1

RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC.,petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea
for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later
reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of
the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to
this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent
judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should
have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de
Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require
it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is
laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more
than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the
fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners'
premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to
bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events
of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public
funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President,
like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet
asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had
been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential
Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired
results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court.
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right
to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may
properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the
hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge
of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime
of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same
at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for
one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team

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which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same
place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing
officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge
who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said
that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in
the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose
Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control
or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to
have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable
by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but
not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to
the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied
by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom
Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises
prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue
in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that
petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a
means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in
the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and
collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things
above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy
with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v.
Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in
said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by
this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable
is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought
to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme

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Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the
violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was
held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be
seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history:
the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the
Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and
destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical
episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper
or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent
danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication
of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment
and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in
subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It
is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City
and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the
disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by
the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE
FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to
close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set
aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby
granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own
reasons for holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were
issued in gross violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126
Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a
specific offense must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing
specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended.
There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It
would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla
to seize and take possession, among other things, of the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives and
purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement
and April 6 Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they
contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the
questions. I must, therefore, conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the
Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive
which has been published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same content but against
which no action has been taken.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the
owners and all of the items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence .

G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL
BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE;
JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL,
JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to
as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

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as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used
or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity
the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants,
were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962,
said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized
or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices
of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure ispurely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the
rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a

question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its
violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the
evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . .
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using
them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under
the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications.
The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom
it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest
order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority
is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant

5
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature
deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon
the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the
common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search,
their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand: As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may
have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved
to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence

obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it
used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment
was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence
seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the
sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily
that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of
the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied
in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police
officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if
he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission
of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a
probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed
By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly
abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually
but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of
the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is
watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been
committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,

6
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club,
should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein
petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and
that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations
above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest
rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over
the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has
Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in
the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies
of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof,
contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by
petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being
best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import
of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and
are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently
illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared,
abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void
the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal
standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the
three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains fromexpressly declaring
as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made
therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only
for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without
exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore
admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made
were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal
standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than
their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic
nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made
thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and
remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be
drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of
the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal
the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation.
The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners
in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or
General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2,
1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States,
296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the
defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an
apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.

7
1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs.
United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in
exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when heplaces himself or
his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in
his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an
unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the
warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court
over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth
Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we
say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.
Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here,
except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the
premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008,
Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing
cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or
through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The
petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently
gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects
seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what
it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it
is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in
evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration
has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act,
1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such
as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman
vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully

moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was entitled
to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search
and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression
of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is
under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme
Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960,
in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones
was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that
the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search
occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds:First he had a sufficient
interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises
searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation'
premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court
observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's
search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show
ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade
premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees
(including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest
and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel andVillano considered also the fact
that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296
F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that
the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of
the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected
the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers
as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural
device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United
States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,

8
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The
papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and
records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these
type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by
the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were
stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court,
relying on Jones vs. U.S.,supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d
631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; andSchwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that: It is overwhelmingly
established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell.
The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search
warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second
search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress.
Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it
matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United
States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed.
459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises
not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell,the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED
SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were
suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection
with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether
from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show
that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects
of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing
the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents and as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the
petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely
corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as
specifically mentioned in the void search warrants. Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that

although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the
constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
G.R. No. 81561
January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelleevs. ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation
to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes,
went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to
Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his
name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend
in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.
The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styrofoam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus
making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an
opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30,
October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office
at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38,
October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath
the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in
his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's
Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office,
was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the
same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry
Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering
tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

9
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED
AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED
FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's
Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should
be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal
Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme
Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20
SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's
Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of
its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is
carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and
other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United
States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous
cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as
a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than
governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the
citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the
right of seizure by process duly served.

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant
who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the
knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and
seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals
(citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of
a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it,
he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it
available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental
action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no
cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and
seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances,
the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of
the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he
opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof
to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135).
Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer,
there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202

10
[1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d
122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was
taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was
initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the
liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But
protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights
answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
(Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1,
p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by
the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The
modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did
not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree
with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be
construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private
seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of
appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation
were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and
found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law

enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed
that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should
be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the
records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under
investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you investigate the
accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional right not
to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on
cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that
appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we
have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made
to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of
conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he
was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a
German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the
cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, selfserving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a
complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of
four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to
comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a)
person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana
flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The
Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the
packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo,
p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989];
People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol,
he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of
Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also
a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from
appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p.
244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must
be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van
Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see alsoPeople v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123
SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did
not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should
have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary,
appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

11
G.R. No. L-69899 July 15, 1985
ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner, vs. HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch XCV HON. REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon City; LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT.
GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO, respondents,
RELOVA, J.:
On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City,
upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and seizure of

1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and
tapes

Which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of
inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by PD 1835 ... (p. 24, Rollo)
On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that:
2. ... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as they are,
connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the crime has been rendered moot and
academic due to the findings of the Agrava Board that a military conspiracy was responsible for the slaying of
the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 at the Manila International Airport. The Agrava Board
which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and circumstances behind the killing had virtually
affirmed by evidence testamentary and documentary the fact that soldiers killed Benigno Aquino, Jr.
4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has dismissed said case against the accused on
all documents pertinent and more so as we repeat, rendered moot and academic by the recent Agrava Report.
(p. 27, Rollo)

On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent portions
of which state: The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are
not under the control of the prosecuting arm of the government. Under these circumstances, the
proper forum from which the petition to withdraw the articles should be addressed, is the Office of
the City Fiscal, Quezon City and not with this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted that it is
not even with this Branch of the Court that the offense of inciting to sedition is pending. (p
29, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and
restraining order to enjoin respondent Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 98
from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. S3-Q-29243, praying (a) that Search Warrant
No. Q-00002 issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio and
that a mandatory injunction be issued directing respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City and
Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio jointly and severally to return immediately the
documents/properties illegally seized from herein petitioner and that final injunction be issued
enjoining respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo and 1st Lt. Ignacio from
utilizing said documents/properties as evidence in Criminal Case No. 29243; and (b) that
respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo Ignacio be directed to
reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco
Building, T.M., Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.
In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their comment. The plea
for temporary restraining order was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City,
Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were enjoined from introducing as evidence

for the state the documents/properties seized under Search Warrant No. Q-00002 in Criminal Cage
No. Q-29243 (Sedition case against petitioner), pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 98, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the present action is
premature because petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge
Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a search
warrant; (3) the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a search was
conducted in an orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent
of petitioner's wife; (6) the findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the issue of the validity of
the search warrant; (7) press freedom is not an issue; and, (8) the petition is barred by laches.
There is merit in the petition. Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order in question before coming to Us. This is not always so. When the
questions raised before the Supreme Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in
and passed upon by the lower court, the filing of the motion for reconsideration in said court before
certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court is no longer a pre-requisite. As held in Bache &
Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, (t)he rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied
without considering the circumstances. The rule does not apply where, the deprivation of
petitioners' fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below
not only with irregularity but also with nullity." Likewise, in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil. 905
and in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court ruled that "it is only when questions
are raised for the first time before the high court in a certiorari case that the writ shall not issue,
unless the lower court had first been given an opportunity to pass upon the same." Further, in the
case of Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, We held that "while as a matter of policy a
motion for reconsideration in the lower court has often been considered a condition sine qua non
for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply where the proceeding in which the
error occurred is a patent nullity or where 'the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due
process ... taints the proceeding against him in the court below not only with irregularity but with
nullity (Luzon Surety Co. v. Marbella et al., L-16038, Sept. 30, 1960), or when special
circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. ..." The records of this petition clearly
disclose that the issues herein raised have already been presented to and passed upon by the
court a quo.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of
the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are
legally just and proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs.
Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus, an application for search warrant must state with particularly the
alleged subversive materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of
the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere generalization will not suffice." A search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The

