336

D<tvid lknalar

oflncl usion ," SudalPitilooufJh)IWUll'vlicy 10, no. :2 Uune 1996): pp. 233-:257.) Nolice that eve n !h ose ways o f satisfying pedophilic preferences that do not involve
ac lltal children-such as child pomography that is either synthesized (tha t is,
without using real mod e ls o r actors) or is produced by ad ults be ing represe nte d
as chi ldre n-are also ab horred , eve n where adul l po rnography is not. This suggests that th e com mon abhorrence of pedophilia is not fully expla in ed b)' the
harm it is believed 10 do to the chi ldren invo lved.
7. That is, unlilth e 1abous can be eliminated.
8. T. G. M . Sand f(Jl' t, 'T he Arg umemlor Adult-C hil d Sex ua l Contael: A Critical Appraisa l a nd New rLtta," in '/'he Sexual Abuse of Children: 'f'heo 1y awl Hesenrdt,
vol. J, eel. Willi;mJ O'Donohu e andjames H. Ccer (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence E.rlbawn Associates, 1992); llruce Rind, Philip Tromovitch, a nd Robe rt Ba userman ,
"A Meta-Analytic Examina ti o n of Ass um e d Properties of C hild Sexual Ab use Using College Samples," J>sydwlogiwl LJullt:tiu J 24, no. l ( J 998), pp. 22-53.
9. Sec, fur examp le, David Finkelhor, "W hat's Wrong With Sex Between
Adults and Ch ildre n: Eth ics and the Problem of' Sexual Ab use," American fuunw.l
oj OrtlwjJsydtiatry 49, no . 4 ( 1979): 692-697.
10. This ol~ject ion was rai sed by a n anonymo us reviewer lo r Public Affairs
Qunrterly.
11 . Of co urse, Sitch benefits wou ld have to be offset aga inst the risks of' sex ually transmiw.:d diseases, or steps wo uld have to be take n wilhin a sex ual li fC govcmed by the casual view to minimize such risks.
12. ln th is context, 'like " can no t mean "sex ua ll y atl.racted to" because that
wou ld be too weak to dillerentiate it from th e p ure hedonist view. Instead it would
have to mean something like "have psychological afkctio ns-l ess-tlt an-love f(n."
I~ . 1 am g rateful to Ra ja Halwani ((Jr p uttin g this to me and for suggcsling
that I raise and respond to the possibilit)' of' a non-h)'brid interme diate view.
1-l. This a ppears not to be tru e of the promiscuous unless one stipu lates th a t
a nybody with whom one has sex is thereby a n illlimate.
15. This view was Sllggested to me b)' an anonymo us reviewer lor Public Affairs
Quarterly.

Chapter 22

VIRTUE ETHICS, CASUAL SEX,

AND OBJECTIFICATION
Raja H alwani

We hold the so-called sexual ''player" and the "slut" or "tramp" up for a special kind of enmity, because these men and women seem to enjoy to an illadvised extreme what many of us, truth be told, enjoy at least on occasion
(even if only on occasion): casual sex, that is, sexual activity without
promises, strings, or plansfor the future. (More than a third of men recently
surveyed approve ofsexual relations without an emotional connection or commitment, though only half as many women do so. Is this difference the sociological result of a "double standard" moral ideology, or is it, moTe provocatively, the underlying foundation of that ideology?) At some point, as some
philosophe-rs, theologians, and psychologists wony, a person's attraction to
and engaging in casual sex come to mold o-r define one's character. Regardless, that is, of whether causal sex is in itself morally suspicious, we can mise
important questions about its consistemy with leading a vi-rtuous, flourishing life of human excellence. In this essay written from the perspective of
vi-rtue theory, Raja Halwani focuses on what we can learn about the cha-racters, the moral personalities, of p-ractitioners of casual sex; indeed, we can
learn about the complexities of virtue theory itself by considering the test case
of casual sex. Halwani arrives at a perhaps su-rprisingly benign, liberal judgment about casual sex. Laying out the conditions in which casual sex does
not run afoul of vi-rtue-theo-retical considerations, Halwani a-rgues that one
of the purpo-rted defects of casual sex, that it involves sexual partners in noxious Kantian oUjectification, is not as serious as we might have supposed.

