ARTICLE IN PRESS

Reliability Engineering and System Safety 95 (2010) 511519

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Reliability Engineering and System Safety

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ress

Safety culture and safety management aboard tankers



Jon Ivar Havold

Alesund
University College, N-6025 Alesund,
Norway

a r t i c l e in fo

abstract

Article history:
Received 10 March 2009
Received in revised form
5 January 2010
Accepted 7 January 2010
Available online 14 January 2010

The present paper focuses on safety related attitudes/culture and management aboard Norwegianowned tankers. The data set used in this paper is part of a larger survey study of attitudes towards
safety and risk at sea. During the summer and autumn of 2002, a questionnaire was distributed in a selfadministered format to seafarers aboard 63 tankers owned by eight shipping companies. A total of 1158
questionnaires were collected from the tanker segment (estimated response rate 70%).
The data collected from the tankers interrogated using factor analysis, and four factors were
identied. Several hypotheses were tested using a General Linear Model (GLM) and post hoc tests. The
results showed signicant differences between ship owners, sailors occupations, sailors countries of
origin and sailors ages, between ags/registration and between age of vessels, but not between
different types of tankers.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Safety related attitudes
Safety culture
Safety climate
Safety management
Seafaring
Tankers

1. Introduction and background

Safety in maritime transportation has many aspects; technical
(e.g. [1,2]), economic (e.g. [1,3]) and organizational (e.g. [1,4]), and
it is easy to argue that maritime transportation should be given
more attention both because of the potential for accidents leading
to injuries, death and pollution, and the volume of trade.
This paper reporting selected results from a survey addressing
safety culture and safety management aboard Norwegian-owned
tankers is focusing on safety related attitudes, culture and
management, and cover as such human and organizational
aspects of safety in maritime transportation. Introductory to the
paper briey discuss characteristics of the seafaring environment,
gives a short review on safety culture and safety management and
outline the hypotheses that will be tested. The hypotheses are
tested by using multivariate data analysis and the results are
discussed.
Most of the things we wear, drive, ll on the tank or eat are
brought to us over water. More than 90% of the worlds trade is
transported by ship, totalling 27 thousand billion tonne-miles in
2004 [5]. By 2007 IUMI (International Union of Marine Insurers)
reports that 20% of the worlds merchant eet over 300 gross
tonnes, or nearly 9000 vessels, were tankers [6]. 25 years ago the
average tanker would have been manned by a crew of between 40
and 50. Today technological advances have contributed to

 Tel.: + 47 70161223, Mob. +47 97536195; fax: + 47 70161300.

E-mail address: jh@hials.no

0951-8320/$ - see front matter & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ress.2010.01.002

decrease manning, in some cases to just above 20 seafarers on a

Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC).
The history of tanker transportation is full of accidents
involving super tankers that result in oil spills and other pollution
as well as the introduction of new requirements, conventions and
protocols by the IMO. The rst really big accident was the
catastrophic grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967,
followed by a number of other big accidents, including the Amoco
Cadiz (1978), the Exxon Valdez (1989), the Braer (1993), the Erika
(1999) and the Prestige (2002) ([7] and Appendix A). The Torrey
Canyon incident led to an extraordinary session of the IMO
Council, which drew up a plan of action on technical and legal
aspects of the Torrey Canyon incident. An international conference in 1973 adopted an international agreement for placing
restraints on the contamination of the sea, land and air by ships,
called the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL). The original MARPOL Convention was
signed on February 17, 1973, but did not actually come into force.
The current Convention is a combination of the 1973 Convention
and the 1978 Protocol, which entered into force on October 2,
1983. As of December 31, 2005, 136 countries, representing 98%
of the worlds shipping tonnage, are parties to the Convention [8].
The double-hull requirement was adopted in 1992 with a nal
phasing-out date for Category 1 tankers (pre-MARPOL tankers) in
2005 and a nal phasing-out date for Category 2 and 3 tankers
(MARPOL tankers and smaller tankers) from 2015 [8]. Following
the Erika incident off the coast of France in December 1999,
the IMO member states discussed proposals for accelerating the
phase-out of single-hull tankers. As a result, in April 2001, the
IMO adopted a revised phase-out schedule for single-hull tankers,

