Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Submitted to:
Dr. Hrishikesh
Manu,
submitted by:
Tejaswini Ranjan
ROLL NO: 829
ADR faculty,
2012-17.
CNLU, Patna.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The inspiration that created zeal to short and successfully complete
this project on Enforcement of foreign awards was given by my ADR
fac
ult
y
Dr.
Hri
shi
kes
h
M
an
u.
He
ha
s
be
en
a
co
nst
an
ts
up
por
t
thr
ou
gh
ou
t
w
hic
h
helped me make a
way through thick and thin especially in beginning the research
project. His guidance and patience gave me strength to continue my
research work.
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CONTENTS
1.
I
N
T
R
O
D
U
C
TI
O
N
2.
E
N
F
O
R
C
E
M
E
N
T
O
F
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INTRODUCTION
Prior to January 1996, the law of enforcement of arbitration awards in India was spread between
three enactments. Enforcement of domestic awards was dealt with under a 1940 act.1
enforcement of foreign awards was divided between two statutes a 1937 act2 to give effect to
the Geneva convention awards and a 1961 act to give effect to the New York convention5
awards.
As the Geneva convention became virtually otiose (by reason of art vii of the New York
convention), enforcement of foreign awards, for all practical purposes, came under the 1961
act and domestic awards came under the 1940 act. The enforcement regime between these
two statutes was, however, quite distinct. The 1961 act conned challenge to an arbitral award
only on the limited grounds permitted under the New York convention. The scope of
challenge to domestic awards under the 1940 act was much wider. This act permitted judicial
scrutiny, inter alia, on the ground that the arbitrator had misconduct himself or the
proceedings6 an expression which came to be widely interpreted and wards were interfered
with, inter alia, on the ground of fundamental errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
However, even under this wide judicial scrutiny regime, courts restrained themselves and
interfered only when the error was grave and the judicial conscience was shocked. It may be
worthwhile to cite a couple of illustrative cases.
One of the declared objectives of the 1996 act is that every nal award: is enforced in the same
manner as if it were a decree of the court.26 hence, the scheme of the act is that it is up to the
losing party to object to the award and petition the court for se ing it aside. The winning party
has to make no procedural move. If the objections to the award are not sustained (or if there are
No objections within the time allowed) the award itself becomes enforceable as if it were a
decree of the court.27 it would be noticed that the Indian law has thus fundamentally departed
from the model law in this regard. The model law requires an application for enforcement (art
35) and the grounds on which enforcement of an award may be refused are as set forth in art 36
thereof. This has been departed from under the Indian regime as stated above with the result, that
in so far as domestic awards are concerned, if there is no application to set aside an award under
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s 34 (or if the objections if made have been rejected), the award can straightaway be executed as
a decree of the court.)
HYPOTHESIS
The researcher presumes that the foreign awards may be enforced in the respective countries as
per the public policies pertaining to the country where such an execution takes place.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The researcher has adopted the non-doctrinal research methodology for the entire
research work on the given topic.
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under chapter 1 of part ii of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996, the award shall be deemed
2
they must be binding as per the rules and the procedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon. Article 5 has further hit the nail on the head by clearly indentifying grounds where the
recognition & enforcement of award may be challenged/refused. The acceptance of the New
York convention into municipal Indian law is evident from parliament's incorporation of it in the
first schedule of the act along with section 44 of the act. The act itself has clearly identified the
role of the foreign territory in the finality of the challenging jurisdiction in section 48(e) of part ii
of the act; if the judgment debtor as per the award shows that the award is not final, the court of
3
the enforcing jurisdiction may refuse the enforcement of the award. The Supreme Court has
issued an important decision that affects the enforceability of foreign international arbitration
4
awards in India .
5
The decision in bharat aluminium co. v. kaiser aluminium technical service s overrules previous
controversial decisions from the Indian supreme court in the cases of Bhatia international v
6
bulk trading s.a .in 2002 and Venture Global Engineering v Satyam computer services
7
limited in
2008. In those cases, the court held that, unless the parties to an arbitration agreement expressly
2
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or impliedly agreed to the contrary, the Indian courts had similar jurisdiction in foreign-seated
arbitrations as they had in domestic arbitrations seated in India, under part of the arbitration and
conciliation act 1996 (the arbitration act).
As a result of these earlier decisions, Indian courts, in a number of instances, have
part i of the arbitration act does not apply to foreign seated arbitrations. The court therefore
refused to set aside two arbitration awards made by a tribunal seated in London.
It was held that arbitrations seated outside of India are dealt with by part ii of the arbitration act,
alone, and that the Indian courts had no authority to annul arbitration awards made outside of
India. It was further held that the law of the seat of the arbitration will govern the conduct of the
arbitration.
