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  • Graham. Being in Western Phiilosophy Compared With Shi/fei and You/wu.

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    Jan Canteras Zubieta
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    El sinólogo Graham estbalece una comparación entre el "ser" de la ontología griega y ciertos términos y partículas del chino que juegan funciones gramaticales aparentemente semejantes.

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    Graham. Being in western phiilosophy compared with shi/fei and you/wu.

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    El sinólogo Graham estbalece una comparación entre el "ser" de la ontología griega y ciertos términos y partículas del chino que juegan funciones gramaticales aparentemente semejantes.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    289 views18 pages

    Graham. Being in Western Phiilosophy Compared With Shi/fei and You/wu.

    Uploaded by

    Jan Canteras Zubieta
    El sinólogo Graham estbalece una comparación entre el "ser" de la ontología griega y ciertos términos y partículas del chino que juegan funciones gramaticales aparentemente semejantes.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 18
    8 XB. GARDNER altogether too much for Chetqua, who proceeded to invent where he could rnot guess. The trusting assistant copied it all down with complete cone dence. Typical of Chetqua’s pronouncements are the following, ‘his Book is difficult to be comprehended by the Chinese themselves and is supposed to contain some abstract Doctrines of their Religion.” (Note inside the book Tathei buan taizen, a register of the feudal aristocracy siving family orests, lineage, residence, income, ets.) “This Book is in the old Chinese Character which Chetqua does not sufficiently understand to explain, But it probably is an Account of the different Dresses of the Empize in different Times.” (Ise monogatari sho, Selections from the Ise monogatari with commentary nates, illustrated by Hishikawa Moronobu.) Book of Instruction by a Chinese Priestess.” (Chetqua’s description of the text of Nokiba na ue, a No play by Zeami Motokiyo,) “A Book of Examination for the Office of Mandarin.” (A collection of five Né plays by Zenchiltu, Motokiyo, etc.) It is pleasing to be able to record, in this anniversary number for Arthur Waley, that it was Dr. Waley himself who sav that all was not well with Chetqua’s account of the last two items, and added in pencil in his distinctive handwriting a correct description of the books, No doubt Dr. Waley has long forgotten this, but his pencilled notes survive (though unsigned) 28 another small tribute to his astonishingly wide-ranging scholarship. ‘The British Museum hopes to publish in the near future a catalogue of the books which Kaempfer brought back from Japan. This will bring to light no staring discoveries of Japanese literary works unknown to biblio- sraphers, and few unrecorded editions, but i will at least place on record. ‘full description of this small library of historic interest, in all probability the first Japanese books ever seen in this country, “BEING” IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SHIH/FEI AND YU/WU IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY by A. C. GRAHAM Introduction Part I. Thetreatment of sixfunctionsof English “tobe” in Classical Chinese A. Existence, "There is a man’ B. General copula linking nouns, “He is a man" Identity. “He is Charles” D. Roles. “He is a soldier” E, Copula with adjectives. “He is tall” F, Copula with location. “He isin Paris” Conclusions Part Il. Shih Sb /fei $e and yu7Ff zou $6 in Chinese philosophy. Introduction ‘Shih and fot in Chuang-tzit and the Mohist eanons Yu and aw in Taoism and Neo-Confucianism ‘The treatment of “to be" in Chinese translations of Western philosophers Appendix. "The supposed vagueness of Chinese OR INTRODUCTION! ‘To what extent are differences between Chinese and Western thought affected by grammatical differences between Chinese and the Indo-Euro- pean languages? Every Western sinologist knows that there is no exact ‘equivalent in his own language for such a word as jen {= or 18 #8, and that a8 long as he thinks of it as synonymous with “benevolence” or “virtue” he will impose Western preconceptions on the thought he is studying. He is bound to suspect that there are also deeper structural differences which mislead him in the same way, and which it is much harder to identify. This ‘question, vital to the study of Chinese philosophy and still hardly touched, is of interest to others besides sinologists It is now widely recognized that the relation between the thought of a society and its language presents an n 80 A. GRaHan important problem, The best known statement of this problem, that of B. L. Whorl in the papers posthumously collected under the title Language, Thought and Realty (1956)? is based on the American Indian language Hopi. But almost the first language to be attacked from this point of view wwas Chinese, in I. A. Richards? Mencius on the Mind (1932); and for more than one reason Chinese is especially suitable forthe purpose. It is the only language outside the Indo-European family with a rich philosophical tradition entirely independent of Europe; and the fact thet it ig an un~ inflected language, with rules of word-order largely similar to those of English, reduces the difficulty of explaining the structure of a Chinese sentence to those ignorant of the language. ‘The verb “to be" is one of the most striking peculiarities of the Indo- European group, performing a variety of functions which most languages distinguish sharply. The metaphysical problems which it raises have been important throughout the history of Western philosophy, from Parmenides to the Bxistentialiss. Classical Chinese deala with the various functions of “to be” by means of at least six different seta of words and constructions, several of which have other functions outside the scope of “to be”. Among the Chinese words, shih/fei and yu/tu occasion philosophical problems which overlap our ovn problem of Being. Until we can decide in what respects these words resemble and differ from “to be”, we cannot avoid projecting our own presuppositions about Being on to Chinese philosophy.? * Abbreviations: SPTK, Sia-pu wung-#an; SPPY, Sit-pu pt-yao; BSS, Base Sinologial Sere. * Like many other sevolusionsry books, thi ie important les fr its conclusions ‘than forthe questions ie asks. Cf. Language in Culture (American Anthropologie! ‘Atsocistion, Memoir No.7, 1950), edited by Harsy Hole, « symposium on the Whorfan hypodhess including ¢contbution on Chine ern English by Chasls F- Host "The relation between “to be and Chinese words with similar functions ie discussed by Waley (f. Pat, Introduction below); by Nakarnra Hajime sh BF, Toysjie no si bahd MH AO BMI W (Tokyo wo45-0), 1/sor-9, 20-30, OF Chang’rung-run sh C$, Diperences between Chive and Western PaatoeR> rom the Pet of Ves of Lc Scie Pe fore tech OD HB, 198 38 8 PART I, THE TREATMENT OF SIX FUNCTIONS OF “TO BE” IN CLASSICAL CHINESE A. EXISTENCE, “THERE IS A MAN” Classical Chinese has one word for “have” and “there is”, yu f+ negative wou $8; RAKE “T have a big tree” RAEN There was a rich man in Sung” (Sung had a rich man) “gern!” 18 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SHI/FEL AND YU/WU_ 81 Re “There ate fat horses in the stables” (‘The stables have fat horses) KT He “Phere are no horses in the world” (The world has no horses) BAM I “There i a man here” ‘When existence is affirmed, yu generally has no subject, asin the last example. But a Chinese sentence docs not necessarily have a subject, and tren in these cases we need not hesitate to say that 9u is a transitive verb followed by its object. These are two words in clasical Chinese which always function ax objec, ch 2 (him, her, it) and so (him or her whom, that which). Both are often found with yu: AF Z (have it, chere is chs), FAT (what one has, what there is) ‘Thus in Chinese one approaches existence from something outside, usually undefined, which has in which there is, the thing in question. The tame is true of ordinary English and French, in which one says ‘here is X” rather than "X is", “ily aX” rather than “X eat”, But Western philosophy, grounded in Greek and Latin rather than in ordinary modern speech, has generally approached the question from the opposite direction, from the thing which “is! or “exists”, The object of yu is the subject of “is”. B. GENERAL COPULA LINKING NOUNS. “HE