[G.R. No.

174759 September 7, 2011]

DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA, vs
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION
FACTS: Denis Habawel and Alexis Medina were the counsel for Surfield Development Corporation
(Surfield), which sought from the Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of
excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2003. The RTC dismissed their petition due to nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. They elevated the case to the CTA, which also ruled against
the petitioners. The counsels filed a several motions for reconsideration wherein they insisted that
they were right and that the CTA First Division, which handled their case, were grossly ignorant of the
law as written in their pleadings. The justices took offense and cited the two lawyers for direct
contempt.
ISSUE: WON the two counsels committed direct contempt
RULING: YES. It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and
their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. The
test for criticizing a judges decision is whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith,
and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. By such statements, the petitioners clearly
and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to
respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge,
especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, and constitutes direct contempt of
court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written
submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated
as direct contempt because they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. This is true, even if the derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court.
[A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 February 04, 2015]
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
FACTS: Jill Tormis charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge
Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the
Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class
discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then
Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges
involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge
Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law. At the time, the case
was still pending in court and Judge Paredes was one of the people who are involved in the hearing if
the case.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but
several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion
Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a court-noted addict.
This resulted to Jill experiencing intense humiliation which caused her to transfer to another school.

ISSUE: WON Judge Paredes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts
RULING: YES but the Supreme Court only reprimanded him as his penalty. Misconduct is defined as
a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must
be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in
a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of
an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of his official duties. Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against
Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be
considered as misconduct. They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a
judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could
come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected
to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of
the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or
otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case
was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make comments on
the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage
scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice
rule. Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project
Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge.

[A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015]

YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES, Complainants, v.
ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.
FACTS: Atty. Nambi was the labor arbiter in a case involving M.A. Mercado Construction, headed by
the spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado, and its employees. He ordered the employer to pay its
employees their back wages and their reinstatement. However, his decision cannot be enforced since
M.A. Mercado Construction allegedly transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. Due to this, an
Alias Writ of Execution was issued by Atty. Nambi to implement the Decision. The petitioners
proceeded to file an administrative case against Atty. Nambi for gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING: NO. As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the
law, there must be a showing that the error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the
actor was so moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty. Respondents
conclusion had some bases and was not plucked from thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did
not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be characterized as imbued with
malice, fraud or bad faith. To reiterate what we have already stated above, we are not here to judge in
this present administrative proceeding whether respondents ratiocination on the application of the
piercing of corporate veil is correct; our only concern here is to decide whether respondents error
was so gross as to amount to fraud and dishonesty.
[OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015]
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREO, ET AL., AGAINST
HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZAROJAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO.
108807
FACTS: An administrative case was filed against the members of the16 th Division of the Court of
Appeals for failing to resolve a certain case within the constitutionally mandated period of 12 months.
The case was only resolved after twenty months.
ISSUE: Whether the justices are administratively liable for the delay of the case
RULING: NO. The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by
Justice Ybaez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the
meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter subsequently joined
another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybaez could promulgate
the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is
accepted. Meanwhile, the other two justices are also not liable since they only had a minimal
participation in the case and were only substitute members of the division pending the reorganization
of the Court of Appeals.

[A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290 November 18, 2014]

MARILOU T. RIVERA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME C. BLANCAFLOR, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 26, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA, Respondent.
FACTS: Marilou T. Rivera is a bondsperson who helps litigants obtain judicial bonds in their cases.
She has instigated an administrative case against Judge Jaime Blancaflor due to his misconducts
and corrupt practices as a judge. The following instances are the reasons as to why she has instituted
the complaint.
1) Judge Blancaflor refused to approve Catudays (one of Riveras clients) motion to reduce bail
bond despite a no objection from the local prosecutor
2) Refusal to order Catudays release despite the favorable judgment given by another judge
3) Refusal to approve another motion to reduce bail bond on one of Riveras clients (Namplata)
4) Offering money to two persons in order to prevent them from testifying in a motion for inhibition
in a case that he has an interest in
5) Maintaining an amorous relationship with a woman who is not his wife
Rivera reiterated her charge that Judge Blancaflor committed gross misconduct in (1) fraternizing
with litigants;(2) maintaining an illicit affair with a woman not his wife; and (3) exhibiting personal bias
and prejudice against her in her efforts to obtain bail bonds for Catuday and Namplata.
ISSUE: WON Judge Blancaflor should be dismissed as a judge
RULING: YES. While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion to
reduce bail, it appears from the records that he abused this prerogative in the cases of Catuday and
Namplata. Through Judge Blancaflors inaccessibility (he was usually not in the court in the
afternoon) and refusal to take action on their pleas for provisional liberty, Catuday and Namplata and
the people working for the approval of their motions (Rivera) suffered inordinate delay and frustrations
in securing the motions approval. In more ways than one, Judge Blancaflor gave Rivera run-around
in Catudays and Namplatas cases for no plausible reason other than the judges strong antipathy
towards Rivera.
This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which mandates that "judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias
or prejudice," and that they "shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains
and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.