CASES

FOR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

1. Cardidad De SyQuia vs Board of Power and Water Works (formerly Public Service Commission), Rafael Ruiz, Peter
Enriquez and Cyril Moses
November 29, 1976

Facts:
- December 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with the Board charging petitioner as
administrator of the South Syquia Apartment with the offense of selling electricity without a permit or franchise
issued by respondent board.
- Petitioner maintains that there was a contractual obligation of the tenants and that this was beyond the boards
jurisdiction.
- Petitioner says that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants
as the end-users their legitimate current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.
- The main complaints of the private respondents relate to the payment of the electricity for the common areas
which the petitioner advances and then reimburses from the tenants pro rata.
- Board decided that private respondents should not be responsible to pay for the common areas electricity,
hence the current petition questioning the jurisdiction of the board to decide on such matters.
-
Issue: Whether the board lacks jurisdiction.

Held: Yes, the board does not have any jurisdiction on the matter.
- The respondent board being a mere regulatory board exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance and
adjudicating the complaints filed. (Powers of the board were vested by the Public Service Act)
- The matter raised being purely civil, should be adjudged by the applicable provisions of the Civil Code and not
the Public Service Act, and adjudged by the regular courts.
- The board acquired no jurisdiction over the petitioners contractual relations with the respondents since he is
not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.

Take note, the court only said the said board had no jurisdiction to act on the issue given to the board as the matter
was purely civil in manner.


2. Globe Wireless LTD vs Public Service Comission and Antonio Arnaiz
January 21, 1987

Facts:
- Globe Wireless LTD challenged in this petition for the jurisdiction of the defunct Public Service Commission to
discipline and impose a fine upon the petitioner, a duly-organized Philippine corporation engaged in
international telecommunication business.
- A message between Maria Diaz and Arnaiz was mislaid which resulted to non-delivery of the message. Arnaiz
then complained to the Public Service Commissioner.
- PSC then, after a hearing, fined Globe.
- Hence this petition questioning the jurisdiction of the PSC.

Issue: Whether PSC has jurisdiction in the matter.

Held: No, PSC does not have jurisdiction in the matter
- Public Service Act, bested the jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises,
equipment and other properties.
1

However, section 5 of RA 4630 (legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating) limited respondent
Commissions jurisdiction over only the rate which petitioner may charge the public.
Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the rates
which the grantee may charge the public subject to international commitments made or adhered to by the
Republic of the Philippines.
The act complained of had nothing to do with the rate that the petitioner was charging.
Commission was also empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public
Service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or ay order, decisions of the Commission, in
this case, the petitioner operated under a legislative franchise thus no certificate was violated.

3. Philippine Lawyers Association vs Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent office
Febuary 16, 1959

Facts:
- This is a petition for prohibition and injunction against Agrava.
- Agrava as the director of the Philippines Patent Office issued a circular that he had scheduled an examination for
the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office.
- Petitioners say that the circular was in excess of Agravas jurisdiction and is in violation of the law as he cannot
impose another condition precedent for the lawyers to practice before the Patent Office.

Issue: Does the Director have the power and the jurisdiction to compel the lawyers to take a test before being
allowed to practice before the Patent office.

Held: No, the Director acted beyond his powers.
- Part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders
and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court has exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.
- Any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing, may practice law anywhere and before any entity in the
Philippines.
- Director is not expressly authorized by law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him
to submit to an examination, even if they are already members of the bar.
- Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of
his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his
bureau. This does not allow the chief bureau to impose additional requirements to practice in front of them.
- Allowing the patent office to impose additional constraints to lawyers, would pave the way for other offices to
do the same.


4. Jose Guevara vs. Comelec
July 31, 1958

Facts:
- Petitioner was ordered by the Comelec to show cause why he should not be published for contempt for having
published in the Sunday Times an article entitled Ballot Boxes Contract Hit. (Concerning the awarding of a
contract for the manufacture of bollet boxes)
- The article was said to have influenced the Commission and its members in the adjudication of a controversy
then pending investigation and determination before the body.
2

Petitioner in his answer said that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish him and granted that it had to
power to punish him in contempt, the same cannot applied to the instant case, where the Commission is
exercising a purely administrative function of purchasing ballot boxes.
- Hence the case was elevated to the SC, in view of the issue raised.

Issue: Whether the Commission has the jurisdiction to investigate and punish the petitioner for contempt in
connection with the alleged publication.

Held: No, the Commission does not have to power to do so.
- Constitution defines the powers of Comelec as follows: "shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions,
affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials"
- Comelec has the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections and any
controversy submitted to it in connection with elections.
- The purchasing and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections Is only a ministerial
duty of the Commission.
- In proceeding with the controversy between several dealers, the Comelec only discharged a ministerial duty and
did not exercise and judicial function.
- "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order
in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the administration of justice"


5. Ang Tibay and National Workers Brotherhood vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union Inc.
February 27, 1940

Facts:
- Teodoro owns Ang Tibay which supplied leather soles to the army.
- Teodoro claims that a shortage of leather soles made it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of
the NLU
- CIR then decided on the case which was subsequently reached the SC but a new motion for a new trial was
raised by the NLU saying Teodoros claims were false and unsupported.
- Ang Tibay opposes the motion for a new trial.
-
Issue: What is the nature of the powers of the CIR and the guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of
cases brought before it and whether there should be a new trial.

Held: There should be a new trial and the powers of the CIR are explained below.
- The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103).
- It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
- Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only
cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic.
- CIR exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees.
- It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them.
3

CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but
may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
These are the rights which must be followed:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and submit evidence in
support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
NLU should be given a chance to receive all evidence which may be relevant to the case.

6. Magcamit vs. Internal Affairs Service-Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency as represented by Remeo Enriquez and
Director General Dionisio Santiago
January 25, 2016

Facts:
- A letter addressed to Director Santiago by a certain Delfin gave information about an alleged extortion done to
his mother by Magcamit and other PDEA agents.
- The PDEA agents denied this allegation.
- Magcamit and his co-agents were charged with Grave Misconduct for demanding P200,000 from Luciana Jaen in
exchange for her release in a buy-bust operation.
- Special Investigator V Enriquez found Magcamit and the others liable for grave misconduct and recommended
that they be dismissed from the civil service.
- They were dismissed.
- Magcamit cite several procedural lapses and say that the decision was not supported by the evidence on record.
- CSC denied Magcamits appeal.
- CA also denied his petition for review.
- Hence this case at the SC.

