Bangsamoro (political entity)

Bangsamoro is a proposed new autonomous political entity within the Philippines.

The proposal is part of a framework agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front and the Government of the Philippines, the new entity intended to supersede
the Autonomous
Region
of
Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM),
described
byPresident Benigno Aquino III as a "failed experiment".[1]
This new political entity seeks to bring closure to the 15-year peace process between
the Philippine government and the Muslim secessionist groups in thesouthern part of
the Philippines.
On 15 October 2012, the historic GPH-MILF framework agreement was signed by
GPH chief negotiator Marvic Leonen, MILF peace panel chair Mohagher Iqbal,
andMalaysian facilitator Tengku Dato Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed along with
President Aquino, Prime MinisterNajib Razak of Malaysia, Chairman Al Haj Murad
Ebrahim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Secretary-General Ekmeleddin
hsanolu of theOrganisation of Islamic Cooperation at Malacaan Palace in Manila.
This document outlines general agreements on major issues, including the extent of
power, revenues and territory granted for the new Muslim autonomous region. [2]

Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

upholding national sovereignty. The agreement was reached after 32 peace talks
between the two parties that spanned a period of nine years.[1][2]
[edit]Signing
The Philippine government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed the agreement
on 15 October 2012 in the Rizal Ceremonial Hall of Malacaan Palace in Manila.
The agreement was sealed at about 15:00PST. President Aquino, Malaysian Prime
Minister Najib Razak, MILF chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and SecretaryGeneral Ekmeleddin hsanolu of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation were all
present in the signing of the agreement. [3]
[edit]International reactions

Australia - Australian Foreign Minister, Bob Carr welcomed the

development and said the Philippine government's announcement of the
agreement "offered hope that the 28-year conflict in Mindanao could be drawing
to a close." He particularly acknowledged the leadership of President Benigno
Aquino III whom he described as a "strong advocate for peace."[4]

European Union - EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in a

statement, congratulated the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front on the successful conclusion of the framework peace
agreement. Ashton said the EU also recognized the contributions of the
Malaysian facilitator in the peace talks, Tengku Datuk Ab Ghafar Tengku
Mohamed, as well as members of the International Contact Group. The EU
foreign affairs chief also said "the EU, as a member of the International
Monitoring Team and major development partner in poverty alleviation in
Mindanao since 1990, will continue to lend its full support."[5]

Indonesia - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia said that

Indonesia "warmly welcomes" the development and described this agreement as
well as the previous peace agreement between the Government of the
Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996 as a reflection of
the "strong commitment of the Philippine government to create comprehensive
peace in the Southern Philippines." It also added that Indonesia "stands ready to
provide
support
and
assistance
including
in
exchange
of
experiences."[6] Indonesia earlier sealed a similar peace agreement with its
decades-long secessionist group GAM in Aceh region in 2005.

Japan - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan said that Japan

"heartily welcomes" the Framework Agreement, which it described as the first

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamorois a preliminary peace agreement
signed in theMalacaan Palace in Manila, Philippines on October 15, 2012. The
Framework Agreement calls for the creation of an autonoumous political entity
namedBangsamoro,
replacing
the Autonomous
Region
of
Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) which was described byPresident Benigno Aquino III as "a
failed experiment".[1]
[edit]Announcement of an Agreement
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippinesheld peace talks in Kuala
Lumpur in Malaysia from 2-6 October. On 7 October, President Aquino announced
that the two parties have agreed to sign a preliminary peace agreement which calls
for the creation of an autonoumous political entity named Bangsamoro, superseding
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). He criticized that the
ARMM is a "failed experiment" that did not address issues such as electoral fraud,
political patronage, poverty, war and warlordism. Aquino claimed that structural
reform is necessary, with the creation of Bansangmoro solving these issues while

step towards the realization of the peace process in Mindanao. Japan also pays
respect to the Philippines and the MILF, as well as to Malaysia for it role as
facilitator. The ministry also added that Japan hopes for the steady
implementation of the agreement and expects more difficulties must be
overcome to reach a final agreement. Finally, it said that Japan continues to
offer full support to the Mindanao Peace Process.[7]

Turkey - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey "congratulates the

Parties on the constructive attitude they have demonstrated during the dialogue
process which has paved the way for this important agreement." It also stated
that "Turkey believes in the importance of mediation for the prevention and
settlement of conflicts and stands ready to provide support also to the
subsequent phases of the Mindanao Peace Process." [8] Turkey is a member of the
International Contact Group involved in the peace talks.

