Appeasement DA - Berkeley 2016

Appeasement Disad
1NC Appeasement DA
The United States is successfully employing a strategy of
containment in the status quo to limit Chinese expansionism
Etzioni 16 (Amitai, professor of international affairs at George Washington
University, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: A Case Study of Multifaceted
Containment, Asian Perspective, 40(2), p. 187-188)
US officials often state that the United States does not seek to contain China (Carpenter 2011). In April 2014, for
example, President Obama stated, Our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China (Manesca
2014). Secretary of State John Kerry repeated the sentiment a month later, stating that the U.S. does not seek to
contain China (BBC News 2014a). However, there are often great discrepancies between the statements made by
top officials and the conduct of the states they speak for.
The actions of the United States
reflect a containment strategy that seems to have evolvedrather than developedthrough

complex interactions among various agencies, with the Pentagon being particularly influential (Etzioni 2013). The
strategys main element involves positioning US or allied military forces along Chinas borders and in the regional
areas into which China might seek to expand. Thus, the United States has announced that it views the contested
Senkaku Islands as being covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and
Japan; encouraged Japan to build up its military; developed military ties with Vietnam; reopened its military bases in
the Philippines; provided India with nuclear know-how and access to uranium, in violation of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, as a means of inciting India to balance China; and moved troops and naval vessels to the
All these moves draw a red line that, if crossed by China, could lead to
war. The so-called Asia pivot thus appears to be a thinly veiled China containment
strategy (Roach et al. 2015). John Mearsheimer has pointed out that involving regional states in various military
Asia Pacific region.
alliances raises the risk that the United States and China will engage in war due to reckless actions taken by one of
the allies (Mearsheimer 2014). Barry Posen concurs and points out that an alliance with the United States gives
allies a false sense of security and encourages them to challenge more powerful states, confident that Washington
will save them in the end (Posen 2013). (This point also applies to China in its relations with North Korea.) At the
same time, one may argue that the most basic foundation of the international order, supported even by many who
do not necessarily accept the liberal elements of that order, is that states may not use force to change the status
quo and must not invade other states. Thus, one might argue that for the United States to position its military
forces or allied forces in places into which China might expand would help stabilize the international order.
However, the same cannot be said of other elements of US policy toward China, as highlighted by the US response
to the AIIBs launch, which itself was of limited import. To proceed, I must introduce a distinction between a strategy
of all-encompassing containment and a strategy that combines some forms of containment (especially military)
with competition (especially economic and ideational) and integration (especially the governance of international
institutions). To distinguish between these two kinds of containment, I refer to the first kind as multifaceted
containment and the second as aggression-limiting containment. Multifaceted containment seeks to block
practically any and all gains by another power, whether territorial, economic, or status (such as voting rights). By
contrast, aggression-limiting containment seeks to block only those advances that are made through the use of
force, while granting room for competition and cooperation. It is useful to think about aggression-limiting
containment as a flashing red light in some lanes and a green one in others, as opposed to a barrier that blocks all
lanes. In a previous book I examined the ways the United States sought to contain the USSR during the Cold War
and showed that the United States practiced multifaceted containment (Etzioni 1964). Thus, if the USSR sought
landing rights for its civilian aviation in Bolivia, the United States sought to block it. If the USSR granted foreign aid
to Ghana, the United States pressured Ghana to reject it. The United States sought to suppress USSR ideological
and cultural outreach. The USSR treated the United States the same, and the result was high levels of tension that
led several times to the brink of nuclear war. When President John F. Kennedy unveiled his Strategy of Peace, he
scaled back these nonmilitary forms of containment, which resulted in considerably diminished tensionsa dtente
US efforts to contain China have not been limited to countering Chinese

aggression, such as by posting military forces, building military alliances, conducting more military exercises, or
ordering major weapons systems to respond to a possible attack from China. Instead, the United States
has also sought to block China in nonmilitary sectors. For example, the United States
pressured states on Chinas borders to resist Chinas economic overtures, blocked
Chinese efforts to begin negotiations on a free trade zone spanning the Pacific (Davis 2014),
(Etzioni 2008).
cautioned regional states against depending too strongly on China for humanitarian aid, and pledged $187 million
to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam in an effort to decrease Chinas influence over those states (Var 2015).
The United States also seems to be diplomatically and economically working to

halt the expansion of Chinas relative influence in Africa (Sun and Olin-Ammentorp 2014) and Latin
America (Noesselt and Landivar 2013)
Concessions to China send a signal of appeasement which

causes China to doubt US resolve to sustain containment
Glaser 15 (Charles L., Prof. at Elliott School of International Affairs and the
Department of PoliSci at George Washington University, A U.S.-China Grand
Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,
International Security, 39(4), p.74)
The next set of potential risks concern U.S. security. The first of these involves possible reductions in Chinas
assessments of the United States resolve for protecting its interests in Northeast Asia. As discussed earlier,
accommodation can lead an adversary to doubt the states resolve to protect

other interests, which is dangerous if the states concessions do not leave the adversary fully satisfied. Two
territorial
mechanisms could be at work here. One mechanism depends on China seeing a similarity across one or more
features of the potentially connected interests, including their geography, the nature and extent of the U.S.
If China is uncertain about U.S.

resolve to protect Taiwan and other American interests, and if China believes that similar factors determine U.S.
resolve to protect all of these interests, then accommodation on Taiwan would reduce U.S.
credibility elsewhere. The other mechanism comes into play if China believes that U.S.
accommodation on Taiwan reflects a change in a factor that also affects U.S. decisions on
these other issues; in that case, U.S. credibility on these issues would be reduced.
interests, and the U.S. history of involvement with these interests.
The broad change that is currently most relevant is the shifting balance of power, specifically, increasing Chinese
If Chinas leaders believe that the United States chose

accommodation on Taiwan in response to Chinas growing regional military capabilities,
then they would also reasonably conclude that the United States could be expected
to make concessions on other regional issues as well. These mechanisms are reflected in
military capabilities in East Asia.
prominent arguments against accommodation of Beijing on Taiwan. For example, Nancy Tucker and Bonnie Glaser
argue that China
would respond to appeasement as have virtually all

governments: It would conclude that a weaker United States lacking vision
and ambition could be pressured and manipulated. Richard Bush argues, Should
the United States concede to Beijing on Taiwan, the lessons that China would learn
about the intentions of the regions dominant power would likely discourage
moderation and accommodation on other issues, like Korea or maritime East Asia .
These are powerful arguments, which the United States needs to take seriously. There is a clear similarity across the
China could be expected to reason that U.S.

accommodation on one of these disputes indicates a greater willingness to make
concessions on all the others. Arguably, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan might even lead China to
disputesthey are all located in East Asia. Thus,
believe that its growing power will enable its leadership to convince the United States to fully exit East Asia. In
addition, Chinas view of the shifting balance of power could reinforce these conclusions: many Chinese officials
believe that the shifting balance of power partly reflects the failings of the U.S. domestic political system and the
superiority of the Chinas model of governance and development; the result is a new international system in which
Chinas growing power should generate greater influence and the major powers should acknowledge its rising
U.S. accommodation on Taiwan

could validate these expectations and put other U.S. interests at greater risk .
status. Because this transformation influences all issues in East Asia,
The impact is US/China war appeasement risks outweigh any

