Rhetoric Society of America

The Rhetorical Significance of the Conversion of the Lover's Soul in Plato's "Phaedrus"
Author(s): John C. Adams
Source: Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 7-16
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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John C. Adams
THE RHETORICAL SIGNIFICANCEOF THE CONVERSION OF THE
LOVER'S SOUL IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS
I
significantbody of rhetoricalscholarshiphasfocusedon Plato'sPhaedruson its three speeches concerningthe subject of love, its sections in which
Socrates provides a summaryof the preceptsof his ideal rhetoric,and its concludingcommentson writtencomposition.However,little has been writtenabout
the rhetoricalsignificanceof the momentwithin Socrates'second speech, in the
course of his mythic depiction of the struggles of the lover's soul, when the
lover's soul is convertedfrom maniato reverence.The soul's conversionto reverence is a key moment in the myth, for it enables the lover to engage his beloved in edifying communication-in the kind of rhetoricaldiscourse literally
describedby Socratesafterreciting his second speech.'
This essay interpretsthe conversion of the lover's soul as an instance (or
allegory) of persuasionthat sets an attitudeof reverencein the lover/studentof
Plato's ideal rhetoric. The persuasion-to-reverence,the consequence of the
lover's appropriateinterpretiveact, shows how the transformationof a lover's/
student's characteris a starting-pointin his progress towardbecoming a Platonic rhetor-not only in affecting the appropriateethical stance toward"winning" his beloved throughedifying communication,but also in understanding,
and being influenced by, the dual natureof embodied logos-its materialand
spiritualsignificance. The lover's "reading"of the beloved's "face"-this nondiscursive sensual presence embodying and radiatinga Platonic Idea-is explained, in the context of the allegory,as a tropefor the appropriatereceptionof
a rhetoricalartifact.
The differencebetween the persuasive"face"andthe persuasive"word"is the
differencebetweenthe two sites wherelogos is manifest.Theirdifferenceshows
how rhetoricalwords artfullymimic the persuasive"face"of the naturalorder.
Nevertheless,they both may influencethe soul to harmonizewith PlatonicIdeas
in more or less the same way. From this perspective, in Platonic thought the
redeemingcharacterof the naturalorderis the effect it has on souls preparedto
receive/observe it appropriately.The same value is attributedto Plato's ideal
rhetoric.So partof the idea of learningrhetoricis linkedto preparingthe soul to
appropriatelyreceive/observeembodiedlogos-to be able to interpretsensually
evocative signifiers in morally edifying ways (as the lover does). Thus, in the
context of the allegory, Plato's understandingof rhetoric,and what the rhetor
must "know,"encompassnot only its appropriateproduction,but its appropriate
receptionas well. The lover's conversionis an allegoricalcase in point. It exemplifies an edifying aim of rhetoricaleducation as a process of being persuaded

RSQ: Rhetoric Society Quarterly

Volume 26, Number 3 Summer 1996

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RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY

andbecoming a noble lover in additionto learningthe technicalprinciplesof the

"art"of rhetoric.
This persuasion-to-reverenceas a condition of appropriately"hearing"Platonic rhetorichas not been emphasizedin the scholarlyliterature.To be sure,the
effects on speakerswho trafficin "neuter",ignoble, or noble rhetorichave been
brought to light and brilliantly assessed by RichardWeaver's reading of the
Phaedrus'threespeeches.Nevertheless,the evolvedcharacterof the noble lover/
rhetorician(exemplifiedin Socrates'second speech) is not linked by Weaverto
the effect of rhetoric.
By focusing on Socrates' second speech, and readingthe lover's conversion
as an allegoricalkey to understandingPlato's concept of the persuasionprocess
andthe link between edificationandthe studyandpracticeof rhetoric,this essay
also shows how Plato and Isocratesshareda common interestin focusing contemporaries'attentionon the kind of person one should become as a result of
studying rhetoric (or discourse) philosophically-with an eye and ear toward
2
loving wisdom and virtue.
II
The depiction of the lover's conversionmakes up a very small partof Socrates'
second speechon the topic of love (Phaedrus253c-256d). His firstspeech,which
is a speech in praiseof the evil lover, is a betterspeech thanthe speech in praise
of the non-loverauthoredby Lysias and recitedby Phaedrusat the beginningof
the dialogue. Socrates'first speech is betterthan Lysias' because it follows the
properform of rhetoric-it is well-organizedwith a beginning,middle,and end;
and it cogently develops its lines of argumentout of a definitionof love. Lysias'
speech is inferiorto Socrates'first speech because Lysias' speech is poorly organized and does not move forwardfrom a definitionof love. Clearly,thereis a
two-fold interestservedby all three speeches. The first interestis technical and
presentsan explicationandevaluationof differentconceptsof rhetoric.The other
interestis ethical or moral and presentsan explicationand evaluationof different concepts of love. Lysias' speech is doubly bad-technically and morally.
Socrates'first speech is half-bad,butworse thanLysias'because it may be more
persuasive.It is technically correct,but morallydepravedas far as it celebrates
the virtue of being an evil lover in a more rhetoricallyeffective mannerthan
Lysias' speech. Socrates' second speech is doubly good-technically and morally-because it persuasivelycelebratesthe virtueof being a noble lover.
Althoughall three speeches provideopportunitiesfor contemplatingtheirtwo
themes (rhetoricand love), they also show how the two themes are entangledor
inseparable.Theirentanglementserves an interestin showinghow knowledgeof
love and rhetoricare dependenton each other.Thatis, the ideal relationshipbetween lovers is mediatedby theircommunicationwith each other,such thattheir
way of speakingandlisteningmaybe connectedto lovingeachother.ThePhaedrus
centerson the significanceof appropriateloving/communicating
to the realization