United Kingdom - UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague said

the United Kingdom"wholeheartedly welcomes" the framework agreement
which he calls a "testament to the commitment and vision of the parties." It also
stated that "full implementation of the agreement by 2016 can bring about
peace, security, and development which will be good not only for Mindanao, but
for the whole of the Philippines." The secretary also reiterated his government's
commitment as a member of the International Contact Group for the peace
process and said the UK "stands ready to provide further assistance if such a
role would be valuable to the parties."[9]

United States US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton affirmed that

"the United States welcomes the announcement of the framework agreement
between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front" and said that the agreement "is a testament to the commitment of all sides
for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the southern Philippines". The
secretary also added that the next step is for the full implementation of the
agreement and "encourage all parties to work together to build peace, prosperity
and greater opportunities for all the people of the Philippines".[10]

Peace process with the Bangsamoro in the Philippines

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the late 1960s, a geopolitical revolutionary movement in the Philippines arose
from the atmosphere of activism that characterized that decade. Sometime during the
late 1968, at least 28 Muslim volunteers from Sulu who were being trained for a
covert commando mission to conquer Sabah were massacred to silence by
government troops in what would popularly be known as the Jabidah Massacre. The
outrage that resulted from this butchery has been widely considered as the catalyst

that gave birth to the Islamic separatist movements in Mindanao, pioneer of which
was Nur Misuaris Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
[edit]The rise of the Moro liberation movement
In pursuit of their goal of liberating theBangsamoro, the MNLF engaged
thegovernment forces in extensive armed collisions, peaking in the early 70s when
the rebels blitz-like operations brought them control of a substantial number of
municipalities surrounding Cotabato City and its airport complex. This prompted
the Marcos regime to beef up military presence by deploying almost three-fourths of
the army in most Muslim parts ofMindanao. Things took a different turn in 1976
when Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi brokered an agreement that led to the signing
of the Tripoli Agreement that introduced the concept of an autonomous Muslim
region in Mindanao. On August 1, 1989, under the mandate of the new 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act 6734 creating the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, out of the 13 provinces and 9 cities that
participated
in
the plebiscite,
only
the
provinces
of Lanao
del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi opted to be part of the ARMM.
Instead of bringing the Muslim leaders together, this agreement further fragmented
the MNLF because some factions within the group preferred independence over
autonomy. Thus, a group of officers led byHashim Salamat broke away and formed
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to continue their armed struggle for an
independent Bangsamoro (Moro nation) in Mindanao.
Though the combined strength of these two rebel forces has not reached a point of
posing any real threat to the government in Manila, their existenceand the reasons
for their resiliencecertainly brings lots of headaches for the government. For
nearly five decades, five presidents have tried to completely end these two
rebellions, utilizing both force and diplomacy. So far, no combination has succeeded.
Perhaps the most remarkable effort to bring closure to these movements was that of
the RamosAdministration, which tried to reach out to both the communist and
Muslim rebels through peaceful means. Highly-uncharacteristic for a soldier who
actually saw combat against both communist forces (in Korea,Vietnam, and southern
Luzon) and Muslim separatists (in Lanao del Sur), Ramos eagerly sat down with the
rebel leaders in an attempt to solve both problems at their roots.
[edit]Efforts to reach peace with Islamic separatists
[edit]MNLF signs peace pact, fragments the movement
Even before being elected president, Fidel V. Ramos had actively pursued the
assistance of foreign Muslim leaders to solve the problem in Mindanao. Thus, he
strongly sought the intercession of Gaddafibecause of his instrumental role in the

signing of the Tripoli Agreement earlier in 1976. Indeed, with Gaddafis assistance,
the Philippine government was able to sign the Final Peace Agreement with the
MNLF in 1996 in what was supposed to be the end of the Moro armed struggle in
Mindanao. Misuari was elected governor of the ARMM and was tasked to supervise
the implementation of the peace pact.
Unfortunately, other factions within the MNLF were not satisfied with this peace
pact and saw this as a deviation from the framework of the Tripoli Agreement. Their
desire for complete secession from Philippine sovereignty led to the establishment of
the MILF, which will be another challenge to Ramos efforts to bring peace in
Mindanao after two decades of negotiations with the MNLF.

ofCotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General

Santos, Iligan, Marawi,Pagadian, Puerto
Princesa, Zamboanga, Digos, Koronadal,Tacurong, and Kidapawan participated in
the plebiscite. However, only Marawi City and Basilan (excluding Isabela City)
voted to be included in the ARMM.
Later that year, the peace process fell apart when the military attacked the MILF just
a day after the ancestral domain aspect of the Tripoli Agreement was signed
in Libya. This attack was based on intelligence reports that the MILF has been
aiding the Abu
Sayyaf terrorist
group,
which
at
that
time
held
some American and Filipino hostages in Basilan. A ceasefire would once again ensue
after informal talks between the government and the MILF through the intercession
of Malaysia.