337

Raja Hal wa ni

Virtue t :thics, Casual Sex, and Objectiflcalion

l ialw,llli did hi s gr.1du<1te work at Syracuse Uni versit y and is associate pro fessor of
p hil osoph y at the Schoo l of the Art Institute oi Chicago. He is the .1uthur o f Virlllous
Liaisom: C ne, Love, Sex, afl(/ Virtue Ethics (Opl'n Court, 2003) and hils edit ed Sex
and Uhics: Ess.1ys on Sexuality, Virtu e, ri Ju!th e Good Life (l'algrave, :2007).

definition . I leave these issues open , focusing on paradigmatic instances

of casu al sex.

338

339

II. Virtue Ethics

iule has been written philosoph ica ll y abo ut casual'sex. In a ny ca se,
casual sex is not usually conside red morally good, eve n it' th e re is
agreeme nt that its practitioners te nd to find it pleasurable. I shall discuss
the e thi cs o f' casual sex, arguing th a t from th e p o int of' view of vinu e
wheth e r casua l sex is immoral d e p e nds on the case, but th a t in ge n e ral
it is not mor<dly wrong in itself'. I also disc uss obj ec tification , a ph e nome non th at is thought to find a na tura l hom e in casual sex, co ncluding
th a t it d oes n ot d eserve a sweeping nega ti ve moral judgmen t; it, too, requires case-se nsitive judgme nts.

I. What Is Casual Sex?

It is dif'licult to d e fine "casual sex" if we unde rstand this to mean the

provi sio n o f necessa ry and sufficient co nditi o ns (llalwani 2006). Casual

sex is sex ual activity that occurs o ut sid e the context of a love re lationship. Usually, but not invariably, th e parties who engage in it do so with
the sole inte ntion of d e ri ving sexual pleasure from the act. Typical examples include two people pi ck ittg eac h o th e r up in a bar for the purpose or sex, peop le meeting through th e Inte rnet for sex, and anonymous e ncounters in gay bath houses and straight swinge rs ' clubs
("Plato's Retreat" in New York City). No te so me departures. First, the
parties to a casua l sex ual encounte r may not be motivated sol e ly by sexual pleasure. Some do it for I h e mon ey, as in sex between a prostitute
and client and sex between pornograph y actors. Second, peop le sometim es engage in cas ual sex without inte nding to do so. Two people
might pic k eac h othe r up in a bar, proceed to have sex, ye t !hey inte nd ed (or hoped) that it would lead to a re lationship. As it ha ppe ns ,
the sex does not lead to a relat ions hip , so. they end up having cas ual sex
d esp ite their intentio ns.
Note also that casual sex is not promiscuity. I Promiscuity has a built-in
temporal and quantitative require rn e nt lac king in the form e r, na rn ely,
that a perso n engages in sex (which might not be casual in th e usual
se n se) multipl e times over a parti cular pe riod of time. (Spec if),ing th e
number a nd I he duration ofthe p e riod is diffi c ult.) Casual sex is not like
th a t; o n e ca n do it eve n on ly once in o ne' s life (m~ a lot) . Second , so m e
sexual practices fit the above ch;t racte ri za tio n or casual sex, but calling
them "cas ual" see ms bizarre: rape, bestiality, a nd n ec rophilia . Ir il is ill co rrect to labe l these '"casual sex," th e n mo re ne ed s to be d o ne to fi x th e

