Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MIZPAH R. REYES, respondent.
Pacianito B. Cabaron for respondent.
Celso C. Dimayuga co-counsel for respondent.

CORTES, J.:
The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 [Art. 172,
Revised Penal Code (RPC)]. Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime prescribes in ten
(10) years [Art. 90, par. 3 (RPC)]. The ten (10) year prescriptive period commences to run "from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ." [Art.
91, (RCP)]. In the instant case, the public document allegedly falsified was a notarized deed of sale
registered on May 26, 1961 with the Register of Deeds in the name of the accused, private
respondent herein, Mizpah R. Reyes. The two informations for falsification of a public document
subject matter of the controversy were, however, filed only on October 18, 1984. The complainants
claim that they discovered the falsified notarized deed of sale in June 1983. The Court is tasked with
determining whether the crime has prescribed which hinges on whether or not its discovery may be
deemed to have taken place from the time the document was registered with the Register of Deeds,
consistent with the rule on constructive notice.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa City registered
in their names under TCT No. T-7471. Both are now deceased, the husband having died on
September 6, 1970 and his wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the following children: the
accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora
Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City that the abovementioned property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah
Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa, Philippines" under TCT No. T9885. They further allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected through a notarized deed

of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo. The
deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961. Upon
examination of the document, they found that the signature of their parents were allegedly falsified
and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married
to one Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950. The document was referred by the complainants to the
National Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.) for examination of the signatures of their parents and a
report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia
Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the accused and after conducting an
investigation, the fiscal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch XIII, Lipa City on
October 18, 1984 two (2) informations both for falsification of public document, the first in Criminal
Case No. V-1163, for allegedly making it appear in the notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo,
the mother of the accused, participated in the sale of a parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's
signature, and the second in Criminal Case No. V-1164, for allegedly making an untruthful statement
of fact in the deed of sale, more specifically, by stating that accused was single.
Before arraignment, accused filed a motion to quash both informations on grounds that: (1) "The
criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription of the crime in the light of Cabral v.
Puno, 70 SCRA 606;" and (2) "The trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the
person of accused because of non-compliance with the pre-conciliation requirement of P.D. No.
1508." [Rollo, p. 33].
The trial court granted the motion and quashed the informations in the two (2) cases stating that:
xxx
...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. All Persons must take notice. No
one can plead ignorance of registration.
The essence, therefore, of registration is to serve notice to the whole world of the
legal status and the dealing therewith.
If registration is a notice to the whole world, then registration is in itself a notice and
therefore, the prescriptive period of registered document must start to run from the
date the same was annotated in the Register of Deeds.
In these two cases in question, prescriptive period of ten (10) years should have
started from May 26, 1960 (sic).
Considering the lapse of more than twenty (20) years before the two informations
were filed, the crimes for which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are charged have
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, Criminal Cases Nos. V-1163 and V-1164 are
quashed. [Rollo, pp. 33-34].

From the trial court's order quashing the two (2) informations, the People, petitioner herein, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals (then designated as the Intermediate Appellate Court). In a
decision ** promulgated on April 3, 1986, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. The Court of Appeals rejected the theory of
petitioner that the prescriptive period should commence on June 1983, when the complainants actually discovered the fraudulent deed of
sale. The appellate court sustained the trial court's ruling that the prescriptive period started on May 26, 1961, when the deed of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, filed by
the People, through the Solicitor-General.

Among the authorities relied upon by the Court of Appeals in dismissing petitioner's appeal is the
case of Cabral v. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 606, where the Supreme Court
made a statement to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public document, the prescriptive
period commences from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery
after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds. However, petitioner contends that this
particular statement is not doctrine but merely an obiter dictum.
The Cabral case stemmed from the filing on September 24, 1974 of an information accusing
Eugenio Cabral of the crime of falsification of public document for allegedly falsifying on August 14,
1948 the signature of the complainant Silvino San Andres in a deed of sale of a parcel of land.
Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription of the
crime, as the notarized deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
After hearing the motion, the judge issued a resolution granting the motion to quash and dismissing
the information on the ground of prescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the resolution. Acting on said motion, the trial court ordered the fiscal to make
known his position. The fiscal filed a comment stating that the crime has not prescribed as the
complainant San Diego claimed that he only discovered the crime in October 1970. Thereafter, the
trial court set aside its resolution granting the accused's motion to quash and reinstated the
information. The accused brought the case to the Supreme Court questioning the trial court's
authority to set aside its resolution granting his motion to quash. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the accused by holding that the aforementioned resolution has already become final and executory
for failure of the fiscal to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period. The motion
for reconsideration filed by the private prosecutor was disregarded because of the latter's lack of
legal standing. Another reason given by the Court for its decision is the following:
. . .The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense [Secs. 2(f) and 8,
Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court]. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also
provides that "prescription of the crime is one of the grounds for "total extinction of
criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article
172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which carries an
imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes in ten (10) years [Article 90,
Revised Penal Code]. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on
August 26, 1948.
xxx

[Cabral v. Puno, supra at p. 609].

Although the prescription of the crime was not squarely in issue in Cabral, it is apparent that the
statement of the Court on prescription and constructive notice was not totally irrelevant to the
disposition of the case. Moreover, it is not without any legal basis.
The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The
record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains [Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby,
31 Phil. 590 (1915); Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 380; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., G.R. No. L-38303, May 30,
1988,161 SCRA 634; See also Sec. 52, Pres. Decree No. 1529 (1978)].
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that a purchaser of registered land is presumed to be charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record. The Court, in explaining the nature of the rule on
constructive notice and the presumption arising therefrom stated in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L21953, March 28 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, that:
xxx
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice
of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein ...
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such
presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the
public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would
lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
xxx
It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased was
executed by some of his heirs, the registration of the instrument of partition with the Register of
Deeds is constructive notice that said heirs have repudiated the fiduciary relationship between them
and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property in question. The heirs who were not included in the deed of
partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was registered with the Register
of Deeds [De la Cerna v. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-28838, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 514]. Likewise,
the rule on constructive notice has been applied in the interpretation of a provision in the Civil Code
on the prescription of actions for annulment of contracts which is parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Civil Code provision states:

Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This period shall begin:
xxx
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same [Emphasis
supplied].
In Armentia v. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-18210, December 29, 1966,18 SCRA 1253, where a notarial
document recorded with the Registry of Deeds was sought to be annulled, the Court, interpreting the
phrase "from the time of the discovery" found in the aforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled
that "in legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the
document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice
to the whole world . . ." [See also Avecilla v. Yatco, 103 Phil. 666 (1958); Gerona v. De Guzman,
G.R. No. L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153; Carantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33360,
April 25, 1977, 76 SCRA 514; Cultura v. Tupacar, G.R. No. L-48430, December 3, 1985,140 SCRA
311; Cimafranco v. IAC, G.R. No. L-68687, January 31, 1987, 147 SCRA 611; Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., supra.] However, petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the
Revised Penal Code which states that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day the crime is discovered by the offended party,the authorities, or their agents. . cannot be
construed in the same manner because the rule on constructive notice is limited in application to
land registration cases. It is argued that haste should be avoided in applying civil law presumptions
to criminal suits.
Although caution should be observed in applying the rules of construction in civil cases in the
interpretation of criminal statutes, the Court will not hesitate to do so if the factual and legal
circumstances so warrant. Hence, inMercado v. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 (1938), the Court applied the
presumption arising from the allowance of a will to bar a criminal action. In theft particular case, the
petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. The will was duly probated.
Sixteen (16) months thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for falsification or
forgery of the will. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case claiming that the order probating the
will is conclusive as to its authenticity and due execution. The motion having been denied, the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which ruled that "the judgment
admitting the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to the due execution and
genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not for the purpose of
punishment of a crime." But the Supreme Court reversed the CA decision by ruling that, in
accordance with See. 625 of the then Code of Civil Procedure which provides that "the allowance by
the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution," *** a criminal
action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.

It is, however, insisted in this case that the rule on constructive notice applies only in civil cases. It is
argued that the law on prescription of crimes is founded on a principle different from that of the law
on prescription in civil actions. The difference, it is claimed, precludes the application of the rule on
constructive notice in criminal actions.

The statute of limitations of civil actions was explained in Penales v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 73611, October 27, 1986, 115 SCRA 223, 228 in the following manner:
Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress
fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and
surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure
from the lapse of time or death or removal of witnesses . . .
On the other hand, the Court in People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 389, 405-406 (1923), discussed the nature
of the statute of limitations in criminal cases as follows:
xxx
. . . The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but
an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense;
that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country; and resume his
immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the
proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that
statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only
because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but
because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public
justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of
testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that
statutes enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not
merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant
activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can
be obtained.
xxx
It is evident that there is merit in petitioner's claim that the law on prescription of civil suits is founded
on different policy considerations from that of the law on prescription of criminal actions. However,
the Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and rules of interpretation used
in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive notice, can not be applied in
criminal actions.
The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits are based mainly on practical and
equitable grounds. The lapse of a considerably long period of time obscures the surrounding
circumstances of a particular claim or right and erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be
presented in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or right. Moreover, where a
particular right has accrued in favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left on a
precarious balance, always susceptible to possible challenge by an adverse party. After a certain

period of time fixed by law, the right enjoyed by a party must be accorded respect by prohibiting
adverse claims the factual basis of which can no longer be verified with certainty. Hence, the law on
prescription of civil suits is properly called a statute of repose.
The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best evidence that can be obtained is also a major
consideration in criminal trials. However, the law on prescription of crimes rests on a more
fundamental principle. Being more than a statute of repose, it is an act of grace whereby the state,
after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal
act. While the law on prescription of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter
between two contending parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality
on the part of the state in favor of the offender [People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405]. Hence, in the
interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to
be adopted [People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil.
725 (1956)]. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the
Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period
of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was
recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on
May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only
on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the
accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible
error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996]
ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
A word or group of words conveys intentions. When used truncatedly, its meaning disappears and
breeds conflict. Thus, it is written - By thy words shalt thou be justified, and by thy words shalt thou
be condemned. (Matthew, 12:37)
Construing the new words of a statute separately is the raison detre of this appeal.
Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution
from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made
by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and was later
carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry,
issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas, who purchased the
parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.
The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced as follows:
On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of
residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas
on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property
was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of
Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an
adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was
inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a
Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4,
1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for
collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a Compromise
Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay
the same in two years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in
the compromise agreement, defendant-appellant Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the court granted in
its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by

the CFI of Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution dated
August 3, 1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12,
1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution
before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073
as Entry No. 123283.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT
No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was ssued in the name of the
Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to
the new title. On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of
Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as scheduled.
On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution upon defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer, Atty. Melchor
Flores. Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said
annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed this complaint dated January 11, 1986 on
February 5, 1986.[1]
The Sajonases filed their complaint[2] in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against
Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevant portion of the complaint
alleges:
7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the defendant, the Uychocde spouses,
debtors of the defendant, have already transferred, conveyed and assigned all their title, rights and
interests to the plaintiffs and there was no more title, rights or interests therein which the defendant
could levy upon;
8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which was carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is
illegal and invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in view of the existence of the Adverse Claim
annotated by the plaintiffs on the corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses;
9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the
cancellation of the said notice of levy but the latter, without justifiable reason and with the sole
purpose of harassing and embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refused plaintiffs demand;
10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of the defendant to cause the cancellation of the
notice of levy on execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigate and engage the services of the
undersigned counsel, to protect their rights and interests, for which they agreed to pay attorneys
fees in the amount of P10,000 and appearance fees of P500 per day in court. [3]
Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim[4] on March 8, 1986, raising special and
affirmative defenses, the relevant portions of which are as follows:
10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein defendants;