IS A MAN” Tn modeen Chinese there is a straightforward copulative verb shih 3, negated by pu 7, the ordinary negative preceding verbs. But in classical Chinese the position is more complicated. There is a negative copulative verb fei JE linking nouns and substantival phras BG HB “A white horse is not a horse.” ‘But there is no corresponding verb in the affirmative. Sometimes two ‘nouns are simply juxtaposed without a copula; more often (in philosophical ‘texts neatly always) they are followed by the final particle oh Ae BH, OG RB Bo “A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse.” Although this is the commonest function of final yeh, it has many others; thus it ie frequently used after substantival clauses and after passive verbs following Ko BY “may” In long sentences the division between subject and complement is often marked by shih, “this” (the aforementioned, the thing in question... . not “this here”, which is t2't Jb, opposite of pi 4 ‘that there"). This pronoun gradually became the modern verb shih, a development which is ‘easy to understand since si stands in the same position as fei, between subject and complement, $0 0 2, % 40 BH Sa, 5 50 Be 8 A. 6, GRAM “When you know it to recognize that you know it, and to recognize that you don’t when you don't, this i knowing.” * ‘When there is ajudgement between alternatives, yeh and feican cover a whole sentence: “(The right alternative) is that..." or “is not that..." ‘RS BRE? Ha, RAT, RES “Why are you weeping for my army? They answered, ‘It is not that wwe presume to weep for your army; we are weeping for our sons"! From the opposite direction, whether A is or is not B, and whether an assertion or action is right or wrong, is judged by shih and fei, “Ie is thia (is B, is the right alternative)” and “It s not”: BEAR RE, ORT 2H MA, KH BS! ““Wheelwrights and carpenters take their compasses and squares to measure the world’s squares and circles, and say ‘What coincides, is this; what does not coincide, is not’."* W EZR, M4 ALI TE your refusal on a previous day was right, your acceptance today is wrong.” In this usuage shih is genuinely parallel with fei, and ceases to be a pronoun at an early date; in the third century B.C. itis already sometimes negated by pu! ‘Chinese indicates time by particles which precede verbs (and adjectives, if we choose to classify them eeparately); since there is no main verb in ‘A.B yeh, it may be asked how one is to show whether A was, is or will be B. But there is no time reference in sentences of this class, OF the six classes distinguished in this essay, four have the possiblity of time refer- fence. A man’s existence (type A) has a beginning and end in time; 80 does his being a soldier or an artist (D), his being young, tall or happy (E), his being in England or in France (F). But it would clearly be meaningless to ask since when he has been a human being, a mammal and a solid objec, or for hovr long he will continue to be the person I met yesterday or the reason why T visieed Bristol last December. Although Socrates is dead, we can all see that to introduce tense into the syllogism would be a useless complica- tion. Japanese Kambun versions of Chinese texts replace yeh by a verb, ‘navi, ut they keep it in the plain form without conjugation, There are many examples of sentences containing yeh in the present essay; is there one in which the tense of “to be” in the translation gives any information which the Chinese text fails to provide? 1 Kangyo cha, Duke Hel 93, sumer. ' Meviee, SPTK, 7/3B/6-8 Menus 38/5. 4+ Gf. Moet, t0/22A/4, 18/81 /1; Chuang-tet, SPTK, 1/4sB/8; Li-shih chem i, SPTR, 16/1888 ws ‘upgiNa” IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SULIN/FEE AND YU/WU 83 ©, IDENTITY. “HE IS CHARLES” Yeh can be used for identity (A is B and Bis A) as well as for class membership;! but there is also a special copula for identity, chi €). ‘The pre Han philosophers make litle use of it, but later the Buddhists and the ‘Neo-Confucians use it regularly: MOE, SMD, ABM, ERB, ‘The Way is human nature, It is wrong to seek human nature outsice the Way, or the Way outside human nature.”” T7Thmaghot this eteay I shall speak of class membership and ignore cla tnctuson, since the logical dference between the two ie not lesa In the ordinary foes of cither Chinas or Engi Chitng Hao HEE (iogz-35), in Hoonan CI@ng-ohih -rhu 94 A A, BSS,1/% D, ROLES. “HE 18 A SOLDIER” [As we have seen, the copula yelt does not provide for time reference. In order to deal with temporary roles, classical Chinese used the verb eet $y, “make”, Wei can hardly be called a copula: it has the flavour of an active verb, "to act as”... 95 % “be ruler”, 45 §S "be minister”. EA KS RH BEB, KG REBAL FRB K, RAID BH ho ‘After seven days he changed into a tiger .. . When he was a tiger, he did not know that he had been a man; when he was a man, he did not know that he was going to be a tiger.” * Hua-nan-tea, SPTK, 2/28/s, sf E, COPULA WITH ADJECTIVES. “HE IS TALL" In Indo-European languages adjectives have much in common with nouns (especially where they are declined, asin Latin); in Chinese, on the other hand, itis doubtful whether there is any formal division between adjectives and verbs. Thus in English an adjective, like a noun, is linked as predicate to the subject by a copula (“He is tll”); in Chinese it stands in the postion of the main verb without final yoh (Ke 2 “Human nature (is) good") Like a verb, itis negated by pu instead off, can be preceded by temporal particles such ax chiong #8, “about to!” and chi E “already”, and can be followed by the perfective particle yi 3. Tt is of course true that the final yeh often occurs after a verb or adjective, among other reasons because the verb or adjective i substantivized (IF HE 4 “This is also running away"), or because the sentence a8 a ‘whole is linked with what precedes (JB 4 2% JB 3 4h, “It is because you oF Ac. GrasaMt had soon the ox but not yet seen the sheep"). In the case of adjectives, one is sometimes tempted to suppose thatthe yeh is linking the adjective to the ‘subject; but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. In the following examples of jn, “benevolent” from Mercia there is no yeh BERRES “TIE the ruler (s) benevolent no one (is) not benevolent.” BEARER BEARER. TThose whose concern is riches (ere) no longer benevolent, those whose concern is benevolence (ate) no longer rich.” Tn the following, there is yes HEL deb, “A sympathetic heart i benevolence” (aot “is benevolent”). RHR C HS “To kill one guiltless person fs not benevolence” (not “is not benevo- lent”). In the following, the fst jen (with ye) contrasts with the second (without yeh): AH, MA BAHU, RUB RR bee, ey Res RIM GRHER, AOA TI, Jt BSE. A, KREARER! “Suppose theres « man who treats one unreasonably; then & gentleman will always examine himself, thinking: ‘It must be that T have not (been) benevolent, that I have failed in courtesy. How could such a thing happen to me?’ If alter examining himself he (is) benevolent, docs behave courteouse ly, but the man remains as unreasonable as before ... the gentleman will sy ‘Afterall he is just a man without principles.” [As we have seen, one refers back to a noun by cone refers back to a verb by jan 2, “thus”: WH 0B ABE Z ate RE IE TM Ay “All have the feeling of sympathy and distress .. It is not because they hate getting a had reputation that iti thus (hat they have this fel- ne In this respect also the adjective goes with the verb against the noun: AM IEA Knell EA BAR AR 0 ‘“Htuman passions are utterly evil. it is only in the worthy that ft ia not thus (they are not evil)” ike shih jan may be used to approve a statement, an action ora things and in this usage the diference between the two diminishes BLS ARMA Z, Bw oy eR, EE EZ BURKIH. "NIE you approve them on the bass of what they approve, the myriad things are allright (jan; if you condemn them on the basis of what they condemn, they are all wrong (fa)."* “penso!” 18 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SHIH/FEI AND YU/WU_ 85 ‘Jn is normally negated by pu, but in certain contexts it has a special negative fou... AR "Ta it so or not?” $8 Yes”... BF “No”, BA “TE so, then 2", HM WIE not, then « Wei, “make” is often found before a predicative adjective: RGR ERAS, THE. "The people are tobe valued rost; the spirits ofthe land and the grain come next the rule isthe least important.”* ‘But the tei isnot a copula. The implication is that “the people (out af all things) isto be accounted valuable”; it can often be conveyed in English bby making the adjective superative. Menus 48/21, 38/24 68/6, 7/335 48/28 * Menus 28/6. 