Night Movement and Tracking Techniques along the Northern Border of

Cambodia by RANGER Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13...Spring 1966 DOD/

MACV/OP-35 directed Long-Range Reconnaissance Operations

The Chinese Bandits had been performing extended patrolling operations

since their arrival in Vietnam in the fall of 1965 and our SOP's,
including mission preparations, had become routine as our teamwork
constantly improved. Warning and operations orders were routinely
given, however only some priority pre-insertion rehearsals, refresher
training and other preparations were performed and were primarily
focused on suspected enemy and indigenous population location reports,
area studies, route navigation and night movement techniques.

The tentative routes had been planned for night-only movement that
would take place primarily along the ridgeline border of Cambodia or
Laos and Vietnam with several routes extending eastward into small
valleys and the adjacent hilltops. Contrary to policy, the routes and
other critical control points were plotted in black pencil directly
onto the topographic maps that we would be carrying. Small penlight
flashlights having a red tinted lens were carried by all team members
and would be used to read and analyze the maps during periods of
darkness when necessary.

A small wooded area was located near our Mustang LZ at An Khe where we
were billeted in tents. This tree area was used to conduct rehearsals
and other refresher patrol training exercises.

For a few hours on the day and night prior to the long-range
reconnaissance mission, the Chinese Bandit LRRP team conducted
refresher drills to improve our track perception skills of on trail
and off trail terrain. The drill that was the most beneficial required
each man to assume the front leaning rest position with their arms and
hands extended in a manner which formed a small square opening between
both hands when the thumb tips met and were held perpendicular to the
main body axis while the other fingers were oriented parallel. After
examining the area between the hands for one minute, each person would
mark the limits of the square while kneeling on one knee after
removing the small green colored Memorandum booklet and short wood
lead pencil from their breast pocket and attempt to sketch what was
observed in the square solely relying on their memory of what was
observed. We would critique each individual sketch and strived to
detect any missing details that were observed but not sketched. During
those drills that were conducted in darkness, the prone positioned was
omitted but the hand orientation used to delineate the square area
that was observed while kneeling where the penlight flashlight was
used to illuminate the area being evaluated and sketched.
I had been shown this drill as a child while training with German Boy
Scouts during a scout jamboree held in the black forest and had
observed for ten years that everyone subjected to the sketching drill
improved to detect more details with practice. Most persons failed to
detect a majority of the clearly delineated details within the area
being observed during their first attempts. Even relatively
undisturbed flat and seemingly feature-less terrain typically
contained large amounts of information that was detected and sketched
only after practicing in a variety of terrain, light and weather
conditions. Indentations, scratches, texture, colors, moisture
content, plant, animal and microbial matter, rain drops, etc. were
only observed and sketched with practice.

In my patrol cap I carried a flexible 12-inch straight edge fabricated

from a 2-inch wide strip of thin sheet metal that had issued
luminescent taped fixed to one side. The tape was the same material
that was used for the markers sewn on the back of our patrol caps.
Several others carried the same device that was used to detect depth
changes during light and darkness when the straight edge was placed
horizontal along the surface being evaluated. During darkness the
faint shadows created by the luminescence revealed details that the
brighter red light did not and any variation in depth below the
straight edge was more evident. Black permanent ink was used to mark
twelve inches with halve and quarter inch increments. The scale was
used to measure the dimensions of tracks and various items, including
wildlife droppings and spent ammunition casings. Longer measurements,
such as the distance between tracks, was measured using the
luminescent notches made on a walking stick inlaid with foxfire and
notched carvings.

The captured NVA rucksack that I carried had several modifications

that included extending the pack straps to provide a more comfortable
fit and enhanced ease of movement; and a section of a shelter half was
sewn on the upper frame of the pack forming a cape which was large
enough to extend over my head and provide a tent above any trail that
was being examined during the darkness when lighting was used. This
procedure provided concealment of the lighting and improved the
lighting control that was needed to create the shadowing required to
detect details. A local Vietnamese tailor whose shop was located near
the newly established "Sin City" at An Khe had made the pack
modifications. He made several other items for the Chinese Bandits
including the special 40mm bandoleers.