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avold / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 95 (2010) 511519

which entered into force on September 1, 2003. Under the revised

MARPOL timetable for Category 2 and 3 single-hull tankers, the
phase-out date was brought forward to 2010. The Prestige
incident in 2002 led to further calls for amendments to the
phase-out schedule for single-hull tankers [8].
Of specic interest to Norway is oil transport from Northern
Russia, because vessels must make hundreds of trips a year, in all
kinds of weather, in a geographic area where the consequences of
an accident might be catastrophic. Perrow [9] focused on the
potential of tankers for creating catastrophes and argues that
there is still a strong motivation for prot in this industry and
ships and their crews are pushed to the limits to meet deadlines.
By reading statistics one can observe that seafaring is one of
the worlds most dangerous occupations. Reports indicate that
fatal injuries and drowning amongst seafarers range from 11.5 to
27.8 times higher than average fatality rates among the general
workforce ashore (e.g. [1012]). A study examining the relationship between work on tankers and mortality found that
Norwegian seamen working on tankers had a higher mortality
rate ratio than seamen from other types of vessels. The increased
risk was especially related to death from cancer and from
accidents [13]. One study of non-fatal injuries based on registered
accidents report an accident rate related to work on board close to
the rate for the working population ashore [14]. Another study
reports a relative risk of 1.7 for all injuries in merchant seafaring
compared to shore based institutions [15]. Jensen et al. [12]
reported an accident incident rate on cargo ships and tankers of
39.5 per million working hours based on a survey of 6461
seafarers from 11 countries carried out in 2001. An analysis of
time lost through injuries reported to the Maritime Authority in
2001, the rate of injury for vessels in the Danish International
Shipping register was estimated to be 14.2 injuries per million
working hours [12]. The marked difference between the survey
study and injuries reported to the maritime authorities suggests
that there is substantial under-reporting to authorities. Underreporting seems to be more of a problem in shipping than ashore
since the fatality rates are very high, but the non-fatal rates are
reported to be around the same level as ashore [12,14].
Improvements in ship design and navigation aids have reduced
the frequency and severity of shipping incidents both in general
and on tankers [16]. In turn, the reduction of failures in
technology has revealed the underlying level of inuence of
human error in the causation of accidents. In an analysis of human
and organizational error in crude oil tanker operations Moore
et al. [17] found that most accidents involve the interaction
between humans, organizations and systems (equipment). Accidents involving the systems component alone are the most easily
remedied; however, when human interactions are involved the
remedy becomes more complex. Anta~ o and Guedes Soares [18]
found in their research on high-speed crafts that accidents was
mainly related to bridge personnel and operations, and the human
elements as key factors responsible for the majority of the
accidents. Sorensen [19] claims: There is a clear consensus
among writers in the eld of safety management that workers
attitudes towards safety make a difference. What is not clear is
the mechanism by which attitudes, or safety culture, affect the
safety of operations [19, p. 203]. In other words it seems to be
interesting to look at the link between attitudes, safety culture
and behaviour.
Most of the safety culture denitions are global and implicit,
have a holistic perspective, focuses on multi-dimensionality,
include both positive attitudes and positive safety management,
and includes culture as a matter of individual values and
attitudesas well as group and organizational values. Safety
management seems also to be closely linked to safety culture and
many authors agree that managing safety is a key aspect of safety

culture/climate [2023]. Gordon et al. describe safety culture and

safety management as a necessary double-act:
It can be seen that both safety culture and safety management
go hand in hand to achieve safe practices in an organisation.
One is less tangible than the other, but both are required. If
there is only an SMS (Safety Management System) but no real
commitment to safety, then the SMS will not be effective, as
decisions will not really prioritise safety, and the SMS will be
merely a paper exercise. Similarly, if there is a good safety
culture but no SMS, then in a complex organisation the way
safety is applied runs the risk of being inconsistent, under- or
misresourced, and not seen as business driven (because it will
not be part of the business plan) [23, p. 674]
An afrmation of the relationship between attitudes, safety
culture and safety behaviour is reported in research by for
example Zohar [24], Lee and Harrison [25], Rundmo [26], Clarke
[27] and Choudhry et al. [28]. Clarke [27] used a meta-analytic
approach reviewing the relationship between safety climate and
safety performance. She found support for a link between
organizational safety climate and employee safety compliance
and participation and reduction in occupational incidents and
injuries. Choudhry et al. [28] concluded in their review that safety
culture inuenced employees attitudes and behaviour in relation
to an organizations ongoing health and safety performance.
The dominant theory used in safety culture and climate
literature to explain the link between attitudes, beliefs and
behaviour are Ajzen and Fishbeins Theory of Reasoned Action
[29], which maintains that an individuals intention is inuenced
by the previous attitude that they have toward the behaviour and
the prevailing subjective norms (the persons belief that specic
individuals or groups think he should or should not perform the
behaviour and his motivation to comply with the specic
referents). Most people weigh the possible outcomes that could
result from a decision that is being made. The theory of reasoned
action argues that behaviour can be predicted if an observer
knows the persons attitude to the particular behaviour, the
persons intention to perform the behaviour, what the person
believes are the consequences of performing the behaviour, and
the social norms that govern the behaviour.
Aizen and Fishbeins model and theory is referred to by
reputable scientists who conduct safety research, e.g. Rundmo
and Hale [30], and Cox and Flin [31]. However, there has been
much discussion as to whether it is attitudes that inuence
behaviour or whether it is behaviour that inuence attitudes
[32,33], or if attitudes and behaviour represent correlated coeffects of a process in which modication of one factor produces
change in the other [34].
Several authors have criticised the concept of safety culture for
many reasons. Hale [35] claims that the present attitudinal tools
based on questionnaires and observations only tap into the more
supercial levels of culture, at most of espoused values and
Guldenmund [36] listed in a review-paper on safety climate/
culture 18 different denitions of the constructs safety climate
and safety culture and claimed that although both seem to be
important concepts, not much consensus has been reached on the
cause, the content and the consequences. Guldenmund proposes,
as a solution to the shortcomings a model based on Schein [37]
dening a central level of basic assumptions (safety culture) and
two outer circles of espoused values and artefacts (safety climate).
He locates most results of safety culture studies in the two outer
circles. Cooper [38] discusses the limitations of safety culture,
claiming that it lacks contextual factors. Cox and Cox [39] suggest
that the very broadness of the denitions of safety culture weaken
its scientic usefulness, indicating that much greater precision is