3 Hania, SPR, 17/12 /st, 66. $ Cinungncsi 7/4986. * Mencus 78/04 F, COPULA WITH LOCATION. “HE 18 IN PARIS” ‘There is a special verb of location, tai #6 “is in": Wh, SF AEP EF ET “Where ei, what you cll the Tao? Chuang-tat said, “There is no place where it is nor.” Tua is sometimes used without an indication of place —"is present, ia alive": LEMMA, REMIT ‘When his father is alive, observe his intentions; when his father is dead, observe his conduct.” concustons “The verb “to be" ia characteristic of In do-Buropesn language which may well be unigue; according fo Eat Locker langagen out i troup generally gui heweenerntental and copulate being, and The rnnty ao hes single word for having ad extn being. Are wrt rondo thal caly Indo-Baropan lage ave word forthe Toncept of Being and tha he langage ve fore oil the gop with Sora which ry mean “haw”, tie" and "inal"? The sberdty of {Es conclsion Becomes apparent a soon ais put nto wor, since tsi hen presupposition Fe nay be fatal fo the understanding of Chinese Slcunsinn of shel and yf Ie conser tore clsly hat i song wth ‘ho Englishman leering Chinte takes «le ine to sd inl of theimpeecion thar something mitng from euch a aesence as A “Human nutce(e) good” fT soy The rove ted” or "Hein Pai havent ft ut the fltinship between the rove anit clour, te man 86 Ac, Gauan and the place—a relationship which is exactly defined by the splendidly ‘unambiguous word “a"? No, for “the red rote” and “the man in Paris are no more ambiguous than “the rose which is red” and “the man who is in Paris". But these phrases do not pretend to be sentences, "The rose red” needs averb, not to show how rednesais related to the rose, bu to assert che redness; for it isa rule of English that there is no sentence without a verb. ‘The conviction that a sentence needs a verb is 20 deeply rooted in us that when we try to define a proposition we find it very hard to resist the fecling that its nature is somehow bound up with the nature of the verb But this rule is of course merely a grammatical convention, not universal even among Indo-European languages. It may be objected that what is asserted must be located in time, and that a verb locating iin time must be understood even if itis not present. But in Chinese temporal particles precede adjectives as well as verbs, and in Japanese adjectives even have tense conjugation (takai, “is-high”, takakatte, “was-high”, parallel to yuh, “go”, ita, “went”). Further, a8 we have noticed in section B above, many Kinds of proposition have no time zeference. In such cases English generally puts the verb inthe present tense (“Two and two make four", "The lion is 4 mammal”), but sometimes uses other ten “Augustus was the greatest ofthe Roman Emperors” (Has he stopped being the greatest? Did he become the greatest before the last Roman Emperor had proved inferior?) Besides linking the subject to a verb, a sentence may, to take the most obvious possibilities, ink it to another noun or to an adjective Xcomes XH Xisamn XA Xisgood XE In Chinese only the frst sentence has a verb. The English rule that a sentence must have a verb is only practicable because there is stop-gep verb, “to be”, which can be supplied in the latter cases also. There is no concept of Being which languages are well or ill tted to express, ‘The functions of “to be” depend on a grammatical rule fr the formation ofthe sentence; it would merely bea coincidence ifone found anything resembling in a language without thie rule * Bare e avcir. Les expression dans let longus. Amtlvopes 49 (3984), 482-510. PART IL. SHIH/FEI AND YU/WU IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY INTRODUCTION In 1934 Dr. Waley wrote in The Way and Ite Power: “A large number of the tangles in which European thinkers have involved themselves have been due to the fact that the verb ‘to he’ means a “nEING'” IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH stini/eEr AND YU/wU £7 ‘great many different things. The fact that Chinese lacks anything exactly corresponding to the verb ‘to be’ might at first sight seem to put Chinese logicians at an initial edvantage, But thi is faz from being the case, Chinese assertions take the form ‘commence begin indeed’, i, “To commence isto begin’. And this pattern of words, attended upon by the harmless-looking particle yeh, ‘indeed’, has caused by its reticence far more trouble than aty ‘Western copulative by its assertiveness. Some of the things that this simple pattern may express are as follows: (1) Identity, as in the example given, above; (2) that A isa member of larger class, B. For example, “Boat woodea- ‘thing indeed’, fe, ‘boats are made of wood"; (3) that A has a quality B, For example, ‘Tail long indeed’, i. “ts tail is Tong connexion with realities, the Chinese argued, yoh (‘indeed’) ought alveays to mean the same thing. If for example it implies identcy, one ought to be able to travel hundreds of leagues on any ‘wooden-thing’; but in point of fact one can only travel on a boat.” ‘This is one of the first attempts to pin down a problem which wil remain elusive for a long time to come; and the value of such an attempt (the present essay is merely another) is that, by presenting for criticism a clear idea on an obstinately obscure subject, it helps to clarify the ideas of its critics. In the fist place itis doubtful, for reasons given in Past I, E above, whether yeh has more than the first two of the functions attributed, to it. “Tail long yek” would mean something like “Te is that the tail (i) Jong”. But even accepting Waley's three functions, itis dificult to see why yeh should cause “far more trouble” than “'to be", which bas all these Functions and the existential function besides ‘Again, in what way ia yeh more “reticent”, less “assertive” than “to >be"? Both words have the function of bringing two units into relation, but ‘neither, in isolation from a context, is either reticent or assertive about how ‘units are related. “To be” can link the subject with a past participle to form a passive (“is eaten”), with a present participle to indicate duration ("is 3”) or the future (“is coming tomorrow”), with an adjective ("is ed”), with a preposition (“i in"): when it links the subject with a noun, it ‘ean indicate identity, class membership, and in epecil patterns many ot relations ("Time is money”, “His speech is a eensation”, “Tt must be the lobster T ate"). Yeh occurs in just as wide a variety of contexts, What ‘matters js not the meaning of “being” and yeh in isolation, but the structure of the sentence patterns X is Y" and "XY yeh” ‘Now in classical Chinese there are wo iain kinds of sentence, nominal and verbal: (A) Nominal, with a noun complement: £4 J IG 4B, “White horse, horse yeh" (B) Verbal, with 2 main verb (which may be an adjective in the position ‘of main verb): 4 =F B Z, “Confucius heard of ic” HE words have a fixed 88 A. c. Grastast Ais negated by fi, B by pu; A generally (but not always) has the final seh, B may have the perfective final yi; the interrogative particles in A are 5a HL and yeh HB, in B hu 3F; for comparison, A uses yu 3, Buses ju i and jo #f. The structural diference is thus much sharper than between English “A white horse i « horse” and “Confucius beaed of ie". Both the latter have a main verb; and although traditional grammar distinguishes between complement and object, the noun’s loss of ease endings has almost obliterated the distinction. (English pronouns still have case, but “Tes me” hhas good claims to be better contemporary English than “Tes I”. The only remaining difference between “to be” and a transitive verb is that it has no passive voice.) ‘A sentence is marked as type A, not only by yeh, but by the presence of| noun complement and the absence of a main verb, and by the ways in which itis negated and turned ioto a question. The yeh by iteelf is not a decisive criterion; it ia sometimes absent from type A, and is found in at least one clas of sentence which does not fit easily into either type, that in which fo, “may” (negated by pu) is followed by a passive verb Te is there- fore dificult to agree with Waley thatthe Chinese can ever have argued that “yeh ought always to mean the sume thing”. In any ease Chinese thinkers ddo not talk about yeh, which as a final particle cannot stand in the position of subject or object, and therefore eannot be treated as indicating a thing to be discussed (although, of course, one can discuss 4b, =F “the word yeh") ‘They talk instead of shit and fei (which can replace the complement in ‘ype A) and of jan (which ean replace the main verb in type B), Te is not clear what examples Waley has in mind when he says that yeh has caused “far more trouble than any Western copulative”, and that it was assumed that yeh “ought always to mean the same thing”. His illustrations in this section are taken largely from the Mohist Hiiao-ch'd ab 3X, which contains some interesting examples of confusion which are impossible in English because of number and the indefinite artice,* but none connected with “to be”. There are more than fifty propositions ending in yeh, limited exclusively € class membership and identity, and without a single case of confusion between the two. The one case of confusion mentioned by Weley an argument the existence of which he infers from a Mohist proposition which he interprets as a criticism of it Although ehis instance is very questionable, there is certainly one really spectacular case of confusion between identicy and class membership in carly Chinese literature, the Essay on the White Horse of Kung-sun Lung 2 # fi (c.300 2.0.) In this ‘the elaim that “A white horseisnot horses justified by arguments which in fact prove merely that horse isnot necessarily a white horse, for example: HAREM HLS AAR HAM AKASMRE, SOG EEA Se, CE WG BY Ee a AT Bhs eH, AB SFM {ING 18 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SHIH /FEL AND YU/ WU 8p “With ‘horse’ there is no selection and exclusion in respect of eolows therefore one can’ answer both with yellow and with black ones. With “white, there is selection and exclusion in respect of colour, and yellow and black horses are both excluded on grounds of colour, therefore one can answer with nothing but a white horse. What excludes none is not what excludes some: Therefore I say: a white horse is not a horse.”* “Two points can be made about this confusion. In the first place, it certainly does not suggest that “XY yeh" is any less assertive than “X is YI the trouble with yeh were its reticence, one would expect Chines thinkers to be deluded by the possibility that “White horse horse ye reans no more than “White horses are somehow dependent on horses’; tone would not expect them to insist on ite narrowest posible sense, “White horses are the same 2s horses ‘In the second place, the Chinese sentence is ambiguous only to the same degree as the English "A white hore isa horse” or “White horses are horses”, either of which could be taken a asserting identity by anyone with Kung-sun Lung’ talent for exploiting ambiguities. Indeed, English lacks any means of specifying identity as convenient as the Chinese ck). In “Tam 2 man”, "Socrates is a man", “The King of Sweden isa man”, the indefinite article does specify class membership. But such sentences have x cular subject, which is enough to imply class membership even in Chinese. FA 4 could only mean “T am a man”: “Iam the man” or “Tam Man” would need other words qualifying J, “man ‘We thus arrive at conclusioos very ualike Waley’s.” The Chinese language sharply distinguishes three questions which in English are assimilated by the verb “to be"; but it combines each of these questions ‘with others which are outside the scope of “to be (A) shih fei “Te X (a horse) or isi not?” But also; “Is the (statement, person or action) X right ox wrong?” (B) yu /tu "Ts there X or is there not?” But aso: “Has X (Form and coloue) or has it not?” (C) ja fou “To it 80 oF not (that X Is white" But also: “sew oF wet (chat X ad this)?” "The last has a less direct connexion with Being than the others have, and vee shall not disenss it in detail * Op. at 6s, = have ven remons for this aim in The Relation eto the Final Particle 9 cand ye (Buletn ofthe School of Oren and Afean Sein 1987, 10/4/205-23 SOL'D.C Las, Some Logical Protons in Anciont China, Proceedings of he Aston Society Ginga to. howten11/9h/ = kd AME Ae (Geading Riot AeA boat etre (08), but to ener a bot Cabvng «confusion ithe thouge which i exaded 9 A. 6. ORAM gl by te indi ani, Wey peers “wooden ching” for “ue Set ae te Tay cnn ptge Ser imply that here wre pene who eg tat ones be tidal sy eaten lager oe a ak be one of aact of popouson,Stersty sheen’ angen sass it Stppc oe hgh ahr ohn ei hh walang rnifer nt fo Alla man" (BAAR. AEAM Ais) We we wid ‘Solty rhe wera ge in See teat TAMERS oN rand eAthena ne Rhee ae at orasning ely but caedonn te Moho ft abating ABTA BF tb, 8A Hit HZ. oB/28). RRR A Rime Ltn Sn AEE A, et Cen Coe EE (Con Or Way fe ther eal fconfton duo anbigues in the Chine mage Op, Tact eon conan wth mane gas eb eAaS Set a ctnple ot uly a ibe deer en oa ogee invert id tocar" GW RW A Chanel oan) han eee rec W tne Tan enetome ie pated pene nt Bp the roe hac cerns uns ut WR ee oe mene the ght of coats Note peace ek oth pooner en ic AB Sotacme ley thle Bion) es ca but to A. SHIH AND FEI IN CHUANG-TZU AND THE MOHIST CANONS ‘The controversy over shih and fei in the third century B.C. originated in the disputes between the Confucian and Mohist schools over such issues as universal love, destiny and music. These disputes had led to an increasing concern with methods of proof, culminating towards the end of the fourth century in the schools of Hui Shih 3 #8, and Kung-sun Lung, who specially studied the arguments by which one “iseriminates” (pien if) between right and wrong. The failure of Confucians and Mohists to con- vince each other led other thinkers of the late fourth century, such as Shen ‘Tao {H Hf, to deny that judgements of right and wrong are absolute,? The classic statement of this relativism is the chapter on Treating Things as Equal (fe 9 Ha) in the third century compilation Chuang-t2i.? "The bsolutencss of right and wrong is defended int dhe Muhist canons, which ‘probably also date from the thitd century B.C. ‘This controversy involved judgements of shik and fei and to a lesser ‘extent of jan and not jam; since the same arguments apply to both, there is no need to give separate attention tothe latter. As we have seen, shih and fet ‘can be used either (A) ofa thing which “is-this” (an ox, a horse) or "is-not” or (B) of an assertion (that human effort cannot alter destiny) or an action of principle of action (aggressive war, universal love, mourning one’s parents for three years) which “is-this” (io the right alternative) or “isenot”. In practice it is the latter use of shih and foi (in which it is convenient to translate them “right” and “wrong”) which concerns philosophers; but this is only an extension of the former usage, and when they discuss shik and fet “speini” 18 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SUIH/FEI AND YU/WU 9& in the abstract their examples ae of the former type—"Ts or is not X an ox, a hore, a dog?” “The Mobist canons confine the name pie, “discrimination” to disputes of the form “is or is not ¥", in which one alternative must be right and the other wrong; they do not admit disputes as to whether X is Y or Z, in ‘which both contestants may be wrong. They recognise the principe ofthe texcluded middle in practice if notin theory GE RAARAN H, Be OA BIE E,W Ah BELLI ‘Canon ‘The other's case must be “paired”. Explanation All that is an ox side by sie (literally, “pivoted” with all that is not an ox, is pairing”, There is ao way fr it not to be (one or the other) A RPL EEL, HE MRALH MRT IE, APE HREM E, WEBBAB, REBRK. “Canon Discrimination is contesting the other's case, View in dis- crimination is one’s claim fting the facts. ‘Explanation One saying that itis an ox, the other that itis not, is ‘contesting the other’ case’, Their claims will not both ft, and if they do not both fitone necessarily des nt fi. Tis not like one’s claim Sting dog. (Uf you argue that i is a dog, instead of merely that it isnot ano, bath contestants may be wrong.) BARRE LAE. ER BE COA) Bi HH He. HH Ab, HBO ak RZ, JE ak NZ Kt, RMR AZ, Tea 2 Hh Eo MEA MMS SLI, BA. “Canon ‘To say that there is no winner in "discrimination" necessarily does not fit the facts, Explanation: "disrimination”. Explanation What the contestants call it is either the same or diferent, If it isthe same, one call it “puppy” and the other calls it “dog”. If different, one cals it “ox”, the other cals it "horse". Neither winning is because they have not “discriminated”, Disrimination is one saying that it is this) the other that te not (fa), and the claim which Ses winnin’-+ We possess thre full-length extmples of Discrimination, the wo genuine estays in the King-sum Ling tal and the Mohist Hsiaoh'd. All tee the "X is of is not Y" form as regularly as Aristotle does. Kung-sun Lang argues that a white horse is not a horse, and in a second essay the significance of which is much disputed, that “No thing is not chit but chit are not chih” (89 SCIE 8 HG 3H 9E A). The argument ofthe Hsiao~it bogin with “A white horse isa horse. To ride a white horse isto ride a horse” (quoted in Part I, B above), and show only alight variations from this formula throughout 2 ALG. GeanaM According to the relativist argument of Treating Things as Equa, judge- ments of shi and fei depend on making distinctions between things by giving ‘them separate names; but the sage unlearns these distinctions and recovers the experience of an undifferentiated world which precedes language: HEA HMA HSK. SFIS AUBR UA WH. RMR AW AMR HAAS AWK, oR sw HA S318 A i AR wh AYR IE A “There were men in ancient times whose knowledge was perfect. Wherein was it perfect? There were some who thought there had not yet begun to be things. Perfect! Exhaustivel One ean go no further! ‘The next in knowledge thought that there were things, but that there had not yet begun to be boundaries, The next thought that there were boundaries around them, but that there had not yet begun to be shik and fei (one being itself and not being another).”