Issue: Whether Magcamits dismissal was supported by the evidence.

Held: No, Magcamits dismissal was not supported by substantial evidence.
- Administrative determinations of contested cases are by their nature quasi-judicial there is no requirement for
strict adherence to technical rules that are observed in truly judicial proceedings.
- Technical rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings.
- Rules stated in Ang Tibay v. CIR are again reiterated by the court.
- The letters as well as some of the affidavits were never shown to Magcamit.
- The way the evidence against him came out, in which he could not properly dispute the allegations against him
as he was not properly appraised of all the evidence against him blindsided him.
- The requirement that the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected was not complied with.
- Magcamit was dismissed from the service based on evidence that had not been disclosed to him.

4

7. Secretary of Justice vs Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez

January 18, 2000

Facts:
- An extradition request was given to the Philippines by the US for Mark Jimenez.
- Mark Jimenez asked to be given a copy or access to the request of the US but was denied stating secrecy
between US and the Philippines.
- Mark Jimenez then filed with the RTC of NCR to compel the Secretary of Justice, Foreign affairs and Director of
NBI to compel them to furnish the documents to him.
- The mandamus was granted.
- Secretary of Justice then initiated the proceedings with the court.

Issue: Is Mark Jimenez entitled to the two basic rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings.

Held: Yes, Secretary of Justice ordered to furnish the copies of the request to Mark Jimenez.
- During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings the nature of the role of the DOJ is to file the
extradition petition after the request has been forwarded by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
- It is the Sec. of Foreign Affairs who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers.
- In this case, the DOJ took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the
same.
- The evaluation is sui generis wherein it is not a criminal investigation but also erroneous to say that it is purely
an exercise of ministerial functions.
- At this stage, the executive authority has the power to (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness
and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the
supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or
not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation.
- The evaluation process is a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial
power.
- Quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved
- The evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee.
- The notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with.
- When the individual himself is involved in official government action because such action has a direct bearing on
his life, he has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.













5

JUDICIAL REVIEW CASES

1. SPOUSES ABEJO V. HON. DELA CRUZ (Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction)
NO. L-63558. MAY 19, 1987

TEEHANKEE, C.J.;

FACTS:
-This case involve the question of who, between the Regional Trial Court and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between the principal stockholders of the
corporation Pocket Bell Philippines, Inc. (Pocket Bell), a "tone and voice paging corporation.

-Namely, the spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo (hereinafter referred to as the Abejos) and the purchaser, Telectronic
Systems, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Telectronics) of their 133,000 minority shareholdings (for P5 million) and of
63,000 shares registered in the name of Virginia Braga and covered by five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her
(for P1,674,450.00), OR the spouses Agapito Braga and Virginia Braga (hereinafter referred to as the Bragas), erstwhile
majority stockholders.

-With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the majority stockholder, holding 56% of the outstanding stock
and voting power of the corporation Pocket Bell.

-With the said purchases in 1982, Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the corporation, Norberto Braga, to
register and transfer to its name, and those of its nominees the total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares in the corporation's
transfer book, cancel the surrendered certificates of stock and issue the corresponding new certificates of stock in its
name and those of its nominees.

-Norberto Braga, the corporate secretary and son of the Bragas, refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in
the corporate books, asserting that the Bragas claim preemptive rights over the 133,000 Abejo shares and that Virginia
Braga never transferred her 63,000 shares to Telectronics but had lost the five stock certificates representing those
shares.

-The Bragas assert that the regular civil court has original and exclusive jurisdiction as against the Securities and
Exchange Commission, while the Abejos claim the contrary.

ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the matter?

HELD:
-Disputes involving controversies between and among stockholders fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the SEC under Section 5 of PD 902-A.The very complaint of the Bragas for annulment of the sales and transfers as filed
by them in the regular court questions the validity of the transfer and endorsement of the certificates of stock, claiming
alleged pre-emptive rights in the case of the Abejos' shares and alleged loss of the certificates and lack of consent and
consideration in the case of Virginia Braga's shares.
-Such dispute clearly involves controversies "between and among stockholders/' as to the Abejos' right to sell and
dispose of their shares to Telectronics, the validity of the latter's acquisition of Virginia Braga's shares, who between the
Bragas and the Abejos' transferee should be recognized as the controlling shareholders of the corporation, with the right
to elect the corporate officers and the management and control of its operations.

-Such a dispute and case clearly fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC to decide, under Section 5
of P.D. 902-A, above-quoted.
-The restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court restraining Telectronics agents and representatives from
enforcing their resolution constituting themselves as the new set of officers of Pocket Bell and from assuming control of
6

the corporation and discharging their functions patently encroached upon the SEC's exclusive jurisdiction over such
specialized corporate controversies calling for its special competence.
-As stressed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the SEC, the Court has held that "Nowhere does the law [PD 902-A]
empower any Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] to interfere with the orders of the Commission," and
consequently "any ruling by the trial court on the issue of ownership of the shares of stock is not binding on the
Commission" for want of jurisdiction.

-Filing of action for rescission and annulment of sale of stocks before the Regional Trial Court will in no way deprive
the SEC of its primary and exclusive jurisdiction to grant or not the writ of mandamus ordering the registration of
shares so transferred.The claims of the Bragas, which they assert in their complaint in the Regional Trial Court,
praying for rescission and annulment of the sale made by the Abejos in favor of Telectronics on the ground that they had
an alleged perfected pre-emptive right over the Abejos' shares as well as for annulment of sale to Telectronics of Virginia
Braga's shares covered by street certificates duly endorsed by her in blank, may in no way deprive the SEC of its primary
and exclusive jurisdiction to grant or not the writ of mandamus ordering the registration of the shares so transferred.
-The Bragas' contention that the question of ordering the recording of the transfers ultimately hinges on the question of
ownership or right thereto over the shares notwithstanding, the jurisdiction over the dispute is clearly vested in the SEC.


2. BERNARDO V. ABALOS (Administrative Exhaustion)
G.R. No. 137266. December 5, 2001

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:

FACTS:
-This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of Resolution No. 98-3208 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc promulgated on December 1, 1998 dismissing the complaint for vote buying filed by petitioners
against respondents.

