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Aznar vs.

Garcia

7 SCRA 95 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Law Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule

Application of the Renvoi Doctrine

Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his
only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for
Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back
to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being
entitled to anything under California law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.

HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the
internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being
domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

Conflict Of Laws Digest: Bank Of America V. CA (2003)


G.R. No. 120135

March 31, 2003

Lessons Applicable: forum non conveniens (conflicts of laws)

FACTS:
Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua (Litonjuas) were engaged in the shipping business owning 2 vessels: Don Aurelio and El

Champion

Because their business where doing well, Bank of America (BA) offered them to take a loan for them to increase their ships.

BA acquired through them as borrowers four more ships: (a) El Carrier; (b) El General; (c) El Challenger; and (d) El Conqueror. The
registration, operation, income, funds, possession of the vessel belonged to the corporation.
May 10, 1993: Litonjuas filed a complaint to the RTC Pasig claiming that during its operations and the foreclosure sale, BA as trustees failed to

fully render an account of the income. They lost all their 6 vessels and 10% of their personal funds and they still have an unpaid balance of their
loans.

BA NT&SA, and BA international filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action against them

RTC and CA: Dismissed

ISSUE:
1. W/N there is grounds of forum non conveniens
2. W/N there is litis pendentia

HELD: Denied

1. NO.

The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is inconvenient', emerged in private international law to deter the practice of
global forum shopping

Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; - present

(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, - present

(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision - present
This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so

only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing
a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense
2. NO.
litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action there must be:

(a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions -present

(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts - not shown

(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other - not shown

It merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and England

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,


vs
MINORU KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177
November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects
national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamura was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon
assigned Kitamura to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion,
DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road
Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamura was named as the project manager in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippons general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing
his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamarus contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru
then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippons contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction.
The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamarus ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the
pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed outside
the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship
rule, or forum non conveniens.
HELD:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement
of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex
fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether
the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1 st phase is at issuejurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to
adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of
the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It
is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy
for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.What
they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the
most significant relationship rule. The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus
or lex loci contractusmeans the law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the
contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the state of
the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial
connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated,
was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make referenceto the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of
law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this
case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippons premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of
Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1 st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of
laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be
pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are
3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from theConstitution and the laws. While it
may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in
matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the
basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the
RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts
principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Other version:
FACTS:

Kitamura, initiated an action for specific performance and damages against Hasegawa and Nippon with the RTC of Lipa City.

Nippon and Hasegawa moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the contract beingenforced by Kitamura had been
perfected in Japan, between and among Japanese nationals.

They assert that the action shall be heard in the proper courts in Japan following the principle of lex loci celebrationisand lex contractus. Thus,
petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties following the
state of the most significant relationship rule in Private International Law.

RTC denied the MTD


, and subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. On a petition for
certiorari toCA, it dismissed the petition. CA ruled that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case,because nowhere in the
pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. CA declared that the trialcourt was correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci
solutionis. Having their motion for reconsideration denied,the petitioners interposed this petition for review.ISSUE:1.
Whether the trial court validly exercised jurisdiction over the instant controversy, despite the fact that the contractsubject matter of the proceedings was
entered into by and between Japanese nationals, written wholly in theJapanese language and executed in Japan?2.
Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damagesinvolving contracts executed outside the
country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex locicelebrationis
, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens?
RULING:1.
YES, THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE.

In the instant case, petitioners, in their MTD, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law
with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, an action for specific performance and damages is one notcapable of pecuniary estimation
and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds
to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship
rule.

The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

The Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of the change in theory, as explained in PhilippinePorts Authority v. City of Iloilo.2.
Forum non conveniens cannot be used as a ground to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein.

it is not a proper basis for a MTD because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground.

whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflictsprinciple is more properly considered a
matter of defense.

Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondentand the grounds raised by petitioners
to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts
correctly denied the petitioners motion to di
smiss.

NOTES:

The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they elevated the case to theappellate court. In the MTD filed with the
trial court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenientforum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will determine the
validity or invalidity of respondent's claimis that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. While not abandoning this
stancein their petition before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense of forum nonconveniens. On petition for review
before this Court, petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the forumnon conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the
applicable principle is the [state of the] mostsignificant relationship rule.

