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R. M.
ARISTOTLE
DANCY
AND
EXISTENCE
tells us more
than once that 'to be' is said in many ways,
Aristotle
I had better say straight off that I can find very
that means.
whatever
But in the
that means.
little in the present paper that tells us what
a long time ago
course of considering
what
it might mean, Owen,
some people held that 'being' has "a single
(1960), told us that, while
was one of those who
in all its applications,
"Aristotle
meaning"
to be was
to be something or other..
denied this. In his view,
.."1
to this sentence, Jie added "This is not to deny the
In a footnote
sounds
between
distinction
elvct? ti and elvai onrXus" But it certainly
as if it is to deny just that: the Greek
as
translate
'to be
phrases
and "just 'to be'."
something'
Owen says, of course, a great deal more than I have quoted, but not
on at least the first few dozen
to remove my puzzlement
enough
came
I
to
I saw what he might have had in
think
readings. Eventually,
But recent
and wrote my initial puzzlement
off to stupidity.
mind,
if it had been Owen's,
has not got
work2 has shown that the message,
around. So I am here going to state what I arrived at.
turned out not to be Owen's:
I found myself
But then, the message
no
some
means
in disagreement
with
of
his
all)
subsequent
(by
on Aristotle's
is
ways with being.3 So what follows
pronouncements
an interpretation
born out of misunderstanding.
No doubt
some,
will
think that
including Owen,
In any event, it seems
understand.
it must
that
be admitted
Still,
Aristotle
is not one he anywhere
some of
will help us to understand
to
it is not only Owen
I failed
to me right about Aristotle.
to hand
the theory
I am going
states.
The
is
idea
that it
outright
the things he does outright state if
we
that he held
the
1 below.
essentialism.
This occupies
section
The theory is, in the first instance, a theory about the Greek word
'to be', of that word
'eivaC whose bearing on the English
translation,
Synthese 54 (1983) 409-442.
Copyright
1983 by D. Reidel
0039-7857/83/0543-0409 $03.40
Publishing
Co., Dordrecht,
Holland,
and Boston,
U.S.A.
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410
R. M.
DANCY
is not
at
and it is probably
set
to
in
(but
begins
relevant
providing
as I can.
1. WHAT
IT
IS TO
BE
IN GREEK
wrote
and Aristotle
and probably
spoke does
as
separate words,
English does, for 'to exist' and 'to be'.5
tell the student that the single word eanv
textbooks6
First-year Greek
on whether
to
it means
is
be accented
'exist' or
differently
depending
as
'Hermann's
known
convention,
rule',
just 'is', but this orthographic
in the writing of Greek or in what we can tell of its
has no foundation
in ancient
before
times, and may have no foundation
pronunciation
that Plato
The Greek
not possess
Socrates
in fact,
exists would
be
is.8
the sentence
'Socrates
exists'
has a peculiar
ring to it. It
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ARISTOTLE
AND
411
EXISTENCE
shall
stick
with (1).
I am
In this and subsequent
formulations
It
said
been
that
has
subtlety.
frequently
a
not
"there
NP
is
is
(such
as) x,"
prefix',
'x exists', for a variety of reasons.91
claims,
claim. On the other hand, I take it that, on
deliberately
ignoring one
the English
'existential
used to make existential
do not want to deny this
the sentences
occasion,
after all" and "So there really was
"So Pr?ster
John really existed,
And that
such a person as Pr?ster John, after all" are interchangeable.
is
our
for
purposes:
present
enough
equivalence
admittedly
floppy
on
the
verb
'exists'
focus is not, ultimately,
anyway.
English
the English
like (1) translates
So a sentence
'Socrates exists', and
to the word
the Greek word
in it that corresponds
'is' is the same
word that appears in the Greek for these:
Socrates
Socrates
(2)
(3)
is pale.
is [a] man
[i.e., a human
being].
to this
Consider
first Plato's
response
situation; Aristotle's
grows
out of it.
At the end of Republic
tells us that, whereas
the form
v, Plato
'the beautiful'
named
and
(iravrek?s,
477a3)
entirely
purely
is, ordinary beautiful
things both are and
(elkiKpivcoc, 468d6, 479d5)
are not. It is tempting
to this
to lend a semblance
of naturalness
etc.
The
contrast
'is', etc., with
'exists',
by replacing
temptation
as some10 think, no
at least at first, not because,
should be resisted,
ever espouse
the absurdity
of
(much less Plato) would
- this seems
to me
to condemn
too many
existence
to the asylums - but because
too quickly
that replace
philosophers
ment severs the contrast
for it. What
condemns
from the argument
the fair Helen11 to being tumbled about (Kvkiv?e?Tca, 479d4)12 in the
rational man
degrees
of
region between
what
purely
is and what
purely
is not
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412
R. M.
DANCY
she is beautiful
with a pot (cf. Hi. Ma. 289a,
by comparison
although
with Phd. 74a-c and R. v 479ab), she is not beautiful
by comparison
an important period of his
with the goddess Aphrodite.
Throughout
habit of concluding
from this that
life, Plato had the unfortunate
to some
Helen
and is not beautiful.13 He managed
both is beautiful
the Republic:
extent to kick this habit, but not before writing
indeed,
here he indulges
in it with gusto and a further twist, for he goes on
that Helen
to the
from the conclusion
both is and is not beautiful
not.
that
Helen
both
is
and
is
conclusion
and the beautiful: Helen
That, then, is the contrast between Helen
as
as
much
she
and is not
both is beautiful
both is and is not, in
that is, it is un
is purely,
but the form, the beautiful,
beautiful,
in as much as it is simply
of nonbeing,
by any admixture
no
and in
way is it not beautiful.14
beautiful,
- or
these moves
We could put the view underlying
rather, one of
in terms that make
it sound more philosophical
the views
by saying
'S is P', Plato is regarding the
that, where we have a true predication
'P' as giving a mode of being of the subject S; and, where
predicate
adulterated
we
in which
have
S lacks being. I should
'S is not P', P is a mode
to put it differently,
it is
and I shall; but even put this way
prefer
came to see, that it is thoroughly
to see, as Plato himself
possible
for his purposes.
For clearly, as he says in the Sophist,
unsatisfactory
there is much
that it is, but an indefinite
"for each of the forms,
[of things] that it is not" (Sph. 256e5-6).15 So there are lots of
plurality
lacks being, and the contrast
in which
the form, the beautiful,
modes
to the
And that, indeed, is just what happens
with Helen
evaporates.
I am
the difficulty
contrast
such as the Sophist:16
in late dialogues
one
aware.
the Academy
to is
became
And
of which
acutely
pointing
it is this that leads to Aristotle's
theory.
But this is better seen if we abandon
austere
formulation,
being for a more
Republic,
allowing
the inference:
S is P -? S is,
(E)
along with
its negative
counterpart:
makes
(E) and its negative
counterpart
in each case is merely
the idea that the consequent
to him is
plausible
a simplification
of
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AND
ARISTOTLE
the antecedent,
For
just as in
Socrates
(P)
this
413
EXISTENCE
is a pale man-?
sort of
Socrates
is pale.17
to work,
simplification
have the same
Socrates
(L)
(G)
Here
is a lousy provider
failures.
Consider
is a good
cobbler-?
-? Socrates
Socrates
is lousy,
is good.
we
need not, and, I think, should not, say that 'good' has
sense from antecedent
to consequent.
'Good' is what Geach
changed
a noun or noun phrase needs
once18 called an 'attributive'
adjective:
to be supplied
the question
that will answer
'a good what?' And,
in a specific conversational
context
it may be clear that the
although
noun to be supplied
is 'cobbler'
are all
in Athens
("The cobblers
Socrates
is good."), we are talking about justified
terrible."?"No,
and that means we need a conclusion
we can,
patterns of inference,
so to speak, carry away with us. But once we have carried away
'Socrates is good', the noun we should supply to complete
the sense is
no longer 'cobbler', but, presumably,
'man'.