potential conflict from hostility
Jacobs 15 (Appeasement will only encourage China, 11/1/15, Bruce Jacobs:
professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University,
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourageexpansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html#ixzz4D642C1lo, EHS MKS)
The tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China. On the basis of false "history",
China claims the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Taiwan . Yet China has no
historical claims to the South and East China seas. Historically, south-east Asian states conducted the great trade in
the South China Sea. China had almost no role. Furthermore, geographically, the contested areas are close to
Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, while they are more than 1000 kilometres south of China.
China's claims for sovereignty in these areas have no historical basis and its
constructing of "islands" on submerged reefs only demonstrates China's
expansionism. Similarly, in the East China Sea, China's claims to the Senkaku Islands (which China calls the
Diaoyutai) have no historical foundation. The People's Daily of January 8, 1953, stated that the "Senkaku" Islands
belonged to the Ryukyu Archipelago, and a World Atlas published in China in 1958 showed that these islands belong
to Japan. China's claims that Taiwan belongs to it also have no historical basis. Mao Zedong, in his famous 1936
interview with Edgar Snow, stated that Taiwan should be independent. Only in 1942 did the Chinese Nationalist
Party (the Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party separately claim that Taiwan was Chinese. In Taiwan's
history, a Han Chinese regime based in China has only controlled Taiwan for four years, from 1945 to 1949. These
four years were perhaps the saddest in all of Taiwan's history because Chiang Kai-shek's government killed tens of
thousands of Taiwanese in the infamous 2.28 (February 28, 1947) massacres. The dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek
and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled Taiwan from 1945 until the latter's death in early 1988. Their
rule was a Chinese colonial project that privileged Chinese who had come with Chiang Kai-shek and systematically
discriminated against native Taiwanese. Only with the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency after the death of
Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 could Taiwan begin its democratisation process. Now Taiwan, a country with a population
the size of Australia, has become a democratic middle power. The so-called "one China" policy of many countries
including the United States and Australia is a relic of the old Chiang Kai-shek/Chiang Ching-kuo dictatorship, which
pushed a "one China" policy without consulting Taiwan's population. All the major Western democracies, as well as
Japan and India, now have substantial if unofficial diplomatic offices in Taiwan. And, although these nations do not
publicise the point, all have de facto "One China, one Taiwan" policies. The arguments of people such as Age
columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about
History has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist

powers as China does not stop war . Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed
conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later. Appeasement of China
only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It
creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue
expansionist policies without international protest . The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own
becoming involved in a war.
president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to
maintain the status quo that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not announce this. Australians
would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would
We must be clear that China is the only

country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between leaders of such countries as
lead to war and that we should vote accordingly.
the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the risks.
UQ US Containing China Now

Asia pivot reflects a new containment strategy
Krepinevich 15 (Andrew F, PhD from Harvard -- currently serves as President of the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china March/April)
RR
the pivot to Asia has begun. By 2020, the navy and the air force
plan to base 60 percent of their forces in the Asia-Pacific region . The Pentagon,
meanwhile, is investing a growing share of its shrinking resources in new long-range bombers and
nuclear-powered submarines designed to operate in high-threat environments. These changes are clearly
meant to check an increasingly assertive China. And with good reason: Beijings expanding territorial
claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as the first island chain, encompassing
parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwanall of which Washington is obligated to protect . But to reliably
In the U.S. military, at least,
deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt
Washingtons ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment,
Washingtons goal,
should be to achieve deterrence through denialto convince
Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force.
in the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism,
and that of its allies and partners,
Containment happening now

Shambaugh 15 (David, PhD (Mich) professor of political science and international affairs at the George
Washington University in as well as a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Fundamental shift
China and US are now engaged all out, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out?page=all , 6-12)RR
The relationship between the United States and China has rightly been described as the most important relationship in world affairs.
It is also the most complex and fraught one. These two titans are the world's two leading powers and are interconnected in
numerous ways bilaterally, regionally, and globally. It is therefore of vital importance to understand the dynamics that underlie and
While Washington and Beijing cooperate where

they can, there has also been steadily rising competition in the relationship. This balance
has now shifted, with competition being the dominant factor. There are several reasons for it - but one is that security now
trumps economics in the relationship. The competition is not only strategic competition , it is actually
drive this relationship at present, which are shifting.
comprehensive competition: commercial, ideological, political, diplomatic, technological, even in the academic world where China
has banned a number of American scholars and is beginning to bring pressure to bear on university joint ventures in China.
Mutual distrust is pervasive in both governments, and is also evident at the popular
level. The last Pew global attitudes data on this, in 2013, found distrust rising in both countries. Roughly two-thirds of
both publics view US-China relations as "competitive" and "untrustworthy" - a significant
change since 2010 when a majority of people in both nations still had positive views of the other. One senses that the sands are
it is increasingly difficult to find a

positive narrative and trajectory into the future . The "engagement coalition" is crumbling and a
"competition coalition" is rising. In my view, the relationship has been fundamentally troubled for
many years and has failed to find extensive common ground to forge a real and
enduring partnership. The "glue" that seems to keep it together is the fear of it falling apart. But that is far from a solid
fundamentally shifting in the relationship. Viewed from Washington,
basis for an enduring partnership between the world's two leading powers.
US is using their allies in Asia to contain China

Fong 13 (Arthur Chi Wing, Commander United States Navy, Dancing with the
Dragon: U.S.-China Engagement Policy, pg.9-10) MLJ
To further understand the complexity of current differences with China, one has to have a thorough understanding of the current U.S.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has five mutual defense
treaties and two security cooperation agreements with Asian countries neighboring China: Table
security alliances in the area.
Philippines: 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty Australia and New Zealand: 1951 Security Defense Treaty of ANZU
Thailand: 1954 Manila Security Pact South Korea: 1954 Mutual Security Agreement Japan: 1960 Mutual Defense
Treaty Taiwan(ROC): 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (security cooperation) Singapore: 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement
(security cooperation) In addition, the United States is improving ties with Vietnam, India, Pakistan,
Myanmar, and central Asian countries on the western border of China. In
2012, Australia strengthened its military ties with the United States by allowing
2500 U.S. Marines to be stationed in Northern Australia. China is
uncomfortable with the situation 10 and criticizes U.S. intentions to contain
China through alliances with its Asian neighbors. While China is ascending as a regional power,
1:
U.S. strategy for the region is creating a potential conflict. On the other hand, China does not have any official security alliance or
treaty with any nation because of its non-alliance principle and its policy of Chinas peaceful rise. 20 Nevertheless, Chinas
assertiveness in its foreign policy has actually driven its Asian neighbors closer to the United States to improve their security.
Chinas rise has created an economic and political shift in the region that creates anxiety to its Asian neighbors. The U.S. leadership
role in the region and the engagement with China thus becomes more important than ever.
US containment policies are strong now perception and

demonstrations of military might
Cook 6/14 (Trevor, Trevor has used Chinese professionally at home and abroad for over five
years, including as a consular officer at the U.S. consulate in Shenyang. Now, he is channeling his
passion for Chinese language and culture into a new firm that will provide linguistic, educational, and
other intercultural services to help clients bridge East and West, A Containment Mindset Must Not
Become an Obstacle to China-US Military Relations, http://watchingamerica.com/WA/2016/06/14/acontainment-mindset-must-not-become-an-obstacle-to-china-us-military-relations/) RR
China-U.S. military relations remain unstable, and it is the lack of

strategic mutual trust that has the greatest effect on the health and stable
development of the military relationship. The problem stems mainly from the U.S. side. First, the U.S.
is unwilling to give up its jealous suspicion and wariness of China . It holds
prejudice against the ordinary growth of the Chinese military , doubting the
motivation and intention behind increasing Chinese military power. Yet, in fact, China needs a peaceful
and stable external environment now more than it has at any other time. Second,
the U.S. has proven completely unable to respect Chinas core interests
and major concerns. Three obstacles have long vexed the development of
China-U.S. military relations, and recently they have become more prominent: U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan, the encroachment of U.S. reconnaissance crafts and
discriminatory American laws. The U.S. Navys recent so-called freedom
of navigation operations within the maritime area of the Spratly Islands
and the territorial waters of the Paracel Islands have severely affected
inter-military trust. Third, the idea of Chinese containment still finds a market within the United States
Currently,
government, military, Congress and think tanks; in particular, the immense strategic dividend the Cold War brought
the United States causes some to feel a special attachment to a policy of containment through the formation of
alliances.
US adopting grand strategy focused on balancing Chinese

power now
Cartalucci 6/10 (Tony, Correspondent for NEO journal (New Eastern Outlook), US Declares
Hegemony Over Asia, http://journal-neo.org/2016/06/10/us-declares-hegemony-over-asia/) RR
Never has US intentions in Asia been so obvious. Attempts to portray

Americas role in the region as constructive or necessary have been
ongoing since the end of World War II, however, recently, with Asia able to begin determining
its own destiny for itself, the tone from Washington has become increasingly curt
and direct. US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carters remarks during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore were all
but a proclamation of US hegemony over Asia a region of the planet quite literally an ocean away from
U.S. flexes muscles as Asia worries about South