Since our arrival in country, I had many opportunities to examine the

trails and off trail areas where while kneeling over the site being
examined, the rucksack would be allowed to slide forward to the back
of my head, allowing me to easily grab the cape and pull it over my
head and cover the trail. I would then remove my patrol cap and the
luminescent straight edge and penlight. The luminescent tabs on the
back of the cap were also used to create faint shadows when needed.

Night movement required excellent night vision that demanded a diet

containing beta-carotene and Vitamin A. We were concerned that the
single LRRP dehydrated ration that we consumed every other day might
not provide sufficient amounts of nutrients to optimize night vision
and we augmented our diet with the consumption of a variety of green
grasses. The soft stems that were pulled from the nodes were the only
part of the plant eaten. Although, no tests were performed to confirm
the night vision value of the grass consumption, we did not experience
night blindness or noticeable night vision decreases after prolonged
patrolling. The soft grass stems did not cause observed digestive
problems and were filling. One 'Jungle Chocolate' candy bar was also
consumed daily by each man and the wild fruits were frequently found
in the mountainous areas along the border. Extreme dysentery and bouts
with malaria adversely effected night vision performance. Every effort
was made for every man to remain in the field and complete the long-
range reconnaissance missions along the border; however, men weakened
by disease or other debilitating did not perform tracking and other
critical duties. On only one occasion was one of the LRRP team members
evacuated. Louis Tyler had lost consciousness and we were unable to
control the fever that was the result of malaria. He was evacuated by
helicopter from a small clearing in the forest that required modifying
our route plans and increased the likelihood of our being detected.
Tyler's night vision had severely diminished earlier and he was unable
to track but merely follow closely behind another patrol member.
At least six weeks was routinely required for an individual's body to
adjust to the environments of SE Asia and for the initial effects of
amebic dysentery and malaria to subside. However, disease and illness
was expected to flare up at intervals where persons were expected to
function marginally. The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team was comprised of
individuals that did not exhibit strong reactions to the diseases
experienced in SE Asia. Malaria tolerance in the local population was
well documented and it was believed that some otherwise healthy
American troops exhibited this same tolerance.

Alcohol also diminishes night vision performance and a policy of not

drinking alcoholic beverages three days prior to patrols was adopted.
Smoking was believed to also have an adverse impact on night vision
but was primarily prohibited for reasons related to general health and
decreases to the sense of smell. Alcohol and tobacco consumption
restrictions were not adhered to by half of the LRRP team members. I
regret not enforcing these rules and at the time only chose to lead by
example.

Chewing tobacco was not done during patrols. Spitting along the route
would have made it easier to be followed. Our military issued jungle
boots and use of walking sticks left distinctive markings that were
easily followed unless individual patrol members exercised the
necessary precautions. On trail movement was not routinely permitted
when the trail surface was easily marked as was the case in soft or
muddy conditions. Many areas along our route such conditions were
encountered and provided the opportunity for the NVA to leave tracks
whereas we did not. During the spring and early summer of 1966, we did
not detect any efforts by the NVA to minimize making tracks on trails
but made use of camouflage during movement and in their bivouac sites.
It is also my belief that their tracking techniques were not
exhaustive and unless obvious telltale signs were left, the NVA would
not detect our presence nor be successful in their attempts to locate
us.

Camouflage sticks were never carried and not used since it was
believed that prolonged contact with the skin caused infantigo-like
infections and the odor masked the natural smells of the environment.
Some team members did carry red, black and yellow pastel sticks that
were intended to be applied as war paint. Although we had opted to
carrying limited weapons and equipment, many of us would not abandon
the pastel sticks that had no intended use on a reconnaissance
operation where contact was to be avoided at all cost. One of SLA
Marshall's books contains a reference to the fact that the Chinese
Bandits did not wear camouflage 'paint'. Jungle 'rot' sores were
prevented only from frequent stream crossing baths and a constant
effort to keep clean using only the available abundance of fresh
water. Several photos were taken while in the rear areas that depict
members wearing camouflage paste, however, the material was always
removed to prevent the infections.

Prior to occupying our observation sites during the last several hours
of night movement, the LRRP team moved only off trail to minimize
being followed; however since anyone following the team for any period
of time would have easily concluded that we were following the ridge
line trail along the border. This was one of the reasons that we
occasionally changed directions and moved into the valleys and
occupied hilltop observation points east of the border.