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avold / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 95 (2010) 511519

required, and Rosness [40] suggests that safety culture is yet

another buzzword designed to hide confusion. Even if Hale is
critical about the usefulness of the term safety culture he is not
negative, in his concluding remarks in an editorial Cultures
confusion (special issue on safety culture in Safety Science), he
indicates a preferred denition of culture in relation to safety:
focusing on the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by
natural groups as dening norms and values, which determine
how they act and react in relation to risks and control systems
[35, p. 7] and propose a list of elements for a good culture for
safety [35, p. 12].
Up to 1998, no research on safety culture in shipping seems to
have been reported [41], but in recent years, a few papers dealing
with the issue have appeared in peer-reviewed journals [4145].
However, most safety culture/climate research has been conducted in relation to the nuclear power industry, chemical
factories, air trafc, train trafc, offshore drilling and the
construction industry (e.g. [25,4650]).
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
an organization with a safety culture is one that gives
appropriate priority to safety and realizes that safety must be
managed in the same way as other areas of the business. The key
to achieving a safety culture is to recognize that accidents can be
prevented by following the correct procedures and best practices,
constantly thinking about safety and seeking continuous improvement [51].
The IMO [51] claims that both the safety culture and safety
management in the shipping industry must be rooted in the
professionalism of seafarers. There is an increasing conviction that
the safety of operations at sea is highly dependent on the
leadership capacity of the senior ofcers, both at sea and onshore.
In this paper safety culture is taken to be composed of values,
attitudes, perceptions and competencies. A search of the literature
using Scopus [52] indicated that there had been no research
specically into safety culture and safety management on tankers,
and only six papers were identied when the search term was
changed to shipping rather than terms related specically to
tankers. The main purpose of this paper is to test a number of
exploratory hypotheses to see if signicant differences in safety
related attitudes (indicators of safety culture and safety management) can be found between type of tankers, ship owners, vessels
ag/state of registration, the vessels age, and the seafarers age,
occupation and country of origin.
Vanem et al. [53] compared accident statistics for different
kinds of oil tankers (chemical tankers, liqueed natural gas/LNG
tankers, liqueed petroleum gas/LPG tankers) and bulk carriers
and found the accident frequencies to be somewhat lower for LNG
carriers than for the other types of vessels. According to Vanem
et al. this could be expected considering the high focus on safety
and competence on LNG carriers.
H1. The type of tanker has a positive impact on safety related
attitudes.
We expect that the propensity for workgroups to be actively
involved in safety initiatives will vary between organizations. To
reach the objective of safety, a crew must be properly trained and
familiarized with procedures. On board and ashore good communication should be established and seafarers and management
ashore should be aware of their duties and responsibilities.
Guedes Soares and Teixeira [54] report that leadership, particularly of senior managers, is important for safety. Managements
commitment to safety and its inuence on working group
behaviour has also been examined by Simard and Marchand
[55] and found to be an important safety factor.

513

H2. The ship owner has a positive impact on safety related

attitudes.
Using the Lloyds casualty database for the years 19971999,
Alderton and Winchester [56] revealed that ships sailing under a
ag of convenience (FOC) have a worse record than both ships
registered on a second/international register and those registered
under national ags, but that there are considerable variations
within the FOC group itself. Shabakhty et al. [57] also indicate that
ag may be a suitable indicator for identication of the most
substandard vessels, but has little potential for the identication
of the best ships.
H3. The vessels ag/register has a positive impact on safety
related attitudes.
Fung et al. [58] found signicant divergence in safety culture
between the management group, supervisory group and worker
group on 10 different construction sites in Hong Kong. They

