Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2, 1990
Corporation
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CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
One salient conceptual problem with the literature pertaining to empathy is that the term has been used to refer to a variety of different emotional responses. In recent studies with adults, Batson (1987a) has
demonstrated that it is very useful to distinguish among various modes of
vicariously based emotional responses. In our work, we were particularly
interested in differentiating sympathy from personal distress reactions. We
define sympathy as an other-oriented response involving some vicariously
induced emotion (e.g., concern) whereas personal distress, as defined by
Batson (1987a), is a self-focused, aversive emotional response to another's
distress. According to Batson's (1987a) and others' work (e.g., Eisenberg,
Shea, Fabes, et al., 1989; Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen,
1988), personal distress is associated with egoistic motivation and therefore
positively related to prosocial behavior primarily when there is not an easier
way than helping to reduce one's own distress. In contrast, sympathy, which
is associated with altruistic, other-oriented motives, is positively related to
altruism even if it is easy to escape from the stimuli evoking the vicarious
emotional reaction.
In our view, both sympathy and personal distress often result from
empathy--an emotional response that stems from another's emotional state
or condition, is congruent with the other's emotional state or condition,
and involves at least a minimal degree of differentiation between self and
other (Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, in press). Sympathy differs from
empathy in that sympathy involves the other-oriented desire for the other
person to feel better and is not the same as merely feeling what the other
person feels. In our view, cognitively taking the perspective of another often
leads to empathy, which then, in combination with additional cognitive
processing, frequently results in sympathy and/or personal distress (see
Eisenberg, Shea, et al., in press, for more detail).
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METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In our research program, we have used a variety of indexes to try to
differentiate between sympathy and personal distress. Specifically, we have
used physiological and facial indexes, in addition to the more traditional
self-report indexes, to address questions of social psyChological and
developmental interest. We did so because we fett we were unlikely to substantially enhance our understanding of empathy using only the methods
that were common a few years ago.
In most of the existing research 5 years ago, self-report indexes of
empathy and related responses were the sole measure of emotional
responding, particularly in research with children. However, based on a
recent meta-analytic review (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), it has become clear
that there are substantial problems in using solely self-report indexes of
empathy, particularly with children (this probably is why Underwood and
Moore, 1982, found no relation between empathy and prosocial behavior
in their review). To summarize briefly, contrary to theory, children's self-
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Self-Report Indexes of Empathy. As Batson (1987b) has noted, the advantages of measuring empathy using self-reports are obvious. First, such
measures are easy to administer and use and can be completed in a relatively short amount of time. Second, verbal indexes can provide a relatively
differentiated measure of vicarious emotional responding, whereas other
measures may provide only a more diffuse index of empathy.
The value of self-report measures rests on the assumptions that the
research participants are aware of what they are feeling and can (and will)
report feelings accurately. There are, however, several good reasons for
questioning these assumptions. First, concern must be raised regarding the
degree to which individuals can decipher and accurately communicate their
emotional states. This concern is especially strong when self-reports are
used with young children who may have difficulty comprehending questions
or producing accurate responses regarding their emotional states. Moreover, children's ability to differentiate among closely related emotional
states (such as sympathy and personal distress) may be limited. For example, in our own research (Fabes, Eisenberg, & Miller, 1990), children's
reports of personal distress were found to be positively related to their
reports of sympathy and negative affect. Thus, children's reports of personal
distress may tap sympathy as well as (or instead of) personal distress (also
see Batson et al., 1988, for similar findings with adults).
A second concern regarding the reliability of self-reports is the previously mentioned bias that may result from self-presentation and social
desirability biases (see earlier discussion). This disadvantage may increase
in importance during the preschool years as children (particularly boys)
become increasingly reluctant to express negative affect (Brody, 1984).
Thus, subjects' self-reports often may tell us as much about how respondents want to see themselves or to be seen as how they actually feel or
respond in empathy-inducing contexts.
Facial Indexes of Empathy. Facial responses are highly accessible indexes of individuals' emotional responses. Considerable research has established the universality and reliability of some facial emotional responses
(e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1975) and interrater agreement generally has been
high on measures of facial empathy across various emotional stimuli (see
Marcus, 1987). Because facial measures of empathy can be collected in
ways that make them less subject to self-presentation or social desirability
bias (e.g., collected through a one-way mirror or with hidden cameras in
the absence of the experimenter), they may have an edge over self-report
measures of empathy.
However, facial emotional responses of emotional responding can be
falsified (e.g., they can be neutralized or masked; Shennum & Bugental,
1982). Similar to the findings regarding the verbal expression of negative
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which two boys became frightened because they were home alone and there
was a strange man lurking outside the house (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1986).