-On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz filed with the COMELEC a
criminal complaint against respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos, Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta
and Arcadio de Vera for vote buying in violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and Section 68 of the OEC. The complaint, docketed as E.O. Case
No. 98-110,2 alleged that:

-On April 14, 1998 (Tuesday), respondent Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., and his son respondent
Benjamin Benhur C. Abalos, Jr., candidate for City Mayor of the same city in the May 11, 1998 elections, conspiring
with respondents Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Schools Division Superintendent, Romeo F. Zapanta, Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent, and Arcadio de Vera, President, Mandaluyong Federation of Public School Teachers, sponsored,
arranged and conducted an all-expense-free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City public
school teachers, registered voters of said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort, Sariaya, Quezon Province.

-During the whole-day affair, the background music loudly and repeatedly played over the sound system was the
political jingle advertisement of Mandaluyong City candidate for Mayor, Benjamin Benhur Abalos, Jr., sang to the tune
of the song SHA LALA LALA. Some of the participants wore T-shirts with the name of candidate Benhur Abalos, Jr.,
printed in oversized colored letters.

-Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech wherein he offered and promised the Mandaluyong City public school
teachers and employees a hazard pay of P1,000.00, and increasing their allowances from P1,500.00 to P2,000.00 for
food, or with a total of P3,000.00 which they will get by the end of the month.

7

-The offers and promises to said public school teachers, who are members of the Board of Election Inspectors of
Mandaluyong City and registered voters thereat, were made a few weeks before the election to induce or unduly
influence the said teachers and the public in general (the other guests) to vote for the candidacy of Benjamin Benhur
Abalos, Jr..

-The offers and promises of Mayor Abalos, Sr., and the enthusiastic acceptance of said monetary increase of allowances
by the public school teachers and employees of Mandaluyong City, is a violation of Section 261 pars. (a), (b) and (j) of the
Omnibus Election Code against vote-buying and vote-selling.3

-The Director4 of the Law Department of the COMELEC conducted a preliminary investigation. All the private
respondents filed separate counter-affidavits5 with prayer to dismiss the complaint.

-On November 26, 1998, the Director of the Law Department submitted his findings to the COMELEC En
Banc recommending that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

-On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution No. 98-32086 dismissing the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case, Considering that this complaint, being criminal in nature, must
have all its allegations supported by direct, strong, convincing and indubitable evidence; and that the submitted
evidence of the complainant are mere self-serving statements and uncorroborated audio and visual recordings and a
photograph; and considering further that the evidence of the respondents have more probative value and believable
than the evidence of said complainants; and that the burden of proof lies with the complainants and not with the
respondents.7

-On February 09, 1999, petitioners, without first submitting a motion for reconsideration, filed the instant petition with
this Court. They alleged therein that the COMELEC En Banc, in issuing Resolution No. 98-3208 dated December 1, 1998,
acted with apparent grave abuse of discretion.8

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said resolution.

HELD:
-Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek a
reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, thus:
Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed.The following pleadings are not allowed:
x x x
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases;

In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC cited a valid reason for dismissing petitioners complaint against private
respondents for vote buying. The COMELEC found that the evidence of the respondents have more probative value and
believable than the evidence of the complainants; and that the evidence submitted by petitioners are mere selfserving statements and uncorroborated audio and visual recording and a photograph.

-If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and
inexpensive recourse, but if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of
discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for certiorari.Contrary to petitioners statement
that a resort to a motion for reconsideration is dilatory, it bears stressing that the purpose of the said motion is to give
the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion
for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a
patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a
petition for certiorari.

8

-Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged Resolution, the petitioners instant
petition for certiorari is certainly premature.A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, can only be resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,and adequate remedy in
theordinary course of law. Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged Resolution,
petitioners instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not raised any plausible reason for their
direct recourse to this Court.


3. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES V. CA (Primary Jurisdiction)
G.R. No. 88550. April 18, 1990

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:
-This petition seeks the review and reversal of the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 12660,
which ruled adversely against petitioner herein.

-Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau
of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with
the then Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which,
together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called Giporlos Area.

-IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the countrys over-all coal supply-demand balance
x x x the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which
was already developing the coal deposit in another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should
be awarded to MMIC (Rollo, p. 37). Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned
and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEIs coal operating
contract.

-Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against
MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
150,2 alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even before the Memorandum of Agreement was
finalized and approved by the BED; that MMIC discontinued work thereon; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal
operating contract for the adjacent coal blocks; and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the reimbursements agreed
upon and to assume IEIs loan obligation as provided in the Memorandum of Agreement (Rollo, p. 38). IEI also prayed
that the Energy Minister be ordered to approve the return of the coal operating contract from MMIC to petitioner, with
a written confirmation that said contract is valid and effective, and, in due course, to convert said contract from an
exploration agreement to a development/production or exploitation contract in IEIs favor.

-Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC.

-In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement, declared the
continued efficacy of the coal operating contract in favor of IEI; ordered the reversion of the two coal blocks covered by
the coal operating contract; ordered BED to issue its written affirmation of the coal operating contract and to
expeditiously cause the conversion thereof from exploration to development in favor of IEI; directed BED to give due
course to IEIs application for a coal operating contract; directed BED to give due course to IEIs application for three
more coal blocks; and ordered the payment of damages and rehabilitation expenses (Rollo, pp. 9-10).

-In reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the rendition of the summary judgment was not proper since
there were genuine issues in controversy between the parties, and more importantly, that the Trial Court had no
9

jurisdiction over the action considering that, under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to
decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
-Incidentally, the records disclose that during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Court, the suit against
the then Minister of Energy was dismissed and that, in the meantime, IEI had applied with the BED for the development
of certain coal blocks.

ISSUE:
-Whether or not civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement
concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks.
-Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that it is the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) which
has jurisdiction over said action and not the civil court.

HELD:
Administrative Law; Contracts; Rescission of Contracts; Jurisdiction; Continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract
and giving due course to application for coal blocks are matters within the domain of Bureau of Energy
Development.While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract
cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coaloperating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of
whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the
integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective of rationalizing the countrys over-all coalsupply-demand balance. IEIs cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it
of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial
Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEIs favor and directed the BED to give
due course to IEIs application for three (3) more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the
BED.

-Bureau of Energy Development, Functions of.For the BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board
(abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is tasked with the function of establishing a comprehensive
and integrated national program for the exploration, exploitation, and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such
as the countrys coal resources; adopting a coal development program; regulating all activities relative thereto; and
undertaking by itself or through service contracts such exploitation and development, all in the interest of an effective
and coordinated development of extracted resources.