measured safety culture using 5 testable factors. Havold

[44]
found that knowledge was a signicant discriminator between
ofcers and crew in a Norwegian shipping company.
H4. The seafarers occupation has a positive impact on safety
related attitudes.
Hansen et al. [59] indicates that aboard Danish merchant ships
seafarers from South East Asia, mainly the Philippines, have a
genuinely lower risk of occupational accidents in comparison
with seafarers from Western and Eastern Europe. This may be due
to different safety attitudes. It may be valuable to identify
differences in approach to safety between South East Asian and
European seafarers and attempt to implement the positive
attitudes in accident prevention programmes. The largest difference between accident rates of foreigners and Danes were found
on tankers (oil, chemicals) where foreigners had an adjusted
relative risk of 0.28 compared with Danes [15].
H5. The seafarers nationality has a positive impact on safety
related attitudes.
A lack of job experience and age were found to be a
contributory factor in causing injury by Nielsen [60] and Jensen
et al. [12]. The youngest seafarers, the ratings and those in the
engine room area had signicantly higher risks of injury.
H6. The sailors age has a positive inuence on safety related
attitudes.
The Ofcial Journal of the European Communities made a
comparison of accident statistics according to tanker age and
showed increasing accident rates for older ships [61]. Shabakhty
et al. [57] found that factors like the vessels age, ag and size may
be suitable indicators for identication of the most substandard
vessels, but that these factors had little potential for identication
of the best ships.
H7. The vessels age has a positive inuence on safety related
attitudes.

2. Materials and methods

The data set used in this paper is part of a larger survey study of
safety and risk attitudes at sea. The total sample consists of answers
from 2558 respondents from 141 vessels owned by 16 Norwegian
shipping companies. Quota sampling was used and the sample was
stratied according to vessel types: Dry Cargo, Tank and Passenger.
Ship owners representing the three categories were drawn

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randomly from lists produced by the Ship-info-com database

(http://www.ship-info.com).
This paper refers to the tanker segment of the survey. The total
sample (2558 respondents) has been used in two previous papers,
the rst focusing on safety and national cultures measured
dimensions of national culture (power-distance, uncertainty
avoidance, individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity
and long term orientation) measured using Hofstedes Value
Survey Model (VSM 94: 20 items on a 5-point Likerts scale)
[62,63], and the second, a methodology paper focusing on
retention rules for factor retention in exploratory factor analysis
and validation and simplication of the factor structure using
LISREL in a two step conrmative modelling strategy with a focus
on construct validity [64].

2.1. The survey instrument

Based on an extensive review of the literature, different
aspects of safety culture were identied. Most of the items for
the questionnaire were chosen from a comprehensive study that
reviewed 9 important safety culture/climate papers [65]. Europeans created the scales and items used in the questionnaire,
and as such, the study might exhibit a somewhat European bias.
Each item on the safety questionnaire sought responses on a 6point Likert scale. The questionnaire was produced in a Norwegian and an English version. As a result of discussions with the
shipping companies, which use both English and Norwegian as
working languages, the questionnaire was originally produced in
an English version, which was then translated into a Norwegian
equivalent, before being translated back into English. Copies of
the questionnaire were distributed to a contact person from each
shipping company, who sent a package to the vessel containing
the agreed-upon number of questionnaires in English and/or
Norwegian, along with posters to inform the crew members about
the project, and an information letter addressed to the person on
the vessel who would be responsible for handing out and
collecting the questionnaires.

2.2. Sample and respondents

A total of 1158 seafarers from 63 vessels and 8 ship-owners
constituted the tanker segment used in this paper, giving an
overall response rate of approximately 70%. The collection of data
took place between the beginning of June and the end of
September 2002. The sample consisted of oil shuttles, and oil,
gas and chemical tankers. The ages of the seafarers ranged from
20 to 60 years, with a mean age of 37.9 years (SD 11.3) and with a
mean job tenure of 15 years (SD 12). The crews were drawn from
17 countries, although 43.2% were from Norway and 45.4% from
the Philippines. Ninety-seven per cent of the sample was male
and 49.9% of the sample consisted of deck, engine and galley
ofcers.

2.3. Analysis

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Exploratory factor analysis
A KMO of 0.951 and a signicant Bartletts test indicated that
the data were suitable for factor analysis [66]. Factor analysis with
varimax rotation (which imposes the restriction that the factors
cannot be correlated) was applied to the items in the safety
questionnaire. Using a selection criterion that factors should have
an eigenvalue of at least 1, 20 factors were extracted from the
material. A distinct knee on the scree plot at 4 factors resulted in
the rejection of the 20-factor solution and a factor analysis with 4
factors was selected [66]. Inspections of histograms and plots
showed that factors were skewed to the right and also showed
some kurtosis. However, transformations were not performed
since factor analysis is generally robust with non-normality [66].
The four factors shown in Table 1 (Management attitude towards
safety, Work content/pressure, Knowledge and Fatalism) explain
approximately 40% of the variance.
Management attitudes are the most important factor in this
model. Attitudes act as an indicator of safety performance under
discussion. The attitude dimension includes management commitment and involvement in safety work, the degree of openness

Table 1
Factors extracted from the survey.
Factor

Cronbachs
alpha

No of
items

F1: Management attitude to safety

0.91

0.87

0.87

0.85

 Safety representatives always get support from the

company in order to do their job properly.