The effect of the decision
The decision in Bharat means that it will no longer be necessary for the parties to an arbitration
agreement to expressly exclude the application of part i of the arbitration act to arbitration
proceedings held outside of India.
The decision, in this respect, is to be welcomed and is consistent with the intention behind the
provisions of the New York convention and the UNICTRAL model law.
However, one disappointing aspect of the decision in Bharat is that it will only
apply prospectively: i.e., only to arbitration agreements that are concluded on or after September
6, 2012, when the decision was handed down. Accordingly, the previous decisions of the
Supreme court that part i of the arbitration act applied to both Indian and foreign-seated
8
A New Era for Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards in India, Mayor Brown Legal
Update,http://www.mayerbrown.com/A-New-Era-for-Enforcement-of-Foreign-ArbitrationAwards-in-India-10-12-2012/, (accessed on: 20/4/2015)
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arbitrations will continue to apply in respect of arbitration agreements concluded before that
date, unless the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed that part i should not apply.
This means that the Indian courts could continue to apply the principles enunciated in the
decisions of Bhatia and Venture Global for many years to come, and seek to assert jurisdiction in
foreign-seated arbitrations and at worst, annul arbitration awards made in foreign jurisdictions.
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made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment
of the arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration: provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with
the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law
of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
(2) Enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the court finds that
(a) The subject-matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law
of India; or
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(b) The enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of India. Explanation.
without prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section, it is hereby declared, for the
avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making
of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption.
(3)
If
an
appl
icati
on
for
the
setti
ng
asid
e
or
sus
pen
sion
of
the
awa
rd
has
bee
n
made to a
competent authority referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) the court may, if it considers it
proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, on the application
of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suitable security.
New York convention would recognize and enforce the award even only one party belongs to the
signatory state. But as against this, the gen') convention requires that the parties to the award
must belong to two different signatory states, and then only the award may be recognized and
enforced. In other words, if the award has been made in a country which is not signatory to the,
Geneva convention or if it is between persons who are not subject of jurisdiction of signatory
state, it may not be recognized and enforced, it may be noted that the trilogy of sections 46, 47
and 48 collectively deals, with the legal status of foreign award and its proof for being
recognized section 48) deals with the conditions for enforcement of foreign binding. While
section 46 envisages binding nature of the award for purposes, section 47 provides the method of
proof. The present section enumerates the circumstances which justify court's refusal to enforce
the, award. The listed circumstances have to be rigidly proved in order to refuse the-enforcement
of the award. Briefly stated, these circumstances under which enforcement of the award may be
refused by the court are as follows:
(1) If the arbitral agreement is invalid;
(2) Due process of law has been violated;
(3) Arbitrator has exceeded his authority;
(4) Irregularity in the composition of arbitral tribunal or arbitral proceedings;
(5) Award being set aside or suspended in the country in which, or under the law which, that
award was made;
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affected by fraud or corruption, it would be deemed to be, opposed to the public policy in India
and, therefore, it would not be enforceable.
Made , an sub-section (3) of section 48 provides that where a party has 11 application for setting
aside or suspension of the foreign award, the court, vire the application of the party claiming
enforcement of the award, may rectified the other party to give suitable security, if it considers it
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10
In Renu Sagar power co. Ltd. V. General electric co. Ltd. , which arose under the foreign
awards (recognition & enforcement) act, 1961 which implemented the New York convention of
1958 relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, the supreme court inter-alia
observed: "in order to attract the bar of public policy, the enforcement of the award must involve
something more than mere violation of the law of India. The enforcement of a foreign award
would be contrary to public policy if it is contrary to (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; (b)
the interests of India; and (c) justice and morality.
The supreme court in Transocaan shipping agency v. Black sea shipping,
11
rejected the
contention that enforcement of an international foreign awards made in ukraine would be against
public policy as the arbitrator was an employee of one of the parties and, therefore, would not
be independent.
It may be however, noted that the phrase public policy has been interpreted differently by
courts depending on weither the award is made by international or domestic arbitration tribunal.
This is why the noted Belgium arbitration expert Bernard Hanotian has described it as the most
confusing notion which ever have invented.
12
The Supreme Court in venue global engineering v. Satyam computers services ltd . Held that
award was passed outside India cannot be said to be not enforceable in India by invoking
provisions of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 or the code of the o procedure, however, it
will be open to the parties to exclude he application provisions of part i of the arbitration and
conciliation act by express or implied agreement, otherwise, the whole part i would be
applicable. In any event, applying the provisions of section 34 to foreign international awards
would not be inconsistent with section 48 of the act, or any other provision of part ii. Even in
case of foreign awards involving properties situate in India but the judgment-debtor residing
abroad, the award can be enforced against such properties in India either through personal
compliance of the judgment-debtor or by holding out a threat of contempt. In such a case, the
judgment-debtor cannot be deprived of his right to file an application for setting aside the award
under section 34 of the act. In the instant case, the enforcement of a foreign award directing the
10
AIR111994 SC
860.
