G.R. No.

176419 : November 27, 2013

a) All complainants are regular employees with respect to the particular

activity to which they were assigned, until it ceased to exist. As such, they
are entitled to payment of separation pay computed at one (1) month salary
for every year of service;
b) They are not entitled to overtime pay and holiday pay; and
c) They are entitled to 13th month pay, night shift differential and service
incentive leave pay.
When Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, it
rendered its Decision denying the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, v. CARLOS P. PABRIGA,

GEOFFREY F. ARIAS, KIRBY N. CAMPO, ARNOLD L. LAGAHIT,
and ARMANDO A. CATUBIG, Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents were engaged by petitioner for the latters operations in
the Technical Operations Center as Transmitter/VTR men, as Maintenance
staff and as Cameramen On July 19 1999 due to the miserable working
conditions private respondents were forced to file a complaint against
petitioner before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII Cebu City.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in finding the respondents as regular

employees of the petitioner.
Whether the CA erred in awarding separation pay to the respondents absent
a finding that respondents were illegally dismissed.

Private respondents filed an amended complaint raising the following

additional issues of 1) Unfair Labor Practice; 2) Illegal dismissal; and 3)
Damages and Attorneys fees.

HELD:
LABOR LAW

An amicable settlement between the parties was set but the same proved to
be futile.

Respondents claim that they are regular employees of petitioner GMA

Network, Inc. The latter, on the other hand, interchangeably characterize
respondents employment as project and fixed period/fixed term employment.
ARTICLE 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where
the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of respondents for illegal

dismissal and unfair labor practice, but held petitioner liable for 13th month
pay.
The NLRC reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, and held that
1

where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of the
season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity actually
exist.

On the other hand, the activities of project employees may or may not be
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
The term "project" could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or
undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. Such a
job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the
ordinary or regular business operations of the employer. The job or
undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable times. ALUTUCP v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 109902, August 2,
1994
The jobs and undertakings are clearly within the regular or usual business of
the employer company and are not identifiably distinct or separate from the
other undertakings of the company. There is no denying that the manning of
the operations center to air commercials, acting as transmitter/VTR men,
maintaining the equipment, and acting as cameramen are not undertakings
separate or distinct from the business of a broadcasting company.

Pursuant to the above-quoted Article 280 of the Labor Code, employees

performing activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
employers usual business or trade can either be regular, project or seasonal
employees, while, as a general rule, those performing activities not usually
necessary or desirable in the employers usual business or trade are casual
employees. The consequence of the distinction is found in Article 279 of the
Labor Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.

In sum, we affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that
respondents are regular employees of petitioner. As regular employees, they
are entitled to security of tenure and therefore their services may be
terminated only for just or authorized causes. Since petitioner failed to prove
any just or authorized cause for their termination, we are constrained to
affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that they were
illegally dismissed.
Since the respondents were illegally dismissed, they entitled to separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement.
2

DECISION
As regards night shift differential, the Labor Code provides that every
employee shall be paid not less than ten percent (10%) of his regular wage
for each hour of work performed between ten o'clock in the evening and six
o'clock in the morning. LABOR CODE, Article 86

NACHURA, J.:
This petition seeks a review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated July 24, 2001 and Resolution dated December 20, 2001, which
affirmed the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
that the petitioners' transfer to another workplace did not amount to a
constructive dismissal and an unfair labor practice.

As employees of petitioner, respondents are entitled to the payment of this

benefit in accordance with the number of hours they worked from 10:00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m., if any.

The pertinent factual antecedents are as follows:

The matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of
the decision, else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and
conjectural. In the absence of a stipulation, attorney's fees are ordinarily not
recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to litigate.
They are not awarded every time a party wins a suit.

Tryco Pharma Corporation (Tryco) is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines

and its principal office is located in Caloocan City. Petitioners Joselito
Lario, Vivencio Barte, Saturnino Egera and Simplicio Aya-ay are its regular
employees, occupying the positions of helper, shipment helper and factory
workers, respectively, assigned to the Production Department. They are
members of Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco (BMT), the exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees.

In the case at bar, the factual basis for the award of attorney's fees was not
discussed in the text of NLRC Decision. Thus, the Court constrained to
delete the same.
G.R. No. 151309

Tryco and the petitioners signed separate Memorand[a] of

Agreement2 (MOA), providing for a compressed workweek schedule to be
implemented in the company effective May 20, 1996. The MOA was entered
into pursuant to Department of Labor and Employment Department Order
(D.O.) No. 21, Series of 1990, Guidelines on the Implementation of
Compressed Workweek. As provided in the MOA, 8:00 a.m. to 6:12 p.m.,
from Monday to Friday, shall be considered as the regular working hours,
and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work
rendered during those hours. The MOA specifically stated that the employee

October 15, 2008

BISIG MANGGAGAWA SA TRYCO and/or FRANCISCO SIQUIG, as

Union President, JOSELITO LARIO, VIVENCIO B. BARTE,
SATURNINO EGERA and SIMPLICIO AYA-AY, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TRYCO PHARMA
CORPORATION, and/or WILFREDO C. RIVERA, respondents.
3

waives the right to claim overtime pay for work rendered after 5:00 p.m.
until 6:12 p.m. from Monday to Friday considering that the compressed
workweek schedule is adopted in lieu of the regular workweek schedule
which also consists of 46 hours. However, should an employee be permitted
or required to work beyond 6:12 p.m., such employee shall be entitled to
overtime pay.

your production should be done at the above mentioned address only.

Further, production of a drug includes propagation, processing,
compounding, finishing, filling, repacking, labeling, advertising, storage,
distribution or sale of the veterinary drug product. In no instance, therefore,
should any of the above be done at your business office at 117 M. Ponce St.,
EDSA, Caloocan City.

Tryco informed the Bureau of Working Conditions of the Department of

Labor and Employment of the implementation of a compressed workweek in
the company.3

Please be guided accordingly.

In January 1997, BMT and Tryco negotiated for the renewal of their
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but failed to arrive at a new
agreement.

Very truly yours,

Meantime, Tryco received the Letter dated March 26, 1997 from the Bureau
of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture reminding it that its
production should be conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in Caloocan
City:

EDNA
ZENAIDA
V.
Chief, Animal Feeds Standard Division4

MR.
WILFREDO
President,
Tryco
San Rafael, Bulacan

C.
Pharma

Thank you.

(sgd.)
VILLACORTE,

D.V.M.

Accordingly, Tryco issued a Memorandum5 dated April 7, 1997 which

directed petitioner Aya-ay to report to the company's plant site in Bulacan.
When petitioner Aya-ay refused to obey, Tryco reiterated the order on April
18, 1997.6 Subsequently, through a Memorandum7 dated May 9, 1997, Tryco
also directed petitioners Egera, Lario and Barte to report to the company's
plant site in Bulacan.