12
evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be committed Bache & Co. Phil. Inc. vs,
Ruiz, supra)." The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times: we
found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others the said periodical published by Rommel
Corro, contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines
or any of its duly constituted authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. They can not serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the
existence of probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant issued, the items
confiscated from the premises of the office of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor,
Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila were the following:
1. One bundle of assorted negative;
2. One bundle of assorted lay out;
3. Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news and other paraphernalias;
4. Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of Aquino and a speech of one
various artist;
5. One bundle Dummies;
6. Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different dates (Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14 & 15):
7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J-2479373;
8. OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011;
9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City (p. 26, Rollo)

In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that search warrants authorizing the seizure
of books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of certain persons,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit comment of the
Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major
objective of eliminating general warrants. In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by
respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of
articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the
language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the
nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which
petitioner was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The consequence is, the printing
and publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, supra, We held that "[sluch closure is in the nature of previous restraint
or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being
is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry."
Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was issued on September 29, 1983 and
was executed on the very same day, it was only on November 6, 1984, or one (1) year, one (1)
month and six (6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of the warrant and the return
of the documents/personal properties. Having failed to act seasonably, respondents claim that
petitioner is guilty of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled

to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April
15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35).
In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42) hours after the
military operatives shut down his newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the
Director-General PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was charged with the crime of
inciting to sedition before the City Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on October 7, 1983, a
preventive detention action was served upon him. Consequently, he had to file a petition for
habeas corpus. It was only on November 8, 1984 when this Court issued its Resolution in G.R. No.
68976, entitled: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rommel Corro Angle Corro vs.
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing Rommel Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys.
Humberto B. Basco, Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto Balce, In the same month, November
1984, petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to return the seized documents. When
respondent judge denied the motion, he came to Us.
Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the
possession of the seized properties is incorrect.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September 29,
1983 is declared null and void and, accordingly, SET ASIDE.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and
all properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Further, respondents
Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked
office premises of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw,
Ermita, Manila.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO
BOLONG yNARET, accused-appellants.
TINGA, J.:
. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should
be used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes,
when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having
got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way,
and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and
announces that it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S.[1] On this occasion, this Court is made
to choose between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble
part.
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received
a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. [2] Solier related
that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area.[3]
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1
Villalonghan,[4] all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted
surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City.[5] For five days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. [6] According to his neighbors,
Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.[7]
On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be
back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. [8] Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and
short, and usually wore a hat.[9] At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed
of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon
and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival.[10] All wore civilian clothes.[11]
About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry
a carton[12] marked King Flakes.[13] Standing some five feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and

13
PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. [14] The same man also toted a
plastic bag.[15]
PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as
police officers.[16] PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks
of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. [17] The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied
that he was carrying any drugs. [18] PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box.
[19]
Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright.[20] Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion
looked on.[21]
The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a
striped plastic bag[22] and another in newspapers.[23] PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the
packages.[24] They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves.[25]
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and
brought them to the police station.[26] The two did not resist.[27]
The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination.[28] Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero,
forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the
confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of
marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. [29] Police Chief Inspector
Austero reduced her findings in her report, Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August
1999.[30]
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged [31] before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. [32] Upon
arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty.[33] The defense, however, reserved their right to
question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them.[34]
Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto and PO1
Floreta, their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi
Austero, and SPO3 Nicolas Algabre, exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said
witnesses testified to the foregoing narration of facts.
The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North Cotabato to sell
pairs of Levis pants, which was his sideline.[35]At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he returned to Davao
City by bus.[36] Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud, along with less than ten passengers, got down the bus.
[37]

Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .38
caliber revolver.[38] The man told him not to run. [39]Tudtud raised his arms and asked, Sir, what is
this about?[40] The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying,
and instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levis pants.[41]
The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away. [42] According to
Tudtud, the box was already there when he disembarked the bus. [43] Tudtud told the man the box
was not his, but proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him.
[44]
Tudtud discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which was something wrapped in
cellophane.[45]
What is that? the man asked. [46] Tudtud replied that he did not know.[47] Without even
unwrapping the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud.[48]
Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side of the
street, some eight meters from Tudtud.[49]
Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a cousins
wedding in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was accosted. [50] After alighting the bus, Bolong
crossed the street.[51] Someone then approached him and pointed a gun at him. [52] The man
ordered him not to move and handcuffed him. [53] Bolong asked why he was being arrested but the
man just told him to go with them.[54]
The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim, they met
each other for the first time.[55]
Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the testimonies of
Felicia Julaton,[56] Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia, [57] Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and
Mercedita Abunda,[58] Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court.They
testified and presented court documents showing that one Bobo or Bobong Ramirez was charged

in their respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious physical
injuries and robbery. The defense asserted that the Bobo or Bobong Ramirez accused in these
cases is the same person as the informant Bobong Solier.[59]
Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered
judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[60]
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in
evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution, which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the places to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomesunreasonable within the meaning of the above-quoted
constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.[61] Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only unreasonable searches and
seizures. The following instances are not deemed unreasonable even in the absence of a warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[62]

The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception,
as a search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as authorities this Courts rulings in People v.
Claudio,[63] People v. Tangliben,[64] People v. Montilla,[65] and People v. Valdez.[66] The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed decision, invokes the cases
of People v. Maspil, Jr.,[67] People v. Malmstedt,[68] and People v. Bagista.[69]
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its revision
in 2000, Section 12,[70] Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds
that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.[71] Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[72] The question, therefore, is whether the
police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been defined as:

14
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person
to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith of the peace officers making the arrest.[73]
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that
reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule
113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that
he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
In the leading case of People v. Burgos,[74] this Court held that the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
[75]
In Burgos, the authorities obtained information that the accused had forcibly recruited one Cesar
Masamlok as member of the New Peoples Army, threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon finding
the accused, the arresting team searched his house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly
subversive documents. This Court, in declaring then Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
inapplicable, ruled that:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellants wife.
At the time of the appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly
fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as
provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal
liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.[76]
Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the
accuseds constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In People v. Aminnudin,[77] this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and subsequent
search of appellant therein illegal, given the following circumstances:
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest. To
all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered
his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.[78]
Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the
search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding ones abdomen,
[79]
or of standing on a corner with ones eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came
near,[80] does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does putting
something in ones pocket,[81] handing over ones baggage,[82] riding a motorcycle,[83] nor does
holding a bag on board a trisikad[84]sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the
street per se.[85]
Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria.[86] Recently, in People
v. Binad Sy Chua,[87] this Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards
a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply,
this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable
information alone is insufficient.