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ADAMS/PLATO'S PHAEDRUS

of the end of humanexistence.In the Phaedrusthis end is depictedas the mutual

repairof the partners'damagedsouls so they may be releasedfrom their bodily
incarnationsto soaragaintowardheavenlovinglyharmonizedwithTruth-returning togetherto the place fromwhich they fell to earth.
In Platonic thought,the rehabilitationof one's soul cannot be accomplished
without externalassistance.3Because its degradedinclinationis alreadydetermined,the lover cannotrepairhis own soul-he is neitherlacking the conscious
interestin doing so, nor the potentialfor doing so, but he simply has not found
the power to do so. The lover's conversion,then, is the story of how his soul's
power to love is reawakenedby persuasion-by the beloved's radiantfaceand of how his soul's driving force is convertedfrom mania to reverenceby a
naturalsign. Allegorically it shows how the student of Plato's art of rhetoric
must first learn to love Ideas for their sensual effect. Learningto read/experience naturalbeauty as a mnemonic sign of the effect of its Idea, and viewing
persuasionas a provocationof the soul to remembrance,the studentof rhetoric
pursuesthe artof using words to make mnemonic signs that similarlyinfluence
others' souls. Such speech is the verbalcounterpartof the naturalorder'sdivine
radiance-its spiritualsignificance. The noble lover/rhetoricianoffers his persuasive speech to his beloved auditorin the spirit of reverence. His aim is to
provokehis beloved's soul to reverentremembrance.
Socrates' second speech is begun with Socrates attributingits authorshipto
Stesichorus,son of Euphemusof Himera(244a).4 The nameEuphemusis translated as "manof pious speech" and the city he comes from (Himera)is translated as "townof desire."The ethos of Stesichorusis set from a combinationof
piety and desire, where the attitudeof worshipis invoked as the properposition
from which to speak in praise of Eros. The placement of Stesichorus'father's
name togetherwith his city of origin gives the impressionthatStesichorus'characterhas been shapedboth by his bloodline and his community-Stesichorus is
a person born from a "manof pious speech"and raised in a community whose
characteris capturedby its name: Desire. The piety/desire complex of person
and place echoes Socrates' image of the soul as conflicted-as a chariotpulled
in one directionby a lustful unrulyhorse, who drags along its docile mate, and
over which the drivermust gain controlif the soul is to travelits propercourse.
But Stesichorus'ethos suggests an unconflicted soul, and Socrates' attribution
of his second speech to Stesichorusindicatesthat his speech betokens the characterof a personwho has undergonethe conversionexperienceportrayedin the
speech, where desire and piety coalesce in the attitudeof reverence which is
markedby Socratesas the spiritof the speakerandhis speech.5The referenceto
Stesichorus,then, is not simply a footnote giving propercredit to the speech's
author.Rather,it opens the prospectfor interpretingthe depiction of the soul's
conversion as an allegory that links the conversion of the speaker'ssoul to the
authorityof the speaker's rhetoricalperformance-where a preferredway of
speakingis conditionedby the speaker'scharacter,and where learningthe pre-