-Powers and Functions of Energy Development Board, transferred to Bureau of Energy Development.That law
further provides that the powers and functions of the defunct Energy Development Board relative to the
implementation of P.D. No. 972 on coal exploration and development have been transferred to the BED, provided that
coal operating contracts including the transfer or assignment of interest in said contracts, shall require the approval of
the Secretary (Minister) of Energy (Sec. 12, P.D. No. 1206).

-Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may
occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also
judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, italics supplied).

10

-Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be
exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a
technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the
matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the
exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial
judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to
proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

-One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular
courts (Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National Housing Authority,153 SCRA 399, at 407).

-The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It
need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.
Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.

-Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to an administrative agency are secured, and the
limited function of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort, for ascertaining and
interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues, to agencies that are better equipped than courts by
specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure (Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570).


4. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (Primary Jurisdiction)
G.R. No. 87146. December 11, 1991

MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:
-This petition for certiorari assails Resolution No. 89031 dated January 17, 1989, of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
denying the appeal of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from the order of the Merit Systems Protection
Board (Board) dated September 2, 1988.

-As far as the service record of private respondent Salazar filed with the CSCNational Capital Region (NCR) revealed,
she was employed by GSIS as a casual laborer on September 23, 1968. She became a permanent employee in the same
office on February 28, 1974 with a designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical
Assistant Aide also under permanent status on December 9, 1975 (p. 37,Rollo).

-Salazars GSIS Service Record however, revealed that also on December 9, 1975, she was appointed to the position of
Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a
permanent status. On August 13, 1982, she was promoted to Technical Assistant III, (p. 58, Rollo), the position she held
when on May 16,1986, her services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the
GSIS for the reason that her position, was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority, Roman A. Cruz, Jr.

-Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but reconsideration was denied. Thereafter,
she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17,
The said Review Committee referred the petition both to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the Civil Service
Commission, stating that Salazars removal or separation from office was not by virtue of the general reorganization
program of the government for which the Review Committee was created,

11

-On July 22, 1987, the Civil Service Commission, issued Resolution No. 87230 directing the reinstatement of Salazar, the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission directs the immediate reinstatement of Ms. Salazar with back salaries and other benefits
due her without prejudice to the final determination of the position, if any, to which she may have been subsequently
appointed.
x x x. (p. 38, Rollo)
GSIS, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 14,
1987 (pp. 3942).

-On the other hand, the Board, acting on the same petition of Salazar referred to it by the Review Committee, issued an
Order on March 9, 1988, finding the petition of Salazar for reinstatement, without merit and affirmed her termination.
The dispositive portion of the decision is quoted as follows:
This Board agrees with the contention of the GSIS President and General Manager that the petitioner was not
dismissed but that her employment ended with the termination of office of the previous GSIS President, since her
position as Technical Assistant III is confidential in nature, hence, belongs to the non-career service. x x x.
x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Board finds the petition without merit. The termination of Ms. Ma. Asuncion S. Salazar as
Technical Assistant III is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED." (pp. 4546, Rollo)

-On April 20,1988, Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Boards order and manifested that the Commission
already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988, the Board set aside its previous Order affirming
Salazars dismissal in view of the Commissions prior resolution of the case.

On August 18,1988, GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 30, 1988 Order of the Board. On September
2,1988, the Board denied the motion. The pertinent portion of the Order states:
Records show that the Resolution dated April 22, 1987, of the Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17
relative to the petition for reconsideration of the termination of the services of Ms. Salazar as Technical Assistant III in
the GSIS, was forwarded to the Merit Systems Protection Board.

-In an Order dated March 9,1988, this Board affirmed the termination of the services of Ms. Salazar. However, in a
position paper dated April 20,1988 of Ms. Salazar, this Board was informed that the same petition had already been
resolved by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution dated July 22, 1987, directing the GSIS to reinstate her in the
service. So, this Board in an Order dated June 30, 1988, set aside its previous Order dated March 9, 1988.

ISSUE: GSIS filed the instant petition for certiorari, raising the following issues for resolution:
The questions presented in this petition may be summarized into two: (1) which body has jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions of government officers on personnel matters? and (2) was the position last held by private respondent
primarily confidential in nature?

HELD:
-Civil Service; Appeals from decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action; Jurisdiction.When the law
bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be
presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409
clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of
appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases
specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which
directly gives it such power, to wit: SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions: x x x j) Hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal.
12


-Same; Same; Same.The Commission, however, is not without power. As the final arbiter on any matter concerning
personnel action in the government, the Commission is empowered by P.D. 1409, to review the decisions of the Board,
as follows: Section 8. Relationship with the Civil Service Commission.Decisions of the Board involving the removal of
officers and employees from the service shall be subject to automatic review by the Commission. The Commission shall
likewise hear and decide appeals from other decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions of the Commission shall
be subject to review only by the Courts. In the case at bar, We note that the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the
Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17 to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service
Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot legally assume
jurisdiction over the appeal.

-Same; Career service;Primarily confidential positions;Nature of position depends upon nature of functions.Whether
the position of Technical Assistant III belongs to the career service where the incumbent enjoys a security of tenure or
primarily confidential where her tenure is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or endures only as long as
confidence in her exists (See Pacete vs. Acting Chairman of COA, et al., G.R. No. 39456, 7 May 1990) depends upon the
nature of the functions of the office (Borres vs. Court of Appeals, L36845, August 21, 1987). Not even the fact that the
position had already classified as one under the career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission, can conceal or alter a positions being confidential in nature (See Hon. Simplicio Grino, et al. vs. CSC, et al.,
G.R. No. 91602, February 26,1991).


5. PAAT V. CA (Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies)
G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997

TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS:
-Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover
a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines?

-Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

-The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman
while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck
and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation.

-On June 22, 1989,1 the Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner of Layugans action
of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended
by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22,
1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.2

-Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents
statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then this
letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.3
13


-Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private
respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of
Cagayan,5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no
cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

-The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989.7 Their motion for reconsideration
having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals
which sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.8

-Hence, this present petition,9 with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to
reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of
the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners
was granted by this Court.

-Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A
of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.

-Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant
case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were
not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary
of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal
forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

HELD:
-Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion
that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

-This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence,
if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before courts judicial power can be sought.

-The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.11Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expense and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the
courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule.

-This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,13(2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question,14(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,16 (5) when there is
irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter,18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
14

unreasonable,19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings,21 (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.22

-In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was
forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents
through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,23 private respondents clearly
recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their
case.

-It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and
open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek the courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during
the pendency of an administrative proceedings.

-Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the
domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.25

-Administrative Law;Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence,
if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before courts judicial power can be sought.
-The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the
courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case.

Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence.Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR
should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
15

Same; Same; Due Process;Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect
bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within
the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can
not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation
of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petiioner Layugan.
-This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private respondents
were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28,
1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan.


6. VALMONTE V. BELMONTE (Exception: Pure Legal Question)
G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989

CORTS, J.:

FACTS:
-Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and
pray that respondent be directed:
1. to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
2. to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
3. to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:

June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila

Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished with the list of
names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each
on guarantty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs.
Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.

If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?

We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. W, Sec. 6).

16

We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on the matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:

June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City

Dear Companero:

Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President & General Manager
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of June 4,1986 requesting a list of the
opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs.
Imelda Marcos.

My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I regret very much
that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.

Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]

-On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Govenrment Service and Insurance System (GSIS)
Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply,
(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest. [Rollo, p. 8.]

-On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.

-On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and
regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p.
41.]

-Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated
reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having
complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the interpretation of the scope constitutional right to information is purely a legal question.

HELD:
-Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Information;Administrative Law;Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies; As the issue involved herein is the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information
which is purely a legal question, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is warranted.Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be
17

allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the
law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the
errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106
Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971,40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No.
L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.]
-The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information,
is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees,
involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves
to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right to information.

-Same; Same; Same; The right to information is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuses in the government.The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government.

-Same; Same;Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; The constitutional right to information is not an
absolute right, hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of public interest
or public concern and that the same is not exempted by law from the operation of such constitutional right.Yet,
likely all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi,the peoples right to
information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. Similarly, the States policy of full disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information
sought is of public interest or public concern, and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]

-Same; Same; Same; Public Interest and Public Concern;The information sought by herein petitioners as to the truth of
reports that some opposition members were granted clean loans by the GSIS is a matter of public interest and
concern.The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secureclean loans from the GSIS immediately before the
February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. The GSIS is a trustee
of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146,
as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the
contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as well as the obligations
which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is
expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and
regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA. No. 186, as amended) was the
necessity to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System [Second Whereas
Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS is not supposed to grant clean loans.
[Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the ligitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the
supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS
and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of
fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and
18

the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern.

Same; Same; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, it cannot be
invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.When the information requested from the government intrudes into the
privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the
Court in Morfeis that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and
governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in
the case ofVassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name
since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation
would have no such ground for relief.

Same; Same; Same; The right to information does not include the right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like.However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought
by petitioners, i.e., to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to access to official records,
the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. It must be stressed that it is
essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the
respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,
1968, 126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners
fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.


5. MANGUBAT V. OSMENA (Exceptions: Patently Illegal)
[No. L-12837. April 30, 1959]

FACTS:
-Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering appellees' reinstatement in the Police
Department of Cebu City and payment of their back salaries. Petitioners Mangubat and Mundo, who are civil service'
eligibles, were detectives when their services were terminated by the City Mayor on December 10, 1953 and January
11, 1954, respectively, for lack of trust and confidence.

-Thereupon, respondents Bacalan and Ramos were appointed to their positions, and collected the corresponding
compensation. Having failed to secure reinstatement, petitioners instituted the present case for quo warranto and
mandamus. Subsequently, Mangubat was reinstated by the Acting Mayor but he was not allowed to collect back
salaries. After trial, the court rendered the above-mentioned decision. Appellants seeks reversal maintaining that (a) the
City of Cebu was not included as an indispensable party and (b) petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.

HELD: As regards the action for quo warranto, the City of Cebu is neither an indispensable nor a necessary party. The
proper parties therein, as respondents, are the holders of the office or employment involved in the case. It is,
however, an indispensable party in the action for mandamus. In the case at bar, the funds appropriated for the
positions involved have already been collected by respondents Bacalan and Ramos, and in order that petitioners
could get back salaries, the City of Cebu would have to assume a supplemental appropriation, corresponding to said
back salaries. In this limited sense, a writ of mandamus directing the mayor, the auditor, the treasurer and the
19

municipal board to pass in audit and pay the back salaries in question would amount to the imposition of an
additional obligation upon the City of Cebu, and this requires the intervention of the latter as an indispensable party.


However, those requirements have been substantially complied with in the case at bar. The parties therein have
handled the case, and the same was heard and decided in the lower court, as if the City had been named respondent
in the pleadings.

As to the second assignment of error, it is now well-settled that, when, from the very beginning, the action of the City
Mayor is patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive; when there has been no semblance of compliance, or even an
attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when, manifestly, the Mayor has acted without jurisdiction, or has
exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; when his
act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority, as in the case at bar, the employee adversely affected
may forthwith seek the protection of the judicial department.

6. PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN
[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2001]

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
-This involves a criminal complaint for violation of the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines, against the captain and
crew of the M/L Hadija as it was found that its documents were irregular and incomplete.
-DENR thus took possession of tanbarks and so the consignee of the goods in M/L Hadija, Hernandez, filed in RTC a case
for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR.
-Respondent Judge Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed respondent Sheriff IV Aguilar to take possession of the
items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days.
-This resulted to the filing of this administrative complaint against respondents by Atty. Tabao.
-Complainant claims that respondent judge cannot claim ignorance of the proceedings in I.S. No. 98-296 for the
following reasons:
(1) the defendants in the replevin case were all DENR officers, which should have alerted respondent judge to the
possibility that the items sought to be recovered were being held by the defendants in their official capacities; and
(2) the complaint for replevin itself states that the items were intercepted by the NBI for verification of supporting
documents, which should have made respondent judge suspect that the same were being held by authority of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for Judge Lilagan to issue a writ of replevin for Hernandez, the consignee, to take
possession of the cargo consisting of tanbarks, seized and in possession of DENR.

HELD:
NO.
-The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark as well as the vessel on which it was loaded were
seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the
DENR for official disposition and appropriate action.
-A copy of the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was attached to the complaint. To our mind, these allegations
would have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that
administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.
-Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies of special competence. Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from
the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to
have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.
20

-Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order the
confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances
used in the commission of the offense.
-In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals: the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

-By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine
a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction.
-The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative.
-The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.