 Information from the company on safety matters is

very good.

 The companys safety instructions are very good.

 The companys emergency response training is very
good.

 The quality of safety meetings on this vessel is very

good.
F2: Work content/pressure

 I break the rules due to management pressure.

 I am under pressure from my workmates to break the






rules.
I break the procedures to get the work done.
I get the work done better by ignoring some rules.
I take chances to get the work done.
I ignore safety to get the work done.
I take shortcuts that involve little or no risk.
F3: Knowledge

 I know the purpose of the Quality Management System






well.
I know the purpose of the ISM code well.
I know the operations aboard that require a checklist.
I am very familiar with the companys safety policy.
I know when to report near-accidents.
F4: Fatalism

 Accidents just happen, there is little one can do to

The data were analysed by using SPSS. Factor analysis was

conducted to clarify the structure of attitude and safety measures.
Multiple regression analysis was used to validate factors. GLM
with post hoc tests and multiple discriminant analysis were used
to test hypotheses.
All cells in the design exceeded the number of dependent
variables included in the GLM analysis [66].

avoid them.

 What happens at work is largely a matter of chance.

 Accidents are unavoidable.
 The odds are against you; it is impossible to avoid
accidents.

 The use of machines and technical equipment makes

accidents unavoidable.

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and the extent to which communications reaches all levels in the

organization (e.g. [44,46,49,67,68]).
Work content/pressure (e.g. [46,48,67,68]) indicates how
people perceive their work. Several authors include the work
situation as one of the main factors inuencing behaviour. The
work situation includes conditions like the physical work
environment, time pressure, workload, stress, and clear rules
and division of work.
Knowledge of rules and regulations and of how to behave
may form part of the safety knowledge construct (e.g. [44,46,68]).
According to Cooper [69], a systematic training process to
develop peoples job and safety related competence is important
for safety culture. Knowledge and training are insufcient
for developing a safety culture. Research suggests that
safety knowledge is an important factor in predicting safety
compliance [70,71]. This factor includes knowledge and competence relating to rules and regulations, of how to behave in
connection with policies, routines, processes, laws and systems
that affect safety.
Fatalism is described as an individuals belief in destiny, that all
events have been predetermined and that there is not much that
can be done about what happens. This is a social construction of
risk that has been found to inuence behaviour [30,72].
Interfactor correlations are estimated through computation of
correlation coefcients between scores from each factor (Appendix B). Factors 1 and 3 exhibit signicant intercorrelation (r = 0.55),
i.e., there is a higher-order relationship between Managements
attitude to safety and Knowledge in these analyses. Furthermore,
correlations between factor scores suggest a signicant correlation (r= 0.43) between F2, Work content/pressure and F4, Fatalism. All other correlations were below 0.3.
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for the four
factors obtained in the factor analysis, broken down by shipping
company and occupational group. The scales on F2 Work content/
Pressure and F4 Fatalism are reversed so the numbers correspond
with F1 and F3, where higher numbers are positive for safety. As
expected, masters and management had a more positive perception
of the shipping companys safety culture factors than the crew [4],
with a higher mean and lower SD on 25 out of 32 calculations in
Table 2.

515

3.2. GLM analysis

GLM was chosen because it is a exible statistical method that
can incorporate normally distributed dependent variables and
categorical and continuous independent variables. Boxes M
showed that the assumption of equality of variance was not
met. However, Levines test, which is more robust, did not reject
the null hypothesis of equal variance for all dependent variables
[66]. Independence of observations is assumed because of
sampling and collection procedures. The assumption of normality
of observations was checked and some of the scales were found to
be skewed and have a degree of kurtosis. Transformations were
performed but these did not change the results. According to SPSS
Advanced Statistics 7.5 [73], an analysis of variance is robust to
departure from normality as long as the data are symmetric, and F
tests can be robust to breaches of the assumption of normality
and equal variance for all treatment groups, except in extreme
cases.
The GLM results showed that there were statistically signicant differences in the factors among ship owners, the vessels
ag/register, the seafarers occupation, the seafarers country of
origin, the seafarers age and the vessels age, but no signicant
difference among different types of tankers. Pillais Trace was
chosen to determine the differences in the entire set of dependent
variables simultaneously, because, according to Hair et al. [66],
Pillais Trace is the most robust criterion for signicance testing of
multivariate analysis of variance. Tamhanes T2 and Waller
Duncan were chosen as post hoc tests based on the SPSS 7.5
manual [73].
By using Pillais Trace, the results showed signicant multivariate effects for ship owners, ags/registers, seafarers occupation, seafarers country of origin, seafarers and vessels age, but
not between different types of tankers.
The tankers were grouped into four types and analysed
separately. These types were oil shuttle, oil, gas and product/
chemical. Table 3 shows no difference in safety related attitudes
between different types of tankers (Hypothesis 1).
Senior corporate managers inuence safety through their
decision-making on budgets and policies, but also through their
daily actions and attitudes. These channels of inuence are