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10

RHETORIC
SOCIETYQUARTERLY

ferredway of speakingrequiresa naturalinclinationandthe cultivationof character attributes,as well as techniquesthat enable its performance.
The passage of the Phaedrus where the conversion experience takes place
comes at the end of Socrates'second speech (253c-256d) and is profferedas the
lover'smeansof "capturing"the beloved. Giventhatthe conversionof the lover's
soul is an instanceof persuasion,it follows thatthe beloved's visage is the natural counterpartof an ideal rhetoricalsignifier (seen but not heard).Further,the
lover's conversion enables him to capturethe beloved because it affects him
with a differentorientationtowardthe signifierandhis knowledgeof techniques
gives him insightinto how to craftits verbalcounterpart.Thatis, the noble lover/
rhetoricianrealizes that his beloved's persuasivebeauty is not put on cosmetically.6 Rather,it is ordainedby the gods and expressedthroughthe body of his
beloved. There is a beautifuldiscoursethatis not cosmetic: it reveals Beauty;it
does not conceal ugliness. Because it does not hide anything,it is not strategic
but "radiant."
The conversionof the lover's soul entails a shock of recognition:
Now when the charioteerbeholds the love-inspiringvision the whole
soul is warmed by the sight, and is full of tickling and prickings of
yearning,the horse that is obedient to the charioteer,constrainedthen
as it is by modesty, controls himself and does not leap upon the beloved; but the other no longer heeding the prick or the whip of the
charioteer,springs wildly forward,causing all possible trouble to his
mate and to the charioteer,and forcing them to approachthe beloved
and propose the joys of love. And they first pull back indignantlyand
will not be forced to do terribleand unlawfuldeeds, as the troublehas
no end, they go forward with him, yielding and agreeing to do his
bidding. And they come to the beloved and behold his radiantface.
And as the charioteerlooks uponhim, his memoryis borneback to the
true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing with modesty upon a
pedestal of chastity,and when he sees this he is afraidand falls backward in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins so violently backwardas to bring both horses upon their haunches,the one
quite willing, since he does not oppose him, but the unrulybeast very
unwilling. (253e-254c)
Withinthe context set by mania,"reverence"at the shock of recognitionof the
Divine Ideabringsthe charioteerliterallyfalling back into virtueas he discovers
for the first time the power he had all along to rein in the "unrulybeast."The
Idea of Beautycommunicated(or radiated)by the visage of the beloved reminds
him of his prior state as he realizes that he is experiencinga Divine Presence.
However,it is the drivingforce of maniathatbroughthim face to face with the
Idea, enablinghim to recognize it at the last possible momentbefore falling into

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ADAMS/PLATO'
S PHAEDRUS

11

a thoroughlymaniacalfrenzy.
In the passage quotedabove,the charioteerat firsthas the desire the steerback
from sin, but he does not seem to have sufficientpowerto do so as the darkhorse
redoublesits chargeandhe momentarilyyields. While boththe unrulyhorse and
the charioteerare persuaded,their "conclusions"conflict. The charioteeremploys coercion, not persuasion,to subduethe unrulyhorse: the unruly horse is
deaf (253c) so it cannot heed an oral plea. That is, seeing the beloved's body
compels conflicted persuasionsin the unrulyhorse and the charioteer(while the
charioteeris affected by his beloved's face, there is no mention made of what
aspect or aspectsof the beloved's body affect the unrulyhorse).The charioteer's
attitudeof reverence and his sheer strengtheventually bring the unruly horse
into line with his higher desire and his truebelief. Nevertheless,in the end it is
the soul (the two horses and the charioteer)that is converted-that is harmonized withinitself and with the Idea. Moreover,it is the initial shock of recognition and the unwilled, uncalculated,falling back in reverentawe that converts
the soul, despiteinstancesof backsliding;the charioteerandthe two horses more
or less stay the course. Thus, in the context of the allegory, one may read the
beloved as a tropefor Platoniceloquence as a discoursethateroticallydrawsthe
fallen soul towardits Truthwith radiant,not cosmetic, speech.Allegorically,the
lover's conversioncan be read as a lesson in the appropriatereceptionof rhetoric induced by the effect of rhetoric-where a naturalmodel of eloquence (the
beloved's face) instructsthe soul, effecting a transferenceof the Idea of rhetoric
throughthe experience of it, not the narrationof its principles (which may in
fact be the icy speech of the non-lover). Since the soul's conversion does not
take place by means of rationalcalculation,this puts it outside of the realm of
Platonicdialectic but within the realmof rhetoric,as a model to contemplatefor
its effect. As the lover's conversionbegins andfollows throughwith an affective
charge that ends in reverence-pious desire-it seems rhetorical persuasion
comes first and remainsthroughoutas the force that drivesthe lover sane.7The
lover's sanity is his reverencecoupled with the true belief it enables. The Platonic rhetoricianis a lover of radiantpeople and radiantwords. Where there is
openness thereis radiance,and where thereare cosmetic masks there are strategies; ulteriormotives; alienatinginterests.
That the readingof the lover's conversion as a rhetoricallesson in character
development is not forced may be indicated by another passage from the
Phaedrus.The passageis addressedby Socratesas an imaginaryrebuttalto Tisias
or to a "Tisian"accountof the centralityto the practiceof rhetoricof probabilistic argument(what seems true),andthe self-conscious adaptationof one's ethos
to the interestsof one's humanauditors:
[U]nless a man take accountof the charactersof his hearersand is able
to divide things by classes and to comprehendparticularsundera gen-