[edit]Ramos negotiates with the MILF, Estrada balks

The exploratory and preparatory talks between the government and the MILF started
in August 1996, followed by low-level negotiations commencing January the
following year.[7] Ramos term as president ended in June 1998, but the low-level
negotiations pushed through under the new administration of President Joseph
Ejercito-Estrada. By October 1999, the formal peace talks would commence, only to
be suspended by Estradas sudden policy-shift by waging an all-out war against the
MILF.
Estradas all-out war policy indeed led to the capture of Camp Abubakar, MILFs
main headquarters. The president himself led the military in raising the Philippine
flag in the erstwhile rebel stronghold, bringing trucks of lechon (roasted pig)
and beer for the triumphant soldiers in what was considered as an insult to the MILF
because eating pork is prohibited in Islam.
[edit]Arroyo resumes peace talks
Areas in southern Philippines underactual political control of Muslims are in red.
When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency in January 2001, the peace
process was revived with a unilateral declaration of ceasefire on the part of the
government. With the assistance of the Malaysian government, Presidential Adviser
on the Peace ProcessEduardo Ermita and MILF Vice-Chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim
signed the Agreement for the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace
Talks between the government and the MILF.
On March 31, 2001, Republic Act 9054 lapsed into law without the signature of the
president. This law amended theOrganic Act of the ARMM to provide for the
regions expansion from the original four provinces under its jurisdiction. The
Provinces
of Basilan, North
Cotabato,Davao
del
Sur, Lanao
del
Norte, Palawan, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Zamboanga del
Norte,Zamboanga
del
Sur, Zamboanga
Sibugay,
and
the
cities

On October 29, 2001, the MILF and the MNLF hold unity talks, but this would fall
apart
barely
a
month
later
when Nur
Misuari allegedly
led
a
rebellion in Sulu and Zamboanga City to stall the scheduled ARMM elections. A
hundred people died in the incident. The government quelled this rebellion and
Misuari escaped to Sabah, but the Malaysian government later on deported him back
to the Philippines to face rebellion charges. On May 6, 2002, the fourth round of
formal peace talks between the government and the MILF resulted in both parties
agreeing to veto criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups in Mindanao, and
to implement the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement.
A final draft of the peace accord was presented to the leaders of Congress on
February 10, 2003, but on the next day, a setback would ensue as the military
launched an offensive in Buliok Complex against the MILF which would last for
more than a week. Ceasefire was enforced three weeks later. By March, the
parties began exploratory talks in Malaysia with a commitment from both sides for a
mutual secession of hostilities. The aspect of a Muslim ancestral domain was laid
down as the next agenda for the peace talks. Until the end of 2008, the peace process
remained in a deadlock due to constitutional and legal issues surrounding the
ancestral domain aspect.
[edit]Muslim Ancestral Domain and the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
On July 27, 2009, a Memorandum of Agreement on the Muslim Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) was finalized in Malaysia. Under this agreement, some 700
villages in Mindanao would hold a referendum within a year to determine if they
intend to join the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, an associated state which would be
formed after the necessary constitutional amendments are undertaken by the
government. This agreement was scheduled to be signed on August 5, with the final
peace agreement set to be concluded by November.