7. ARROW TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and SULTAN RENT-A-CAR,
INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-39655
March 21, 1975
FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
-Arrow Transportation has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility bus air-conditionedauto-truck service.
-Sultan Rent-A-Car filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to
operate a similar service on the same line.
-Eight days later, without the required publication, the Board issued an order granting it provisional permit to operate
such auto-truck service on the line applied for.
-There was a motion for reconsideration and for the cancellation of such provisional permit filed, but without awaiting
final action thereon, this petition was filed.
-This is the explanation: "That petitioner has not waited for the resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration before
going to this Court considering that the question involved herein is purely a legal one, aside from the fact that the
issuance of the Order without the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction."
-It denied the allegation that there must be a publication before a provisional permit can be issued, reference being
made, as noted, to Presidential Decree No. 101, which authorized respondent Board to grant provisional permits when
warranted by compelling circumstances and to proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisional permit issued by BOT to Sultan Rent-A-Car was proper.

HELD:
YES.
-It is the well-settled doctrine that for a provisional permit, an ex parte hearing suffices. The decisive consideration is the
existence of the public need.
-That was shown in this case, respondent Board, on the basis of demonstrable data, being satisfied of the pressing
necessity for the grant of the provisional permit sought.
-It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed there was pending with the respondent Board a motion for
reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded on prematurity can
be raised. Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner would stress that certiorari lies as the failure to observe procedural due
process ousted respondent Board of whatever jurisdiction it could have had in the premises.
21

-This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the
issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled.
-As was set forth in Executive Order No. 101 which prescribes the procedure to be followed by respondent Board, it is
the policy of the State, as swiftly as possible, to improve the deplorable condition of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum
utilization of existing public motor vehicles and eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, as
well as update the standard of those carrying such business, making it "imperative to provide, among other urgently
needed measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing, redefining, or modifying the lines and mode of operation of
public utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter, may operate in this country.

-It is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding public to ascertain whether or
not the procedure followed in this case and very likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the procedural due process
requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication becomes apparent.


8. KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA,
INC. (KBMBPM) vs. HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE: Exception to the Doctrine of Administrative Remedies

FACTS:
-Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract with the
KBMBPM represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's management and operation of the new
Muntinlupa public market.
-The KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying the New Muntinlupa Public
Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 175 and Letter of Implementation
No. 23; its articles of incorporation and by-laws were registered with the then Office of the Bureau of Cooperatives
Development (thereafter the Bureau of Agricultural Cooperatives Development or BACOD and now the Cooperative
Development Authority).
-Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr., petitioner Ignacio Bunye,
claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of
Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of the
aforesaid contract. He sought opinions from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC)
on the validity of the instrument.
-Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988
Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract.
-KBMBPM filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific
performance and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-1702.
-The complaint was premised on the alleged illegal take-over of the public market effected "in excess of his (Bunye's)
alleged authority" and thus "constitutes breach of contract and duty as a public official."
-Amado Perez filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners with
oppression, harassment, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 10 for taking over
the management and operation of the public market from KBMBPM.
-Respondent Bunye claims that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
G. R. NO. 91927

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have exhausted all administrative remedies.

22

HELD:
-YES.
-As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the
latter, unless actually disapproved by him.
-This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need
then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately.

Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the
question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.


9. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners, vs. WILFREDO HERVILLA,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-65718
June 30, 1987
PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
-The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of possession and damages filed on December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo
Hervilla against DOLE Philippines involving four lots with a total area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo Hervilla,
claiming to be the successor-in- interest of his brother, Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the
former], filed with the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent Application for the
said lots. On April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant, filed with the Bureau of Lands, Manila, his free
patent application, having planted agricultural plants.
-On April 27, 1968, Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against DOLE, successor-in-interest of Candido de Pedro. Counsel
of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer requesting for the investigation of the said lots, to which a report
was rendered and an order was issued as to the adjustment of the said title numbers. The trial court dismissed the
action for recovery, to which was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court decision and declared
that the issuance of the patent title by the Bureau of Lands to Candico de Pedro is null and void. A motion for
reconsideration was filed and subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the purpose of submitting original
certificate of titles which was issued to the DOLE predecessor-in- interest by the Bureau of Lands while the case was
pending.
-The two motions were denied.

Thus this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court in deciding a case involving recovery of possession can declare null and void title issued by an
administrative body or office during the pendency of such case?

HELD:
NO.
-It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of
Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
-The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the
actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the
better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts).
-In any event, petitioners' possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance of Free Patents in
favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the courts to pursue. Thus, the private
respondent's cause of action has been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the Director of Lands.
23

-Moreover, records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners' predecessor-ininterest. Neither did he appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to
the office of the President of the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to
our mind, is fatal to a court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no
longer interfere with such decision.



10. ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. Hon. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary, and ASTERIO BUQUERON, respondents.
G.R. No. 75501 September 15, 1987
PARAS, J:

FACTS:
-Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim
with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City.
-Private respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr."
mining claims with the same Mining Recorder.
-Atlas registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the same Mining Recorder.
-Boquerns "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were duly approved by the
Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was published in the February 22 and 28,
1977 issues of the Evening Post.
-During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining claims on
the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
-After the hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, which gave preferential rights to Buqueron in his claim
except the areas covered by the adverse claim to which Atlas Consolidated has preferential rights.
-Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who rendered a decision reversing the decision of the Director of
Mines.
-Subsequently this matter was appealed to the Executive Secretary, which reversed the decision of the Minister and
reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines.
-Thus this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not findings on facts based on substantial evidence by an administrative official can be disturbed or
overturned during appeals.

Whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims is a question of fact best left to
the determination of the administrative bodies charged with the implementation of the law they are entrusted to
enforce.

HELD:
NO.
-As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or
negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence.
-Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
-In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines' decision was supported by substantial evidence.
-The Director of Mines established that there is in fact an overlapping of mining claims of petitioner and private
respondent and that as a matter of record petitioner's mining claims were registered subsequent to those of private
24

respondent with the exception of Master VII Fr. which was registered on February 9, 1972 or prior to the registration of
the mining claims of private respondent.
-After a careful appraisal of the evidence submitted, and cognizance as we are of the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 99-A, we are of the view that adverse claimant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to nullify the prior claims of
respondent. Stated differently, the evidence submitted are not sufficient to destroy the prima facie character of the
sworn declarations of location of respondent's mining claims which were duly registered on the date herein before
stated.
-Thus "A location notice certificate or statement when re-examine accorded is prima facie evidence of all the facts the
statute requires it to contain and which were sufficiently set forth" and constitute notice to all persons and to the whole
world of the contents of the same (Sec. 56 of the Mining Act, as amended).