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RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY

eral idea, he will neverattainthe highestperfectionin the artof speech.

But this ability he will not gain without much diligent toil, which a
wise man ought not to undergo for the sake of speaking and acting
before men, but that he may be able to speak and to do everything,so
far as possible, in a mannerpleasing to the gods. For those who are
wiser thanwe, Tisias, say thata man of sense would surely practiceto
please not his fellow slaves, except as a secondaryconsideration,but
his good andnoble masters.Therefore,if the pathis long, be not astonished; for it must be troddenfor great ends, not for those you have in
mind.Yet your ends also, as our argumentsays, will be best gained in
this way, if one so desires. (273d-274a)
Here, the abilityto persuadeotherpeople by adaptingone's discoursesto their
interestsis secondaryin the study of rhetoric.It seems its primarypurposeis to
learnto "speakand to do everything,so far as possible, in a mannerpleasing to
the gods." This learning and practice surely rehearsesthe student'ssoul in the
attitudeof pious desire, or reverence,that is aroused by the visage of the beloved.Thispassagealso helpsaccountfor Socrates'favorablementionof Isocrates
nearthe close of the Phaedrus (278e-279b). Clearlyit resonateswith Isocrates'
concept of how study of the "artof discourse"(or "political discourse"-see
Isocrates,"Againstthe Sophists"21) may uplift or edify the soul of the student,
as well as make her or him able to speakeffectively to particularauditors.In his
"Antidosis"Isocrateswrote:
For in the first place, when anyone elects to speak or write discourses
which are worthyof praiseor honour,it is not conceivable that he will
supportcauses which arepetty or unjustor devotedto privatequarrels,
and not ratherthose which are great and honourable,devoted to the
welfare of man and our common good; for if he fails to find causes of
this character,he will accomplish nothing to the purpose. In the second place, he will select from all the actions of men which bear upon
his subjectthose examples which are the most illustriousand the most
edifying; and, habituatinghimself to contemplate and appraise such
examples, he will feel their influence not only in the preparationof a
given discourse but in all the actions of his life. It follows, then, that
the power to speak well and think right will rewardthe man who approachesthe artof discourse with love of wisdom and love of honour.
(276-278)'

Socrates'rebuttalof Tisias (thoughmore other-worldlyin its aim of pleasing

the gods) generally parallelsIsocrates'view and reflects Plato's and Isocrates'
commoninterestin makingthe inculcationof virtuean integralpartof oratorical
training.This is probablywhy Isocratesgets favorablemention-"something of

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ADAMS/PLATO'SPHAEDRUS

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philosophy is inbornin his mind"(Phaedrus 279b). Like Plato, Isocratesprivileges the "love of wisdom" and "love of honour"over wrangling in "private
quarrels"or supportingunjustcauses ("Antidosis"276). In Plato's usage, in the
Phaedrus"philosophy"is the love of wisdom-the reverencegerminatedby the
beloved's radiantface, and then, induced in the beloved throughthe lover's use
of its verbalcounterpart:rhetoric.