In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of
suspicious circumstances: People v. Tangliben[88](accused was acting suspiciously), People v.
Malmstedt[89] (a bulge on the accuseds waist), and People v. de Guzman[90] (likewise a bulge on the
waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-fitting clothes).
There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information sufficient to
justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating
from Burgos. To this class of cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr.,[91] People v. Bagista,[92] People v.
Balingan,[93] People v. Lising,[94] People v. Montilla,[95] People v. Valdez,[96] and People v. Gonzales.
[97]
In these cases, the arresting authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but
there were no overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases,
except the last two, come under some other exception to the rule against warrantless
searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr. involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a moving
vehicle, Bagista was both, and Lising and Montilla were consented searches.
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in turn, more
faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the phrase in his presence therein,
connoting personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be
secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of
his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond
the cases specifically provided by law.[98]
The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely misplaced. In Claudio,
[99]
the accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting officer, put her bag behind
the latter, thus arousing the latters suspicion. In Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also
acted suspiciously.
As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other exceptions to the
rule against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover, was not without its critics. There, majority of
the Court held:
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box
should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But
precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily
hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and
not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them,
that the drugs were in appellants luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if now
downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a wait and see
attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the
search were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create
in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of
violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and
the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.[100] While concurring
with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the discussion on the warrantless search
being incidental to a lawful arrest. Mr. Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs. Justices Melo and
Puno, filed a Separate Opinion.
Although likewise concurring in the majoritys ruling that appellant consented to the inspection of his
baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. He argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part
of the officers making the in flagrante delicto arrest. In Montilla, the appellant did not exhibit any
overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was
embarking on some felonious enterprise.
Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without
warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting person must have
actually witnessed the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or
he must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated the
crime that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply determines personally from
testimonies of witnesses that there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was

15
committed by the accused. To say that reliable tips constitute probable cause for a warrantless
arrest or search is in my opinion, a dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy the doctrines
laid down in many decisions made by this Court, in its effort to zealously guard and protect the
sacred constitutional right against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. Everyone would
be practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the makapilis during the
Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the
law could then be subject to search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power upon
informants who will no longer be required to affirm under oath their accusations, for they can
always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless arrests and searches. Even law
enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without warrants, for they can
always claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon before.
This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or
conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the majoritys ruling would open loopholes that would
allow unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures.[101]
Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganibans concurring opinion in People v.
Doria, supra, where this Court ruled:
Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria
named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangits) query as to where the
marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing
drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without any conspiracy. Save
for accused-appellant Dorias word, the Narcom agents had no showing that the person who
affected the warantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person
arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.[102] [Italics in the
original.]
Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Punos ponencia, Justice Panganiban said
that Doria rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and
searches, which have seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.[103]
Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions searches
incidental to lawful arrest under similar circumstances.At any rate, Montilla was a consented
search. As will be demonstrated later, the same could not be said of this case.
That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved an on-the-spot
information. The urgency of the circumstances, an element not present in this case, prevented the
arresting officer therein from obtaining a warrant.
Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious
manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to be, committed. If the
arresting officers testimonies are to be believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a
carton box. Although appellant Tudtud did appear afraid and perspiring, [104] pale[105] and trembling,
[106]
this was only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box.
In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud was in
possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his
neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud:
Q What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to Cotabato and get stocks of marijuana?
A Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person whou [sic] would point to him
because he had been giving trouble to the neighborhood because according to them there are [sic]
proliferation of marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of our neighbors.
Q Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting him particularly?
A His friends were the once who told me about it.
Q For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in proliferation of marijuana?
A About a month.
.
Q Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana which led to his apprehension
sometime in the evening of August 1 and according to the report [which] is based on your report my
question is, how did you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him marijuana stocks on August 1,
1999?
.
A Because of the information of his neighbor.[107]
In other words, Soliers information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on how his neighbors or Tudtuds friends
acquired their information that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of drugs in their neighborhood.

Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliablility of their informant. He testified on cross-examination:
Q You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?
A He is trustworthy.
Q Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?
A (witness did not answer).
ATTY. CAETE:
Never mind, do not answer anymore. Thats all.[108]

The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any explanation from PO1
Floreta for his telling silence.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct
their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out
appellant Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gather[ing] of
information from the assets there.[109] The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not
identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is
also hearsay, not of personal knowledge.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away
with the requisite warrant, PO1 Desiertos assertions of lack of time [110] notwithstanding. Records
show that the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Soliers
information at around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to arrive at around 6:00
in the evening of the same day.[111] In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was
sufficient time to procure a warrant where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an
intelligence report that the accused, who was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next
morning at 7:00 a.m.:
Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house,
there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to
dock until 7:00 a.m. the following day.Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search
warrants even after office hours:
3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant
may be filed directly with any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after
office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is
required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays; . . ..
The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of 1987,
entitled Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Application for search warrants for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts
with Multiple Salas:
This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search
warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and
order. There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly,
these amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued:
1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes against
public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms
and/or ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no
longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose
jurisdiction the place to be searched is located.
2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of
and personally act on the same.In the absence of the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge,
the application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon byany judge of the Court where
application is filed.
3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be
taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be
searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent.
4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the
examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. He
shall observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants
provided for in this Courts Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985.[112] [Italics in the
original.]

16
Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floretas testimony that
the real reason for their omission was their belief that they lacked sufficient basis to obtain the
same assumes greater significance. This was PO1 Floretas familiar refrain:
Q When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from Cotabato to get that (sic) stocks, you did
not go to court to get a search warrant on the basis of the report of Bobot Solier?
A No.
Q Why?
A Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.
Q When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real basis to search Tudtud and
Bulong at that time?
A Yes, sir.
.
Q And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this was 9:00 a.m.?
A Yes, sir.
Q The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the search warrant or the prosecutor do
[sic] not assist?
A They help.
Q But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?
A As I said, we do not have sufficient basis.[113]

It may be conceded that the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the
existence of probable cause is not binding on [the courts] which must independently scrutinize the
objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause and that a court may also find
probable cause in spite of an officers judgment that none exists. [114] However, the fact that the
arresting officers felt that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite their own
information-gathering efforts, raises serious questions whether such surveillance actually yielded
any pertinent information and even whether they actually conducted any information-gathering at
all, thereby eroding any claim to personal knowledge.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if
the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [115]
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose
that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see
the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was
alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself.
The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these
circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. [116] The
fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.
. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving
his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is
not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law.[117] [Underscoring supplied.]
Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag [118] or the
[119]
chairs
containing marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there was no valid consent to
the search.
On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right,
peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and
shift to the accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented.[120]

In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the
allegation of appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before asking
them to open the subject box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows:
Q This person who approached you according to you pointed something at you[.] [What] was that something?
A A 38 cal. Revolver.
Q How did he point it at you?
A Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding something towards somebody).
Q This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?
A He said do not run.
Q What did you do?
A I raised my hands and said Sir, what is this about?
Q Why did you call him Sir?
A I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.
Q Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?
A Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a gun is a policeman.
Q When you asked him what is this? What did he say?
A He said I would like to inspect what you are carrying.[]
Q What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?
A I told him that is not mine.
Q What did this man say?
A He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.
Q What did you do?
A So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot.[121]

Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. [122] Consequently, appellants lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.[123]
As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as
there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant,
the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of
their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes
meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution,
occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental
power.[124]
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of
rights,[125] next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is
protected by the due process clause.[126] This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of
noted freedom advocates,[127] the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is
the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to exist, and
the right to enjoyment of life while existing. Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v.
Aruta:
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order.Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.[128]
Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government
play an ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and ineluctable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is
REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong yNaret are hereby ACQUITTED
for insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the
immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are being held for some other
lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.SO ORDERED.