Aristotle's
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414
R. M.
DANCY
goes about
is, as far as I can tell, the way a Greek
himself may be found
the existence
Aristotle
of Socrates.
asserting
using this format in Cat. 10, 13b16-17, 19, etc. For realism, one must
and Cyrus. Xeno
say, between
Xenophon
imagine a conversation,
that there
and Cyrus denies
phon has been talking about Socrates,
"Socrates
is"
it is close by, in
here is not the one I am primarily
after, although
involve isolating the predicates,
mind. As I see it, it would
Aristotle's
that give trouble, call them
in' and 'used as examples',
like 'believed
in
and
'intensional
(E) unfit for use with
pronouncing
predicates',
does not, I think, see it quite that way.
Aristotle
tensional predicates.
But I am not going to worry any more about that here.
A second interesting problem not covered by the theory to come is
such as 'fake', 'mythical',
and, parti
adjectives
So we do
is no diamond.
'dead'. ? fake diamond
is
is fake' that that diamond
from 'that diamond
man
'that
is
to
want
from
not
it
follow
does
and Aristotle
(exists),
we
label
the
man
is.
Here
that
dead' that
may simply
problem
again
or 'alienating
alienantia'
and shelve it: call such adjectives
'adjectives
by certain
provided
for
Aristotle,
cularly
not want it to follow
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ARISTOTLE
adjectives';19
(E) does
not work
AND
415
EXISTENCE
for alienating
adjectives
as predi
cates.
as an
The democratic
attitude
toward S's predicates
suggests,
in: the logical sum of all the
account
consists
of what S's existence
true of S. But that account
of S's existence
ties S down
predicates
our
as
too
Take
Socrates
and
let him be
candidate
S,
entirely
firmly.
can
at
his
then:
he
lose
the
and
local
become
pallor
parlor
pale. First,
we
he
Socrates.
Of
could
clock
is
still
his
course,
dark;
simply
pallor,
and then his being pale on Thursday
afternoon would be part of his
with
dark
his
existence,
being
Thursday
night. But, again, he
along
as much
well
have
been
there
Thursday
night,
might
perfectly
as
even
at
if
he had missed
the parlor
Socrates
his appointment
ever,
as a sheet. The
is that the loss of
white
trouble
and remained
Socrates'
pallor is perfectly
compatible with the retention of Socrates,
while with the loss of other things - notably,
the loss of his life, and
- we seem to lose
the
loss
of
his
humanity
perhaps
something more:
namely,
Socrates.
view
controversial.
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416
R. M.
DANCY
(3)
is a man
(2)
holds
of
its subject
is pale
accidentally,
'by virtue
of
an accident'
(k t?
avjjL?e?y)KO<;).
a predicate
between
This distinction
and
pertains to the relationship
at different points
its subject, but Aristotle
it to the sentence
attaches
at different
times. Initially, the reflexive pronoun
(abro, 'itself) refers
are frequently
and person
back to the subject:
its gender, number,
features of the subject (as inMet. Z
determined
by the corresponding
see A 18.
for some other
4. 1029b14-16,
below;
quoted
samples,
31
Z
3.
5.
But
sometimes
28,
1029a20,
1022a26-27,
[bis], 34,
1030b19).
the phrase goes along with the predicate, when
the predicate
is taken
a
a
more
or
less
dim
in isolation, with only
view of
subject:
possible
a 'by-virtue-of
then the predicate becomes
itself term (as in An. post.
A 4. 73a34ff., 22. 84a13-17, Met. Z 4. 1029b9, etc.).
are plainly con
the distinction
These different ways of employing
to say how. We might
but it is not easy
nected,
try, as a first
a term T is a by-virtue-of
itself term iff, whenever
approximation:
itself (viz., S)T. This can only be
any subject S is T, S is by-virtue-of
or putative
an approximation,
counter-exam
since counterexamples
a
'that pale thing is man', e.g., which has as predicate
ples abound:
itself term, but pale things are not by virtue of them
by-virtue-of
takes the
selves
(i.e., by virtue of being pale things) men. Aristotle
line that 'that pale thing is a man' is not of the form 'S is T' (An. post.
The fact is, I think, that the 'by-virtue-of
A 22. 83al-17).
itself
an
and
when
with
it
carries
intensional
Aristotle
element,
terminology
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ARISTOTLE
AND
417
EXISTENCE
essence
to
of each
Tt r\v
elvai
thing
eKaarco
is what
o keyerai
it is said
kol?'
of itself
(?or?
?oto)."
it is for each
that
for
you
educated.
that
this
further
alternative
discussion
possibility
for the next.
has
not
been
ruled
out,
and
leave
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418
R. M.
Consider
once more
the two
DANCY
inferences
S is P -> S is
(E)
and
Socrates
(P)
but breaks
(L)
down
is pale
for
Socrates
is a lousy provider
Socrates
is a good
?? Socrates
is lousy
and for
(G)
cobbler
-> Socrates
is good.
residue
(L) and (G) were ruled out on the ground that the simplified
was
to
in the course of the simplification.
had changed character
(P)
was
to
constant.
And
if
is
because
its
residue
be allowed
so,
(E)
a
constant
residue.
survive, it must show
Consider,
(et)
then,
Socrates
the instance
is.
So we write
is to be an inference with a detachable
consequent.
on a slip of paper and put it to sea in a bottle. But
its consequent
that
when
it washes
shore, its readers, who know
up on a distant
it is said to be by virtue of
"what it is for each thing to be is what
is a man,
is by virtue of himself
itself," and know that what Socrates
noun. So (eO is a failure, and (E)
will supply 'aman' as the completing
This
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ARISTOTLE
is not
Socrates
is a man
419
EXISTENCE
in general
(e2)
AND
-> Socrates
is involved
with
is.
or by-virtue-of
to essential
itself predicates,
(E), restricted
In fact, confining
to
essential
is overly
(E)
predications
Consider
That
(e3)
thing
pale
is a man ?? That
pale
thing
survives.
restrictive.
is.
We
not
should
count
qualification',
one to make
'elvai
Socrates
(1)
tempt
phrase
is.
mark exis
just 'is', not 'is' + Pred. Such occurrences
sense of 'is' in Aristotle,
if there were an existential
tential sentences:
sense here;
this would be it. But there is plainly no special existential
'to be' followed
between
there is a merely
difference
by a
syntactic
predicate and 'to be #\ The latter results from truncating a predication.
Here
we
have
So even
to be something.
'to be #' is, implicitly,
may be so truncated:
But, as we have seen, not just any predication
the simplifying
Under
the predicate must be restorable.
assumption
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420
R. M.
DANCY
Socrates
That
is the theory.
is a man.
Let us translate
2. BEING
The word
sentence
AND
EXISTING
it into English.
IN
ENGLISH
would
The
'is' does
(1) seems
not
(4)
already
mentioned
about
exists.
I have
tenses
(5)
There
is (such
a - as) Plato.