China Sea row, Secretary Carter is quoted as saying: The United States will
remain the most powerful military and main underwriter of security in the [Asian] region for
Washington. In Reuters article,
decades to come and there should be no doubt about that. The US, besides implied exceptionalism, never fully
explains why it believes underwriting security for an entire region of the planet beyond its own borders is somehow
justified. Reuters would also report (emphasis added): Any action by China to reclaim land in the Scarborough
Shoal, an outcrop in the disputed sea, would have consequences, Carter said .
I hope that this

development doesnt occur, because it will result in actions being taken by
the both United States and by others in the region which would have
the effect of not only increasing tensions but isolating China , Carter told the
Shangri-La Dialogue, a regional security forum in Singapore. The term, isolation is key and has defined US
foreign policy toward rising powers in Asia since before even World War II. US Policymakers Make No Secret of
Aspirations of Primacy in Asia Robert Blackwill, a former US ambassador, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign
Relations (CFR), a lobbyist, and US National Security Council Deputy for Iraq during the US invasion and occupation
in 2003, penned last year a paper for the CFR titled, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China (.pdf), in which no
secret was made about US designs toward Asia Pacific. The paper states explicitly that (emphasis added):
Because the American effort to integrate China into the liberal

international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia
and could eventually result in a consequential challenge to American
power globally Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China
that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than
continuing to assist its ascendancy . The paper elaborates by enumerating precisely how this will
be done (emphasis added): preserving U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective of
U.S. grand strategy in the twenty-first century. Sustaining this status in the face of rising Chinese power requires,
among other things, revitalizing the U.S. economy to nurture those disruptive innovations that bestow on the United
States asymmetric economic advantages over others; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S.
friends and allies to increase their mutual gains through instruments that consciously exclude China; recreating a
technology-control regime involving U.S. allies that prevents China from acquiring military and strategic capabilities
enabling it to inflict high-leverage strategic harm on the United States and its partners; concertedly building up
the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on Chinas periphery; and improving the capability of U.S.
military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese oppositionall while
continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that befit its importance to U.S. national interests.
Link TPP
TPP exclusion key to containment
Khong 14 (Yuen, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, Primacy or
World Order? The United States and Chinas Rise,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00147, mitpressjournals, p.166-167)
KR
the United States is so keen on the Trans-Pacific Partnership

(TPP) as a means to reassert its economic centrality and to counter Chinas
economic primacy in Asia.21 As one analyst put it, the TPP is an attempt by the United
States to contain China [economically] by setting a high regulatory bar. 22 The fear among
some in Asia is that the TPP may be too little, too late, and too exclusive. A trade pact that excludes China and
India in contemporary Asia seems out of kilter with the economic realities of the region; moreover, U.S.
attempts to structure the rules in favor of U.S. industries have slowed down the
progress of the pact.23
Whites approach helps us understand why, for example,
Link - SCS
The plans SCS concession will be seen as appeasement
Joyner 98 (Christopher C., Professor of Government and Foreign Service at
Georgetown University, 12/24, The Spratly Islands Dispute in the South China Sea:
Problems, Policies, and Prospects for Diplomatic Accommodation, The Stimson
Center, p. 77) MLJ
Sovereignty connotes both legal and political dimensions. For China and Vietnam especially, notions of political
Any challenge to Chinas claim to the Spratlys is

considered to be a challenge to Chinas domestic sovereignty. Any
concession is seen as appeasement, with adverse implications both for domestic politics and
foreign relations. This point is reinforced by the realization that nationalism and
sovereignty remain the strongest political cement holding the ideologically
bankrupt Chinese Communist Party together in the post-Cold War era. In the past, the Chinese political
sovereignty are very sensitive concerns.
leadership could point to foreign intervention, the Soviet threat and irredentism to bolster its nationalist legitimacy.
Today, such appeals to nationalism by the leadership hold less political sway for challenges to Chinese claims in
the South China Sea.84 The importance of the region is viewed more in terms of geopolitical
attributes, particularly its fisheries resources, hydrocarbon potential, and
commercial sea lanes. Thus, SinoVietnamese contention over the Spratlys turns
less on ideology and more on access to resources, both for food and
development. In Chinas view, then, control over the Spratlys can not be
handed over to any adversary, especially to its principal antagonist, Vietnam.
The plan disrupts successful status quo containment of China

in SCS
Jin 14 (Kai, lecturer at GSIS, Yonsei University, 4/30, The US, China, and the
'Containment Trap', http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-us-china-and-thecontainment-trap/ ) MLJ
Despite U.S. assurances, in Beijings view, a number of signs indicate that the U.S. policy
toward China intends to contain rather than engage. The U.S. supports the
Philippines on the South China Sea dispute, reiterates Washingtons security
commitment to Japan on the East China Sea dispute, and has also agreed to sell more
advanced arms to Taiwan. In almost every dispute that involves China, the U.S. seems
to automatically support any party that has trouble with China, either directly or
indirectly. Meanwhile, the U.S. labels Chinas overseas economic activities as neo-colonialism and calls Chinas
territorial disputes with its neighbors evidence of expansionism. The U.S. has also called China one of the biggest
sources for cyber espionage activities (although Mr. Edward Snowden told the world another story).
Link - Greentech/CCS coop.

US-China green technology research fails China has own
interests in mind
Crane et al. 14 (Keith Crane et al, Director of Environment, Energy and
Economic Development Program at RAND, The Effectiveness of China's Industrial
Policies in Commercial Aviation Manufacturing, https://goo.gl/W0fglf, 57)
Joint ventures with foreign manufacturers have been an important source of
technologies for their Chinese partners. American Superconductor Corporation
(ASC) accuses Sinovel, its former joint venture partner and now one of China's three
largest wind turbine manufacturers, of stealing its technologies. ASC and Sinovel fell out in 2011,
when Sinovel abruptly refused shipments of ASC's wind turbine electrical systems and control software. ASC later
discovered that one of its employees was given a $1.5 million bribe by Sinovel to share key technology secrets. The
employee confessed to the crime and is now serving time in a U.S. prison. ASC alleges that 70 percent of its
business evaporated due to the theft of its intellectual property by Sinovel, as well as Chinese government policies
favoring Chinese domestic suppliers, as opposed to joint ventures. For its part, Sinovel claims it stopped accepting
components from ASC because of quality problems and has launched a countersuit." However, quality problems
According to
Thomas F. Holt Jr. who teaches international intellectual property law at Tufts
University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, this case underscores the importance for companies
investing in China of protecting their intellectual property. He notes: Chinese companies, once they
acquire the needed technology, will often abandon their Western partners on the
pretext the technology or product failed to meet Chinese govern- mental
regulations. This is yet another example of a Chinese industrial policy aimed at procuring. by virtually any means. technology in order to provide Chinese domestic
industries with a competitive advantage.
appear to plague Chinese manufacturers rather than the products of their foreign counterparts.
US-Chinese business partnerships are a one-way street China

steals and forces tech transfers
Atkinson 12 (Robert D. Atkinson, President and Founder Information Technology and Innovation
Foundation, The Impact of International Technology Transfer on American Research and
Development, http://www2.itif.org/2012-international-tech-transfer-testimony.pdf, 2-3)
A nations investments in research and development (R&D) are vital to its ability to
develop the next generation technologies, products, and services that keep a country and its firms
competitive in global markets. Until recently, corporate R&D was generally not very mobile, certainly not in
comparison to manufacturing. But in a flat world companies can increasingly locate R&D activities anywhere
skilled researchers are located. Moreover, as I argue in Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage1 , in
the last decade many other nations have put in place a range of policies, including expanding government R&D
funding, training scientists and engineers, and expanding R&D tax incentives, to make them more attractive for
many nations have also put in place a range of bad policies,