(1998)
2
12
SCC 281. AIR
2008 SC 1061.
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appellant foreign company to transfer shares in Indian company (respondent) was sought by the
respondent in foreign court (us district court) was held to be violative of share-holder's
agreement and therefore, the appellant can challenge the award under section 34 of the
arbitration and conciliation act in Indian court. That apart, in view of the injunction restraining
the respondent from effecting transfer of shares being the respondent ought not to have
proceeded with the matter in a foreign court without getting the earlier injunction order vacated.'
The supreme court in countertrade minerals & metals inc. V. Hindustan copper ltd.- interpreted
the phrase "country under the law of which, that award was made" used in section 48 (1) (e) to
mean law of the country in which the arbitration has its seat rather than the country whose law
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Foreign awards may be set aside or suspended in the country in which or under the laws of which
the award was made but there is no provision to set aside a foreign award in India. This
fundamental distinction between a foreign and a domestic award has been obliterated by the
supreme court in the recent case of venture global. here, the supreme court was concerned with a
situation where a foreign award rendered in London under the rules of the London court of
international arbitration (LCIA) was sought to be enforced by the successful party (an Indian
company) in the district court, Michigan, United States of America . The dispute arose out of a
joint venture agreement between the parties. The respondent alleged that the appellant had
committed an event of default under the shareholders agreement and as per the said agreement
it exercised its option to purchase the appellants shares in the joint venture company at book
value.
The sole arbitrator appointed by the LCIA allowed the claim and directed the appellant to
transfer its shares to the respondent. The respondent sought to enforce this award in the usa.44
the appellant led a civil suit in an Indian district court seeking to set aside the award. The district
court, followed by the high court, on appeal, dismissed the suit holding that there was no such
procedure envisaged under Indian law. However, the supreme court on appeal, extending its
earlier decision in the case of Bhatia International v Bulk Trading, held that even though there
was no provision in part ii of the 1996 act providing for challenge to a foreign award, a petition
to set aside the same would lie under s 34 part i of the 1996 act (i.e. it applied the domestic
award . Provisions to foreign awards). The court held that the property in question (shares in an
Indian company) is situated in India and necessarily Indian law would need to be followed to
execute the award. In such a situation the award must be validated on the touchstone of public
policy of India and the Indian public policy cannot be given a go by through the device of the
award being enforced on foreign shores. Going further the court held that a challenge to a foreign
award in India would have to meet the expanded scope of public policy as laid down in saw
pipes46 (i.e. meet a challenge on merits contending that the award is patently illegal). The
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venture global case is far reaching as it creates a new procedure and a new ground for challenge
to a foreign award (not envisaged under the 1996 act). The new procedure is that a person
seeking to enforce a foreign award has not only to le an application for enforcement under s 48
of the 1996 act, it has to meet an application under s 34 of the 1996 act seeking to set aside the
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PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
One of the declared objectives of the 1996 act is that every award: is enforced in the same
manner as if it were a decree of the court. Hence, the scheme of the act is that it is up to the
losing party to object to the award and petition the court for seeing it aside. The winning party
has to make no procedural move. If the objections to the award are not sustained (or if there are
no objections within the time allowed) the award itself becomes enforceable as if it were a decree
of the court. It would be noticed that the Indian law has thus fundamentally departed from the
model law in this regard. The model law requires an application for enforcement (art 35) and the
grounds on which enforcement of an award may be refused are as set forth in art 36 thereof. This
has been departed from under the Indian regime as stated above with the result, that in so far as
domestic awards are concerned, if there is no application to set aside an award under s 34 (or if
the objections if made have been rejected), the award can straightaway be executed as a decree
of the court. A party applying for enforcement of a foreign award is required to produce before
the court:
(a) The original award or a copy thereof, duly authenticated in the manner required by the law of
the country in which it was made;
(b) The original agreement for arbitration or a duly certified copy thereof; and
(c) Such evidence as may be necessary to prove that the award is a foreign award
A. Relevant court
The Indian Supreme Court has accepted the principle that enforcement proceedings can be
brought wherever the property of the losing party may be situated. This was in the case of Brace
Transport Corp of Monrovia v. Orient Middle East Lines ltd. The court here quoted a passage
from Redfern and Hunter on law and practice of international commercial arbitration, inter alia,
as follows:
A party seeking to enforce an award in an international commercial arbitration may have a
choice of country in which to do so; as it is sometimes expressed, the party may be able to go
forum shopping. This depends upon the location of the assets of the losing party. Since
the
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purpose of enforcement proceedings is to try to ensure compliance with an award by the legal a
acumen or seizure of the defaulting partys assets, legal proceedings of some kind are necessary
to obtain title to the assets seized or their proceeds of sale. These legal proceedings must be taken
in the state or states in which the property or other assets of the losing party are located.