17
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LEILA JOHNSON Y
REYES, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110,
Pasay City, finding accused-appellant Leila Johnson y Reyes guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, each
bag weighing:
#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
#2 ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and
#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, respectively,
or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding
license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[3] whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George de Lara, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, duty frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense presented
accused-appellant who testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow,
and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was
naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse,
taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimers disease, in convalescent homes in the
United States.[4]
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba, Laguna. She
was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine
Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and
checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998.[5]
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of
the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and
check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives.[6]
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United
States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal
area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.[7]
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo
Embile, saying Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not believe that it is just
a panty.) She was directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for
inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina
Bernal. Embile stayed outside.[8]
Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on
her stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez

then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant brought out three plastic
packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the womens room.[9]
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2 grams of a
substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.[10]
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security
Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport and ticket
were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were
itemized.[11]
In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate
when she was approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed
and taken to the womens room. There, she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a
body search. She insisted that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room
filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some
change were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she said, she
was transferred to the office of a certain Col. Castillo.[12]
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white
packages on the table. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied
knowledge and ownership of the packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of
June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal for inquest.[13] She claimed that throughout the
period of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed to talk to
counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines. [14]
On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:[15]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as
amended and hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns said
accused to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibits G,
C-2 and C-3) are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is
hereby ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in
accordance with law.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail of Pasay City
during the pendency of this case provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly
with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) despite failure of the prosecution
in proving the negative allegation in the information; (2) despite failure of the prosecution in proving
the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride; (3) despite violation of her constitutional rights;
and (4) when guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[16]
First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her
constitutional rights. She argues that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible against her
because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the
1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her
constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should
have been excluded from the evidence.[17]
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her
detention and used in evidence against her.There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants
invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in
flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person.

18
The trial court held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial
investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as the
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in]
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. This presupposes that
he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit
information or [a] confession from him."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b)
of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation
is far from being accurate.[18]
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.[19] Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.[20] Indeed, travelers
are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets
that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant
herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had
been obtained while she was in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of
counsel, the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that
accused-appellant was required to affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of
Embile and Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect, were presented by the
prosecution in proving its case.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket,
luggage, and other personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as
are the girdle taken from her, and her signature thereon. Rule 126, 2 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:

Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property: (a) Subject of the offense;(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits
of the offense; and (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.
Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:
Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or Instrument Of The
CrimeThe penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;
6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements as determined
and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for her possession of 580.2 grams of shabu.
Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a qualitative examination of
the substance contained in Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the examination conducted
by the NBI forensic chemist was a qualitative one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu,
but failed to establish its purity; hence, its exact quantity remains indeterminate and unproved.
This contention is likewise without merit.
The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted would have indicated the
presence of impurities if there were any. He testified:
PROS. VELASCO By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants or impurities, it will be discovered by just mixing it?
WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a thin layer chromatographic examination.
PROS. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr. Witness?
WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears one spot which resembles or the same as the Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride sample
PROS. VELASCO So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals you have examined, in chemical
examination, what color it will register, if any
WITNESS In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it will not react with the reagent, therefore it will not dissolve. In my
examination, all the specimens reacted on the re-agents, sir
PROS. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in laymans term?
WITNESS It is only a tawas
COURT In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the specimen?
WITNESS None, your Honor.
ATTY. AGOOT I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed with 200 grams of tawas,
you will submit that to qualitative examination, what will be your findings, negative or positive, Mr. Witness
WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
ATTY. AGOOT That is qualitative examination.
WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate.[21]

A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a quantitative analysis
requires the determination of the percentage combination of the components of a mixture. Hence,
a qualitative identification of a powder may reveal the presence of heroin and quinine, for instance,
whereas a quantitative analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent
quinine.[22]
De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2
and C-3. Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a
mixture. It is particularly useful for analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently
received in a crime lab. For example, illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically

19
any material that is at the disposal of the drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is
made available to prospective customers. Hence, the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation
would be an arduous one without the aid of chromatographic methods to first separate the mixture
into its components.[23]
The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough, but also that the
scientifically correct method of obtaining an accurate representative sample had been obtained.
[24]
At any rate, as the Solicitor-General has pointed out, if accused-appellant was not satisfied with
the results, it would have been a simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination of the
substance by another chemist.This she did not do.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation in the
information that she did not have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu
Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 provides: SEC.
16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription,
subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,a
regulated drug, is not unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the required license or
prescription. She points out that since the prosecution failed to present any certification that she is
not authorized to possess or use regulated drugs, it therefore falls short of the quantum of proof
needed to sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit.
The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. Chan Toco.[25] The
accused in that case was charged with smoking opium without being duly registered. He demurred
to the information on the ground that it failed to allege that the use of opium had not been
prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician.
This Court denied the motion and said: The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to
prohibit and to penalize generally the smoking of opium in these Islands. But the legislator desired
to withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited class of smokers who smoked under the
advice and by prescription of a licensed and practicing physician . . . . Hence where one is charged
with a violation of the general provisions of the Opium Law, it is more logical as well as more
practical and convenient, if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician, that he
should set up this fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution should be called upon to prove
that every smoker, charged with a violation of the law, does so without such advice or
prescription. Indeed, when it is considered that under the law any person may, in case of need and
at any time, procure the advice of a physician to use opium or some of its derivatives, and that in
the nature of things no public record of prescriptions of this kind is or can be required to be kept, it
is manifest that it would be wholly impracticable and absurd to impose on the prosecution the
burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium does so without the advice of a
physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in a particular case, that one using opium does so
without the advice or prescription of a physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility
without the aid of the defendant himself, while a defendant charged with the illegal use of opium
should find little difficulty in establishing the fact that he used it under the advice and on the
prescription of a physician, if in fact he did so.[26]
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform
that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation
which he owes to himself, when to meet it is an easy thing for him to do, he has no one but himself
to blame.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, which requires the prosecution to present a certification that
accused-appellant has no license or permit to possess shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited
substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she
has a license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug.
Fourth. Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not
sufficient to support a finding that she is guilty of the crime charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected.
Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law
enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are
inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any
improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. This Court
accords great respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses in
the absence of any palpable error or arbitrariness in its findings.[27]
It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no other witness was
presented in her behalf. Her denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.[28] As has been held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it
is notsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi,
has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is
a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.[29]
The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be validly
charged with and convicted of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended, have been complied with by the prosecution in this case. The decision of the trial
court must accordingly be upheld.
As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held that courts may fix any
amount within the limits established by law.[30]Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580.2)
grams of shabu were confiscated from accused-appellant, the fine imposed by the trial court may
properly be reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding
accused-appellant guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine
imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs against appellant.
The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet returned to the
accused-appellant are hereby ordered returned to her.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y

GATDULA, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 22, 1994 for
violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias,
Cavite in an information which alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
administer, transport, and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are

20
considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage
and prejudice to the public interest.[1]
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from
appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte.[2] Trial was held on scheduled dates
thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995
and which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine
in the amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.[3]
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00
A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by
SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine
National Police Command based in Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers, was
caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which
marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of
appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or
on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize,
would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an
undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting
officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day,
hour, and place.[4]
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed during
the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite
with only some pocket money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to
look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality,
after which he would return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by
SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never
informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with
him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment
factory where she reportedly worked as a supervisor,[5] although, as the trial court observed, she
never presented any document to prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally
caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and exhaustive
review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial
court. It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police
officers to whom no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of
denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of
insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police
officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly
corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to
confront the witnesses against him, that informant was a vital personality in the operation who
would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how
appellant was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as
amended, is as follows: SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is
a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate
cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the
various modes of commission[6] being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and
transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law.The
text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in
its headnote by including these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions." Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified
therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving away,
distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts
alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and transported
marijuana. The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the
different modes provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have
been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in the
information of the various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description of
only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness.[7] In
appellant's case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported
marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant
had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must
fail. The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have
been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was
essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the
witnesses arrayed by the State against him. These assertions are, however, much too strained. Far
from compromising the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the
informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error. For one, the testimony of said
informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and
SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters
in which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed
with by the prosecution,[8] more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of
law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal
presumption. Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide
their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police.[9] Moreover, it is up to the
prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that
course.[10] Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to
compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below,[11] but which remedy was not availed of
by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful
warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00
P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been apprised by their
so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had
the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the
search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following
dawn. Once again, the Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must
be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. [12]Evidence

