OTTOMAN EMPIRES DEBT MANAGEMENT IN 19TH

CENTURY AND ROLE OF THE GALATA BANKERS

(1838-1881)
Prof.Dr. Bedriye TUNCSIPER
Balikesir University, Balikesir IIBF

Res.Asst. Arzu TAY

Zonguldak Karaelmas University, IIBF

Res.Asst. Fatih M. BAYRAMOGLU

Zonguldak Karaelmas University, IIBF
SUMMARY
The main objective of this study is to review the role played by Galata Bankers in Ottoman
Empires borrowing in the 19th century. Towards this objective, the economic and fiscal conditions
leading the Ottoman Empire to borrowing in reviewed. The borrowing strategies and sources of the
Empire and how these strategies functioned in domestic and foreign borrowing are reviewed with
emphasis on the role played by the Galata Bankers. The Ottoman Empire had resorted to domestic
borrowing until 1854 but from this date on it also incurred foreign debts. So, the Galata Bankers who
until 1854 had an active role in domestic borrowing began to play an active role in foreign borrowing
also. European finance capital which began to enter into the Empire through foreign loans had effects
on the structure and functioning of financial institutions being established by the Galata Bankers. Also
financial institutions set up in the Ottoman Empire and by Europeans, and the role of Galata Bankers
in this process is reviewed. During this period under study we see that Galata Bankers who despite
being members of minorities were ultimately Ottoman citizens and as such usually overlapped their
interests with those of the Empire and intervened at critical times to help out the Ottoman treasury
and offer important contributions to this process of borrowing.
Keywords: Galata Bankers, Domestic Debt, Foreign Debt, Tax Collection, Galata Securities
Exchange, Bank of Istanbul, Ottoman Bank, General Debt Administration.

1. Economic and Fiscal Environment Causing Ottoman Empire Debt in the

19th Century
1.1. General Condition of the Ottoman Economy in the 19th Century
Ottoman economic thought and policy, or simply economic identity, was shaped by varying
combinations of principles of provisionism, traditionalism and fiscalism (Gen, 2000:52).
Two important points in emergence of this identity are noteworthy. First of these is the fact
that this identity generally reflects the prevalent economic thought and ethics of the period
and the second is the influence of various factors, especially of religious and sectarian, in
shaping of this identity over the centuries (lgener, 1991:13).
Generally speaking the Ottoman Economy is an agriculture-based economy. Most of the
production and employment was in the agricultural sectors. These sectors were also one of the
most important sources of public revenue through the taxes they paid. With the developments
of 19th century agricultural producers in the coastal areas and areas serviced by railways
began venturing into new markets and even exporting. These developments accelerated
monetarisation of agricultural relationships (Pamuk, 2003:234-235). Land legislation of 1858
attempted to regulate land ownership. During the same period attempts were made to increase
productivity and an increase in industrial agricultural products such as cotton and tobacco that
were supplied to European industries as raw materials was achieved (Kazgan et al, 1999:245).
Commerce in the Ottoman Empire has traditionally been the vocation of non-Muslims. By the
19th century the capitulations issued since the 17th and 18th centuries in the area of foreign
trade were causing serious harm to the Ottoman Economy (Kazgan et al, 1999:238).
Concessions that these capitulations provided to European merchants gave them a competitive
advantage over the Muslim and non-Muslim merchants in the Ottoman Empire. The Trade
Agreement signed with England in this period provided for free trade and these non-Muslim
merchants played the mediating role in this trade. Through these merchants agricultural
products were exported and finished and semi finished industrial goods were imported.
Through this trade these merchants prospered and in extension increased their economic and
political influence (Pamuk, 2003:241).
The Ottoman Empire never industrialized in the Western sense. The basic underlying factor
preventing industrialization of the Ottoman Empire was inadequacy of capital stock. The
underlying factors for this deficiency were the timar 1 system and its enforcement mechanism
and tight regulation of economic activities by the state. Also limitations of technical
knowledge and skills contributed. At the same time concept of contentedness that was an
extension of the religious culture, the single most prominent factor shaping the worldview of
the Ottomans prevented over consumption and as an extension mass production. The newly
forming trades could not successfully fend of foreign competition and withered under
pressure (Kazgan et al, 1999:241-243). Although new state sponsored corporations and
industrial schools were established in the 19th century industrialization of the Ottoman Empire
was not achieved.
As far as the services sector is concerned during this period we find that foreign capital
investment by large makes up the majority of the sector. European investors were
concentrated in activities such as railways, seaports, lighthouses, water, natural gas, trams,
mining and electricity production and distribution.

Timar was a form of land tenure in Ottoman Empire, consisting in grant of lands or revenues by the Ottoman
Sultan to an individual in compensation for his services, especially military services. Timar essentially similar to
the iqta' of the Islamic empire of the Caliphate-source: the Encyclopedia Britannica

1.2. Important Developments in the 19th Century Effecting Economic and Financial
Structure
1.2.1. Industrial Revolution
By the second half of 18th century there existed in England an agricultural sector that
produced for the market and internalized capitalist production relationships and a developing
goods production sector, which had initially appeared in the 16th century. When the technical
advances of 1760s are included in this relationship network we find the appearance of a
novel production network that was very different from the traditional structure and was
influential on the whole social system. After the beginning of 19th century this new paradigm
leaped into the Continental Europe and gained a wider area of influence. This process
required new markets for the goods produced and a source of resources for sustainability of
production. At this point both England, which was the cradle of the industrial revolution, and
other European nations, focused their attention on the Ottoman Empire (Pamuk, 2003:23133).
1.2.2. Balta Port Trade Agreement of 1838
With this agreement the Ottoman Empire terminated exorbitantly high customs and excise
taxes it applied to foreign trade. As a result resources produced in the Ottoman Empire and
demanded by European industry became freely tradable. This agreement effectively
neutralized the Ottoman States capability of independently determining its customs regime
(Pamuk, 2003:248-255).
1.2.3. Gulhane (Tanzimat) Decree (the Reform Declaration)
This decree issued in 1839 identified and guaranteed many new rights for all Ottoman
citizens, especially the non-Muslims. Although this edict is deemed to be prominent in the
developments in political and legal dimensions it also prepared the environment for the
developments encountered in social and economic structure that ensued. The Tanzimat
economy was a Transition from classical Ottoman economic structure to a contemporary
economic structure a dissolving of stationary, internally focused, provisionist, fiscalist
structure and birth of a dynamic, open, monetarised structure that was sensitive to market
forces (Kazgan et al, 1999:239). The Tanzimat guaranteed accumulation of large wealth that
was prevented in the Classical period through the timar system and forfeitures. The views and
concepts reflected in this decree were based on liberal economic thought and the desire to
develop an administration model based on this thought (Ortayl, 1987:239).
When we consider the economic policies of the Ottoman Empire in light of this
transformation-taking place in the 19th century we find that;
From fiscal policy perspective: Taxes, which make up the most important source of States
revenue was increased in response to the requirement for increased revenue. This on the other
hand had the effect of further upsetting the state of agricultural producers who were most
addressed by these taxes. As far as government spending was concerned we find that despite
decreasing income these expenditures were constantly increasing. Financing of long drawn
wars and luxury consumption resulting from increased trade with the West were the main
factors increasing government spending.
From a monetary policy perspective: The Ottoman economy was not interest-based economy.
Therefore interest rates could not be used as a policy tool. Other factors also limited the
money supply. Discounting a very short period when it was issued, the treasury had no
opportunity or authority to issue fiat money. Because of this the Ottoman treasury had to
resort to barrowing. Also at this time there was no national financial institution to
intermediate this barrowing.
3

As a result any examination of the Galata Bankers in the 19th century Ottoman Empire has to
take into consideration the financial institutions and their activities, the dilemma faced by the
fiscal authority, the rise and fall of Galata Bankers, paper currency issues, development of
banking, foreign debt, development of foreign capital investments and the first steps toward
developing a securities exchange in the Ottoman Empire. All these developments need to be
addressed in a framework that takes into consideration the financial inadequacies faced by the
Ottoman State during the 19th century and the solutions developed by the western powers. In
other words the Ottoman financial system of the 19th century has to be evaluated as one of the
most important dimensions of the interdependence of the Ottoman State and the West
(Kazgan et al, 1999:251).