11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filed an adverse claim against the property
covered by TCT No. 79073 registered under the name of spouses Ernesto Uychocde on August 27,
1984, the same ceases to have any legal force and effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to Section
70 of P.D. 1529;
12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ
of Execution dated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (now RTC) of Quezon City proceeding
from a decision rendered in Civil Case No. 28859 in favor of herein defendant against Ernesto
Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper and appropriate because the property is registered in the name of
the judgment debtor and is not among those exempted from execution;
13. Assuming without admitting that the property subject matter of this case was in fact sold by the
registered owner in favor of the herein plaintiffs, the sale is the null and void (sic) and without any
legal force and effect because it was done in fraud of a judgment creditor, the defendant Pilares. [5]
Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplary damages in a counterclaim against the Sajonas
spouses. The parties appeared at pre-trial proceedings on January 21, 1987, [6] after which, trial on
the merits ensued.
The trial court rendered its decision on February 15, 1989.[7] It found in favor of the Sajonas couple,
and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
The court a quo stated, thus:
After going over the evidence presented by the parties, the court finds that although the title of the
subject matter of the Notice of Levy on Execution was still in the name of the Spouses Uychocde
when the same was annotated on the said title, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated
on the same title by the plaintiffs who earlier bought said property from the Uychocdes.
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an
adverse claim is equivalent to registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy
could not have any legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim
annotated on the title of the Uychocdes.
xxx xxx

xxx

On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in good faith of the property of the spouses
Uychocde even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale executed by the spouses
was made in fraud of creditors, the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of any
indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over
said property or that the same is involved in a litigation between said spouses and the
defendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any bad faith must
be established by competent proof.[8] (Cai vs. Henson, 51 Phil 606)
xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Pilares, as follows:
1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on Execution annotated on Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-109417.
2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as attorneys fees.
3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said defendant.
Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.
Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals[9], assigning errors on the part of the lower
court. The appellate court reversed the lower courts decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy
on execution on the certificate of title, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February 15, 1989 is reversed and set aside
and this complaint is dismissed.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees."[10]
The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for Review on Certiorari[11], praying inter alia to
set aside the Court of Appeals decision, and to reinstate that of the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondent filed his Comment[12] on March 5, 1992, after which, the parties were ordered to
file their respective Memoranda. Private respondent complied thereto on April 27, 1994[13], while
petitioners were able to submit their Memorandum on September 29, 1992. [14]
Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate court, to wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR
ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT
FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE
APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A
WHOLE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE
ON THE GROUND THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among the parties in suit has a better right over the
property in question. The petitioners derive their claim from the right of ownership arising from a
perfected contract of absolute sale between them and the registered owners of the property, such

right being attested to by the notice of adverse claim[15] annotated on TCT No. N-79073 as early as
August 27, 1984. Private respondent on the other hand, claims the right to levy on the property, and
have it sold on execution to satisfy his judgment credit, arising from Civil Case No. Q28850[16] against the Uychocdes, from whose title, petitioners derived their own.
Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice is
registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province where the property
is located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other dates pertinent thereto. [17]
The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. *
Noting the changes made in the terminology of the provisions of the law, private respondent
interpreted this to mean that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effective only for a period of 30 days
from its annotation, and does not automatically lose its force afterwards. Private respondent further
maintains that the notice of adverse claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will be
effective only up to September 26, 1984, after which it will no longer have any binding force and
effect pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of the petitioners by the
Uychocdes was made in order to defraud their creditor (Pilares), as the same was executed
subsequent to their having defaulted in the payment of their obligation based on a compromise
agreement.[18]
The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents theory when it ruled:
The above stated conclusion of the lower court is based on the premise that the adverse claim filed
by plaintiffs-appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days from the date of
registration. However, under the provisions of Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be
effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of its registration. The provision of this Decree is
clear and specific.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act
496) does not provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529,
however, now specifically provides for only 30 days. If the intention of the law was for the adverse
claim to remain effective until cancelled by petition of the interested party, then the aforecited
provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of effectivity would not have been inserted in the law.
Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27, 1984, it was effective only until September
26, 1984. Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the notice of levy on execution on February
12, 1985, said adverse claim was already ineffective. It cannot be said that actual or prior
knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim on the Uychocdes title is equivalent to registration
inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective when the notice of levy on execution was

annotated. Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of levy on execution was
proper and justified.
The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory construction that Section 70 is specific and
unambiguous and hence, needs no interpretation nor construction.[19] Perforce, the appellate court
stated, the provision was clear enough to warrant immediate enforcement, and no interpretation was
needed to give it force and effect. A fortiori, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of its registration, after which it shall be without force and
effect. Continuing, the court further stated;
. . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of preference- which should be preferred
between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice
of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February
12, 1985.
In the case of Landig vs. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil 638 it was held that where a sale is recorded
later than an attachment, although the former is of an earlier date, the sale must give way to the
attachment on the ground that the act of registration is the operative act to affect the land. A similar
ruling was restated in Campillo vs. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 513).
xxx

xxx

xxx

The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, which provides as follows:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered owner.- An owner of registered land
may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing
laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are
sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting
to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds
to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land in so far as third
persons are concerned, and in all cases under the Decree, the registration shall be made in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (Italics supplied by the
lower court.)
Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the
register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on
the property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title. [20]
Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases coming before us, the same, however,
does not fit in the case at bar. While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which

conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the
subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim,
duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale. [21] While it is true that
under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance of property
registered under the system, or any interest therein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land
upon its registration, and that a purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens
title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus, one who buys from the
registered owner need not have to look behind the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound by
the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the vendors title
takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.[22]
In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the subsequent sale of the property to the De Castro
spouses cannot prevail over the adverse claim of Perez, which was inscribed on the banks
certificate of title on October 6, 1958. That should have put said spouses on notice, and they can
claim no better legal right over and above that of Perez. The TCT issued in the spouses names on
July, 1959 also carried the said annotation of adverse claim. Consequently, they are not entitled to
any interest on the price they paid for the property. [23]
Then again, in Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, we said that the statement of respondent court in its
resolution of reversal that until the validity of an adverse claim is determined judicially, it cannot be
considered a flaw in the vendors title contradicts the very object of adverse claims. As stated
earlier, the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said
property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or has a better right than the registered
owner thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over the adverse claim which was previously
annotated in the certificate of title over the property.[24]
The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
N-109417 still in force when private respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be
registered and annotated in the said title, considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed
since it was annotated? This is a decisive factor in the resolution of this instant case.
If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are charged with knowledge of pre-existing
interest over the subject property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to the cancellation of the notice of
levy attached to the certificate of title.
For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land
Registration Act reads:
Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered lands adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or
interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate
of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and
designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. The statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree
therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall
be cancelled. If in any case, the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered
was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble the costs in its
discretion.
The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse claims has to be reexamined in the light of the
changes introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision
is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration
as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided,
however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First
Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall
grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render
judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing
shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount
not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the
lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds
a sworn petition to that effect. (Italics ours)
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a
construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole. [25] For taken in solitude, a
word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
evident when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. [26] In ascertaining
the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its
entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to
thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read
in relation to the sentence following, which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
verified petition therefor by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse
of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and
complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically
terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a
useless act.
A statutes clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation to the statutes
totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with the pre-existing body of
laws. Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages of the
published Act, its history, origin, and its purposes may be examined by the courts in their
construction.[27] An eminent authority on the subject matter states the rule candidly:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections, and is animated by one general purpose
and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine its intention to the
one section construed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by a
process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated
from the context, some particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase usually to be
ascertained from the context.[28]
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the
portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would
serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that
the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the
inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse
claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer
necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.[29]
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase may be cancelled, which obviously indicates, as
inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an
adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty
days from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by such period as it would be
inconsistent with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity is
immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal issue to
be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for
the court to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not. [30]
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to
thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of

adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of
a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming
an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. [31]
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to be
threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where
the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining
at last the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line
with the provision immediately following:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim shall be registered by the same
claimant.
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property, the adverse claimant will be
precluded from registering a second adverse claim based on the same ground.
It was held that validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by the Court upon
petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof
and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim
is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting
the interest of the adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third parties. [32]
In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was
still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of
levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to
be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the
registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners. This can be deduced from the pertinent
provision of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons- The levy on execution shall create a lien
in favor of the judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in such
property at the time of the levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then existing. (Italics supplied)
To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long time to
complete payments on their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by the
inscribed adverse claim.
As lucidly observed by the trial court in the challenged decision:
True, the foregoing section provides that an adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration. Does this mean however, that the plaintiffs thereby lost their right
over the property in question? Stated in another, did the lapse of the thirty day period automatically

nullify the contract to sell between the plaintiffs and the Uychocdes thereby depriving the former of
their vested right over the property?
It is respectfully submitted that it did not.[33]
As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject property, the same should
be made to rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the appellate court,
there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares
against Uychocde at the time of the sale of the property by the latter in their favor. This was clearly
elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination on April
21, 1988.[34]
ATTY. REYES
Q - Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his wife offered to you and your husband the
property subject matter of this case, they showed you the owners transfer certificate, is it not?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - That was shown to you the very first time that this lot was offered to you for sale?
A - Yes.
Q - After you were shown a copy of the title and after you were informed that they are desirous in
selling the same, did you and your husband decide to buy the same?
A - No, we did not decide right after seeing the title. Of course, we visited...
Q - No, you just answer my question. You did not immediately decide?
A - Yes.
Q - When did you finally decide to buy the same?
A - After seeing the site and after verifying from the Register of Deeds in Marikina that it is free from
encumbrances, that was the time we decided.
Q - How soon after you were offered this lot did you verify the exact location and the genuineness of
the title, as soon after this was offered to you?
A - I think its one week after they were offered.[35]
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in
the property.[36] Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious

advantage of another.[37] Thus, the claim of the private respondent that the sale executed by the
spouses was made in fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no evidence that the
petitioners had any knowledge or notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private
respondents, nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes properties or that the same was
involved in any litigation between said spouses and the private respondent. While it may be stated
that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established by competent proof by the
party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be purchasers in good
faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.
At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser
of registered land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and all prior
claims, liens and encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly
mentioned in the ACT as having been preserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the
conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile
and nugatory.[38]
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 17, 1991
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 15,
1989 finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-109417 is hereby REINSTATED.
The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107653. February 5, 1996]
FELIPA GARBIN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TENTH
DIVISION) and SPOUSES ANTONIO JULIAN and CASIMIRA GARBIN, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac which had earlier dismissed the complaint for annulment of sale
filed by private respondents.
The facts are the following:
Pablo Garbin and Leoncia Garbin are the parents of petitioner Felipa Garbin (Felipa) and private
respondent Casimira Garbin (Casimira) married to private respondent Antonio Julian. Pablo Garbin
is the original owner of Lot 12712, Camiling, Tarlac Cadastre with an area of 25,681 square meters,
title thereto being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 33251.
On October 31, 1955, Pablo Garbin and his wife Leoncia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Estate purportedly conveying to private respondent Casimira Garbin the undivided northern half of
the said lot. Casimira then registered an adverse claim over the property.
On May 24, 1970, Pablo Garbin sold the entire Lot 12712, including the northern portion, to
petitioner Felipa by virtue of a Deed of Sale. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 88932
was issued in favor of Felipa. On July 29, 1974, Felipa and Pablo Garbin filed an ejectment case
against private respondent spouses. In that case, the Municipal Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac
decided against private respondents. They appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac
which affirmed the questioned decision. Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, but said petition was dismissed. They questioned the dismissal in this Court
docketed as G.R. No. 59817 but the petition was denied due course.
On March 1, 1982, before judgment could become final in the ejectment case, private respondents
filed a complaint for annulment of sale, partition and damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac. The issue presented therein was whether or not private respondents, as the alleged first
vendees in a double sale, (who annotated the same as an adverse claim on the covering title) have
a superior right over petitioner, the subsequent vendee (who received a transfer certificate of title for
the entire lot despite prior inscription of the adverse claim).
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. Aggrieved, private respondents
went to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.
The appellate court said:

x x x it is Our view, and so We hold, that, at the very least, the inscription of the adverse claim of
plaintiffs-appellants on vendor Pablo Garbins OCT No. 33251 did constitute a sufficient notice to the
whole world, defendant-appellee Felipa Garbin included, - that the northern half of subject Lot 12712
was deeded out by the registered owner to plaintiffs-appellants. Therefore, defendant-appellee is a
buyer in bad faith, with full awareness of the prior sale of the northern half of Lot 12712 to her sister
Casimira Garbin, and consequently, the registration of the sale in favor of defendant-appellee did not
cleanse her bad faith and the legal consequences thereof, and did not vest in her (appellee) the
ownership over the northern half of Lot 12712, as against the first buyer thereof, plaintiff-appellant
Casimira Garbin.
It is well-settled that in a double sale of real property, ownership thereof shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property (2nd paragraph,
Article 1544,New Civil Code of the Philippines). Under this applicable provision of law, mere
registration of the sale of real or immovable property is not enough. The good faith of the buyer
registering the sale must concur. In the case of defendant-appellee she cannot be considered in
good faith, within legal contemplation, and her profession of innocence or lack of knowledge of the
prior sale is incredible and unworthy of belief. To be sure, the annotation of plaintiffs-appellants
adverse claim on the title of vendor Pablo Garbin made defendant-appellee fully aware of such
earlier sale.
As regards the defense of prescription or laches invoked by defendant-appellee to defeat the claim
of plaintiffs-appellants over the portion of land in question:
We find the same equally undeserving of serious consideration. Considering that before instituting
this action on March 2, 1982, plaintiffs-appellants were pre-occupied with the ejectment proceedings
commenced against them by defendant-appellee on July 29, 1970; it cannot be said, then, that
plaintiffs-appellants slumbered on their rights and had failed to assert their claim seasonably. As a
matter of fact, even during the pendency of the ejectment case they did find time to initiate this case
under consideration. Plaintiffs-appellants having been busy defending themselves in said ejectment
case against them; their inability to file the present action sooner is understandable. It should be
borne in mind that the running of the period of prescription is capable of interruption. And, to repeat;
during the pendency of the ejectment case aforementioned; We believe that the running of the
period of prescription of plaintiffs-appellants cause of action had been interrupted.
As regards the equitable principle of laches, the attendant facts and circumstances come to the
fore. Whether or not laches set in depends on the surrounding facts and circumstances. Here, We
believe that plaintiffs-appellants have not faltered or failed for an unreasonable length of time to
assert their claim of ownership.
With respect to the southern half of Lot 12712; plaintiffs-appellants stance is also meritorious. When
the wife of Pablo Garbin died, her estate was transmitted by operation of the law on intestate
succession to plaintiff-appellant Casimira Garbin, defendant-appellee Felipa Garbin, and surviving
spouse Pablo Garbin. So, when Pablo Garbin executed the deed of sale in favor of defendantappellee, he could only convey to the latter his undivided share therein, which was 4/6 of the
southern portion of Lot 12712 because as hereinabove pointed out, the northern half of the said lot
was effectively conveyed to plaintiffs-appellants, so that he could only dispose of 4/6 of the southern