21
secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law,
it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches;
[13]
(2) searches of moving vehicles,[14] (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;[15] (4) consented
searches;[16] (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17] and (6) "stop and frisk" measures[18]have
been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the
law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier
coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the
policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these
circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention
of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew
the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the
warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the
drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such
delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of
transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the
same were arriving together with, or were being brought by someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant,
assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time
they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented
by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time
is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in
rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the
possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding
the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and
around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the place in Barangay
Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he would do so. On the other hand, that they
nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting
recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations. Moreover, experience shows
that although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and
piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional
spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of
appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement
agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of
the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial
chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the
evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of
the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2)
those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.[19] On the other hand, the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could
be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).
[20]
These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught inflagrante

delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the
determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as
having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[21]
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the
propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been
reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima
facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or quantum,[22] and was even used with dubiety as
equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the
term and its concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief
in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of,[23] or an apparent state of facts
found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent
man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime.[24]
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the
issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112
thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as
suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof.[25] It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in
other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists."[26] It should, therefore, be in that sense,
wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at
once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting
shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden
inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus
realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of
luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as
policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which
appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the
prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his
luggage to their headquarters for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box
should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But,
precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily
hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and
not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them,
that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not
downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see"
attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the
search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly
create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the
act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality
that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With
these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his
arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat,
when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him
about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the
officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all

22
likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an
individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person
or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either
expressly or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a
warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of
that person's regard for the supremacy of the law,[28] the case of herein appellant is evidently
different for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the
bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a
clear waiver of his right.[29]
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly and
adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the
same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting
officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did not
have to do so. It should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court below and formally
offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box
in which the same were contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and
proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist for
examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs taken from
appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence, satisfied that the articles
were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting
who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of
appellant appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the
latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No
other conclusion can therefore be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the
way to Cavite from Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the
crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of appellant
for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not
allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.Indeed,
appellant has a point. The police authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of
Republic Act No. 7438[30] which defines certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under
custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers,
and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not
necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his
custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary
confession or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in
evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other
evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together
with the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in
the court below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now
provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is, in the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the
transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present case, Article 63

of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be observed in the application of
said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in
which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.Contrary to the
pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity
of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of
death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a
conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already concluded that
Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,[31] the rules wherein
were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity
provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the
violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4
whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense in said section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.[32] While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the
liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the
law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is
attended by either of such factual features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the graduation
of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was neither a minor victim
nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in
Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben
Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment
of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HEDISHI SUZUKI, appellant.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 94-16100 convicting Hedishi Suzuki, appellant, of illegal possession of
marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6525, as amended,[2]and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00.
The Information[3] against appellant reads: That on or about the 12th day of April, 1994, in the
City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused,
not being lawfully authorized to possess, prepare, administer or otherwise use any prohibited drug,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody
and control 1.9 kilos or 1,900 grams, more or less, of marijuana which is a prohibited drug, in
violation of the aforementioned laws.
Acts contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial followed. The prosecution
presented P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. of the Police Aviation Security
Command (PASCOM), PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao, also of the PASCOM, and SPO1 Gilbert Linda of
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), all of Bacolod City. Their testimonies, woven together,
established the following facts:
Sometime in November, 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to all Chiefs of
Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals within their respective areas

23
of responsibility, following reports that drug trafficking is prevalent in domestic airports; and to
coordinate with local airport authorities and the PASCOM.
In the morning of April 12, 1994, while the prosecution witnesses were in their respective stations,
appellant and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals, entered the pre-departure area of the
Bacolod Airport Terminal. Appellant was bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine
Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked Bongbongs piaya.[4] At the predeparture area, upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the PASCOM, appellant
proceeded to the walk-through metal detector, a machine which produces a red light and an alarm
once it detects the presence of metallic substance or object. Thereupon, the red light switched on
and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the
box he was carrying. This prompted PO3 Poyugao to frisk him bodily.Finding no metallic object in
his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and passed it through the machine. Again, the
machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao then ordered appellant to go to the hand-carried luggage
inspection counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were
present. SPO1 Casugod requested appellant to open the box. He appeared tense and reluctant
and started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he consented, saying in faltering
English, open, open. SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found therein eighteen (18) small packs,
seventeen (17) of which were wrapped in aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside
were dried fruiting tops which looked like marijuana. Upon seeing this, appellant ran outside the
pre-departure area but he was chased by PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Linda and Donato Barnezo of the
PASCOM.
They apprehended appellant near the entrance of the terminal and brought him to the
PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes Linsangan, to the office, being
suspects as conspirators with appellant in drug trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty.
Silvestre Tayson. When he arrived, the police apprised appellant of his constitutional rights.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and inventoried the same. The total
weight of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or 1,900 grams. He then drafted
a confiscation receipt which appellant, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to
acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned over appellant to SPO1 Linda for investigation.
Subsequently, appellant and his companions were brought to the prosecutors office for inquest and
placed under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM office. The box with its
contents was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Inspector Villavicencio conducted three tests
on the specimen samples which proved positive for marijuana.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness whose testimony is as follows: On April 9,
1994, he and Takeshi Koketsu arrived inManila from Osaka, Japan. The purpose of his trip was to
collect from Takeshi Y2.5 million or P500,000.00 which the latter owed him. Waiting for them at the
airport was Takeshis wife, Lourdes. On the same day, the three flew to Bacolod City. Appellant
stayed at the house of Takeshi.
Two days later, appellant asked Takeshi to pay. When Takeshi admitted he had no money,
appellant got angry and went to the Casino Filipino where he stayed until 10:30 in the
evening. Upon leaving the casino, he met Pinky who enticed him to have sex with her. They then
proceeded to the Moonlight Motel. Moments later, Pinky left, while appellant stayed there for the
night. He told her he was leaving the following morning.
The following day or on April 12, 1994, appellant went to the airport. Pinky, who was there waiting,
gave him a box of Bongbongs piaya aspasalubong from Bacolod City. He did not ascertain the
contents of the box since he trusted Pinky although he just met her the previous night. Appellant
found and joined Takeshi and Lourdes at the coffee shop. Takeshi apologized for his failure to pay
his debt, assuring him that he would settle his obligation next month.
When it was time to leave, appellant, accompanied by Takeshi, proceeded to the pre-departure
area. When he passed through the metal detector, a policeman frisked him, got the box and placed