To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved:1.
jurisdiction,2. choice of law, and3. recognition and enforcement of judgments.

Corresponding to these phases are the following questions:(1) Where can or should litigation be initiated?(2) Which law will the court apply? and(3)
Where can the resulting judgment be enforced? A. JURISDICTION: Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.

Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to bothparties.

The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law.
While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not alwaysprovide the necessary significant
contacts for the other.

The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy the following should be present:1. it must
have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent,2.over the subject matter,3.over the issues of the case and,4.in
cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.

In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority whichestablishes and organizes the court.

It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law.

It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to allor some of the claims asserted therein.

To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of theclaim, the movant must show that the court or
tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no lawgrants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
B. CHOICE OF LAW

Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rulesproper for the second phase, the choice
of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving thesubstantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this
case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three
alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it:1.dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case;2.assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or 3. assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply
the law of some other State or States.

The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may
choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters
regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs Minoru Kitamura


December 5, 2012
538 SCRA 261 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Jurisdiction Lex Loci Celebrationis Lex Loci Solutionis State of the Most Significant
Relationship Forum Non Conveniens
In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to
supervise the construction of the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with
Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In
January 2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But in
February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract. Kitamura sought
Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC
of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of lex loci celebracionis, cases
arising from the contract should be cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an inconvenient forum because the
parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on the other hand invokes the trial courts ruling which states that matters
connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, so since the obligations in the ICA are
executed in the Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed.
HELD: No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance and damages. Such case is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such
cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those provided for by the Rules as a
ground for dismissing a civil case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there are three phases and
each next phase commences when one is settled, to wit:

1.

Jurisdiction Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the issues, the property, the
res. Also considers, whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.

2.

Choice of Law Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws must automatically
apply. The court must determine which substantive law when applied to the merits will be fair to both parties.

3.

Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?

This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the RTCs taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a motion to dismiss, which
was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for
certiorari. The question of which law should be applied should have been settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed the
interlocutory order denying his MFR.

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Court of Appeals


November 21, 2012
297 SCRA 469 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Situs Locus Actus
Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta,
Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were
arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised
her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and
eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah
got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the
Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia
Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi
Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The
asking for other reliefs effectively asked the court to make a determination of Saudia Airliness rights hence a submission to the courts jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the
provisions of our Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff
may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within
her right to file the case here because if shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil Law is
the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called locus actus or where an act
has been done. In the case at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a
Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into appearing before a court trial
which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and
suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place).

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008)


[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United
States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected

by

the

Mt.

Pinatubo

eruption

and

mudflows.

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust
International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment
contract.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La
Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in
the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST,
denominated as Special Sales Representative Agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the lawsof the State of
Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and witnesses

involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines that renders our local courts
inconvenient forums.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?
RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the parties and theres, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point
to

foreign

forum.

This

is

an

exercise

of

sovereign

prerogative

of

the

country

where

the

case

is

filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by thelaws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the
Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in
the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more
properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.

Conflict Of Laws Digest: Phil. Export And Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. V. V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc. (2004)
G.R. No. 140047

March 31, 2003

Lessons Applicable: No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts (conflicts of law)

FACTS:

November 8, 1980: State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of
the Institute of Physical TherapyMedical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, (Project) to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company
(Ajyal), a firm duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce for ID5,416,089/046 (or about US$18,739,668)

March 7, 1981: 3-Plex International, Inc. represented by Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos a local contractor engaged in construction
business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal. However since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas Construction
Board (POCB), it had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI.

VPECI entered into an agreement that the execution of the project will be under their joint management.

To comply with the requirements of performance bond of ID271,808/610 and an an advance payment bond of ID541,608/901, 3-Plex and
VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified
Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service contracts abroad.

Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was, therefore,
engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required a similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee

The Surety Bond was later amended to increase the amount of coverage from P6.4 million to P6.967 million and to change the bank in whose
favor the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait

SOB and the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy Medical
Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq. It commenced only on the last week of August 1981 instead of the June 2 1981

Prior to the deadline, upon foreseeing the impossibility to meet it, the surety bond was also extended for more than 12 times until May 1987
and the Advance Payment Guarantee was extended three times more until it was cancelled for reimbursement

On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding full payment of its performance bond counterguarantee

VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Mohammad Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex call on the performance
guarantee for being a drastic action in contravention of its mutual agreement that (1) the imposition of penalty would be held in abeyance until the

completion of the project; and (2) the time extension would be open, depending on the developments on the negotiations for a foreign loan to
finance the completion of the project.
VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to pay yet Al Ahli Bank because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the

Project

VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already paid to Rafidain Bank the sum of US$876,564

under its letter of guarantee, and demanding reimbursement by Philguarantee

VPECI requested the Central Bank to hold in abeyance the payment by the Philguarantee "to allow the diplomatic machinery to take its
course, for otherwise, the Philippine government , through the Philguarantee and the Central Bank, would become instruments of the Iraqi
Government in consummating a clear act of injustice and inequity committed against a Filipino contractor

Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank

Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit US$876,564 to Al Ahli Bank, and reiterated the joint and solidary obligation of the
respondents to reimburse the Philguarantee for the advances made on its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay so a case was filed in the RTC

RTC and CA: Against Philguarantee since no cause of action since it was expired because VPECI. Inequity to allow the Philguarantee to pass
on its losses to the Filipino contractor VPECI which had sternly warned against paying the Al Ahli Bank and constantly apprised it of the
developments in the Project implementation.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine laws should be applied in determining VPECI's default in the performance of its obligations under the service contract

HELD: YES.

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws
The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by the lex contractus
or "proper law of the contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis) - none in this case

In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of
performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However,
since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual presumption,
comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours

In the United States and Europe, the two rules that now seem to have emerged as "kings of the hill" are (1) the parties may choose the
governing law; and (2) in the absence of such a choice, the applicable law is that of the State that "has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties Another authority proposed that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and valid excuses
for non-performance are determined by the law of the place of performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is undoubtedly always
connected to the contract in a significant way

In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of
performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However,
since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual presumption,
comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours

delay or the non-completion of the Project was caused by factors not imputable to the respondent contractor such as the war in Iraq

petitioner as a guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion, that is, it cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of
the debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the creditor. It could also set up
compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the principal debtor VPECI. In this case, however, the petitioner has clearly waived
these rights and remedies by making the payment of an obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of the
principal debtor.

LLORENTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000


PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents
November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after,
he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother
and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties
will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the

motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be
declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As
stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce
obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he
became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the parties
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
ORION SAVINGS BANK vs.SHIGEKANE SUZUKIG.R. No. 205487, November 12, 2014
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural
law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like
any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an
official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to
present evidence as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons
upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity
and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand.
[44]
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view of the absence of any
statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and procedure.
[53]
Considering that under the procedural rules of the
High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon
which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate
the judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign judgment,
being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the High Court of Malaya. But instead of doing so, private
respondent merely argued, to which the trial court agreed, that the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the
money judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would render meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign
judgment were the party seeking to enforce it be required to first establish its validity
ORIONS SAVINGS BANK VS SUZUKI
FACTS:
Suzuki a Japanese national bought a property (condominium unit and a parking lot) from Mr. Kang, a Korean national
through his agent Soneja. A deed of absolute sale was executed, however even after several demands from Mr Suzuki to
have the titles of the properties delivered by Mr Kang, still he failed to deliver the documents. Later he found out that
Kang has already left Philippines, this prompted Suzuki to verify the status of the property.
Suzuki learned the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under the name of
Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified
that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 536
10
and Parking Slot No. 42. The title to the condominium unit
had no existing encumbrance, except for annotation which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No.
18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although the title to the condominium
contained an annotation representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to
Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
12
withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles.