2. Galata Bankers
2.1. Galata Bankers before the 19th Century
Galata Bankers who are also known as Galata Moneychangers and their banking institutions
they established in the second half of the 19th century had a very big role in the economic life
or even the daily lives of all strata of Muslim and Turkish citizens of the Ottoman Empire
along with the fiscal history of the Empire (Kazgan, 2005:13).
Galata was an important center to govern the "capitulations" which caused the decline of the
Ottoman Empire. Galata district of Istanbul which is on the eastern shore of the golden horn
(Hali) was a trade and finance center during the Byzantium era. Merchants and bankers who
directed trade lived or were accommodated in this area. The merchants and bankers of Galata
were lending money to Byzantium and they were also doing tax collection. Byzantium
government would auction the right to collect taxes and the Galata merchants would buy the
right to collect taxes. Byzantine tax collectors or Galata merchants would continue this
function in the Ottoman Empire long after the death of Mehmed II and through this would rise
to prominence in the Empire. After the conquest and towards this end a search for advisors,
even financiers from Galata was necessary (Kazgan et al, 1999:284-361).
Mehmed II was able to conquer Byzantium in the way he wanted with help from Venetian
and Genoese merchants and Bankers in Galata. Wanting to maintain economic and political
relations with Europe, Mehmed II choose to cooperate and pact with Galata residents. After
meeting with their representatives he issued a decree stating that under the condition of
adhering to orders and prohibitions, payment of taxes and fees they can continue their old
activities in hopes of securing their allegiance (Kazgan et al, 1999:360).
Their integration into the Ottoman fiscal system came about due to the financial crises at the
end of the 16th beginning of the 17th century. During and after these crises the Bankers
became a source of internal debt for the government. The period of prominence for the Galata
Bankers however was the 19th century (Kazgan et al, 1999:284). The financial power of the
Galata bankers reached its peak around midcentury (Pamuk, 2000:230).
Galata Bankers had a network of partners and contacts throughout Europe and the Ottoman
Empire. These local moneychangers began financing agricultural credits backed by produce
after the 18th century when Ottoman minorities began agricultural activities following being
given right to possess land. These local moneychangers also acted as partners, officials or
agents of the Galata Bankers in their tax collection roles. They were financed by the Galata
Bankers. Until the last quarter of the 19th century when telegraph lines were established in the
rural areas these local moneychangers provided financing for local agriculture, the army and
local administration at an interest rate determined by the interest charged to the local
moneychangers by the Galata Bankers (Kazgan et al, 1999:362).

After the 16th century the prominence of Jews in credit, finance and commerce decreased as
the importance and power of Greeks and Armenians increased. In the 17th century the Greeks
gained more prominence and became the Istanbul representatives of mercantilism that was on
the rise in Europe at the time. Along with their near monopoly on wholesale commerce they
also established commerce schools similar to the ones being established in Europe at the time.
Capitulations of 1740 also gave these merchants prominence in the Black Sea, Aegean,
Balkan and Adriatic trade. During the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839) Armenian bankers
began to appear (Tabakolu, 2003:279). In the rise of Armenian moneychangers their
relationships with European finance and trade networks they established thorough the
Armenian congregation was effective. Armenian moneychangers also established good
relationships with the Ottoman bureaucracy and more prominent of these moneychangers
became intermediaries between the bureaucracy and the Armenian Millet. After Greek
independence in the beginning of 19th century the rise of the Armenians gained speed (Pamuk,
2003:216). Sarrafs with the same family names, such as Tngrolu, Gelgelolu, Dzolu. A
family could remain in the profession for as long as a century (Cezar, 2005:65).
In short the financial network between Greek bankers and merchants effectively gave them
power as monopolist buyers and monopolist sellers. Meanwhile Armenian and Jewish
moneychangers were mostly concerned with financing domestic consumption, especially the
needs of the court and high bureaucracy. During this period the Armenians were also
performing their traditional role as governments preferred moneychanger in various tax
collection duties (Kazgan, 2005:14).
2.2. Galata Bankers in the 19th Century
The rise of the moneychangers to prominence during the eighteenth century and their
transformation into large financiers called the Galata bankers during the first half of the
nineteenth century was closely related to the financial difficulties of the state and its needs for
short and long-term finance (Pamuk, 2000:226).
Balta Port Trade Agreement of 1838 started a whole new era in Ottoman Empires foreign
trade. This agreement brought about free trade and in this process money and credit affairs
were overseen by the Galata Bankers.
Galata Bankers and their agents and partners in various port cities, Izmir and Istanbul quickly
added to their wealth as demand for manufactured goods quickly spread to all strata of the
society. Through their dominance in credit affairs throughout the empire they began financing
not just local merchants but also consumers. These bankers would buy goods from Europe
using capital raised at relatively lower interest rates in the European financial centers and sell
these goods for cash in the empire. They would then lend the proceeds of the sale at high
interest rates to the retailers of these goods and consumers. This banker-merchant relationship
also enabled them to cheaply obtain goods exported to the West, especially agricultural raw
materials and grains. They were usually able to buy agricultural produce before harvest
through their finance networks (Kazgan, 2005:13-14).
2.2.1. Galata Bankers and Domestic Debt
2.2.1.1. Galata Bankers and Tax Collection
The main source of states tax revenues was the tenant fee it collected from agricultural land.
After the shift from short-term tax-farming to the long-term malikane system, the financing of
the large advance payments had assumed even greater importance (Pamuk, 2000:226). The
state usually auctioned off this tenant fee to tax collectors or as is the case after the Tanzimat
syndicates established by the Galata Bankers. In this way the state could realize the revenue in