I did carry a set of tight fitting black tennis shoes that had the
flat and featureless soles that were commonly worn by most NVA. The
larger length of the shoe did not allow indiscriminate movement but
did optimize my 'counter tracking' efforts. We did request and the
military did produce military boots with NVA shoe and human print
soles. We did not receive these boots in 1966 but I have read of their
later use in Vietnam and have received personal correspondence from
some of those that used them indicating that the boot design was not
without its own problems. Another thing that I would have changed in
our Chinese Bandit LRRP Team uniform was the use of an NVA-like tennis
shoe. It is also my understanding that some LRRP teams later wore such
tennis shoes. During my Special Forces training prior to my assignment
to the Chinese Bandits, I had been briefed on the frequent TDY uniform
of many Special Forces teams operating in foreign countries that
consisted of dark sweat shirts, blue Levis and local tennis shoes. I
regret not adopting the use of a local tennis shoes SOP, albeit
locating a sizes of the normal American foot size took a concentrated
effort.

The Chinese Bandits wore a mixture of uniforms including standard

issue jungle fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues
with the metal thirteen star buttons, and tiger fatigues. I normally
wore one of my father's M42 jungle camouflage fatigues. I had brought
two pairs to Vietnam in 1965 and preferred the jacket having the
"JUSMAAG" scroll patch on the upper left arm. Both pairs were treated
with the stock water repellant that was issued to all companies but
rarely used. SSG Robert Grimes preferred and only wore tiger fatigues
on long-range reconnaissance operations. The remainder of the team
normally wore the standard jungle fatigues and jungle boots; however
several of the shorter members wore various items of captured NVA
clothing on occasion.

The small black leeches seem to prefer attaching to the skin in areas
where clothing covered the body. I also carried and frequently wore a
pair of issued khaki combat swimming trunks and would don the shorts
and remove my shirt when leech infested areas were encountered. The
tennis shoes and 'shorts only' dress would have appeared similar to
that worn by indigenous personnel who occasionally hunted in the
mountains and when observed for a distance had the advantage of
appearing non-military. It was not uncommon on long-range
reconnaissance operations for me to remain in this form of casual
dress for many days. The long-range reconnaissance patrols that we
performed in the spring and early summer were not conducted under the
monsoon rains and the shorts and tennis shoes were adequate and
provided an optimized indigenous appearance. However, I did not
recommend this uniform during NATO debriefings and took efforts to
conceal that it was a sometimes-preferred means of dressing,
especially in the damp 'triple canopy' mountainous terrain where
leeches were often encountered. Since our movements were conducted
primarily during hours of darkness, a level of tolerance was required
for the mosquitoes. To my knowledge no other LRRP team members wore
shorts during the operations along the border; however, they would
have been permitted to do so and observed me wearing them during our
daily reassemblies. I also regret not formally recommending this
indigenous uniform for use in the central highlands during the dry
season.

Night movement that incorporated tracking and counter-tracking

objectives was the norm and sustaining a 3 km per hour movement rate
was easily accomplished in the mountainous regions of the Central
Highlands. We were lightly equipped and capable of moving during
darkness 25 miles daily; however, the assigned mission areas often
permitted moving at much slower rates and allowed for a more thorough
search. Small active infrared observation devices were carried and
used to examine trails for evidence of tracks and longer distance
monitoring. The range of the IR light source was limited to about 50
yards that minimized its long-range applications; however, the
opportunity to observe the night activity of animals, including
insects, snakes and large mammals was enhanced and aided in keeping
the user alert and interested in the nighttime surroundings. Many
experiments were conducted using the small device in conjunction with
the other luminescent tools to examine and evaluate the trail for
tracks and other markings. The IR light source was removed from the IR
monitoring unit and placed at different angles to provide detection of
depressions or other trail disturbances and was beneficial in
analyzing any nighttime situation.

In practice, our night movement normally involved evaluation of NVA

tracks only at locations where tracks were anticipated. Trail
junctions and routes near stream crossings and along muddy sections of
the trail and all approaches into our daily observation positions were
routinely examined whereas the majority of the route was not examined.
Rest halts were never conducted but any possible sight, sound or smell
that might indicate NVA contact was investigated which included
examining the trail for tracks. It was not uncommon to hear the
distinctive singsong voices in the distance and the smell of smoke and
other human activity odors during our nighttime movements. Each
discovery was evaluated from a distance and recorded in our Memorandum
booklets and often plotted on the topographic maps.

