1AC

Inherency
The U.S. is not enforcing red lines in the SCS now
Jennings 15 (Peter, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The International
Community & the Strategic Balance in the South China Sea, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/151110_Hiebert_ExaminingSouthChinaSea_Web.pdf)

Competition in the South China Sea also plays out in a wider

strategic context of the growth of Chinese influence and of relations
between the major powers. If the broad sweep of relations
between China and the United States is positive, that could result in
Washington being reluctant to challenge Chinese behavior in
the South China Sea. The same logic applies to the responses of other
countries with interests in the region. Thus China pragmatically strengthens
its position in the South China Sea by testing the limits of
international tolerance for its island construction and other activities. So far
the obvious conclusion seems to be that China is indeed able to make
gains for little or no practical penalty.

As a result, China has adopted a policy of salami slicing,

taking moderate aggressive actions to isolate rival
claimants in the SCS by conducting land reclamation
projects to build artificial islands SQ policy fails to
restrain island reclamation which raises tension
Waguri 15 (Hiroshi, 7/6, Center for Strategic & Intl Studies, Japan Chair, Countering Chinas
Gradual Creation of a Fait Accompli in the South China Sea, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/150706_Waguri_AMPAC_JapanPlatform.pdf)

There also is increased tension in the South China Sea where

Chinese land reclamation activities are making remarkable
progress and Beijings intention to exert greater control over
the South China Sea appears undiminished. 1 The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed serious concerns in
the chairmans statement issued after the ASEAN summit meeting on April
27, 2015. However, land reclamation in the South China Sea is a tricky
issue because there are no provisions in international law that

specifically prohibit any state from pursuing reclamation at

sea, 2 and most of the international community does not take a position on
the sovereignty of those islands. The strategy adopted by the Xi Jinping
administration does not rely on the use of force. Instead, China is

engaged in salami-slicingusing small, incremental actions,

none of which by itself is a casus belli.3 That is why the possible
responses from the international community including the
United States are limited, and land reclamation is expected to
make more progress without substantial policy measures to

halt it even though China officially mentioned its intention to

use facilities on reclaimed land for military purposes.

Advantage 1 is Leadership
China is dominating the South China Seas now The U.S.
has not communicated strict red lines to China, focusing
instead on shoring up Southeast Asian competitors That
policy fails & a new diplomatic focus is needed; 2016 is
key
Thomson 3/23 (Jason, staff @ Christian Science Monitor, 2016, China's hold on South
China Sea tightening, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2016/0323/China-s-holdon-South-China-Sea-tightening?cmpid=push004s)

The saga of the South China Sea twists and turns, with a flurry of
developments this week peppering the region that China seeks to
dominate. Taiwan invited international journalists to an island in a bid to
prove it was habitable, and the Philippines agreed to open up five
military bases to station US troops the first to set up house on the
archipelago in almost 25 years. And in what may be the oddest twist, China
had a maritime confrontation with Indonesia, one of the few countries in the
area with whom it previously had no territorial disputes. What were
seeing here is the emergence of the underlying trends were going
to see this year, says Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
in a telephone interview with The Christian Science Monitor. The big
events of 2016, says Mr. Poling, will be the ruling of an international
tribunal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, on the
Philippines territorial dispute with China (which China intends to ignore ) and

completion of Chinas dual use civilian-military structures on

the Spratly Islands. It is hard to know how China will react to the former,
but the latter will significantly increase its ability to project
power in the South China Sea. All this comes hot on the heels of
Chinese installation of sophisticated radar in the Spratly Islands, surface-toair missiles in the Paracels, and possible land reclamation at Scarborough
Shoal, which it seized from the Philippines in 2012. Together, they would

lay the foundation of a strategic triangle, allowing China to

begin meaningful domination of the area, perhaps to declare an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, just as it has in
the East China Sea. The military balance in the region certainly is
shifting towards China, as Mira Rapp-Hooper of the Center for New
American Security writes in Foreign Affairs , but the political climate is
moving ever more in favor of the United States. While Beijing has
been building islands faster than the United States can build coalitions," the
United States has been focused more on diplomacy, firming its ties with
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and seeking to
strengthen its long-term military foundation. The ultimate Chinese goal

in the next few years is less about pushing the US military out of the
area (though that is the long-term naval strategy), says Poling, but rather
about achieving administrative domination of the seas , so other
Southeast Asian nations can do little without seeking Chinese permission.
And, as The Economist notes, where China used to seek to divide

and rule as it pursued its absurdly aggrandizing territorial

claims," it has abandoned that approach, now seemingly
content to antagonize them all at the same time." And some, the
Philippines in particular, have such a severe capability shortfall militarily,
that they can barely hope to inflict any cost whatsoever on China, let alone
go toe-to-toe militarily, as Poling explains. But this is the task that lies
before the United States: to help the nations of Southeast Asia maintain
sufficient strength to at least defend their maritime access, to have enough
military might that China hesitates before crossing too many lines. And then,
if that uneasy balance can be maintained, perhaps China will become
convinced that, as a great power, there is a certain way it should act, lest it
undermines its own interests and tarnishes its image too severely in the eyes
of the world. This is not a bilateral dispute between the United States and
China, though in Washington it is being increasingly seen in this light, says
Poling. It is China versus the international system Ultimately,

the solution will not be military. It will be diplomatic and

legal.