Three days before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, local officials of North
Cotabato filed a case asking the Supreme Court to block the signing of this
agreement. On October 14, the Court voted 9-6 to strike down the MOA-AD as
unconstitutional. According to the decision penned by Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales, the Constitution does not recognize any state within this country other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for the possibility of any
transitory status to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Likewise, the Court held as unconstitutional the guarantees under the MOA-AD that
the government will implement the necessary constitutional amendments to create a
framework for its implementation. According to the Court, the peace panel and even
the president do not have the authority to make such guarantees because they do not
have the power to propose amendments to the Constitution, such power being vested
exclusively in Congress.
The junking of the MOA-AD marked another setback for the peace process, with
the armed conflicts for the year 2008 reaching a record-high of 30 incidents in
Mindanao. In an effort to salvage the negotiations, Arroyo declared the suspension of
military operations against the MILF on July 2009.
[edit]Noynoy Aquino resumes peace talks
The administration of Benigno Aquino III continued the peace talks with the MILF
after the rebel group announced that they were no longer seeking secession from the
Philippines. But the prospects for peace remained elusive as rogue MILF forces
conducted sporadic attacks against government forces in several areas in Mindanao
despite the existing ceasefire agreement. Worst of these attacks came on October 18,
2011 when MILF forces ambushed an Army contingent in Al-Barka, Basilan killing
19 young soldiers and wounding 12 others. Despite the MILFs half-hearted efforts
to make these rogue leaders answer for their attacks, the president and the military
hierarchy rejected calls for an all-out-war approach to this problem.
The Al-Barka attack came just two months after Aquinos controversial meeting with
MILF chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim in Tokyo. This gave rise to concerns that the
real reason for the stalled peace process is not just the governments lukewarm effort
to make peace, but also the lack of sincerity of the rebel groups in negotiating lasting
peace with the government.

comes two months after lead negotiators from both sides expressed pessimism about
concluding negotiations in the near future.
Just a month earlier, chief government negotiator Marvic Leonen warned both GPH
and MILF panels that the peace process was already on the verge of reaching a
stalemate because of both parties disagreement on what constitutes genuine
autonomy, as it had been made apparent by MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal
that what they want is a Muslim sub-state distinct from the already autonomous
ARMM.
Thus the sudden turn of events after the 27th Round of Exploratory
Talks in Malaysia is indeed a welcome development in the ailing peace process,
especially after the Aquino administration refused to order military operations
against rogue MILF members who ambushed a military contingent in Basilan in
October 2011.
The three-year impasse that followed the junking of the MOA-AD was marred with
violence as clashes between government troops and rebel forces escalated. It was
during the 27th Round of Exploratory Talks that new hope sprung forth as a
document entitled Decision Points on Principles surfaced with much enthusiasm
from both sides. Under this document, a new autonomous political entity governed
by a ministerial form of government shall be introduced as a replacement for the
current ARMM. This new setup would be introduced during a transition period
through the institution of transitional mechanisms under the new entity.
One of the most special aspects of this new entity is its power-sharing and wealthsharing rights vis--vis the national government, with an accompanying power to
to create its own sources of revenue, i.e., to tax. The existing Shariah courts
would also be strengthened by expanding their jurisdiction and giving them
competence over the Shariah justice system. The document also mentions basic
rights ought to be afforded the citizens residing in the new political entity.
Considering that the 10 points are vague declarations regarding the new entity, we
cannot yet assess whether it can survive any constitutional challenge similar to that
successfully posed against its predecessor. Nonetheless, as the points have been
made public, it might be a good idea to consider them carefully, in the hope that they
not suffer the same fate as befell the BJE.

[edit]The Ten Decision Points in establishing a new Bangsamoro Entity

[edit]Breakthrough in the peace process
In late April 2012, news emerged of a breakthrough in the 15-year-old peace
process. This breakthrough revolved around a document, GPH-MILF Decision
Points on Principles, that mentions a new autonomous political entity that would
ultimately replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This

[edit]Compliance with the existing legal framework

Implementation of these Ten Points would of course need to comply with the
existing legal framework under Philippine law, most important of which is
the Constitution. Section 18, Article X of the fundamental law explicitly provides
that the power to create an autonomous region rests in Congress subject to the
favorable vote of the people through a plebiscite. Thus, ARMM Organic Act (RA