RIVERA
Corporation

Subject: LTO as VDAP Manufacturer at San Rafael, Bulacan

BMT opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending
that it constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike on
May 26, 1997.

Dear Mr. Rivera:

This is to remind you that your License to Operate as Veterinary Drug and
Product Manufacturer is addressed at San Rafael, Bulacan, and so, therefore,
4

In August 1997, petitioners filed their separate complaints8 for illegal

dismissal, underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay and service
incentive leave, and refusal to bargain against Tryco and its President,
Wilfredo C. Rivera. In their Position Paper,9 petitioners alleged that the
company acted in bad faith during the CBA negotiations because it sent
representatives without authority to bind the company, and this was the
reason why the negotiations failed. They added that the management
transferred petitioners Lario, Barte, Egera and Aya-ay from Caloocan to San
Rafael, Bulacan to paralyze the union. They prayed for the company to pay
them their salaries from May 26 to 31, 1997, service incentive leave, and
overtime pay, and to implement Wage Order No. 4.

paralyze or render the union ineffective for the following reasons: (1)
complainants are not members of the negotiating panel; and (2) the transfer
was made pursuant to the directive of the Department of Agriculture.
The Labor Arbiter also denied the money claims, ratiocinating that the
nonpayment of wages was justified because the petitioners did not render
work from May 26 to 31, 1997; overtime pay is not due because of the
compressed workweek agreement between the union and management; and
service incentive leave pay cannot be claimed by the complainants because
they are already enjoying vacation leave with pay for at least five days. As
for the claim of noncompliance with Wage Order No. 4, the Labor Arbiter
held that the issue should be left to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrator.

In their defense, respondents averred that the petitioners were not dismissed
but they refused to comply with the management's directive for them to
report to the company's plant in San Rafael, Bulacan. They denied the
allegation that they negotiated in bad faith, stating that, in fact, they sent the
Executive Vice-President and Legal Counsel as the company's
representatives to the CBA negotiations. They claim that the failure to arrive
at an agreement was due to the stubbornness of the union panel.

On October 29, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision,
dismissing the case, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of February 27, 1998 is hereby
AFFIRMED and complainants' appeal therefrom DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Complainants Joselito Lario, Vivencio Barte, Saturnino Egera and
Simplicio Aya-ay are directed to report to work at respondents' San Rafael
Plant, Bulacan but without backwages. Respondents are directed to accept
the complainants back to work.

Respondents further averred that, long before the start of the negotiations, the
company had already been planning to decongest the Caloocan office to
comply with the government policy to shift the concentration of
manufacturing activities from the metropolis to the countryside. The decision
to transfer the company's production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan was
precipitated by the letter-reminder of the Bureau of Animal Industry.

SO ORDERED.11
On December 22, 1999, the NLRC denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.12

On February 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of
merit.10 The Labor Arbiter held that the transfer of the petitioners would not
5

Left with no recourse, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

-B-

On July 24, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and ruled that
the transfer order was a management prerogative not amounting to a
constructive dismissal or an unfair labor practice. The CA further sustained
the enforceability of the MOA, particularly the waiver of overtime pay in
light of this Court's rulings upholding a waiver of benefits in exchange of
other valuable privileges. The dispositive portion of the said CA decision
reads:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND

CONCLUDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED ACTS
OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.
-CTHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND
CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR
MONEY CLAIMS AND TO DAMAGES, AS WELL AS LITIGATION
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.15

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the

Labor Arbiter dated February 27, 1998 and the Decision and Resolution of
the NLRC promulgated on October 29, 1999 and December 22, 1999,
respectively, in NLRC-NCR Case Nos. 08-05715-97, 08-06115-97 and 0805920-97, are AFFIRMED.

The petition has no merit.

We have no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that findings of
fact of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect
but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence. 16 This
is particularly true when the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the
CA are in absolute agreement.17 In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the CA uniformly agreed that the petitioners were not constructively
dismissed and that the transfer orders did not amount to an unfair labor
practice. But if only to disabuse the minds of the petitioners who have
persistently pursued this case on the mistaken belief that the labor tribunals
and the appellate court committed grievous errors, this Court will go over the
issues raised in this petition.

SO ORDERED.13
The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration on December 20,
2001.14
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this petition for review raising the following
issues:
-ATHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND
THE COMMISSION THAT THERE WAS NO DISMISSAL, MUCH LESS
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, OF THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS.
6

Petitioners mainly contend that the transfer orders amount to a constructive

dismissal. They maintain that the letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry is
not credible because it is not authenticated; it is only a ploy, solicited by
respondents to give them an excuse to effect a massive transfer of employees.
They point out that the Caloocan City office is still engaged in production
activities until now and respondents even hired new employees to replace
them.

This prerogative extends to the management's right to regulate, according to

its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the
freedom to transfer and reassign employees according to the requirements of
its business.19 Management's prerogative of transferring and reassigning
employees from one area of operation to another in order to meet the
requirements of the business is, therefore, generally not constitutive of
constructive dismissal.20 Thus, the consequent transfer of Tryco's personnel,
assigned to the Production Department was well within the scope of its
management prerogative.

We do not agree.
We refuse to accept the petitioners' wild and reckless imputation that the
Bureau of Animal Industry conspired with the respondents just to effect the
transfer of the petitioners. There is not an iota of proof to support this
outlandish claim. Absent any evidence, the allegation is not only highly
irresponsible but is grossly unfair to the government agency concerned. Even
as this Court has given litigants and counsel a relatively wide latitude to
present arguments in support of their cause, we will not tolerate outright
misrepresentation or baseless accusation. Let this be fair warning to counsel
for the petitioners.

When the transfer is not unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to the

employee, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of
salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it
amounts to a constructive dismissal.21 However, the employer has the burden
of proving that the transfer of an employee is for valid and legitimate
grounds. The employer must show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion
in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.22
Indisputably, in the instant case, the transfer orders do not entail a demotion
in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges of the
petitioners. Petitioners, therefore, anchor their objection solely on the ground
that it would cause them great inconvenience since they are all residents of
Metro Manila and they would incur additional expenses to travel daily from
Manila to Bulacan.

Furthermore, Tryco's decision to transfer its production activities to San

Rafael, Bulacan, regardless of whether it was made pursuant to the letter of
the Bureau of Animal Industry, was within the scope of its inherent right to
control and manage its enterprise effectively. While the law is solicitous of
the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to
exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of
management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot
be denied.18

The Court has previously declared that mere incidental inconvenience is not
sufficient to warrant a claim of constructive dismissal.23 Objection to a
transfer that is grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship
7

that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid
reason to disobey an order of transfer.24

organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts,
no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices.26

Incidentally, petitioners cite Escobin v. NLRC25 where the Court held that the
transfer of the employees therein was unreasonable. However, the distance of
the workplace to which the employees were being transferred can hardly
compare to that of the present case. In that case, the employees were being
transferred from Basilan to Manila; hence, the Court noted that the transfer
would have entailed the separation of the employees from their families who
were residing in Basilan and accrual of additional expenses for living
accommodations in Manila. In contrast, the distance from Caloocan to San
Rafael, Bulacan is not considerably great so as to compel petitioners to seek
living accommodations in the area and prevent them from commuting to
Metro Manila daily to be with their families.