Virtue ethics is often construed as a moral theory independent of, and

p e rhaps rivaling, other th eories, such as consequentialism and Kantian
ethics. 2 Most virtue ethicists mine the writings of the ancien t Greek
p hilosophers, especially Aristotle, to develop a plausible version. 3
Virtues and vices are character traits that dispose their possessor, tl1e
agent, to act according to their dictates (so to speak) . On a n Aristotelian
view, tl1e virtues are infused with wisdom, a form of practical intelligence
that allows the agent to differentiate between what is right or proper to
do, a nd what is wrong or improper to do . The virtues in cline their agents
not only to be have rightly, thereby judging rightly how to proceed in a
particular situation, but also to exhibit, when applicable, the proper
emotions.
Consider courage. According to Aristotle, this virtue allows its agent to
handle fear and dangerous situations properly.4 He claims tl1at the courageous agent feels the right amount of fear when in danger; oth erwise he
would be either rash or cowardly (NE 1115b17-20) . The goods for the
sake of which the agent faces fear must be worthwhile (NE 1Il5al0-15).
Overcoming one 's fear and stepping into the bathroom despite the prese nce of a cockroach does not count as being courageous-the good at
stake is trivial. By contrast, overcoming fear of retribution and reprisals
and speaking up in a crowded and hostile room in defense of an inn<'-.
cent victim would count as being courageous. Aristotl e also requires (NE
Il05a30-ll05bl) that the agent must act for the righ t reason or out of
the righ t motive (this is also required by Kant). To be virtuous, the agent
must speak up because an innocent victim must be defended and an injustice stopped, not because h e is motivated by anticipated rewards for
doing so.
Thus the virtuous agent is one who makes the right decision about
what to do in a particular situation, makes this d ecision for the right reason, and fee ls the right kind and amount of any associated e motion. 5
Not all virtuous actions require the display of emotion, however. Some
virtues have no necessary connection to emotions, for example, magnanimity and magnificence (Hursthouse 1980-1981 , 58). And some virtues
deal with desires, rather than emotions, as is the case with temperance.
(Th is does not m ean that emotions are n ever experienced along with
temperate action: realizing that my hunky neighbor lusts after me as I lust after him, I strip for the e nsuing sexual activity feeling not only desire but also joy and gratitude.)

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Raja Halwa11i

III. Casual Sex and Virtue

A virtue ethics approach is neither inherently hostile to nor inh eren tly
in favor or sexual behavior. Aristo tle's views on sex are found mostly in
his treatment o r temperance- the virtue that best exp resses the proper
attitudes and actions towards bodi ly desires (Halwani 2003 [chap. 3] ,
2007a; Young 1~188). vVhether a sexual action or desire is pennissihle or
worthwhi le depends on the o~ject o r th e action or desire, much like
whe ther tear is appropriate depends o n its object (NJ\' lll8b2!'i) . O n e
question , then , is: Are people's d e sires for casual sex permissible or
worthwhile? ls there anything wrong with desiring to h ave casual sex?
Further, assuming that desires for casual sex are morally permissible,
ought they be acted on? T h e type or desire, say, a desire for heterosexual,
van illa sex, might be morally impeccable, yet acting on it in a particular
case (having sex with my b est rriend 's spou se) might not he. T h e re
might be types of casual sex such that desiring them is wro ng and indicative or a lack of vi rtue. For example, rape is wrong; if it is casua l sex,
then it is wrong casua l sex, and both desirin g it and acting on the desire
would be wrong. Similar reasoning appli es to sex with chi ldren. rvlmeover, if sex with a nimals or with corpses is wro ng, and it is casua l sex,
then it would be wrong Gtsual sex, a nd so desiring it wou ld be wrong. But
these cases are not exhaustive . Indeed , they are not eve n the types of casual sex that ftrst come to mind , which include o n e-n ig h t stands, a nonymous sexual encounters, and swinger sex . \l\lh at seems to be wrong abo ut
rape , pedophi li a, and so forth, is something other th an th e t~tct that they
are casual. They involve coe rcion, manipulation, d ece ption, and hann ,
to name a few moral hm lts. In these cases, desire indicates a de fec tive
characte r.
It" we l"oetts on th e usual cases or casua l sex, th ey seem not to include
these Lulits.li It" two adults p ick each other up in a bar with th e inte ntio n
a nd th e knowledge that th ey a re to have casual sex, what might be wrong?
Seuing objectif-i cation aside for a moment, and assum in g-contm
!(;;tnt?-that sexual desire is not inhe rently m orally suspi cio us, it would
seem that nothing is wrong with d esiring casual sex or acting on the desire as long as, from a virtue-centered perspec tive , two condi tions are satisf-ied (beyo nd that the type o r casual sex desired must avoid the standard
wrong-making features) .
The first co ndition is one on whi ch th e advocates or virtue ethics must
insist, given virtue theory's inclusio n of c h aracter and motives unde r the
moral umbrella: the agent's desire tor casual sex should not consum e hiS
or her life . That is, d esires should not be so strong or numerous that th e)'
overshadow oth e r important aspects of life. Further, there might be
something especially pemicious about letting sexual desire take co ntro l
o f one's lite." The first co ndition is bound to be co ntroversial. WhY