including intellectual property theft and forced joint ventures and technology
transfer that unfairly seek advantage.2 The result of these good and bad policies has
been that the United States has seen its relative competitive advantage in R&D and
advanced technology industries decline. While the United States still leads the world in aggregate
global R&D investment. But
R&D dollars invested, on a per-capita basis it is falling behind. The United States now ranks just eighth among
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the percentage of GDP devoted to
R&D expenditures (2.8 percent), behind Israel (4.3 percent), Finland (4.0 percent), Sweden (3.6 percent), Korea (3.4
percent), Japan (3.3 percent), Denmark (3.0 percent), and Switzerland (3.0 percent), with Germany and Austria
close behind the United States. In 2008, for the first time, Asian nations as a group surpassed the United States in
R&D investment, investing $387 billion to the United States $384 billion.3 As another example, business R&D
expenditures by U.S. IT manufacturing and IT services industries as a share of GDP fell substantially compared to 21
other OECD peer countries between 1997 and 2005. While at first glance the United States appears to score fairly
well on these measuresfifth in business R&D expenditures in IT manufacturing and sixth in IT servicesthe data
reveal a striking decrease of almost 50 percent in the amount of U.S. IT manufacturing industry R&D as a
percentage of GDP from 1997 to 2005.4 Moreover, during this time, businesses in IT manufacturing and services
industries in countries such as Finland, Korea, Denmark, Ireland, and the Czech Republic substantially increased
their IT R&D investment.5 In the ITIF report Atlantic Century II: Benchmarking EU & U.S. Innovation and
Competitiveness, which assesses the innovation-based competitiveness of 44 nations or regions on 16 factors,
including corporate R&D, the United States ranks second to last, ahead of only Italy, in the rate of progress on these
factors.6 3
The decline in Americas innovative edge is due to a number of factors , not
the least of which are failures of federal policy, such as an unwillingness to make permanent and expand the
R&D tax credit, limitations on high-skill immigration, and stagnant federal funding for R&D. But the decline is also
unfair practices by other nations that collectively ITIF has termed as innovation
mercantilism. Many other nations engage in a variety of practices related to unfairly
obtaining knowledge for competitive advantage. One way is through intellectual
property theft. This can take the form of cyber espionage where foreign actors, sometimes governments
related to
themselves, hack into the computer systems of U.S. companies or government to steal intellectual property. (In
fact, one German study found a 40 percent increase in industrial espionage cases between 2009 and 2010.) 7 In
other cases, nations maintain a weak and discriminatory patent or broader IP system that allows their firms to
reverse engineer U.S. technology products, even though they are under patent protection. For example, some
nations have weak protections for data related to biopharmaceutical firms (e.g., data exclusivity) in order to more
easily transfer critical data to their domestic firms. Increasingly, state-owned or state-supported enterprises buy
U.S. technology companies and then transfer the intellectual property, including trade secrets, back to the home
country and its companies. Nations also rely on forced joint ventures, where U.S. multinationals are forced to
partner with a domestic firm to gain the right to produce in that country, with the domestic firm then using this
relationship to steal the firms IP. In addition, many nations have turned to compulsory licensing as a way to
transfer knowhow and technology to their economies. This normally involves countries granting permission to
domestic companies to produce patented products from foreign companies without the permission of the patent
owner. This is done often in the case of medical drugs, where countries not only want to get drugs at a lower price
without paying for the costs of drug development, but also to support their own domestic pharmaceutical and
biotech industry. For example, earlier this year the Indian government issued a compulsory license to Natco, an
Indian pharmaceutical company, enabling it to produce a cancer drug made by Bayer. A decade ago, Brazil passed
its Generics Law, which allows companies to legally produce generic drugs that are perfect copies of patented
drugs. Finally,
a growing number of nations rely on forced technology transfer where

U.S. firms are pressured to transfer technology to the host country (by opening R&D
labs, sharing proprietary secrets with domestic firms, or opening advanced
production facilities) in exchange for being able to sell their products or services in
the market. While many nations practice this, China is by far the most egregious actor when
it comes to forced technology transfer. As David Joy, Chief Market Strategist for
Ameriprise Financial, stated with respect to China, To me, thats [forced technology transfer]
actually the biggest issue, more even than currency valuation . Being forced to give up technology for
access to the market is essentially blackmail.8
Specifically, US-China research partnerships fail China takes

technology from the US
Atkinson 12 (Robert D. Atkinson, President and Founder Information Technology and Innovation
Foundation, The Impact of International Technology Transfer on American Research and
Development, http://www2.itif.org/2012-international-tech-transfer-testimony.pdf, 3-4)
Many nations seek to engage in forced technology transfer, but no nation does it
better or more than China. This is in part because China is not a market-oriented democracy
constrained by the rule of law, but also because the Chinese economy is so large and fast
growing that the country is able to get away with practices that if implemented by a smaller
nation would be rejected out of hand by multinational corporations. While the forced technology transfer practices
of a nation a like Argentina are onerous, it is small enough that many companies would rather give up on the
Argentinean market than succumb to the strong arm tactics. U.S. multinationals have much less room to maneuver
with China since it is the worlds second largest economy. This is why in a survey of U.S. executives doing business
in China by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, the majority of industry representatives interviewed for this
study clearly stated that technology transfers are required to do business in China.9 Foreign companies capitulate
because they have little choice; they either give up their technology or lose out to other competitors that are willing
to make the essentially Hobsons choice.28 Industrial organization economists refer to this type of market as
monopsonistic: having one buyer that can set largely whatever terms it wants against competitive sellers. A case in
point is related to a Chinese state-owned enterprise engaged in dumping the chemicals for a particular herbicide
that a U.S. company sold (that is, selling it below what it costs to make in order to gain market share). The company
told the Chinese agricultural minister that it was planning to bring a complaint before the WTO. The minister
responded that if the case were brought, the company would lose access to the Chinese market. Needless to say,
the U.S. firm did not bring the case, even as it continued to lose global market share and jobs in the United States.
Forced technology transfer is a cornerstone of Chinas economic plan. For example, in 2011, the Chinese
government committed to place the strengthening of indigenous innovative capability at the core of economic
restructuring, growth model change, and national competitiveness enhancement .Indigenous innovation refers to
enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and absorption of
imported technology, in order improve our national innovation capability.10 As Thomas Hout and Pankaj Ghemawat
describe in the Harvard Business Review, Chinas goal with these indigenous innovation policies is no less than
creating a tipping point in which multinational corporations will have to locate their most-sophisticated R&D
projects and facilities in China, enabling it to eventually catch up with the U.S. as the worlds most advanced
economy.55 Figure 1 provides a framework to identify the types of innovation mercantilist practices the Chinese
government engages in to directly benefit Chinese companies at the expense of foreign companies. As it shows,
forced technology transfer is just one of many tools in the intellectual property category that the nation employs to
gain unfair competitive advantage.
A principal arrow in Chinas innovation mercantilist quiver

is to force requirements on foreign companies with respect to intellectual property,
technology transfer, or domestic sourcing of production as a condition of market
access. While Chinas accession agreement to the WTO contains rules forbidding it from tying foreign direct
investment to requirements to transfer technology to the country, the rules are largely ignored.11 Because
China is still largely a technologically developing nation, forcing companies from
developed nations to transfer their technology (or, in many cases, just downright
stealing it) is a faster way to innovation success than engaging in the hard work to
move up the technology learning curve, as European and American companies have had to do. And
then China uses this newfound technological prowess to turn the tables on the
developed companies, by combining their newly acquired advanced technology
with low wages (and government subsidies) to take global market share away from
them.
Link Engagement = Appeasement