cash without having to go through the trouble of administering the whole process of taxation
(Kazgan, 1995:85).
Galata Bankers also gave credits to other people entering auctions for tax collection. While
the high risk interest rates in Europe were about 6% and low risk long term interest was about
3% interest rates in Ottoman Empire reached upwards of 20%. Most Galata Bankers would
actually acquire money in Europe for 6-7% and would lend this money to the Ottoman
government at rates of over 20%. One of the reasons why the interest rates were so high was
that for the authorities in the Ottoman government the concept of compound interest was very
alien. Agop Pasha who became the minister of finance during the reign of Abdulhamid II was
the first to actually introduce the state to the concept of time value of money and compound
interest (Kazgan, 1995:33-86).
Increased imports after the trade agreements of 1838-39 also caused an increase in customs
revenue. These revenues were also auctioned and the bankers wishing to profit from the
increase in foreign trade usually cooperated in these auctions. The bankers who won the
customs concessions employed many people and this made them all the more influential in
the government. One of the main reasons that the bankers sought customs concessions was
the fact that customs taxes were usually paid in foreign currencies but the bankers had to pay
the auction fees in local paper currency or silver coins (Kazgan, 2005:24-25).
2.2.1.2. Banknotes and Galata Bankers
The reign of Mahmut II once again brought the Galata Bankers to the limelight when paper
currency was introduced. The decision to put into circulation banknotes was taken near the
end of Mahmut IIs reign but the notes themselves only entered circulation in 1839 during the
first days of Abdulmecids reign. The facts that these notes were hand written and didnt have
serial numbers meant that in any time at all they were counterfeited. These banknotes were in
circulation at the same time with silver coins. These coins were debased to such an extent that
in 1843 when an English Pound Sterling was supposed to be 110 kuru it had reached 220
kurush and the money needed to finance imports had to be barrowed from Galata Bankers at
high interest and commission rates. The daily fluctuations in the exchange rates of Ottoman
currencies resulted in speculation in import goods. These speculative activities enabled the
Galata Bankers to acquire great wealth in short time and gave them to win auctions for large
chunks of customs taxes (Kazgan, 2005:24).
2.2.1.3. Incorporation of the Bank of Istanbul
By the middle of the 19th century gold equivalent value of banknotes began a rapid decline as
a result of trade deficits and exchange rates of French and English currencies began to rise.
This resulted in difficulties in imports and goods that were once abundant became rare. In
1845 two bankers Alleon and Baltazzi were contracted to find a solution to this currency
crises. They were able to secure 450 thousand Francs through Paris and London and helped
alleviate the crises and also gained the trust of the Ottoman government and Sultan
Abdulmecid (Kazgan et al, 1999:284-285).As a result of this success these two bankers were
allowed to establish Banque de Constantinople in 1847 to keep the exchange rates stable.
Establishment of this first Ottoman bank was also related to the money reform of 1844
(Tabakolu, 2003:278).
One of the features of this bank was that it did not have a set amount of equity. This was one
of the special privileges given to all Galata Bankers. Ever since the time of Mehmed II the
real wealth of these bankers were never known. Perhaps they preferred to keep most of their
money hidden in other countries because of a mistrust of Ottoman legal system (Kazgan et al,
1999:368-369).

With the recession in trade with Europe through Marseilles as a result of the 1848 revolution
and the general economic recession in Europe the Bank of Istanbul ceased its activities. But
with intervention by the Ottoman government Banque de Constantinople was reestablished in
1872. The bank who made Zarifi one of the most known banker of the country reached the
strength to take under its administration all of Greeces foreign debts. The bank was
successful in maintaining the exchange rate of Sterling at 110 qurush 2 until 1852. Later when
the government failed to pay some of its debt on time the bank transacted on some securities.
With Ottoman government resorting to foreign barrowing starting in 1854 and almost annual
renewals of debt an increase in Ottoman bonds began in the market. These bonds named
consoled also made speculations possible. The bank was alleged to have made a huge profit
in its speculation but bank administrators preferred to close the bank instead of using these
profits to rebuild its credit and reputation in Europe (Kazgan et al, 1999:285).
Galata Bankers incorporated other banks besides Banque de Constantinople. Among these
were the following Franco-British firms the Societe Generale de l' Empire Ottoman (1864),
the Credit General Ottoman (1869, a creation of the Societe Generale de France), the Banque
the Societe Ottomane de Change et de Valeurs (1872) (Thobie, 1992:407).
2.2.1.4. Establishment of Galata Securities Exchange
After formation of The Bank of Istanbul a new group of people called corner
moneychangers who would trade in metal currencies and various interest bearing
instruments appeared. Daily fluctuations in the prices of these instruments also provided the
first experience of stock exchange in Istanbul (Kazgan et al, 1999:371).
Giving the concession to mint gold and silver coins to the Galata Bankers caused an exchange
where coins of various values, weight and purity were traded to appear in Istanbul unlike the
ones in Western countries where various negotiable instruments and other securities were
traded. There existed all over the empire, even in small rural towns, merchants called corner
moneychangers who would trade coins. They would also trade in interest bearing securities
of all sorts. This implies that even before the formation of an organized securities exchange a
widespread finance network where bonds, stocks and similar securities were traded and their
values determined daily existed (Kazgan, 1995:15-19).
Interest bearing domestic debt instruments called consolids that was issued as a result of
consolidation of various short term securitized debts, the bonds for the foreign debt incurred
during Crimean War in 1854, and various other foreign bonds were subject to these tradings.
Later this trade led to establishment of a securities exchange in Galata (Kazgan et al,
1999:371).
Merchants and minorities living in the Ottoman Empire began to show interest in stocks of
corporations that appeared after the industrial revolution and easily purchased stocks because
the money in circulation was gold and silver based, there were no exchange controls and
capitulations gave them many freedoms to transfer money outside the country. After the
Tanzimat many Turks also began to show interest in these securities. Exchange of these
foreign securities created a market in very short time and Galata Bankers facilitated this trade.
Debt instruments exported during the 1854 Crimean War and subsequent exports of various
bonds, stocks and bonds of foreign companies operating in the empire and following the
Constitution reform bonds and stocks of domestic corporations were traded in this market.
First in 1864 Galata Bankers set up an association and in 1866 the government established the
2

The Ottomans curency and their relationships are 1 Lira = 100 Qurush, 1 Qurush = 40 para, 1 Qurush = 120 akca, 1 para = 3 akca

first securities exchange in Istanbul. In this exchange many domestic and foreign bonds and
stocks were transacted and communications with European exchanges was kept via telegraph.
For example Panama bonds and Suez Canal stocks were purchased by wealthy Turkish
families through foreign banks (Karsl, 1994:36).
A bank set up by two bankers tried to alleviate foreign trade payment problems by using their
reputation in Europe to sell direct and indirect debt securities and serve as a sort of
clearinghouse. For a time they succeeded and their indirect securities were traded in Galata
while the direct securities were traded in European exchanges. The exchange in Galata was in
a way in direct connection to other exchanges in other countries. When telegraph was
introduced in Istanbul around 1850 and the exchange in Galata was connected to the rest of
the world the Bank of Istanbul became a bank with major dealings in the exchange (Kazgan et
al, 1999:369-370).
By the 1870s the exchange reached rural areas. Through their partners or representatives in
the rural areas exchange traders and moneychangers were able to entice rural populations to
participate in the exchange and offered stocks and other securities as alternative investments.
This had the effect of increasing interest incurred by farmers and also caused many
bankruptcies and mortgages, culminating in many foreclosures. With increasing securities
speculation a very large social problem began to emerge that would overwhelm even the
government. This culminated in the 1881 Securities Exchange Regulation, transforming the
exchange into a semi legal institution. Abidin Bey who has authored a booklet on the
developments in the exchange was named the government commissioner and brought in to
head the exchange. In 1873 the first Securities Exchange Law was legislated and enacted
(Kazgan et al, 1999:376-377).
Agop Pasha, the minister of treasury during Abdulhamid IIs reign, paid special attention to
the securities exchange in his reform of Ottoman financial organization and expanded the
authority of the government commissioner in observing and regulating transactions. Also
during this period courses on economics and commerce were integrated into the curriculum of
public secondary schools (Kazgan et al, 1999:403).
Following Ottoman Empires entry into the First World War the exchange administrators
personally requested that the government close the exchange and in turn the exchange was
closed. Despite the official closing of the exchange securities trading continued in cafes,
restaurants and theatre halls around Galata and Beyoglu.
2.2.2. Foreign Debt and the Galata Bankers
Until 1840s the Ottoman Empire had not only failed to issue paper currency in place of gold
and silver coins it had not utilized public borrowing of any kind, domestic or foreign.
Whenever treasury had problems the only solution was to send whatever gold or silver items
could be found in the palaces and send them to the treasury to be melted into coins. Artin
Kazaz was the first Ottoman bureaucrat to first apply debasing and thus provide a new
revenue for the state (Kazgan, 1995:18).
From 1840s on European capitalists and representatives of European states started applying
pressure to the central bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire to resort to foreign borrowing to
solve fiscal problems. Ottoman Empires Treasury bill exports to European securities
exchanges would be beneficial to European capital. Bankers who were to organize these sales
in financial centers of Europe would earn large commissions and small investors would earn
serious interest income. On the other hand the Ottoman government would use some of these
borrowed funds to purchase various industrial goods, especially weapons and military
equipment from Europe, creating additional demand to European industries (Pamuk,