Virtue Ethics, Casual Sex, and Objectification

341

should n o single activity take over one's life, if that activity is worthwhile?
And if there is nothing morally wrong or vicious in general with a worthwhile activity taking control of one's life, why be suspicious of sex? Perhaps when it comes to casual sex the idea is that an agent's life being consumed by it is hard to defend, because sex is not sufficiently worthwhile
to justify sacrificing other things. But casual sex is not special here, for
life-consuming sex between a loving couple would perhaps not redeem
such lives.
There is a tradition in philosophy and theology, which includes Plato,
Augustine, and even john Stuart Mill, that doesn't view sexual pleasure
as valuable. The p leasures and goods of sex, though intense, are brief
and tend to vanish (as opposed to, say, the pleasures and goods ofreading a book). One can fondly remember sexual e ncounters, and can even
dwell on these memories, but this is not worthwhile, if the activities that
o ne dwells on are not worthwhi le to begin with. One can manifest excellence when it comes to sex, but this, too, amounts to little if the activity at which one excels is not worthwhile.
I think this view is largely correct. Although sex is pleasurable, it is not
the sort of activity to which devoting one's life would be good. It is not
an activity that ordinarily enriches the agent or leaves its mark on humanity. Here casual sex might be especially vulnerable, since one cannot
redeem it even on the grounds that one meets interesting people and
thereby enriches one's life (as is often said about taxi drivers). The meetings tend to be fleeting; they involve superficial conversations (if any)
between strangers; one's partner (and oneself) may well be dull and
shallow. Casual sex seems not to merit letting one's life revolve around
it, let alone letting it consume one's life. However, the argument has limits: if casual sex and the desire for it are not all-consuming, they could
satisfy the first condition.
T he second condition is another one on which advocates of virtue
ethics would insist: what motivates the parties is subject to moral assessment, and casual sex must be engaged in for the right reason. Sometimes
those who are motivated by desire for sexual pleasure have other motives
that actually account for their behavior. (Similarly, one might desire casual sex yet for some virtuous reason not engage in it.) One's motives or
reaso ns must be morally permissible or commendable. Having casual sex
with X in order to spite Y, to make Yjealous, or to exact revenge on Yare
morally pernicious motives. Morally permissible motives might include
making money, engaging in leisurely activity, and wanting sexual pleasure. Morally commendable motives go beyond what is expected of people, for example, having casual sex with X out of compassion for X, or '
having sex with X so th at X knows what to do on X's wedding night.
An Aristotelian virtue ethicist would also consider the role of casual sex
in a flourishing- well-lived, eudaimon-!ife. The concept of a flourishing

34::!

