ARTICLE 37 TO 51

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL

R. LEE, respondents.
June 28, 1996
Doctrine: Art. 49 of the NCC - Naturalization and the loss and reacquisition
of citizenship of the Philippines are governed by special laws. (n)
Panganiban, J. :
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May
8, 1995 elections.
On March 23, 1995 Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the
Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any
public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines" (Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code), and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled which was later granted on May 1,
1995.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon
until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he
was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the
Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
On May 27, 1995, the canvass was issued showing the following votes
obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon: Juan
G. Frivaldo unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes and Raul
R. Lee was the second placer in the canvass
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. At 8:30 in the
evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for
the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon,
he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the
evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor . . ."
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein
assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest
number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June
30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is)
qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus: granted the

petition and declared the proclamation of Raul Lee void. Frivaldo was later
proclaimed governor for having the highest votes and being qualified.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution promulgated on February
23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on
the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February
27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the
status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines and eligible to
be proclaimed governor
HELD:
1. Yes. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are
settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and
also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
P.D. 725 also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other
"natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now
desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo
the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent
of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.
The effect deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application
therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this
case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply
to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the
law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all
the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective
manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage
of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995
can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As
earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would
show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there
is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither
has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional
guaranty.
Notes:
1. DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no
merit
2. See PD 975

3.

See Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code

MOYA LIM YAO-petitioner vs Commission on Immigration respondent

Facts:On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. She was a Chinese residing at
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the
Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of
one month that would expire on April 13, 1961. After repeated extensions,
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to
February 13, 1962 . On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with
Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of respondent to order her arrest and
immediate deportation after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction against
Commission on Immigration at Court of First Instance Manila. The CFI held
that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the reasons
set forth, in that she is not Filipino by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen
and may need to be deported at the expiration of her authorized stay.
Issue:Whether or not alien Lau Yuen Yeung became a Filipino Citizen by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino Citizen.
Held:Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law.
Those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law)
are:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines,
have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of
the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States,
whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.
The Court recognized Lau Yuen Yeung who was declared to have become a
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino.
MOYA LIM YAO-petitioner
vs Commission on Immigrationrespondent

Facts:On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. She was a Chinese residing at
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the
Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of
one month that would expire on April 13, 1961. After repeated extensions,
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to
February 13, 1962 . On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with
Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of respondent to order her arrest and
immediate deportation after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction against
Commission on Immigration at Court of First Instance Manila. The CFI held
that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the reasons
set forth, in that she is not Filipino by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen
and may need to be deported at the expiration of her authorized stay.
Issue:Whether or not alien Lau Yuen Yeung became a Filipino Citizen by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino Citizen.
Held:Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law.
Those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law)
are:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines,
have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of
the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States,
whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.
The Court recognized Lau Yuen Yeung who was declared to have become a
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino.
TITLE: Dumlao v Quality Plastics
GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976
FACTS: Pedro Oria died on April 23, 1959. On June 13, 1960, Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. filed a case against Pedro Oria, Vicente
Soliven, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbog, and Juana
Darang. On June 24, 1960, Vicente Soliven received and signed the
summons and copies of the complaint in his behalf and his co-

defendants. On February 18, 1962, CFI ordered the defendants to

pay P3,667.03 to Quality Plastic Products Inc to avoid foreclosure of
their surety bonds. However, Oria failed to pay (eh kais patay na
nga) the said amount. Thus the lower court ordered the foreclosure
of his surety bond and sale of his public land which he had given as
a security for the bond. On March 1, 1963, Orias land was sold
through auction by the sheriff. Hence, the testamentary heirs of
Oria sued Quality Plastic Products and prayed for the annulment of
the judgment against Oria and the sale of his land. Quality Plastics
did not know about Orias death.
ISSUE: W/N the judgment against Oria and his land are valid
HELD: The Quality Plastics only learned about Orias death upon receipt of
the summons of Orias heirs. They acted in good faith in including
Oria as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over
Oria. Hence, the judgment against him is patent nullity. Oria, upon
his death, had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity
which made him capable of legal relations was lost through death.
However, Dumlaos (heirs) are not entitled to claim attorneys fee
for the corporation.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC
Petitioner: Imelda Romualdez-Marcis Respondent: Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Private respondent: Cirilo Roy Montejo
Facts:
On March 23, 1995, Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification of Marcos for the same position with the
COMELEC alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency requirement.
The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under
residency, which he sought to rectify by adding the words since
childhood in her Amended/Corrected COC filed on March 29, 1995 and
that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff had established legal residency required to
be a candidate of the district of Leyte.
Held:
Yes. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a COC which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutional requirement on residency.
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioners claim
of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1 A minor follows domicile of her parents Tacloban became
Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of aw when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2 Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the

former residence and establishing a new one, and acts with

correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence
of al these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue;
3 A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late president
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium;
4 Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. Petitioner even obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living
in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested.
Court ruled in favor of the petitioner that she possessed the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS
G.R. No. 183110 October 7 2013
Facts: Azucena Batuigas was born of Chinese parents in Malangas, Zamboanga del
Sur on September 28, 1941. From that moment on, she has resided in the Philippines
ever since she was born. She can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano.
She finished her schooling in the Philippines, and has been practicing her teaching
profession until she had to stop to help her husband, Santiago Batuigas, a Filipino
citizen, in their business. She filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. She contended that she has conducted herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as well as her
relations with the constituted Government and with the community she is living. She
has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs, traditions and
ideals that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to
renounce absolutely her foreign allegiance to China. On the other hand, OSG argued
that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA No. 473, stating
that her business is not a lucrative trade. She countered that being a wife of a
Filipino husband, she should not be treated like male applicants for naturalization who
are required to have their own lucrative trade.
Issue: Whether or not Azucena can be naturalized as a Philippine citizen.
Ruling: Yes. Under the existing laws, an alien may acquire Philipine citizenship
through judicial declaration under CA No. 473 or Republic Act No. 9139. A third
option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to
Filipino husbands can be found under Section 15 of the CA No. 473 which permits
any woman who are married to Philippine citizens be ipso facto Philippine citizens
and it is not necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications nor
they have to submit any judicial declaration.
QUIMIGING VS. ICAO
FACTS:
Petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and defendant Felix Icao were neigbors in

Dapitan City. They had a close and confidential relations. Although married,
Icao succeeded in having intercourse with with plaintiff several times
without Quimiguings permission through force and intimidation.
As a result, Quimiguing got pregnant and had stop studying. She claimed
support at 120pesos per month, damages and attorneys fees.
Defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born. After hearing the
arguments, the trial judge dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, the petitioner moved to amend the complaint to allege that as
a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. The trial
court ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint
averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Wether or not the Icao can claim for damages pursuant to Article
40 of the Civil Code
HELD: Yes.
Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result of the
intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. The Supreme Court
says that since, as provided in Article 40 of the New Civil Code (the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it,
provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in following article),
petitioner Quimiguings child, since time of conception, and as having
fulfilled the requirement of having been born later, has a right to support
from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee. Thus,
independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff
herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the
complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action
was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.