2003:280). When the state finally resorted to foreign debt in 1854, the bureaucracy was
initially hesitant. Despite this hesitation selling 20 year or longer term bonds in European
markets and pushing fiscal problems to the future seemed an easier fix (Pamuk, 2001:9).
From the onset England was one of the most prominent lenders of the Ottoman Empire.
Between 1854 and 1862 of the total 23 million Sterling worth of foreign debt was 90% was
obtained through bonds sold in London while Paris accounted for the remaining 10%. Alas
with time France became the most prominent lender and in 1869 Frances share reached 66%
and Englands share dropped to 34%. Germany which started lending to the Ottoman Empire
in 1870 eventually replaced England as the second most important lender (Kray, 1995:2425).
The fact that the Ottoman Empire failed to divert the 15 separate debt issue following the
initial issue to investments in revenue generating areas and industrial production, coupled
with high commissions paid to intermediaries meant that the each subsequent issue was below
the break even point, or ensured a debt spiral (Ylmaz, 2002:192).
Galata Bankers lived their golden age between the time when the Ottoman Empire first
resorted to foreign debt and 1881 when General Debt Administration was established. This
period which is also called the Consoled Era Galata Bankers established stratum among
them. The most powerful left Galata in order to more freely spend their earnings or to become
players in larger markets (Kazgan et al, 1999:285).
2.2.3. Financing of 1877-88 Ottoman-Russian War and the Galata Bankers
The only clear winner of this war which took place at a time when the Ottoman Empire was
deprived of European credit because of the moratorium declared in 1875 was European arms
dealers. Because of the moratoriums effects the Ottomans had to finance this war by credits
obtained from the Galata sources. The most prominent of Galata Bankers and the Ottoman
Bank bore all weight of the governments obligatory imports and the full weight of the
domestic debt issue called Defense Loan. By this time the governments total debt to Galata
had reached 90 million gold liras. Alas in the postwar period the government had to give
some concessions to Galata Bankers During the peace talks at Ayestafanos the Russian
Commander in Chief threatened to march on to Istanbul if reparations were not paid. In
response to this threat the Ottoman government had no choice but to once again turn to the
Galata Bankers for help. All of the Greek bankers and Armenian bankers, who were
constantly provoked by the Russians to rebel against the Ottomans, took their place in helping
the Ottoman treasury. For them Galata was a gold mine. In case they lost this mine to the
Russians they were well aware of the consequences that would follow. Also they were
claimants to huge sums of Ottoman debt and the only way to collect these credits was through
demonstration of their loyalty (Kazgan et al, 1999:386-390). During the war period the
Ottoman government put up as collateral its most sound revenue sources.
The postwar loss of land and mass immigration that ensued brought the Ottoman State to the
brink of disaster. At this time also the Galata Bankers once again stepped in and rescued the
state treasury. The real concern of the Galata Bankers in this case was not the safety of their
claims or any obligation to provide credits but was reopening of the exchange. They knew
that once the exchange was reopened their earnings in just one year would cover what they
were owed by the government. As a result they quickly formed a syndicate to give new
credits to the government and ensure the reopening of the exchange. This also provided a
relief to European claimants to Ottoman bonds. With the success of some Galata Bankers in
convincing the government to reopen the exchange claimants in foreign countries got the
chance to collect their money through the General Debt Administration (Kazgan et al,
1999:389).
9

In light of these developments the government started negotiations with the bankers on 22
November 1879. During these negotiations the plan proposed by the bankers was accepted.
The deal stipulated that some of the most sound of Ottoman revenue sources such as land tax,
tobacco and salt duty would be put as collateral for some of the Ottoman foreign debt. This
deal had far reaching effects and as a result the government had to offer, to company to be
established, as collateral tax revenue of Istanbul and its environs. As a result the Galata banks
and bankers would set up a company and begin collecting taxes that up to that point was
auctioned off to individuals. This new company which would collect six taxes and duties in
and around Istanbul demonstrated a fact that until then was not known. With just these taxes it
seemed possible to pay future interest and capital installments for the period of 1875-80 of
debts incurred between 1874 and 1876. The company achieved these results in just two years
encouraging European creditors to seek a similar deal. In cooperation with the largest partner
of the company, Ottoman Bank they presented a new project concerning the payment of
foreign debts and pressured the government to bowing to these demands (Kazgan et al,
1999:390-391).
2.2.4. Other Functions of Galata Bankers
With the Tanzimat reforms the much of the authority that lay with the Sultan and the palace
and the power to use this authority was ceded to some high level officials in the bureaucracy.
As a result Galata Bankers felt the need to establish contacts with these officials. As an
extension bankers basically divided up all of these high ranking officials among themselves.
Especially governors would borrow money from bankers to pay high bribes to the court and
high ministers to attain these posts. After they became governors they would pay off these
loans through tax collection in their provinces (Kazgan, 2005:19).
This cooperation between the governors and the bankers quickly spread consumption patterns
prevailing in Istanbul to the rural areas (Kazgan, 2005:19). Trade developed to meet this
demand and contributed to cultural changes. This cultural change was accelerated by foreign
merchants who settled in port cities like Galata, Izmir, Selanik and Beirut after the
capitulations (nalck, 1996:428).
Many sarrafs also acted as personal financiers to the sultans and many of the leading Ottoman
bureaucrats (Pamuk, 2000:228). For example Banker Kamondo was the private banker of
Mustafa Reit Paa. In this capacity banker Kamondo was influential in economic and
political life (Kazgan et al, 1999:287). Later on there were instances of banker backed crown
princes political moves and even some instances where these bankers were tied financially
with coupe attempts (Kazgan et al, 1999:287). Also Rumeli Railways corporate rights were
given to M. Boundy who was a French banker in Galata. Galata Bankers were interested in
mine sector that lead with silver Mines in Bulgar Mountain and Zonguldak coal mines
(Kazgan, 2006:97-158).
2.2.5. Reactions to Galata Bankers
As Galatas power and prominence and its role in all fiscal and economic activities increased
it quickly attracted attention. Galata bankers who were at times given some posts in
government and employed as advisors were at times blamed by the general public, the court
and others in government of being loan sharks, cheaters and traitors, and were given prison
and even death sentences (Kazgan et al, 1999:361).
The increasing role of moneychangers in commerce and finance caused some dissent. As
imports started to increase rapidly in the beginning of the 19th century trade guilds in the
capital had a difficult time trying to compete against imported goods. Debasement of coins
which was blamed on Armenian administrators of the treasury also had negative effects on

10

craftsmen and janissaries. Constant skirmishes between these groups which were interwoven
and moneychangers continued until the disbandment of janissaries (Pamuk, 2003:218).
Until disbandment of janissaries in 1826 almost all of the Galata Bankers were under the
protection of janissaries. But this protection did not prevent bankers loss of property and life
(Kazgan et al, 1999:284). Ever since its establishment minorities in the Ottoman Empire
usually employed only a portion of their wealth and even skills in economic activities because
of fear and hid most (Kazgan, 1995:40). Given the constraints under which they operated,nonMuslim financiers in the Ottoman capital cannot be considered truly autonomous
entrepreneurs or comprising a fully private sector (Salzmann, 2003:114).
Janissaries who had for long time extorted money from tradesmen after development of trade
with Europe began to display behavior towards minority merchants and especially bankers
that was illegal and against peace. During this period property of people accused of treason
would be confiscated. As a result estates of these people after they were executed would not
be passed to their inheritors (Kazgan, 1995:20-21). These developments led to much internal
strife and alliance of hostility towards foreign capital, foreigners and minorities who were
gaining dominance in economy during the 19th century. It was this alliance that carried the
Young Turks and the Ittihat ve Terakki Party (Committee of Union and Progress) movement
to power following the constitutional reforms (Kray, 1995:176).