it inside the metal detector. The machine produced a red light, hence, the policeman brought the
box to the inspection table, with appellant following him. Thereafter, the policeman, whom he later
knew as SPO1 Arturo Casugod, pointed to the box uttering something appellant did not
understand. Appellant said, wait a minute, (in Japanese) and went outside to ask Takeshi
and Lourdes to interpret for him, but they did not respond. When PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao called
him back to the pre-departure area, he found Takeshi near the table and the box containing
something wrapped in aluminum foil already opened. Takeshi told him that he was carrying
marijuana. He replied it was given to him by a woman that morning. Then he and SPO1 Casugod
went to the PASCOM office where the latter weighed the contents of the box. He did not sign the
Confiscation Receipt presented to him. They then proceeded to the NARCOM office with
C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, SPO1 Linda, PO3 Poyugao, and three other officers. From the
NARCOM office, appellant was brought to the Bacolod Police Station.
Shortly thereafter, they went to the Nagoya Restaurant owned by Takeshi where appellant
saw C/Inspector Alcantara and Lourdes talking.When he inquired from Takeshi what was going on,
he was told they needed money in dealing with the police. Appellant was then brought to the
prosecutors office. There Takeshi told him to keep silent as he would make a deal with the
prosecutor. Then they went to Takeshis house where appellant stayed for two days.
On April 14, 1994, C/Inspector Alcantara and SPO1 Linda brought appellant to the Bacolod
City Jail. Takeshi visited him twice, advising him to ask someone from Japan to send him money
and be discreet, otherwise he would be killed; and to admit he has in his possession less than 750
grams of marijuana so he could post bail. However, he refused.
Five days later, appellant, escorted by the police, went to Takeshis house to retrieve his
money (Y120,000 equivalent to P30,000.00), but Takeshi told him that it was already spent for the
food and drinks of the NARCOM agents and the airport policemen.
On December 7, 1994, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused HEDISHI SUZUKI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to pay a fine of
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 7659, let the 1,547.07 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, subject matter of this case, be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government and be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed according to law.
SO ORDERED.
Hence the instant mandatory review.
In his brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I.
II.

III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT AGENTS HAD THE LEGAL
AUTHORITY WHEN THEY OPENED AND SEARCHED THE SMALL CARTON IN QUESTION.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE
OPENING AND SEARCH OF THE SUBJECT CARTON AND IN DECLARING LEGAL AND VALID THE SEIZURE OF
SAID CARTON AND THE SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE APPELLANT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA CONTENTS OF THE
SUBJECT CARTON AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE CARTON IN QUESTION WAS
INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE SUBJECT CARTON WAS MADE
UNDER THE EXCEPTION OF SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST OF THE APPELLANT WAS VALID AS HE
WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO POSSESSING MARIJUANA.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS UNQUALIFIED, VOLUNTARY AND
AUTHORITATIVE CONSENT GIVEN BY THE APPELLANT TO THE OPENING OF THE CARTON.
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE APPELLANT WAS CAUGHT IN POSSESSION OF
MARIJUANA, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM, FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PROVE THE NEGATIVE ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.

24
IX.

X.

XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.

ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT HE WAS CAUGHT IN PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
CARTON IN QUESTION (CONTAINING MARIJUANA), THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
APPELLANT INTENDED TO POSSESS SAID PACKS OF MARIJUANA
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS PETITION TO BE RELEASED ON BAIL
CONSTITUTES WAIVER OF ANY IRREGULARITY ATTENDING HIS ARREST AND ESTOPS HIM FROM
QUESTIONING ITS VALIDITY.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT, CONSIDERATION AND CREDIT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT AND IN DECLARING THE SAME SELF-SERVING AND NOT AMPLY PROVEN.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING SUBSTANTIAL CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE PROSECUTION WHICH CREATE REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GOING BEYOND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION
IN SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION CONVICTING APPELLANT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH
AND IMPOSING A FINE OF TEN MILLION PESOS.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT WAS PROVEN BY
THE PROSECUTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM.

Considering that the above assigned errors are interrelated, they will be discussed jointly.
Appellant invokes his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, contending
that: (1) the authority to open and investigate suspicious packages and cargoes under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6235[5] does not apply to PASCOM and NARCOM agents but is limited only to
aircraft companies or operators of aircraft for hire; (2) he did not consent to be searched by the
authorities; (3) the prohibited substances confiscated by the authorities were not actually in their
plain view; and (4) the search they conducted was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
Pertinent is Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 which reads: SECTION 8. Aircraft
companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft which are for hire are
authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages and cargoes in the presence of the
owner or shipper, or his authorized representatives if present, in order to help the authorities in
the enforcement of the provisions of this Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his
representative refuses to have the same opened and inspected, the airline or air carrier is
authorized to refuse the loading thereof.
In line with the afore-cited law, the trial court correctly upheld the PASCOMs authority to
open packages and cargoes, thus:
This Court does not subscribe to the contention of the accused. The Police Aviation Security
Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking
(NACAH), which is a creation of Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 399, dated April 28,
1976.
On February 18, 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of National
Defense, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Secretary of
Justice, the Director General, National Intelligence and Security Authority and the Secretary of
Finance was signed. The purpose was to establish a working arrangement among cognizant
agencies, set up guidelines and procedures for the security of the airport complex throughout
the Philippines particularly handling, coordination and disposition of hijacking and other criminal
incidents that may occur thereat (PAFM 3-9, page 1-3).Under the said Memorandum of
Understanding the then AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:1. Secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil
aviation;2. Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations;3. Exercise operational control and
supervision over all agencies involved in airport security operations;4. Take all necessary
preventive measures to maintain peace and order, and provide other pertinent public safety
services within the airports;
One of its guidelines before the passenger can enter the sanitized area (pre-departure area) is to
check the hand-carried luggage and personal effects of passengers (PAFM 3-9, page 2-3).
Passengers are allowed one hand-carried bag or attach case with the following limitation:
c. It can be readily opened for inspection (PAFM 3-9, page 2-4).

Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in relation to R.A.
6235, the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to
inspect luggages or hand-carried bags.
Under DOC 8973/3, Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful
Interference, particularly paragraph 3.6.4 when x-ray inspection is not possible or when the xray image of a bag gives rise to suspicion, x x x, a manual search must be carried
out (Memorandum of the Prosecution, pp. 15-16; underscoring supplied).
The prosecution correctly argued that the PASCOM established a system of checkpoint at the
pre-departure area of theBacolod Airport to quickly inspect or screen persons or hand-carried
baggages for illegal items pursuant to said Memorandum of Agreement, which in turn derived its
life from LOI 399. In short, the setting up of checkpoint at the BacolodAirport on April 12,
1994 does not have only jurisprudential basis (Valmonte vs. De Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83288,
September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 211, more popularly known as the checkpoints cases) but also
statutory basis.
Moreover, to sustain the stand of the accused exclusively limiting the authority to open and search
suspicious luggages would result to absurdity. It would deprive law enforcers of their authority to
perform their duty of maintaining order, preserving peace, protecting life and property and other
police works such as crime detection, while within the airport premises. The construction given by
the accused conveniently omitted the phrase found in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 which
readsin order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. The
word authorities evidently refers to police officers and other law enforcers such as the PASCOM
officers. It follows that in allowing or authorizing aircraft companies which operate as public utilities
or operators of aircraft which are for hire, to open and investigate suspicious packages and
seizures, the authors of the law does not disallow or prohibit law enforcement agencies of the
government from assisting or conducting the opening and investigation of suspicious packages and
cargoes. Otherwise, they will be remiss in their sworn duty of protecting the public in general and
more particularly those in the aviation industry. x x x. It becomes crystal-clear that the PASCOM
officers and personnel had the legal authority when they opened and investigated the box in the
presence of the accused and his counsel.
This is not the first time we recognize a search conducted pursuant to routine airport security
procedure as an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In People vs. Canton,
[6]
and People vs. Johnson,[7] we validated the search conducted on the departing passengers and
the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting
to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. (Underscoring ours)
Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search of prohibited materials
or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected illegal items to enter the pre-