Raja Halwani

life is central to Aristotle's ethics since it explains why people should be

virtuous (NE 1 097aJ5-l098a20). Casual sex might not consume one's
life, might be done for the right reasons, and might not involve the usual
wrong-making features. Still, co uld it contJ ibute to a flourishing life?
Sexual ac tivity is often experienced as an urge that, if not satisfied,
leaves the agent agitated; it is generally pleasurable; in this and other
ways it is an important source of leisure; and it often functions as a release, whereby the agem is able, afterward, to attend more freely and less
anxiously to other matters. Consider, in this light, an agent who has a
healthy sexual drive but who either has 110 room fix a romantic commitment in her life or who, for some good reason, does not desire such
a commitment. She prefers to pursue activities and projects central to
her life. She might then opt to conduct her sexual life by engaging incasual sex, meeting sexual partners in bars, online, or having one or two
''fuck buddies." Such a sex life helps the agent flourish in the ways described above, i.e., casual sex allows h e r to avoid the agitation of unsatisfied desire, it refreshes her for a return to her work, and so fonh.
Now consider a couple, X andY, who decide to jettison sexual fide li ty.
They might do so because their sex has become boring or because they
desire sexual variety. Extramarital sexual behavior should be conducted
cautiously, because it can lead toj ealousy and insecurity that endangers
the relationship X and Y desire to continue to have. Still, if conducted
wisely, it might lead to enriching th eir sexual lives without detracting
fiom their lives and pursuits. It might even strengthen their love, allowing them to see how valuable th ey are to each other and how much they
want to be with each otherY And their casual sex may make their lives
more pleasant. Jf properly and wisely engaged in, casual sex can enrich
an otherwise eudaimon lif e by making it more pleasant and allowing the
agents to pursue their life-projects more comfortably.
Finally, consider people who are not especially virtuous, but are not vicious, either. Because the virtues are necessary for flourishing, according
to Aristolle, these people are not living their lives well. Furthermore, they
might have very little going for them under a philosophical (perhaps elitist) notion of what it is to live a worthwhile life: they are not astronauts,
Proust scholars, or Piet Mondrians. They might be slow-witted or otherwise have bland personalities. Yet if they are physically attractive, the availability of casual sex might be something that makes their lives better. Casual sex would help them lead enjoyab le , even if not flourishing, lives.

IV. Objectification
T o objectify a person is to treat him or her on ly as an object. For example, a person treats another as an oqject if the first uses the second as a

Virtue Ethics, Casual Sex, and Objectification

343

chair while reading the paper. If objectification is always morally wrong

and is an essential feature of casual sex, casual sex is always wrong. It
would not avoid one of the standard wrong-making characteristics of
acts. Further, it would be tainted to the extent that the desire for casual
sex included the vicious motive of objectifying one's partner. Objectification poses a problem for anyone who thinks that casual sex is morally
permissible.
Why assume that objectification is always morally wrong? Its moral
wrongness cannot simply be read off from the definition; it is not obvious why treating an entity that is not an object (in particular, a person)
only as an object constitutes conclusive grounds for moral condemnation. Something else must be added, to the effect that the person does
not merit object-like treatment in virtue of some characteristic he has
that morally blocks object-like treatment. So, in treating the person only
as an object, one is trespassing this moral boundary. For persons, it
might be their rationality, sophisticated desires and mental structures,
hopes, wishes, happiness, capacity for flourishing or eudaimonia, or their
affi nity to God that morally elevates them above objects. Note that any of
these features-not only rationality-could be the basis on which persons can legitimately demand nonobjectifying treatment. Objectification, then, though it has its natural home and origin in Kantian ethics,
is a concept that fits well with other moral frameworks, including virtue
ethics. If the feature specified cannot do the job of morally elevating us
above objects (or animals), those who think objectification is always
m orally wrong will have to find other arguments (Soble 2002, chap. 2).
I shall not pursue this approach.
Why assume that objectification is an essential feature of casual sex? In
typical cases of casual sex, two people engage in sex only for sexual pleasure. In doing so, we might argue, they use each other-treating each
o ther as objects, as sophisticated dildos or plastic vaginas-for the purpose of pleasure. Even when one party has other reasons or motives
(money), there is still objectification, for X uses Y to fulfill that purpose.
This argument need not rely on the implausible assumption that in typical cases of casual sex the parties intend to objectifY each other. Even if
X does not intend to objectifY Y, X still does so in and by using Y for sexual pleasure.
The defender of casual sex can adopt two strategies. First, it can beargued that although objectification is an essential feature of casual sex, objectification is not always wrong. Second, it can be argued that objectification is not an essential feature of casual sex, and that whether casual sex
objectifies depends on the particular case. I adopt the second strategy.
How can a particular casual sex act not be objectifYing? If objectification is to treat someone who is not an obj'ect merely as an object, at10
tending to the phenomenology involved in casual sex helps us see how.

''' ... 1

'....J.