3. Factors of the Decline of Galata Bankers

3.1. Mires Bonds
Foreign debt of the Empire entered a rising trend after 1854 and by the autumn of 1860 the
amount of foreign debt immediately due reached 900 thousand Ottoman liras. Ottoman
government who until that point had revolved debt by new borrowing requested new loans
from France and England but was turned down. Finally Ottoman authorities had to resort to
M. Mires who was a banker with no credit. A credit agreement was signed on 29 October
1860 which was named Mires Loan (Aba, 1995:52). The most worrisome of the credits that
were due at the time of this new loan were a series of short term domestic loans that had
somehow found their way to the Galata Bankers and through them to European investors
(MKB, 1990:76). Upon hearing of the new loan agreement Galata Bankers requested that
Mires give the amount of the loan to them for the money they were owed. The Ottoman
government vehemently refused this action (Aba, 1995:52).
As the agreement was put into effect Mires attempted to take advantage of governments
weaknesses and started illegal speculation with the bonds in his possession an act for which
he was imprisoned. This event shook the government and the exchange in Galata. The
government had taken out large advances from the Galata Bankers in hopes that this new loan
would quickly be secured. European merchants who also had hoped that this loan would go
through smoothly had offered merchandise on credit. The amount of securities that had come
due held by one of the better known bankers reached an amount that his bankruptcy was
speculated. The news that Mires was imprisoned while all Galata Bankers were awaiting a
new infusion of credits to the government so that they could be paid caused uproar (Kazgan,
2005:42).
Mires affair was an unexpected set back for the Galata Bankers who were owed large sums of
money by the government. Since they could not collect on their claims they themselves had
difficulty in paying back their personal debt to European bankers. To make these payments
they began liquidating personal assets. This caused great deal of worry to creditors in London
and Paris. Through negotiations with representatives from France and England some of these
worries were alleviated. The truth that this whole affair uncovered was that the Ottoman
11

Empire needed a state bank. This decision which was supported by Western circles seemed to
be the only guarantee of the future for the claimants and the debtor (Kazgan, 2005:43).
3.2. Establishment of Ottoman Bank
This bank was established in 1863 with equal shares of English and French capital served in
many instances as the central bank of the Ottoman Empire. Because of this the bank along
with the General Debt Administration came to symbolize foreign capitals control over the
economy and finance of the empire (Pamuk, 2003:284). While financial nationalization was
gaining momentum in Europe the way the capitulations were going, the General Debt
Administration and the Ottoman Bank demonstrated the drift of Ottoman finance and
economics away from being national (ener, 1990:205).
The ever increasing demand of the government for new loans began to exceed the capacity of
the Galata Bankers. The government began searching for more powerful institutions for its
short term debt requirements. Ottoman Bank was established in this environment. With its
establishment the government gave it the right to print paper currency and in effect gave up its
sovereign right to follow an independent monetary policy. Transactions such as repayment of
domestic and foreign debt, interest and withdrawing worn currency from circulation were also
given to the bank. Also the bank was responsible for furnishing short term credits to the state
(Pamuk, 2003:285). The sarrafs, as private/individual bankers benefited from the absence of
institutional banks and in that period they made large profits and became the richest group in
the Ottoman society (Cezar, 2005:68). But The establishment, in 1863, by British and French
capital of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, they lost their unrivaled position (Pamuk, 2000:230).
According to Christopher Clay, a researcher of late period of Ottoman financial history, the
Ottoman administrators had four aims in establishing this bank: 1. To break the monopoly of
Galata Bankers in short term high interest loans they furnished and lower the interest rate of
borrowing. 2. The bank was expected to export long term instruments in European markets
and use the capital raised for infrastructure investments. 3. Enabling the government to
undertake needed spending by facilitating transfer of tax revenue to the central finance
organization. 4. Taking part in restructuring financial structure and administration (Bayraktar,
2002:83).
3.3. Financial Crises of 1875 and its Effects on the Financial Structure
The Ottoman State failed to undertake investments that would stimulate the economy and
increase income because of its foreign debts incurred between 1854 and 1876. Most of these
funds were used in current spending, palace construction, building of a new fleet and paying
bureaucrats salaries.
When stock exchange crises which were indicators of world wide recession gripped European
and American money markets the possibility of the Ottoman governments incurring new
loans from Europe disappeared. The Ottoman Empire wasnt the only country that couldnt
pay its debt during this period. Over twenty third world countries in Latin America and the
Middle East stopped debt repayments (Pamuk, 2003:281-282).
On the night of 5 September 1875 Mahmut Nedim Paa called a meeting of the cabinet and
the following day announced that all foreign debt repayments would be made half in cash and
half in new 5% interest bearing bonds (Kazgan et al, 1999:381).
There were many reactions to these announcements from within the empire from namely the
Ottoman Bank, Galata Bankers and high level bureaucracy. The fact that none of the bankers
knew of this decision before hand damaged the trust between them and their European
partners (Aba, 1995:83). This moratorium had negative effects on Ottoman imports whose

12

economy and especially military was dependent on foreign supplies. This encouraged Russia
to use this as a chance to avenge the Crimean War and it declared war on the Ottoman
Empire.
3.4. General Debt Administration
On 20 December 1881 a legislation that established the Ottoman Public Debt Administration
(Duyun-u Umumiye daresi) was passed. This gave the Western Nations a historically
unprecedented opportunity to collect their claims by establishing a tax collection corporation
staffed by their own personnel and operating with powers preceding government authority.
The Western Nations continued this operation until the end of the peace talks with the Turkish
Republic in Lausanne with some interruptions during the First World War and the subsequent
war of independence (Kazgan et al, 1999:391-392).
One of the organs of the administration was the council where an English representative
representing British, Dutch and Belgian claims, a French, a German, an Italian, an AustriaHungarian and an Ottoman representatives took place. The Ottoman Empire had to cede
control of many taxes, excises and duties to this administrative to pay its debts (Gvemli,
2000:17-18).
General Debt Administrative through some novel applications succeeded in performing
capital and interest payments of Ottoman bonds in a timely manner. At times it had generated
extra revenue which was according to the agreement transferred to the Ottoman government.
The administration, in an attempt to increase tobacco and silk tax revenue which was under its
control, tried to increase their production and export (Gvemli, 2000:29).
4. CONCLUSION
Galata Bankers played an important role in financing of domestic and foreign debt in the
Ottoman Empire beginning from the reign of Mehmed II and peaking in 19th century, and
later facilitated establishment of a financial market in the Empire and its integration into the
West. Their acceptance of this role was a development forced upon all parties involved by the
prevailing environment of the day. In this role the bankers developed close relationships with
persons at all levels of the Ottoman government including the Sultan. Although they made
many enemies along the way the bankers simply constituted a rational profit seeking group. In
many instances their interests overlapped with those of the State simply because they were
citizens of that state.
With time the Galata Bankers left their place to foreign capital banks such as the Ottoman
Bank and the Ottoman General Debt Administration and other organizations which facilitated
the debt spiral imposed on the Empire by Western Nations. The bankers were excluded from
financial markets especially with the establishment of the General Debt Administration. Most
of the Galata Bankers became citizens of other countries to obtain certain concessions
immigrated to other countries with time. Their exodus accelerated during the First World War
and the National Liberation Struggle. The exit of Galata Bankers from financial markets did
not in any way hinder the Ottoman Empires debt repayments. The Turkish Republic
continued to pay Ottoman obligations and the foreign debts were finally paid off in 1954, a
century after the first foreign loan to the Empire.