25
departure area, as claimed by appellant, is to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct
search, thus sanctioning impotence and ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to the detriment of
society.[8]
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his
right by giving consent to the search or seizure.[9]
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM agents. The
testimony of SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. is quite revealing, thus:
Q And when the said carton box was passed for the second time thru the walk-through machine it indicated this
metallic element by flashing a red light, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because of that, what did you do?
A Rhodelin Poyugao put the box on top of the inspection table.
Q What happened then?
A And then our non-uniformed personnel, Mr. Donato Barnezo, asked the passenger Mr. Hedishi Suzuki, saying,
kindly open your box for inspection.
Q What happened after he asked the accused to open the box?
A Mr. Hedishi Suzuki refused to open, sir. He signaled no, no.
Q What happened then?
A At that juncture, sir. I advised the said passenger, Mr. Hedishi Suzuki: Very sorry, sir, we need to open your
luggage because it indicated a red light.
Q When you say open the luggage you are referring to the box?
A Referring to the small carton marked Bongbong Piaya.
Q What happened then?
A Mr. Hedishi Suzuki tried to get outside of the pre-departure area instead of opening the box.
Q Where did Mr. Suzuki go if he went away?
A Before he could get out of the door of the pre-departure area I called his attention to come back.
Q Did he come back?
A He came back and I explained to him again, sir, that we are very sorry but we need to open your small carton
marked Bongbong Piaya. I told him, I am very sorry, sir, but we need to open your small carton marked
Bongbong Piaya.
Q And what did Mr. Suzuki do?
A Mr. Suzuki answered me, open.
Q What did you do?
A I said kindly open your carton and he repeated, open.
Q For the second time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do then because he said open?
A I explained to him, sir, and I asked him again, sir, I am going to open this and he told me you open.
Q Then, what did you do?
A I got hold of the carton and opened it by means of cutting the masking tape that bound both ends of the carton.
Q And what did you find inside the said box?
A When I opened the box, sir, I found out that it contained suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops wrapped in an
aluminum foil, sir, and transparent cellophane.

That appellant gave his consent when PO1 Casugod asked him to open the box was confirmed by
SPO1 Linda and PO3 Poyugao.[11] As succinctly found by the trial court, appellant cannot deny that
he consented by feigning ignorance of the English language, thus:
Accused through counsel would want this Court to believe that the opening of the carton containing
marijuana fruiting tops was without the consent of the accused. The defense relied on the alleged
inability of the accused to understand nor speak the English language because he is a Japanese
national. It made capital on the presence of Japanese interpreters, Tsuyushi Tsuchida and Hideo
Agarie, who assisted during the trial.
The Court has no doubt in the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and their
categorical declaration that accused Hedishi Suzuki gave his consent not only nodding his head
but also by saying Open. Open. Open. There was even a third-party consent given by his
Japanese companion Takeshi Koketsu.
The allegation of the accused that he does not understand English is indeed incredible to
believe. As aptly observed by Assistant City Prosecutor Rafael Guanco, the trial prosecutor, the

accused might not be able to speak straight English yet he might

understand English (Memorandum of the Prosecution, page 21). The prosecution witnesses
categorically declared that accused Hedishi Suzuki was speaking English during the airport
encounter with the PASCOM and NARCOM operatives and while being investigated at the
PASCOM Office. While it may be true that Lourdes Linsangan participated on some occasions, her
participation merely facilitated the conversation.
The Court cannot believe accuseds protestation of ignorance of the English language. There are
several indications that accused understand the English language. It may be noted that in filing a
motion to terminate the legal services of Atty. Nicanor Villarosa, it appeared that accused caused
its preparation or filing without the assistance of a lawyer (Motion ToTerminate Services of Counsel,
page 53, expediente). The accused testified that his wife is proficient in English. Accused was able
to play games in the casino, the night before the airport incident. He was able to give direction to
the driver from the motel to the airport. He has traveled to the Philippines about ten (10) times. He
claims to be an owner and manager of a company where some clients or customers are nonJapanese such as Germans and Americans. During the trial accused appeared to be an intelligent
witness and this Court has keenly observed that accused had shown eagerness and readiness to
answer the questions propounded in the English language even before the Japanese
translation. Above all, accused answered in the affirmative when queried by the Court whether he
was able to attend English classes while in college. In short, the Court was literally taken for a ride
when initially made to believe that the accused could not read, speak and understand the English
language.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.[12] Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find
the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana
fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even
without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. [13]The packs of
marijuana obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against
appellant.[14]
Nonetheless, we find the trial courts reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine
finds application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in the plain view of the police
officer.[15] Here, it is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the box
of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not immediately apparent to the airport authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at the time
of the search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there
must be a lawful arrest before the search can be made.[16]
At this point, it bears stressing that mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per
se and the burden of proof is upon appellant to show that he has a license or permit under the law
to possess the prohibited drug.[17] Here, appellant failed to prove that he has a license to possess
the marijuana. In People vs. Bongcarawan,[18] we held that such possession constitutes prima facie
evidence of animus possidendisufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation.
Appellant vigorously contends that the trial court should have sustained his unrebutted testimony
that he was a victim of frame-up contrived by Takeshi in connivance with the arresting officers,
especially C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, accused in several criminal charges.
It is noteworthy that aside from appellants testimony, not a shred of evidence was presented
by the defense to prove his claim that he was framed-up. Not even Pinky who allegedly gave him
the box of piaya containing marijuana was presented as a witness to confirm his story. We have
ruled that clear and convincing evidence is required to prove the defense of frame-up because in
the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime

26
against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands. [19] Also,
allegations of frame-up are easily fabricated, making it the common and standard line of defense in
prosecutions involving the Dangerous Drugs Law.[20]
We are not swayed by appellants reference to C/Inspector Alcantaras criminal
records. Suffice it to state that he is neither an accused in this case or a prosecution witness.
We have carefully reviewed the records and found no cogent reason to overthrow the
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court.That this is a matter exclusively within its
competence, since it had the unique opportunity of observing the witnesses and their manner of
testifying during trial, had long been established. Hence, its findings are accorded respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal, except when there is a clear showing that facts of weight and
substance which would affect the outcome of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied.[21] This exception is not present here.
However, the trial court imposed the wrong penalty.
Under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging fromP500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be
imposed if the quantity of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more. [22] Section 63 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance. [23]
In the case at bar, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, appellants
possession of 1,547.70 grams[24] of marijuana does not merit the supreme penalty of death but
only reclusion perpetua.
While the imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of illegal
drugs,[25] we, however, reduce the fine imposed by the trial court to P1,000,000.00, considering that
courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal
Case No. 94-16100 finding appellant Hedishi Suzuki guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and fined One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended, under an Information[1] whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT
HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding prescription or license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch 110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker
Mylene Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.