Raja Halwani

Virtue Ethics, Casual Sex, and Objectification

Casual sex partners do not usually think of each other as mere objects.
A woman who picks up a man in a bar does so precisely because she
thinks him a man, not a cleverly constructed robot or a penis with some
sort of body attached to it. A gay man who sucks another's penis through
a glory hole does so precisely because he thinks the penis is auach ed to
a ma n, a man whom he likely saw ea rlier and was attracted to. Thus, the
parti es to casua l sex usually desire interaction with other persons, not
o l~j e cts. On its own, this bet means little, J(>r even as we know that ou r
casual sexual partner is a person , we can nonetheless proceed to objectily him or her. But the fact is still important in reminding us that cas ual
sexual inte raction is close to many o th er types of human inter;tct ion , sexual and nonsexual. In casual sex, as elsewhere, we are aware or the humanity of others, and we usually attempt to respect their wishes, desires,
a nd wants. Paying the grocer ((>r the ch ewing gum, in a civil fas hi on , is a
form of respect: 1 respect his wishes to be treated as a seller a nd kindly,
no t merely someone to be abused and robbed. This is no less true in casual se x; in typical cases, th e partners auend to each other's sexual
n eeds, desires, and wishes. Indeed , even when X complies with Y's demand, "Yes! Use me like a lemon sucked dry," X would not be objectifying Y, for in treating Yas nothing but a body part, X is doing Y's bidding.
T h e operative phrase is "'doing Y's bidding," and it is h ard to see how
abiding by Y's wishes an d desires 011e is objectifying Y, that is, treating Y
1/lei P~)' as an object.
No te that this argument does not deny th at objectification occ urs in
som e cases of casual sex, in which, say, one partner treats the other as a
piece o f meat. Such cases are unlikely to be frequent, since the used person, rea lizing that he or she is being used in selll.sh ways, op,ts ou t of the
activity (un less he or she is unable or afraid to) , and since such behavior
is largely confined to deranged individual s. Note also that this argument
does not deny th at in casual sex the focus is on sex itself and th e body of
o ne's partn e r, rath er than on some purportedly more substantial feature. Indeed , few things can disrupt the n1ood or casual sex act as well as
inte ll ec tual conversation. But it does not follow that o~jectif1cation is occurring, 1111less it also follows (whi ch I cannot see th at it does) from my
fo cusing on a dancer 's body that I am ob jec tilying her, or focusing on a
c hef's hands as he swiftly dices an onion is ol~j ectifica tion . If so, objectifi ca tion is not an essential feature of casual sex, and casual sex can not be
sweepingl y faulted on this score.
Pe rhaps th e d efense or casual sex has gone through so easily because
we have bee n employing a superficia l definition or objectification. As argtted by Ma nha Nttssbaum ( 1995), objectifi cation may be more cotnp lex ,
a nd trea ting someone as an object can take many forms and have dille re nt meanings. If so, a defense of casual sex should take this complexity
into account. Of the seven senses of 'objectifi cation " Nussbaum li sts, how-

