Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 02-4933
COUNSEL
Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, P.L.L.C., Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States
Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Christine
Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Curtis Elwood Ellis pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (2000), pursuant to a plea agreement in which he waived his right to appeal his sentence. Ellis was
sentenced to a term of 110 months imprisonment. He now appeals his
conviction and sentence. We affirm Ellis conviction and dismiss the
challenge to his sentence.
Ellis alleges that the district court plainly erred in failing to dismiss
the indictment on the ground that 922 no longer has a sufficient
nexus with interstate commerce in light of the Supreme Courts decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848 (2000). His argument is foreclosed by our decision in United
States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Morrison and Jones do not affect our decisions regarding the constitutionality of 922(g)), and United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810-11
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the jurisdictional requirement of
922(g) satisfied Commerce Clause).
Ellis next argues that the district court erred in applying a fourlevel enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
2K2.1(b)(5) (2002) for possession of a firearm in connection with
another felony offense. In his plea agreement, Ellis waived his right
to appeal "whatever sentence is imposed, including any issues that
relate to the establishment of the Guideline range," reserving only the
right to appeal from an upward departure. A defendant may waive the
right to appeal if that waiver is knowing and voluntary. United States
v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 402-03 (4th Cir. 2000). Ellis does not contend that his waiver was unknowing or involuntary, and our review
of the guilty plea hearing leads us to conclude that it was voluntary.
Thus, the claim of sentencing error may not be raised on appeal.