Without
the parenthetical
filled in, this does not
material,
properly
even scan.27 And properly
some fairly
filling in the blank requires
noun or noun phrase:
substantial
for
covering
just 'thing',
example,
will only work
in quite special cases ("My good man, there is such a
and so on). 'Plato' is the name of a
you know,"
thing as decency,
as well as that of a philosopher,
computer
language
and, for that
I could use it to name my pet cat, my pet theory, my favorite
matter,
the national debt, the coin Washington
skimmed across the
number,
or the value of that coin in real terms of Christmas
Delaware,
Day
1776 given
in terms of the Laspeyres
index. In the absence
of a
that has some bite to it, we do not know what
is
covering
phrase
talked
about.
being
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ARISTOTLE
AND
421
EXISTENCE
to place the
It is not altogether
clear, in that case, what pigeon-hole
no
in.
the
to
Some
feel
that
it is not
doubt,
will,
urge
argue
ignorance
an
for
such
The
relevant.
argument might be
pattern
linguistically
it (although
distinction
and couple
this: invoke the sense-reference
of
this would not have made Frege very happy) with Mill's doctrine
names.
to
that
into
doctrine
(translated
Fregese),
proper
According
someone
says 'I'm study
proper names do not have sense. So when
and it is not clear to you
PLATO'),
(or 'I'M STUDYING
ing Plato'
or the theory
she is trying to grasp the theory of recollection
whether
mean
not
have
failed to get
that
does
of programmed
you
learning,
the sense of what she is saying: you have got all the sense there is to
the minimal
fact
and, perhaps,
get if you know the rest of her words
name.
a
that 'Plato' (or 'PLATO')
is proper
seems
the sense
to me one of the many
This
places where
with
Mill's
reference
and its alliance
distinction
theory of proper
me
seems
names
us
to
clear that there is something
It
lead
astray.
and
the sense of what
about
she said that we are not getting,
with the proper name in it.28 But I am not able
associated
something
to lay out a proper account of the matter, at least not here. So I shall
for
that (4) and (5) require for their understanding,
simply assert
noun or cover
their sense, some fairly substantial
covering
grasping
the 'expli
and admit that I do not know whether
ing noun-phrase,
sense belongs
to the science
cation' (I shudder at the word) of making
or necromancy.
of semantics,
that of pragmatics,
is at least partly right: the demand for an
If this is correct, Aristotle
noun or phrase is his demand for an answer to
informative
covering
to complete
is'.
the sense of 'Socrates
the question
'what is Socrates?'
It is no accident
that this is close to some of the things that have
with
recently been said29 in connection
identity by way of reviving
essentialism.
Aristotle's
But as things are, an argument
itself that would
may
suggest
undermine
views
into Anglo
any further steps in beating Aristotle's
the facts about Greek
shape. For it may seem that, whatever
to
(which is, after all, a dead language and perhaps should be allowed
rest in peace), we do in English
have a special sense for 'is' that is
the 'is' in
Consider
plainly existential.
Saxon
(6)
(again,
There
embedded
is such a person
as Plato,
in a conversational
context
that gives
it natural
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422
R. M.
DANCY
or, better, the 'was' in 'there really was such a man as Pr?ster
These verbs can be replaced by 'exists' and 'existed',
respec
(who lives in Athens
tively. But the 'is' in 'Plato is a person
...)' and
the 'was' in 'Pr?ster John was a man (who ...)' cannot be so replaced.
ness),
John'.
about
sentences:
the following
Consider
to
go, without
pretending
might
I think we can see enough
to tell
(7)
There
(8)
(9)
There
There
(10)
There
a furious clamor.
ensued a riot.
the entire retinue.
followed
fought by his side the bravest
(11)
There
resulted
(12)
(13)
her window
there sang a popular singer.
Outside
There sat next to me the saddest man in the world.
arose
the worst
disaster
of the Romans.
he remembered.
We
(7')
(10')
(13')
linguistics
us from
in
that was fashionable
require is (to put it in a way
last week or the week before) a transformation
that will get
that underly
such sentences
them) as
(or the structures
(7')-(13')
insertion'
to (7)-(13).
and would
X
(T)
At
we
what
And
least,
others,
NP!
The
- V
be
transformation
would
look a little like this:
(NP2) Y X
- there - V
labeled
(such NP2
'THERE
as) Y
NPt.
a man'.
I said I would
not pretend
to correctness.
And
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AND
ARISTOTLE
not correct.
want.
E.g.,
starting
These
(14')
we
It would
use
could
books
weigh
some
things we
- or at least I - do not
a lot
(T) to derive
There
*(14)
generate
from
423
EXISTENCE
weigh
(15')
(T) would
generate
There
*(15)
what we
where
There
(15)
mice
is
in the bathtub.
But
word
being
Its meaning
or in the end
almost
like nothing,
unfindable,
is finally,
It means
then, only an empty word.
nothing
is an unactual
vapor.33
remains
'being'
entirely
actual,
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real.
424
R. M.
DANCY
a lamentable
for
loss: apparently,
this represents
for Heidegger,
to bursting with mean
before Plato,
the Greeks
elvai was chockful
is not bad.
is wrong. But fifty percent
ing. And about that, Heidegger
is to show that the part of Aristotle's
So far all we have done
in fact, have
to Greek may,
theory that seems at first provincial
to
it
of
that is not all
in
course,
English. But,
something
corresponding
there is to the theory. For one thing, there is also its essentialism.
the doctrine
of
This
is not, on the face of it, a linguistic matter:
or implausible
I take it, as it is
in English,
is as plausible
essentialism
But
in Greek.
plausible
to leave
one
But it sometimes
sounds as if the doctrine might not be
or Rortyspeak.36
Here I am going
in Chinese,34 or Nootka,35
I am innocent, on
these languages, along with others of which
side.
of his essen
there is one thing about Aristotle's
employment
with
the
must
that
is
connected
be mentioned,
tialism that
closely
senses
or
or
in
in
Greek.
of
'is'
absence of different
presence
English
that some have
another distinction
To get at this, first consider
to
and
to be pertinent
Greek
that between
being:
English
alleged
a
here: it is
is
There
distinction
certainly
identity and predication.37
between
claims like
But
Dr.
(16)
Jekyll
is Mr. Hyde
and claims
like
(17)
Dr.
Jekyll
is schizoid
(18)
Dr.
Jekyll
is an addict
or
predication
'is' in (18).
I shall call this habit of supposing
to the next must
from one sentence
the 'fallacy of the magnifying
words
in character
that every difference
in single ambiguous
be locatable
glass'. We do not need to pull the
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ARISTOTLE
AND
425
EXISTENCE
(3)
differently
is a man
in
Socrates
(2)
glass in
is prone to
is its most
falls into it
is pale:
the latter is an
A 7. 1017a7-8,
of the fallacy
in sense from
identities
to predications.
it is a natural mistake.
That
Perhaps
to him; that he is pale is accidental
relationships.
They are both covered by
to talk as if there were
two varieties
Socrates
is a man is essential
to him. These
are different
the word
'is'. So it is natural
of 'is'. In the sequel,
I shall
with
Aristotle's
go along
occasionally
talking that way.
But I do it under protest.
If this way
of talking
is not to be
a
as
away merely
explained
way of talking, but is to be taken as
in senses of 'is', or concepts
of being, or
marking a genuine distinction
it is a case of the fallacy of the magnifying
whatever,
glass. It would
be a great relief to get Aristotle
off this particular hook. I do not at
present
know
how
to do it.
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426
R. M.
DANCY
But
of the predicate.
cancellation
3. DE
In the final
INTERPRETATIONE
lines (21H8-34)
of De
11. 21a25-28.
has just
(in De int. 210. 17-20)43 rightly says. Aristotle
that the argumentative
rule we might
pointing out, for example,
'Addition':
So Ammonius
been
call
(A)
we have
from
is good', where
'Socrates
always work:
is a
(airkus aya??c,
21a15) and 'Socrates
'good'" or 'good #
is a good cobbler'
you cannot use (A) to get 'Socrates
he notes that the rule we have been calling
'Sim
(20b35-36).44 Now
He
is very brief about
also needs
this: he
restricting.
plification'
we
1 above,
listed in section
all three of the exceptions
mentions
dead men (see 21a23), and
namely
things that are not (see 2T32-33),
inferences
to existence
based on the wrong
and it is not
predicate,
does
not
"simply
cobbler',
easy
to see what
from dealing
myself
the third is this.