For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and had prosecution
witness Mylene Cabunoc recalled to be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN
take the witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m.,
SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound
for Saigon, Vietnam.[2] When she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was
emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on
Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention, saying
Excuse me maam, can I search you?[3] Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her
abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several
times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules.[4] When Mylene passed
her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN
to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: Money, money only. Mylene forthwith
reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.[5]
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to
a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies room,
Mylene touched something in front of SUSANs sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her
skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually
wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. [6] The
first was taken from SUSANs abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital area; and the
third, from her right thigh.[7] Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Reyes.[8] The latter
forthwith informed his superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the
incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination
table, opened the same and found that they contained white crystalline substances[9] which, when
submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a regulated drug.[10]
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office,
testified that no investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN.[11] However, SUSAN signed a receipt
of the following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3)
one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty
girdles.[12] He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not
have a counsel when she signed the receipt.[13] Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or
not to sign the receipt.[14]
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances surrounding
the arrest and search of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her person.[15]
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision [16] finding SUSAN
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, [17] alleging therein that the trial
judge erred in (1) giving weight to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette
Arcena because it was not presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is therefore hearsay
evidence; (2) upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers,
since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police officer; (3) making statements which gave
the impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the accused; and (4) deliberately ignoring the
decisive issue of how the evidence was secured. SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the search
and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized items were not in plain
view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge, SUSAN filed a motion

27
to inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial.[18]
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellants Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial, as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued
an order[19] on 26 November 2001 denying the motions. According to the trial judge (1) he
explained to SUSANs counsel the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration, but the latter
chose to magnify the judges statement which was uttered in jest; (2) SUSANs conviction was not
based on the medical report which was not presented in court; (3) there was no violation of
SUSANsconstitutional rights because she was never interrogated during her detention without
counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the airport and
were therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing
to the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on
the alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrantedelicto and
that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went
beyond the limits of the Terry search doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial
investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical
report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.[20]
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in
the ladies room was constitutionally infirmed because it was not incidental to an arrest. The arrest
could not be said to have been made before the search because at the time of the strip search, the
arresting officers could not have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her body,
which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they could not have determined
whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore nothing but a
fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v.
Ohio,[21] such stop and frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in
order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of
the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package
at her abdominal area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to
submit her to a strip search in the ladies room, she was under custodial investigation without
counsel, which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission of the
medical report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on
nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson[22] because of its sweeping
statement allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity
of the safety interests involved. She stresses that the pertinent case should have beenKatz v.
United States,[23] which upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States of America that
protects people and not places.
In its Appellants Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was
found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the
case falls squarely within the exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted herself to the search and seizure when she allowed
herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by airport security
personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from SUSAN

during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG
argues that SUSANs conviction was not solely based on the questioned document but also on the
fact that she was caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being
authorized by law. Consequently, it supports SUSANs conviction but recommends the reduction of
the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSANs conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs,
as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution
bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue
of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court. [24]
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.[25]
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in
this case were incidental to a lawful arrest.SUSANs arrest did not precede the search. When the
metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith
made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSANs
abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and
liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room, the airport
security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSANs body; hence, they did
not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the
discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they
believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have
been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires
that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.[26]
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to
search for weapons under the Terry search doctrine.
The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer
approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.[27]

28
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure,
which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition
printed thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier.

This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex D of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is
stated in the Notice to All Passengers located at the final security checkpoint at the departure
lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited
to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances. In this
case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the
discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further
searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by
her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages contained only money,
aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated
that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of
the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home
(as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.[28] Thus, the strip search
in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds application to
the present case. That case involves accused-appellant Leila Johnson, who was also a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then
the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk departing passengers, employees and crew to check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When Olivia frisked Leila,
the former felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained that she
needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to her superior, who then
directed her to take Leila to the nearest womens room for inspection. In the comfort room, Leila
was asked to bring out the thing under her girdle. She acceded and brought out three plastic packs
which contained a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. This Court
ruled that the packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride seized during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore
admissible in evidence against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her
person flagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy,
which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are

often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
SUSANs reliance on Katz v. U.S.[29] is misplaced. The facts and circumstances of that case
are entirely different from the case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information by
telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted, over the accuseds objection, to
introduce evidence of accuseds end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the conviction. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United States of America reversed
the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in the instant case,
was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved. It ruled that what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth
Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and
mandates not to unsettle things which are established.When the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it
to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. [30] There being a disparity in the
factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case the ruling in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.

The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search
conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white
crystalline substances, which upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were
legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security
personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her
subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial
investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may
be invoked only when a person is under custodial investigation or is in custody interrogation.
[31]
Custodial investigation refers to the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.[32] This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the
investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. [33] And the right to counsel
attaches
upon
the
start
of
such
investigation. [34] The
objective
is
to

29
prohibit incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.[35]
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no
custodial investigation was conducted after SUSANs arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt
of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign
or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution
to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her detention and used in
evidence against her.[36] Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of the medical
report on the physical and medical examination conducted upon appellants request, which
contained the following: On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and
cooperative. She related that she was an illegitimate daughter, married, but divorced in 1995. She
verbalized, I gamble like an addict. I gambled since I was young and I lost control of myself when I
played cards. When I lost control, I want my money back. I owe other people lots of money. I lost
all the cash of my husband. This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the money. She denied
having any morbid thoughts and perceptual disturbances. (Emphasis supplied). This argument is
meritorious. The admission of the questioned document was erroneous because it was not
properly identified.Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellants conviction will stand,
as the courts finding of guilt was not based on that document.
VII. SUSANs conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be valid, we do
not hesitate to rule that that the three packages ofshabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in
evidence against her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425),
as amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments
of the Crime.--Thepenalties for offenses under Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14,
14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved [are] in any
of the following quantities:
There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law. For
possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In
view of the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN, the
trial courts imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the confiscation
of the following: SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and
other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
Clearly, the seizure of SUSANs passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the
afore-quoted provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her.[37]
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic
Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellants
passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her. Costs de oficio. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133917

February 19, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @
"BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY",accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from
lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our
ultimate freedom and liberty depend.1
For automatic review is the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in
Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malaguraalias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 8,3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,4 and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana
which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation
against them.6Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel
Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National
Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the
presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.7 The first time he came to see the said
marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then
with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,
accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no
occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accusedappellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.8
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that morning. 9 Consequently, at
around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina,
Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house
of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.10
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of
SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1
Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their,
vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from
where the accused-appellants were accosted.12
The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who
was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the
bag.13 Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening
the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and
Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.15
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and

30
seizures.16 The demurrer was denied by the trial court.17A motion for reconsideration was filed by
accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of
evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision,18 the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both
accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their counsels, more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and
GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal
injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by
law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records of
this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of their
case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.19
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court,
the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:
I.
II.
III.

THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN

VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE
PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE
OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the
acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a
reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the
existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.21
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III,
Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.22 Thus: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's
high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.23
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;24 and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search).25
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the
process cannot be reversed.26 As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid

warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a
peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped prisoners
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the
warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace
officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of
prohibited drugs.28 This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and
seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law
adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,30probable cause means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,31 it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at
the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that
he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of theMN Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed
to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,32 the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to side :..
[while] holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and
circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the
Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed or was at least being attempted
in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada,33the Court ruled that no
probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby
chairs.1wphi1.nt
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,34 the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting
to commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with
his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'" 35 In
declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on
the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed.36
It went on to state that Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could
have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an
observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near
petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were
merely standing at the comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble...

31
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered"
"inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu.37
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.38
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina
responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag.
Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accusedappellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1
Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to
the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or
otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accusedappellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and
address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized
accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in
person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These
circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula,
considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a
glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had
never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before
the arrest, to wit
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could
not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon

himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants'
name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting
officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all
indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada
even before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a
semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared
in said case that the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he
prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked
from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise
could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances."40
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.41
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence
against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of
accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the
achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of
criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case
No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and
Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy", areACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.