Engagement is appeasement undermines containment
strategy
Smith 07, Investigative Journalist (Charles R. China Killing Americans,
chinawatchcanada.blogspot.com/2013/02/charles-r-smith.html)
Engagement merely extends the life of a totalitarian state . It does not end the cruelty, make it
any nicer in terms of nationalistic aggression or for the economic plight of the masses. This extension also
China is a very good

example where, despite the vast income, little if anything has flowed to the massive
impoverished population. It has created a very narrow middle class that would rather the masses not have
freedoms. They are living off the blood, and sweat of slave labor to buy their SUVs, stereos and TVs. They
certainly do not want that to change. The illogic of engagement with China is an extreme case of
lengthens the time under which the people must suffer, living in a chained society.
stupid. For example, the World Bank still classifies China as a developing nation so it provides billions of dollars in
low cost or free loans. Primarily the U.S finances these loans. This, of course, flies in the face of economic reality.
China currently runs the largest export deficit in history mainly due to its predatory currency policy of maintaining a
low priced Yuan. China also spends billions on advanced military hardware and is engaged in an expensive space
program. Until recently, Canada was providing billions in loans to the Chinese government based on the premise
that it was still an underdeveloped nation. The Canadians changed that because of the obvious current economic
power in Beijing. This brings the question of why should we be financing Chinese economic development when they
certainly can afford to do it themselves? The answer comes in the form of corporate interests who seek these U.S.
government backed loans to provide financing of their business activities in China.
In reality - We are
financing the growth of the Chinese military . The idea of funding nuclear tipped missiles pointed at
America is not a pleasant notion. I would prefer to not do it at all. In the end, engagement is
appeasement. It costs money, lives, and freedom. It has not helped but instead - hurt
development and in the long run - hurt the chances of peace . The only
sensible solution is to adopt a unified containment policy . This means that India, the US,
Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Korea and the Philippines are going to have to band together and agree on joint policy,
political - military - economic action toward Beijing.
Engagement will be perceived by China as appeasement

reduces perception of American resolve
Accommodation could bring risks of its own. For example, it would jeopardize U.S. security if it were to
convince China that the United States lacked the resolve to protect its vital
national interests, leading China to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. This
danger would be especially large if, instead of limited aims, China desired regional
hegemony and was determined to force the United States out of East Asia.
Accommodation might also raise serious concerns among U.S. alliesmost importantly,
Japanabout the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, thereby undermining
alliances that are widely judged to be essential to the security of the United States. Finally, ending
the United States commitment to Taiwan could sacrifice important U.S. nonsecurity interests, including support for
democracy and individual liberties, with no guarantee of benefits in return.
Engagement emboldens Chinese expansionism

Smith 15 (Jeff, Director for Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign
Policy Council in Washington, DC and author of Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in
the 21st Century (Lexington Books 2014,RIP: America's "Engagement" Strategy
towards China?, g.1) S.J
Depending on whom you ask, these events either dislodged China from a more
peaceful course, or accelerated its path along a preordained, nationalist trajectory.
Likewise, Americas engagement strategy was either flawed from the start, or is
simply proving insufficient to cope with the realities of a neonationalist China.
Whatever the case, Xis China has brought the flaws in Americas China strategy
into sharper focus. Rapid economic growth has correlated with greater repression,
while efforts at engagement and integration have been met with more brazen
challenges to the status quo.
Link - Appeasement Spillsover to Other Issues

Concessions spillover to convince China that the US will back
down on other important areas of contention
The literature is divided on how a states actions influence an adversarys assessment of its credibility. A key strand
a states credibility is connected across issues; making unmatched

concessions on one issue can reduce a states credibility for defending its
other interests. Although the broadest version of this argumentconcessions on any issue anywhere
holds that
damage a states credibility on all other issues everywhereseems implausible, a more conditional argument is
concessions on an issue that an adversary believes is similar

along one or more dimensions to a second issue will reduce the states credibility
for defending the second issue. For a rational adversary, an opposing states credibility is directly
logically sound. Specifically,
related to its understanding of that states interest in the specific issue. The connectedness logic requires that the
The states action

on the first issue provides the adversary with information about the extent of the
states interest in that issue. In addition, because the two issues share significant similarities, the action
also can provide the adversary with information about the extent of the states
interest in the second issue. The relevant dimensions along which issues can be similar include
adversary be uncertain about the nature or extent of the states interest in the two issues.
geography; the estimated magnitude of the interest; and, related but separable, the nature of the interest (security,
economic, identity, etc.). The opposing strand of the credibility debate holds that a states past actions do not
influence its credibility. According to this line of argument, credibility depends only on an opposing states power
and interests, both of which are known, not on its past behavior. This formulation, however, mischaracterizes the
issue of credibility by assuming that the adversary essentially knows the extent of the states interests.
Uncertainty about the states interests , however, lies at the core of the adversarys
uncertainty about the states credibility. This in turn creates a role for past actions
to influence current assessments of credibility. And, although the adversary may be
nearly certain that the state places an extremely high value on defending its
homeland, the adversary is likely to be more uncertain about the value that the
state places on defending its allies and lesser interests. Given this uncertainty, if the
adversary sees logical similarities between the two issues, one would expect that a
states policy toward a lesser (but possibly still important) interest would enable an
adversary to update its assessment of the states interests and, in turn, of the
credibility of its commitments. For example, ending an alliance could lead an adversary to reduce its
assessment of how likely the state would be to meet certain other alliance commitments. The magnitude of the
change would depend on the size of the accommodation, the extent of uncertainties about the states interests, and
if the adversary believes

that a structural change caused the state to adopt accommodation, it will see a
similarity across otherwise disparate issues that are affected by the structural
change and will, therefore, reduce its assessment of the states credibility on
all of these issues.
the similarity between the terminated and the continuing alliances. In addition,
Link Territorial Concessions

Territorial concessions increase the likelihood of war by
signaling weakness
Second, and more complicated, instead of satisfying the adversary, territorial
accommodation could enable or encourage it to demand or forcibly pursue
additional concessions. Whether these dangers exist depends on the adversarys
motives and the extent of its aims. Accommodation that might satisfy a greedy
adversary with limited aims could instead increase the probability of war if the
adversary has unlimited aims, or even limited aims that significantly exceed the
scope of the concessions. The state will almost always face some uncertainty about
the nature and extent of the adversarys aims, so accommodation will rarely be risk
free. Given this uncertainty, territorial accommodation can be dangerous if it
increases the adversarys ability to launch additional challenges. Territorial
concessions can enhance the adversarys potential offensive capabilities by
increasing its wealth or access to critical resources, by providing it with territory
that enhances its ability tonight on the offensive, and by freeing up military forces
that were previously committed to challenging the conceded territory. In addition,
given uncertainty about the adversarys aims, territorial accommodation can be
dangerous if it decreases the adversarys assessment of the states
credibility for defending its interests, thereby increasing the adversarys
willingness to launch additional challenges.
Link Naval Engagement

Naval concessions to China increase risks of miscalculated
conflict and marginalize US Asian power
Kurth 12 (James, Senior Fellow at Center for the Study of America and the West,
Confronting a Powerful China with Western Characteristics,
http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/01/confronting-a-powerful-china-with-westerncharacteristics/) KR
If the United States adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China

in the three littoral seas and Taiwan, it would gradually but discernibly reduce both
its actual naval operations and its formal security commitments there . The pace and
direction of this reduction might be understood by China to be consistent with its own conceptions of patience and
persistence.
In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese

characteristics. Again, however, some Americans would still think of themselves as
strong and resolute, and they would always be contesting this policy, making its
application inconsistent and confusing and therefore again making for
misconceptions and miscalculations. However, if the appeasement or accommodation policy were
carried out to its logical conclusion, there would be a massive realignment of the long-established U.S. alliance
system in the Western Pacific, i.e., involving not only the states bordering the three littoral seas and west of the
First Island Chain, but also involving Japan, which is a major component of that chain and a principal power in the
the loss of the three littoral seas would likely issue in the loss of the
U.S. dominance in the waters that lie between the First and the Second Island
Chains. In the end, the United States could be reduced to being a secondary, or even
marginalized, power in the Western Pacific . Indeed, some Chinese military figures are beginning to
region. In other words,
raise the idea of a partitioning of the Pacific between China and the United States, along a line roughly
Given the economic and military dynamics now

underway in China (and the absence of such dynamics in America), it might seem
that the Chinese will inevitably displace the U nited States from its dominant position in
the three littoral seas and replace it with its own . The time and the way that this will
happen is unknown, but the eventual outcome can be discerned. If so, whatever
might be the name, the result would be appeasement or accommodation in this
regional arena.
corresponding to the Second Island Chain.
Link AT: Aff Isnt Appeasement