portion. Plaintiff-appellant Casimira Garbin inherited 1/6, and the remaining 1/6 of the southern
portion went to defendant-appellee as her inheritance from their mother. Therefore, plaintiffsappellants own 7/12 of Lot 12712 while defendant-appellee owns 5/12; the northern half being
equivalent to 6/12, and out of the other 6/12, Pablo Garbin conveyed 4/12 to appellee Felipa Garbin,
who inherited 1/12 in her own right. Plaintiff-appellant Casimira Garbin also inherited 1/12 which
portion added to what appellants bought from Pablo Garbin, made appellants area 7/12 of Lot
12712.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE; the sale by Pablo Garbin to
defendant-appellee Felipa Garbin of the entire Lot 12712, Camiling, Tarlac Cadastre (Exh. B) is
hereby declared null and void and without force and effect, and the resulting TCT No. T-88932 of the
latter (Exh. C) is ordered canceled; plaintiffs-appellants are adjudged the owners pro-indiviso of
seven-twelfth (7/12), including the northern half, of the said lot, with defendant-appellee as the owner
of the remaining five-twelfth (5/12) southern portion thereof.
To avoid multiplicity of suits; the plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee are hereby given thirty
(30) days from finality of this disposition, to submit to the trial court of origin a scheme of partition for
subject lot on the basis of their undivided co-ownership of seven-twelfth (7/12) and five-twelfth
(5/12), respectively; otherwise, pursuant to Rule 69, Revised Rules of Court, the lower court shall by
order appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested commissioners to effect the
partition in accordance herewith. Costs against defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, before this Court, now questions the appellate courts decision stating that:
1. No evidence has been presented by private respondents to prove the validity of the Deed of
Absolute sale of Real Estate executed in their favor by Pablo Garbin.
2. The annotation on the title of the adverse claim is not sufficient to prove validity of the said claim.
3. Pablo Garbin himself repudiated the alleged sale to private respondent spouses in testimony
before the trial court in the ejectment case, denying knowledge of the sale of subject property to
them.
4. Pablo Garbin solely owned the subject lot, as shown by the Original Certificate of Title, and thus
the property could not be considered conjugal.
5. Private respondents cause of action had already prescribed.
We find the petition meritorious.
The central issue to be resolved here is: does the registration of the said adverse claim by private
respondents prevail over the title of petitioner which was registered subsequent to the adverse
claim?

Considering the circumstances peculiar to the present case, we must rule in the negative.
Sec. 110 of Act No. 496 (otherwise known as the Land Registration Act) states:
whoever claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in the Land
Registration Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged
right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall
be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest
shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter
such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration shall be canceled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing finds that a claim
thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in
its discretion. (Italics supplied)
The purpose of the annotation of an adverse claim is to protect the interest of a person over a piece
of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the
Land Registration Act, and serve as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property
that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner.[1]
It is undisputed that the adverse claim of private respondents was registered pursuant to Sec. 110 of
Act No. 496, the same having been accomplished by the filing of a sworn statement with the
Register of Deeds of the province where the property was located. However, what was registered
was merely the adverse claim and not the Deed of Sale, which supposedly conveyed the northern
half portion of the subject property. Therefore, there is still need to resolve the validity of the adverse
claim in separate proceedings, as there is an absence of registration of the actual conveyance of the
portion of land herein claimed by private respondents.
From the provisions of the law, it is clear that mere registration of an adverse claim does not make
such claim valid, nor is it permanent in character. More importantly, such registration does not
confer instant title of ownership since judicial determination on the issue of the ownership is still
necessary.[2]
Regarding the alleged Deed of Sale by Pablo Garbin in favor of private respondents, the trial court
correctly observed:
On the assumption that the deed in favor of the plaintiffs was presented for registration as claimed,
it should, however, be underscored that the entry in the day book is but a preliminary step of
registration, the actual annotation of the memorandum or the issuance of a new certificate of title
being the final step to accomplish registration.
In Pilapil v. CA,[3] we said:

To affect the land sold, the presentation of the Deed of Sale and its entry in the day book must be
done with the surrender of the owners duplicate of the certificate of title.
Considering further that Pablo Garbin himself denied the sale of the subject property, it is evident
that the sale never transpired.
In view of the above, the entry in the day book automatically loses force and effect. Thus, it is the
Deed of Sale that petitioner registered in her favor and the Transfer Certificate of Title subsequently
obtained over the property, which has a superior right thereon.
As regards the issue of the ownership by Pablo Garbin of the property, the Original Certificate of Title
clearly states that he is the sole owner thereof. There is no basis, therefore, for the ruling of the
appellate court that said property is conjugal in character and also for its computation of the shares
that Pablo Garbin could dispose of when he executed the Deed of Sale on May 24, 1970 to Felipa.
Lastly, on the issue of prescription, we agree with the trial court which found that the action for
annulment of sale had already prescribed.
x x x the title of the defendant must be upheld for failure or the neglect of the plaintiffs for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time of more that fifteen (15) years since they registered
their adverse claim, or for a period of more than three (3) decades since the execution of the deed of
sale in their favor upon which their adverse claim is based, to do that which, by exercising diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. For it is this negligence or omission to assert a right within
reasonable time that is construed that plaintiffs had abandoned their right to claim ownership under
the deed of sale, or declined to assert it. Thus, when a person slept in his rights for 28 years from
the time of the transaction, before filing the action amounts to laches which cannot be excused even
by ignorance resulting from unexcusable negligence (Vda. de Lima vs. Tiu, 52 SCRA 516 [1970]).
Private respondents, having waited for 36 long years before flung an action to annul the sale to
Felipa in the trial court we hold that this constitutes laches.
The unexplained interval of 29 years that the plaintiffs allowed to elapse before making any claim or
instituting action constitutes laches that places them in estoppel to question the validity of the
probate courts order and of the sale executed in pursuant thereof. [4]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and that of the Regional
Trial Court REINSTATED. Private respondents complaint for annulment of sale is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 49470 April 8, 1991

DARIO N. LOZANO, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the deceased AGUSTO N.
LOZANO, PATROCINIO DEL PRADO and ANTONIO LOZANO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
IGNACIO BALLESTEROS, defendant-appellee.
Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.
Generoso T. Tarlit for defendant-appellee.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is an appeal elevated to Us by the Court of Appeals on pure questions of law seeking the
reversal of the decision of the respondent Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial
District, Dagupan City in Civil Case No. D-2107 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, declaring
defendant Ignacio Ballesteros the absolute owner of the land in question, ordering the cancellation of
the plaintiffs' adverse claim and the payment to defendant of damages, attorney's fees and cost of
suit.
The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court and adopted partially from the
parties' stipulation of facts are as follows:
Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the original registered exclusive
owner of the land in question comprising Lots Q, B and O as evidenced by Original Certificate of
Title No. 46076. However only Lot Q is the subject of this present action. On March 6, 1958, by
virtue of a deed of absolute sale, Tuazon sold the land in question to Marciana de Dios.
On June 2, 1958, Augusto, Dario, Jaime, Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed Lozano,
together with Marciana de Dios filed a verified petition before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan seeking the approval of the consolidation-subdivision plan and for the annotation of
several documents at the back of the Original Certificate of Title No. 46076. Acting on the verified
petition, the court approved the consolidation-subdivision plan and directed the inscription, among
others, of said deed of sale at the back of the title.

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26537 was issued in the name of Marciana de Dios who later
mortgaged the land to Kaluyagan Rural Bank in San Carlos City, Pangasinan.
On January 22, 1963, plaintiffs caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back of the title of
the said lot.
Thereafter, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Augusta Lozano was filed by the plaintiffs in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. On November 18, 1965, plaintiffs through the
administrator filed an inventory which included said lot Q.
On August 25, 1966, De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 63171 was later transferred in his name.
On September 21, 1966, plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dios in Civil Case No.
D-1953, alleging that the estate of Augusto Lozano is the absolute owner of Lots Q, O and B. On
June 8, 1967, the court rendered a default decision in favor of the plaintiffs. However, the judgment
was not satisfied on the ground that De Dios was insolvent and did not have any registered property.
Having failed to effect the recovery and/or reconveyance of the lots, plaintiffs filed several complaints
in Civil Cases Nos. D-2107, D-2109 and D-2115 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for
reconveyance and recovery of possession. The trial court in Civil Case No. D-2107 rendered a
decision on October 21, 1969, the dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court hereby renders
judgment (1) dismissing the complaint for lack of merit; (2) declaring defendant
Ignacio Ballesteros the absolute owner of the land in question; (3) ordering the
cancellation of plaintiffs' adverse claim at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
63171 at the expense of the plaintiffs; and (4) ordering plaintiffs to pay, jointly and
severally, the herein defendant in the amount of P1,000.00 damages, and P500.00
for attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Record on Appeal, p. 35)
Hence, plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 46169-R.
However, the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated November 16, 1978 ruled that "the matter
submitted for determination is purely a question of law that is beyond the jurisdiction of this court."
(Rollo, p. 50). Thus, the records of the case were elevated to this Court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, let the records of this case be elevated to the Honorable Supreme
Court as a matter pertaining to its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 50)
It should be noted that during the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the appellants
manifested in the motion for extension to file brief their intention of filing a joint brief for all cases

pending before the same court because of the relationship and similarity of issues of the aforementioned cases.
Thereupon, said appellants as well as appellees filed their respective joint briefs.
The appellants raised the following seven (7) assignments of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ADVERSE CLAIM OF
HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FILED AND ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF
THE PRIOR TITLES OF MARCIANA DE DIOS AS ENTRY NO. 194992 AND ENTRY
NO. 197335 ARE BINDING AND VALID AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
WHO ARE SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS FROM MARCIANA DE DIOS.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT BY VIRTUE OF SAID
ADVERSE CLAIM THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES PURCHASERS ARE BOUND
BY THE DECISION AGAINST MARCIANA DE DIOS IN CIVIL CASE NO. D-1953
(EXHIBIT "I").
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID AS AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. D-1953.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT AS LONG AS THE
ADVERSE CLAIM REMAINS AS AN ENCUMBRANCE ON THE TITLES THE SAME
IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE INTEREST OF THE ADVERSE CLAIMANTS
AGAINST CLAIMS OF SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES AS PURCHASERS IN BAD FAITH AS THEY HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF
HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' CLAIMS AGAINST MARCIANA DE DIOS.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES DESPITE THE LACK OF EVIDENCE OF
DAMAGES AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT

HEREIN PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT WERE FILED IN GROSS BAD FAITH OR WITH

MALICE.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASES IN FAVOR OF
APPELLEES. (Rollo, pp. 49-50)
Appellants maintain that the first five assignments of errors should be discussed jointly because
these errors boil down to the issue of the validity and effectivity of the adverse claim. The appellants
insist that "the said adverse claim has been carried along in the subsequent titles of the defendants."
(Joint Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 7) Thus, they conclude that the consequence of this
cautionary notice is that whatever would be the result of their claim against Marciana de Dios is
binding on subsequent purchasers or successors-in-interest. They contend that the "defendantsappellees should have waited for the decision of the court on the question of the validity of the
adverse claim or should have first moved for the removal or cancellation of the adverse claim." (Ibid,
p. 8) Hence, appellants conclude that defendants-appellees are purchasers in bad faith as they have
knowledge of the claims against De Dios.
However, the appellee stresses that "a cursory examination of the adverse claim filed by the
plaintiffs-appellants . . . readily reveals that the same has failed to comply with the formal
requirements of Section 110 of Act 496 with respect to adverse claims. And for which, and for all
legal purposes, the adverse claim under comment is not valid and effective." (Joint Brief for
Defendants-Appellees, pp. 15-16) Appellee argues that "there was a fatal non-joinder of necessary
or indispensable parties." (Ibid, p. 21) Thus, the position of the appellants is untenable because "the
non-joinder of necessary and indispensable parties renders null and void as against them any
decision in a case in which they were not made parties-litigants." (Ibid, p. 23) Furthermore, appellee
"submits that the protection given by the law to adverse claimants in regard to the property subject to
an adverse claim is available only to the party whose registered adverse claim meets all the formal
requisites of law, and not when the same is a nullity." (Ibid, p. 26) Hence, appellee concludes that
"an invalid and ineffective adverse claim cannot validly serve as a notice or warning to third parties
who may deal with the properties subject thereto because such adverse claim by reason of its nullity
is deemed not existent and unregistered." (Ibid, p. 27)
The appellants claim that "there are several reasons why the decision of the lower court in the matter
of damages and attorney's fees should be reversed, to wit:
First, defendants did not present evidence on damages and attorney's fees.
Second, there is no proof of mental suffering, mental anguish, fright, and the like to
entitle defendants to moral damages.
Third, there is no showing by the defendants that herein plaintiffs' complaints were
filed in gross bad faith or malice.