Table 2
Mean and standard deviations of factors for the eight shipping companies subdivided by occupational groups.
Sample size: N

Mean SD

F1 Management attitude to safety

F2 Work content/pressure

F3 Knowledge

F4 Fatalism

Mn

On

Cn

401

Mean
SD

4.60
0.51

4.56
0.83

4.66
0.86

5.30
0.75

4.88
0.87

4.66
0.97

5.33
0.45

5.03
0.52

4.78
0.73

4.87
0.87

4.32
1.03

3.97
1.14

102

Mean
SD

4.93
0.81

5.00
0.69

5.02
0.81

5.48
0,50

4.85
0.83

4.61
1.00

5.40
0.52

5.19
0.54

5.04
0.71

5.31
0.80

3.87
1.19

4.00
1.11

181

Mean
SD

4.64
0.92

4.97
0.78

5.00
0.48

4.84
0.71

4.79
0.86

4.36
1.01

5.18
0.42

5.08
0.70

5.02
0.42

4.89
0.93

3.88
1.07

3.02
1.00

40

Mean
SD

5.07
0.31

4.94
0.61

4.95
0.38

5.14
0.14

4.77
0.80

4.33
0.59

4.80
0.20

4.90
0.41

4.80
0.54

4.93
0.46

4.02
1.12

3.47
1.23

187

Mean
SD

4.42
0.58

4.34
0.71

4.82
0.79

5.00
0.76

4.77
0.74

4.70
0.94

5.20
0.44

4.95
0.61

4.97
0.59

4.69
0.79

4.53
0.82

3.82
1.14

58

Mean
SD

5.25
0.44

4.76
0.65

4.87
0.80

5.46
0.41

4.93
0.83

4.83
0.84

5.70
0.48

5.07
0.35

5.01
0.90

4.85
0.98

4.26
1.01

3.78
1.23

122

Mean
SD

4.84
0.57

4.62
0.70

4.74
0.53

5.34
0.60

4.37
0.84

4.35
0.82

5.34
0.48

4.93
0.42

4.67
0.62

4.52
0.93

3.94
1.06

3.58
0.88

67

Mean
SD

5.00
0.00

5.17
0.58

4.74
0.51

5.07
0.10

5.01
0.85

4.68
0.84

5.00
0.00

5.18
0.35

5.01
0.59

4.50
0.71

4.22
1.07

3.56
0.87

M= master, O= ofcers, C = crew.

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avold / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 95 (2010) 511519

Table 3
Multivariate effects of the 7 hypotheses: Pillais Trace

Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Hypothesis

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

Tanker type
Ship owner
Flag/register
Seafarers occupation
Seafarers country of origin
Seafarers age
Vessel age

Value

Signicance

Hypothesis

0.018
0.051
0.036
0.131
0.221
0.090
0.082

1.118
1.572
1.669
3.548
8.547
5.700
3.063

0.340
0.038
0.046
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Rejected
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted

Table 4
Result of GLM using occupation as grouping criterion.
Test name

Value

Approx. F

Signicance of statistics P

Multivariate effects:
Pillais Trace

0.131

3.549

0.000

Between subjects effects:

Dependant variables

Sum of squares

df

Mean square

Signif. of statistics P

Post Hoc Waller Duncan1

Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor

4.837
20.877
10.661
24.703

6
6
6
6

0.691
2.982
1.523
3.529

1.859
4.240
5.236
4.119

0.074
0.000
0.000
0.000

(4*, 2*,1*) o (5*,3*)o (7*,6*)

(5*,3*)o (2*,4*,7*) o (1*, 6)
(5*,7*,3*) o (4*,2*,6*,1*)
(3*,5*,7*,6*) o(2*, 4*) o (1*)

1
2
3
4

*Signicant at p o 0.05 for at least one other group (TamhaneT2)

1

(y) = homogenous subsets. Master =1; deck ofcer= 2; deck crew = 3; engine ofcer= 4; engine crew = 5; galley ofcer = 6; galley crew = 7.