Even advocates of engagement believe unconditional
concessions are appeasement
Sutter 95 (Robert, Senior Specialist in International Politics at Office of Senior
Specialists, China in World Affairs -- U.S. Policy Choices, Congressional Report,
http://fas.org/man/crs/95-265.htm) KR
The foreign powers around China's periphery and those who have an important role to play regarding Chinese
interests in international organizations, trade and global issue could influence the course of Chinese foreign policy
in several ways. Some may adopt policies on issues sensitive to Beijing that would prompt Chinese leaders to
subordinate pragmatic interests for the sake of protecting Chinese territorial or other national claims. Most notable
in this regard are outside challenges to China's claims to disputed territories. In the case of Taiwan, for example, if
the leaders in Taipei were to formally declare independence from the mainland, Beijing might be hard put not to
follow through on its repeated pledge to use force to stop such a development. And in the case of disputed claims
to islets in the South China Sea, Chinese naval forces could be expected to respond promptly to any effort by
Vietnam or others to expand their territorial holdings by force. On global economic issues, there is uncertainty as to
how far the Chinese government will go in compromising with or retaliating against the U.S. and others unless China
is allowed expeditiously to enter the WTO.((17)) What is clear, however, is that a major shift toward protectionism
among the developed countries would clearly undermine the basis of China's export-led growth. It could lead to a
major shift in China's foreign policy, away from continued cooperation with the developed countries. By the same
token, if foreign powers were to appear to "gang up" against China and impose sanctions because of PRC arms
exports, human rights or other policies, this too might prompt a serious Chinese reevaluation of the costs and
benefits of cooperation with the international status quo.
In contrast to those who argue against

heavy or provocative external pressure on China are those who argue against the
dangers of appeasement or weakness in the face of China's growing strength. Even
those who want foreign countries to "engage" closely with China often add
that this must be done from a firm position. As a recent Trilateral Commission
Study concluded "a cooperative approach may not elicit a constructive Chinese
response... the strength and prosperity of the Trilateral Countries -- not their weakness -generate Chinese respect. Such classic considerations as balance of power, realism and a keen sense of
Trilateral interests must also govern Western and Japanese thinking about China."
AT: Containment Inevitable - US

Forces/Nukes/Allies
Credibility not capability is key the plan undermines the
signal of US resolve in containing China
Mandelbaum 15, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins
(Nov/Dec, Michael, How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb: The Case for Deterrence,
Foreign Affairs)
Deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons by promising to prevent it with military action, if necessary, is
To be effective, a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility, with the Iranian regime knowing just what
justified, feasible, and indeed crucial to protect vital U.S. interests.
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will follow through on its threats.
During the Cold War, the United States was successful in deterring a Soviet attack
on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of communist
initiatives. In 1954, for example, the Eisenhower administration announced a policy of
massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations , including costly conventional
wars like the recent one in Korea, by promising an overpowering response. But the doctrine
lacked the credibility needed to be effective, and a decade later, the United States
found itself embroiled in another, similar war in Vietnam. In the case of Iran, the aim of
deterrence would be specific and limited: preventing Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons. Still, a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties. One is the likelihood of Iranian salami tacticssmall
violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction
seeming dangerous enough to trigger a severe response. The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations. The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on Western Europe, but Iran is all too
likely to try to develop the technology needed for nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has
an extensive history of doing so), and the loopholes in the agreements inspection provisions suggest that keeping
credibilitythat is, persuading the target that

posed a major challenge to the United
States during the Cold War. It was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate
for a direct Soviet attack on North America, but the United States also sought to
deter an attack on allies thousands of miles away, even though in that case,
retaliation would have risked provoking a Soviet strike on the American homeland.
Even some American allies, such as French President Charles de Gaulle, expressed skepticism
that the United States would go to war to defend Europe. The American government
therefore went to considerable lengths to ensure that North America and Western
Europe were coupled in both Soviet and Western European eyes, repeatedly
expressing its commitment to defend Europe and stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to
track of all of Irans bomb-related activities will be difficult. As for
force really will be used in the event of a violationthis
trigger U.S. involvement in any European conflict. In some ways, credibly threatening to carry out a strike against
Iran now would be easier. Iran may have duplicated, dispersed, and hidden the various parts of its nuclear program,
and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems, but the U.S. military has or can develop the tactics and
munitions necessary to cause enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years, even
without the use of any ground troops. The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia or Israel (whether directly or
through their Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah), or attack American military forces, or sponsor acts of anti-American
The problems
with deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological. Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an Iranian bomb over the
terrorism. But such responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishment.
years, and then observed the Obama administrations avid pursuit of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear
program, Irans ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish
Iranian cheating. U.S. President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position that Iran
should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale, then abandoned it. He backed
away from his promise that the Syrian regime would suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons. He
made it the core argument in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war, implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs. Moreover, neither he nor his
predecessor responded to Irans meddling in Iraq over the past decade, even though Tehrans support for Shiite
militias there helped kill hundreds of U.S. troops. The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States,
particularly during this presidency, to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in order to keep Iran
from going nuclear, the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an explicit, credible threat of military action. To be
credible, such a threat must be publicly articulated and resolutely communicated. The Obama administration should
declare such a policy itself, as should future administrations, and Congress should enshrine such a policy in formal
resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support. The administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise
by increasing the deployment of U.S. naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and
As in Europe during the Cold

War, the goal of U.S. policy should be to eliminate all doubts, on all sides,
that the United States will uphold its commitments
frequency of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies.
Controlling signals of US resolve is key to deterring China

French 14 (Erick, Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies Pacific Forum, PhD candidate at the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs, analyst at Wikistrat Inc, pg. 72) S.J
To understand how the United States
can successfully communicate deterrence threats and reassurances to Chinas
leadership, we must have a firm grasp of the psychological biases that undergird
how leaders interpret and process incoming information. In particular, we must
acknowledge the role misperception can play in both impeding and facilitating
deterrence and reassurance. This article investigates the role of motivated
reasoning (also known as motivated bias) in Chinese decision making, focusing in
particular on confirmation-motivated reasoning. First, it presents a general overview
of motivated reasoning as discussed by psychologists and political scientists. Then it
illustrates the importance of this psychological dynamic by tracing its involvement
in three major historical crises involving the United States and China: (1) the US
reassurance attempt during the Korean War, (2) the US deterrence attempt during
the 1950 blockade of the Taiwan Strait, and (3) the US deterrence attempt during
the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Next, it examines an instance in which the
United States overcame Chinese skepticism to reassure China and reduce strategic
distrust: Pres. Richard Nixons rapprochement with China in the 1970s. Finally, it
considers how US policymakers and strategists should cope with motivated
reasoning in Chinese decision making. In particular, a tailored approach to
deterrence and reassurance emphasizes the need to gauge Chinas preconceptions
about US strength, resolve, and intent and to adjust signals accordingly.
Impact Appeasement Expansionism

Appeasement emboldens China to expand military action in the
ECS and SCS
Glaser 11 (Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs-George
Washington University, Will China's Rise Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 90(2), p86)
MLJ
Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make
Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is
modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack.
Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force
enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action,
leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability
to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive
targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign
U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations. Given
such risks, the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the
most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better
relations between them in the decades to come. Critics of such a move argue that it would result in not only direct
Beijing would not be satisfied by

appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even
greater demands afterward--spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a
defender of its allies. The critics are wrong, however, because territorial concessions are not always
costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well:
such
bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool.
When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to
satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension. The key question, then, is whether China has
limited or unlimited goals. It is true that China has disagreements with several of its neighbors, but there is actually
little reason to believe that it has or will develop grand territorial ambitions in its region or beyond.
Concessions on Taiwan would thus risk encouraging China to pursue more

demanding policies on those issues for which the status quo is currently
disputed, including the status of the offshore islands and maritime borders in
the East China and South China seas. But the risks of reduced U.S. credibility for protecting allies when the
status quo is crystal clear--as is the case with Japan and South Korea--should be small, especially if any change in
policy on Taiwan is accompanied by countervailing measures (such as a renewed declaration of the United States'
other alliance commitments, a reinforcement of U.S. forward deployed troops, and an increase in joint military
exercises and technological cooperation with U.S. allies).
Appeasement signals fuel Chinese regional assertiveness