In the spring and summer of 1966, we did not observe or anticipate the
NVA to booby trap or establish ambush sites in the area that they
considered as 'no man's' land and the sole domain of the NVA. We took
no precautions to detect mines or any other devices along the trail
other than normal visual scanning that was often afforded during
periods when star and moon light penetrated the trees and during our
day light scouting in the areas near our assigned day time occupied
observation points. It was also observed and widely reported that the
NVA noise and light discipline was poor in all areas along the border.
The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team had experienced a detect first success
since early January and no information had been obtained that movement
along the northern borders of Cambodia and southern Laos would
encounter an increased level of NVA alertness or an improvement in
their noise and light discipline.

Suspected regimental size CPs were plotted on the aerial photographs

that we were provided during the early planning stages of each LRRP
mission and updated with daily reconnaissance flights including that
performed my the LRRP team leaders using OH-13 aircraft. Each trail
leading into the suspected NVA sites was thoroughly evaluated for
evidence of enemy usage.

One of the most important mission preparations was the conduct of a

thorough map study by each individual team member and construction of
the 'sand table'. Each person was required to 'spider overlay' their
individual topographic maps where a red colored lead pencil was used
to trace down each ridgeline and finger to the intercept with the
valley floor and a blue or green colored lead pencil was used to trace
up the smaller valleys until intercepting the hilltops of the area
that encompassing the first days movement after insertion. As this
process was completed, the topographic map became a spider-like
network of red and blue lines that gradual became denser. This same
exercise was conducted to some degree during the daytime prior to each
day's night movement. The procedure assisted in visualizing the
terrain in three dimensions and forced focus on the terrain along our
intended routes. The subsequent daily routes were only partially
delineated with the red ridgeline and valley traces.

Once each individual had satisfactorily completed their spider

overlays, some members created a 'sand table' of the entire route. The
table was created directly on the cleared ground near our tents at An
Khe and consisted of one-foot equals two kilometers scaled squares
that contained mounded dirt to outline the hilltops and valleys. The
vertical scale was exaggerated but done in a manner that 'line of
sight' could be visualized. Each observation and assembly point,
including emergency escape assembly points, preplanned fire target and
the expected NVA regimental CPs were marked using items cut out of
paper. The table was large and did not contain the topographic detail
of our spider overlay topographic maps. Mastery of topographic maps
and terrain association was essential and required of each long-range
reconnaissance patrol member and taught to all members of the entire
Chinese Bandit Recon Platoon. Any Chinese Bandit that did not
demonstrate the ability to 3D visualize topographic maps in the spider
overlay and sand table exercises was not permitted to conduct long-
ranger reconnaissance or combat operations. In addition, each man was
expected to know the meaning of every mark and label on the
topographic maps in use.

No 'pace-counts' were performed during night movement and persons were

expected to have memorized the topography and other critical
information of the entire day route prior to departing each day.

Stevens, my RTO was also expected to be aware of his actual coordinate

position, at all times, within six digits WITHOUT consulting his
topographic maps. Stevens conducted map checks at all high and low
ground points. He mastered this skill after only two months of effort
and could call for a fire mission or provide approximate coordinates
in the event of an emergency in a matter of seconds. He was the only
person expected to be making map checks on a regular basis and no one
was in a position to discuss their map location with him, including
myself. When unexpected enemy or other critical sites were located,
the positions were posted on each man's topographic map. It was
interesting to compare these plots with those of the other team
members during the occupation of our daily observation positions. Any
errors in plotting were resolved and corrected on each man's
topographic map. No actual overlays were used but all notes and plots
were made directly onto each man's map, although the procedure was in
contradiction with normal security procedures, we did so to ease
movement and minimize what was carried. The reconsolidated maps and
notes that were submitted after each operation were placed over new
maps and overlay paper was used during after action debriefings. The
actual green Memorandum books and topographic maps were NOT submitted
for examination and some of these documents survive today.
I sent one Memorandum book home to my father and younger brother that
contained sections describing me following wild or escaped elephants
for a day in addition to the other information that I recorded.
Again, these protocols were add odds with what was expected but the
information was normally used and shared with the entire Chinese
Bandit Recon Platoon and the information was deemed beneficial enough
to warrant deviation from normal policy. I have no doubt that
intelligence specialists will find fault with what we did. We deviated
from dress uniform, communications and intelligence reporting and
policies. Sometimes to achieve what was required in the most optimized
manner, and at other times motivated only by our own zeal regarding
collecting intelligence information at close quarters with the NVA.
Everyone understood the strategic and tactical importance of not being
detected or leaving evidence behind that would alert the NVA to our
operating in the area. Any increased vigilance on the part of the NVA
operating along the border would have made ground reconnaissance
operations significantly more difficult and dangerous. Although we
were confident that we would not be discovered, three response plans
were developed in the event the Chinese Bandit LRRP team was detected
or suspected of being detected by the NVA or any other indigenous
personnel.