21a18-21 tell us:
he
with
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ARISTOTLE
AND
427
EXISTENCE
predicated
The
follow
Homer
accidentally
of Homer.
traditional
is something,
of Homer;
way
of taking
these
lines is as saying
from
(19)
Homer
is a poet
Homer
is.
that
(20)
And
along with
to Homer
applies to Homer
applies
the denial
that 'is' by-virtue-of
itself
to be the denial that the existential
'is'
must have had advanced
views
(and then Aristotle
this, often
is understood
about
and
not Kad'
avro,
the predicate
may
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428
R. M.
not be canceled
by
simplification
DANCY
to yield
'is' ?irk
s, the "existential
'is'".
it yields considerable
This way of putting
ground to the fallacy of
the magnifying
but
it
shortens
the work.
certainly
glass,
for the second point: simplification
cannot be applied to
So much
to
not
Homer
does
k?#'
am?. But then the
because
its
'is'
(19)
apply
is not saying that (20) does not follow
first point is clear: Aristotle
He puts forth
from (19), but that it does not follow by simplification.
or not?" In
"Homer
the question:
is ... a poet; well,
is he, therefore,
it is not hard to read this, not as asking "does
its context
some devious means or other, that Homer
is?", but "does
are talking about apply here?"
it follow, by
the move we
it would
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ARISTOTLE
4. METAPHYSICS
AND
429
EXISTENCE
A 7.
1017a7-30
It may
of
danger
shooting
are in
to be
met.
Aristotle
in an accidental
begins by stating that 'is' comes
variety
and a by-virtue-of
itself variety
(a7-8), and promptly
gives examples
of the former (a8-10): "e.g., we say the just is cultivated,
the man [is]
and the cultivated
cultivated,
[is a] man."
We may write:
(21)
(22)
(23)
to
material
has nothing
is pretty awful. The bracketed
serves
us
to
to
it
in
it
remind
in
the
Greek:
where
that,
correspond
as
is
the
'cultivated'
easily
occurring
predicate
English
adjective
in
because
it is an unsupplemented
identified as a predicate
adjective,
The
English
needs no supplementation
Greek
the predicate
adjective
'/xouotkoc'
in order to be treated as a noun phrase.
as making
are to be construed
to parti
reference
These
examples
cular people
in each case, the fellow holding up that lamppost over
is not talking about a maxim he and his friends
there, say: Aristotle
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430
R. M.
DANCY
like to utter to the effect that the just man is a cultivated man.
He adds another example which, he says, is similar (a10?11):
The
(24)
cultivated
[one] builds
houses.
is a single verb,
(Here 'builds houses'
to the preceding
dissimilar
relevantly
what we are talking about is accidental
that (24) is so
promptly
explains
because
it-is-accidental
be a] housebuilder
OlKOS? jUM?).
to the housebuilder
(al 1?12: on
crvp,?e?7)Ke
that it is
Notice
'oiKo8oixeiv\)
no 'is', and
cases:
it contains
knows
'is'. Aristotle
this, and
to be cultivated,
rq o?ko8??jlcp
or to the cultivated
plovctik^
elvai
[one to
r? t?> ilovctiku
This
for his
examples:
the general
form
for all,
including
the paraphrase
for (24) (but not (24) itself) is "that this is this signifies that this
to this" (a13?14: t? y?p T?8e elvai ro?e o-raia?ve? r?
ra>8e ro8e). More particularly,
in cases like (21), both
o-vii?e?iqKevai
same thing (a15?16);
to
and
the
are-accidental
terms, 'just'
'cultivated',
to that
in cases like (22), the term in predicate
"is-accidental
position
to the
it
which
is" (t? ovti
appears,
(Tvp??e?t]Ke, a16)
namely,
is-accidental
existent
by the subject term; and in cases like (23),
thing designated
to the predicate
term (a17?18).
the subject term is accidental
are paraphrases
of sentences
These
'is' in predicative
employing
not
do
themsleves
that
'is'
in
role, but in one of
position. They
employ
sum
occur.
for
When
Aristotle
them, the paraphrase
(22), 'is' does
occurrence
in
that
this
clear
is important:
marizes
a19-22, it becomes
are so said either because
to the
both belong
things said to be accidentally
to [a thing that]
that [i.e., the predicate-term]50
belongs
[thing that] is, or because
that of which
it is predicated
is.
is, or because
that, to which
belongs,
Well
then,
same
are occurrences
of
to
taken
they
justify
(21)?(23). He is assuming
tence of something
both
These
are
thinks
are existential
claims, and
'is' in the predications
one to the exis
that stating (21) commits
And
and
cultivated.
he
just
presumably
man
a
who
is
both
the existence
of, say
just
of
and cultivated.51
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ARISTOTLE
AND
431
EXISTENCE
(25)
or parenthetically,
is, marginally
acceptable.
There are two possible
derivations
for its 'is#'.
One may be suggested by the comment
just quoted,
(3)
Socrates
is a man.
(1)
Socrates
is#.
(1) is to follow
Thursday
(26)
night,
Socrates
viz.:
that it is
way. Assume
at the tanning parlor, and
[thing].
Then
like Leibniz'
using this and something
Law, we might get (25)
we
If
the
of
would
'is#'
be that of (1), and so,
(1).
did,
(25)
a
and
that
of
k<*#'
am?
'is'.
so, again,
(3),
ultimately,
But the immediately
context
The
preceding
suggests an alternative.
comment
of a18-19 is attached
to a statement
of the
parenthetical
truth conditions
one is a man':
for (23), 'The cultivated
this is so
the cultivated
because
to
is accidental
the man, and so, Aristotle
adds,
even the not pale is said to be.
That sounds as if Aristotle
had the following
in mind.
derivation
Start, as before, with (3), and assume
(26); this yields
from
(27)
The
not pale
thing
is a man.
Then
(2)
not allow
simplification
to operate
on
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432
R. M.
DANCY
the
once context-free,
its predicate would not be restorable:
lead to the com
would
'what is Socrates?'
to the question
But if we now count
'a man'.
(27), et al, as accidental
pletion
we
cases
would work as
in
the
restoration
which
have
predications,
'what is the pale thing?' would be
well as it ever does: the question
answered by 'a man'. (Of course, to answer the question,
you have to
because,
answer
then, about
What,
this latter
'is'? Aristotle
has
27):
many
things are said to be by-virtue-of
as [they] are
for in as many ways
signify,
some
of things
since
signify
predicated,
some to do
some relative-to
what,
how-big,
the same things as each of these.
be' signifies
As
as the figures
of predication
'to be' signifies.
in so many ways
So,
some
[it] is, some what-[it]-is-like,
themselves
said,
what
or to undergo,_some
(kok?' auj? 8k elvai
where,
X?yerai
r?
some when,
'to
ocrarrep criqiiaivei
t? eivai
criqixa?vei.
r? 8? rrpo? ti, r? 8?
o"X)p,aivei)
thinks that
the only thing that is agreed on here52 is that Aristotle
About
to the next.
from one category
'is' varies somehow
in
Our theory tells us that the 'is' he has in view is that occurring
source
occurrences
for
of
the
essential
paradigmatic
predications,53
'is#'.
So whatever
variation
there
is will
show up in existence-claims
as well.
passage
recalls
naming
the first
what
[a]
who
signifies
[it] is sometimes
signifies
one of
sometimes
sometimes
[a] what-like,
[a] how-big,
is
For when, with a man set out, one says that what
the other categories
[Karr\yopi(?v].
a substance;
when, with a
set out is a man or an animal, he says what
[it] is and signifies
it is and
is set out is pale or a color, he says what
pale color set out, he says that what
a cubit set out, he says
a
of
with
what-like.
if,
And,
magnitude
similarly,
[a]
signifies
It
is clear
substance
from
[ouo-iav],
them54
that
one
sometimes
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ARISTOTLE
AND
EXISTENCE
433
that what
is set out is a magnitude
of a cubit,
he says what
it is and signifies
[a]
And
in the other
each such [term], both
if it is said about
how-big.