III
In the Phaedrus the conversionof the lover's soul is a lesson in the appropriate
receptionof Plato's Ideal rhetoric:a sensually evocative signifierembodyingan
Idea. The lover's conversionalso provides him with insight into what and how
edifying rhetoricaldiscourse communicates.The net result of the lover's conversionis the creationof a mutuallybeneficialrelationshipbetween lovers characterized by pious desire-where both partners love and are loved. Just as
Euphemus is from Himera, so does Stesichorus' speech show how reverence
may come from pious desire. Plato's model portrayalof naturaleloquence capturedin the visage of the beloved is furtherhighlightedby Socrates'attribution
of the source of his first speech-the speech in praise of the evil lover-to "the
son of Phythocles ('Eagerfor Fame') from Myrrhinus('Myrrhtown')."The reference to myrrhandthe speaker'smotive links his brandof persuasionto seduction-to somethingthatmay be cosmetically appliedwith a self-interestedaim.
Ironically,the son of Phythoclesis namedPhaedrus.
In conclusion, Plato's Phaedrus depicts the curativepower of rhetoric-both
as a techniqueof persuasionand as a course of studies.The lover's conversionis
a partof his learning.It is my contentionthatthe curativeconversionof the lover
goes hand in hand with Plato's concept of how the study or contemplationof
rhetoricmay first preparethe soul to properlyreceive the earthlyexpression of
the divine Idea of Beauty-in an attitudeof reverenceor pious desire. It also
shows how different people may be moved by the same image, for different
reasons,andto differentends. Surely,in Platonicthoughta totally depravedsoul
will never fall backwardin reverentialawe. Nevertheless, a depravedsoul may
be moved by the body of the beloved. Or,put anotherway, the reverentauditor
will "get" the Platonic Idea from his sensual experience of the visage of his
beloved-he will be edified. The depravedauditorwill have a sensual experience but will "get"a very differentidea.
Notes
'John C. Briggs provides an excellent interpretationof this passage that focuses on the conversionas an instance of persuasion,but does not elucidatethe
connection between the transformationof the determininginterest of the soul
and Plato's concept of what the rhetoricianneeds to know (developed in the rest

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RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY

of the dialogue). In his interpretation,Briggs refers to the relevant secondary

literatureon the Phaedrus.His paraphraseof Ficino's Renaissancecommentary
on the Phaedrusbest capturesthe sources of the soul's conflict and the fact that
Platonicrhetoricappealsto the whole person:"Truerhetoricis itself beautifulto
the intellect as well as the sense" (Ficino in Briggs: 178). The beautyit projects
(allegorically portrayedas the beloved's "face")initiates the lover's interestin
getting closer to Truthbut not out of regardfor Truth(appetite/thedarkhorse is
arousedby the beautifulbody [its medium], not its Idea). The persuasionprocess moves from appetite's initial attraction,througha struggle, to intellect's
final recognitionof what it already"knew"but was not conscious of. As Briggs
pointsout, this is the only way the soul (thatwhich is self moving) can be moved/
persuadedand still be a soul. Put anotherway, as Aristotle'senthymemeelicits
an already-heldbelief, Plato's Truerhetoricelicits remembranceof an alreadyheld (butforgotten)Idea. See JohnC. Briggs, FrancisBacon and the Rhetoricof
Nature: 178-89 for his discussion of the Phaedrus.
2Although Edward Schiappadoes an admirablejob of dismantlingthe idea
that"rhetoric"was a termthatcirculatedwidely priorto its inventionby Plato, I
do not believe that its inventionwas motivatedby Plato's desire to distinguish
himself from Isocrates.Forexample,bothPlato andIsocratesused the argument
of dissociation to set themselves apartfrom so-called "Sophists." If Isocrates
had thought to coin the term rhetoricto describe what he took to be bad discourse or philosophy,it would have served him just as well as it did Plato. But,
Isocrates did not coin the term-he just discussed good and bad speech as he
explainedhis philosophy,andhis idea of "bad"speech is just as "bad"as Plato's
"rhetoric"is (at least as far as it is presentedin Gorgias).Althoughit is beyond
the scope of this essay to arguethis point at length, I believe that Plato refined
Isocrates' line of thought while at the same time taking it in a different,more
other-worldly,direction.The ethos of what Isocratesreferredto as his philosophy in "Antidosis"is akin to Plato's as far as it has a serious stake in loving
wisdom and virtue, not vice. While Plato and Isocrateshad differentideas concerningthe sources of virtue,I thinkthe spiritof their ideas of virtueconverges
at manypoints.Thereis no doubt,however,thatboth Plato andIsocratesdisparaged the same type(s) of person(s).Moreover,it is hardto believe thatPlato was
very hostile towardIsocrates, if his influence on Aristotle is to be taken seriously. For example, Aristotle uses at least a half-dozen examples drawn from
Isocrates' speeches to illustratethe finer points of style in his Rhetoric. Plato
gets about half as many references. Nowhere does he condemn Isocrates. See
Schiappa:3-20, 39-63 for his well-put argumentconcerning dissociation and
the inventionof rhetoric.In the end, the missing partof "Againstthe Sophists"
may hold the key to understandingthe place (if any) of the ideograph<rhetoric>
in Isocrates' thought.
3Like the Phaedrus,Plato'sRepublic(515c) depicts a conversionof the determining interestof the spectator,and like the Phaedrus, the conversionis com-