* ‘As soon as men begin to distinguish themselves from the external ‘world, and things from each other, preference arises; and each clings to ‘what he likes, dismiaes from him what he dislikes, What is near to him he ‘alls This (shih), what is distant That (pi). Whether a thing is This or That depends on one's point of view; thus music, prolonged mourning, and belief in destiny “‘are-this” (chit) for Confucians, “are-not” (fei) for ‘Mohists, But there is no true contradiction between them, since what is ‘This to itelf is That to another: 0 Fe He ME, OIE IE ae lh TE A ET As BES — Se Ie, Di ak — SE 0 SR AL AY ARP AL? 3 ak PHL OE ‘ii By TAP, AH ES BA TEL LE HS HF KE HR EB Wo ‘No thing is not That, no thing is not This. . . This is also That, ‘That is also This. Thete they use ‘s-this’ and ‘is-not’ from one point of view; here we use ‘s-thie’ and ‘is-not’ from another point of view. Are there really That and This? Or really no That and This? Where neither "That nor This finds ies opposite is ealled the axis of the Tao. Once the axis is found at the centee of the circle (where everything is equally near), we respond without end, On the one hand there is no end to what the other no end to what is-not'"? his argument depends on the fact that where in English we say ‘rue” of “right”, Chinese use words which are primarily demonstrative thik, “this” and jan, ‘thus. In order to make his point convincingly, the writer uses shih regularly as the opposite of pi, “that” as well as of fei, ““a-not”, avoiding as far a8 possible the use of #2"d, the ordinary opposite of pi? Whether he confusés two senses of thik distinguished in English, or ‘whether the expression of approval by shik justly calls attention to the subjective element in judgement, is outside the scope of this article; in any cease itis not a question with a simple answer. ‘pena’ ry WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SHTH/FEL AND YU/WU 93, Even when I ask whether something is ois not a horee, Iam asking whether oF not itis This—what I have picked out from other things to call “horse”. Names are given only by convention (“Words are about something, it is only that what they are about is not fixed” BAA Se Bi BK 48 AE Ab). The horse will not be the meaning of "horse", will not be a horse, if I give the name to another thing. Kung-sun [aun elaborate arguments about meanings (ehis) and horses were quite un- DAA AZ Be HABE A ZEA A A RS IE BB AEA IE WB I SE I A, FR BY — HH, = Bo “Using the meaning to show thet the meaning is not the meaning is not as good as showing it by means of what is not the meaning. Using horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as showing it by reans of what is not « horse. Heaven and earth are the one meanings the rytiad things are the one horse.""” ‘The absolute This which Confucians and Mohists confuse with the own limited points of view can be reached only by unlearning all distinc- tions, recognizing every variety of conduct as equally right, embracing the entire universe as This; for itis only the universe which is This from every point of view: RAR RAR. RHR, MES RPA LB, IG Bio AIR MRA, IR ZB IR AL, TE RE “Treat even what is not This as This, even what is not ‘Thus as Thus. Lf This and ‘Thus are realy (from every point of view) This and Thus, there can be no discrimination between This and not This, Thus and not Thus.” Tt is assumed that, in the words ofthe commentator Kuo Hsiang 2b (Ged. a.p.312), “If shih is really shit, there can no longer be anyone in the world who considers it fet” (fe 9 HE Ak, RU FRG BAL SEE 26 41).3* Judgements (not only value judgements, but “X is « horse” also) cannot be abeolute unlees there is universal agreement. This presupposition seems strange if we forget that shih is primarily demonstrative and take it 2s equivalent to English “right”; but the claim that X is absolutely ‘This is of course discredited by the appearance ofa single person for whom itis That, Consequently, “discrimination” (pien) cannot reconcile different points of UE BR SUA FFE 5 AE AER ALA A, BE RAR A BRIE AB oo BEL PA AS TE, OE HHS SR, EZ? “Suppose that I dispute (pien) with you; if you defeat me, if I do not defeat you, i it that what you say realy ‘i-th’, what I say really ‘is-not’? «+ « {Whom shall [callin to decide it?] Suppose that one whose point of view is the same as yours decides it, since his point of view is the same as yours how can he decide it?” 4 Ac. GRauam ‘The dialectician Hui Shih had tried to show, by argument similar Kung-sun Lung’ sophistres about the white horse and about hardness and whiteness, that "Heaven and earth are one body” (3 38 — HE 48). But Discrimination is useless even for this purpose. I ceate to distinguish between things by an inward, wordless illumination; 2s soon as T use words to say that everything is one, Ihave fallen back into a world of things distinguished by words. “The Tao ia brought about by walking it; things are ‘Thus because of what we cal them.” (8 47 2 fii 2 , 49 98 2 TH AB) Language by its nature selects and excludes. One who deseribes in words ia like a musician who, a8 long as he plays, must choose certain notes and ‘ignore other; he ceaes to leave out only when he ceases to play and silence return, Hu Shih is compared with two famous musicians: RMA Ab, WAR Z Re ME TERE ZA RH A TEMES 1, AZ ORE BG BA i BY 2, BOAR AZ wk “They were all men who excelled, therefore thei names will be caried to later generations. But they ked something, and differentiated it from ‘That. Liking it they wished to understand it; but since they understood it wsithous That being what they understood, they ended inthe obscurity of hairpliting discusions of hardness and whiteness Suppose tht I try to make a statement in which nothing is left out. [At fiat sght it seems posible to say something, and then go on enlarging ita scope until everything is included without exception: FL H EB io KM TM BB PT IIE PD HL AG, NBM, MR REAR RK “Now let me say something, I do not know whether what is sid is of the same class as This? Or not ofthe same class? If we make a clas of bot thing which ate and things which are not of the same clas, then theres no longer any difference from That." ‘But however many additions I make tothe orginal statement, there is always an elusive That all tobe included: MR, TR A SAA A US, AR Ki BRBRABH ELK. “However, let us try to say it. There is something (ys)}—there is nothing (au)—there is having not yet begun to have nothing—there ia having not yet begun not to have begun to have nothing.” Further, my attempted description of everything isa failure at the very first step since {Af FE 3, He 405 FE ZR Be H We HE Ao FRG ABR, MRI EMS RA PIR FP “Suddenly there is nothing; but [still do not know of something and nothing really which there is and which thee is aot. Now I have already referred to them, but I still €o not know whether what I zeferred to is realy referred to oF no.” ““aEnNa" IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SHLK/FEt AND ¥U/WO 95 Again, if Tsay that “the mysiad things are one with me” (5 #9 5 RB—." there are already two—the vnivere and my own state- ‘ent about it.I canrot affirm my own unity with thing, for to afirm and deny that dstinetions disappear for me. At Teast sx of the Mohist canons atack these found in Treating Things 1 Equal. One defending Diserimioation is quoted above. Another points ‘out that shih and fi are not subject to degre, and ate therefore not relative in the way that “long” and “shore” are: E WERK, REHR. HH EH, WH, REE “Canon Whether or not a thing is s0 to the highest degree— Explanation: “‘As much as this”, : i Explanation If a thing were to the highest degree long or shor, nothing would be longer of shore than it, As for this being this or not being this, nothing reaches a higher degree than this.” According to Treating Things as Equal, we can treat every statement cither a8 shih or as fei. The Moist eanons reject these claims as self- contraditory* B UsSme ewe. BORA MO ZALEH, RAM ETM H, ZAZEAY AB, LAB Canon One who considers all statements mistaken is mistaken, Explanation: “His own statement’ Explanation “Mistaken” means “inadmissible”. 