The SQ makes the U.S. look weak in Asia, reinforcing the

perception of great power transition; their defense
increasingly does not apply because of strategic
uncertainty
Cronin 13 (Patrick, sr. fellow @ Center for Strategic & Intl Studies, The Strategic
Significance of the South China Sea, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/attachments/130606_Cronin_ConferencePaper.pdf)

The

importance of this body of water thus has important

operational military implications. China is pursuing across-the-board
military modernization, advancing counter-interventional
capabilities that effectively would deny access to other military forces, including
the power projection forces of the United States. While the
geopolitical

Peoples Liberation Army is keen to develop the ability to push the United
States armed forces beyond the first island chain, the United States is
seeking ways to counter anti-access and area-denial capabilities. The nations
along the first island chain, which comprises the archipelagic Asian countries
from Japan down through maritime Southeast Asia, are in a quandary over
how to defend their own sovereignty in the face of an increasingly capable
Chinese military backed by a regime that may want the rules to be made in
Beijing. The perception of Chinas rise and Americas decline is
fueled by many sources, including the 2008 global financial crisis and
Chinas widely reported success in cyber espionage; coming off protracted

ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States looks like a

declining power against a rising China in the midst of what is

often viewed as a classic great-power transition. Nor do academic
proposals for a G-2 power-sharing arrangement between China and the
United States satisfy most of Chinas neighbors, who want trade with China
but a continuing American military presence to serve as a stabilizing force
and a security guarantor. Competing claims over islands, other land

features, or resources further confound and confuse the

underlying strategic competition. Thus, tensions in the South
China Sea have grown over the past few years because of a
confluence of geopolitical and resource competition, mixed with
an increasing Chinese domestic political debate about sovereignty and a
corresponding increasing in national assertiveness.1 And the frictions that
have resurfaced since about 2009 are complex, dangerous and unlikely to be
resolved soon. While these tensions appear manageable and are

unlikely to trigger war (except through miscalculation or

accident), they are trending in an unfavorable direction. The
security situation in the South and East China Seas has deteriorated in the
past few years, as disputes have multiplied and distrust has deepened.
Chinas assertiveness is growing, tensions in each of the seas have spilled
over and produced suspicions in the other, regional institutions are not
facilitating cooperation, international law is being ignored and Sino-

American relations appear to be unmoored, with competitive

elements outweighing shared great-power interests.

Take China at their word They intend to militarize the

SCS conflict to expand power & undermine regional
security
Singh 13 (Hemant Krishan, Indian Ambassador to the U.S., South China Sea in
Regional Politics, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/attachments/130606_Singh_ConferencePaper.pdf)

Unsurprisingly, the Pentagons latest assessment is that C hina is pursuing

long-term comprehensive military modernization designed to

fight and win short duration, high intensity regional military conflicts .
Experts tell us that Beijing usually does what it says it is going
to do, capitalizing on opportunities such as signs of weakness
among potential adversaries. Seen in this light, China's dream and
new core interest is to become a power at sea befitting its
status as a major power. In the East China Sea, it aspires to extending
its sea power to the first and second island chains, but finds its path blocked
by the formidable presence of the US Navy and the Japan MSDF. The South

China Sea on the other hand presents a perfect opportunity,

with relatively weak states divided by competing claims. Lying

beyond the straits of the Indonesian archipelago, its waters are both a
strategic waterway and a soft underbelly for China. It is here that Chinese sea
power assertions will be focused in coming years. Asias regional
security outlook has deteriorated steadily since Chinas 2009
promulgation of its so-called Nine-dash line covering 90% of the
South China Sea. This claim is based purely on Chinas interpretation of
history and unrelated to any UNCLOS-based continental shelf or other
maritime jurisdictional claims.

Causes great power war

Zenko 15 (Micah, fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, The A Word: An
Accomodationist strategy for US-China relations,
http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2319%20WEB.pdf)

Chinas economic and military rise over the past two decades
has unquestionably increased its influence in the Asia-Pacific region
and beyond. The debate as to whether this will result in cooperation or
military conflict between China and the United States and its regional allies
has been the focus of countless studies, reports, and high-level discussions
among political and military officials. Changes in the relative

distribution of power between rising and declining great

powers have historically been a condition that complicates the
credibility of a declining powers commitments. Subsequently, a
rising power may aggressively test those commitments of a
strategic competitor by issuing an escalating series of threats and demands,
which canintentionally or unintentionallyculminate in the most
consequential and deadly outcome in international relations: great power
war. Thoughtful Asia-Pacific government and military officials are deeply
aware of this dynamic, but have not been forced to directly consider the
implications until recently. This was primarily because China lacked the
political will and conventional military, cyber, and space capabilities to
challenge domains in which the United States and its allies had enjoyed a
preeminent position. Not only has Chinese military spending
increased by approximately 9 percent each year over the past decade1 ,

but China has employed its power-projection capabilities on

behalf of an unprecedented range of missions. For example, Adm.
Samuel Locklear, then-commander of US forces in the Pacific, acknowledged2
in June 2013 that PLA Navy ships had begun operating within the United
States 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. (Locklear refused to clarify exactly
where.) In the Indian Ocean, submarines began docking at the Chinesefunded terminal in Colombo, Sri Lanka in September 2014 the first of which
was a diesel sub, followed by a nuclear-powered sub in November.3

Things can get worse Eroded U.S. credibility is a threat

multiplier & makes every scenario for escalation more
likely
Erickson 15 (Andrew, 7/23, Associate Professor China Maritime Studies Institute U.S.
Naval War College, Americas Security Role in the South China Sea,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20150723/103787/HHRG-114-FA05-Wstate-EricksonA20150723.pdf)

My Naval War College colleague, China Maritime Studies Institute

(CMSI) Director Peter Dutton, characterizes the aforementioned

Chinese activities as a tipping point meriting U.S.