Fourth, the decision itself did not make finding of facts which would show that
defendants are entitled to damages and attorney's fees. The reason for this is that
these cases were submitted mainly on stipulation of facts and exhibits. In the
stipulation of facts, there is no stipulation as to damages and attorney's fees.
Fifth, the herein plaintiffs-appellants in coming to court are just pursuing a proprietary
claim which has legal and factual basis." (Joint Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 11)
However, the appellee argues that when he was unfoundedly sued by the appellants, the former
was under pain of default. Whether he liked it or not, he had to come to court and defend himself.
Thus, he was compelled tounnecessarily incur expenses for the services of their counsel. (Joint Brief
for Defendants-Appellees, p. 33)
In sum, the appellants insist that "the lower court erred in deciding the cases in favor of appellees."
(Joint Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 1)
Issue:w/n the adverse claim is valid.
We find appellants' contentions devoid of merit except that pertaining to the award of damages and
attorney's fees and therefore uphold the ruling of the lower court with modification.
The applicable law in the case at bar is still Section 110 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act despite the modification introduced by Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
The said section particularly deals with adverse claim, to wit:
Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to date of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing
setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and
a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner,
and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a
petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the
validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and
equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus
registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or
treble costs in its discretion.
Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the abovequoted provision, as amended,
the following are the formal requisites of an adverse claim:
1. the adverse claimant must state the following in writing:

a. his alleged right or interest;

b. how and under whom such alleged right or interest is acquired;
c. the description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed,
and
d. the certificate of title number
2. the statement must be signed and sworn to before a notary public or other officer
authorized to administer oath; and
3. the claimant should state his residence or the place to which all notices may be
served upon him.
The lower court quoted in part the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs, to wit:
That this adverse claim is being filed prior to the filing of a court action because all
the properties above-described formerly belong to my husband, the late Augusto
Lozano. (Record on Appeal, p. 32)
However, the lower court noted that "the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the title of
Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant, did not meet the requirements
provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that is setting forth fully how or under whom the heirs of
Lozano acquired the property. (Record on Appeal, p. 33)
We adhere to the lower court's findings and find appellee's position meritorious. A cursory reading of
the aforequoted adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs shows that the same has failed to comply with
the formal requisites of Section 110 of Act 496, more specifically the appellants' failure to state how
and under whom their alleged right or interest is acquired. Thus, the effect of such non-compliance
renders the adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective.
In a case where the adverse claim filed for registration did not fully comply with the formal requisites
of Section 110 of Act No. 496, or more specifically, there being no description of the land in which
right or interest is claimed nor the place to which all notices may be served upon the adverse
claimant given, such adverse claim could not be registered. (LRC Consulta No. 144, Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, pet., February 18, 1957)
Despite the appellee's alleged knowledge of the appellants' claims against De Dios, We still find the
allegation of bad faith on the part of the appellee devoid of merit. It should be stressed that bad faith
is inconsequential because of the ineffectiveness of the adverse claim.
Anent the appellant's contention that appellee is bound by the decision in the former reconveyance
case against De Dios, the lower court stressed that it is convinced that the decision rendered in Civil
Case No. D-1953 is a nullity, because an indispensable party like the defendant herein was not
brought as party therein. The failure of the plaintiffs to implead the present defendant in that case,

constituted a legal obstacle to the exercise of judicial power in said case, and rendered any
judgment therein an absolute nullity. (Record on Appeal, p. 30)
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
We rule that "owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties,
without whom no relief is available and without whom the court can render no valid judgment." (see
Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and Makati v. Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 57, G.R. No. 81564, 24 April 1990, 184 SCRA 622, 633.)
As defined, "an indispensable party is one without whom the action cannot be finally determined,
whose interests in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so bound up with that of
the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. (Co
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. 65928, 21 June 1988, 162 SCRA 390, 399)
On the basis of the above-mentioned definition, We believe that the point of the appellee was well
taken by the court and We therefore conclude that the defendant-appellee was correctly considered
as an indispensable party, ergo, the court cannot rule that said party is bound by the previous
decision in favor of the appellants.
Finally, the appellants' claim against the lower court's award of damages and Attorney's fees is
meritorious.
The lower court is admonished in ordering the payment of damages without mentioning the specific
type of damages being awarded. In view of the lower court's inaccuracy as well as its failure to state
any basis for the award of the indemnity, the same must be deleted.
More specifically, We already emphasized that most of the items for which moral damages can be
awarded under Article 2219 of the new Civil Code are such as affect the moral feelings and personal
pride of the person seeking recovery, and they should be weighed in determining the indemnity to be
awarded. (Layda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 90 Phil 724) Thus, if the court has no proof or evidence
upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, such indemnity could not be outrightly
awarded.
In relation to appellee's prayer for exemplary damages, it has been held that under Articles 2229,
2233 and 2234 of the New Civil Code, "exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, but they cannot be recovered
as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the discretion of the court. It further appears
that the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, because its determination depends
upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant. If the amount of
exemplary damages need not be proved, it need not also be alleged and the reason is obvious
because it is merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as compensatory
damages. Unless and until this premise is determined and established, what may be claimed as

exemplary damages would amount to a mere surmise or speculation." (Singson, et al. v. Aragon and
Lorza 92 Phil 515, 518.)
Hence, in the absence of any claim and proof of compensatory damages, the award of exemplary
damages has no leg to stand on.
Finally, the rule on the award of attorney's fees is that there must be a justification for the same. In
the absence of a statement why attorney's fees were awarded, the same should be disallowed.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the lower court committed no error in
adjudicating in favor of the defendant-appellee except as to the award of damages and attorney's
fees which We find erroneous.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with modification
insofar as it awarded damages amounting to P1,000.00, and attorney's fees amounting to P500.00
which are hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130352. November 3, 1998]
ROGELIA P. DIAZ-DUARTE, petitioner, vs. SPS. BEN and ETHYL ONG, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding Lot 1208 to respondent spouses Ben and Ethyl
Ong.[1]
The facts are as succinctly summarized by the trial court, viz:
"Macario Diaz married Encarnacion Reyes sometime in 1895. Out of this union, Trinidad Diaz was
born in 1896. Sometime in 1903, Encarnacion Reyes died. In 1905, Macario Diaz married Cristina
Pedrosa. Out of this union, x x x, Rogelia-Diaz Duarte was born in 1910.
"Trinidad Diaz, x x x, married Filomeno Arteche. This marriage was blessed by nine children,
including Encarnacion Arteche and all the other plaintiffs in the case in the trial court. Trinidad
Arteche died on March 21, 1977.
"On October 28, 1932, in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Cad. Record No. 1040, Judge Luciano Ortiz
adjudicated Lot 1208 of the Tacloban Cadastre, located in Marasbaras, Tacloban City, containing
26,738 square meters to `Macario Diaz married to Cristina Pedrosa, of Tacloban, Province of Leyte,
Philippines'. The decision having become final, Decree No. 639202 was issued by the General Land
Registration Office on August 18, 1937, and Original Certificate of Title No. 19486 was issued.
"On April 30, 1941, Macario Diaz died and on October 2, 1962, his second wife Cristina died. On
June 6, 1979, Rogelia Diaz-Duarte issued an Affidavit of Adjudication and Sale of Lot 1208 of the
Tacloban Cadastre in favor of Wilfredo M. Corregidor for P20,000.00 before Notary Public Atty.
Antonio F. Mendiola of Tacloban City who entered the same as Doc. No. 445, Page 40, Book 29,
Series of 1979. By virtue of this sale, OCT No. 19486 of Macario Diaz was cancelled and in its place
TCT No. T-17501 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City in favor of Wilfredo
Corregidor on June 25, 1979.
"On October 12, 1979, Wilfredo Corregidor sold back Lots 1208, 3332, and 3364 of the Tacloban
Cadastre to Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte for P33,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of repurchase
executed by him on said date before Notary Public Atty. Victor C. Veloso of Tacloban City who
entered the same as Doc. No. 5, Page 2, Book I, Series of 1979.

"On October 17, 1979, Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte executed an adverse claim to Lot 1208 covered by
TCT No. T-17501 of Wilfredo Corregidor on the basis of the deed of sale executed by Wilfredo to her
on October 12, 1979.
"On April 10, 1980, 30 days having elapsed, the affidavit of adverse claim of Diaz-Duarte was
cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, albeit erroneously, pursuant to Sec. 70 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree of the
Philippines.
"On February 28, 1981, notwithstanding the resale of the property made by him in favor of Mrs.
Rogelia Diaz-Duarte in 1979, Wilfredo Corregidor sold again Lot 1208 to Ben S. Ong and his wife
Ethyl Ong for P35,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale executed by him on said date before a
Notary Public who entered the same as Doc. No. 380, Page 79, Book I, series of 1981.
"On July 21, 1981, Ben S. Ong mortgaged Lot 1208 and some other properties to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P450,000.00.
"On February 17, 1983, Encarnacion A. Arteche and the other children and heirs of the deceased
Trinidad Diaz-Arteche, filed a civil case for recovery of Lot 1208 of the Tacloban Cadastre against
herein petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duarte, Wilfredo Corregidor and his wife, Ben S. Ong and his wife,
and the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and Pablo G. Amascual Jr., the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City."[2]
On October 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region decided the civil case for the
recovery of Lot 1208 in favor of Encarnacion Arteche, et. al., to wit:[3]
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"1.
Declaring the affidavit of Adjudication and Sale of Lot 1208 of the Tacloban Cadastre
executed by Rogelia Diaz-Duarte on June 6, 1979 as null and void being a false document it having
been established to the satisfaction of the court that Mrs. Rogelia-Diaz Duarte is not the sole heir of
Macario Diaz, original owner of Lot 1208;
"2.
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-17501 of Wilfredo Corregidor and Roseanna F. Corregidor of Lot 1208 of the Tacloban Cadastre
and all certificates of title emanating therefrom including TCT No. 20338 of Ben S. Ong and Ethyl
Ong;
"3.
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Tacloban to cancel TCT No. 20338 of Ben S. Ong and
his wife Ethyl Y. Ong to Lot 1208 of the Tacloban Cadastre and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer
certificate of title to the following persons: Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte, of legal age, widow and
residing in Tacloban City, three-fourth or 20,052 square meters; and to the Heirs of Trinidad Diaz
Arteche, represented by Mrs. Encarnacion A. Benedicto of Tacloban City, Philippines, one-fourth or
6,684 square meters, subject to the mortgage lien of the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation.
"4.

Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."
The defendants appealed but only the appeal of spouses Ben and Ethyl Ong was considered by the
Court of Appeals as Wilfredo Corregidor, Rizal Banking Corporation and Pablo Amascual failed to file
their respective briefs.[4] In their appeal, appellant-spouses raised the following errors, to wit:
I
"The trial court erred in admitting as evidence and giving it any probative value the parol testimony of
the defendant Rogelia Diaz-Duarte as to the affidavit of adjudication with deed of absolute sale of
the land in question executed by Rogelia Diaz Duarte in favor of Wilfredo Corregidor on June 6,
1979."
II
"The trial court erred in not finding or declaring that the affidavit of adjudication with deed of absolute
sale of the land in question executed by Rogelia Diaz Duarte in favor of Wilfredo Coregidor was valid
and legal.
III
"The trial court erred in not finding or declaring the deed of repurchase of the land in question
executed by Wilfredo Corregidor in favor of Rogelia Diaz-Duarte on October 17, 1979 was absolutely
simulated or fictitious.
IV
"The trial court erred in not declaring or finding that the deed of sale of the land in question executed
by Wilfredo Corregidor in favor of the spouses Ben S. Ong and Ethyl Y. Ong on February 28, 1981
as valid and legal.
V
"The trial court erred in not declaring or finding that Rogelia Diaz-Duarte was the sole heir of Macario
Diaz with respect to the property in question.
VI
"The trial court erred in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20338 of Ben S.
Ong and Ethyl Y. Ong of the land in question and the issuance of new transfer certificates of title to
Rogelia Diaz-Duarte and to the heirs of Trinidad Diaz Arteche for the three fourth (3/4) and one
fourth (1/4) portions of the land in litigation, respectively in their names by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City."

The appellate court sustained the fourth and sixth assigned errors of the appellant-spouses. It
awarded Lot 1208 to appellant-spouses Ben and Ethyl Ong after a finding that they were buyers in
good faith and for value.
Hence, this petition where Rogelia Diaz-Duarte contends:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SPOUSES ONG WERE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND IN
GOOD FAITH.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SPOUSES ONG WERE
BUYERS IN BAD FAITH.
III
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE WRONGFUL AND ILLEGAL
CANCELLATION OF PETITIONER'S ADVERSE CLAIM.
IV
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS LOST HER
RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The core issue is who between petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duarte and respondent spouses Ong, has a
better right over Lot 1208. Petitioner claims ownership over Lot 1208 on the basis of the deed of
repurchase between her and Wilfredo Corregidor. When the latter refused to surrender TCT No. T17501 to her, she caused to be annotated thereon a notice of adverse claim. On the other hand,
respondent spouses aver that they own Lot 1208, having bought the same from Corregidor without
knowledge of its encumbrance. They contend that petitioner's notice of adverse claim in
Corregidor's title, was already cancelled when they bought the property. Petitioner disputes the
legality of said cancellation. She maintains that the Registrar of Deeds should not have automatically
cancelled the notice of adverse claim simply because the 30-day period has lapsed.
We find for petitioner.
The good faith of appellant-spouses rests heavily on whether the notice of adverse claim on Lot
1208 was validly cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds. The issue is no longer of first impression. In
the 1996 case of Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,[5] we explained that a notice of adverse claim
remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period provided by Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree. Section 70 provides:

"Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree
for registering the same, make a statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,
and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
"The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and
a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration
as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest. Provided,
however that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant."
We explained in Sajonas that for as long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the notice of
adverse claim remains subsisting: Thus:
"At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to
thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read
in relation to the sentence following, which reads:
`After the lapse of said period, the annotation of the adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
verified petition therefor by the party in interest.'
"If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse
of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and
complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically
terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a
useless act."[6]
In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted. The hearing will
afford the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim.
[7]
Petitioner was unlawfully denied this opportunity when the Registrar of Deeds automatically
cancelled the adverse claim. Needless to state, the cancellation of her adverse claim is ineffective.
But this is not all. Appellant spouses alleged good faith is negated by the evidence on record. At
the trial court, respondent spouses declared that they retained Atty. Rufino Reyes to assist them in
buying Lot 1208. According to Atty. Reyes, his clients asked him to verify the status of the land from
the Register of Deeds. However, he failed to do so. Had he done so, he would have discovered the
adverse claim of the petitioner over the lot. He would have also known that the adverse claim was
cancelled by the Registrar on his own and not because any petition was made by any party-ininterest.[8]Respondent spouses are bound by the negligence of their lawyer.
Time and again, we have reiterated that a purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of

the claims or interest of some other person in the property.[9] The adverse claim of petitioner Rogelia
Diaz-Duarte was annotated in Corregidor's title as early as October 17, 1979. It was existing when
Corregidor sold the property to respondents Ong on February 28, 1981. Hence, respondent
spouses cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. Their claim over Lot
1208 must yield to the lien in favor of petitioner.[10]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 09598, is
REVERSED and the decision of the trial court is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123361. March 3, 1997]
TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN, respondentsappellees.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land situated in what
was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits of Military Reservation No. 43,
known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly tried and decided
by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho vs. Government of the United
States (28 Phil. 616 [1914]) the trial court made the following pronouncements:
Re: Case No. 6908
The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased by the applicant, Doa Demetria
Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel Salzos. The title of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in his
favor, executed and signed by a Moro woman named Alanga, who acted for her husband, a Moro
named Dorondon. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet and before
admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon be presented,
renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered that
the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels and
contains 37.87 hectares or more than 90 acres. This was purchased by the applicant from the Moro
Datto Bunglay.
Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance from his uncle Datto Anandog who
died without issue and the balance by his own possession and cultivation.
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by the Christian Filipinos. In the
Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of
the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro with all his family
could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in question.