1f this man's state- sent is admissible, that i to say not mistaken, then this means that there are admissible statements, This man's statement cannot ft the facts it must be il-considered."** ‘The oppotte claim that all statements may be accepted as right is exposed as self-contradictory hy mening i intan double negative-—“Denial ray be rejected” BER MERI. AGRI EZ, ATE BE SE HY IE A A De a AH A Canon One who rejects denial is mistaken, Explanation: "He does not reject it”. Explanation If he does not reject his own denial, he does not reject denial. If “Rejection may be rejected” may not be rejected, this is not rejecting denial." Another eanon rejects the claim that one can abandon the distinction between This and That, treating everything either as one or asthe othe, y ceasing ROADIE oh ke 2k IR 96 ALG. GRAKAM It points out that although my ‘This may be treated as That, whoever does so must also teat my ‘That a8 This: BE RLRLMUILM, MER. BE EAM A, EA ak HE Me, Bo AE HE I, BULA WY eH Be A, OG DS To A Dk ak Me Dk, i Ak iE cA, Be Ts BLE BAe Canon One cannot treat This as ‘That without exchanging That and ‘This.* Explanation: “(The two sides] are differen Explanation Ie is admissible for those who use names correctly 10 exchange That and This. If what you treat as That is confined to That, and ‘what you treat as This is confined to This, itis inadmissible to treat This ts That. If That is also treated as ‘This, itis admissible to treat This as ‘That. If in teating This as That, you go 20 far a9 to confine to This what you treat as That, then That is also being treated a8 This." Finally, an obscure canon attacks the assertion in Treating Things as Equal that one should “treat even what is not ‘This as Thi” (i 78), approve even the wrong alternative as right.** A key word in the text has Deen corrupted to XC throughout the explanation; although other sugges- tions have been offered,” it seems likely that the word was J" This translation is offered without much confidence: & LENAM, REAM. SR Hh HN Ak LH Bo Aah AL AER iH A aR HE a, He FEA tke ALAR ly UH A ah 0 AHR A a HSA AEE Sho Bek SE AE BE Canon You cannot approve as sight without approving as right only the right. Explanation: “(Righ) is not all-embracing” Fsplanation "When even the wzoag is approved as right, the right is also being approved as right. Now if right is confined to the right, your approval isnot being confined to right. Therefore your approval as right is not confined. ‘But when approval as right is not confined, right itself is not being ‘confined. Now if right is not confined to the right, your approval is being Confined to right. Therefore you cannot show that your approval a right is not confined without showing that itis confined.” * Chuangated 10/32A-248. 1 Beng utes docs not question Chuang-t2's authorship of this chapter, and ues hs eas re ot dental with howe of Shen Taos ele athouh ntueneed ip them. (Elitory of Chinee Phiorophy, onsated Detk Bodde, Princeton, 1952, /4gs-8) Bu Sot-nien {QB Se goes so fr a o cam tha Shen Ta actualy wrote the USES Eluhorhip ofthe Tvtcam-ten ta Chuang-ed, Academia Sinica, 6/4 (1036) 769) $97 Riactst SPTK 10/2A/sf, 9A/6-8. The fst word ofthe canon is is wal epeted ns the fest word of the explanation. & is corrupted to in both the canons “apie” 1N WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SHIH/FEI AND YU/WU 97 bt notin the explanations, This part of Afo-ta ie notoriously corrupt; s considerable proportion of mendations (mostly the work of Sun Vijang HAF in hin Movtea Titus OF MHS) are slily eatablinhed, but many puosges are uninelgible ‘lesa vistuallyrewstten st the him of the commentator. Fortunately, mort ofthe ‘Sorrections in the sctons quoted are ofthe former kind and generally accepted esi 4 esha Tn he cond at ot he ee cae scter is corrupted ta I ve argued elsewhere thatthe lat thee easays belong tothe time ofthe Si ynatin(Compuston ofthe Gongien Log 239, a Mejor, New Series, 3/3 (F957) 7-83) " Cihung-ted 4/32/48 2 ut nbs 4/373 28/28 Chiang Tteyen AB supgated that there is textual confusion between pi snd fy, bt his corrections seem t9 me uanocesary. (Chuangstetchish-ku $F RSM, SA/aciy in Changes tv ungssha 53). * Ghsuog-ta 1/26A/ah. One ofthe contentions of the sophits was that “a dog ‘might be regarded 66 a sheep" GR DISH). Commenting on this (Chuamgetsd {0/4903}, Ssoema Piso BY I RS (died A306) saye that "the shape belongs to the thing, the name belongs to man” (He fel, & # 88, and points out that pu teato “uneut jade” inne dniect an dried careat” in another, (hie wa a vou fe ilarration ofthe pitalls of language. Cf- Chanekuo-'@, SPTKC9/53A/ t-s30/ Vin Wen sa HF, SPT raD/4n7, hiss PP, SPPY, B/7B/S Hou Han th Paina #3, Biographies, 38/1081. S Change 1/2387. asb/eaea le 1/43B/2, commentary. 4a /6E, 45A/SE- 1/398 /76 a eup. 1/394 /5. seu up. 3/ BAS. rut anp.1/33A/5-% 53B/s, 33B/5-34A4 at ep. 1/348/7 19 Montaa 10/6A/3f, 228 /xf The Best in the canon is cotrupted 10 ‘this pe of argument found in other canons; thus one poins out the slf- contradiction to teaching (causing to Tear) that learning is useless (at mp. SB/7 S1B/3-s, eanslated Bode, ut 1, 276). 8 Mostea 10/8A/8, 208/3-5. The Best but not the second % A is corrupted to Bt A, (The canons do not ute ae adjectival "thi", always refering 22). 1p tp. 6A/ay 213/7-228/1. Bis compte to The fst word of the eapon fn repeated (f- m9 above) alte instead of before the fist word of the explanation and [8 cormupted by the addition of the speech radial. (Tes remarable thatthe repeated ‘Mor! soften found ane word tao late never one word too eaty, this suggests that i ‘as rignaly writen by the side of the fre word of the explanation and later in ‘corporate in the text, generally before sometins after the Bet word. Oe text emit thie charscee (fot hry BSS, 24076, commentary). "The formula "Doing X fe the same ae doing Vie used in the canons to deny that one can do ¥ without being logically commited to doing X. CF. 6A/5, translated below (where Blin the canon is expanded to BY Bt in the explanation), and §A/3f {tanslated Compoation ofthe Gonganen Lang ty, att. 263 (where, however, fled to recognize thatthe second word ofthe explanation isthe repeated fse word of the anon, ef No. 22 above). trap. $A/af, 108/7-208/2. othe canon ain both cases corrupted t ‘There na pallet n one of the spurious eeaye ofthe Kungrun Lary tat (217), whieh, homever, pillage the Mobist canons without understanding them (ns 2bove). % Contrast Hainted, 1/88/30 18 FE eM Oa EEA ZB. “To teeat ight ght, wrong a rong, is called windom; fo tea ight as Wrong, rong a8 Fight, i called foolishness” 98 ALC. GRAHAM "Ten Chich-fa SU IRM reads 2 for 2 (Mo-pion fossci BATE My Peking, 1938, 208) Kao Heng BE reads J (Mo-ching chao. aan Bh BE #3, Peng, 1958, 222)! Gf 2.8 below 'W One ofthe most old real in the textual xitcsm ofthe Mobis canons isthe discovery that 3 is thoughout simply graphic eror for 2. Sun Yijang (Mo-fea Teens 243/7), Liang CO rch'n0 BREE AL (Morching chiar B88 BB, 163) and Wo Ytcohiang eh A (Mo-toa chiaonchu BeoF BE #, Tur chiupan the, Ione, 198/25B), analng this emendaton here, try im various says to account for the {ectat the word in question used aa verb. But the character 2 was originally the ferme es ks which wae stil wed for ft on Chow bronaes (Karigeen, Gresmata Seria, Stcckhol, 1940, Nos. 961, 62a). ‘The corrupted character is/used in the came fontexts ask the canon on ‘This and That jure quoted, which i closely related this one in subject and phrasing Byfonted 10/6A/5, 220, 46. fo I, a8 in 14/sA/a (of, x6B/s). The Akin the second sntencr ofthe Explanation restored on the analogy of the corresponding lst Sentence but one, avec i equired in any ete afer the“ In this passge I preter to ‘Scuime that the second