[cases]:
similarly
itself [e?v re avro
and if its genus
is said of it, signifies what
rrepi avrov]
[it] is, but
whenever
it signifies,
not what
or
[it is said] about another
[thing],
[it] is, but how-big
or one of the other categories.
what-like
Here
moves
from the point that 'all premisses
unhesitatingly
or what-like
what
either
or
[it] is or how-big
(irpoTacrei?)...
signify
one of the other categories"
where
the
sentences
under
(b25-27),
are ones like our old friends (3) and (2) and
consideration
Aristotle
Socrates
(28)
to sentences
is a cubit
tall
(29)
(30)
This
[viz., off-white]
is a color
and
(31)
Aristotle
is either
those sentences
describes
by saying that in each something
"said about itself" or "its genus
is said of it"; the former
is familiar
from An. post. A 22. 83a24ff.,58 and is, for
terminology
a variation
on the 'by-virtue-of
ter
itself
present purposes,
merely
minology.
The transition
in Top. A 9 from the variable
list to the 'what is it?'
list is fairly abrupt, but not as abrupt as that inMet. A 7, for Aristotle
to give examples.59 He merely
does not there even bother
sketches
the variable
some signify what [it] is, some
list ("of things predicated,
and says that 'to be' will have a single
what-like,..."
1017a24-27)
force (to use as neutral a word as I can think of) for each entry on the
list (a27). But he is discussing
'to be' K?d' am?, so it looks (at least to
the same transition.
me)60 as if he is making
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434
R. M.
He
follows
DANCY
a comment
it with
that has
caused
consternation61
(a27-30):
or
'a man
flourishes',
in
the
and
'cuts',
similarly
'cutting'
rro? ?yiaiVt?v ecrriv r] r? avBp??rros vyiaCvei, ol)8e
other cases (ovd?v y?p 8ia<^?pei r? avdp
ecrriv r) r?fxvc?v rov ?vOpc?rro? ?a8C?ei r? r?pbvei, o/uloi?j? 8? Kai em
r? avOp?)rro<; ?a8iC(ov
v.
t?)v ?kk
for
there
between
is no
'a man
difference
between
is walking'
or
'a man
and
is flourishing'
'a man walks'
and
or
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AND
ARISTOTLE
itself
if the
'is',
latter
is the
simply
435
EXISTENCE
former
with
un
predicate
canceled.66
Aristotle
denies that there is a genus of beings, that is,
Notoriously,
a genus
is' (An. post. B 7. 92b13-14).
Less
labeled
'that which
an
B 3.
that
Met.
he
in
for
claim,
argument
notoriously,
provides
a
A
1.
121a14-19
also
for
but
998b22-28
different,
(see
related,
Top.
a genus,
he says, cannot be predicated
of something
argument):67
unless one of its species
is predicated
of that thing, and no species
can be predicated
own
of its
so, if beings formed a genus,
differentia;
not exist,
could not be beings,
that is, they would
its differentiae
is absurd.
which
see how to make anything
I do not at present
out of
convincing
as
this. But,
is another day.
they say, tomorrow
NOTES
1
G.
E. L. Owen,
and
During
G.
E.
Studia
(G?teborg:
tations are from p. 165.
2
W.
Jacobs,
Particularly
282-300.
On pp. 297-98
on Nonreferring
Phronesis
24 (1979):
Subjects',
int. 11. 21a25-27,
is critical
of my note on De
A Study
in Aristotle
Reidel,
1975,
(Dordrecht:
but it was only Jacobs's
note that
that appendix
obscure,
'Aristotle
(n. 6) Jacobs
and Contradiction:
II to Sense
Appendix
have
pp. 153-55. Others
made
me
aware
how
found
I might
grossly
not help.
is part
paper
present
of the more outrageous
the
be misunderstood.
Snares
(London:
of a larger
demands
The
effort
present
(see
section
of Ontology',
in R. Bambrough,
ed., New
& Kegan
Paul,
1965), pp. 69-95.
I hope
in carrying
that out to remove
project;
Routledge
on the reader's
credibility
paper
presents.
There
are different
verbs
for
in the Greek
'to be'
for example,
of the period:
we might
is sometimes
used
in Aristotle
where
'elvai' and translate
'vrrapxeiv'
expect
as a copula
'to exist' (see Bz. Ind. 788b43ff.).
But it is also used occasionally
(see ibid.).
It could not be used
to 'disambiguate'
to disam
'eiVat' if there were
any ambiguity
biguate
(see below).
F. H. Fobes,
An
Greek:
Introduction
of Chicago
Philosophical
(University
this is not simply an artifact
texts:
of introductory
it
Press,
1957) p. 51 n. 1. Of course,
will also be found
R. K?hner
and F. Blass, Ausf?hrliche
Grammatik
in, for example,
der griechischen
1er Teil (Hannover:
1966 [reprint of ed. 3, 1890), vol. i
Hahn,
Sprache,
p. 344 ?90.2.
7
See here C. H. Kahn,
The Verb
'Be' in Ancient
Greek
(Dordrecht:
Reidel,
1973),
E.g.,
Appendix
pp. 422-24.
II,
of ecrri
and
its position
in the
sentence',
pp. 420-34,
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
esp.
R. M.
436
8
DANCY
see Kahn,
The Verb
(a great many)
'Be', ch. VI.
examples
'On "There
and N. Wolterstorff,
Studies
Is'", Philosophical
(U.S.)
and Existents',
'Existentials
47 (1981):
Theoria
41-48; G. Vision,
1-30; Y.
'Another Look
at Definites
in Existentials',
Journal
18 (1982): 73-88.
Ziv,
of Linguistics
10
on Plato
in Plato',
in R. Bambrough,
G. Vlastos,
of Reality
ed., New Essays
'Degrees
9
For Greek
E.g., N.
11 (1960):
Fleming
and Aristotle
& Kegan
in Vlastos's
(London: Routledge
Paul,
1965), pp. 1-20, reprinted
Studies
with
this
1973, 1981). My disagreement
(Princeton
Press,
University
the fact that I am greatly
should not mask
to it.
indebted
I pass by an interpretative
a fair run for its money
possibility
given
by J.
Platonic
article
11
Here
V: r? rroW?
5 (1960):
116-28.
See
Kaka,
Gosling,
"Republic, Book
etc.', Phronesis
on r? rroXX? Ka\?\
also F. C. White,
'J. Gosling
Phronesis
23 (1978):
'The
127-32,
in Republic
7 (1979): 291-306,
Canadian
Journal
and
475a-480',
"Many"
of Philosophy
am not convinced
idem 307-14.1
but I think the
'Reply to White',
Gosling's
by Gosling,
here.
issue has little bearing
12
as well
treatment
The
of what might
be a static
situation
simul
(Helen's
being
as if it involved
and not beautiful)
beautiful
taneously
(Helen's
change
vacillating
one
between
and T.
13
For
and
see Aristotle,
Met. A 6. 987a32-b10,
etc.,
27 (1977):
1-13.
Quarterly
Philosophical
a rather different
see C. Kirwan,
conclusion,
seem to be adopting what Kirwan
19 (1974):
112-29.1
is characteristic:
the other)
'Plato's Heracleiteanism',
Irwin,
a review
of the evidence
with
'Plato
and Relativity',
'relativist
calls
the
thing
Plato
that
he
says
doctrine
any
Phronesis
existence":
see below.