The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land
occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object
of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is
denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for
the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes marking
the N.E., S.E., & N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned. It is further
ordered that one half of the costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by
the Government of the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the late Doa
Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title under Republic
Act 26, and docketed under the original GLRO Record No. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the Philippines, National Steel
Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and the NSC, the
lower court dismissed the petition because it found the evidence inadequate to show the prior
existence of the titles sought to be restored. The same order stated further that the proper remedy
was for the reconstitution of decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909,
Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were already issued. The same trial court specifically
found that since the decrees had, in fact, been issued, the judgment of this Court in Cacho vs.
U.S., supra, although by itself expressly dependent upon some conditions, must have indisputably
become final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit amended petition, but
this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon.
Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court,
ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees
under the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos
vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 (1968), and the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been
issued, the omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to
have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the amended petition
subject to the private respondents being given the opportunity to answer and to present their

defenses. The evidence already on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert
existing evidence shall be given the parties.
(p. 59, Rollo.)
Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one for re-issuance of the
decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the amended petition, respondents Republic of
the Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities;
that petitioner was not the real party in interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria
Cacho was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees covering the
properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance of the decrees
was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered its decision decreeing the
reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969. The pertinent portion of the said
decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for the issuance of the subject
decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18959 were issued in these LRC Cases
Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively, and that the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior
judgment that had already become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited pronouncements and
therefore these should now be considered final and conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), through its then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy
Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, all certified that
according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969
was issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No.
6908. (Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC Commissioner Santiago Kapunan in
compliance with an order of this Court, confirmed that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the
original petition for reconstitution have been regularly and properly done based on existing records;
that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have been issued and recorded in LRC's Record Book of Decrees;
that the plan and technical description of the lots involved were found to be correct, approved by the
LRC and transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and 63 in which this Court
affirmed the issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969 in the name of Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A. Arandilla, Deputy Clerk of Court of
the LRC which identified and validated the report of the LRC to this Court on the present petition,

(Exh. "M"), shows that the decrees registry of the LRC had recorded the fact and date of issuance of
Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in GLRO Rec. No. 6908 and 6909 and the approval of the plans and
corresponding technical descriptions of the lots involved in the aforesaid record numbers and
decrees (Exh. "T").
It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors' counsel, Arandilla produced for scrutiny
the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases, which contained therein the entries showing
that Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in Case No. 6908 and Decree No. 18969 was
issued on July 7, 1915 in Case No. 6909. (Exhs. "T", "P" and "19").
From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the existence of the decrees have been
established sufficiently and indubitably by the evidence submitted by the petitioner, and therefore,
said amended petition has to be granted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The amended petition is hereby granted and approved. Declaring Decrees No. 10364 and No.
18969 as reconstituted.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly
Land Registration Commission) to reissue Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869 existing at the LRC
Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases in the name of Demetria Cacho upon payment by the
petitioner of the required legal fees.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel Corporation in their joint brief assigned the
following errors:
The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho's amended petition for reconstitution of
decrees of registration purportedly issued in LRC Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Notwithstanding that

I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmities;

II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, that final
decision in LRC Cases 6908 and 6909 had been reserved pending compliance by the applicant
therein of certain conditions albeit, as of Date, No competent evidence exists showing compliance
with the imposed conditions and/or the rendition of a "final judgment" and/or the issuance of decrees
pursuant thereto;
III.The petition is barred by laches; and

IV.The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person and/or a party who does not have a lawful
interest in the case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial court erred:
1.
In giving due course to "Teofilo Cacho's" petition for reconstitution of titles when the same
is already barred by laches.
2.
In granting the amended petition for reconstitution when there is no proof that Teofilo
Cacho actually exists and is a real party in interest.
3.
In granting the amended petition for reconstitution even in the absence of sufficient proof
to the effect that land registration Decree Nos. 10364 & 18969 were indeed issued to Demetria
Cacho.
4.
In reopening the case despite the finality of the order dated 16 April 1979 dismissing the
original petition for reconstitution of title.
5.
In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land already owned by appellant City of Iligan
pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4 October 1965) which ownership was
affirmed by the Supreme Court on 26 February 1988 [City of Iligan versus Director of Lands, et al.,
158 SCRA 158].
(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings below and brushed aside
respondents' claim of jurisdictional infirmities. It also acknowledged the issuance and existence of
the registration decrees in favor of Demetria Cacho, to wit:
As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 were
issued in GLRO Record No. 6908 and GLRO Record No. 6909, on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915,
respectively, according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case. Then
Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of
the Supreme Court), submitted a Manifestation, dated November 2, 1978, in compliance with an
order at the lower court, confirming that the plan and technical description of the land involving both
Lots 1 and 2 were correct, that said lots are decreed properties, and that all the proceedings
undertaken by the LRC were regularly done based on existing records.
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed
the petition for re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, with prejudice, for the following
reasons:

First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government of the United States on
December 10, 1914, now appearing in 28 Phil. 617, regarding GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909,
denied in part and granted in part the application for adjudication and registration of the two parcels
of land of Demetria Cacho, appellee's predecessor-in-interest. Final decision on the cases was
reserved pending compliance with conditions set forth therein.
1.) Re: Case 6908, "x x x before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from
Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No.
6908" (28 Phil. 629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger
of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares . . . (28 Phil. 619). The court therefore finds that the
applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the
deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only;
and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On
the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for the
purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog . . . with previous notice to the
applicant and her husband and representative Seor Vidal. Having arrived late, Seor Vidal did not
assist in the ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and
N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630);
"And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned . . ." (28
Phil. 630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in the Manifestation dated
November 2, 1978 of the Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission and the plan
submitted by Demetria Cacho in Case No. 6909 are the same as to the area, which is 37.87
hectares, and as to the date of approval, which is November 15, 1910. Since the Supreme Court
decision in Cacho vs. US "ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points
mentioned"; that applicant Demetria Cacho is owner only of the portion of land occupied and planted
by the deceased Datto Anandog; and that her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in
case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new survey, if it was made, must have a smaller area and
a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO No. 6909, re-issuance of
the decree cannot be made in the absence of the "new survey" on which to base the area and
technical description of the parcel of land in Case No. 6909.
Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property through continuous adverse
possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however,
may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of
laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a.

any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to act earlier;

b.
that they were misled by appellee's inaction into believing that appellee would not assert the
right on which he bases his suit;
c.
the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to them in the event that relief is
accorded to the appellee or that the suit is not held barred; and
d.

that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property covered by the decree.

The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever
classification belong to the state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless the contrary is shown, are
presumed to be public lands, under the principle that all "lands belong to the Crown which have not
been granted by (the King), or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that he is a real party interest. To
qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present petition because
allegedly, the Court of Appeals decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with the law
and applicable decisions of this Court:
First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a reopening of Decree Nos. 10364
and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively, when it required proof of
compliance with conditions for their issuance. These conditions are conclusively presumed to have
been complied with before the original decrees were issued and can no longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing doctrines pronounced in
Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when
it applied laches as a bar to the reissuance of decrees.
Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this Honorable Court when it
applied laches despite the total absence of proof to establish the requisite elements for its
application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the "Regalian doctrine" to dispense with
proof of the essential elements of laches.
Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility to uphold the stability and
integrity of the Torrens system.
Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on the identity and existence of
petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed by wild and gratuitous allusions to the contrary.

(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed their respective memoranda,
we shall now resolve the case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon
and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches, irrespective of
whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have
appeared and filed an answer to said application, because all persons are considered as notified by
the publication required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on
the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or
decided in the land registration proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then Land
Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished member
of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of
Registration, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that decrees
of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that such
decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to
once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs. U.S. would be
tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from
the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action would definitely run counter
to the very purpose of the Torrens System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the
conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res judicata.
Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the
issuance of such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission
(now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment
in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in
GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on
or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO
Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10,
1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued
on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would
render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule
regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the judgment and the resulting decree are res
judicata, and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of
proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and
stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.

As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that laches
cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason therefor may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla
(1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act to
enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had
been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a
decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to
be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a
ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission ...
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuver (25 SCRA 316 [1968]) that a final
decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations
nor by laches. This was reiterated in Vda. De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being a real party in interest,
records show that petitioner has sufficiently established his existence and identity as well as his legal
interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the property in question were
adjudicated in favor of petitioner under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series of 1985 of the Consulate
General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was
published in the Times Journal. Petitioner also appeared personally before Vice Consul Stephen V.
David of the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent him in this
case.
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a
presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden
of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to
petitioner by merely casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting
preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply
in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of
the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering oath being of itself a
performance of duty by a public official.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of
Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its
LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122181. June 26, 1998]
JOSE A. LINZAG and the HEIRS of CRISTOBAL A. LINZAG, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial
Court, Branch IV, Mati, Davao Oriental, PATRICIO S. CUNANAN, ORLANDO
SALVADOR, MANUEL P. BLANCO, JR., JOSE MANUEL SERRANO and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS of Mati, Davao Oriental, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
May a party aggrieved by a judgment of a cadastral court and who subsequently
obtains an unfavorable judgment in an action to annul the original certificate of title
issued pursuant to the former, and then loses both in the Court of Appeals and in
this Court in the appeal from the latter, be allowed to file with the Court of Appeals
an action to annul the judgment of the cadastral court? The Court of Appeals
resolved the issue in the negative on the ground of res judicata. Hence, this special
civil action of certiorari.
We affirm the Court of Appeals not only because of absence of grave abuse of
discretion, but likewise because an action for annulment of judgment was no longer
available. Moreover, the instant special action was not the proper remedy against
the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals.
As gathered from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the
pleadings of the parties, the following are the material facts in this case:
Petitioners Jose A. Linzag and the heirs of Cristobal A. Linzag are members of the
non-Christian tribe known as the Kalagan tribe of Mati, Davao Oriental. Jose and
Cristobal claim to have inherited from their deceased parents, Datu Joaquin Linzag
and Regina Agustino, a parcel of land, otherwise known as Waniban Island,
designated as Lot No. 1222 of the Mati Cadastre, with an area of 36,575 square
meters, more or less.[1]
At the cadastral proceeding (CAD CASE No. N-16, LRC Cad. Record N-326) involving
Lot No. 1222 before the then Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental sitting in Mati,
Davao Oriental, Cristobal Linzag filed his claim over said Lot. Another claimant, one
Patricio Cunanan, likewise filed a claim.
On 26 July 1971, one Orlando L. Salvador filed a motion [2] to award Lot No. 1222, as
an uncontested lot, in his favor. He alleged therein that he had acquired the rights
of Patricio Cunanan for sufficient consideration and that the other claimant,