B.
Ti
me
limi
t
The
1996 act does not prescribe any time limit within which a foreign award must be applied to
be enforced. However, various high courts have held that the period of limitation would
be governed by the residual provision under the limitation act 1963 (no 36 of 1963), ie the
period would be three years from the date when the right to apply for enforcement accrues.
The high court of bombay has held that the right to apply would accrue when the award is
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CONCLUSION
In order to be considered as a foreign award (for the purposes of the act), the same must fulfill
two requirements. First it must deal with differences arising out of a legal relationship (whether
contractual or not) considered as commercial under the laws in force in India. The expression
commercial relationship has been very widely interpreted by Indian courts. The supreme while
construing the expression commercial relationship, held: the term commercial should be
given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial
nature, whether contractual or not.
The second requirement is more significant cant and that is that the country where the award has
been issued must be a country notified by the Indian government to be a country to which the
New York convention applies. Only a few countries have been notified so far and only awards
rendered therein are recognized as foreign awards and enforceable as such in India. The
countries which have been notified are: Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Central African
Republic, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Arab Republic of
Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, Kuwait, republic of Korea, and United States of America.
An interesting issue came up before the Supreme Court as to what would happen in a case where
a country has been notified but subsequently it divides or disintegrates into separate political
entities. This came up for consideration in the case of trans-ocean shipping agency pvt ltd v
black sea shipping & ors. Here the venue of arbitration was Ukraine which was then a part of the
USSR a country recognized and notified by the government of India as one to which the New
York convention would apply. However, by the time disputes arose between the parties
the USSR had disintegrated and the dispute came to be arbitrated in Ukraine (which was
not notified). The question arose whether an award rendered in Ukraine would be
enforceable in India notwithstanding the fact that it was not a notified country. Both the high
court of Bombay
(where the matter came up initially) and the supreme court of India in appeal, held that the
creation of a new political entity would not make any difference to the enforceability of the
award rendered in a territory which was initially a part of a notified territory. On this basis the
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court recognized and upheld the award. This decision is of considerable significance as it
expands the lists of countries notified by the government by bringing in a host of new political
entities and giving them recognition in their new avatar also.
At another level the judgment demonstrates the willingness of Indian courts to overcome
technicalities and lean in favor of enforcement. There are two fundamental divergences between
enforcement of a foreign award and a domestic award. As noted above, a domestic award does
not require any application for enforcement. Once objections (if any) are rejected, the award is
by itself capable of execution as a decree. A foreign award, however, is required to go through an
enforcement procedure. The party seeking enforcement has to make an application for the said
purpose. Once the court is satis ed that the foreign award is enforceable, the award becomes a
decree of the court and executable as such. The other difference between the domestic and
foreign regime is that (unlike
For domestic awards) there is no provision to set aside a foreign award. In relation to a foreign
award, the Indian courts may only enforce it or refuse to enforce it they cannot set it aside.
This lacuna was sought to be plugged by the supreme court in the recent decision of venture
global38 (discussed further below) where the court held that it is permissible to set aside a
foreign award in India applying the provisions of s 34 of part i of the act.
The conditions for enforcement of a foreign award are as per the New York convention. The
only addition being an explanation to the ground of public policy which states that an award
shall be deemed to be in conflict with the public policy of India if it was induced or affected by
fraud or corruption. Indian courts have narrowly construed the ground of public policy in relation
to foreign awards (unlike domestic awards where saw pipes has construed it widely). In Renu
Sagar, the supreme court construed the expression public policy in relation to foreign awards as
follows: this would mean that public policy in s 7(1)(b)(ii) has been used in narrower sense and
in order to attract to bar of public policy the enforcement of the award must involve something
more than the violation of the law of India .
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BibLIography
Boo
ks:
Avtar singh, law of arbitration and conciliation, lucknow, eastern book company. 2007
S. Chandra, adr: is conciliation the best choice, p.c. rao eds., universal law
publishing co. Pvt. Ltd., new delhi, 1996.
O.p. malhotra, the law and practice of arbitration and conciliation, new delhi,
lexisnexis butterworths, 2002.
P.c. markanda, law relating to arbitration & conciliation, wadhwa & co., delhi, 2001.
R.s. bachawat, law of arbitration and conciliation, nagpur, wadhwa & co., 1999.
Websites:
http://www.kaplegal.com/upload/pdf/arbitration-law-India-critical-analysis.pdf
http://lawcommissionofIndia.nic.in/adr_conf/nageswara%20rao10.pdf
http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/vol4-issue3/a0430107.pdf
http://psalegal.com/upload/publication/assocfile/disputeresolutionbulletinissuevii08092010070309pm.pdf
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