As
I am going
to reject
the one
that it does not attribute
to
for the
say
follow
Kirwan's
'relativist
on the formulation
emphasis
there it is said that big things are no more big than small,
that that does not mean
they are both big and small. But they
I cannot
general,
479b6-7:
of Kirwan's
primary
at the
time
predicates
than
of
in
interpretation'
the conclusion
and Kirwan
wants
in
to
are picked
out as big
from
small, it follows
there
is between
the Republic
of writing
were
somehow
special,
us here.
was
and
aware
that
is
targets.
that I am
in agreement
with Vlastos
The
(see n. 10 above).
I say, below,
that the concept
of being
that operates
in this
I am siding with Owen,
of existence.
Here
'Aristotle
argument
concept
just is Plato's
on the Snares of Ontology'
retracts
this in 'Plato on Not-Being',
in
p. 71. Owen
partially
A Collection
I (Garden
G. Vlastos,
vol.
ed., Plato:
of Critical
Essays,
City, N.Y.:
It is here
disagreement
especially
comes when
Anchor
Books,
1970), pp.
Doubleday
as far as I can tell, and
the Sophist,
here (see the next paragraph).
15
treatment
of 'is',
On the Sophist's
von "...
ist..."
Piatons
Gebrauch
& Ruprecht,
Vandenhoeck
37ff.
16
W.
Kamiah,
Zetemata
not
seem
Piatons
265-67,
223-67,
I am saying as
see M.
und
1967). Particulary
"...
but
this
little
as
retraction
I can
about
concerns
only
that dialogue
und Existenzaussage:
Pr?dikation
Frede,
ist nicht..."
im Sophistes
(G?ttingen:
relevant
to my theme above
is ch. II, pp.
im Sophistes
Selbstkritik
C. H. Beck,
1963
(Munich:
[=
to say that is relevant
here (see esp. chs. V & VI), but he does
256e5-6
the flat rejection
of R. v 476-80
that I d^.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
AND
ARISTOTLE
17
ignore
here
that
complications
EXISTENCE
come
have
to
light
437
in
recent
discussions
of
& Kegan
Paul,
[London:
(see, e.g., M. Platts, Ways
Routledge
of Meaning
there cited, esp. J. A.
and the literature
Constructions'
1979], pp. 161ff. on 'Adjectival
in E. L. Keenan,
'Two Theories
about Adjectives',
Semantics
W. Kamp.
ed., Formal
of
I am, for purposes
Natural
Press,
1975], pp. 123-55).
[Cambridge
University
Language
a con
that
is merely
the simple-minded
view
of exposition,
'pale man'
adopting
adjectives
of
catenation
intersection
an
in Montague's
that,
'pale' denotes
terminology,
as a Formal
in Formal
Philosophy:
Language',
& London:
ed. R. H. Thomason
[New Haven
Montague,
'man':
and
'pale'
function
(see
of Richard
Selected
'English
Papers
at p. 211.). Roughly:
the pale men are the
Press,
1974], pp. 188-221,
University
as a pale
men.
to
what
counts
of
is
also
be
false:
that
course,
This,
pale things
happen
man varies with race, location,
time of year, and so on. (So far, then, 'pale' might be an
On one of Kamp's
in the terminology
two
of the next paragraph.
attributive
adjective
Yale
adjectives'.
20One of the faults
translation
of the Metaphysics
reliable
(Oxford)
generally
'in
for the crucial phrase
'k?#' avro':
of renderings
it shows
'of itself
(A 18), 'propter se' (Z 4), 'in itself
(Z 3. 1029a20),
(a24), 'in
virtue of its nature'
'self-subsistent'
and, no doubt,
(Z 6. 1031a28ff.),
(Z 5. 1030b19-20),
other things as well.
21
to
to be said here. See A. Code,
is a great deal more
'Aristotle's
There
Response
is the astonishing
virtue of itself
of Ross's
variety
to Modal
Objections
Quine's
F. J. Pelletier,
'Sameness
and my
'On Some
283-311;
5 (1976):
Logic
159-86;
of Philosophical
Nous
in Aristotle',
13 (1979):
Opacity
about Substances',
First Thoughts
Philoso
and 'On Some of Aristotle's
340-42,
365-68)
Journal
Logic',
and Referential
of Aristotle's
84 (1975): 338-73
(esp. pp.
phical Review
Review
87 (1978): 372-413.
Second
about Substances:
Matter',
Philosophical
Thoughts
in Aristotle',
Frank
Lewis
finds
Sameness
all of us objectionable
in 'Accidental
Studies
(forthcoming).
Philosophical
22
'Defines'
should be taken with a grain of salt here, for in A 18. 1022a27-28 Aristotle
the phrase
'defines'
of 'essence'.
The point is that the two
'by virtue of itself by means
the one without
the other.
is no understanding
and an interpretation
of the phrase with which
literature,
(I
see J. Owens,
not agree,
in the Aristotelian
The Doctrine
of Being
Pontifical
Institute
of Mediaeval
1951, edition
2, 1963),
(Toronto:
Studies,
and
go together,
23
For a review
think)
I do
Metaphysics
pp. 180ff.
24
The Greek
there
of
present
pastness
the
'was'. The
context,
about
imperfect,
the
but
the tense.
Often,
one
I opt
in Plato,
explanation
for is one
the
for this
is not of
in
importance
Aristotle's
by Ross,
Clarendon
is the 'philosophical
Press,
(Oxford:
1924) i 127: the imperfect
Metaphysics
as well:
I get you to agree to 'S is P', we continue
This occurs
in English
imperfect'.
to remind you of that, so I say 'S was P, wasn't
it?'. Here
it
talking, and I later want
could be that 'S was P' was
of
'Two and two made
four': there is no real implication
the
has
the
rejected
'philosophical
imperfect'
is employed
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in
R. M.
438
DANCY
Ross
to a previously
stated definition.
appealing
discussion
when
there has been an actual previous
(ibid.) objects
of the subject
that
to t? r)v elvai
is used."
in which
in but few of the passages
is arrived at by detaching
in general)
technical
you: his (and the Academy's
terminology
context would
contexts.
The original
have been an explicit
terms from their dialectical
to be',
'what it was
for virtue
to which would
be made by the phrase
definition,
appeal
case
and
that
then
a label
just becomes
it is that virtue
for whatever
is correctly
defined
to
be.
25
I have,
to be."
educated
the
"for
admittedly,
Alternatively:
picked
[something]
But it could be done either way
that most
favors my overall
translation
interpretation.
in terms of the alternative
translation).
(and, in fact, I arrived at it thinking
26
s. v. 'be',
see OED
on the Snares of Ontology',
'Aristotle
p. 71. For further examples,
B I 1 (vol. i p. 717 col. 3).
27
cited in n. 9 above.
This consideration
plays a part in the literature
28
and yet I do not find myself
to reject the sense-reference
I do not want
distinction,
names
sense. Among
are
have
those who
that proper
with
saying
quite comfortable
comfortable
with
Paul,
pp.
1973,
worth,
('Frege's
zu Frege
Wiggins
Studien
saying
66ff.), M.
1981], index
1957],
(Mental
Press,
Names",
Philosophical
Form
and Predication
Names'.
29
P. Geach,
(Cambridge
Review
'Identity',
University
Press,
[Oxford: Blackwell,
sketch
Argumentation
Press,
Universals
in Linguistic
esp.
pp. 44ff.;
Foundations
Sentences',
sion and Transitivity',
Philosophy
of Science
Press,
ch.
1979),
'Mill's
2,
of
Theory
3-12
21 (1967/68):
(in Logic Matters
and 'Ontological
1972], pp. 238-47)
Relativity
and Ontology
ed., Logic
(New York University
Mass:
Substance
(Cambridge,
and Spatio-Temporal
Continuity
and
Sameness
of Identity
1980 (a revision
Identity
took
and Essence
its departure
the Structure
and
Press,
1979); see esp. pp.
be
challenging.
implicitly
31
'The Case
See also C. J. Fillmore,
1-88,
Reidel,
1972), pp.