-In the light of the aforequoted provisions of law applicable on the matter, and in view of our findings, earlier discussed,
the subsequent mining claims of adverse claimant insofar as they conflict the prior claims of respondent are hereby
declared null and void.
-On the other hand, it is also our view that respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the prior claim
of adverse claimant (Master VII Fr.) is null and void.
-Considering that this mining claim is prior in point of location and registration, it follows that this claim will have to
prevail over that of respondent.
-As earlier stated the above findings, although reversed by the Minister of Natural Resources, were affirmed by the
Office of the President.
-However, petitioner would have this Court look into the said findings because of the open divergence of views and
findings by the adjudicating authorities in this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues which warrant
appellate review (Rollo, p. 18).
-This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course subject to
certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or
mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to
factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.
-A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is present in the case at bar, which would
justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President.
On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing
Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional
evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be
respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even
if not overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission vs. Lood, supra).


11. G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner,
vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

Facts:
-Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975, a law which established the PNP and reorganized the DILG. This is in pursuance
to the constitutional provision under Article XVI, Section 6:
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be national in scope and civilian in character,
to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
-Petitioner contends that RA 6975 emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting its power
"to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department
25

Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were placed. In addition, by giving the
Governors and Mayors the power to appoint the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police respectively, they went
beyond the constitution which only intended to give operational control over the day-to-day functions to local chief
executives. The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" (or the PLEB)
and city and municipal mayors is a derogation of the commissions powers over the PNP.

ISSUE:
Whether RA 6975 violated Article XVI, Section 6 of the constitution.



HELD:
-RA 69 75 does not violate the constitution. Under the principle that the President has control of all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices and the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency" which provides that "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. Under these principles, the PNP is still under the control of the
President as they are still under control of the executive secretaries and unless revoked by the President, the act of the
Secretary is presumed the act of the Pres. Additionally although NAPOLCOM and PNP are both placed under the DILG,
the PNP is still administered and controlled by a national police commission as provided in Art. 14 of the assailed law,
which provides for the powers and functions of the commission.
-On the issue regarding the local Chief Executives, the court agreed with the SOLGEN that "there is no usurpation of the
power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local
executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies, they are answerable to the
NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the
NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM."
-Regarding the grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the PLEB and the local chief executives, there is no
derogation of powers as the Commission still exercises appellate jurisdiction over the disciplinary cases filed against a
police officer.
-Although the constitution provides for the 3 constitutional commissions independent from the executive, this does not
include the NAPOLCOM. It is well established that the NAPOLCOM shall be under the control of the President through
his alter ego or the Secretary of the interior and local government.


12. G.R. No. L-67195 May 29, 1989
Heirs of Eugenio vs. Roxas

Facts:
-Petitioner corporation, Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc.(HEVR) was incorporated by by the late Eufrocino Roxas and his
seven children for the purpose of owning and developing the properties of Eufrocino Roxas and the estate of his late
wife, Dona Eugenia V. Roxas, located in the Province of Laguna. One of the properties is the resort, Hidden Valley Springs
Resort situated in Calauan. Laguna. One of the children, Eriberto operated a restaurant and liquor concession in the
premises under the name "Hidden Valley Agri-Business and Restaurant, Inc (HVABR). When he died, his son Guilliermo
took over the business.
-It was later found out that the corp. was operating at a loss because the primary income generator, which was the
restaurant, was not being properly managed. The board of HEVR resolved that the restaurant should be handed over to
them and failure of HVABR to comply would require them to close the resort indefinitely in order to avoid further loss.
HVABR filed for an injunction and restraining order for the unilateral termination of the concession.
-In the meantime, HVABR filed with the Bureau of Tourism Services of the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) ; a petition to
increase the food and beverage prices at the resort restaurant. But was contested by HEVR. Subsequently, the trial court
ruled in favor of HEVR and upheld the closure of the resort. The case was appealed to the IAC. The MOT also
26

promulgated a resolution ordering HEVR to take over operations of the restaurant as HVABR was operating without the
requisite license.
HEVR entered into a contract of lease with Valley Resort Corporation for the entire resort, including the restaurant, for a
period of 10 years. However, respondent Guillermo Roxas doing, business under the name "MJB Food and
Services"(MJBFS) obtained a license from the Department of Tourism (DOT) to operate the restaurant at the Hidden
Valley Springs Resort, which was contested by HEVR.
-Subsequently a mayor's permit to engage in the restaurant business was issued by Hon. Jaime Gasapos, the Officer-inCharge (OIC) of Calauan, Laguna, to MJBFS and obtained the DOT license to operate the resort restaurant. HEVR
contested the issuance of such permits, filing a writ of prohibition.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can have an affirmative relief considering a license has already been issued.

Held:
-As a license to operate the restaurant had already been issued to private respondents, a writ of prohibition cannot
issue. Nevertheless, it does not mean that no other affirmative relief may be given to petitioner if found to be deserving.
For it is not the title or caption of a pleading, but the substance and averments thereof that is controlling; so that, in the
interest of justice, although a petition is styled "Prohibition", it may be considered a petition for certiorari if the facts
alleged make out a case for the issuance of the latter writ .
- It is a recognized principle that courts of justice will generally not interfere in executive and administrative matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies, such as, the grant of licenses, permits, leases, or
the approval, rejection or revocation of applications therefor. However, there is a limit to the deference accorded by the
courts to the actions of such agencies. Findings of fact by an administrative board or officials, following a hearing, are
binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave
abuse of discretion.
-The court ruled that the issuance of the restaurant license in favor of MJBFS was in lack or excess of jurisdiction.
-The DOT was fully aware of the circumstance of the ownership of the resort and that MJBFS was prohibited from
operating the restaurant. The DOT was informed of the pending cases and the resolutions on the ownership and the
rights over the resort and the restaurant as it was given proper notice of the facts, such as the RTC rulings and the IAC
injunctions in addition to the fact that before issuance of the license that the subject restaurant was covered by the
MOT approved contract of lease between petitioner and Valley Resort Corporation.
-The Court holds that it was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion on the part of public respondents to have
issued, and thereafter to have refused to revoke, the restaurant license in favor of Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS
knowing that: (1) the latter was not the owner of the restaurant for which the license was sought; (2) the latter's right to
possess the same was being disputed by no less than petitioner as restaurant owner; and, (3) the subject restaurant was
already leased to Valley Resort Corporation pursuant to a contract of lease approved by the department.
-The court ruled that the license to operate the subject restaurant in the Hidden Valley Springs Resort issued by the DOT
in favor of MJB Food and Services is NULLIFIED for being issued with lack or excess of jurisdiction.