ord of the Explanation i aot (faa above) the repented fret word of the canon B. YU AND WU IN TAOISM AND NEO-CONFUCIANISM "The words yu (“have”, “there ia") and wu (“have not”, “there is not”) sive rise to metaphysical problems in some ways like, in some ways very unlike, those connected with “to be”. They become especially important in the Taoism of the third and succeeding centuries A.D. and in the Neo- Confucianism of the Sung dynasty (t.0.960-1279). ‘As we saw in Part IA above, the subject of the English “is” corresponds to the object of Chinese yu, In Indo-European languages a thing simply is, ‘without implying anything outside it, and it is the most abstract entities which the Platonic tradition most willingly credits with being. In Chinese, ‘on the other hand, one approaches the thing from outside, from the world which “has” it, in which “there is” it. From this point of view, the more concrete a thing is, the more plainly the world has it; for exemple, one ean emphasize the absolute non-existence of X by saying 5KF $€ X, “The ‘world does not have X" (more literally, “There is no X under the sky"). In this respect, as in the absence of the copulative functions of “to be”, yu is like “exist”, which alzo implies « concrete thing with a background from ‘which it stands out (essstit), But there remains the difference that “exists”, like “is”, i attached to 2 subject and not to an object. ‘This is the source of one of the most striking differences between Chinese thinking about yw and ew and Western thinking about Being. In English, a table isa thing, exist, is; Beauty is not a thing, does not exist, ‘but we can still say it is. Having a verb “to be” (este), we can form a noun from it and say that Beauty, although not a thing, isan “entity” (ens, centitas). We can aleo form an adjective from “thing"(res) and say that itis “real”, To indicate the kind of being which is not existence we ean invent subsistence”, Beauty, that real, subsisting entity, is assimilated as closely as possible to the table, that real, existing thing. As a last refinement, we “apna” 18 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITH SHIEY/FEK AND YU/WU 99 say find reasons for claiming that such an immaterial entity more truly i is more rel, than the phenomena peresived by the senses. Tn Chinese, on the other hand, the word yu is used primarily of concrete things (wu §). So is the word shih $f, “solid”, “real”, the opposite of fst i, “tenuous” (if absolut, void") of “unzeal". ‘There are horse, they ate things, they are solid or real but what ofthe Tao, or the Neo: Confucian 1%, “principle"? Occasionally philosophers extend the scope of ‘yu to cover these abstractions; but i is more usual to decide either that they “re Nothing, the Void, or that the distinction between yu and teu does not apply to them. ‘When yu and saw are used a8 nouns, a serious ambiguity arises; they ray mean ether “(here-Jbeing” and “(chere-)not-being” or “something” and “nothing”. This confusion is inherent in Classical Chinese, which has no convenient way of distinguishing the substantivized verb from the ages, teen when the verb is followed by ché (af may mean either “knowing” or he who knows"), Wu may be taken as either (A) “there not being” (non-existence), or (B) “that which there ie not”, “that in which there is rot” (the non-existent, nothing). Speculations about yu and su generaly sssume the later sense, but without clearly distinguishing it from the former. An argument of the Neo-Confucian Ch’éag Hao #8 $8 (1032-8) provides a good illustration, Taoist had identified the Tao with Nothing, tex in sense By the Neo-Confucian Chang Tsai $8 (1020-7) replied that “there is no Nothing”, ecw su (x); Ch’éng Hao holds that both postions are self-contradictory: BA RBA, SE Re Ifyou say that there is what there is not (yu we), you have no right to say ‘there i' if you say that there is no (there) not-being (aw ew, you hhave no right to say ‘there is 20! Chang "Tai meant by ww wu that “there is not what there is not", and this sense is also demanded by the analogy with yu sow. But in this seme 0H ou is not self-contradictory onthe contrary, i is a eatology. "The second sense of we has jut been defined a8 “that which there is not” of “that in which there is not”. Logically, thee is no difference between these alternatives, & Ch'éng Ho assumes, But grammatically ww isonly “that in which there is not” (what doesnot have); the substantive ‘verb is confused with the agent, not with the object and “that which there is not” (hat isnot had) should be so ew ff 4K. ‘Those who identify the "Tao with wou mean primarily that it lacks form and other qualities, and only secondarily that itis nota thing which exists inthe world. Compare these two Tacit definitions of the Tao, the fst by Wang Pi 5E # (4.0.226-0) the second by Ho Yen ff (died 4249) RA MZ LS MR ME Hs WS RR S61, BAT B ho “The Tao isa term for Nothing. Since there is nothing it does not pass through and nothing which does nor followt, itis called bymetaphorthe's0 (Way). [eis stil and has no body, and cannot be conceived as an image.”* Fe A HE AT AC “Phe Tao is only that in which there is not anything that there is."4 A sentence of the Lao-t2u (third century B.C.), “Something is born from nothing” (ff 2 #8 48), reappears in the Huai-nan-tad (second con- ‘tury B.C.) in the following context $e TA TE A, MAM TL wy MC OK Ow, MM HG HR BO Ae TE, BE HE “Tt has no form but what has form is bora from it, no sound but the five notes resound from it, no taste but the five tastes are formed from i, no colour but the five colours come about from it. Therefore what has (yu) is born from what does not have (wu), the solid comes out of the tenuous.”* ‘The English word “Nothing” implies the absence of any “entity”, the Chinese sw only the absence of conerete things, Taoists agree with Western {idealists in exalting the immaterial, but cannot like them identify it with pure Being; for Taoists all that lacks material form is by definition wu, But if the Tao is Nothing, then Nothing is a positive complement of Something, not its mere absence. A similar conception of Nothing is found in the West (for exemple, in Hegel and in Existentialism), but the Chinese language gives it especial encouragement. Yu, “there is” and shih, “solid” are not, like most verbs and adjectives, negated by pu, “not”, but form pairs with ‘wy, “there is not” and Ard, “tenuous”, similar to such pairs as long and short, left and sight, Yin and Yang. It is therefore easy to see them as rautually dependent, asin these passages from the Lao-tzi: 5 MA A, WE Am A HL, TB A, BA HE “Something and Nothing give birth to each other, difficult and easy ‘complete each other, long and short offset each other, high and low deter- ‘mine each other, voice and accompaniment harmonize with each other, front and back give each other sequence.” Et SEH SE MA ZF He HH a HELA RAMUS S, SHRM EM. KATH BA, HZ ABB. “Thirty spokes share one hub; itis just where it does not exist that the wheel is useful. We turn clay to make a vessel; i is just where it does not exist that the vessel is useful. We chisel out doors and windows to make a house; itis just where it does not exist that the house is useful. Therefore ‘we draw advantage from them where they exit, use them where they do not cexiat”® “penn” IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY COMPARED WITK SHIH/FE1 AND YU/WU Tox ‘The second pessage deals, not with Nothing in general, but with the parts of the wheel, vessel or house which do not exist (3€ $8). Each is a combination of something and nothing; the hole inthe wheel which takes the axl, the empty space inside the vessel, doors and windows in the house, are nothing yet belong tothe things which could not be used without them. ‘To live in the world we must use the Teo, just as to Keep things ina vessel we must use the void inside i. eis chus possible for the Taoist to hold that the world depends on the ‘Tao in spite of the laters nothingness. But the dependence must be mutual; “Something and Nothing give birth to each other.” The verb “to be” allows us to conceive immaterial “entities” detached from the material, for example God before the Creation, But ifthe immaterial is a Nothing which complements Something, it cannot be isolated; the imman- ence of the Tao in the universe is not an accident of Chinese thought, iis inherent in the functions of the words yu and tou. Admittedly “Something is born from Nothing”, things with form and colour emerge out of the formless, and in early Taoism itis not always