Cristobal Linzag, had withdrawn his answer/claim in favor of Patricio Cunanan and/or
his successors-in-interest, thereby making said lot as a non-contested lot. At the
hearing of the motion, which was not opposed by the Director of Lands, then
represented by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Salvador offered in evidence the
following: (a) a Deed of Absolute Sale of Hereditary Rights Over an Unregistered
Land covering Lot No. 1222 executed on 29 December 1970 [3] by Patricio S.
Cunanan, Avelina C. Salazar, Elena C. Abayari, Igualdad Cunanan, Diosdado
Cunanan, Lakandula Cunanan, Josefina C. Sibala as vendors and Orlando L. Salvador
as vendee; and (b) a verified Withdrawal of Claim/Answer dated 13 July
1971[4] signed by Cristobal and Jose Linzag and executed in favor of Patricio
Cunanan and/or his successors-in-interests.
On 10 August 1971, the cadastral court, on the basis of the foregoing, issued an
Order[5] declaring that Salvador and his predecessors-in-interests had been in
peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of Lot No. 1222, in
concept of an owner for a period of at least 30 years; that Salvador was the
successor-in-interest of original claimant Patricio S. Cunanan; and that the lot was a
non-contested lot. The court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby adjudicates Lot No. 1222,
together with all its improvements thereon, in favor of:
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, of legal age, Filipino, married to Jovita B. Ramos-Salvador,
a resident of Paraaque, Rizal.
The Land Registration Commissioner is hereby directed to issue the corresponding
decree of registration for said Lot No. 1222, as soon as this Order becomes final and
executory.
After the Order became final, the cadastral court issued an Order [6] directing
issuance of the decree of registration.
In due time, Decree No. N-137262 was issued. Then on 13 October 1971, pursuant
to said Decree, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-2039 [7] covering Lot No. 1222
was issued in the name of Orlando L. Salvador.
On 4 February 1977, petitioners herein filed an action for annulment of title and
reconveyance with damages[8] against private respondents Patricio Cunanan and
Orlando Salvador before the Court of First instance of Mati, Davao Oriental
(docketed as Civil Case No. 571).
On 10 June 1977, petitioners filed an amended complaint [9] wherein they
alleged, inter alia, that they and their predecessors-in-interests had been in actual,
lawful, peaceful, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession and occupation of
the land since the Spanish regime up to the present; the lot was ancestral land of
the Linzags; the lot had been included in a prior land registration case filed by

Patricio Cunanan which was decided against him, with the land registration court
holding that the land was part of the public domain, which decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals on 19 November 1960 in CA-G.R. No. 19594-B; that in the
cadastral proceedings, specifically on 13 July 1971 and after the effectivity of said
decision of the Court of Appeals, Patricio Cunanan, with the aid and participation of
his son-in-law, Atty. Galileo Sibala, procured, through fraud, the signatures of Jose
and Cristobal Linzag on a document which turned out to be a withdrawal of their
claim to Lot No. 1222 by representing to them that it was a deed of mortgage over
the lot in consideration of P3,000.00; and thereafter, Cunanan, together with the
heirs of his deceased wife, sold the lot to Orlando Salvador for the sum
of P25,000.00. Petitioners further alleged that both the withdrawal of claim and
deed of absolute sale were notarized by Atty. Sibala; on the basis of the deed of sale
in his favor, Salvador filed a motion with the cadastral court to adjudicate the lot in
his favor as an uncontested lot; that the cadastral court granted the motion and as
a consequence thereof, OCT No. 0-2039 was issued in Salvadors name; and that it
was only on 14 May 1974 that petitioners discovered the fraud. They then prayed
for judgment directing the Register of Deeds of Davao Oriental to issue a certificate
of title in petitioners names, and ordering defendants to pay moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and transportation expenses.
In its decision[10] dated 14 February 1984, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No.
571 because the action [was] improper and that the claim of plaintiffs have not
been duly substantiated by them. The court likewise ruled that plaintiffs therein
were not the true owners of the property; plaintiffs failed to prove extrinsic fraud;
there was no evidence that Salvador was a buyer in bad faith; and that the action
was filed beyond the prescriptive period.
Petitioners appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals (Eighth Division) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 03329. In its decision[11] of 25 July 1989, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners thereafter appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 89441. In the resolution [12] of 2 October 1989, this Court
(First Division) denied the petition for late filing and decreed that the judgment
sought to be reviewed has now become final and executory.
Meanwhile, on 9 November 1993, Original Certificate of Title No. O-2039 was
cancelled and the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Davao Oriental issued a
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16604[13] in the name of Manuel P. Blanco, Jr. and
Jose Manuel Serrano.
Undaunted by the foregoing adverse events, on 5 December 1994, petitioners filed
with the Court of Appeals, a petition[14] for the annulment of judgment of the then
Court of First Instance of Mati, Davao Oriental in CAD. CASE No. N-16, LRC Cad.
Record No. N-326 concerning Lot No. 1222 (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

35877). Impleaded as respondents were the presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Mati, Davao Oriental, which succeeded the former Court of First Instance
that decided the cadastral case, herein private respondents Patricio Cunanan,
Orlando Salvador, Manuel Blanco, Jr., Jose Manuel Serrano and the Register of Deeds
of Davao Oriental.
In its decision[15] of 28 February 1995, public respondent Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for being barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. 571, i.e., on ground
of res judicata. The appellate courts extensive discussion[16] on this issue deserves
to be quoted, thus:
On the issue of res judicata, the private respondent point [sic] to the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental in Civil Case 571 affirmed by this Court in
CA G.R. CV. 03329. It was argued that this previous case involved the same parties,
subject matter and cause of action as this instant petition, and is, therefore, a bar to
this petition.
An action is barred by a former judgment if (1) the former judgment is final; (2) the
court which rendered it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
it must be a judgment on the merits; (4) there must be, between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
An examination of the records show [sic] that the first three requirements for the
application of the doctrine of res judicata are present in this case.
The petitioners themselves related in their petition that they had instituted a
complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages against the
private respondents, Salvador and Cunanan. The complaint was dated 10 June
1977 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 571 of the then Court of First Instance of
Davao Oriental.
On 14 February 1984, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the
petitioners dismissing their complaint and ordering them to pay Orlando Salvador
P5,000.00 and Patricio Cunanan, P2,000.00 by way of litigation expenses and
attorneys fees (see Decision, Annex J, Petition; Rollo, pp. 50-68).
The judgment was affirmed by this Court in CA G.R. No. 03329 (Jose A. Linzag, et.
[sic] al. vs. Patricio Cunan, et. [sic] al.) in a decision rendered on 25 July 1989 (see
copy of Decision; Annex K, Petition; Rollo, pp. 69-74).
The petition for review with the Supreme Court was not filed within the extension
period granted to the petitioners. Thus, on 2 October 1989 the Supreme Court
issued a Resolution stating that no appeal was taken on time by the petitioners and
the judgment had already become final and executory (Annex L, Petition; Rollo, p.
75).

The judgment in Civil Case 571 (i.e., the annulment case) having already become
final as pronounced in the Supreme Court Resolution, the first requirement for the
application of res judicata is, therefore, present.
The Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental undoubtedly has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The parcel of land in question is located within the
province and as such, lies within the territorial jurisdiction of said court. No
question on the jurisdiction of the trial court over the parties appears to have been
raised.
The judgment was on the merits as it was rendered after a determination of which
party is right and was not merely based on a preliminary or technical issue (see
Santos vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 238, 245-246). A reading of the
decision of the trial court shows that it was based on matters of substance and not
merely on technical points.
There is also an identity between the parties in this petition and that in Civil Case
571. The petitioners in this case, Jose Linzag and the Heirs of Cristobal Linzag are
likewise the plaintiffs in Civil Case 571. The defendants in Civil Case 571 are also
the private respondents in this case. The inclusion of Manuel Serrano and Jose
Manuel Blanco as private respondents does not affect the identity of the parties as
these two are successors-in-interest of original defendant Orlando Salvador.
The subject matter between the two cases are also identical. It is the parcel of land
known as Waniban Island in Mati, Davao Oriental and the certificate of title covering
such property.
The issue is whether or not there is an identity in the causes of action between this
petition and Civil Case No. 571.
The test generally applied in determining whether causes of action are identical as
to warrant the application of the doctrine of res judicata is to consider whether
there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions or
whether the same evidence will sustain both. This is regardless [of whether] the
form or nature of the two actions are different. If the same facts or evidence can
sustain either, the two actions are considered the same so that the judgment in one
is [a] bar to the other. If, however, the two actions rest upon two different state
[sic] of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a
judgment in one is not a bar to the maintenance of the other (Nabus vs. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732; Aroc vs. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, 81
SCRA 350; Pagsisihan vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 540).
In this petition, the petitioners claim for nullity of judgment and their argument of
lack of notice to them in the cadastral case [is] essentially based on allegations of
fraud. As narrated earlier, the petitioners also alleged that the documents
submitted by the private respondents to support their application for registration

were fraudulent. They further alleged that the withdrawal of claim filed in their
behalf in the cadastral case was procured through fraud.
It is, however, clear from the complaint and the decision in Civil Case 571, attached
to this petition, that these issues have already been raised by the petitioners and
passed upon by the trial court. This can be shown by the following excerpts of the
decision of the Court of First Instance.
In any case, even granting arguendo that plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property before 1945, it would appear that at the
time of the filing of the action, they had no more right [to] the property. The main
thrust of plaintiffs assault on the validity of defendant Orlando Salvador is that the
waiver of claim is null and void, did not reflect truly the intention of the parties.
An examination of the testimonies of the two (2) witnesses for the plaintiffs, Jose
Linzag and Salvacion vda. De Linzag, who were twice presented as witnesses will
show that plaintiffs were not able to successfully substantiate their claim on the
invalidity of said withdrawal of answer or claim. Nothing was said in their
testimonies as would support the contention that the said instrument was not
validly executed.
xxx
On the second requirement, that the land must be wrongfully registered through
fraud, it is clear from jurisprudence that the fraud in securing title must be actual
fraud and must be proven and that the said fraud must be extrinsic. It is clear that
as earlier discussed, plaintiffs failed to prove any actual fraud. The alleged fraud
plaintiffs claimed is not extrinsic fraud, granting that fraud was committed. xxx (See
CFI Decision, pp. 10, 15; Rollo, pp. 59, 64)
Notably also, the underlying objective or relief sought in this petition and in the
earlier case are essentially the same. It is the nullification of the land title in the
name of the private respondents and the adjudication of the land in question to the
petitioners.
The only difference is the form and nature of the two actions; while the earlier
complaint is for the annulment of the land title, this present petition is for the
nullification of the judgment upon which the title sought to nullified (sic) in the first
case was issued.
It is readily apparent, therefore, that were this petition to be given due course, the
same evidence or set of facts as that considered by the Court of First Instance in the
annulment case, Civil Case 571, will be also be [sic] considered in this
petition. Applying then the test earlier discussed, this court finds that the causes of
action in Civil Case 571 and in this petition are the same as to warrant the
application of the doctrine of res judicata.

In sum, we find that all the requirements for the application of res judicata are
present in this case. This petition should, therefore, be dismissed. The difference in
the form of the actions instituted is immaterial. The petitioners may not escape the
effect of the doctrine by merely varying the form of his [sic] action (Filinvest Credit
Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 59, 63; Sangalang vs.
Caparas, 151 SCRA 53; Ibabao vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 76, 85).
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity in
them in law or estate. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end
to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly
adjudicated (Ibabao vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at p. 85; Sangalang vs.
Caparas, supra, at p. 59).
As this petition is already barred by the judgment in Civil Case 571, We see no other
course of action but to resolve to dismiss this petition.
Their motion for reconsideration[17] and supplemental motion for
reconsideration[18] having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution [19] of
3 October 1995, on the ground that there existed no new and cogent ground to
warrant reversal or modification, petitioners filed the instant special action
for certiorari with mandamus, raising the following issues:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CAN DENY DUE
COURSE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS
THAT THERE WAS AN EARLIER CASE FOR NULLIFICATION OF TITLE BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT;
(2) WHETHER OR NOT A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TITLE FILED
AND DISMISSED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS A BAR (RES JUDICATA) TO THE
FILING OF A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF AN LRC CASE RENDRED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SITTING AS A
CADASTRAL COURT;
(3) WHETHER OF NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CAN DENY DUE
COURSE TO A VALID PETITION ORIGINALLY FILED BEFORE IT MERELY BECAUSE A
CASE FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE WAS ALREADY FILED AND DECIDED BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT;
(4) WHETHER OR NOT PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF WHICH THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS THE SAME AS A
PETITION FOR NULLITY OF TITLE WHICH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION.

(5) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE
EVEN BEFORE RECEIVING EVIDENCE AND WITHOUT DETERMINING THE ACTUAL
MERITS OF THE PETITION FILED FOR THE ANNULMENT OF A PATENTLY NULL AND
VOID JUDGMENT.
Petitioners contend that the decision in Civil Case No. 571, an action for annulment
of title and reconveyance with damages, does not constitute res judicata to bar the
instant petition for annulment of judgment. Petitioners further insist that the 10
August 1971 decision of the cadastral court is void for violation of due process and
extrinsic fraud, stressing that a void judgment never acquires finality and is subject
to collateral attack. Petitioners underscore that in the proceedings before the
cadastral court they were not informed of the dates of hearing, and as a result, were
unable to hire the services of counsel. Thus if they had been afforded their day in
court, they could have proved possession of the land for the required number of
years that would have entitled them to ownership thereof; and that private
respondents procured spurious documents showing a waiver of petitioners claim
over the disputed property. Moreover, petitioners were not furnished a copy of the
trial courts decision. Finally, petitioners contend that the transfer of the land title
to private respondents Blanco and Serrano, who failed to verify true ownership of
the land, was part of Salvadors fraudulent schemes and strategies to deprive
petitioners of an opportunity to recover the land.
Cunanans comment[20] filed on 12 January 1996 does not meet squarely the
substantive issues raised by petitioners and, instead, interposes the following
defenses: (1) he is not a party-in-interest, having sold all his rights over the subject
property to Orlando Salvador; (2) Galileo Sibala has not appeared as counsel on
behalf of the other respondents; (3) there is no new and cogent reason to disturb
the 28 February 1995 decision as the allegations in the petition are a mere rehash
of the issues already passed upon by respondent Court of Appeals; and (4) the
petition fails to show that petitioners motion for reconsideration was filed within the
reglementary period.
In their comment filed on 4 October 1996, respondents Manuel P. Blanco, Jr. and Jose
Manuel Serrano contend that: (1) petitioners were not denied due process since
they were afforded ample opportunity to present their side of the controversy; (2)
the trial courts finding on the issue of possession and extrinsic fraud must be
accorded great weight and respect, if not finality, on appeal; (3)the transfer
certificate of title evidencing their ownership over the land has become
incontrovertible and indefeasible; (4) they are purchasers in good faith and for value
and may safely rely on what appears on the face of the title; (5) the instant petition
is barred by res judicata; and (7) there is no showing that respondent Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it refused to give due course to the
petition.