In the event of detection resulting in the exchange of fire, our sole

strategy was to immediately break contact and run rapidly to pre-
designated assembly points that were located along the route. In the
event that we did not successfully transmit our daily surveillance
report and the report received by the overhead airborne Air Force
aircraft, then a search and recovery operation was to be launched
immediately in the area between our last reported position and the
next scheduled reporting point. The search area was to be expanded to
all areas along the route until the Chinese Bandit LRRP team was
recovered or until the decision was made to abort the search and
recovery efforts. Each man carried a VS-17 panel and signal mirror
that would allow for the marking of extraction sites near each pre-
designated assembly point. Breaking contact did not emphasize keeping
the six team together but an 'every man for himself' approach. The
LRRP team was normally spread over a distance of several miles. The
team carried only one radio and the operator followed the LRRP Team
leader and maintained a line of sight distance from him or closer as
the situation required. The radio operator also responsible for
initiating calls for fire support and maintained a constant awareness
of the adjacent pre-planned fire missions that would be provided
solely by aerial fire support. In the event of an attack, the radio
operator would call for fire support while running to break contact
and the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team leader was to make every effort to
join his radio operator and move together towards the pre-designated
assembly of their choice. All other team members normally were
extended beyond line of sight distances and any effort at regrouping
would have decreased the flexibility needed when evading any pursuing
NVA troops.

In any situation where we were detected by the NVA or indigenous

personnel but not fired upon or being pursued by them, then an effort
was to be made to assemble the team and move together and coordinate
for an extraction of the team. In either the detection scenarios, it
was important for team members to assess any heard rifle or other
small arms firing to determine if the firing was that of the NVA and
if the fire was directed at one or more of the Chinese Bandits. Since
the NVA were using some US and other foreign weapons during this
period of the Vietnam War, merely hearing the sound of small arms fire
and determining the weapons type by sound did not provide confirmation
of detection or engagement. Although it was observed that the NVA
rarely discharged weapons unless in an actual engagement, it was
important that any Chinese Bandit LRRP Team member not assume that
other members were engaged merely by the sound of weapons fire in the
vicinity of the patrols route. We had the opportunity to make use of
Air Force emergency radios that could have been carried by each member
of the LRRP Team. We failed to take advantage of these radios that
would have provided improved communications to coordinate the
decisions for aborting missions and inter-team coordinations during
critical situations.

It was believed that the threat of our detection was greatest by

indigenous persons and not the NVA. Generally, the local population
knew the area better and often hunted on and off trail areas. The
discovery of off trail disturbances and any discarded items,
intentional or otherwise, that we made during our movements could be
expected to have been made by anyone moving and slowly stalking prey.
We made many inquiries to determine if the local population were using
the trails and hunting and gathering crops in the mountainous areas
along the border and were informed that such activities were rare now
with the large presence of NVA and Saigon backed forces frequenting
the region. Our patrolling confirmed this assessment, however, we
remained vigilant and concerned that any disturbances or debris left
behind would be discovered by the local hunters and those collecting
food from abandoned slash and burn fields and our presence reported to
the NVA.