13. G.R. No. L-29171 April 15, 1988
INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. DUMA SINSUAT etc., et al., respondents-appellees.

Facts:
-In April of 1965 two (2) Invitations To Bid were advertised by the Bureau of Supply Coordination of the Department of
General Services. The first letter contained a proviso limiting the offers to foreign made products on a CIF basis, Port of
Manila. However the second letter said that the Office would not have any objection to locally manufactured utility
truck bodies provided they conform to the approved technical specification of this Office as well as to the
manufacturer's standard product specification, since this type of body manufacture has been acceptable in most
government vehicles.
27

-Among the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc.(IPSI) and Delta Motor Corporation(Delta). IPSI subsequently won
but was questioned by Delta, claiming that trucks offered by IPSI were not factory built, as stipulated in the
specifications contained in the requisition itself and in the Invitation to Bid. The Acting Director for Supply Coordination
adjudicated and resolved the issue against Delta, claiming there was strict compliance with the requirements. Delta
again filed a protest with the Office of the Secretary of General Services claiming that IPSI's offer of locally assembled
trucks was not in accordance with the bid specification for bread new, complete and factory-built trucks. This time it was
ruled in his favor. -The secretary ruled that any amendment to the requisition by a subordinate official should have the
approval of the department head.
-IPSI filed a case with the CFI for certiorari, mandamus and injunctions. The court however ruled in favor of Delta.

Issue:
Whether or not IPSI is the valid winner of the bidding
Whether or not IPSI could have validly gone to court without first exhausting all administrative remedies
Held:
-Court held that Delta was fully aware of the amendments to the notice of bidders and still participated; only raising his
objections when he had lost. On the issue of whether the undersecretary had authority to amend the bidding notice, the
court applied the principle of regular performance of official duty. Absent a clear showing that an official act was
without or lacking authority, it is presumed to be validly done. In addition, the pertinent laws of the time should have
been applied, namely RA. 4164 which provides that the appropriation for the purchase of equipment, supplies and
materials shall be available only for those locally manufactured unless none are available or the price exceeds those
determined by the flag law by 10%. And the Flag law which states that whenever several bidders participate in a bidding
for supplying articles, materials, and equipment for any office of the government for public use ... or public works, the
award shall be made to the domestic entity making the lowest bid, provided it is not more than 15% in excess of the
lowest bid made by a bidder other than a domestic entity. Delta is acting merely as an agent of a foreign corporation,
hence IPSI was the rightful winner.
-On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, there are universally accepted axioms governing judicial review
through the extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of determinations of administrative officers or agencies:
first, that before said actions may be entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all the administrative
remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted; and second, that the administrative decision may
properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the administrative official or tribunal has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. There are however exceptions to the principle known as
exhaustion of administrative remedies, these being: (1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted
act is patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the latter's implied or assumed approval, unless
actually disapproved; or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

In view of such, court ruled in favor of IPSI, declaring it the rightful winner of the bidding.


14. G.R. No. L-19180 October 31, 1963
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant.

Facts:
-The National Development Company which is engaged in the shipping business under the name of "Philippine National
Lines" is the owner of steamship "S.S. Doa Nati" whose local agent in Manila is A. V. Rocha. On August 4, 1960, the
Collector of Customs sent a notice to C.F. Sharp & Company as alleged operator of the vessel informing it that said vessel
was apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations in that it carried an
unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
A. V. Rocha was informed of the apprehension and gave a reply stating, among other things, that the television set
referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. It further
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expressed that if explanation is not sufficient, that a formal investigation and hearing be made. The collector of customs
was unsatisfied with the explanation and maintained that the item was not exempted from tax and imposed a fine of
P5,000. Petitioners however contest the fine, claiming that the Collector of Customs had exceeded his authority by,
issuing the fine without an investigation and hearing as requested.
-Respondent set up the following special defenses: (1) the court has no jurisdiction to act on matters arising from
violations of the Customs Law, but the Court of Tax Appeals; (2) assuming that it has, petitioners have not exhausted all
available administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs; (3) the requirements of
administrative due process have already been complied with in that the written notice given by respondent to petitioner
Rocha clearly specified the nature of the violation complained of and that the defense set up by Rocha constitute merely
a legal issue which does not require further investigation; and (4) the investigation conducted by the customs authorities
showed that the television set in question was unloaded by the ship's doctor without going thru the custom house as
required by law and was not declared either in the ship's manifest or in the crew declaration list.

Issue:
Whether there was denial of due process in the imposition of the fine.

Held:
The Respondent had deprived the petitioner of his right to due process, by imposing the fine without the requested
investigation and hearing.

The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not
automatically make the vessel liable. It is necessary for the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show
otherwise. The determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is
concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely
administrative. Even in administrative proceedings, Due process is still required to be followed as enshrined in the
constitution.
That this principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated upon by this Court in the
Ang Tibay case as follows:
cardinal primary rights which must be respected The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the
duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. No only must there be some evidence
to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reason for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.


14. G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP
HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

Facts:
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-Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law". The second tarpaulin was divided in two,
those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those
who voted against it form "Team Buhay".
-The Election Officer of Bacolod City, filed a notice for the removal of the campaign materials for being oversized or
face penal sanctions. Petitioner replied requesting they be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department
regarding the tarpaulin and pending such, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain. COMELEC reiterated their stand. For
fear of prosecution, petitioner initiated proceedings for prohibition and injunction, among others.
-Respondent claims the court, whose power to review is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the
COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. In addition, the case is
violative of the hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue:
Whether the court has jurisdiction over COMELEC cases.


Held:
-As a general rule, decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly
not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review viacertiorari, an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. However there are exceptions, such as
to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,
when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent
and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
-During elections, the Supreme Court has the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any
act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions
by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts constitutional mandate to protect the people against governments
infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the
COMELEC. Hence the court can take jurisdiction over the case.
-On the issue of hierarchy of courts, the court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume
jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons. As
such, the rule is not iron-clad and may be dispensed with.
-Although the respondent claims the petitioners had violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, and therefore divest the court of jurisdiction, such is not the case in this instant. The case being already
ripe for judicial adjudication and being within the exception such as the assailed issuances violated their right to
freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question. The
circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH
Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case
would be unreasonable.

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