Mass.:
Harvard
[Cambridge,
"On Predicating
Lockwood,
Proper
A Study
in
and J. Cargile,
Paradoxes:
(Dordrecht:
Brody,
Syntactic
California
in D. Davidson
and Necessity',
'Naming
Language
and Necessity
University
inM. K. Munitz,
D. Wiggins,
287-302,
1977), and B. A.
ch. 1.
30
The
following
& Kegan
Routledge
of Metaphysics
of California
pp.
1973),
see
also M.
1980], p. 127). See
Review
84 (1975): 471-98,
[Berkeley:
University
and Relative
Identity',
Press,
Harvard
[London:
Duck
[London:
of Language
(Frege: Philosophy
s. v. 'proper names,
sense of),
and D.
[in 2nd edition
only]
of the Morning
Star and the Evening
Problem
Star', inM. Schirn,
ed.,
II: Logik
und Sprachphilosophie
Frommann-Holzboog,
[Stuttgart:
here:
S. Kripke
1976], pp. 221-55).
hedges
& G. Harman,
eds., Semantics
of Natural
at p. 322 (in the reprint, Naming
253-355,
University
Acts
Dummett
Theory
J. Lyons,
(Princeton
from
S.
University
1980),
esp.
and D. M. Perlmutter,
etc.: University
of
(Berkeley,
I shall
of which
the claims
Soames
of English
some
of
46-52,
(New York,
'A Note
3 (1967): 390-96,
of Language
& J. F. Staal,
in B. van Rootselaar
III
Press,
(Amsterdam:
North-Holland,
'Existence,
Location,
eds.,
Methodology
Logic,
1968),
pp.
Posses
495-504,
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
and
Intro
ARISTOTLE
to Theoretical
auction
Allan,
'A Note
on
1-18. Allan's
(1971):
to treat 'there' as a locative
Lyons)
this issue.
32
This
is a Fregean
EXISTENCE
439
Sentences',
pp. 388-90;
Foundations
of the attempt
(made
rejection
I think, but the above
is correct,
by Fillmore
is independent
(Cambridge
University
Linguistics
in Existential
the Source
of THERE
Language
AND
Press,
1968),
K.
of
and
of
schaftliche
Philosophie
"als blosses
Formwort
of Gottlob
Frege,
mere
verbal
sign
see
is heartily
of predication").
view
endorsed
The
by Geach:
N.Y.:
Cornell
and
34,
Press,
1962,
p.
1968)
(Ithaca,
University
Reference
Generality
as well,
on the strength
to Aristotle
1.
Geach
the view
where
of An. pr. A
ascribes
case:
delete
Ross would
the words
that make Geach's
24b17?18
(where, unfortunately,
see Aristotle's
Prior
and Posterior
Clarendon
Press,
1949, 1957]
[Oxford:
Analytics
seems
int. 1. 16a16?18, which Ross
to me to make
the case
the parallel, De
cites,
see also M. Dummett,
For Frege,
for the deletion
p. 214. Both
Frege,
quite
strong).
senses
want
to retain special
of 'is': Frege,
the 'is's of identity
and
and Geach
Frege
as opposed
to predication
that of existence
existence
(see
(loc. cit.), and Geach,
=
on p.
Review
74 (1965): 449-65
[ Logic Matters
'Assertion',
254-69]:
Philosophical
thousand
and more
460
those who
"two
after Plato's
years
[265] he rails against
290f.:
will wantonly
Sophist,
here
the references
with
the existential
'is'"). See
[the 'is' of predication]
see also H. Bonitz,
37 below.
For Aristotle,
'?ber die
der Kaiserlichen
der Wissen
Akademie
Sitzungsberichte
as a separate
10 (1853): 591-645,
p. 601 (available
reprint
confuse
in note
des Aristoteles',
Phil.-hist.
Klasse
schaften,
Wissenshaftliche
with
the original
Darmstadt:
pagination,
33
"Aber das Sein bleibt auffindbar,
fast so wie das Nichts
Kategorien
Wort
ist dann
'Sein'
Greifbares,
Reales.
Metaphysik2
translation
(which
(New Haven:
34
Cf. Tsu-Lin
schliesslich
Seine
ein
is ein
leeres Wort.
unwirklicher
Es
meint
Wirkliches,
in die
Einf?hrung
In R. Manheim's
A Grammatical
Mei,
'Subject and Predicate:
Preliminary',
153-75.
70 (1961):
in Language,
B. L. Whorf,
and Logic',
Thought,
'Languages
ed. J. B. Carroll
Selected Writings
Lee Whorf,
(Cambridge,
of Benjamin
Review
35
Cf.
ganz
nichts
Dunst."
1957), p. 27.
Verlag,
from in the above), An Introduction
departed
occurs
at the bottom
of p. 35.
1959), the passage
(T?bingen:
I have
Yale,
nur
Bedeutung
Max Niemeyer
1967).
so. Das
Buchgesellschaft,
oder am Ende
English
to Metaphysics
Philosophical
and
Reality:
MIT
Mass.:
Press,
1956), pp. 233-45.
36
A Reading
'Genus as Matter:
of Metaphysics
in E. N. Lee, A. P.
Cf. R. Rorty,
Z-H',
D. Mourelatos
and Argument:
Studies
in Greek Philosophy
& R. Rorty,
eds., Exegesis
to Gregory
Presented
Vlastos
Press,
p. 403;
(New York: Humanities
1973), pp. 393-420,
and the Mirror
also, Philosophy
Press,
1979), p. 120.
(Princeton
University
of Nature
37
see also Frede,
'On
On what
Pr?dikation
und Existenzaussage,
Lockwood,
follows,
B. Mates,
in Plato', Phronesis
24
Names',
'Identity and Predication
Predicating
Proper
'A Hundred
Years
Later:
The Rise
and Fall of Frege's
J. Hintikka,
(1979): 211-29,
in Language
'The Unambiguity
and 'Seman
Influence
of Aristotelian
Theory',
Being',
The Alleged
of "is", and Aristotelian
tical Games,
this issue.
Ambiguity
Categories',
38
to inflate (18) to 'there is some addict
that Dr. Jekyll
Others
is the same as',
prefer
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R. M.
440
call
an
this
moves
will
identity,
turn any
and,
as an alleged
into an
predication
DANCY
But
(18) an identity.
but confusion
is nothing
call
consequence,
there
identity;
these
along
these lines.
39
Clarendon
Sense and Sensibilia
Cf, J. L. Austin,
Press,
(Oxford:
1962), p. 87-102.
40
See also C. H. Kahn,
She is his wife
the
The Verb
illustrates
'Be', p. 400 n. 33: "...
under
is of identity
of monogamy,
but not under
conditions
the
polygamy.
Surely
of the sentence
is the same in either case." This argument
is picked up by C.J.
grammar
F. Williams,
is Existence1}
Clarendon
10-12. But
What
Press,
(Oxford:
1981), pp.
a separate
sense.
still wants
Williams
existential
41
in Aristotle
the Philosopher
J. L. Ackrill,
Press,
(Oxford University
1981), p. 25, says
... serves
out that 'is' does not always
"... Aristotle
assert
It also
to
identity.
points
a characteristic
of Eleatic
to something."
He is discussing
Aristotle's
refutation
ascribe
A 2-3, but I cannot
in Physics
find Aristotle
this out anywhere
in
pointing
these chapters.
42
is a slight basis
for hope: Aristotle
There
in fact, have
that
does not,
any Greek
or "is ambiguous."
the English
translates
He
"has many
senses"
says such
directly
as "is said in many
he should
to be saying
and perhaps
be taken
things
ways,"
monism
once
than "has many
senses."