In 1965 and 1966, many of the local population where still hunting and
carrying homemade crossbows and arrows; rifles made from steel pipe
using a threaded cap at one end and a hole drilled near the rear
having a spring loaded hinge which detonated a toy pistol cap... the
pipe was normally mounted to a carved wooden stock and secured by
wire; and vintage Japanese and other bolt action rifles and pistols.
Boys and men of all ages actively hunted and fished in areas near any
hamlet unless military units, any military unit, were operating in the
area. The threat of booby traps was not yet a widespread problem and
these local area hunters would reenter their hunting areas when the
military units were believed to have departed. They wore a variety of
clothing and were often barefoot. The older men often hunted large
game, including elephants, barking deer, anteaters, and gibbons and
monkeys. Monkey blood and whiskey was a ceremonial drink amongst many
of the upland high peoples. One hunting technique involved occupying
positions, often in trees, near watering areas, and shooting the
animals at close range. Another method specific to gibbon hunting
involved slow cross-county movement where gibbons were heard in the
high trees and then shooting a female gibbon which was carrying her
baby. The dead female was used for food and source of blood and the
baby gibbon sold in the market place and often shipped to larger
cities and abroad to traders and zoos. Locals also placed fish traps
in the larger streams and rivers and frequently traveled to these
locations and removed any fish that had been captured. These locations
were especially well traveled and recorded on our maps as possible
contact sites with the local populations.

These indigenous hunters were our greatest threat, not the NVA, and
unless counter tracking methods were used and used well, then we would
be detected or evidence of our being in the area detected after our
extraction.

Fortunately I had hunted with the hill tribes of SE Asia prior to my

assignment to the Chinese Bandits and my focus always including the
effort to locate the local hunters, who were encountered on occasion
and our detection by them was thought to have been avoided. I believed
at the time and now that any special operations-like teams should
spend a minimum of one month hunting with local populations in the
area of operations or an adjacent country with a nearly identical
environment immediately prior to conducting any long-range
reconnaissance operations in a hostile area.

Waste disposal was stressed and necessary to minimize detection. Our

waste disposal and minimization protocols included the following:

We consumed the wax paper wrapper of the 'jungle chocolate bars';

We only carried the dehydrated food portion of LRP ration and retained
the plastic wrapper that was later used to package any items
collected. The plastic bags were licked clean and filled with stream
water again and drank to recover any nutrients;

We only carried one white plastic spoon that doubled as a vertical

half rhombic antenna insulator (this antenna was for emergency use
only)...airborne aircraft were on station above during scheduled
transmissions...if the spoon broke than the parts were carried;
We carried only one toothbrush that was used often without paste or
other cleaner. It was a common practice for persons to often keep the
toothbrush in their mouths even after the sweet flavor of the paste
was gone;

No soap or other personal hygiene items were carried or used. We

regularly rinsed daily during the stream crossings and routes were
partially selected to provide this opportunity;
Mosquito repellant was carried by some members but not permitted for
use unless 'approved'...the small black leeches were often left in
place...many deviated from this policy;

No extra clothing (many deviated from this policy also)...including

dry socks, combat swimming trunks, tennis shoes, and distinctive
headgear. We stayed wet after rains and streams crossings;

No toilet paper was carried and wiping was done with vegetation or the
bare hand which typically required scheduling immediately prior to
stream crossings to allow for washing up. Feces were buried carefully
off trail and with the assumption would be uncovered by animals. With
the minimal amount of food that we were able to carry and consume,
bowel movements were not common or were the growth of body hair;

Urination was performed also off trail on forest litter and along the
sides of already saturated tree trunks;

Trail blazing debris in mountains along the Laos and Cambodia

Borders was done using foxfire branches which were replenished at
night and placed on the ground along the right side of the trail using
four symbols (STOP...link up; DANGER LEFT; DANGER RIGHT; and DANGER
AHEAD). The last man in the formation recovered the foxfire that was
given to the lead person during each morning assembly at the
designated observation points;

Foraged food waste such as fish bones of rotted fish removed from
stream traps were placed in pockets until dry and then 'chewed'; fruit
pits were 'sucked on'...savored like the wrappings of the 'jungle
chocolate bar' wrappers and eventually buried in the same manner as
feces; the wild limes that were consumed skin and all as were the
other food found around abandoned slash and burn areas;

Rifles, pistols, knives and machetes were cleaned with soap and water
prior to missions and shaken in the water at stream crossings and a
new round was chambered daily. Ammunition was not oiled but wiped down
when initially transferred to magazines in base camp. We did not
experience weapons malfunctions during test firings before and after
operations;

If the 101st Recondo emergency soap dish wrapped to our LBE was opened
to administer morphine or other drugs or to perform suturing, then the
contents were resealed and rewrapped with the old tape. The tape was
good for reuse if the effort was made to keep it untangled while
removing or at least good enough until the mission was completed;
All LRRP personnel were to be non-smokers and or chewers since both
diminish the sense of smell. Many deviated from this policy but NOT
when on LRRP operations and therefore waste disposal for these items
was not a factor;

During 1965 and early 1966 drug use was not prevalent and NO Chinese
Bandit LRRP Team members were pot heads or had smoked POT or used
other drugs; therefore no disposal issues regarding drug use were
necessary.

There were other waste disposal procedures and many were very detailed
and constantly evolving. The topics included sharpening pencils, etc.
It was a mistake to wear anything other than clothing that resembled
the NVA or the indigenous populations, however, each of us wore
uniforms that were preferred and reflected sentiments rather than
optimized for the terrain, weather and enemy situation. I regret not
studying more carefully the enemy and local attire, and then
specifying a uniform that was more appropriate. In the case of the dry
season along the border in 1965 and early 1966 that uniform would have
included combat swimming trucks, that have the large leg openings
which provided ease of movement and good air circulation and tennis
shoes that had soles identical to that worn by some of the NVA and
local population. We did request and the military did produce a jungle
boot having human footprint and NVA soles. The boots were not
available until after the Chinese Bandits were disbanded and I have
been informed that some special operations teams did use them and
found them inadequate for a number of reasons.

A third and not well developed or approved escape protocol was

discussed amongst team members that considered escape routes through
Laos and Cambodia to the safe refuge afforded by Thailand which was
located approximately 250 kilometers from the tri-border area where
the Chinese Bandit LRRP operations were performed. Operating along the
border line afforded escape routes in both directions and the decision
was made that each LRRP Team member had the discretion to use the best
terrain during their escape efforts and that cross border maneuvering
was not prohibited. When patrolling along the actual border, fifty
percent of the terrain that afforded the best escape route was located
beyond the border of South Vietnam. Each team member carried a portion
of a 'one over the world' scale topographic map that encompassed the
tri-border area of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos that also included the
area extending to the border of Thailand. Area and other order of
battle information were requested for both sides of the border and
this information contained the same degree of detail. We had been
provided road maps of the same regions that depicted the general
geography, including cities and land usage. Copies of these maps were
not carried during operations along the border but were studied to
evaluate the feasibility and potential routes of escape that would
provide adequate concealment for night movement and possible foraging
opportunities. We did seek approval for this cross border escape
option but each man knew that it was an option if the approved escape
protocols were deemed more dangerous. If this option had been executed
during the later days of any long-range reconnaissance mission, then
our carried food supply would have been depleted and therefore,
foraging near hamlets and fields that were encountered would have
taken place. Night cross-country routes in heavily forested areas were
deemed safer than any movement near occupied hamlets and villages.
Dogs, pigs and other domestic animals were typically alert at night
and any disturbances would have been investigated, therefore, the plan
was to proceed without attempts to gather foods and maintain a minimum
25 kilometer per day rate of movement when enroute towards Thailand.
It would not have been difficult and the option was viable.
The escape plan options permitted the team to focus on locating the
enemy and performing the evaluations that were feasible from a
distance and maintaining such distance that minimized any chance
encounters with the NVA or being detected.

The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team used foxfire, an aid to night tracking
and trail marking extensively in the spring and summer of 1966.
Foxfire covered branches were placed along side of trails to provide
information to following team members and to provide additional
nighttime illumination. The branches were collected by the last man of
the patrol and redistributed when the team reassembled during the
daily occupation of the observation assembly areas.

Constant efforts were made to identify the plants and animals of the
Central Highlands and the understanding provided immeasurable
benefits. Leaves from the several trees that provided the most common
encountered edible wild fruits were collected and provided to
intelligence staff on completion of previous patrols and we were
informed of the name of the tree, where the trees were expected to
grow and some information that confirmed the edibility and nutritional
value of the fruits that augmented our diet.

Spider webs were especially interesting to team members and when it

was observed that certain species of web tending spiders erected their
webs at different times of night and in different types of habitat and
at different heights above the trail surface, several us made the
effort to evaluate web encounters as an indicator of recent trail
activity. The webs were often easy to detect in certain nighttime
light conditions and any disturbed or damaged web was reason to
suspect the presence of something that recently passed along the
trail. It was also observed that some species of spiders erected their
webs early in the evening and removed them early in the morning. Any
disturbance of these webs was a good indication that the damage had
occurred during the same night when they were encountered. We later
made requests for more information of the spider web building
activities but were not provided any follow-up information on the
subject.