Newsham 14 (China, American and the Appeasement Question. 9/8/14, Grant
Newsham: Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question11226, EHS MKS)
failure to challenge the Peoples Republic of
Chinas (PRC) territorial seizures in the South China Sea would be repeating the 1930s era
appeasement of Hitlers Germany. The Chinese were predictably outraged while the rest of the world mostly
In February 2014, Philippine President Benigno Aquino warned that
ignored President Aquino. Appeasement is still a dirty word. But in the 1930s, until the Nazis invaded Poland in September, 1939,
European and American elites considered appeasement to be a sophisticated, nuanced approach to dealing with increasingly
powerful authoritarian regimes. To these elites, appeasement was more than simply disarming and letting unpleasant people have
their way. Appeasement actually had a coherent logic. The elites believed that aggressive, authoritarian regimes act the way they
do out of fear, insecurity, and at least partly legitimate grievances such as German resentment of the harsh Treaty of Versailles.
Understand and address these issue, remove their fears, and the regimes will become less aggressive and transform into
responsible members of the international community and operate under international norms. Or so the elites argued. Challenging
these regimes could dangerously isolate them and even needlessly provoke them into miscalculations. The elites thought
engagement and transparency were beneficial in their own right, as only good things could come from familiarity with one
another. In the 1930s, the major Western powers all attended each others war games. The US Marine Corps even took the German
World War I fighter ace, Ernst Udet on a ride in a USMC dive bomber. This engagement and transparency did not make the Nazis
nicer, but perhaps gave them some ideas about dive bombing and Blitzkreig. Even the Soviets and Germans had close ties with
joint training, military technology development, and raw material shipments to Germany. There was also extensive political and
diplomatic interaction. Close economic ties were believed to be a further hedge against conflict breaking out, and companies such
as Ford, IBM, and many others did profitable business in Germany. The elites believed anything was better than war. Preserving
peace, even if sacrificing principles and certain small nations was considered wise and statesmanlike. People who criticized
appeasement policy in the 1930s, most notably Winston Churchill, were ridiculed as dolts and war mongers. We know how this
turned out. Curiously, appeasement (by another name) reappeared even before the end of the war in calls to address Stalins fears
and allow him to dominate Eastern Europe. And throughout the Cold War, in Western academic and government circles it was
argued that Soviet behavior was simply a reaction to fears of Western containment. The appeasers protested the peacetime draft as
threatening the Russians. They also pushed for unilateral nuclear disarmament, and opposed the Pershing missile deployment and
the neutron bomb well into the 1980s. Even President Jimmy Carter, once he overcame his inordinate fear of communism, tried
something akin to appeasement as national policy. It was not until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that Carter learned his lesson. It
perhaps will take another case of an authoritarian regime rearranging its neighborhood to understand the cost of modern
The United
States does its best to understand the PRCs concerns and its resentments going
back to the Opium Wars and the century of humiliation, to accommodate these
resentments, and to ensure China does not feel threatened. Defense and State
Department officials enthusiastically seek greater transparency and openness
especially in the military realm as such openness is perceived as inherently good.
In return, the PRC is expected to change, to show more respect for human rights
and international law and to become a responsible stakeholder in the international
community. We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this concessionary approach. It has not
resulted in improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the S outh China Sea or the
East China Sea, or even in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged
Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior
towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human
rights, rule of law, consensual government or freedom of expression for its citizens .
appeasement. US policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly in recent times, seems familiar.
Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory dictators. Nonetheless, we invite the PRC to
military exercises and repeat the engagement mantra expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some argue that
letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as likely to be seen as nave or
weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very well without transforming and the PRC
the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and

the like are outmoded Western values having nothing to do with China. This is also
has never been stronger. Indeed,
demoralizing our allies, who at some point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC. Some revisionist historians
argue that Neville Chamberlains 1930s era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This overlooks that
even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia, the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One can
appease oneself into a corner. And the beneficiary of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain
without great sacrifice. One worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the US
Governments unwillingness to even verbally challenge the PRC - might turn out to be this generations Rhineland. Had the West
resisted Hitler in 1936 when he made this first major demand, there would have been no World War II, no Holocaust, and no Cold
War. Our choice about how to deal with the PRC is not simply between either appeasement or treating China as an
enemy. Our policy must accommodate options ranging from engagement to forceful confrontation. Who would not
be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its neighbors and followed the civilized worlds rules? While
ensuring we and our allies have a resolute defense both in terms of military capability and the willingness to employ it it is
important to maintain ties and dialogue with the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear signs of
We should constantly stress that China is welcome as

a key player in the international order but only under certain conditions. The US
and other democratic nations have not done enough to require China to adhere to
established standards of behavior in exchange for the benefits of joining the global
system that has allowed the PRC to prosper. Human nature and history are a useful guide to where
transforming to a freer, less repressive society.
appeasement (by whatever name) leads. And they also show that a strong defense and resolutely standing up for ones principles is
more likely to preserve peace.
Appeasement foments warfighting incentives

Guangquan 13 (Wu, President of AVIC International, US Should Remember the
Consequences of Appeasing Japan, http://watchingamerica.com/WA/2013/07/24/u-s-shouldremember-the-consequences-of-appeasing-japan/) KR
A U.S. think tank pointed out in a recent report that the rightward bent of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and
other politicians has caused a significant amount of controversy. This presents an enormous barrier to peaceful
cooperation within Northeast Asia.
It is not yet too late for the U.S. to switch from condoning
this to worrying about it. I think it would be extremely beneficial for Americans to
look back upon World War II and recall the valuable lesson of how appeasement
leads to war. In the early 1930s, after Hitler rose to power, he began a frenzied military
expansion in preparation for war. Under the pretext of taking so-called "living space," he brazenly
fanned the flames of racial purity, making Germany the epicenter of the war . The U.K., France and the
U.S. wished to avoid war with Hitler, adopting policies of appeasement . When German
and Italian forces interfered in Spain, Britain and France adopted policies of noninterference and the U.S. declared
its neutrality; when Germany annexed Austria, Britain and France said that the Anschluss was necessary; as
Czechoslovakia was divided piecemeal, Britain and France signed the infamous Munich Agreement, selling out their
ally. However, these policies of appeasement did not win them peace in return . On Sept. 1,
1939, Germany invaded Poland, marking the beginning of World War II. Japan's path to war was somewhat different
than that of Germany and Italy. At the time, the strength of Japanese militarism was fast developing and, in the end,
the Ministry of War seized power over the country. Japan was always dissatisfied with its share of the spoils from
the U.K., France and the

U.S. sought to protect their existing interests through appeasement, most
particularly the U.S. with its appeasement under the banner of "splendid isolation ,
World War I and advocated for once again dividing the global pie. Meanwhile,
which then encouraged Japan to invade and expand into other countries in Asia. This continued until Japan launched
its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, prompting the U.S. to finally come to its senses and join the war.
We should
not forget the past, but learn from it. Now let us follow the trajectory of history to gain a better view of
Shinzo Abe's current conduct: as soon as he was elected, he denied the history of Japanese invasions and crimes,
including widespread massacres; he challenged the post-World War II global order, howled about his desire to make
Japan a normal country and, with complete disregard for the terms of international treaties, made ludicrous
territorial demands of neighboring countries; he was agitated by the indeterminate "definition of what constitutes
an invasion" and the legitimacy of colonial rule; he encouraged many members of parliament and his cabinet to
visit the Yasukuni Shrine; he contrived every possible means to modify Japan's peaceful constitution, expand the
armed forces and change the Self-Defense Forces into an army; and Japan's latest white paper pointed to a desire to
develop its own military strength. Under the influence of Abe's antics, Japanese society is quickly moving to the
right.
Impact Turns The Case/Key to Cooperation

Only effective containment can garner meaningful Chinese
cooperation
Eisenmen 16 (Joshua, assistant professor at the University of Texas at Austin's Lyndon Baines Johnson
School of Public Affairs and senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC,
Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China,
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756)RR
a growing contingent in Washington and beyond is arguing that extensive U.S.