Table 5
Result of GLM using seafarers age as grouping criterion.
Test name

Value

Approx. F

Signicance of statistics P

Multivariate effects:
Pillais Trace

0.082

5.700

0.000

Between subjects effects:

Dependant variables

Sum of square

df

Mean square

Signicance of statistics P

Post Hoc Waller Duncan1

Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor

7.546
8.149
15.157
2.278

3
3
3
3

2.515
2.716
5.052
0.759

6.766
3.862
17.369
0.886

0.000
0.009
0.000
0.448

(1*) o(2*,4*,3*)
(2*,1*)o (4*,3*)
(1*) o(4*,3*,2*)
(1*,2*)o (4*, 3)

1
2
3
4

*Signicant at p o 0.05 for at least one other group (TamhaneT2)

1

(y) = homogenous sub sets. Under 30= 1; 3140 =2; 4150 = 3; more than 50= 4.

important in forming the safety culture of the shipping company.

GLM/Manova shows a signicant difference in safety related
attitudes between ship owners (Table 3, Hypothesis 2). The
factors that discriminate between ship-owners best were fatalism
and work pressure. No signicant interaction effects were found
between ship-owners and nationality, or ship-owners and type of
vessel.
By neglecting safety related attitudes/safety culture there is a
risk that the ship-owners costs will increase and reputations will
be damaged. Ship-owners who face reputational damage might
have problems recruiting high quality crew and securing
contracts from quality conscious customers.
Table 3 shows a signicant difference by ag/register (Hypothesis 3). GLM showed differences in Work pressure and Fatalism to
be signicant at the 0.05 level between the ve different ship
registeration (Norway ordinary NOR, Norway international NIS,
the Netherlands NED, the Marshall Islands MHL and Britain BRI).
Management attitudes to safety were signicant at the 0.1 level,

indicating that NOR and NED had less favourable attitudes to

safety than NIS, MHL and BRI. NOR were signicantly less
fatalistic than the other registers.
Tables 3 and 4 show signicant differences in safety related
attitudes between seafarers in different occupations (Hypothesis
4). The results show that a strong management commitment to
health and safety plays a vital role in cultivating a positive safety
attitude/culture. The analysis indicates two clusters, with the
masters, deck and engine ofcers in one cluster reporting more
positive safety attitudes/culture than the galley ofcers, galley,
engine and deck crew. This conrms previous ndings [58,44].
Based on the above ndings, it is believed that if the
communication between the vessels management and the crew
is good, the more strongly employees will buy in to the
organizational values. When greater numbers of employees
behave safely in their work, they will act as good examples and
by exerting leadership help to raise the safety awareness among
the other employees.

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avold / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 95 (2010) 511519

There were enough seafarers from six countries, Norway, the

Philippines, Poland, Indonesia, the Netherlands and Latvia, to
make comparisons on the basis of nationality practicable. GLM/
Manova showed signicant differences in safety related attitudes
according to country of origin (Hypothesis 5). The ndings
indicated three clusters: Norway and the Netherlands in one,
Poland and Latvia in another and Indonesia and the Philippines in
a third. On the Fatalism factor, the clusters were especially clear;
Norway and the Netherlands were the least fatalistic countries
and Indonesia and the Philippines the most fatalistic countries.
Norway and the Netherlands reported the least favourable
attitudes towards safety, while Latvia, Poland, Indonesia and the
Philippines formed a single cluster on this issue. These clusters
correspond quite well with Geert Hofstedes dimensions of
national culture. Norway and the Netherlands are quite close on
all dimensions. The PhilippinesIndonesia and PolandLatvia are
not as close as Norway and the Netherlands but are still relatively
close [63].
In safety management it would seem logical that different
cultures could need different leadership styles to inspire the
safest possible behaviour and differences in safety attitudes/
safety culture could be used to tailor accident prevention
programmes. Management could use knowledge of national
cultures when recruiting crew and putting together work teams,
since it can be seen that the culture of each individual involved
not only inuences their own role, but also the interpersonal
dynamic within the team.
GLM/Manova (Tables 3 and 5) shows signicant differences in
safety related attitudes between age groups (Hypothesis 6). The
analysis suggests that there are four different clusters with
respect to age: 30 years of age or less, 3140, 4150 and over
50 years of age. Younger seafarers report less favourable attitudes
towards safety, less knowledge, higher work pressure and more
fatalism than older seafarers.
It seems to be important that the ofcers should structure the
workforce and assemble workgroups reecting the differences in
safety related attitudes/safety culture between age groups in
order to achieve positive socialization.
GLM/Manova (Table 3) reports signicant differences in safety
related attitudes between vessel age groups (Hypothesis 7). In this
case the analysis suggests that six groups need to be considered:
less than 3 years old, 36, 710, 1115, 1620 and over 20 years
of age. Newer vessels (but over 3 years old) report less
favourable attitudes towards safety, less knowledge, higher work
pressure and less fatalism than the crew on older vessels.
However the newest vessels (less than 3 years old) reported the
most positive attitude to safety, lowest work pressure, highest
knowledge and lowest fatalism of all the groups.