13

Appendix 1: Ottoman External Debts Between 1854 and 1914

Years
1854
1855
1858
1860 -1 *
1860 -2 **
1862
1863
1865 -1
1865 -2
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873 -1
1873 -2
1874
1877
1886
1888
1890
1891
1893
1894 -1
1894 -2
1896
1902
1903 -1
1903 -2
1904
1905 -1
1905 -2
1906
1908 -1
1908 -2
1909
1910
1911 -1
1911 -2
1913 -1
1913 -2
1914

Total

Nominal Value
(Million, )
3,00
5,00
5,00
16,00
2,00
8,00
8,00
6,00
32,90
22,00
31,68
5,70
4,82
20,23
27,78
40,00
5,00
5,91
1,47
7,80
6,33
0,90
1,60
8,20
2,98
7,80
2,36
29,76
2,50
4,82
2,40
8,67
9,10
4,28
6,36
1,57
0,91
6,40
0,75
13,50
20,00

Interest Rate
(%)

Emission Rate
(%)
80,00
102,60
76,00
53,25
62,50
68,00
75,00
66,00
60,00
57,00
32,13
73,00
98,50
54,00
54,00
40,00
52,00
100,00
70,00
88,00
90,00
70,00
73,50
91,00
84,00
80,00
80,00
100,00
80,00
80,00
81,00
87,00
100,00
82,50
86,00
89,00
84,00
81,50
100,00
100,00
88,75

6,0
4,0
6,0
6,0
6,0
6,0
6,0
5,0
6,0
3,0
6,0
9,0
5,0
6,0
5,0
5,0
5,0
5,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
3,5
5,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
4,0
5,0
5,5
5,0

399,48

Cash Interest Rate

(%)

Come into
National Treasury
(Million,)

7,9
4,0
8,7
9,8
9,4
9,7
9,7
8,3
11,5
10,0
8,5
9,3
11,5
11,5
12,3
9,6
5,0
7,4
4,7
4,5
5,7
5,6
45,0
6,0
5,1
5,1
4,0
5,1
5,6
5,0
4,7
4,0
4,8
4,8
4,6
4,9
4,9
5,0
5,5
5,6

2,29
5,13
2,44
1,23
5,15
4,98
3,70
19,80
11,56
9,54
4,05
4,65
10,96
14,44
15,09
2,60
5,79
1,00
3,90
1,27
0,61
1,40
0,36
2,47
1,47
2,43
1,20
1,96
2,33
1,90
1,24
8,90
3,50
5,31
1,35
0,75
5,21
0,75
1,35
17,75

191,81

Source: Emine Kray (1995), Osmanlda Ekonomik Yap ve D Borlar, letiim Yaynevi, stanbul, pp. 205-221.

It expresses the first debt borrowed in the year.

It expresses the second debt borrowed in the year.

**

14

Appendix 2: A Selection of Sarrafs Names Randomly Selected from Various Archival Sources
Name of the Sarraf/Banker
ABDURRAHMAN (Birecik gmr.)
ABDLBAK
ABRAHAM
AC DAVD
AGOP
AGOP
AGOP
AGOP (Erzurum)
AGOP (son of Mihail)
AGOPYAN
ALYON BAZRGAN
APOSTOL PAPA
ARAM and BOGOZ (Barsra gmr.)
ARSLANOLU MANOK
ARTN
ARTN

Source
CM 21003
CM 10 107
CM 12 993
CM 29 407
CM 2 175
CM 15 195
Cev.Darb. 255
Cdarb. 446
CM 23 557
CM 15 459
CM 9 428
HH 5815C
CM 16 801
CM 21 249
CM 15 941
HH 11 657;
HH 11 551
CM 13 657
Dah.ra. 1 161
CM 1 858
HH 16 049
CM 28 894
HH 24 510
CM 22 069
CM 22 641
Cev.Darb. 255
Cev.Darb. 208
Meclis-i Vl 522
CM 396
Dakr. 3161
CM 15 002
Dah.ra. 3924
Melis-i Vl 608
CM 9 428 and
13 560
CM 22 485
CM 26 79
HH 9 950
CM 30 604
Cdarb. 167
Tarih-i Ltf
CM. 121
MecIis-i Vl 618
CM 2 320
CM 16 748
CM 2 560
CM 2 085;
CM 2 084
CM 18 302
CD 5 623
CM 1 413
CM 12 862
CM 12 795
CM 20 332
Tarih-i Ltfi
CD 3 490

ARTN
ARTN
ARTN
ARTN (Msr sarraf)
ARTN (Msr sarraf)
ARZAN
ASTOR
AVADS
AVANES
AVANS
AVANNES
AVANS (Filibeli lolu karatik)
AVRAM
BADAR (Gonceglolu)
BADASAR
BADASAR
BALTACI BAZRGAN
BEDROS
BEDROS
BEDROS
BEDROS (Darbhane sarraf)
BEDROS (Seraki)
BEDROSUN ANTON
BOGOS
BOOS
BUHUR
CANK (Sarraflar kethdas)
CANK BAZRGAN
CANK veled-i SMON
CEZAYRLOLU MIGIRDI
CEZAYRLOLU MIGIRDI
CEZAYRLOLU MIGIRDI
DANYEL
DAVD
DAVDOLU EVSEK
DAVUDOLU BEDROS
DEMR

15

Date
1120
2 L 1176
1220
12 C 1215
3 C 1254
17 M 1220
23 C 1181
7 Za 1212
15 Ra 1198
27 M 1262
10 C 1265
1218
12 S 1191
1267
CA 1237
1204 - 1205
11 M 1256
4 N 1256
21 Z 1229
1205
19 z 1204
1225
C1215
6 C 1204
23 C 1181
15 Za 1176
2 Za 1257
15 CA 1258
C 1258
5 Ra 1232
5 1259
23 M 1258
10 C 1265/
12 S 1261
Tarih yok
1 S 1205
1205
26 1200
Tarih yok
1242
19 S 1234
3 S 1258
7 R 1231
12 S 1255
5 M 1261
13 B 1239
R 1254
9 C 1259
25 Ra 1269
1258
1232
L 1259
1242
Ra l260

Appendix 2 Cont.
DMTRAK (Moral)
DMTR
DMTR (Sakzl)
DZOLU
DZOLU
EBREN (Sultann Parisdeki sarraf)
EMREZE
ETRBAS
GASPAR
GELGELOLU
GELGELOLU
GELGELOLU
GELGELOLU
GELGELOLU ARTIN
GELGELOLU ARTN
GELGELOLU ONK
GONCEGULOLU BAGDASAR
GLGLOLU ARTN
GLGLOLU BOOS
GLLABOLU
GZELOLU ARTN
GZELOLU ARTN
HAMYUS
HANM
HARLAMBO (Kbrs sandk sar.)
HARON
HASFL (Badadl)
HASKYEL
HAYIM
HAYM
HAYM
HAZAR
HOCA AGOP
HOCA AVANS
HOCA HARKAL
HOCA MAKSUT (Bazirgan)
HOCA MKAL
HOCA MKAL
HOCA OHANNES
HOCA OSEB
HOCA OSEP
HOCADUR/HACADUR
HOCE KEVORK
HDAVERDLU
HDAVERDLU NEZARET
HDAVERDOLU ABRAHAM
HDAVERDOLU MANNK
SPRDAK (Msr sarraf)
STEFAN
STEFAN
STEFAN (Edirne)
STEPANOLU BEDROS
KALEF
KALICIOLU VN