Many suspected animal nighttime sounds were investigated. Moving files

of ants often created a noise that was suspected to be the sound of a
crawling snake. Each suspected 'crawling' snake investigation resulted
in the discovery of insects moving in a file formation. Many snakes
were encountered but few at night and they were never found by any
sound that was made but solely by visual detection. The large black
jungle forest scorpion also was solely detected by visual sightings.
Our knowledge of the preferred habitat of mosquitoes and the small
black land leeches enabled us to avoid them to some extent. When they
were encountered we typically deviated from our intended route and
occupation sites to escape them. Drier and areas having more air
movement were areas preferred for movement and observation points.
However, frequent encounters with mosquitoes and leeches could not be
avoided and mosquito repellent was used against both of these pests,
despite our internal policy not to do so.

The repellent greatly reduced the sense of smell of anyone using the
liquid and every effort was made to restrict the use of the repellent
and stream crossings provided the opportunity to bath and wash away
the liquid and smell of it. We had decided that the repellent would
not be carried on the LRRP operations along the border; however,
several persons did not comply with this requirement and we all shared
the repellent when invested with the leeches.

Soap, toothpaste and other lotions were also not carried or used by
any Chinese Bandit LRRP team member. Toothbrushes were carried and
used often. Gun solvents and weapons cleaning equipment was not
carried either. We relied solely on frequent stream crossings to clean
our bodies, uniforms and equipment, including shaking the rifles
vigorously in the water. All equipment including weapons had been
washed with soap and water since November 1965 and little oils or
solvents could be detected on them. Our ammunition was not washed but
wiped dry of any oils. The M16 rifles only required re-chambering a
round each day to remain functional and prevent jamming. In the few
situations when we did fire our weapons no misfires had occurred
during the long-range reconnaissance operations that were only
scheduled for a two-week period. Test firing in base camp or during
patrols that were deemed 'secured' did not result in weapon
malfunctions. I later opted to carry my personal Browning Hi-Power M35
pistol with only one fully loaded magazine. The pistol was carried in
a brown issued shoulder holster. It was cumbersome to carry a M16
rifle that was the LRRP teams designated personal weapon and the
walking stick that I used. The rifles were typically carried at the
'Ranger carry' with slings removed and silenced with duct tape
wrappings and strips of camouflage fabric. While moving at night with
the rifle it was necessary to store the walking stick between my
harness straps near my waist and could do so only in vegetation that
provided a four-foot wide ease of movement. The foxfire inlayed stick
was used primarily for trail signaling at night and carrying the
Browning pistol provided improved ease of movement. The pistol had a
blue finish and would easily rust without daily cleaning with solvents
and oils. I decided to not clean the pistol and intended to rub off
any rusting using 'elbow grease' only. The pistol was purchased as a
used weapon and was in excellent condition but was rusted and pitted
after only one week of patrolling and attempting to rub off the rust
that began accumulating immediately after washing the pistol in hot
water and soap at base camp. The Browning was left in the rear for the
remainder of my tour and I carried a cleaned with water and sand only
issued M1911A1 during subsequent patrolling. A new round was chambered
in the .45 caliber pistol each morning and did not malfunction when
test fired or during target practice. I can still remember the smell
of the odors of gun solvents, oils and insecticides that permeated the
tents at base camp. Other than our own sweat and the odor of our food,
the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team smelled of the surrounding mountainous
jungle.

The importance of not using any substance that would decrease our
sense of smell was emphasized daily when the odor of smoke and animals
and people that were encountered were detected from distances that
required training, experience and vigilance.

Bandit LRRP team members were instructed to moisten their nose hair
using fresh water to enhance their sense of smell and were required to
practice 'sniffing the air' which required shifting the head and
seeking out air movements that were expected due to the prevailing
wind and air movements created by topography and moving water.
Heightening the sense of smell, hearing and vision was always
practiced when we 'lay dogged' after insertions and during the
frequent encounters with variations in vegetation, weather, topology
or light conditions.

Not being detected and detecting required our constant efforts at

improvement.