Petitioners filed separate replies to the comments of Cunanan and Blanco and
Serrano.
In his manifestation filed on 20 September 1996, counsel for private respondent
Cunanan informed the Court that Cunanan died on 8 April 1996, and on 20
November 1996, said counsel submitted the names and addresses of the heirs of
Cunanan. Upon motion of petitioners, to which the other parties submitted their
comment, the Court granted, on 2 July 1997, petitioners motion to substitute the
heirs of Cunanan for the latter.
The Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their memoranda, which petitioners and respondents Serrano and Blanco did
on 4 September 1997 and 26 August 1997, respectively. The parties likewise filed
reply memoranda.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Respondent Court of Appeals did not err, much less, commit grave abuse of
discretion, in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 on ground of res judicata.
Paragraph (b) of Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
was likewise Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the 1964 Rules of Court, enshrines the
doctrine of res judicata:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgment or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for
the same thing under the same title and in the same capacity
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity which makes it to the interest
of the State that there should be an end to litigation - republicae ut sit litium, and
(2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause
nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the
public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer gratification
of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquility and happiness.[21]

The requisites of res judicata are: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2)
the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be,
between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. [22]
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, to wit: (1) the effect of a judgment as a
bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action; and (2) preclude relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. [23] As earlier
shown, the Court of Appeals convincingly demonstrated that the decision in Civil
Case No. 571 of the Court of First Instance of Mati, Davao Oriental operates to bar,
on the ground of res judicata, the case for annulment of judgment -- CA-G.R. SP No.
35877. As stated earlier, the decision in Civil Case No. 571 dismissed petitioners
complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages; and, in effect,
affirmed the judgment of the cadastral court. The judgment in Civil Case No. 571
was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 03329,
while a petition to review the latter was denied by this Court in G.R. No. 89441.
The claim of petitioners that the judgment in Civil Case No. 571 does not bar CAG.R. SP No. 35877 because the former was for annulment of title only, while the
latter was for annulment of the judgment, is palpably unmeritorious. There is here
a clear case of hair-splitting. It is settled that a party cannot evade or avoid the
application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case. [24] This is as good a time as any to remind
lawyers that any attempt to do so merits the Courts condemnation for being an
abuse or misuse of the rules of procedure.
We stress in this connection that petitioners may have resorted to the filing of Civil
Case No. 571 because they had lost the right to file a petition for review. It is
settled that a party deprived of his property in a cadastral proceeding may file
within one (1) year from entry of the decree, a petition for review. After the lapse of
said period, if the property has not yet passed on to an innocent purchaser for
value, an action for reconveyance may still be filed by the aggrieved party. [25] An
action for reconveyance attacks not only the judgment of the cadastral court; it
likewise seeks confirmation by the court of plaintiffs title to the land.
Another more telling reason why CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 should be dismissed was
that the remedy of annulment of judgment allowed in Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129
was no longer available to petitioners. Such is available only where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of petitioners. [26] Here, petitioners had, in fact,
availed of an action for reconveyance where they litigated the grounds for
annulment of judgment. There would be no end to litigations if parties who have
unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their
fault would still be heard in an action to annul the judgment.

A final word before ending.

The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an
action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court (or of its predecessor the Court
of First Instance) is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, where only
questions of law may be raised. Petitioners, however, have availed of the special
civil action for certiorari andmandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. No
special reasons exist in this case to justify resort to Rule 65. Of course, every
lawyer should be familiar with the obvious distinctions [27]between a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 and an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. For one, that under Rule 45 is a continuation of the
judgment complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent
action.[28] It is likewise settled that, generally, the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 will not be allowed as a substitute for failure to timely file
a petition for review under Rule 45[29] or for the lost remedy of appeal.[30]
The wrong choice of remedy thus provides another reason to dismiss this petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35877
is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 124605 June 18, 1999

ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and RAFAELA RASING, respondents.

PARDO, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals, 1 which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan, 2 declaring respondents
as the absolute and lawful owners of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 139 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenza, all surnamed
Fontanilla. Rosa married Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and Paciencia.
Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and they had a daughter, petitioner Amparo Rasca (married to
Enriquito Serna). Jose had a son, respondent Santiago Fontanilla (married to Rafaela Rasing).
Hence, the parties involved are first cousins.
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a parcel of land, containing an area of
twelve thousand five hundred eight square meters (12,508 sq. m.), located in Barangay Lucap,
Alaminos, Pangasinan. 3
In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation purposes. In the same year, Turner Land
Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the agreement that the cost of
survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Bureau of Lands. On March 2, 1923, the
Bureau of Lands approved the survey plan.
In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio Fontanilla sold the
land to his daughter, Rosa Fontanilla. In 1939, Rosa began paying the real estate property tax
thereon.

On August 21, 1955, for a consideration of one thousand seven hundred pesos (P1,700.00), Rosa
sold the land to her nephew, respondent Santiago Fontanilla, evidenced by a notarized deed of
absolute sale, signed by Rosa. The instrument was not registered.
In 1955, respondents constructed their house of strong materials on the lot in question, which was
completed in 1957.
On December 16, 1957, Rosa's heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two (2) children, Fructoso and
Paciencia, executed another deed of absolute sale over the same land in favor of respondent
Santiago Fontanilla.
In 1978, respondents went to the United States to visit their daughter Mila Fontanilla Borillo. They
stayed there until 1981.
On December 20, 1978, talking advantage of respondents' absence from the country, petitioners
Enriquito and Amparo Serna applied to the land registration court of Pangasinan for registration 4 of
the said parcel of land in their name.
In 1979, the land registration court approved the application, and pursuant to Decree N-176768, the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to petitioners. On
January 10, 1980, the title was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
On May 27, 1981, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XIII, Alaminos,
Pangasinan, an action for reconveyance with damages, and sought the annulment of O.C.T. No.
139. 5
In the trial court, petitioners admitted that Dionisio Fontanilla originally owned the land in dispute.
However, they claimed that in 1978 they bought the property for three thousand pesos (P3,000.00)
from Lorenza Fontanilla-Rasca. Lorenza, in turn, traced her title from her husband, Alberto Rasca.
Petitioner Amparo said that when Dionisio failed to pay the survey costs in 1921, Turner Land
Surveying Company took the property in question as payment for services. Her father, Alberto
Rasca, redeemed the property from Turner evidenced by a deed of sale, which, however, Amparo
could not produce in court. When her father died, Santiago Fontanilla borrowed from her mother the
deed covering the transfer of the property, which Santiago did not return. She said that the property
was first declared in Alberto's name for taxation purposes in 1951. Later, the property was ceded to
her.
After due trial and consideration of the evidence presented before the trial court and in the land
registration case, on June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (herein
respondents) spouses Santiago Fontanilla and Rafaela Rasing, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute and legal owners of the land in question
particularly described and bounded and stated in paragraph two (2) of the complaint;
(b) Ordering the defendants to Transfer and Recover [sic] Original Certificate of Title
No. 139 to the plaintiffs;
(c) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees;
(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
(e) And to pay the costs, without pronouncement as to moral damages.
Done at Alaminos, Pangasinan, this 5th day of August, 1992
(t/s)
Vivenci
o A.
Bantug
an
Judge 6
From the decision of the trial court, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents
questioned the court a quo's failure to grant their claim for moral damages. On the other hand,
petitioners claimed that the trial court committed serious error in the appreciation of facts and
application of law and jurisprudence.
On August 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the trial court.
In a resolution dated February 26, 1996, 7 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners submit these issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the appealed decision is supported
by evidence; (2) whether or not the decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence. 8
The first issue is factual, which we cannot review on appeal. 9 However, petitioners make an issue of
the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the one who presided over the proceedings.
"We have ruled in People vs. Rayray, 10 that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not
himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to
jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void. While it is true that the
trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the

testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance does not
violate substantive and procedural due process." 11

As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and
we will not normally disturb such factual findings. This is because in an appeal by certiorari to this
Court, only questions of law may be raised. 12 And "for a question to be one of law it must involve no
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them." 13 "To
reiterate the distinction between the two types of questions: there is a question of law in a given case
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is
a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 14
Petitioners claim ownership of the land based on the deed of sale executed by Turner Land
Surveying Co. in favor of Alberto Rasca, which, however, they failed to present in court. The truth or
falsity of this claim is a question of fact, which, as aforesaid, is not reviewable in this appeal.
On the other hand, respondents proved that they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse
possession of the property for more than sixty (60) years tacking in the possession of their
predecessors in interest, Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa Pajaro. As early as 1921, Dionisio Fontanilla
was in adverse possession and paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes for the first time
in 1939, 15 while respondents began paying taxes in 1967. 16They had their residential house built in 1955,
which was completed in 1957. In 1980, Santiago executed a tenancy agreement 17 with Sixto Fontanilla.
Until 1984, Santiago paid the taxes together with his tenant Sixto.
1wphi1.nt

Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the declarant, 18 tax
declarations and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession
for a period sufficient for prescription. 19
Going to the second issue that the appellate court's decision is not supported by law and
jurisprudence, we find this to be vague and without merit as well.
At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended.
Later, Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended and codified laws
relative to registration of property. "Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree." 20 After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to
reopening or review.
However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law 21 as a valid and legal basis for
reopening and revising a decree of registration.
The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional
omission of a fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or
collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of

their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of
registration. 22
"An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This means that
petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon
the alleged fraudulent registration of the property." 23 Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have
taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title "because registration of real property is considered
a "constructive notice to all persons" and it shall be counted "from the time of such registering, filing or
entering." 24
In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to the land sometime
after its registration, however, an innocent purchaser for value had not acquired the property.
Extrinsic fraud attended the application for the land registration. It was filed when respondents were
out of the country and they had no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their
name.
Fortunately, respondents' action for reconveyance was timely, as it was filed within ten (10) years
from the issuance of the torrens title over the property. 25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922.
No costs.

1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994

ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN, respondents.
Bautista, Salva, Arrieta, Salva for petitioner.
Arthem Maceda Potian for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1993, which dismissed the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
CV Nos. 28391-92.
I
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land located at Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to
private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee. The latter, the brother of petitioner Ong
Ching Po, died in January 1983; while petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986. The said sale
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the document was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9260
dated September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent.
According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to petitioner
Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded
that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate
the said premises.
On March 19, 1984, private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong
Ching Po before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26. The inferior court dismissed her
case. The dismissal was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court was, in turn, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. The
decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the
said parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale
written in Chinese with the letter head "Sincere Trading Co." (Exh. "B"). An English translation of said
document (Exh. "C") read as follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a
lot located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square
meters including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the
sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by me and
consequently I have executed and signed the government registered title (sic) the
said lot inclusive of the house erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po
unequivocally. And the purpose of this document is to precisely serve as proof of the
sale.
Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another
document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of
Ong Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the City

Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the
truthfulness of this fact.
Lot
Seller:
Ong
Joi
Jong
(Exhibits for the plaintiff, p. 4)
On December 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his
children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Ong Joi Jong to private
respondent in 1947. On December 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy Ong and David Ong
filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 53, Manila, docketed as Case No. 85-33962.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title against petitioners Ong Ching
Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No.
86-36818. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with Civil Case No.
85-33962. On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. On
appeal by petitioners to the Court of Appeals, the said court affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court.
Hence, this petition.
II
According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") in favor of private
respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh. "B" and its translation, Exh. "C") in
favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and
private respondent (Rollo, pp. 17-18).
As stated by petitioners themselves, what is in dispute ". . . is not so much as to which between
Exhibit "A" and "Exhibit "B" is more weighty, but whether this document is what it purports to be (i.e.,
a deed of conveyance in favor of Soledad Parian [private respondent] or it was only resorted to or
executed as a subterfuge because the real buyer (Ong Ching Po) was an alien and it was agreed
upon between Ong Ching Po and his brother (Ong Yee, Soledad Parian's husband) that the land be
registered in the name of Soledad Parian in order to avoid legal complications and to facilitate

registration and transfer and that the said title would be transferred by Soledad to Ong Ching Po or
his successors-in-interest and that she would be holding the title in trust for him" (Rollo, pp. 19-20).
We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as
a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he
was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention
would be giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.
Assuming that Exhibit "B" is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners cannot claim
ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands in the public domain.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands in the public domain.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities
"qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines 439440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition, exploitation, development
and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines" for
Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands;
hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "B" has been
established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.
On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in favor of private
respondent (Exh. "A") is a notarized document.