government response. Militarization of the newly constructed
islands, he argues cogently, which China appears determined to do, will
alter strategic stability and the regional balance of power. It
will turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait under threat of land-based
power. 10 This is part of a regional maritime strategyto expand Chinas
interior to cover the maritime domain under an umbrella of continental
control. 11 Dutton contends, and I agree, that Beijings militarization of
artificial islands sets the clock back to a time when raw power was the basis
for dispute resolution. Chinas power play, combined with its refusal to
arbitrate, its aversion to multilateral negotiations, and its refusal to enter into
bilateral negotiations on the basis of equality, undermines regional stability
and weakens important global institutions. 12 As bad as things are

already, they could get worseparticularly if American

attention and resolve are in question. In attempting to prevent China
from using military force to resolve island and maritime claims disputes in the
South China Sea, the United States will increasingly face Beijings

three-pronged trident designed precisely to preserve such a

possibility. Maritime militia and Coast Guard forces will be forward
deployed, possibly enveloping disputed features as part of a Cabbage
Strategy13 that dares the U.S. military to use force against non-military
personnel. Such forces would be supported by a deterrent backstop that
includes both Chinas navy and its anti-navy of land-based anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD), or counter-intervention, forces, collectively deploying the
worlds largest arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. In the region, only
Vietnam also has a maritime militia, and the U.S. Coast Guard is not
positioned to oppose Chinas. Meanwhile, Chinas Coast Guard is

already larger than those of all its neighbors combined, and

still growing rapidly.14 More broadly, worries about Chinas island
construction, developing force posture in the South China Sea, and
accompanying official statements exemplify broader foreign concern about
Chinas risethat as it becomes increasingly powerful, Beijing
will: abandon previous restraint in word and deed bully its
smaller neighbors implicitly or explicitly threaten the use of force to
resolve disputes and attempt to changeor else run roughshod over

important international norms that preserve peace in Asia

and underwrite the global system on which mutual prosperity
depends Chinas combination of resolve, ambiguity, activities, and
deployments has corrosive implications for regional stability and international
norms. Thats why the United States now needs to adjust

conceptual thinking and policy to stabilize the situation and

balance against the prospect of negative Chinese behavior and
influence.

Only one mistake is needed to ensure escalation

De Castro 13 (Renato Cruz, Intl Studies @ De La Salle U., Chinas Realpolitik Approach in the South China
Sea Dispute: The Case of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/attachments/130606_DeCastro_ConferencePaper.pdf)

The standoff ended when the Philippines and China withdrew these civilian
vessels mid-June. However, the volatile situation in the South China

Sea remains as China intensifies its efforts to control the

islands and waters it claims sovereignty over, and as other
claimant countries, like the Philippines, firmly hold on to their respective
claims. Meanwhile, the strategic pivot of the U.S. to the Asia-

Pacific which has strengthened the resolve of the Philippines

and Vietnam to protect the islands and waters they control can
cause a turn of events. All in all, the Philippines filing of an arbitrage
case, Chinas vehement refusal to participate in proceeds, and the massive
activities of its naval flotilla on 30 March 2013 signify that the South China

Sea dispute has become a regional geo-strategic tinderbox.

One can only hope that the proverbial single spark that can
start a prairie fire in the South China Sea does not happen
any time soon.

US red lines solves the balance of power conflict by

clarifying the escalation ladder
Schaus 15 (John, fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, 3/16,
CONCRETE STEPS FOR THE U.S. IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA,
http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/concrete-steps-for-the-u-s-in-the-south-chinasea/)

The United States, its allies, and its partners face an intertwined series of
challenges in the South China Sea. This nested series of issues is most clearly
manifest in Chinas recent (and continuing) island-creation and expansion in
the South China Sea. Chinas island-dredging is itself only a

symptom of the real problem: a significant power vacuum in

the South China Sea. The United States has largely reduced its
presence in those waters over the past 20 years. While the overall
capabilities of the U.S. Navy are increasing with each new ship, the newer,

more versatile platforms are more expensive. In DoD terminology, the Navy

has prioritized capability over capacity, with the result being

the reduction by more than 20 percent in total Navy ships since
1995. Combined with demands on the U.S. Navy to be present in the waters
around the Middle East, and the United States is left with fewer
presence days elsewhere in the world. In terms of hard power,
Southeast Asias littoral states maritimenavy and coast guardcapabilities
are extremely limited. In addition, they are reluctant to take actions that
would put them in direct opposition to China. The reluctance may be due, at
least in part, to the fact that China is the top trading partner of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even considering countries
willingness to pursue their interests according to international law, the
Philippines much-noted arbitration case (which was initially highly
controversial among ASEAN countries) is only to determine what maritime
features are contestable in courtnot who owns them, but can they be
owned? Together, these factors leave a significant power gap in
the South China Sea. While Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Indonesia are all increasing their spending on maritime assets, their efforts
will need to be sustained for at least another decade to provide the countries
with both the assets and the crews capable of sustaining presence in their
claimed waters of the South China Sea. Mira Rapp-Hooper is right to highlight
the need to expedite U.S. capacity-building efforts for maritime domain
awareness. That said, Chinas 35 years of economic growth, and 20

years of 10 percent or more annual growth in military spending

allows it to fill the gap. If current trends continue, the future
strategic landscape in the South China Sea will be considerably
different, and unlike today, it will no longer be open to interpretation.
Recent events certainly suggest that the Chinese are consolidating
their claims in a de facto, if not a de jure way. But is it really so bad
for the United States if China controls the fisheries and resources of the South
China Sea? After all, China asserts it does not seek to impede the free flow of
commerce in the South China Sea. Despite Chinas stated commitment to
uphold open commerce, it has demonstrated both its capability and
willingness to utilize economic tools punitively to further national objectives.
For example, China halted exports of rare earth elements, necessary for
batteries and other high-end electronics, to Japan during a 2010 dispute over
the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain. At the time, China controlled

93 percent of the global supply of rare earths. China has a

legitimate interest in preserving the continued flow of
commerce through the South China Sea, with a large share of its
imports flowing through those waters. However, Japan and South Korea have
the same interest in the free-flow of commerce, and are even more importdependent for many resources than China. Approximately 50 percent of

annual global merchant shipping traverses the South China

Sea. Should China have control of the waters of the South China Sea, there

is no certainty it would not utilize the same economic strongarm tactics used against Japan to secure its objectives.
Promoting the rule of law and equal access by all countries to
the maritime commons will require a far more comprehensive
set of activities from the United States. The first need, as noted by
several contributors at War on the Rocks, is that the United States will
need to pursue policies that demonstrate to China that its
actions in the South China Sea risk escalation. As long as China
sees little risk of escalation in its actions, it will have little reason to refrain
from provocation. Second, my colleague Zack Cooper is right that the United
States needs gray hulls for gray zones. To be truly effective, the United
States (and countries in Southeast Asia) will also need more hulls so that they
are present more often for more time. Doing so will require the United States
to carefully consider what the rules of engagement are, and the latitude
given to ship commanders.

Advantage 2 is Reefs
Contradictory messages reinforce Chinese island building,
rather than challenge it
Graham 15 (Euan, PhD, Dir of the Lowy Institute, 10/19, SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE:
US CHALLENGE MAY FALL INTO CHINA TRAP, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/southchina-sea-dispute-us-challenge-may-fall-china-trap)

The US finds itself in an invidious double bind on freedom of

navigation (FON) in the South China Sea. Having ramped up
expectations in recent months that the US Navy is about to conduct a
freedom of navigation operation in the Spratly Islands, it is damned if it
doesn't. This first snare is a product of White House vacillation. If the
operation goes ahead, however, Washington risks sailing into

another trap by handing Beijing an excuse to militarise its

artificial islands. After months of talking the talk on freedom of navigation
but apparent paralysis on walking the walk, if the US does not proceed
with some physical demonstration its diminished stock of
credibility on the South China Sea may be irreparably
damaged. Failure to act now will be viewed as another Obama foreign
policy "red-line" rowed back from, further undercutting the US
rebalance to Asia. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter
did a decent job of communicating US resolve in the context of China's
artificial-island-building, without appearing overly provocative. "There should
be no mistake;" Mr Carter told the Shangri-La Dialogue delegates in May, "the
United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows". Yet

Washington's failure to follow through in the South China Sea

begins to resemble a self-inflicted mistake. The short explanation is
a risk-averse White House reluctant to rock the boat of Sino-US relations in
the lead-up to President Xi Jinping's state visit. Despite a gathering chorus of
US admirals and Beltway "leakers" advocating FON operations in the South
China Sea, the net outcome has been policy wavering and mixed

messaging. Consequently, Mr Carter's oft-repeated words have

taken on the hollow ring of a mantra. By sailing within 12 nautical miles
of the artificial islands that China has built in the Spratlys since 2013, the US
Navy would not be countering China's sovereignty claims per se, but
asserting its legal right to operate there against a backdrop of mostly nonphysical challenges against US naval vessels and aircraft in the South China
Sea. At least three of the seven diminutive features on which China has
collectively heaped 3000 acres (1200 hectares) of sand and concrete would
be submerged at high tide in their natural state. Under international law, they
are not capable of generating jurisdiction or restricting access to the
surrounding waters and airspace beyond a 500-metre safety zone for artificial
marine structures. While the US Navy is both an advocate of and adherent to
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, American leadership on freedom of

navigation remains hampered by the Senate's failure to ratify the treaty. Also,
China is not the only Asian state engaged in creeping maritime jurisdiction.
The US has previously conducted FON operations in waters claimed by
several south-east Asian countries. Any US operational assertion in the
Spratlys should also include features occupied by them, to demonstrate that
China is not being singled out arbitrarily. Assuming the US FON action,
or possibly a sustained operational program, goes ahead and achieves its
basic demonstration aims, restoring a measure of US credibility

and perhaps even encouraging China to clarify its maritime

claims, there will still be a lingering sense that this was a
"better-late-than-never" mission that should have been done
earlier, without fanfare. By belatedly making good on its longtrailed intentions, the US also risks falling into a Chinese trap.
The risk of a naval confrontation with China is low. While Beijing's diplomatic
response will be shrill, there is scant appetite for confronting the US
"kinetically" beyond the kind of shadowing now commonplace for US naval
vessels operating in the South China Sea. Moreover, China lacks military
infrastructure around the islands from which to support an operational
response. Therein lies the trap. In the US last month, President Xi said China
would not militarise the Spratly Islands a commitment that Julie Bishop said
Washington and Canberra would hold Beijing to, at the recent AUSMIN
meeting. By taking the US Navy within 12 nautical miles of the

artificial features occupied by China, Washington may be

gifting China's military leaders the perfect opportunity to order
"defensive measures" ushering in the next, overtly military
phase in the island-building project. Ahead of Xi's US state visit,
Chinese naval ships were reported to have entered US territorial waters off
Alaska. What better lure could there be for the US Navy to respond in kind?
US strategic planners may have resigned themselves to the eventual
establishment of Chinese bases in the Spratlys, regardless. But asserting

freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in the weeks and

months ahead will require more sustained commitment, guile
and imagination than a simple sail-by.

Advanced island construction destroys reefs critical to

marine life
Watkins 15 (Derek, 10/27, staff @ New York Times, What China Has Been Building in
the South China Sea, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-chinahas-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html?
hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=photo-spot-region&region=topnews&WT.nav=top-news&_r=2)

Several reefs have been destroyed outright to serve as a

foundation for new islands, and the process also causes
extensive damage to the surrounding marine ecosystem. Frank
Muller-Karger, professor of biological oceanography at the

University of South Florida, said sediment can wash back into the

sea, forming plumes that can smother marine life and could be
laced with heavy metals, oil and other chemicals from the ships
and shore facilities being built. Such plumes threaten the biologically
diverse reefs throughout the Spratlys, which Dr. Muller-Karger said may
have trouble surviving in sediment-laden water.

That irreversibly collapses global fish stocks & threatens

unique biodiversity
Borton 15 (James, staff @ Wash Times, South China Sea territorial clashes threaten
environmental catastrophe, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/7/south-chinasea-territorial-clashes-threaten-envir/)

Chinas mounting clashes with its neighbors over control of the

South China Sea also could be fueling a major environmental
catastrophe, endangering fishing stocks, threatening marine
biodiversity and posing long-term threats to some of the
globes most spectacular coral reefs. Environmental scientists
say the dangers are increasing as the conflicting sovereignty
claims heat up between China and eight East Asian nations bordering one
of the worlds most strategic maritime routes, which boasts an
irreplaceable ecological harvest of atolls, submerged banks, islands,
reefs, rock formations and over 3,000 species of fish. Beijings accelerated
land reclamation over these specks of rock in the roiling sea in recent years
has only escalated the friction among claimants. In particular, Chinas
expansion in Johnson and Gaven reefs also claimed at least in part by
Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam threatens to wreck rich fishing
grounds and valuable coral reefs in the archipelago. The United Nations

Environmental Program estimates that the South China Sea

accounts for as much as a tenth of global fish stocks. More than a
quarter of the worlds population resides in the littoral nations of the sea.

The daily dumping of landfill with sand dug from nearby reefs
by Chinese laborers upsets the marine ecology of the region,
completely destroying the formed coral reefs aging hundreds of
millions of years, said Le Van Cuong, former director of the Institute for
Strategy and Science and a recognized authority on the South China Sea.
Beijing stakes claim: China has upset its neighbors by moving oil rigs into
disputed territory in the South China Sea. (Associated Press) At the same
time, these actions destroy the habitat of many marine species.

Protecting the marine ecological environment is a global issue,

and citizens all over the world are responsible for that, he said.

Chinese reclamation destroys the entire Asian food chain

The SCS has a uniquely critical link to all regional
biodiversity; future development is the linchpin to
irreversible harm. Its not too late
Batongbacal 15 (Jay, associate professor at the University of the Philippines
College of Law and director of the universitys Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law
of the Sea, 5/7, ENVIRONMENTAL AGGRESSION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA,
http://amti.csis.org/environmental-aggression-in-the-south-china-sea/)

Chinas reclamation activities in the South China Sea remain a

matter of grave concern for reasons that are not solely political. The
radical transformation of major coral atolls in the regions
marine ecosystem affects far more than the already huge area
physically occupied by Chinas new islands. The biophysical
impacts extend well beyond their artificial foundations into the
waters of surrounding littoral states. The Spratly Islands region
has long been known as a treasure trove of biological
resources, hosting part of Southeast Asias most productive
coral reef ecosystems. Fish breed and replenish in its reefs and migrate
across vast distances to and from littoral coasts as they follow plankton and
other organisms adrift in the water. Satellites can discern the circulation of
plankton-rich seawater around the South China Sea, indicating biological
connections throughout the waters. (Fig. 1) These Dangerous

Grounds ironically are a wellspring of life that helps sustain

the marine populations of surrounding coasts. The Philippines is
particularly sensitive to these events due to heightened environmental
awareness of its coastal communities that directly depend on fishing for
subsistence. The closest province of Palawan is quite special in this regard as
the countrys final ecological frontier: its waters are its most productive
fishing ground, contributing 20% of annual fish production. Studies have also
confirmed genetic linkages and interchange of species between the Spratly
Islands region, Palawan waters, and the Sulu Sea, (Fig. 2) which in turn
connects with all other archipelagic waters and Southeast Asias Coral
Triangle. Dr. Edgardo Gomez of the Marine Science Institute, one of the
most-respected marine scientists of the region and pioneer in the
scientific cooperation activities in the 1990s, laments the destruction of
311 hectares of precious reefs and pegs the economic losses to be worth
at least 110 Million USD annually, to be surely felt as reduction in fish
catch in the coming decades. He points out that the ecological

footprint of Chinas reclamation spans more than the ground

that the new islands stand on. While formerly productive reefs
have been replaced with lifeless sand and concrete, the months
of work to create each island also smothered surrounding areas through
sedimentation and turbidity produced by dumping massive amounts of filling
material. To bury the reef, these were siphoned off from surrounding areas,

indicating disturbance and destruction of benthic communities either around

the new island or elsewhere. Natural atolls will be dredged and
become artificial harbors for the many ships to be stationed in the area,
bringing with them the corresponding impact of continuous operational
marine pollution on any remaining coral. Settlement on the new

islands will bring ruin through accompanying day-to-day

activities such as sewage, garbage, anchoring, and marine debris.
People will require a continuous supply of food most likely to be harvested
from nearby waters. To top this off, China is deploying and

operating its ravenous fishing fleet. Chinese fishing has

already caused the destruction of its southern coastal reefs
and decline of coastal fish stocks; no doubt it will also cause
the rapid decline of these distant fishing grounds. The impact
zone of Chinas activities thus extend well beyond the South China
Sea: reefs directly destroyed, surrounding areas damaged, fish stocks of
connected waters deprived of precious breeding grounds and habitats. The
island-building spree and fishing fleet mobilization result not only in the
deliberate destruction of vital and productive commons they also impair
the long-term sustainability of the marine environment of all
the littoral States around the South China Sea. While China argues
that island-building is reasonable, understandable, and legal, the largescale and irreparable damage wrought contravenes the fundamental principle
that states activities should not cause trans-boundary harm to other states.
This applies not only to incidental effects like pollution, but with
even more force to activities that are purposely planned and executed,
especially in areas where disputing states are additionally obliged not cause
permanent damage pending settlement. Chinas action, undertaken on
such a massive scale, significantly damages the marine
environment of the South China Sea and surrounding waters ,
and heralds the further degradation and depletion of their living resources .

Chinas own marine scientists have previously called attention

to the decline of sensitive coral reefs in the South China Sea by
as much as 80% due to ravenous economic exploitation; with
reclamation, the remaining 20% stand to be lost as well. Thus,
there is some truth to Chinas claim that the reclamation activities are not
directed against any state: the long-term damage done is indiscriminate and
undirected, making it much worse. In attempting to exclusively secure and
control natural resources, it is also destroying the most fragile and

sensitive marine resource base of the South China Sea and

diminishing everyone elses. It has engaged in environmental
aggression on a regional scale, and turned reclamation into a
environmental weapon of mass destruction.

Kills billions in the short-term

Fox 16 (Bill, vice-president, fisheries, World Wildlife Fund, Overfishing: Overview,
http://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/overfishing)

Overfishing occurs when more fish are caught than the population can replace through natural

overfishing
has serious consequences. The results not only affect the balance of life in
the oceans, but also the social and economic well-being of the coastal communities who
depend on fish for their way of life. Billions of people rely on fish for protein, and
fishing is the principal livelihood for millions of people around the world. For centuries, our
reproduction. Gathering as many fish as possible may seem like a profitable practice, but

seas and oceans have been considered a limitless bounty of food. However, increasing fishing efforts over

unsustainable fishing practices are pushing many fish

stocks to the point of collapse.
the last 50 years as well as

Causes planetary extinction

Young 15 (Grace, MIT ocean engineer, aquanaut, and Marshall Scholar focused
on underwater imaging at Oxford University, How to Save Our Sick, Neglected
Oceans, http://time.com/4029379/cern-for-the-oceans/)

Without the oceans, Earth is just another rock in space. Human survival
depends on healthy oceans. They produce up to 70% of the oxygen we
breathe, provide essential protein for billions, and absorb vast quantities of
carbon from greenhouse gases. They make our planet habitable. Yet we know
more about the dark side of the moon than the depths of the ocean. While
robots patrol Mars and billion-dollar missions probe deeper into space, 95% of
our oceans remain unexplored and largely unknown. We know with certainty,
however, that our oceans are sick. Mass displacement of marine species from
warming seas, expanding dead zones from chemical pollution, eight-million
tons of animal-choking plastic garbage dumped every year, rapidly increasing
acidification, and gross overfishing all threaten the extinction of entire
ecosystems in our lifetime. Meanwhile, rising sea levels risk overwhelming
coastal metropolises and weather-inflicted catastrophes are growing in force
and frequency. These are symptoms of serious illness. Untreated, Earth will
become uninhabitable.

Moral equality means even a small risk of preventing

extinction outweighs structural violence future
generations
Bostrom, 2012 (Mar 6, Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute
at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award, We're Underestimating the
Risk of Human Extinction, interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in
D.C., http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/wereunderestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)
Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's
existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the
latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk
mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of

present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that
counts future people as being worth as much as present people . You might say that
fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at
some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it
doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less
because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If
you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population

existential risk mitigation has a much

higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many
people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this
critical period of time---we might live for billions of years , our descendants might
colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more
people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the
probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense
benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under
numbers, then you get this very stark implication that

ordinary standards.

Its not too late for a diplomatic solution to save reefs &
recover fish stocks
Holmes 15 (Oliver, 6/28, staff @ The Guardian, South China Sea Images reveal impact on coral of
Beijing's military bases, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/sep/17/south-china-seaimages-reveal-impact-on-coral-of-beijings-military-bases)

Prof Terry Hughes, a coral specialist, says the image of Subi Reef is
particularly worrying. Building new manmade islands on top of
shallow reefs is smothering them with sediment, and turning clear
water muddy the environmental damage is substantial and unprecedented
in scale, he says. Coral reefs in the South China Sea are
increasingly threatened by overfishing and climate change, and
now they will struggle to cope with this additional impact of massive amounts
of dredging to create new military outposts. What we need is a

breakthrough in cooperation, aimed at protecting fragile reef

ecosystems rather than destroying them. The South China Sea
accounts for 10% of global fish stocks, the UN environment programme
estimates. The reefs provide a refuge for economically important

fish during their life cycle and therefore play an important

role in recruitment and maintenance of fish stocks, it says. The
smallest of the four islands analysed by the Guardian, Johnsons Reef, is built
slightly away from the protective reef crest. But the images show sand was
dredged from other reefs in the South China Sea, Hughes says. More than

20 reefs in the Spratly area show such signs of serious

ecological damage," he adds. "This will negatively impact
fisheries locally on the reefs and across the South China Sea, a
region of the world in which marine fish are crucial to jobs, culture, nutrition,
economies, and peace.

Plan
The United States federal government will convey through
diplomatic channels to the Peoples Republic of China
that:
*If China or any other party fails to abide by the expectations of the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea, the United
States will take diplomatic and economic action to sanction those parties; if
those actions involve hostilities, the United States military will intervene;
*The United States will not involve itself in commercial or non-military
diplomatic disputes in the South China Sea. Those disputes should be settled
by the claimants through any UNCLOS-consistent means, including bilateral
talks;
*If China or another claimant escalates hostilities in the South China Sea
against United States allies, the United States military will intervene.
Conversely, the United States will not initiate hostilities against any claimant,
including China, involved in peaceful development or commercial shipping;
*The United States will conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations in the
South China Sea within the 12-mile nautical zone of any disputed claim,
including reclaimed Chinese islands, and outside the 12-mile nautical zone
of undisputed claims, using typical innocent passage procedures in the latter,
and;
*If China and other claimants establish and abide by joint development
norms, cease new military development in, and establish and abide by a
Code of Conduct for the maritime areas of South China Sea, the United States
will support UNCLOS-consistent, legally disclosed Chinese territorial claims in
the South China Sea. If claimants interfere with legitimate, UNCLOSconsistent Chinese territorial claims, the United States will take diplomatic
and economic action to sanction those parties. If those actions involve
hostilities, the United States military will intervene.

Solvency
The plan solves by clarifying the U.S. diplomatic stance,
disentangling maritime & territorial claims, &
emphasizing non-military solutions through UNCLOS & a
maritime Code of Conduct
Swaine 15 (Michael, Senior Associate, Asia Program Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 7/23, Americas Security Role in the South China Sea,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20150723/103787/HHRG-114-FA05-Wstate-SwaineM20150723.pdf)

Washingtons message on the South China Sea issue has been

badly garbled, making it seem as if it is opposed to any Chinese activities that involve an
increase in presence or capability in the area, with little serious reference to the provocative actions of any
other claimants, in particular Vietnam and the Philippines.

To clarify its position, the

U.S. needs to focus like a laser on its two only real interests in the South China Sea,
and connect its statements and actions to them as much as possible.
The first interest is freedom of navigation (FON), meaning access by the U.S.
Navy to areas outside any legally established territorial waters surrounding islands or other features,
including the so-called Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends for 200 nautical miles beyond such

China has no interest in obstructing commercial shipping

or flights across the South China Sea and warning them against
something they have never undertaken and would never do in the
future, except perhaps in time of war, is unnecessarily provocative
and misleading. The second U.S. interest regarding this issue is
the possible unprovoked use of force by China against other claimants.
waters.

Such actions would inevitably generate a much greater level of tension across the region and push it
toward an emphasis on military rivalry over peaceful economic growth. Both Washington and Beijing have
a vital interest in preventing an escalating spiral of violence over disputed rocks and islands. Washington
needs to end its vague opposition to undefined coercion by Beijing or others in the South China Sea and

Both of these U.S. interests

involve potential violations of or disputes regarding
international law and process in respect to three issues: 1) whether man-made islands can be
focus on preventing the sustained use of force.

used to justify 12nm territorial seas and EEZs that can then be used to limit naval access; 2) whether a
coastal state with EEZs can demand that foreign militaries notify them before transiting or engaging in ISR
or similar military activities; and 3) the threat or resort to force over disputed territories. Regarding the first

the U.S. must make it abundantly clear to the Chinese

government that any attempt to claim sovereign waters or
EEZs for man-made islands built on features that do not
possess territorial waters or EEZs would be in violation of
international law and completely unacceptable. Washington has in fact said this at times, but
point,

too often it also makes statements that give the impression that it is opposed to Chinese land reclamation

Land reclamation in itself is meaningless. Virtually every claimant has engaged in it,
The issue is about what China does
with its reclaimed land. In addition, the lack of Chinese clarity
per se.

and to say that China is doing more of it means little.

regarding the specific claim to waters around man-made

islands is magnified by its larger unwillingness to clearly

define its claims to those waters existing outside of any

conceivable 12 nm limit or EEZ associated with land features
and yet inside the much larger nine-dashed line (9DL) that is
intended to signify its claims across the South China Sea. Beijing
has at times acted as if it has exclusive rights over such waters, but has never clearly 3 stated its position,
thus greatly increasing the overall level of uncertainty. Washington and others have repeatedly called for
Beijing to clarify its stance on the 9DL and should continue to do so. On the second point (regarding naval
activities within EEZs) Beijing and Washington clearly differ over how freely U.S. military assets can
operate in areas just outside territorial waters, especially the EEZ. China, along with several other coastal
nations such as India and Brazil, insists that it has the legal right, under the regulations of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to deny foreign navies the ability to conduct a variety of
supposedly hostile activities in its EEZ, including surveillance. The U.S. and many other countries reject
this interpretation. Moreover, China has itself conducted such supposedly hostile naval actions (i.e.,

Washington must point out

the hypocrisy of the Chinese position and insist that it has a
right to operate in a non-hostile manner (including normal surveillance
surveillance) in the U.S. EEZs around Guam and Hawaii.

activities) outside of legal 12 nm territorial waters. At the same time, Washington should reduce the
frequency of its monitoring activities within Chinas EEZs. It is my understanding, based on discussions
with former U.S. officials, that the U.S. military does not need to conduct such ISR activities at high levels.
The third point (an unprovoked threat or use of force) would constitute a clear violation of the UN Charter
prohibiting such behavior. Any sustained attempt by China to forcibly threaten or remove other claimants
from disputed territories without any clear appeal to self-defense would seriously disrupt peace and
generate a strong regional and international response. Beijing must recognize that such an outcome would
undermine its entire peaceful development policy and put at risk its relations with the West and many
regional states. Although China has stated many times that it is committed to a peaceful process of
negotiation over the disputed areas and signed the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea---in which all parties agreed to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by
peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force,---it has never clearly disavowed an
unprovoked use of force. Moreover, China has employed force in the past to eject other claimants from
disputed South China Sea territories, and at present it (along with many ASEAN states) seems to offer little

The U.S. and others

should thus press China and other claimants to make a clear, definitive
statement that they will not resort to force to remove other
claimants without a direct, prior provocation. Some might counter that
strong support for adopting a binding Code of Conduct to avoid future incidents .

China and others could not make such a pledge without damaging its sovereignty claims in the South

consequences are
avoidable if Beijing makes its non-use-of force- pledge
contingent on similar pledges by other claimants and defines
its pledge clearly as a confidence building measure that in no
way imperils its sovereignty claims. In addition to the above near-term actions in
support of its two interests in the South China Sea, Washington should also
undertake several specific actions to prevent the further
deterioration of the situation over the long term. First.
Washington should stop emphasizing military deterrence methods
China Sea or undermining its future negotiating leverage. However, such

to prevent changes in the status quo (thus freezing the situation into one of constant potential conflict)

and start focusing instead on the resolution of territorial

disputes through negotiations between the claimants designed to clarify the nature
of claims. This should be followed by the application of UNCLOS
principles to sort out the territorial and EEZ implications of the claims, perhaps using South China
Sea Council modeled on the Arctic Council. 4 Second, Washington needs to make it
clear privately to Beijing that its continued failure to enter into

binding Code of Conduct talks, to clarify the nature of its

claims to waters within the 9DL, and to disavow the
unprovoked use of force, combined with its growing presence
and capabilities in the area, will increasingly cause the U.S.
and other states to hedge against worst case outcomes and
act accordingly. Specifically, the U.S. will need to maintain its own capacity, and the capacity of
others, to counter possible future attempts by Beijing to declare a de facto exclusionary zone or zones in

Washington
should make it clear to Beijing that such hedging would require
a significant improvement in U.S. defense relations and
presence with, and the provision of armaments to Manila, as well
as Hanoi and Malaysia. However, this augmented level of U.S. activity should
be made contingent on China clarifying its claims and entering
into negotiated codes of conduct with other claimants. Beijing
the area and to employ force, possibly against an ally (the Philippines). Third ,

must also clearly affirm, through its words and actions, that there is no
military solution to these disputes and that it will never seek to dislodge rivals forcefully from
occupied areas in an unprovoked manner. It should also refrain from deploying significant power projection

Washington
should make it clear that, if China undertakes such actions and
pledges, the U.S. would suspend the above hedging activities,
but would restart them if China violates its commitment.
capabilities on its occupied islands in the Spratly Islands, such as advanced fighters.

The plan generates political will for Chinese settlement by

emphasizing neutrality & deterrence
USIP 96 (US Inst. Of Peace, The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy,
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR18.pdf)

A coherent and effective policy toward the South China Sea must include two
objectives: (1) to help the disputants to generate the political will to engage
in a negotiating process, and (2) to maintain the credibility of the U.S. intent
to deter any one (or group of) claimants from unilaterally asserting a solution
by force of arms. The immediate US interests in the South China Sea disputes include maintaining
peace and stability in the South China Sea, maintaining freedom of navigation, and upholding international
law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. These points were emphasized in a May 10, 1995,
statement by the U.S. Department of State on the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. While
maintaining its neutral position on the legal merits of the various territorial claims, the United States
expressed concern over destabilizing unilateral actions in the region, declared that maintaining freedom of
navigation is in the fundamental interest of the United States, and strongly urged that the disputants
peacefully resolve the dispute among them- selves consistent with international law, including the UN

initial reactions of Chinese government press

spokesmen to the U.S. statement were negative, but Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen's statements the following August at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in
Brunei ostensibly committed the PRC to a path consistent with what the U.S.
government had recommended. This pattern suggests that repeated U.S. expressions of
interest in seeing an expeditious and peaceful settlement of the South China
Sea dispute might help deter unilateral actions by the claimants and
maximize the possibility for a negotiated solution, rather than waiting for all sides to continue
to harden their respective positions. At the same time, the United States might underscore
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The

its neutrality and avoid mediating the dispute on behalf of any single party.
The National People's Congress (NPC) ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in May 1996, a
move that specialists hailed as a major step forward in clarifying the rules under which China will consider
its claim, as only islands and rocks above water at high tide generate maritime zones. Simultaneously, the
NPC declared straight baselines from which Chinese claims to an EEZ and continental shelf will presumably
be measured, including some baselines surrounding the Paracel Islands that deviate from conventional
practice, in which only archepelagic states may draw baselines enclosing groups of islands. As part of its
interest in upholding the generally accepted interpretations of the Law of the Sea,

it is likely that

the United States will dispute the Chinese baselines

around the Paracels or any other

future baseline claims that do not conform to conventional international practice (as has also been the

a leading U.S. role in

trying to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute is likely to complicate matters by
adding another contentious issue to the already-overloaded agenda of U.S.Chinese relations. Such a role would also be perceived by China as
interference by a non-claimant in an attempt to internationalize the issue. At
case with Vietnam's expansive baseline claims). Many specialists believe

the same time, the fact that China responded at the ARF meeting in Brunei to the major U.S. concerns

the United States

may be able to indirectly influence the claimants to be active in constructive
directions while also taking actions to diminish the possibility that
intimidation tactics might be used as part of a negotiation process. The U.S. naval presence in the
high- lighted in its May 10. 1995, statement on the Spratly Islands suggests that

region is essential in implementing the second aspect of U.S. policy toward the South China Sea by deterring the use of
military force by any of the disputants. A regular U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea area underscores the nation's
interest in stability and rein- forces the prevailing interpretation that a significant part of the South China Sea outside of
the immediate area of the Spratly Islands is categorized as high seas, where no party exercises territorial jurisdiction. In
the event of destabilizing unilateral actions by any party to the Spratly Islands dispute, the U.S. Navy has an interest in
playing its balancing role in the Asia-Pacific area by undertaking an augmented presence in international waters
proportional to the severity of any unilateral provocation.

Such a response would underscore the

US commitment to seeing the dispute resolved nonviolently, while avoiding
taking sides in or becoming a party to the conflict. The recent U.S. naval response to Chinese missile
exercises in the Tai- wan Straits show that a stepped-up U.S. military presence in response to aggressive
unilateral actions may be important in reassuring Asian allies that the United States maintains the political
will to deter aggressive or destabilizing unilateral actions that threaten the status quo in Asia. Some
analysts have suggested that the United States support greater transparency in the South China Sea by
using satellite reconnaissance to actively monitor and make public reports on activities in the area.
Another possibility-if such information were made available to a nongovernmental media- tor respected by
all sides in the Spratly Islands dispute--would be to find a way to provide technical support for South China
Sea "proximity" negotiations by using satellite imagery similar to that provided by the Defense Mapping
Agency for the Bosnian proximity talks.

The likelihood is slim that direct U.S. intervention

will be useful or accepted

in resolving the Spratly Islands dispute. After all, there is a range of

mechanisms that might be used to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without U.S.

The most constructive role for the United States may be in urging
the parties to muster the political will necessary to find peaceful solutions
while continuing to discourage a military resolution of future disputes. Most important,
involvement.

the United States might support preventive diplomacy by the parties involved by underscoring positive
precedents such as the decision by Great Britain and Argentina to enter into negotiations over Falkland

A steady U.S.
policy of "active neutrality"- combined with a "forward-leaning" posture to deter potentially
Islands boundaries without prejudice to the claims made by the disputants themselves.

destabilizing military aggression and stepped-up support for an expeditious and peaceful resolution of the
parties' conflicting claims consistent with the Law of the Sea- is

the surest sign of support for

preventive diplomacy that the United States can offer to deter potential
conflict in the South China Sea.