Finally, we do not agree with the petitioners' assertion that the MOA is not
enforceable as it is contrary to law. The MOA is enforceable and binding
against the petitioners. Where it is shown that the person making the waiver
did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.27
D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the
benefits that the employees will derive from the adoption of a compressed
workweek scheme, thus:
The compressed workweek scheme was originally conceived for
establishments wishing to save on energy costs, promote greater work
efficiency and lower the rate of employee absenteeism, among others.
Workers favor the scheme considering that it would mean savings on the
increasing cost of transportation fares for at least one (1) day a week; savings
on meal and snack expenses; longer weekends, or an additional 52 off-days a
year, that can be devoted to rest, leisure, family responsibilities, studies and
other personal matters, and that it will spare them for at least another day in a
week from certain inconveniences that are the normal incidents of
employment, such as commuting to and from the workplace, travel time
spent, exposure to dust and motor vehicle fumes, dressing up for work, etc.
Thus, under this scheme, the generally observed workweek of six (6) days is
shortened to five (5) days but prolonging the working hours from Monday to
Friday without the employer being obliged for pay overtime premium

Petitioners, however, went further and argued that the transfer orders
amounted to unfair labor practice because it would paralyze and render the
union ineffective.
To begin with, we cannot see how the mere transfer of its members can
paralyze the union. The union was not deprived of the membership of the
petitioners whose work assignments were only transferred to another
location.
More importantly, there was no showing or any indication that the transfer
orders were motivated by an intention to interfere with the petitioners' right
to organize. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right
to organize. With the exception of Article 248(f) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self8

compensation for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours on weekdays,

in exchange for the benefits abovecited that will accrue to the employees.

PESALA v. NLRC,28 cited by the petitioners, is not applicable to the present

case. In that case, an employment contract provided that the workday
consists of 12 hours and the employee will be paid a fixed monthly salary
rate that was above the legal minimum wage. However, unlike the present
MOA which specifically states that the employee waives his right to claim
overtime pay for work rendered beyond eight hours, the employment contract
in that case was silent on whether overtime pay was included in the payment
of the fixed monthly salary. This necessitated the interpretation by the Court
as to whether the fixed monthly rate provided under the employment contract
included overtime pay. The Court noted that if the employee is paid only the
minimum wage but with overtime pay, the amount is still greater than the
fixed monthly rate as provided in the employment contract. It, therefore, held
that overtime pay was not included in the agreed fixed monthly rate.

Moreover, the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in the company

will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the petitioners by
their transfer to a farther workplace.
Notably, the MOA complied with the following conditions set by the DOLE,
under D.O. No. 21, to protect the interest of the employees in the
implementation of a compressed workweek scheme:
1. The employees voluntarily agree to work more than eight (8) hours a day
the total in a week of which shall not exceed their normal weekly hours of
work prior to adoption of the compressed workweek arrangement;

Considering that the MOA clearly states that the employee waives the
payment of overtime pay in exchange of a five-day workweek, there is no
room for interpretation and its terms should be implemented as they are
written.

2. There will not be any diminution whatsoever in the weekly or monthly

take-home pay and fringe benefits of the employees;
3. If an employee is permitted or required to work in excess of his normal
weekly hours of work prior to the adoption of the compressed workweek
scheme, all such excess hours shall be considered overtime work and shall be
compensated in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code or
applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA);

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated July 24, 2001 and Resolution dated December 20, 2001
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

4. Appropriate waivers with respect to overtime premium pay for work

performed in excess of eight (8) hours a day may be devised by the parties to
the agreement.

WILGEN LOON vs. POWER MASTER INC.

Facts:
1. Respondents Power Master Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed

5. The effectivity and implementation of the new working time arrangement

shall be by agreement of the parties.
9

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in
Metro Manila area.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims
against Power Master Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers,
the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the
respondents).
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid
minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive
leave, and thirteenth month pays.
They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank
payroll sheets.
The petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal
dismissal as their cause of action.
They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in
retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001 when
Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents behalf. The
respondents counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory
conference on July 5, 2001.
LAs Ruling: The LA awarded the petitioners salary differential,
service incentive leaves and 13th month pays. In awarding these
claims the LA stated that the burden in proving the payment of these
money claims rests with the employer. However, they were not
awarded backwages, overtime, holiday and premium pays for failure
to show that they rendered overtime work and worked on holidays.
Moreover, it was not decided that they were illegally dismissed for
failure to show notice of termination of employment.

9. NLRC: Both parties appealed to the ruling of the LA. NLRC affirmed
LAs ruling with regard the payment of holiday pay and attorneys
fees but vacated the awards of salary differential, 13th month pays
and service incentive leaves. Moreover, NLRC allowed the
respondents to present pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal
on the ground that they have been deprived of due process. It also
ruled that petitioners were legally dismissed due to gross misconduct.
10. CA: Ruling of the NLRC was affirmed.
Issue: Whether the respondents perfected their appeal before the NLRC
Held:
1. YES.
2. Pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected, only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company, duly accredited by the
Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
3. In the present case, the respondents filed a surety bond issued by
Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (Security Pacific) on June 28,
2002.
4. At that time, Security Pacific was still an accredited bonding
company.
5. However, the NLRC revoked its accreditation on February 16, 2003.
6. Nonetheless, this subsequent revocation should not prejudice the
respondents who relied on its then subsisting accreditation in good
faith.
7. In Del Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc., we ruled that a bonding
companys revocation of authority is prospective in application.
8. However, the respondents should post a new bond issued by an
10

accredited bonding company in compliance with paragraph 4, Section

6, Rule 6 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. This provision states that
[a] cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective from the date of
deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or
terminated or the award satisfied.
9. Contrary to the respondents claim, the issue of the appeal bonds
validity may be raised for the first time on appeal since its proper
filing is a jurisdictional requirement.
10. The requirement that the appeal bond should be issued by an
accredited bonding company is mandatory and jurisdictional. The
rationale of requiring an appeal bond, is to discourage the employers
from using an appeal to delay or evade the employees just and
lawful claims. It is intended to assure the workers that they will
receive the money judgment in their favor if the employers appeal
is dismissed.
A party may only adduce evidence for the first time on appeal if he
adequately explains his delay in the submission of evidence and he
sufficiently proves the allegations sought to be proven.
1. In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is
not required.
2. However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason
and fair play.
3. The liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements:
(1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission
of evidence; and
(2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be
proven.
4. The reason for these requirements is that, the liberal application of the
rules before quasi-judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate

injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case.

5. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the
rules of procedure.

Durabuilt vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 76746
July 27, 1987
DURABUILT RECAPPING PLANT & COMPANY and EDUARDO LAO,
GENERAL MANAGER, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. COMM.
RICARDO C. CASTRO, HON. ARBITER AMELIA M. GULOY,
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA DURABUILT and
REYNALDO BODEGAS, respondents.
FACTS:
-In July 1983, Reynaldo Bodegas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Durabuilt, a tire capping company.
-Labor Arbiter rendered a decision reinstating Bodegas to his former position
with full backwages (including benefits) from the time of his termination up
to the time he was actually reinstated.
- A computation of backwages, ECOLA, 13th month pay, sick and vacation
leave benefits in favor or Bodegas was then submitted which amounted to
Php 24, 316.38.
- Durabuilt filed an opposition to the computation.
Durabuilts contention: Bodegas should only be entitled to a total of
P3,834.05 and not 24, 316.38. The submitted computation contemplated a
straight computation of twenty six (26) working days in one month when the
11

period covered by the computation was intermittently interrupted due to

frequent brownouts and machine trouble. Hence, the days during which they
were not in operation due to the brownouts should be excluded in the
number of days worked for the purpose of computing Bodegas backwages.
ISSUE: WON Bodegas is entitled to backwages. YES, (for 3,834.05 and not
24, 316.38)
SC:
The illegal dismissal of Bodegas is conceded by the Durabuilt and is willing
to pay backwages. However, it argues that for days where no work was
required and could be done by its employees, no wages could have been
earned and, thereafter, lost by said employees to justify an award of
backwages.
Here, it appears that Durabuilts business was not in actual operation due to
brownouts or power interruption and the retrenchment of workers they had
during the period of private respondent's dismissal, thus it is justified to
exclude certain days for purposes of computing backwages.
It cannot be denied that during the past years particularly in 1983, there was
chronic electrical power interruption resulting to disruption of business
operations. To alleviate the situation, the government thru the Ministry of
Trade and Industry called on the industrial sector to resort to the so-called
Voluntary Loan Curtailment Plan (or VLCP), whereby brownouts or
electrical power interruption was scheduled by area. The program while it
may have been called voluntary" was not so as electrical power consumers
had no choice then due to the prevailing energy crisis.
As early as 1978, Ministry of Labor thru Policy Instruction No. 36 provides
that:
2. Brownouts running for more than twenty minutes may not be treated as
hours worked provided that any of the following conditions are present;
a) The employees can leave their work place or go elsewhere whether within

or without the work premises; or

b) The employees can use the time effectively for their own interest.
It is of record that during the electrical power interruptions, Durabuilts
business was not in operation. Hence, it would neither be fair nor just to
allow Bodegas to recover something he has not earned and could not have
earned and to further penalize Durabuilt over and above the losses it had
suffered due to lack of raw materials and the energy-saving programs of the
government. Bodegas cannot be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of
Durabuilt. The computation of backwages should be based on daily rather
than on monthly pay schedules where, as in the case at bar, such basis is
more realistic and accurate.
Hilario Rada vs National Labor Relations Commission
205 SCRA 69 Labor Law Labor Standards Hours of Work OT
Pay of a Project Based Employee
In 1977, Hilario Rada was contracted by Philnor Consultants and Planners,
Inc as a driver. He was assigned to a specific project in Manila. The contract
he signed was for 2.3 years. His task was to drive employees to the project
from 7am to 4pm. He was allowed to bring home the company vehicle in
order to provide a timely transportation service to the other project workers.
The project he was assigned to was not completed as scheduled hence, since
he has a satisfactory record, he was re-contracted for an additional 10
months. After 10 months the project was not yet completed. Several contracts
thereafter were made until the project was finished in 1985.
At the completion of the project, Rada was terminated as his employment
was co-terminous with the project. He later sued Philnor for non payment of
separation pay and overtime pay. He said he is entitled to be paid OT pay
12

because he uses extra time to get to the project site from his home and from
the project site to his home everyday in total, he spends an average of 3
hours OT every day.

not so much for the convenience of the employees, but primarily for the
benefit of Philnor. As embodied in Philnors memorandum, they allowed
their drivers to bring home their transport vehicles in order for them to
provide a timely transport service and to avoid delay not really so that the
drivers could enjoy the benefits of the company vehicles nor for them to save
on fair.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rada is entitled to separation pay and OT pay.

HELD: Separation pay NO. Overtime pay Yes.
Separation Pay
The SC ruled that Rada was a project employee whose work was
coterminous with the project for which he was hired. Project employees, as
distinguished from regular or non-project employees, are mentioned in
Section 281 of the Labor Code as those where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee.

PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc v. NLRC (December 14, 2006)

Facts
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as seaman by PCL Shipping Philippines
for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine. Rusel thereby
joined the vessel MV Cemtex for 12 months with a basic monthly salary of
US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of
US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and
special allowance of US$175.00.

Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated
as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they
are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been
employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the company is
not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection
with such termination.

On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped,
and as a consequence thereof, he suffered a broken/sprained ankle on his left
foot. A request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of
the vessel. On August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle,
Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore. He was
brought to a hospital where he was confined for 8 days. On August 22, 1996,
a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required to board a
plane bound for the Philippines. On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, claim

OT Pay
Rada is entitled to OT pay. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at
certain specified points along EDSA in going to the project site and drops
them off at the same points on his way back from the field office going home
to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to Radas job as a
driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted,
13

for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL Shipping and
U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer,
the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the
vessel.

abroad.
Held: Yes, it does.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the
charges against him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to
give him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the
twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the
employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly
observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.

Labor Arbiter held that respondent is liable for the unjust repatriation of the
complainant. NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Whether or not respondent was guilty of desertion to justify his

dismissal.

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the
Labor Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees
whether working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of
lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs
in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent
was executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code
together with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting
labor apply in this case. Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and
hearing in the case of a seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of
cases that before a seaman can be dismissed and discharged from the vessel,
it is required that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against
him and that he be afforded a formal investigation where he could defend
himself personally or through a representative. Hence, the employer should
strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing without
regard to the nature and situs of employment or the nationality of the
employer. Petitioners failed to comply with these twin requirements.

Held: No
For a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there
be evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had
engaged to perform a voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his
duty and of not returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case, however,
petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to show that when
private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning.
The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where he was stationed, swam to
shore and sought medical assistance for the injury he sustained is not a
sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude that he had the intention of
deserting his post.

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor
Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees working
14

Wherefore, the petition is partly granted. The Court of Appeals' Decision

dated December 18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are affirmed
with modification to the effect that the award of US$1620.00 representing
private respondent's three months salary is reduced to US$1200.00. The
award of US$550.00 representing private respondent's living allowance,
overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted
and in lieu thereof, an award of US$710.00 is granted representing private
respondent's living allowance, special allowance and vacation leave with pay
for the same period.
G.R. No. 164681

terminal) along Ayala Avenue, Makati. His driver's license was confiscated
by a Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) enforcer and a
corresponding traffic violation receipt (TVR) was issued to him, which was
valid as a temporary driver's license for seven days from date of
apprehension. Before the expiration of the TVR, petitioner allegedly gave the
same to respondent's Operations Manager Arnel Hegina3 (Hegina) and
requested the latter to redeem his license from the MMDA. Respondent was
not able to redeem the license from the MMDA but merely secured a twomonth extension for the validity of the TVR. Sometime in May 1996,
petitioner was again apprehended along Shoemart, Makati by highway patrol
operatives who demanded petitioner's driver's license. The record does not
specify the violation. When petitioner presented his TVR, the operatives
ordered him to drive the bus directly to the garage. After the incident,
petitioner was not able to work for respondent again.4

April 24, 2009

BERNARDINO V. NAVARRO, Petitioner,

vs.
P.V. PAJARILLO LINER, INC., Respondent.

On March 14, 1997, petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA), a complaint
for illegal dismissal with damages against respondent, alleging that he was
dismissed from the service on May 19, 1996; that as a bus driver, he worked
for five days a week and from six in the morning up to eleven in the evening
with a gross fare receipts average of P6,500.00; that from the amount
of P6,500.00, he was entitled to a 9% commission and P50.00 incentive; that
in cases of apprehension of respondent's driver due to violations involving
illegal terminal or being "out of line," respondent was in charge of getting the
driver's license from the MMDA; that when he was apprehended in March
1996 for illegal terminal, he gave the TVR to Hegina and requested the latter
to redeem the license from the MMDA; that petitioners license was not
redeemed and respondent secured only two extensions of the TVR's validity
for two months; that when he was again apprehended in May 1996 and upon
arrival at the respondent's garage, he gave the extended TVR to Hegina and

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision 1 dated November 28, 2003 and
the Resolution2 dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP
No. 67666.
P.V. Pajarillo Liner Inc. (respondent), a corporation engaged in the business
of land transportation, employed Bernardino V. Navarro (petitioner) as a bus
driver on April 20, 1995. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner, while on duty,
was apprehended for picking up passengers in a non-loading zone (illegal
15

requested the latter to redeem his license from the MMDA; that Hegina
informed him that his license would be redeemed the following day, but
when petitioner tried to get his license from Hegina, the latter told him that
he failed to get it because of heavy workload; that petitioner was asked to
come back after one week with the assurance that his license would already
be available, but no license was released; that he was constantly following up
his license with respondent's office but was only given promises that his
license was due for release; that respondent's refusal to redeem his license
constituted constructive dismissal because he was deprived of his source of
livelihood, as he was not able to perform his work as a bus driver without his
license.

ang pagkukulang at ito'y tungkol sa hindi pagtubos ng aking TVR na nahuli

sa Ayala ng illegal terminal na dapat ay sagutin ng ating kumpanya.
Nagpabalik balik ako sa ating opisina dahil gusto kong makuha ang original
license ko pero ang nangyari puro extension at hanggang sa tuluyan ng
nawala dahil nadukutan ako. At isa pa, nagpaalam ako kay Arnel na hindi
muna ako makakalabas hangga't hindi pa nalulutas and problema
ko.5 (Emphasis supplied)
that there was no response received from respondent; that it was only in its
position paper filed with the LA that respondent raised the matter of not
condoning or encouraging the act of using illegal terminal, and that it could
not be held liable for petitioner's unlawful act. Petitioner added that it could
not be denied that petitioner requested respondent to redeem his license,
since the TVR was in respondent's possession.

In its position paper, respondent claimed that petitioner abandoned his job as
shown by the former's letter dated July 28, 1996 addressed to petitioner
requiring the latter to explain why he should not be dismissed for neglecting
his duty through prolonged absence; that after petitioner submitted his reply
to respondent's letter, nothing was heard from him until he filed his
complaint with the LA; that it was petitioner's obligation to redeem the
driver's license; that petitioner's inaction to get back his license showed his
lack of interest in resuming his job; and that respondent could not give back
petitioner's work without his driver's license.

In the Rejoinder, respondent argued that the TVR was submitted by

petitioner when he was given an extension permit, and it was for record
purposes as it was only a xerox copy.
On September 10, 1998, the LA rendered a decision6 in favor of herein
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Petitioner filed his reply, arguing that in his August 8, 1996 letter to
respondent's letter dated July 28, 1996, he had already brought to its attention
that it should redeem his license for having been caught for illegal terminal,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to

reinstate complainant to his former position with full backwages which as of
August 31, 1998 had already amounted to P175,500.00 and incentives in the
amount of P35,100.00.7

Bilang tugon sa sulat ninyo ay ikinalulungkot kong sabihin sa inyo na hindi

ako nagpabaya sa aking tungkulin bilang driver bagkus ay nasa management

In finding that petitioner was constructively dismissed, the LA said that

respondent's claim of petitioner's negligence in the performance of his duties
16

as a driver due to his alleged prolonged absences had been well explained by
petitioner; that said absences could never be attributed to petitioner's fault,
since he could not perform his usual duties as a driver without his license;
that he was not remiss in following up the release of his license from
respondent, which did not do its job.

which did not connote any obligation on Hegina's part; that as respondent
failed to heed such request, it was incumbent upon petitioner to redeem his
license, as it was necessary in the pursuit of his occupation as a bus driver.
The NLRC did not believe petitioner's claim that he submitted the original
TVR to respondent, because he could not have driven with only a photocopy
of said document.1awphi1.zw+

The LA did not sustain respondent's claim that it was not the latter's policy to
redeem the license of its drivers who were caught for illegal terminal, as
respondent did not deny petitioner's allegation that he submitted the TVR to
Hegina and that the office of respondent worked for the renewal of the period
of its validity pending the release of petitioner's license; and respondent's
policy of redeeming driver's license was further established by the affidavit
of Marcelino Ibaez, one of respondent's drivers and the Chairman of the
Board of the Kilusang Manggagawa sa PVP Liner. The LA then concluded
that respondent's failure to redeem petitioner's license deprived him of the
source of his livelihood without just and valid cause.

On the issue of constructive dismissal, the NLRC found that the evidence
showed that respondent sent a notice to petitioner requiring him to explain
his prolonged absences, to which petitioner submitted an explanation that he
could not report for work, as his license was with the authorities and was
waiting to be redeemed by respondent; and that no action was taken by the
latter on the matter. Thus, the NLRC agreed with the LA that there was
constructive dismissal; and petitioner should be reinstated upon presentation
of his driver's license, but without backwages considering that he was equally
at fault, as he did not bother to take proper steps to redeem his license.

Respondent filed its appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC rendered its
decision8 dated August 17, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 10 dated

September 29, 2000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that respondent is

ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position as bus driver without
backwages.9

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Respondent filed its
Comment and petitioner his Reply thereto.
On November 28, 2003, the CA rendered herein assailed decision dismissing
the petition for lack of merit.

On the question of who should redeem petitioner's driver's license, the NLRC
ruled that petitioner as the holder of the license should be the one to redeem
the same; that considering petitioners allegation in his position paper, that
he gave the TVR to Hegina and requested the latter to redeem his license, it
was clear that petitioner was merely requesting him to redeem his license,

The CA found that while an award of backwages presupposes a finding of

illegal dismissal, not every case of illegal dismissal deserves an award of
backwages, citing Manila Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations
17

Commission,11Cathedral School of Technology v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 12 and Durabuilt Recapping and Plant Company v. National
Labor Relations Commission.13 The CA further held that petitioner was the
holder of the confiscated driver's license; thus, it was his duty to redeem his
license; that while respondent previously took care of retrieving a confiscated
driver's license, it was only a matter of accommodation, as there is no law or
regulation making it an obligation of the employer to undertake retrieval of
its erring driver's license; that when respondent failed to heed petitioner's
request to redeem his license, a personal privilege and non-transferable,
petitioner should have personally redeemed the same, which he did not; thus,
he was not entitled to backwages.

For a correct perspective in the resolution of the present petition, it must be

stressed that the finding of the LA that petitioner was constructively
dismissed by respondent is already a settled issue. Respondent did not appeal
from the finding that it constructively dismissed petitioner.
Thus, the Court is constrained to limit itself to the determination of whether
petitioner is entitled to backwages; that is, whether the CA was correct in
upholding the NLRC's finding that petitioner is not entitled to backwages, as
he was equally at fault for not bothering to take proper steps to redeem his
license.
The LA found that it was the obligation of respondent to redeem petitioner's
drivers license and, therefore, petitioner was constructively dismissed by
respondent. While affirming the constructive dismissal committed by
respondent, the NLRC and the CA, however, held that petitioner as the
holder of the license should be the one to redeem the same, as this was
necessary in the pursuit of his occupation as a bus driver.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed Resolution

dated July 19, 2004.
Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:
(1) the decision is inconsistent with the settled doctrine that doubts arising
from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the employee;14

Petitioner was using the extended TVR when he was again caught sometime
in May 1996 by highway patrol operatives and was ordered to drive directly
to the garage.

(2) the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner should be the one who
should redeem his driver's license are grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures;15 and

Petitioner claimed that he gave the extended TVR to respondent for the latter
to redeem the same. However, such claim was belied by petitioner's letterreply dated August 8, 1996 to respondent's letter dated July 28, 1996, asking
him to explain his prolonged absence. Petitioner wrote that the extended
TVR was stolen from him. Such admission shows that the extended TVR had
been in petitioner's possession in May 1996 until it was stolen from him, the
date of which petitioner did not specify, wittingly or unwittingly. There is no

(3) petitioner is entitled to reinstatement with full backwages considering that

he was illegally dismissed from the service. 16
The petition lacks merit.

18

showing that petitioner ever reported the loss of the extended TVR to
respondent before he was asked to explain his prolonged absence in July
1996; or that he reported the loss to the MMDA. Thus, how could petitioner
expect respondent to redeem his driver's license when the extended TVR was
not in respondent's possession? Respondent could not be reasonably expected
to redeem petitioners driver's license while he, as owner of the license, did
not take the proper steps to report the loss of the TVR to respondent or to the
MMDA to get back his license. These circumstances show that petitioner was
not at all faultless, as his violation caused the confiscation of his license.

locked out, suspended or dismissed,18 or otherwise illegally prevented from

working,19 a situation which we find is not present in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated
November 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
G.R. No. 130935 May 11, 2000

Consequently, the Court agrees with the NLRC's conclusion that petitioner is
not entitled to backwages.

ALLAN VILLAR, DANILO INDITA, ARTURO MANIMTIM,

GERSON DATALIO, GERRY VILLARALBO, ALFONSO PIPINO,
NOEL ANGAY and EXEQUIEL MANIMTIM, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and HI-TECH
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents.

He never bothered to redeem his license at the soonest possible time when
there was no showing that he was unlawfully prevented by respondent from
doing so. Thus, petitioner should not be paid for the time he was not
working. The Court has held that where the failure of employees to work was
not due to the employer's fault, the burden of economic loss suffered by the
employees should not be shifted to the employer. Each party must bear his
own loss.17 It would be unfair to allow petitioner to recover something he has
not earned and could not have earned, since he could not discharge his work
as a driver without his driver's license. Respondent should be exempted from
the burden of paying backwages.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
ALLAN VILLAR, DANILO INDITA, ARTURO MANIMTIM, GERSON
DATALIO, GERRY VILLARALBO, ALFONSO PIPINO, NOEL ANGAY
and EXEQUIEL MANIMTIM, in this petition for certiorari, assail for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion the 30 May 1997
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) vacating and
setting aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, as well as its 31 July 1997
Resolution
denying
1
reconsideration.

The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or
management and employee, of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor"
remains as the basic factor in determining employees' wages. If there is no
work performed by the employee, there can be no wage or pay -- unless, of
course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally
19

HI-TECH MANUFACTURING CORPORATION (HI-TECH), a corporation

duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, is engaged in the business
of manufacturing cartons for commercial purposes. On different dates, HITECH hired petitioners to perform various jobs for the company such as
slitter machine operator, inkman, silk screen printer, truck helper, rubber dye
setter, forklift operator and stitching machine operator.

paid for the overtime. Neither were they paid their service incentive leave
pay and 13th month pay.

Sometime in March 1994 petitioners, who were members of the Federation

of Free Workers Union, filed before the Department of Labor a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of HI-TECH. The
petition was granted and a certification election was conducted inside the
company premises on 31 July 1994. However, petitioners lost in the election
as the HI-TECH employees voted for "No Union."

On the other hand, HI-TECH denied having dismissed petitioners. It

contended that petitioners were probably stung by their defeat in the
certification election such that they refused to work thereafter; that the HITECH management called their attention concerning their unauthorized
absences without leave but petitioners continued with their leaveen
masse with the sole intention of crippling the company operations; and, that
petitioners could return to their jobs at HI-TECH any time at their discretion.
In support of these allegations, private respondent presented in evidence
the affidavits3 of employees who initially joined petitioners in filing their
complaints but later desisted from pursuing their claims. The pertinent
portions of the affidavits uniformly read

Petitioners originally numbered twenty-three (23) but fifteen (15) of them

desisted in the course of the proceedings thus leaving only the eight (8)
petitioners who pursued their cause to the end.2

On 1 August 1994 and the succeeding days thereafter, petitioners failed to

report for work. They alleged that they were barred from entering the
premises of HI-TECH; hence, they immediately filed before the Labor
Arbiter separate complaints for illegal dismissal and labor standards claims
against HI-TECH, Herman T. Go, owner, and Carmen Belano, general
manager.

2. That I hereby state that I was not dismissed by the company or its officials,
the truth of the matter being that I did not report for work anymore after the
certification election on July 31, 1994, when our Union lost in the said
election; that I wanted to resign from the company, as I am hereby resigning
voluntarily from my job with HI-TECH MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION;

Petitioners claimed that they were summarily dismissed from employment by

the management of HI-TECH in retaliation for organizing a labor union in
the work premises as well as in filing the petition for certification election
before the Department of Labor. They further averred that they were paid
daily wages ranging from P81.00 to P145.00 which were below the
minimum fixed by law and that they were required to work six (6) days a
week from 8 o'clock in the morning to 7 o'clock in the evening without being

3. That it is not likewise true that I was underpaid, or that I was paid salary
below the minimum fixed by law; that I was receiving my daily salary in
accordance with law; and that I received all the benefits due me as employee
20

like holiday pay, service incentive leave and 13th month pay for 1994 that I
have no claims whatsoever against the company or its officials in connection
with or arising from my employment with the company, and that the
complaint I filed against the company was due to misunderstanding and
misconception of what I perceived I am entitled to; that now I realize that I
have nothing or I do not have any valid complaint or claim against the HITECH MANUFACTURING . . . .

Ang inyong lingkod,

(Sgd.) Arturo Manimtim
On 15 August 1996 a consolidated decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter
Emerson C. Tumanon in favor of petitioners ordering HI-TECH to reinstate
petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with
full back wages, and to pay their mandated monetary benefits computed as
follows

They further submitted the handwritten notes of petitioners Arturo Manimtim

and Exequiel Manimtim addressed to the management of HI-TECH. The
letter of Arturo Manimtim, the contents of which were substantially the same
as those of Exequiel Manimtim, read

NAME B/WAGES U/PAYMENT 13TH MP SILP

A.VILLAR P100,062.05 P24,026.00 P2,002.10 P1,855.00

Ako po si Mr. Arturo Manimtim ay kusang loob na pumunta at lumapit sa

pamunuan upang humingi nang anumang financial assistance o tulong na
inyong maibibigay sa akin lalung-lalo na po para sa aking pamilya, at
kabilang na rin po ang aking tuwirang pag-amin sa kasalanang aming ginawa
laban sa management na kami po ang nagdulot ng malaking kasiraan at
perwisyo sa inyong kumpanya noong nakaraan dahil sa aming ginawang
pagtigil sa aming trabaho ng sabay-sabay ng walang paalam o pahintulot sa
management at naging sanhi ng malaking pagkalugi ng kumpanya.

D. INDITA 100,062.05 12,913.00 1,076.05 675.00

G. DATALIO 100,062.05 10,734.00 895.00 675.00
G. VILLARALBO 100,062.00 16,163.00 1,347.35 1,855.00
A. PIPINO 100,062.05 520.00 430.00 2,145.00
A. MANIMTIM 100,062.05 5,930.90 495.90 1,855.00

Ako po ay kusang loob na humihingi ng inyong kapatawaran sa

pagkakataong ito bilang inyong dating manggagawa at sa tagal po rin ng
aking serbisyo sa inyong kumpanya na sana'y malugod po ninyong
pagbigyan ang aking kahilingan.

N. ANGAY 115,456.25 944.00 78.65 1,855.00

E. MANIMTIM 122,091.65 5,938.00 494.90 1,855.00
On appeal by HI-TECH, the NLRC in its Decision of 30 May 1997 vacated
and set aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision and ordered petitioners to report

Ako po ay humihingi ng kapatawaran sa management sa aming maling

pamamaraan o pagturing sa management.
21

back to work, or if no longer feasible, directed HI-TECH to pay petitioners

their separation benefits. The NLRC ruled

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its
Resolution dated 31 July 1997, petitioners are now before us imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the NLRC: (a) in ruling that petitioners voluntarily
resigned from their jobs and were not illegally dismissed; (b) in refusing to
correctly apply the law and jurisprudence relative to burden of proof in
termination cases and money claims of workers, abandonment of work and
offers made by a party in the course of litigation; and, (c) in ruling that
petitioners did not state their respective specific basic pay and the basis of
their claim that they were underpaid.

We have pored (over) the records and we find no proof to support the [labor
arbiter's] contention that soon after the union to which complainants belong
lost in the certification election, said complainants were summarily dismissed
without even the benefit of due process. There was no record that the
complainants were terminated from their employment. What is very
revealing is that the day after they lost in the certification election, they
refused to report to work for no justifiable reason which makes us believe
that they voluntarily resigned . . . . the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the
mere fact that they (complainants) filed the complaint for illegal dismissal
negates a notion of abandonment is so speculative and conjectural to be
sustained. The filing of their complaint for illegal dismissal indicates that it
was nothing but an attempt on their part to give verisimilitude to their desire
to get even with respondents.

The pivotal issues to be resolved are: first, whether petitioners deliberately

and unjustifiably abandoned their employment, or were illegally dismissed
by the management of HI-TECH; and second, whether petitioners are entitled
to back wages and other monetary benefits.
The first issue involves a question of fact. It is well-settled that factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC are generally accorded
not only respect but, at times, even finality. However, the rule is not absolute
and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the findings of
fact of the NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence, 4 capricious or
arbitrary, and directly at variance with those of the Labor Arbiter,5 this Court
may make an independent evaluation of the facts of the case.

In view of all the foregoing, the finding of the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal against respondents, the award of backwages in favor of
complainants is without any factual or legal basis. However, complainants in
their own free will and volition may return to work with respondents who are
directed to accept them without loss of seniority rights and benefits but
without backwages based on the principle of a fair day's work for a fair day's
pay . . . . the allegation of complainants that they were underpaid without
stating their respective specific basic pay and the basis of their claim that
they were underpaid cannot be given credence. Mere allegations without
supporting proofs are not evidence in themselves.

We find sufficient cause to deviate from the findings of the NLRC. It is clear
from the records that sometime in August 1994, immediately after petitioners
supposedly "refused to work" having lost earlier in the certification election,
several complaints for illegal dismissal against HI-TECH were filed by
petitioners. These are sufficient proofs that they were never guilty of leaving
their jobs. The concept of abandonment of work is inconsistent with the
22

immediate filing of complaints for illegal dismissal. An employee who took

steps to protest his layoff could not by any logic be said to have abandoned
his work.6

Neither do we subscribe to HI-TECH's argument that petitioners were highly

skilled workers, and that to abruptly terminate their services would have a
debilitating effect on the company. In this country, labor supply far exceeds
the demand. Sooner or later, equally skilled workers would be lining up to
fill the job vacancies. HI-TECH apparently adopted a rather unsound
business policy in terminating petitioners' employment, preferring to bear the
immediate and inconsequential losses in profit which, it hoped, would prove
to be temporary and minimal in the long run, as compared to the long-term
company losses that would result if they complied with union demands.
Unfortunately, they miscalculated its repercussions.

Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from

certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, there must be clear proof
of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee
relationship.7 Mere absence of the employee is not sufficient. The burden of
proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume
his employment without any intention of returning rests on the employer.8
HI-TECH failed to discharge its burden. We find its evidence consisting
mainly of the affidavit of employees and the handwritten notes of Arturo
Manimtim and Exequiel Manimtim not enough to establish that
petitioners indeed deliberately and unjustifiably abandoned their jobs. The
statements of the employees in these documents, readily acknowledging their
guilt and absolutely exonerating their employer from any liability, were
rigidly and uniformly stated, and appeared too good to be true. We are not
unaware of the schemes employed by management to extract favorable
statements from their employees and entice them to desist from pursuing
their claims in exchange for some financial considerations or promise of
immediate employment or at some future time.

HI-TECH next avers that it had expressed willingness to reinstate petitioners

to their former positions in the company, but the latter adamantly refused.
Suffice it to say that such refusal is understandable and should not be taken
against petitioners. Yielding to the company offer would deprive them of
back wages to which they are entitled thus effectively negating their cause.

The handwritten letters of Arturo Manimtim and Exequiel Manimtim spoke

of their financial plight. Without work they found it difficult to know how
their basic needs could be met. They are likely to be family men, horrified by
the thought that they could not even provide sufficiently for their young ones.
It is precisely this situation that must have compelled them to surrender to
HI-TECH and seek financial assistance.

On the second issue, the NLRC held that petitioners' claims for
underpayment of wages, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay are
without basis.

We conclude that petitioners did not abandon their jobs but were illegally
dismissed therefrom by private respondent. As a consequence, they are
entitled to reinstatement with full back wages, undiminished by earnings
elsewhere, to be computed from their illegal dismissal to their actual
reinstatement.9

We disagree. First, petitioners executed a JOINT AFFIDAVIT 10 specifying

their daily wages, positions and periods of employment, which was made the
23

basis of the Labor Arbiter's computation of the monetary awards. Second, all
that the NLRC needed to do was to refer to the prevailing minimum wage to
ascertain the correctness of petitioners' claims. Third, and most importantly,
the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the
employer. 11 InJimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission 12 we held

received by Arturo and Exequiel Manimtim as consideration for the

quitclaims be deducted from their respective monetary awards.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 30
May 1997 and Resolution dated 31 July 1997 of the National Labor
Relations Commission are SET ASIDE, and the Labor Arbiter's Decision of
15 August 1996 is REINSTATED. Private respondent is directed to reinstate
petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with
full back wages, as well as to pay their monetary benefits in accordance with
the computation made by Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon in his
Decision of 15 August 1996. However, insofar as Arturo Manimtim and
Exequiel Manimtim are concerned, this case is remanded to the Labor
Arbiter for purposes of determining the amounts they received as
consideration for their quitclaims and thereafter deducting these amounts
from their monetary awards. No costs.

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.
Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to
prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment.
The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records,
remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime,
differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been
paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and
absolute control of the employer. Thus, in choosing not to present evidence
to prove that it had paid all the monetary claims of petitioners, HI-TECH
failed once again to discharge the onus probandi. Consequently, we have no
choice but to award those claims to petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Lagatic v NLRC
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full
text
of
the
case
cited.
Xie
xie!

Finally, we note that the handwritten letters and affidavits executed by Arturo
Manimtim and Exequiel Manimtim partake of the nature of quitclaims.
Nevertheless, a deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from
demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled, or stop them from
contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of these benefits
does not amount to an estoppel. 1 However, it is but just that the amounts

RIGHT

TO

PRESCRIBE

RULES

ROMEO
LAGATIC,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITYLAND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, JESUS GO,
24

GRACE
G.R.
January

LIUSON,

and

ANDREW
No.
28,

LIUSON,

respondents

similar

121004
1998

warning.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning, petitioner again

failed to submit cold call reports for February 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12, 1993. He
was verbally reminded to submit the same and was even given up to
February 17, 1993 to do so. Instead of complying with said directive,
petitioner, on February 16, 1993, wrote a note, "TO HELL WITH COLD
CALLS! WHO CARES?" and exhibited the same to his co-employees. To
worsen matters, he left the same lying on his desk where everyone could see
it.

Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lagatic was employed in May 1986 by Cityland, first as a
probationary sales agent, and later on as a marketing specialist. He was
tasked with soliciting sales for the company, with the corresponding duties of
accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. Cold calls
refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone
directory. Cityland, believing that the same is an effective and cost-efficient
method of finding clients, requires all its marketing specialists to make cold
calls. The number of cold calls depends on the sales generated by each: more
sales mean less cold calls. Likewise, in order to assess cold calls made by the
sales staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland requires the
submission
of
daily
progress
reports
on
the
same.

On February 23, 1993, petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to

explain why Cityland should not make good its previous warning for his
failure to submit cold call reports, as well as for issuing the written statement
aforementioned. On February 24, 1993, he sent a letter-reply alleging that his
failure to submit cold call reports should trot be deemed as gross
insubordination. He denied any knowledge of the damaging statement, "TO
HELL
WITH
COLD
CALLS!"

On October 22, 1991, Cityland issued a written reprimand to petitioner for

his failure to submit cold call reports for September 10, October 1 and 10,
1991. This notwithstanding, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports
for September 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 28, as well as for
October 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14, 1992. Petitioner was required to explain
his inaction, with a warning that further non-compliance would result in his
termination from the company. In a reply dated October 18, 1992, petitioner
claimed that the same was an honest omission brought about by his
concentration on other aspects of his job. Cityland found said excuse
inadequate and, on November 9, 1992, suspended him for three days, with a

Finding petitioner guilty of gross insubordination, Cityland served a notice of

dismissal upon him on February 26, 1993. Aggrieved by such dismissal,
petitioner filed a complaint against Cityland for illegal dismissal, illegal
deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay, damages and attorney's
fees. The labor arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the
same was affirmed by the NLRC; hence the present recourse.
Issue:
W/N NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not finding that petitioner was
25

illegally

dismissed?
SO ORDERED

Held:
The

petition

lacks

merit.

To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met,

namely: (1) the employee must be afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal
must
be
for
a
valid
cause.
Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and regulations for the
government of their employees, and when employees, with knowledge of an
established rule, enter the service, the rule becomes a part of the contract of
employment. It is also generally recognized that company policies and
regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are
generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with.
Corollarily, an employee may be validly dismissed for violation of a
reasonable company rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the
company business. An employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the
employment of a person whose . . . lack of regard for his employer's rules . . .
has so plainly and completely been bared." 5 Petitioner's continued infraction
of company policy requiring cold call reports, as evidenced by the 28
instances of non-submission of aforesaid reports, justifies his dismissal.
With the finding that petitioner's dismissal was for a just and valid cause, his
claims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, must
fail.
Resolution is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Costs
against
petitioner.
26