To remove the mantle of validity bestowed by law on said document, petitioners claim that private
respondent admitted that she did not pay anything as consideration for the purported sale in her
favor. In the same breath, petitioners said that private respondent implied in her deposition that it
was her husband who paid for the property. It appears, therefore, that the sale was financed out of
conjugal funds and that it was her husband who handled the transaction for the purchase of the
property. Such transaction is a common practice in Filipino-family affairs.
It is not correct to say that private respondent never took possession of the property. Under the law,
possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article
1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred." If what petitioners meant was that private
respondent never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her family had
settled in Iloilo.
There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po as
trustor and private respondent as trustee. Not even Exhibit "B" can be considered as such a
document because private respondent, the registered owner of the property subject of said "deed of
sale," was not a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust will not
suffice. Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "No express trust concerning an
immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence."
Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing, they can prove an
implied trust orally. While an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, because
such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated (Salao v. Salao, 70 SCRA 65 [1976]). It cannot be
made to rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (Cf.
De Leon v. Molo-Peckson, et al., 116 Phil. 1267 [1962]). Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee was
not in a financial position to acquire the land and to introduce the improvements thereon. On the
other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that
Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.
The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit "B" and its translation, Exhibit "C",
because these documents had not been properly authenticated.
Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution
and lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by
a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of the
witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But
prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss;

contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar,
218 SCRA 602 [1993]).
Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale,
Exhibit "B".
The due execution of the document may be established by the person or persons who executed it;
by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or by any person who was present and
saw it executed or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to
whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof (De Vera v.
Aguilar, supra).
Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was executed, but the
trial court rejected her claim and held:
If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely as
a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was
married only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City
where she apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was executed. The Court
does not believe that she was present during the execution and signing of the deed
of sale involved therein, notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary (Decision p.
6, Records p. 414).
As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts, deed of
sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were in their possession, private respondent explained
that she and her husband entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.
As observed by the Court of Appeals:
We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of
dominion, as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them
pursuant to his appointment or employment (Rollo,
p. 10).
It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her husband.
The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001]
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D. ALOVERA, * Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Roxas City, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS
CITY, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS,* respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case under consideration is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals nullifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928,
[2]
pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389.
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion,
Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a
Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designated as
Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue
and Pavia Street, Roxas City.[3]
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against
the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. [4] The plaintiffs assailed the validity
of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private
agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme
Court ruled thus:
granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to the vendee, it does not necessarily
follow therefrom that the title remained in the vendor, who had also violated the constitutional
prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by
his act in ignoring the prohibition. In such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the
equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration,
that of pari delicto.[5]
On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, together with Francisco, Carmen,
Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Rizal, Jimmy, and Jesse Dinglasan
filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action for recovery of the same parcel of land. [6] Citing
the case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She,[7] they submitted that the sale to Lee Liong
was null and void for being violative of the Constitution. On September 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee
Liong filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata.[8] On
October 10, 1968, and November 9, 1968, the trial court denied the motion. [9] The heirs of Lee Liong
elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. On April 22, 1977, the Supreme

Court annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to dismiss the case, holding that the suit
was barred by res judicata.[10]
On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Register of Deeds of Roxas City.[11] Petitioners alleged
that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of
Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. Lee Liong died intestate in February 1944. On June 30, 1947, Lee
Liongs widow, Ang Chia, and his two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee Bing Ho, executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lee Liong, adjudicating to themselves the subject parcel of land.
[12]
Petitioner Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in Lot No. 398 through an extra-judicial settlement
and donation executed in her favor by her deceased husband Lee Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita Yu
Lee acquired her share in the same lot by succession from her deceased husband Lee Bun Ting, as
evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial settlement.[13]
Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds, Capiz, Salvador Villaluz, issued a
certification that a transfer certificate of title over the property was issued in the name of Lee Liong.
[14]
However, the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. Thus, as
heretofore stated, on September 7, 1968, petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of title.
On June 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, ordered the reconstitution of the
lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approved plan and
technical description.[15] The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads thus:
WHEREFORE, in reiteration, the Register of Deeds for the City of Roxas is ordered to reconstitute
the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong, deceased, of Roxas City, with all the
conditions stated in paragraph 2 of this decision. This decision shall become final after the lapse of
thirty (30) days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of LRA of a notice of
such judgment without any appeal having been filed by any of such officials.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Roxas City, Philippines,
June 10, 1994.
JOSE O. ALOVERA
Judge[16]
On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17 issued an Entry
of Judgment.[17]
On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of
judgment in Reconstitution Case No. 1928, alleging that the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City had no
jurisdiction over the case.[18] The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper

parties in the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title
to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject
land.
On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the judgment of
reconstitution void.[19]
On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
for reconsideration of the decision.[20] On February 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
[21]

Hence, this petition.[22]

Petitioners submitted that the Solicitor General was estopped from seeking annulment of the
judgment of reconstitution after failing to object during the reconstitution proceedings before the trial
court, despite due notice. Petitioners alleged that the Solicitor General merely acted on the request
of private and politically powerful individuals who wished to capitalize on the prime location of the
subject land.
Petitioners emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two previous cases of the
Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Lee
Liong. Petitioners also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the land through actual
possession of the lot and their consistent payment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the reconstitution case was
void; otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring ownership of private or public agricultural lands.
We grant the petition.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a
lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. [23] The purpose of the
reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. [24]
In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong, alleging that the
transfer certificate of title issued to him was lost or destroyed during World War II. All the documents
recorded and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz, which include the transfer certificate of title
issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of the
transfer certificate of title was not in the files of the Office of the Register of Deeds did not imply that
a transfer certificate of title had not been issued.[25] In the trial court proceedings, petitioners
presented evidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the latters
subsequent possession of the property in the concept of owner. Thus, the trial court, after examining
all the evidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong.

However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the
Philippines.
The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,[26] aliens could not acquire private agricultural
lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.[27] Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified
to acquire the land in question.[28]
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction,
for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or
private domain. However, the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction was not the
parties to the transaction.[29] In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by
virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford
protection to either party.[30]The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was
what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment
of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not
barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the State.[31]
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari
delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State,
subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.[32]
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is
now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been
inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens,
a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was
intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire
and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.[33] Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos
may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.[34] The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. Petitioners are
Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.

Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based
on an owners duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be
reconstituted.[35] In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description
approved by the Land Registration Authority.[36] This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack
of factual support.[37] A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void. [38]

As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition.[39] It does not pass upon the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title.[40] Any change in the ownership of the property must be the
subject of a separate suit.[41] Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate
proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in
Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition,
without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119682. January 21, 1999]
FRANCISCO BAGUIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RICARDO T. MICHAEL,
in his capacity as Heir-Successor of WILLIAM MICHAEL, SR., and as President of MICHAEL
SLIPWAYS, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of Mandaue City, nullifying Free Patent No. 7757 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 issued in the name of petitioner Francisco Baguio.
The patent and certificate of title cover a parcel of land, consisting of 5,870 sq. m., in Catarman,
Liloan, Cebu. Known as Lot 1426, Case 2, Pls. 823, the land was declared by the government
public land in 1963.
The evidence shows that, on August 2, 1963, private respondent Ricardo Michaels predecessor-ininterest, William Michael, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of the
land. The application was recommended for approval by the land investigator who also
recommended that the applicant be granted a provisional permit to occupy the land for one year
from October 4, 1963 to October 3, 1964.
On October 8, 1963, by virtue of a permit granted to him by the Bureau of Lands, William Michael
made some reclamation on the land, built a fence around the premises, and constructed a bridge
over a portion which was under water. Upon the expiration of the permit on October 4, 1964, the
Highways District Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands that the land be leased to
Michael. On the other hand, the land investigator recommended granting Michael the authority to
survey the foreshore land in view of the completion of the reclamation made by him on the premises.
On February 25, 1968, Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application covering the reclaimed
foreshore land.
On November 9, 1976, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands for a free patent covering
the same land. In his application, petitioner stated that the land was agricultural land and not
claimed or occupied by any other person and that he had been in actual and continuous possession
and cultivation of the same. On the basis of these representations, a free patent was issued to him
and, on January 10, 1978, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 was issued in his name by the
Register of Deeds of Cebu.
On April 6, 1978, petitioner demanded payment of rentals from William Michael for the use of the
land occupied by Michael Slipways, Inc.. On August 4, 1981, petitioner filed an opposition to
Michaels miscellaneous sales application covering the land on the ground that he was the
registered owner thereof.

William Michael in turn protested the issuance by the Bureau of Lands of a free patent to
petitioner. He claimed that he had been in actual possession of the land since 1963 and that he had
introduced substantial improvements thereon.
On February 16, 1989, upon the recommendation of the Land Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the government, represented by the Director of
Lands, filed a petition for cancellation of title and/or reversion of land against petitioner Baguio and
the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City which
granted private respondent Ricardo Michael leave to intervene as heir and successor-in-interest of
William Michael and as president of Michael Slipways, Inc.
On July 20, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision canceling the free patent and the certificate of
title of petitioner Baguio, ordering the reversion of the land to the public domain, and declaring
private respondent Michael the true and lawful occupant of the land. The trial court ruled that the
false statements made by petitioner Baguio in his application for free patent had the effect of ipso
facto canceling the free patent and the title of petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on February 28, 1995, affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner contends that
1. The public respondent erred in not declaring that respondent Republic of the Philippines action
was already barred by prescription.
2.
Granting arguendo that respondents action was not barred by prescription, nonetheless,
the Regional Trial Court, erred in finding that petitioner acted in bad faith and procured the issuance
of the Free Patent (VII-I)-7757 and the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 through fraud and
misrepresentation.
3. Granting arguendo that respondent Republics action should prosper, nonetheless, the Regional
Trial Court erred in (d)eclaring intervenor (private respondent herein) as the true and lawful
possessor and occupant of the land subject of the intervention.
4. The Regional Trial court erred in finding that the land in question is a foreshore land.
We find these contentions to be without merit.
First. It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the
land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the
Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of issuance of such patent.[2] However, as held in Director of Lands v. De Luna,[3] even
after the lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action under 101 [4] of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 for the reversion to the public domain of land which has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals.[5]Such action is not barred by prescription, and this is settled law.[6]

Indeed, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the title by
means of fraud.[7] Public policy demands that one who obtains title to public land through fraud
should not be allowed to benefit therefrom.[8]
Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that he was guilty of fraud in
procuring the issuance of the free patent and the corresponding certificate of title. He insists that
what he stated in his application for free patent (that the subject land is agricultural land not claimed
or occupied by persons other than himself and that he had been in actual and continuous
possession and cultivation of the same) were all true. He also assails the finding of the trial court
that the subject land is foreshore land.
Petitioner puts in issue the findings of fact of the trial court. But the only errors which are reviewable
by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals are those
allegedly committed by the latter court and not those of the trial court. Petitioners assignment of
errors is thus misplaced, and for this reason, the petition should be dismissed. Furthermore, only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. In the absence of any showing
of lack of basis for the conclusions made by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not disturb the
factual findings of the appellate court.[9] In this case, petitioner has not shown that the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not supported by substantial evidence so as to justify this Court in departing from
the general rule which regards the findings of the appellate court as final.
At any rate, we have decided to consider the issues raised insofar as they are pertinent to the
appellate courts decision in order to put them to rest once and for all.
In his free patent application, petitioner declared under oath that the land in question was an
agricultural land not claimed or occupied by any other person; that he had continuously possessed
and occupied it; and that he had introduced improvements thereon. These declarations constitute
fraud and misrepresentation. The government has proven that, contrary to these allegations, as
early as September 2, 1963, i.e., thirteen (13) years before the alleged entry of petitioner on the
land, private respondents predecessor-in-interest, William Michael, had already filed a foreshore
lease application over the same; that on February 25, 1968, William Michael filed a miscellaneous
sales application over the land; that since 1963 up to the present, private respondent has been
continuously in possession of the land on which he has been operating a drydocking service under
the style of Michael Slipways, Inc.; and that private respondent Ricardo Michael had made
improvements thereon consisting of the reclamation of a portion of the land, the construction of the
fence thereon, and the construction of a bridge over a portion under water. In addition, it has been
duly established that the land in question is foreshore land, not agricultural. The fact that the land is
being used by private respondent Ricardo Michael in his drydocking operations is evidence that the
land is foreshore land. Moreover, there would have been no need to reclaim a portion of the land if it
had not been under seawater.
Petitioner is guilty of making false statements in his application for a free patent thus justifying the
annulment of his title. Sec. 91 of C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act) provides:
The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein

or omission of facts altering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in
the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. It
shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable,
to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set
out in the application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in
good faith, and for the purpose of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from
the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith,
fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the
grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Land or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse
or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such
presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings.
As already stated, the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. The registration of a patent under the Torrens System merely confirms the
registrants title. It does not vest title where there is none because registration under this system is
not a mode of acquiring ownership.[10]
Third. Petitioner assails the trial courts finding, as affirmed by the appellate court, that private
respondent Michael is the true and lawful possessor of the subject land. He argues that private
respondent, being a mere heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael and not the person who
filed the foreshore lease and the miscellaneous sales applications, has no right to the land in
dispute.
Suffice it to state that it was clearly proven that William Michael had already been in possession of
the land under a provisional permit to occupy the same in 1963. Petitioner applied for a free patent
only in 1976, thirteen (13) years later. In addition, William Michael had filed a sales application
covering the land in 1968, i.e., eight (8) years before petitioner filed his free patent application. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly held William Michael and private respondent
Ricardo Michael to be the true and rightful possessors of the land in question. The fact that private
respondent Michael is merely the successor of the original foreshore lease and sales applicant,
William Michael, does not make him any less entitled to the possession of the land. Sec. 105 of the
Public Land Act provides that, in case of his death, the original applicant shall be succeeded in his
rights and obligations by his legal heirs with respect to the land applied for or leased. [11]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.