Children reported more happiness, sadness, and sympathy, and less distress,
in response to the sympathy film (in comparison to the distress film), Fs
(1, 111) = 8.67, 23.98, 23.44, and 45A0ps < .004, .001, .001, and .001. They
also exhibited less facial personal distress and more concerned attention
while watching the sympathy film, j~' (t, 102) = 3.91 and 5.54, p s < .051
and .023. In addition, according to a linear trend analysis, there was a Film
x Linear trend interaction, F (1, 110) = 5.96, p < .05; H R accelerated
during the most evocative portion of the distressing film, F (1, 110) = 15.91,
p < .001, but not during the evocative portion of the sympathy film.
Similar results were obtained in a study in which college students
viewed the spina bifida film and a distressing film (about a young man
who has picked up a hitchhiker who threatens to cut off his head). The
adults reported emotional reactions consistent with the content of the
f i l m s - m o r e persona! distress was reported for the distressing film and
more sympathy in reaction to the sympathy film, all p s < .001. Relatively
little facial affect was observed in response to either film, atthough the
subjects did exhibit more facial distress in response to the distressing film.
H R decelerated during the most evocative portion of the distressing film,
perhaps because it was already heightened due to the frightening content
in earlier sections of the distressing film clip. Consistent with this explanation, H R was marginally higher during the most evocative portion of the
distressing film than during the analogous portion of the sympathy film,
p < .058.
The fourth relevant study involved a different method of inducing
vicarious emotional responses. A mood induction procedure was used to
induce personal distress and sympathetic reactions (Eisenberg, Schaller, et
at., 1988). Elementary school children and adults reminisced about two
situations, one in which they had felt anxious about their own welfare and
one in which they had been concerned about someone else's welfare. They
also talked about neutrai topics, for example, their route to school.
Throughout the inductions, H R and facial expressions were monitored;
moreover, participants reported how they felt while reminiscing (distressed,
sympathetic, and positive or negative mood).
Again the results generally were consistent with the conclusion that
HR, facial indices, and self-reported reactions could be used as markers of
sympathy and personal distress. H R was higher in the distress than in the
sympathy induction; facial sadness and concerned attention were highest in
the sympathy induction (findings for facial distress were tess clear); and
self-reports differed in ways consistent with the content of the inductions
(with the exception of males' reports of personal distress).
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tensity of affective responding and fantasy empathy. In addition, sympathy may contain elements of positive affect as well as negative effect,
e.g., feelings of warmth toward others (e.g., it frequently is assessed with
adjectives such as soft-hearted). Thus, it is questionable whether SC reactivity in studies of empathy and related emotional reactions reflects intensity of sympathy and personal distress or primarily intensity of
distress-related reactions.
Our initial data suggest that SC is a better index of personal distress
than sympathy, although it atso may reflect intensity of sympathy to some
degree. In the recent study of third and sixth graders discussed previously
(unpublished data), SC (frequency of phasic responses, mean amplitude
and rise time of phasic responses, and maximum amplitude and rise time
of phasic responses, standardized within subject) was significantly higher
in response to the evocative portion of the distressing film than the
analogous portion of the sympathy-inducing film. Across grades, all five
standardized indexes of SC were higher for the distress film than for the
sympathy film, although the effect for the mean frequency index was considerably weaker, p < .044, than those of the other indexes, all p < .001.
However, there was a Grade x Film interaction. All five indexes of SC
response were significantly higher for the distress than the sympathy film
for older children, all ps < .003; however, for third graders, the only indexes
of SC that were significantly higher for the distress film were maximum
amplitude and maximum rise time, ps < .006 and .002. Thus, although in
general children exhibited more SC in response to the distress film, this
pattern was clearer for the older children.
Similarly, in a study involving college studies (Eisenberg, Fabes,
Schaller, et al., in press), SC (i.e., number of phasic responses and mean
amplitude of phasic responses, standardized within individuals) was higher
during the evocative portions of a distressing film (the hitchhiker film
described previously) than during the sympathy-inducing portions of the
spina bifida film, all ps <.001. Moreover, tonic level was higher during the
distressing film.
Additional data in these studies suggested that SC was an index of
personal distress rather than sympathy, particularly for girls. In the study
involving children, high SC (a composite index of all five measures of SC)
was positively related to girls' (but not boys') facial personal distress and
negatively correlated with scores on the Bryant (1982) questionnaire
measure of empathy. SC, unlike facial expressions (for boys) and HR, also
was unrelated to donating. In addition, in the study involving adults, SC
during the distress film was positively related to self-reported distress in
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REFERENCES
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