Hintikka
tried this out in a different
and Necessity:
in Aristotle's
Studies
(see Time
Theory
of Modality
of Ambiguity'),
and the Ambiguity
but
Press,
[Oxford: Clarendon
1973], ch. I, 'Aristotle
not
to want
he appears
it in this connection
and
Semantical
Games,
(cf. "'Is',
weaker
something
connection
Semantical
See
Relativity',
T.
also
523-44.
43
CAG
Ackrill,
p. 148.
Irwin,
Journal
'Homonymy
iv 5. So also T. Waitz,
Aristotle's
Categories
of Philosophical
in Aristotle',
Aristotelis
and De
Logic
Review
Organon
Interpretation
8 (1979):
433-68,
of Metaphysics
graece
at p. 450 top).
34 (1980-81):
1844) i 351,
(Leipzig: Hahn,
Clarendon
Press,
1963),
(Oxford:
as to when
two predicates
is another
of
this passage,
question
running
through
to form a special
sort of unity:
combine
and
see, e.g., 21a10?14,
subject
single
Aristotle's
Ackrill's
Cat. & De Int. 126f.
comment,
45
if this is a man, Socrates,
then this is a man?
See 21a2f., which makes
this
Perhaps:
less outrageous,
but still not plausible.
46
on Nonreferring
I am unable
to see what
Jacobs
p. 287) makes
('Aristotle
Subjects',
least denying
the interpretation
and I (and
of these lines. He is at the very
Ammonius
^here
a
are still
the others
He
cited
in n. 43 above)
that we
believes
accept.
apparently
the rule of Addition.
But he does not, as far as I can tell, explain
these lines.
discussing
47
see 'Snares' pp. 77, 82.
I am in conflict with Owen:
On both points
48
of Opposition',
to resolve
it: M. Thompson,
'Aristotle's
Cf. other attempts
Square
in J. M. E. Moravcsik,
Review
62 (1953): 251-65
ed., Aristotle:
(reprinted
Philosophical
A Collection
esp.
pp.
Singular
Essays
of Critical
of the reprint);
Phronesis
Sentences',
56-57
[Garden City,
M. V. Wedin,
23
N.Y.:
1967], pp.
Doubleday,
on the Existential
'Aristotle
179-96,
(1978):
to Thompson's.
Jacobs,
'Aristotle
51-72:
Import
see
of
on Nonreferring
is closest
resolution
Subjects'.
My
49
refers to this
In E 2. 1026a33-b2, Aristotle
This is deliberately
vague
(cf. n. 42 above).
'what is is said in many ways'
the formula
scheme with
four-fold
(to ov...
X?yerai
in characterizing
the
the same
formula
he uses
1. 1028a 10-20
In Z
rroXXaxus)-
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ARISTOTLE
AND
EXISTENCE
441
is no indication,
in
There
of the categories.
Kad' avr?
bvra by means
as far as I know,
to the effect
that these
any of his commentators
none
in any of his commentators
to the effect
in status, and certainly
differ
senses of 'is'?until
we get to J.
the uses of 'is' and the other
that one of them divides
of Categories',
Phronesis
19 (1974): 238-56, who
W. Thorp,
Use
'Aristotle's
suddenly
finds this distinction
'notorious'
(p. 238).
50
or predicate
like a predicate
Cf. the employment
of 'eKelvo' as something
variable
letter in An. post. A 22. 83a24, 27.
51
Von der mannigfachen
des Seienden
Cf. F. Brentano,
nach Aristoteles
Bedeutung
subdivision
of
or,
Aristotle,
divisions
translation
Olms,
1862; Hildesheim:
1960) p. 16. (In the English
(Freiburg: Herder,
by
in Aristotle
R. George,
On the Several
etc.: University
of
Senses
of Being
[Berkeley,
California
Press,
1975], pp. 10-11.)
52
on this: cf. his
there
is not even agreement
Since Thorp's
article
(n. 49 above),
on p. 247. I cannot
see how this translation
is supposed
to work.
retranslation
53
i 306.
So also Ross, Aristotle's
Metaphysics
54
translates
"on the face of it"; Forster
(Oxford)
(Loeb)
?? avr?jv. Pickard-Cambridge
same way,
as does
i (Paris:
J. Brunschwig,
Aristote:
Soci?t?
Topiques
'Les Belles
des choses").
But
Lettres',
1967), p. 13 ("de par la nature m?me
sur la doctrine
see also S. Mansion,
des cat?gories
'Notes
dans les Topiques',
in G. E.
on Dialectic:
L. Owen,
Clarendon
The Topics
Press,
ed., Aristotle
(Oxford:
1968), pp.
189-201
(p. 198: "? partir de l?").
55
in H. Hiz,
and Categories',
Cf. C. H. Kahn,
ed., Questions
(Dordrecht:
'Questions
Reidel,
1978) 227-78.
56
'what is it?' will not by itself mark out the category
So the question
of substance.
takes
it the
d'?dition
will
that matter,
the word
cf. 'the substance
'substance':
of everything
and the official doctrine
something',
Top. Z 8. 146b3, for example,
(applied
to 'what it is') of Met.
Z 4. 1030a17-27,
27-b13.
primarily
57
to say, as does Waitz,
It is misleading
ii 447 (and endorsed
Aristotelis
Organon
by
in one sense
loc. cit.) that 'necrri'
is used
in 103b22 and another
in
Mansion,
(sensus)
Neither,
relative-to
for
is a man' ambiguous.
'Socrates
b27: that would make
58
in Sense & Contradiction,
this passage
I have discussed
pp. 100-102.
59
of /<?#' avro elvai at all (see below).
in a27-30, and these are not examples
Except
as examples
of k?#' avro elvai
leads some to think
that they are intended
Supposing
that this must
Syllogistik
pp. 328f.
include
des Aristoteles
(n.
Aristotelis
1 to p. 328), who
thinks Aristotle
Commentarius
(Bonn,
Metaphysica:
E. Buchanan,
Aristotle's
Greek,
even
all predications,
'Socrates
H. Laupp,
II, 2 (T?bingen:
Theory
and Byzantine
Roman,
in the Philosophy
Die
See, e.g., H. Maier,
1900; Hildesheim:
Olms,
1970),
is misspeaking
himself
here, H. Bonitz,
is pale'.
1849; Hildesheim:
(University,
Mississippi
no. 2, 1962), pp.
Monographs,
Mouton,
(The Hague:
of Aristotle
of Being
Olms,
1960), p. 241,
Mass.:
& Cambridge,
11-13, M. T. Larkin,
der aristotelischen
'Die Ursprung
40 (1931):
488-96
449-85,
Philosophie
Fritz,
inconsistency".
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
R. M.
442
60
DANCY
in the Philosophy
p. 87 with n. 20,
Language
of Aristotle,
(see also last note).
confusing
i 307-308,
and Ross, Aristotle's
'Snares' p. 82 n.
Cf. n. 59 above,
Owen,
Metaphysics
Use
of Categories',
'Aristotle's
pp. 249ff.
1, and Thorp
62
to the category
of quality
in Soph.
el.
refers
In fact, Aristotle
'flourishing'
(vyiaiveiv)
but
61
So
also, perhaps,
I find pp. 87-88
Larkin,
very
4. 166b16-19;
cf. also Cat. 8. 9a14-16.
63
Use of Categories',
So far, I agree with Thorp. As he points out ('Aristotle's
pp. 250f.),
use of the same examples
fits Aristotle's
inDe int. 12.21b5-10,10.20a3ff.
this interpretation
64
I leave Thorp
Use of Categories',
Here
for Ross
('Aristotle's
pp. 252-54)
(Aristotle's
i, pp.
Metaphysics
65
is certainly
This
C. Kirwan,
Contrast
307-308).
the way
Aristotle's
many
presentations
Metaphysics,
make
Books
loc. cit.
Press,
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions