these counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.
ISSUE: WON payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were required in the respondents Answer
with counterclaim?
HELD: NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance
with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer
with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or a
cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein. As to the failure to
submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMCs Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a certification
against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading,
hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory
counterclaims. At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to
pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004
under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory
counterclaim or cross-claims.

LUCAS ADAMSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS- Deficiency Tax Assessment

FACTS:
A deficiency tax assessment was issued against Petitioners relating to their payment of capital gains tax and VAT on
their sale of shares of stock and parcels of land. Subsequent to the preliminary conference, the CIR filed with the
Department of Justice her Affidavit of Complaint against Petitioners. The Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that, in a
criminal prosecution for tax evasion, assessment of tax deficiency is not required because the offense of tax evasion is
complete or consummated when the offender has knowingly and willfully filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade
the tax.
ISSUES:
(1) Dis the CIR issue an assessment?
(2) Must a criminal prosecution for tax evasion be preceded by a deficiency tax assessment?
(3) Does the CTA have jurisdiction on the case?

HELD:
(1) NO. The recommendation letter of the Commissioner cannot be considered a formal assessment as (a) it was not
addressed to the taxpayers; (b) there was no demand made on the taxpayers to pay the tax liability, nor a period for
payment set therein; (c) the letter was never mailed or sent to the taxpayers by the Commissioner. It was only an
affidavit of the computation of the alleged liabilities and thus merely served as prima facie basis for filing criminal
informations.

(2) YES. When fraudulent tax returns are involved as in the cases at bar, a proceeding in court after the collection of
such tax may be begun without assessment considering that upon investigation of the examiners of the BIR, there was
a preliminary finding of gross discrepancy in the computation of the capital gains taxes due from the transactions. The
Tax Code is clear that the remedies may proceed simultaneously.

(3) NO. While the laws governing the CTA have expanded the jurisdiction of the Court, they did not change the
jurisdiction of the CTA to entertain an appeal only from a final decision of the Commissioner, or in cases of inaction
within the prescribed period. Since in the cases at bar, the Commissioner has not issued an assessment of the tax
liability of the Petitioners, the CTA has no jurisdiction.

HEUNGHWA INDUSTRY CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. DJ BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondent. (dili ni cya digest)
Incidentally, in the recent case of Heunghwa Industry Co., Ltd. v. DJ Builders Corporation (G.R. No. 169095, 8
December 2008), the Supreme Court (SC) laid down important guidelines in the interpretation of an arbitration clause
contained in a construction contract and, in effect, further clarified the jurisdiction of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
The SC ruled that an arbitration clause in a construction contract or the submission to arbitration of a construction
dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to the CIAC jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission.
Thus, for a particular construction contract to fall within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, it is merely required that the
parties agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. It is not necessary that the parties specifically name the
CIAC for the latter to acquire jurisdiction over the contract. As long as the parties stipulate on voluntary arbitration,
regardless of what forum they choose, their agreement will fall within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even if
they specifically choose another forum, the parties will not be precluded from electing to submit their dispute before
the CIAC because this right has been vested upon each party by law, i.e., E.O. No. 1008 (National Irrigation
Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129169, 17 November 1999, citing the 1988 CIAC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by CIAC Resolution Nos. 2-91 and 3-93).
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that there are two (2) acts which may vest the CIAC with jurisdiction over a
construction dispute, to wit:
(a) The presence of an arbitration clause in a construction contract; or
(b) In the absence of such arbitration clause, the agreement by the parties to submit the construction dispute to
arbitration.
If any of the abovementioned acts exists, the CIAC has jurisdiction over the dispute. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and
cannot be waived by agreement or acts of the parties. (Atty. Archivald De Mata)