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pelled. However,unlike the Phaedrus,in the Republicthe source or cause of the

spectatorbeing "freedfrom his fetters and compelled to standup suddenly and
turnhis head around"is not explained-it just happens.However,as in all the
dialogues, the "conversion"is dependenton the intercessionof something outside the control of the spectator.
4Socrates claims earlier(243a-243b) that,like Stesichorus'palinode wherein
he attemptedto atone for "speakingill of Helen", Socrates' second speech is a
recantation.In Stesichorus'case, his recantationput him back into favor with
the gods, who then restoredhis sight. SocratescontrastsStesichorusto Homer,
whose sight was not restored. Because he was "ignorantof the reason"for his
blindness (i.e. sin) he could not plead his case to the gods. The contrastbetween
Stesichorusand Homer probablyalludes to the contrastbetween the converted
and the unconverted(see note five below).
5According to the Oxford Classical Dictionary (OCD), Stesichorus' "real"
nameis Teisias(orTisias).Accordingto OCD,Stesichorus("establishingchoroi")
was probablya title. At any rate,in the context of the Phaedrus, and the significance of naming explained above, there is a possible allusion here to the idea
thata so-called poet can be inspiredby reverence,andmoreover,thata chorusor
choir, as appropriatelyinterested/affected(i.e., reverent)spectators and commentators,can edify through(among other things) their song and dance. This
resonates with Plato's concept of the appropriaterole of poetry set out in his
Republic. There may also be some significance attributableto the "real"name
(Tisias) and the title (Stesichorus)-a cognomen. The two names may signify
conversion-from a "Tisian"way of speakingto a deepermore spiritualway of
speaking enabling Stesichorus'palinode as a reverentexpression motivatedby
regretfor "lying"aboutHelen. See also below wherethe significanceof Socrates'
referenceto Tisias is discussed.
6Plato's Gorgias provides a pointed condemnationof "cosmetic"rhetoric.
7It seems fairly clear to me that Plato's dialectic is a process of critically determiningwhetherone's already-heldbeliefs are truebeliefs. In his dialogues it
seems that dialectic's function is to disaffect one from one's already-heldfalse
beliefs. Rhetoric,on the otherhand, seems to enable true belief by its power to
arouse reverentremembrancein the first place. That is, Plato's dialectic establishes what is not the Truth.For Plato it seems that true belief is compelled by
reverence(not truth)and thatreverenceis elicited by rhetorical(not dialectical)
logos.
8This passage expandson what Isocratesalludedto approximatelythirty-five
years earlier,ca. 388 BCE, in his "Againstthe Sophists."At any rate,the inculcation of characterattributes,through the students' imitation of models, is a
keynote of Isocrates'school-this is probablywhat Socratesis referringto. I do
notbelievePlatois makingfun of Isocrates,giventhe resonancebetweenSocrates'
rebuttalof Tisias (quoted above) and the passage quoted from the "Antidosis."
The most significantdifferencebetween IsocratesandPlato/Socrates,at least in

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RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY

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terms of the theme of edification,is Plato's other-worldlyinterestin Ideas and

enabling souls to returnto heaven, and Isocrates'this-worldlyinterestin inculcating pan-Hellenicvirtues suited to advancingthe political interestsof a more
or less democraticstate.
Works Cited
Aristotle. TheArt of Rhetoric. Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes. Vol. 22. Trans.

John HenryFreese. Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardU P, 1975.

Briggs, John C. Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature. Cambridge, Mass.:

HarvardU P, 1989.
Isocrates."Againstthe Sophists."Isocrates.Vol. 2. Trans.George Norlin. Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardU P, 1929. 159-83.
. "Antidosis."Isocrates. Vol. 2. Trans. George Norlin. Cambridge, Mass.:
HarvardU P, 1929. 180-365.
Plato. Gorgias. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Trans. W.D. Woodhead.

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