ever, only tw-o pose difficulties; the other five-denial of autonomy, inertness, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity-do not. On the
contrary, what typically occurs during casual sex is the opposite. In taking
into account my partner's sexual desires, I consider him to have autonomy, self-determination, and agency. Furthermore, I do not consider him
to be violable, for I attribute to him boundaries and integrity in two ways:
first, by not treating him contrary to his desires and, second, precisely by
treating him in accordance with his desires. I also, for the same reasons,
do not treat him as an owned object. Finally, in taking his sexual desires
into account, I certainly do not ueat him "as something whose experience
and feelings ... need not be taken into account" (257).
This leaves us with two objectifications, instrumentality and fungibility.
Instrumentality is a problem only if the person is treated merely as a tool
(which Nussbaum acknowledges, 265). But people frequently use each
other as tools (students use teachers for educational purposes; teachers
use students for career purposes). In interactions with each other, if we
use each other as tools but also, in doing so, act in accordance with each
other's wishes and desires, it seems that objectill.cation disappears. Since
in casual sex the partners typically do this, instrumentalization, understood as the mere use of another as a tool, is not a problem.
Fungibility-the treatment of something or someone "as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type, and/ or (b) with objects of
other types" (Nussbaum 1995, 257)-is an interesting type of objectification . "When we objectifY someone, he would make perfect sense were he
to say, "I demand that I not be treated this way," given that we ought not
to objectifY people. However, fungibility does not license such reactions.
Suppose I enter a coffee shop, do not like the selection, and go somewhere else. In doing so, I treat the owner of the store as fungible with
o ther coffee shop owners. Yet for him to protest that I have wronged him
in this treatment would be silly. Similarly, ifl go to a bar in search of casual sex, no one can demand that I pick him or her up. In considering
p eople as "interchangeable with other objects of the same type" I do
nothing wrong. When objectification is wrong, others can demand of obj ectifters that they, the objectified, not be objectified. This seems out of
place regarding fungibility. Unless I have preexisting obligations, no one
can demand of me that I purchase coffee from his shop ra ther than ano ther shop or that I have sex with him instead or someone else.
Does this argument show that fungibility is morally innocuous objectification, or that fungibility is not objectill.cation, period? If objectill.cation is always morally wrong, as I have presumed, then fungibility cannot
b e objectification, because not all cases of treating people as fungible are
morally wrong. We ca n add that in permissible fungibility-buying and
se lling merchandise , selecting hotels for vacationing, picking up people
in bars, hiring people for j obs-those making the choices treat others in

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Raja

H<tlwani

a fungible way, but they do not treat them as objects, beca use both the
selected and rejected people have mad e the choice to compete with othe rs for special attention, whether this attenLion be eco n om ic, sexua l,
academ ic, etc. The respectful treatm ent of others that occurs h e re nullifi es ol~jectifica ti o n .
The reason wh y fungibility seems wrong is that it is like treating people like pens or paper cups, disca rding one and using a not he r f(H our
own purposes. llut this indi ca tes th at fungibility is wrong when it occ urs
with actions that are otherwise wrong, in whi ch case fungibility itse lf is
not the problem, 11 or when it occ urs in spec ial relatio nships. Fo r e xampl e, were I to own live slaves whom I treated li ke pens, consigning eac h
to the trash bin when they ceased to be useful , J would be trea tin g them
fungibl y. The wro ngness h ere, howeve r, stem s from my trea ting th e m as
objects to begin with, not the resu ltin g fung ibility. If! kidna p my neighbor's child and bring th em a ch ild from the local sh e lter, declaring
"!lave this one. I Ie' ll do," the wrongn ess is fungibility, bm on ly because
I acted , wrongly, as if no special rel atio nship had ex isted between parent
a nd child, th at is, as if a ny ch ild of a certa in age would for them be an
adequate substitute. Now, if I we re in a bar cruising for a one-night
stand, eye ing pote ntial sexual partners, I wo uld be treatin g them as fungible; I view them, individually, as interchangeable with othe r me n in
genera l or with o th er men of a panicular sort, say, thirty-some thing Indian or Pakistani men ("of the same type"). But sin ce none of th e m ca n
rig htly d e mand of m e that I sleep with him, and si n ce l canno t sex ua lly
impose myself o n any one of them or demand o f any one of then1 that
h e slee p with me, in treating them as fungible I not only do not do th e m
wrong, J do not objectify th e m. So fun g ibility, when it comes to cas ual
sex, shou ld be stricken from the list of possible ways to objecti fy ot he rs.
I have arg ued th a t vi rtue e thics morally permits cas ua l ,sex in so me
cases bu t not in o th e rs. Virtue e thi cs also all ows that an o th e rwise ll o urishin g life ca n be en rich ed by casua l sex. Moreover, objectilication incasual sex is much less frequent than thought; it requires mora ll y nasty behavior in which cas ual sexual pa rtn ers do no t u sually e ngage.