13
Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles.
Thereafter, Suzuki received a letter from Orions counsel dated stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount
of P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion
covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003. The registration was
made only after Suzukis demand for the delivery of the titles to the properties.
Suzuki thus then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42. Suzuki filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against Kang and Orion. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Suzukis right over the
properties in litigation, contending that he was a buyer in good faith and the dacion was belatedly registered, only two
months after the sale has been executed. Orion elevated the case to the Supreme Court contending that the deed of sale
executed was null and void for under the Korean law the sale of a conjugal properties should be made with the consent of
both spouses.
ISSUE: What law shall govern in the case at bar?
RULING: Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property.
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position, however,
because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.
To consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the
denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found
in the very nature of immovable property its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them
have their natural center of gravity there. Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by what is known as the lex
loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or
lost.This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction
of wills and other conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an
instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his
domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.
He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer havingthe legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. Accordingly, matters
concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property
shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact. In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on
the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law.
This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by
the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun
Sook Jung. We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate
the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of
only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties. Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kangs conveyance in favor
of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent
MIJARES V. RANADA (2005)
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 ]
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, AND JOEL C. LAMANGAN IN THEIR
BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS PLAINTIFFS IN CLASS ACTION NO. MDL 840, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 137, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MAKATI CITY, AND THE ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, THROUGH ITS COURT APPOINTED LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES IN CLASS
ACTION MDL 840, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII, NAMELY: IMELDA R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND MARCOS, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
Facts:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in
their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations
of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees
based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD
alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary
estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of
the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.
Ruling:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in
concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners
Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the
Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this
might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such
courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of
rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for
enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US
District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus
placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign
judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property.
Crim Pro Case Digest: Mijares V. Ranada (2005)
G.R. No. 139325

April 12, 2005

Lessons Applicable: In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:

May 9 1991: a complaint was filed by ten Filipino citizens representing a class of 10,000 members who each alleged having suffered human
rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime with the United States
District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate)

US District Court and Affirmed by US CA: awarded them $1,964,005,859.90

Petitioners filed Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment

Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees paying only P410

Petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation

RTC: estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately P472 and dismissing the case without prejudice

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of a foreign judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation

HELD: NO. (But belongs to "other actions not involving property") petition is GRANTED.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign
judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive,
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title

However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the
enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the
purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for
enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.

There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that

arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential
difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right
to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign
judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of

personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal
systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations
resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by neverending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law:
"rest and quietness." If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause
of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.
Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted

the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of

pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action

based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it
does, "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for
respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
Minoru Fujiki vs Maria Paz Marinay
May 31, 2015
700 SCRA 69 Civil Law Family Code Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage Who May File Bigamy
Remedial Law Special Proceedings Rule 108 Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC
In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in the Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her
marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting, married another Japanese citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and Maekara later went to
Japan.
In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinays
marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back home to the
Philippines together.
In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage). He filed the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki
wanted the following to be done:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage); that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, a petition for such may only be filed by the husband or wife or in this case either Maekara or Marinay only.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC is correct.


HELD: No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. Whats applicable is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As aptly commented by the Solicitor
General:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, [t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x. The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Thus:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave
v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
But how will Fujikis petition in the RTC prosper?
Fujiki needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan,
the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs Venicio Escolin
November 5, 2010
56 SCRA 266 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Nationality Principle
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo
City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later
die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate
court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno
was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk
in Charles office. Hence, in the meantime, hed like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as
admininistratrix of Linnies estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnies brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must
be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code,
successional rights are governed by Linnies national law; that under Texas law, Linnies will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes
(Charles share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death
(applying the renvoi doctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court
held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The

Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnies death is the law applicable (and not said law at any other time). NOTE:
Dynamics of law.
CADALIN vs POEA ADMINISTRATOR 238 SCRA 721
Borrowing Statute
Ex: Sec. 48, Rule on Civil Procedure if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in
the Philippines.
Facts:
Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Intl Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for
Brown & Root Intl Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims
arising from the unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely terminated. They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the
suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their employment contract.
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall
not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract, it appears that their suit has prescribed.
Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation of a
contract.
The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of
the Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1 yr
period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign procedural law will not be applied in our country as we must adopt our own procedural laws.
EXCEPTION:
Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Rule stating if by the laws of the State
or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines. Thus, Bahrain law must be applied. However, the
court contends that Bahrains law on prescription cannot be applied because the court will not enforce any foreign claim that is obnoxious to the forums
public policy and the 1 yr. rule on prescription is against public policy on labor as enshrined in the Phils. Constitution.
The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the case should be Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription
period since the claim arose from labor employment.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date
of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that
FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions:
(1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of
merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65,
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would
include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata
and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the

reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The
father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a
public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the
totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section
78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation,
which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

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