clear whether this is a con~ tinuous process or a single event before which Nothing reigned alone. But 8 soon as this issue is clearly perceived, for example by Kuo Hsiang 6 (Ged c.a.0.312), the second interpretation is definitely excluded: 8 A Oy HFN? GLA RR UB BAe A, i A 2 A Teo i KAAS WS MOP? WIA GAR See, i BAR OT FM, BU BH SR, i MH Ty ML, OE ER, LR I AE HH A a AR TA EB 2 HAR, HH LR “Who can have preceded things? I may suppose tha the Yin and Yang preceded things; but the Yin and Yang are exactly what is meant by ‘things’. I may suppose that Nature (teitjan, ‘being s0 of itself) preceded them; but Nature is simply shings being as they are of themselves, I may suppose thatthe utmost Tao preceded them; but the utmost Tao is utmost Nothing. Since it doesnot exist, how ean it be considered to precede? Then who is it that preceded them? But still things exist without coming to an end. This shows that things are so of themselves, there is nothing which makes them s0."7 He A 1 At 8 AS A AERA HH BR RBH ZB Mh, He TBM i, AB BRL, KH — BM, te BMRA ZB tis not only that Nothing cannot be transformed into Somethings if also can no longer be transformed into Nothing. ‘Therefore Something is so constituted that, although it alters and transforms in thousands and myriads of ways, it can never become Nothing. Because it can never become Nothing, from the remotest past there has never been a time before there was Something and it will always continue.”* Som In Western and Indian mystical philosophies, God, the One, the ‘Absolute, Brahman, are conceived as mote real than the phenomenal world. ‘These systems were developed in Indo-European languages, in which “to be isnot confined to speaking of concrete things, and in which iis easy to angue that what is heavy or ight, large or small, does not enjoy the pure bbeing of what simply is, Even Buddhism, which rejects the Brahman identified in the Upanifad: with sat (“being”), and refuses to attribute tither being or non-being to the void (Fimyatd 2), puts the main stress on the unrealty of phenomena. For Taoists, on the other hand, it is concrete things which exist and are solid or real, the Tao which does not exist and is tenuous or unreal. ‘This difference is all the more striking since in each of these mystical traditions, Western and Chinese, we find elements which are better suited ‘othe intellectual scheme ofthe other. In the West also there isa tendency ‘to emphasize the absence of sensible qualities by saying that the object of the mystic’s search is Nothing—an assertion which Taoiats intend quite literally, but which Christians can offer only as a daring paradox. On the other hand, Taoists play with te idea thatthe world isa dream, without being able to ft it into their philosophy. When Chuang-teil wakes from dreaming that he is a buttery," he does not conclude that the ‘Tao is the reality behind all dreaming; he merely suspects that he is a butterfly dreaming that he is a man, ‘The third chapter of the Lieh-toit argues at length tha there is no difference between dreaming and waking, but never suggests that we should wake from both to some deeper reality. The idea that the world is a dream has the same kind of significance in Taoism as the idea that God is Nothing has in Christian mysticism—it is a metaphor ‘expressing an intuition for which the aystem has no place. The difference between yu and “to be” is one of the factore which radially alter the interpretation of what may wel be very similar experiences. Chinese Buddhism at first confused the Void (damyata) withthe ru of ‘Taoism, but later learned to deny that itis ether yu or eu. In place of the sat (Being) of the central Hindu tradition, Buddhism speaks of tathata, ‘generally translated “suchness” or “‘thusness”. The Chinese translation of fathaid is ju, generally used in the combination chén-ju 3 #0 “genuine ju’. Ju, “lke, as much as”, comparing qualities and actions rather than ‘things, i related to jan, “thus” (like this, a8 much 25 this). As «noun, one ray take ju as “being as (not “what”) it is”,—Being in sense E above (“Fe is tll"), quite different from yu, which is comparable with Being in sense A ("There is a man”), But the reception of a recent book by D. T. ‘Susuli provides an interesting example of how easly such an equation can cause misunderstanding ‘“Bekhart’s expetiences are deeply, basically, abundantly rooted in God 1s Being which is at once being and non-being; he sees in the “meanest” cs tel nel “penn!” 1x WESTERN PHILOGOPHY COMPARED WITH SHIH/FEI AND YU/WU_ 10}, thing among God's creatures all the glories of his i-ness (jtihet). The Buddhist enlightenment is nothing more than thia experience of is-ness or fsuchness (tathata) which in itself as all the possible values (guna) we hhumans ean conceive.” But “suchness”, however vague it may sound, is much narrower than “being”, overlapping with only one ofthe six senses ofthe later which we have distinguished, and having no connexion with existence. It is clear to an Orientalist that Suruki is aware of this, but i is nat clear to the general reader to whom the book is addressed; one reviewer drew the conclusion that “what links them (Eckhart and the Zen Buddhists) must closely is thir common recognition of God a8 Being”! Confucians alays dated the Taoist doctrine of Nothing because of ite practical corollary, that just as the world depends on Nothing, so the ‘good government of the Empire depends on eee! 4 3, “no action” Pei Wei 8 (267-300) wrote an essay, Honouring the Exiting (38 7 Ht), in which he argued that Nothing isnot the complement of Something, Eut rerely its absence: RES AMMA WA AA, AAI BEA, NAR MAC UAB CH MLMLH ZH RS ho MOE Me ZH, HME Z Bi Oth, OE A ZH, I HB Bi he ME Bo “Utmost Nothing (‘that which to the utmost degree doct not hace) does not have the means to produce. Therefore what was produced fist was produced of itself. If whet is produced of itself must exist bodily, then by ‘what it leaves out it wil produces gxp. If what is produced takes existence for its own share, then the void and Nothing are what the existing learea ‘out. Once the existing hab developed, one cannot maintain it by usi nothing; once the people exist, one cannot govera them by doing nothing” ‘More than a thousand years later Wang Fu-chib 3E 3 & (1619-42) attacks from a slightly different angle: SRAM SRA GRRL WMS AA SH MA BNA Lo KTR A RSM TEM Eo Ri TEL, PRED TM HE TKO FUL eRER FEAL RE RSET MESHED ABR. “One who says "There is not is provoked to denial by someone saying there is. He takes up what the other says there is and aays theze iano such thing. What is chere inthe world really which ean be called Nothing? Ifyou say there ie no air ona tortoite, you are talking about (something on) dog, rot (nothing on) a tortoise, If you say there are no hozns on a hare, You se talking about (comething on) a deer, not (nothing on) a hare. A speaker ‘ust set something up before be can argue succesfully. Now if he isto set 4 Nothing infront of us, he can search everywhere above and below, Nor, 104 A. 6. oRAHIAM, South, East and West, in the past and the presen, the surviving and the Jost, without succeeding in getting t the end of f.™* ‘Wang Fu-chih goes so far as to claim that even abstractions such as principles (i) exist: KT A Hi MH RT RAT, TIE MF OB AR KA, BIE Me ‘How can there be anything in the world which is ealled Nothing? ‘What we do not find existing asa thing may exist as an activity, what we do tot find existing as an activity may exist ana principle?” Te is natural that some Confucians should carry their reaction against the Taoist concept of a non-existent 20 justifying “No Action” to the point of icsistng that moral principles are eolid, real, existing. An earlier txample is Ch’éng Vi AB FA (1033-1107), who held that “nothing in the world is more real than Principle” 3G ¥ $€ IE WS #2 4. Yet this con- ficted sharply with the ordinary use ofthe words yu and wu, as ean be seen from a dialogue in which Ch'éng Yi declares that moral Right exists GB RT es, Set, eh EAT, HART 51, BAF ME Sho (HN EA BABA AR 3K 3 Zea? “"Q. L suppose that itis through conduct that Right becomes visible? A.No. It exists of itself within human nature. Q. Te has no visible features. ‘A. To say that it exists i to say that it is visible. But men do ot let them- selves se it. It is there quite plainly between heaven and earth,”2? Yu applies to concrete things, 28 the questioner recognizes; in crediting smoral Right with existence, Ch'éng Yi finds himself saying that tis there

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