6734) created the ARMM out of the four provinces that favorably voted in
the plebiscite called by Congress in 1989. Another plebiscite was held under
the ARMM Expansion Act (RA 9054), with only one other province and one city
opting to join the ARMM.
A new Bangsamoro political entity, should it replace the ARMM, must comply not
only with the Constitution, but also with the ARMM Organic Act as amended by RA
9054. In addition to this, any attempt to create the entity must not require any
amendment to the Constitution for it to be effective.
It should be remembered that the main reason that the Supreme Court struck down
the MOA-AD was because of the governments commitment to the MILF that the
necessary constitutional amendments would be made to implement the MOA-ADs
provisions. Justice Conchita Carpio Morales saw this as outright illegal, considering
that the executive branch of government, which has no power whatsoever to propose
any amendment to the Constitution, was then trying to guarantee something that it
does not even have the power to do by itself. For the new entity to survive any
constitutional challenge, its creation should not be based on any commitment on the
part of the government to touch the Constitution.
The 10 points, which were signed by both Leonen and Iqbal, laid down the general
principles to guide the negotiations until the signing of a final peace pact.
Decision Point No. 1: The Parties recognize Bangsamoro identity and the legitimate
grievances and claims of the Bangsamoro people.
The first decision point concerns the recognition of a Bangsamoro identity.
Whatever identity that is would heavily depend on how most of the country would
accept a radical change in the image of Muslim Filipinos. According to Philippine
Council on Islam and Democracy (PCID) director Amina Rasul, implementation of
Decision Point 1 means the whole nation will now have to look at fellow citizens in
Muslim Mindanao and accept that Philippine history books have sold a story that is
different from reality.
There should not be any legal issue regarding the adoption of this Decision Point
because it requires no legislation whatsoever. The task of the government here
involves information dissemination and media conditioning to paint a whole new
image of the Moro people to the rest of the country.
Decision Point No. 2. The Parties agree that the status quo is unacceptable and that
the Parties will work for the creation of a new autonomous political entity in place of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
This, according to leading peace process luminary Judge Soliman Santos, is the
most significant consensus point substance-wise as it would lead to a qualitatively

higher form of self-determination/self-governance than the level of the ARMM.

This is so because at the onset, the Muslim rebellion is really based on their demand
for self-determination, and the decades-old problem rests in the fact that both the
government and the rebel forces fail to agree on what kind of self-determination best
fits the region.
Rasul believes that The previous MILF demand for a sub-state in place of the
present autonomous region was poisoned from the first, as the term evoked visions
of an independent Bangsamoro nation within the Philippines. This is probably the
reason why the Supreme Court itself rejected the sub-state proposed in the botched
MOA-AD that introduced the associative relationship between the Philippine
government and the BJE.
The negotiating panels must take care not to risk another adverse Supreme Court
ruling should the resulting entity be challenged in the High Court, especially with the
MILFs insistence that such entity would still be a sub-state. Iqbal himself
admitted that [Just like] the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, [the] sub-state, new
autonomous political entity [as termed by the government] are descriptions, not
specific names. He also stressed that The Muslim sub-state in essence is a form of
federal state.
In any case, it should be kept in mind that the creation of a new entity to replace the
ARMM must still be the same autonomous region mandated by Section 15, Article
X of the Constitution that would exist within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Decision Point No. 3. The Parties agree to the continuity of negotiations in the
context of agreed documents.
This simply means both the GPH and the MILF agrees to adopt the previous
documents signed in previous negotiations. This, of course, excludes the illfated MOA-AD.
Decision Point No. 4. The Parties agree that the new autonomous political entity
shall have a ministerial form of government.
The present setup in the ARMM was established by the ARMM Organic Act, which
provided a system of government similar to a presidential system with clear
separation of powers between the executive (regional governor) and the legislature
(regional assembly). Although the Constitution provides no specific instruction as to
the form of government in autonomous regions established by Congress, the decision
as to the adoption of a ministerial form government for the new entity must still
emanate from Congress as the sole body empowered to create any autonomous
region in the country.

While such provision in the peace pact may not require any constitutional
amendment, still, the peace panel, which is under the executive department, may not
be in a position to commit a ministerial form of government for the new entity. This
was the same mistake made in the MOA-AD when the peace panel committed to
something that only Congress can do.
Decision Point No. 5. The Parties agree to the need for a transition period and the
institution of transitional mechanisms in order to implement the provisions of the
agreement.
Logically, there needs to be a transition period during which the ARMM would pass
on to the new entity its powers and responsibilities. This matter, however, should just
be considered as vague propositions, considering that Congress would be the one
with a final say on how the transition would be facilitated.
Decision Point No. 6. There will be power-sharing and wealth-sharing between the
National Government and the new political entity. In the matter of power-sharing, the
National Government will have its reserved powers, the new political entity will
have its exclusive powers, and there will be concurrent powers shared by the
National Government and the new political entity. The parties agree that the
following matters are reserved for the competence of the National Government
1. Defense and external security
2. Foreign policy
3. Common market and global trade
4. Coinage and monetary policy
5. Citizenship and naturalization
6. Postal service
This list is without prejudice to other powers, which the Parties may agree to reserve
to the National Government in the course of the negotiation.
National Government retains control (without prejudice to other powers which may
be agreed on in future negotiations) over defense and external security, foreign
policy, common market and global trade, coinage and monetary policy, citizenship
and naturalization, postal service.
Consistent with the constitutional mandate of devolution of powers to local
governments, there is nothing new with Decision Point No. 6, considering that

Article IV of the ARMM Organic Act itself established a system of devolution of

powers to the ARMM. Nonetheless, whatever exclusive powers would be
delegated to the new entity depend on what Congress would be willing to grant. Note
the Decision Points express reservation of powers to the national government on
matters concerning (a) Defense and external security, (b) Foreign policy, (c)
Common market and global trade, (d) Coinage and monetary policy, (e) Citizenship
and naturalization, and (f) Postal service. The ARMM Organic Act actually has a
much more exhaustive enumeration of reserved powers to the national government.
Decision Point No. 7. The Parties agree that wealth creation (or revenue generation
and sourcing) is important. The Parties also acknowledge the power of the new
political entity to create its own sources of revenue, subject to limitations as may be
agreed upon by the parties, and to have a just share in the revenues generated
through the exploration, development or utilization of natural resources.
Revenue-generation is also not a new concept, as Article X of the ARMM Organic
Act already grants such power to the ARMM. In fact, the present setup is that a
province or citys total collections of national taxes are distributed 30% to the
province or city, 30% to the regional government, and 40% to the national
government. Each province or city automatically retains its share then remits the
70% to the regional government, which, after deducting its share, remits the balance
to the national government on a monthly basis. Whether the new entity would
demand a larger piece of the pie remains to be seen in the course of the negotiations.
Decision Point No. 8. The Parties recognize the need to strengthen the Shariah
courts and to expand their jurisdiction over cases. The new political entity shall also
have competence over the Shariah justice system.
Although this is not a political issue, legal problems would most likely arise from
this decision point. Judge Santos argues that expanding the jurisdiction of the
Shariah courts may entail a constitutional amendment since the 1987 Constitution,
Art. X, Sec. 18 refers to the basic structure of government for the region consisting
of the executive department and legislative assembly and allows for the special
courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws. Plus, it also goes to the core of
the Islamic aspiration since Shariah is Islamic law, where there is, among others, no
principle of inviolable separation of Church and State but, on the contrary, the
integration of religion and politics.
This decision point would certainly be contentious because of the contrast between
the constitutional mandate of a secular government and the religious character of
Islamic law. How a concession could be achieved would certainly be a challenge to
the peace panels.

Decision Point No. 9. The Parties agree to the creation of (third party) monitoring
and evaluation mechanisms, which may utilize competencies already available in
existing mechanisms, e.g. International Contact Group (ICG), International
Monitoring Team (IMT), Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
(CCCH).

9. Right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination in social and economic

activity and public service, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or
ethnicity;

This is also already in effect as part of both parties desire to minimize clashes
between the military and rebel forces. While there have been countless alleged
violations of ceasefires over the years, Amina Rasul believes that the existing
mechanisms have been relatively successful as shown by its track record prior to the
war over the MOA-AD in 2008.

11. Right to freedom from religious, ethnic, and sectarian harassment; and,

Decision Point No. 10. In addition to basic rights already enjoyed, the following
rights of all citizens residing in the new political entity bind the legislature, executive
and judiciary as directly enforceable law and are guaranteed:
1. Right to life and to inviolability of ones person and dignity;
2. Right to freedom of expression and of religion and beliefs;
3. Right to privacy;
4. Right to freedom of speech;
5. Right to express political opinion and pursue democratically political
aspirations;

10. Right to establish cultural and religious associations;

12. Right to redress of grievances and due process of law.

These rights, already constitutionally recognized, were included in the decision
points to highlight the demand of the Moros for equal treatment with non-Moros.
Rasul found it interesting that enjoyment by the Bangsamoro of human rights,
already accorded to all citizens by Philippine law, had to be part of the 10 decision
points.
[edit]The prospect for peace
Main article: Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
On October 15, 2012, the Philippine government signed a much-hyped document
touted as theFramework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which culminates the
Aquino Administration's effort to end the deadlock in the peace process. This new
document, while merely providing for a general framework for the actual peace
negotiations, announces that "the status quo is unacceptable and that the Bangsamoro
shall be established to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The Bangsamoro is the new autonomous political entity (NPE) referred to
in the Decision Points of Principles as of April 2012."

6. Right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means;

7. Right of women to meaningful political participation, and protection from
all forms of violence;
8. Right to freely choose ones place of residence and the inviolability of the
home;

According to President Aquino, this is the agreement that "can finally seal genuine,
lasting peace in Mindanao."[8]