Study Questions
l. lf it is true, as a number of su rveys have been quick to re mind us,
that three-quarters o r a ll men think abo ut sex every da y (eve ry
ten seco nds?) , at wh a t point is it acc u rate or fair to conclude th at
a pe rso n 's d esires for sex have beco me consumi ng, or Loo co nsumi11g? Do those judg tn e nts make any sense, or how cou ld we
bshion them to make sense?

Vi-rtue Ethics, Casual Sex, and Objectification

347

2. Suppose the sexual player disagrees with the claim made in the
essay that "sex is not so worthwhile to justifY sacrificing other
things for its sake." Can you imagine what sort of reasonable
grounds the player might offer? How would you defend RaJwani's virtue ethics against the player's arguments?
3. Halwani suggests that my abiding by or acceding to your sexual
wishes and needs is sufficient for my avoiding objectifying you,
even if, or especially when, you wish to be sexually objectified
(see Alan Goldman's similar sentiment, in chapter 5). Is it possible to rely either on Thomas Mappes's (chapter 16) or Immanuel Kant's (as presented by Alan Soble in chapter 18) notions of impermissible sexual use to rebut this view?
4. Virtue ethics expects people to exhibit appropriately virtuous

emotions, but at least for some emotions Uoy and grief) this is
asking a lot of us. What emotional responses can any theory reasonably expect of people with respect to sexual attraction and romantic love? Try to develop this inquiry into a criticism of RaJwani's views.
5. The list of dominant virtues changes over time; the central
virtues of courage and temperance for the Greeks were, it is plausible to say, supplanted by faith and charity for the Christians.
Further, the range of behaviors and motives exemplary of any
particular virtue is acknowledged by Aristotle to be relative to a
mean discernible by the person of practical wisdom. Given these
vicissitudes, might Halwani's conclusion, that casual sex is on the
whole a positive phenomenon, have to be qualified? That is,
might it be true only for liberal societies? If so, is this a drawback
to his approach?

Notes
The author thanks Alan Soble for comments on earlier drafts, and many students with whom I discussed these issues, especially David Cordero, Elliot Layda,
Nora Mapp, Wi ll Megson, and Carissa Ann Owen.
l. One essay whose title claims to "revisit" casual sex is about promiscuity
(Krisgansson 1998) . For more on casual sex and promiscuity, see Anscom be
1972; Ellis 1986; Elliston 1975; Halwani 2003 (chap. 3), 2006, and 2007b.
2. See Foot 2001 and Hursthouse 1999.
3. Not all do . See Swanton 2003 for a Nietzsch ean version of some virtues.
4. Nicomachean' t.'thics (henceforth Nl;").

Raja Halwani

~H8

!1. No t all virtue ethicists ag ree; see Drive r ~00 I, es peciall y chap . !1, for an acco nnt not requ iring right mo tives.
(). There might be manipulation , such as using cosme ti cs to concea l wrinkles, but this does nol scun to be morall y objec ti o nabl e (Ha umrin J 984, 30 I) .
7. Kant a rgue d that sexua l acts were o bjectifying in virtue of th e nature of
sexual desire (l..el"lureso lll~lh io, 1 6~-7 0 ). O n Kant, see Mappes~OO~ \in thisvolltlllC, chap. I oj; De ni s 1.999, ~ 007; Soble ~007b lin this volu.me, chap. l 8].
8. Sec Dent J 984, especially chap .~ and 5; Ca rn es 1983; Soble ~007a , ~11-47 .
9. T his case indicates that wedding sex Lo love or intimacy is no t necessary,
as some (Finn is 1994; Scruton 198o, chap. II ) have ma intain ed .
10. Sec Sc ruton EJ86, es pecially cha p. 5, 6, and 11 , for a similar argument
that has a differe nt concl usio n.
11 . Nussba um seems to acce pt this point abo nt fungibilit)', unwillingl y, when
she sla tes, "th e su spicion re ma ins th at th e re may . .. be some conn ec tion between th e spirit of fun g ibilit)' and a focus o n th ese supe rfi cia l aspects of ra ce and
class and penis size, whic h do in a se nse delHnn anizc , and turn people into potentia l in strum ents" (~87). The probl e m he re is cle llllm aniza tion and instmmenta lizat.io n, no t fun gibil ity.

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