4. Conclusions, limitations and future research

It seems that the threats posed by oil transportation have been
taken seriously by the IMO, as well as by serious shipping nations
and companies, because the accidental pollution and incident
records have shown very considerable and sustained improvements over the last 10 years and more. Among the objectives
identied in IMO documents, the main reasons for introducing the
ISM (International Safety Management) Code are: (1) to provide
for safe practice in ship operation and a safe working environment, (2) to establish safeguards against all identied risks, (3)
continuously to improve the safety management skills of
personnel ashore and aboard, including preparing for emergencies
related both to safety and environmental protection and (4) to
develop a safety culture in shipping.

517

It is important for safety that all parties involved maintain a

strict adherence to international (maritime) law and review
processes, and that they also cooperate with impartial and
comprehensive accident investigations. However, it is also
important to look for new measures to help analyse and
understand the risks and consequences involved in oil transport
at sea. This research indicates that measuring safety attitudes/
culture can be an additional tool for accident prevention, since it
can provide company with information about the underlying
dimensions of safety culture that can be used by management for
planning and implementing changes. The ndings from this
research conrm the usefulness of safety attitude/culture measures as predictors of unsafe work behaviour and are in line with
the result reported in the literature, that organizational and
cultural factors inuence safety management (e.g. [2023]).
Measures of safety related attitudes/culture can, for example,
be used for benchmarking purposes and the identication of best
practice and promote improvement in safety management.
According to Grabowsky et al. [74] quantitative safety culture/
attitude measures can provide important input to an organizations continuous safety monitoring systems and work proactively
as a leading safety indicator. Analyses of data can facilitate an
evaluation of overall performance, allowing managers to identify
problem areas and concentrate resources on areas that particularly need improving. The results can also be used in discussion
with insurers and customers, as well as being a visible tool for
discussing safety with the workforce.
One of the most striking aspects of these scales and items is
that so many of the items in the original item pool reected a high
level of consensus amongst the respondents, irrespective of the
company, the type of vessel, the occupation or the age group that
they were drawn from. The skewness of the scale might reect
general beliefs or stereotypes about safety that are shared among
the workforce. The most likely explanation is that the skewed
items reect the shared positive safety attitudes generated by the
conditions in the companies taking part in this survey.
Perhaps insurance and classication companies could be
persuaded to release information to researchers about accidents
and underwriting inspections. One readily available source of
information in shipping is safety data from Port State Controls,
which might be transformed into usable outcome data. Another
possible line of future research may be to look into the interaction
between the organization and the safety attitudes/safety culture/
safety management in more detail.
There will always be ship-owners who are prepared to risk
their ships, the cargo and the crew for more prot, but they will
never willingly take part in a survey. Ship-owners who are
protected by the hull and P&I insurance cover and whose liability
is limited under the international limitation of liability conventions would like to have a risk free business. Flag states which do
not implement the legislation, ofcers who are in dire nancial
straits, and classication societies that aim to attract more
tonnage undermine the efforts of the international organizations
like IMO.

Appendix A. Major oil spills since 1967

See Table A1.

Appendix B. Correlations between the factors

See Table A2.

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J.I. H
avold / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 95 (2010) 511519

Table A1
Position (tonnes)

Ship name

Year

Location

Spill size

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
35

Atlantic Empress
ABT Summer
Castillo de Bellver
Amoco Cadiz
Haven
Odyssey
Torrey Canyon
Sea Star
Irenes Serenade
Urquiola
Hawaiian Patriot
Independenta
Jakob Maersk
Braer
Khark 5
Aegean Sea
Sea Empress
Katina P
Nova
Prestige
Exxon Valdez

1979
1991
1983
1978
1991
1988
1967
1972
1980
1976
1977
1979
1975
1993
1989
1992
1996
1992
1985
2002
1989

Off Tobago, West Indies

700 nautical miles off Angola
Off Saldanha Bay, South Africa
Off Brittany, France
Genoa, Italy
700 nautical miles off Nova Scotia, Canada
Scilly Isles, UK
Gulf of Oman
Navarino Bay, Greece
La Coruna, Spain
300 nautical miles off Honolulu
Bosphorus, Turkey
Oporto, Portugal
Shetland Islands, UK
120 nautical miles off Atlantic coast of Morocco
La Coruna, Spain
Milford Haven, UK
Off Maputo, Mozambique
Off Kharg Island, Gulf of Iran
Off Galicia, Spain
Prince William Sound, Alaska, USA

287,000
260,000
252,000
223,000
144,000
132,000
119,000
115,000
100,000
100,000
95,000
95,000
88,000
85,000
80,000
74,000
72,000
72,000
70,000
63,000
37,000

Source: International Tanker Owner Pollution Federation (ITOPF), 2007.

Table A2
F1
F1:
F2:
F3:
F4:

Management attitude to safety

Work content/pressure
Knowledge
Fatalism

1.000
.290**
.552**
.160**

F2

F3

F4

.
1.000
.294**
.433**

1.000
.058

1.000

**Correlation is signicant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

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