CM 2 085
CM 12 799
CM 26 041
CDARB. 671
CDARB. 672
CM 24 171
CD 5 646
AliEmiri 218
Cev.Darb. 418
MAD 5 990,P 85
CM 10535
CD 1486
CM 12 776
CM 20 144
CM 25 734
Medis-i Vl 516
Dah.ra. 1 064
CM 1 685
HH 16 350
Belleten 151, s.412
Meclis-i Vl
r. 1 029
Tezakir, I, p 73
CD 7 699
CM 19 944
CM 21 122
CM. 6 789
CM 2 084
HH 24 510
CD 4 469
Meclis-i Vl 710
CM 21 429
CM 1 577
CM 15 120
CD 1 348
CM 2 484
CM 192
CM 15 794
CM 13 560
Cevdet Adliye 4 802
CM 24 253
CD 639
CM 16 225
Dah.ra. 3849
CM 12 580
CM 31 312
CM 12 787
CM. 26 846
HH 16 035
Cev.Darb. 259
HH 15 430
CM 10 820
CM 12 218
CM 22 532
Tarih-i Ltfi

16

13 B 1239
1237
25 M 1203
19 M 1235
29 C1235
1281
8 Za 1237
1230
25 Za1258
1259
19 R 1261
Ra 1260
R 1263
28 Za 1252
3 Z 1266
24 L 1257
7 1256
9 1260
1236
1221
28 Za 1259
C 1161
14 R 1255
1 M 266
19 L 1198
12 B 1239
1225
21 Ca 1197
13 R 1258
Z 1246
Tanzimattan sonra
27 R 1237
17 B 1222
NO DATE
17 B 1246
5 Z 1259
12 S 1261
1266
R 1241
23 Ra 1239
22 Ra 1232
22 C 1259
5 1232
R 1239
5 C 1258
S 1255
4 Z 1173
1204
13 R 1215
28 1246
4 S 1221
1242

Appendix 2 Cont.
KARABET (Sarraflar kethdas)
KARABET (Sarraflar kethdas)
KARAKA
KASABAR
KASPAR
KAZAZ ARTN
KILCIOLU ANDON
KILCIOLU ANTON
KILCIOLU KRKOR
KRKOR
KRKOR
KRKOR
KRKOR STEFAN
KRKOR (KloIu/Glolu)
KOKAS
KOKAS
KONORTA
LAMBO
LOHMANOLU
MANK
MANK
MANK HDAVERDOLU
MARDROS
MARDROS (Sarraflar kethdas)
MARKAR
MARKAROLU BOOZ
MARKOS
MEHMED
MENDS
MIGIRDI
MIGIRDI
MIGIRDI
MIGIRDI
MIGIRDI
MHAL
MKAL
MNAS
MNAS
MNAS (Sarraflar kethdas)
MMOS (Sarraflar kethdas)
MSAK
MSAK (Bazirgan)
MSAK (Bazirgan)
MURAD
MURAD
MURADOLU RAFAEL
MUSA
MUSA API
NAZRET (HDAVERDOLU)
NESM
NESMAC
NUR EFEND (Gmrkte)
OHAN
OHAN
OHANNES

CM 4 622
CM 11 078
CM 31 228
CM 25 047
CD 1 348
Tarih-i Ltfi
CM 14 722
MAD 9 722, 372
CM 1 508
CM 1461
Meclis-i Vl 370
Cev.Darb. 255
Cev.Darb. 384
CM 14 698
CM 17 077
Meclis-i Vl 646
CM 12 365
CM 18 009
CM 22 248
CM 19 822
CM 12 365 and 12 410
CM 2 320
CM 9 456
CM 15 192
CM 9 456
CD 2 627
Cevdet Adliye 6 358
CM 10 107
Cev.Darb. 255
CM 11 639
CM 10557
Meclis-i Vl r. 965
CM 25 056
Meclis-i Vl 559
CM 23 557
CM 1 383
Cev.Darb.208
CM 31 330
CM 23 921
CM 10575
CM 2 919
CM 26 006
CM 9 420
CM 1 784
CM 14 042
CM 2 522
CM 21 915
CM 30 368
CM 21 236
CM 31 030
CM 22 539
CM 10 830
CM 10 979 and 13
462
CM 23 733
CM 13 816

17

27 S 1229
19 1234
1192
N 1230
17 B 1222
1242
7 R 1234
27 C 1210
1246
1260
4 Ca 1257
23 C 1181
9 Ra 1217
Tarih yok
N 1268
28 S 1258
5 M 1220
21 Za 1231
3 N 1233
23 Z 1227
5 M 1220/4 S 1224
7 R 1231
3 C 1265
12 S 1220
3 C 1265
R 1236
4 Ra ll83
2 L 1176
23 C 1181
3 L 1222
7 ZA 1250
21 Ca 1259
21 Ra 1269
Za 1257
15 Ra 1198
1253
15 Za 1176
C 1192
3 B 1208
9 Z 1210
11 M 1264
1267
1267
24 S 1233
12 N 1231
17M 1216
20 Za 1256
15 R 1220
9 R 1234
21 1247
1144
17 L 1255
4 ZA 1244/25 M
1246
1204
4 M 1251

Appendix 2 Cont.
OHANNES
OHANNES
(Tanferolu?/Tngrolu)
OHANNNES (Balkpanl)
OSBEK
OSEB
OVANS
OVANS
OVSEB (Pekmezolu)
PASKAL
PEKKANLI AVANNES
PETRAK ZMM
RAFAEL
RAFAEL
SAAM
SAKAOLU MARDROS
SAKAOLU MARDROS
SASKAL
SAVDOLU OSEB
SERGS
SERGZ
SERGZ
SMON
SMYON
SALCI MUSA
AMANTO
AMANTO
API BOHOR
API BOHOR
API BOHOR
TINGIROLU AGOP
TINGIROLU AGOP
TINGIROLU AGOP
TINGIROLU AGOP
TINGIROLU ARTN
TINGIROLU ARTN
TINGIROLU KRKOR
TINGIROLU SMON
TINGIROLU SMON
YABIK
YAZICI KRKOR
YENEHRL SABETAY
YORGAK (Kbrs tercman)
YORGAK (Semurka)
YORG

CM 21 915
Maclis-i Vl 707

20 Za 1256
10 R 1258

CM 24 913
CM 23 009
Tarih-i Ltfi
CM 10557
CM 538
CM 16 235
CM 11 371
Meclis-i Vl 202
CM 24 910
CM 19 213
CM 19 213
CM 31 740
Dah.ra. 3560
CM 13 138 and 13 210
CM 21 984
CM 18 294
CM 12 745
CM 12 544
CM 11 369
CM 2 305
Cev.Darb. 208
CM 22 447
CD 824 and CM 13 244
CD 824
MAD 8250
Tarih-i Ltfi
HH 16 352
CM 20 164
CM 19 538
CM 16 226 and 20 764
Tarih-i Ltfi
CD 1253
CM 1 097
Tarih-i Lfi
CM 20 348
CM 13 841
CD 5 776
Cev.Darb. 261
CM 12 705
CM 16 468
CM 13 761
CM 16 642

19 Ca 1258
R 1215
1242
7 ZA 1250
8 B 1233
22 S 1267
M 1236
24 L 1256
20 S 1192
1261
1261
M 1223
6 M 1259
15 N 1246/1207
18 B 1228
C 1227
4 R 1251
Za 1250
6 N 1230
Za 1213
15 Za 1176
B 1201
Tarih yok/1208
Tarih yok
1242-1249
1242
1235
R 1217
1205
6 M 1232/29 Z 1228
1242
B 1253
B 1253
1242
B 1263
8 L 1208
L 1229
15 Za 1235
7 B 1237
14 B 1226
16 Za 1208
15 R 1232

Source: Yavuz Cezar (2005); Economy and Taxation, The Role of the Sarrafs in Ottoman Finance and
Economy in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Imber, Colin(Editor), Frontiers of Ottoman Studies,
Volume 1, London, pp.69-73.

18

Appendix 3: The Share of The Sarrafs Credits in the Total Debt of Some Ottoman Bureaucrats 3
Between 12301246
I

II

III

IV

Kuadas muhafz lyas Aa

166.460,00

Ovannes

166.460,00

14

am valisi elhac Ali Pasha

922.209,00

Patrik(?)

579.236,00

17

Zihne ayan elhac Ali Aa

841.245,00

Gelgelolu Boos

837.945,00

21

Vezir Mehmed Selim Pasha

288.717,00

Boos

226.396,50

49

Berkofal Yusuf Pasha

116.985,00

Artin

113.929,50

61

Hseyin Pasha, Kstence Muhafz

237.835,50

Matris/Patris(?)

109.894,50

Varkasan
113

Yeniehir mutasarrf

262.773,00

18.821,00

Markar

165.000,00

Mrolu Agop

840.000,00

smail Pasha
115

Hasan Pasha

1.103.330,50

Miran

80.578,50

119

Reid Pasha

727.860,50

Patrik(?)

616.125,00

122

Salih Pasha

199.426,50

Maksur

182.926,50

125

am valisi Salih Pasha

126

Maral Ali Pasha

376.810,00

Ohan

141

Ahmed Aa, Darbhane Nazr

479.306,50

A sarraf

144

Trhala valisi

237.067,00

Tngnolu Oseb

236.567,00

792.948,50

Kirkor

309.500,00

1.050.939,00

Tngrolu Kirkor

1.020.000,00
24.000,00

Bonak Sleyman Pasha

146

Tepdelenli Ali Pasha, Veli

Pasha, Muhtar Pasha

151

Sleyman aa, Menlik ayan

147.000,00

Hocador

140.000,00

197

Motafni zimmi

105.759,00

Hatem Yahudi

42.000,00

202

Mihal/Mican(?) zimmi

Matros

214.571,00

ft yehud

800.000,00

2.254.682,50

ap Bohor
Patrik(?)
223

Maral Ali Pasha

244.182,00

Tmgrolu Agop

1.161.220,00
78.833,00
160.183,50

valde sultan kethdas

226

? zimmi

108.743,00

Bohor

266

Sleyman Pasha, am valisi

301.718,00

ap Bohor

135.000,00

271

Ltfullah Pasha

377.333,00

Aop ve Artin(?)

365.308,00

281

Ahmed Pasha, sadr- sabk

128.696,50

Manok

45.000,00

72.627,50

Source: Yavuz Cezar (2005); Economy and Taxation, The Role of the Sarrafs in Ottoman Finance and
Economy in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Imber, Colin(Editor), Frontiers of Ottoman Studies,
Volume 1, London, pp.69-73.

I: The rank in the original document, II: The Ottoman Bureaucrats names and surnames, III: The total amount
of each persons debt, IV: The name of the sarraf concerned, V: The amount of debt to the sarraf.

19

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aba, Sait (1995); Osmanl Devletinin D Borlanmas (18541914), Afyon Kocatepe niversitesi ktisadi ve
dari Bilimler Fakltesi Yaynlar, No 1, Afyon.
Bayraktar, Kaya (2002); Osmanl Bankasnn Kuruluu, Cumhuriyet niversitesi ktisadi ve dari Bilimler
Dergisi, Cilt 3, Say 2, s. 7188.
http://www.cumhuriyet.edu.tr/edergi/makale/149.pdf .
Cezar, Yavuz (2005); Economy and Taxation, The Role of the Sarrafs in Ottoman Finance and Economy in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Imber, Colin (Editor), Frontiers of Ottoman Studies, Volume 1, London,
GBR: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, pp.69-73.
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/karaelmas/Doc?id=10132955&ppg=75 .
Gen, Mehmet (2000); Osmanl mparatorluunda Devlet ve Ekonomi, tken Neriyat, stanbul.
Gvemli, Oktay (2000); Trk Devletleri Muhasebe Tarihi: Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, Cilt 3, stanbul YMM
Odas Yaynlar, stanbul.
MKB, (1990); Osmanl Dnemi Borsa ve Mali Sistemi, Borsa Tarihi Aratrmalar (2): Borsa Rehberi 1928"
(2), stanbul Menkul Kymetler Borsas Yaynlar, stanbul.
nalck, Halil (1996); Osmanl mparatorluu: Toplum ve Ekonomi, Eren Yaynclk, stanbul.
Karsl, Muharrem (1994); Sermaye Piyasas Borsa Menkul Kymetler, rfan Yaynclk, stanbul.
Kazgan, Haydar (2006); Galata Bankerleri, Cilt II, Orion Yaynevi, Ankara.
Kazgan, Haydar (2005); Galata Bankerleri, Cilt I, Orion Yaynevi, Ankara.
Kazgan Haydar, Toktam Ate, Murat Koraltrk (1999); Osmanl Devletinde Finansal Faaliyetler ve
Kurumlar: Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, Osmanldan Gnmze Trk Finans Tarihi: Kurulutan
Cumhuriyete, Cilt 1, Proje Koordinatr: Serpil Teoman, Creative Yaynclk, stanbul, ss. 217413
Kazgan, Haydar (1995); Osmanlda Avrupa Finans Kapitali, Yap Kredi Yaynlar, stanbul.
Kray, Emine (1995); Osmanlda Ekonomik Yap ve D Borlar, letiim Yaynlar, stanbul.
Ortayl, lber (1987); mparatorluun En Uzun Yzyl, Hil Yayn, stanbul.
Pamuk, evket (2003); Yz Soruda Osmanl-Trkiye ktisadi Tarihi, K Kitapl, 6.Bask, stanbul.
Pamuk, evket (2001); Osmanl Devletinin D Borlanma Deneyimi, Muhasebe ve Finansman Dergisi, Say
12, Ekim, s. 69.
Pamuk, Sevket (2000); Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, Port Chester, USA, Cambridge University
Press, p. 226.
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/karaelmas/Doc?id=5007855&ppg=226 .
Salzmann, Ariel (2003); Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State, Leiden, NLD:
Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij, 2003. p. 114.
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/karaelmas/Doc?id=10090495&ppg=130 .
ener, Abdllatif (1990); Tanzimat Dnemi Osmanl Vergi Sistemi, stanbul.
Tabakolu, Ahmet (2003); Trk ktisat Tarihi, Dergh Yaynlar, stanbul.
Thobie, Jacgues (1992); European Banks in the Middle East, Cameron, Rondo(Editor), International Banking
1870-1914, USA: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, p. 407.
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/karaelmas/Doc?id=10087135&ppg=422 .
lgener, Sabri F. (1991); ktisadi zlmenin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Dnyas, Der Yaynlar, stanbul.
Ylmaz, Binhan Elif; Osmanl mparatorluunu D Borlanmaya ten Nedenler ve lk D Bor, Akdeniz
..B.F. Dergisi, Say 4, Kasm 2002, s. 186198.
http://www.akdeniz.edu.tr/iibf/yeni/genel/dergi/Sayi04/13Yilmaz.pdf .

20