engagement has failed to prevent China from threatening other countries .
One longtime proponent of engagement with China, David M. Lampton, gave a speech in
May 2015 entitled "A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us," in which he noted that, despite
the remarkable "policy continuity" of "constructive engagement " through eight U.S. and five
Chinese administrations, "today important components of the American policy elite
increasingly are coming to see China as a threat." 11 Former Australian Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd summarized this view: Beijing's long-term policy is aimed at pushing
the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning
Now, however,
the region.12 Similarly, in June, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said on PBS Newshour: "The longstanding
In response to these misgivings

about Beijing's intentions, there have been calls for Washington to actively shape China's
strategic choices by enhancing U.S. military capabilities and strengthening alliances
to counterbalance against its growing strength. Recent publications reflect increasing
apprehension; most argue that policymakers must avoid an enduring " structural
problem" in international relations that causes rising powers to become
aggressive. Some experts, like Princeton's Aaron Friedberg, contend that the U.S. should
"maintain a margin of military advantage sufficient to deter attempts at coercion or
aggression.14 Thomas Christensen, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for
East Asia, noted in June, that there are two primary questions for U.S. security vis--vis China: How to
consensus that China's rise is good for the U.S. is beginning to break down.13
dissuade China from using force in East Asia? How can we get China to actively contribute to stabilizing global
governance? These initiatives, Christensen noted, are based on the assumption that " whenever
a country
becomes a rising power, tensions with neighbors arise. 15 Christensen agrees with Bader that
the U.S.' "strategic goal" vis--vis China is to "shape Beijing's choices so as to channel China's nationalist ambitions
To elicit Beijing's participation U.S. policymakers

should persuade China that bullying its neighbors will backfire, while proactive
cooperation with those neighbors and the world's other great powers will accelerate
China's return to great power status.17 The U.S. should build a robust
deterrence architecture to counter-balance China's rise and push Beijing
towards meaningful engagement, Christensen argues. The U.S. and its allies
"need to maintain sufficient power and resolve in East Asia to deter Beijing from
choosing a path of coercion or aggression.18 "Chinese anxiety about a U.S.
containment effort could carry some benefits for the United States: the
potential for encirclement may encourage Chinese strategists to become
more accommodating," resulting in more "moderate policies." Both engagement
into cooperation rather than coercion." 16
supporters and deterrence supporters agree that the U.S. should change China's strategic calculus in ways that
increase the benefits of cooperation and the costs of aggression; where they disagree is on how to achieve this.
Deterrence is more effective for maintaining US/China relations

This presents immediate problems for US reassurance efforts and puts the United
States at risk of falling into an acute security dilemma with China . While Chinese
policy elites are split on the threat posed by US power, they view US intentions as
threatening and will be inclined to scrutinize any signals that do not fit with this
belief. China will likely be receptive to US deterrent threats which fit with its view of
the United States as a revisionist, adversarial power, but it will be skeptical of US
signals designed to reassure it that the United States has no intention of
threatening Chinas interests if it behaves as a responsible power. This situation
enables two alternative policy implications. The first is that deterrence will prove a
more effective strategy for managing US-China relations than reassurance. The
second is that deterrence will be easier and less costly than reassurance, but both
strategies can be employed simultaneously and symbiotically provided the United
States dedicates extensive resources to making its reassurance signals clear,
consistent, and persistent
Deterrence solves better than reassurance for dealing with

Chinas rise
Broadly speaking, these trends in perceptions indicate that deterrence may simply
be more effective than reassurance as a strategy for handling a rising China. US
deterrence attempts toward China are likely to be effective given Chinas
increasingly adversarial views of US intent. Reassurance, on the other hand, may
fall on deaf ears unless it is executed to perfection. Motivated reasoning, driven by
the desire to achieve cognitive consistency, will make Chinese leaders discount and
discredit US reassurance signals.
Impact Engagement Fails

Engagement can never produce positive results because China
sees no benefit from cooperation
Ford 12 [Christopher Ford, formerly Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology and Global
Security at Hudson Institute, Challenges of Regional Peace and Stability in East Asia,
http://www.hudson.org/research/9308-challenges-of-regional-peace-and-stability-in-east-asia] RR
These four factors represent the conventional wisdom about the causes of the recent inflammation of tensions in
the SCS and ECS, and I think there is much truth in analyses that emphasize such factors. Id like, however, to
suggest an additional factor one that also has to do with internal PRC political dynamics, but which isnt likely to go
the CCP regime has

invested political capital in cultivating anti-foreign nationalism as a basis for the Partys
legitimacy narrative, and this nationalism has indeed become a potent force. As another part of its effort to
develop a post-Marxist ideology to sustain one-party rule , the Chinese Party-State has
also been developing a discourse of quasi-Confucian domestic politics and international
relations doctrine. Together, these two themes of the modern CCP legitimacy narrative call it Confucionationalism, if you will have an impact upon Chinese policy. They have helped make China more
moralistically confrontational in its foreign relations and more inclined to press its neighbors
into patterns of deference to Beijing than at any other point since the era of reform and opening took off
away after the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. For the last two decades,
under Deng Xiaoping more than three decades ago. This just isnt a pre-Party-Congress pose, in other words, but in
fact an important part of the new normal in 21st-Century China. Though adopted, in the first instance, for
domestic political reasons tied to the Partys desire to cling to power, these themes essentially demand
confrontational foreign postures and efforts to nudge East Asia, at the very least, into more Sinocentric forms of
Beijing today feels freer to act upon such thinking than

at any time since the death of Mao Zedong . Let me explain a little more about what I think has
interstate order. Significantly, moreover,
happened. After Tiananmen, Deng is said to have articulated a pithy phrase about the importance of biding ones
time and hiding ones capabilities, which encapsulated important conclusions about Chinas interest in strategic
caution. This did not amount to any relinquishment of the dream of national rejuvenation and return that so
many Chinese have shared since the Qing Dynasty was first humbled by Western power in the 19th Century, but it
was a clear policy of tactical postponement of the kind of self-assertion implied by the countrys destined return.
China, it was said, needed breathing space in which to build up its strength, and to this end should carefully keep a
low profile and adopt a relatively non-provocative posture. This approach of Dengist time-biding, which some
scholars have referred to as Taoist Nationalism, became the foundation of Chinas foreign relations for many
years. As Chinas strength and confidence have grown in the international arena, however and as the CCP has
invested more and more political capital in Sino-nationalist legitimacy strategies that encourage both revanchiste
posturing against an outside world felt to have humiliated China and quasi-Confucian notions of the desirability of
a Sinocentric global order such time-biding has come increasingly under pressure. A dynamic that I think has
been particularly important recently, however and which is probably a major factor behind Chinas recent moves to
escalate tensions in the SCS and the ECS is Beijings perception that America is enfeebled, weary of foreign
commitments, and in a precipitous decline. Why is that? Taoist Nationalism based its strategic logic on two main
assumptions. First, it was felt that in order to gain the strength necessary to effect its return to glory, China
needed to learn modernity from the West, particularly from the iconic modern state and the most powerful of the
Western polities: the United States. This required congenial engagement in which China could engage in exportdriven growth, acquire technology and modern know-how from the West, and have the breathing space necessary
for its development. Second, it was recognized that the outside world and the Americans in particular were still
powerful enough to be able to impose huge costs on the PRC if sufficiently threatened or provoked. Accordingly,
great care should be taken not to provoke them, at least until China was strong enough to handle the
consequences. The strategic caution of Taoist Nationalism thus rested upon the presumed great benefits of
friendly engagement and high costs of confrontation. To my eye, however, this balance was destabilized by the U.S.
we no
longer appear an attractive teacher or model of modernity, which reduces
the benefits of friendly engagement side of the equation. Our continuing politico-economic
financial crisis and our present indebtedness and ineffective political leadership. In Chinese eyes, I think
woes have also encouraged Beijing to think we are on a steep downhill slope in what Chinese strategists call
comprehensive national power, thus also reducing the costs of confrontation element. As a result, it is
presumably harder than ever in Beijing to argue for a continuation of Taoist Nationalism, and more confrontational
sentiments are gradually coming to predominate. Even as the CCP regime has staked its political legitimacy on antiforeign nationalism and increasingly Sinocentric pretensions of global return, in other words, the confrontational
postures encouraged by such thinking have seemed more feasible than ever. To my eye, there is little chance in the
near term of conclusively resolving the disputes in question. One could argue all day about the relative legal merits
of the various competing claims and lots of people do but whatever their merits, I think it is unlikely that well see
the issues resolved any time soon. It is thus the challenge of diplomacy and statesmanship to defer the issue
peacefully and manage the situation so as to keep things from getting out of hand. Near-term crisis management
will be important in this work, as will trying to persuade all participants to avoid provocative actions, and doing
everything possible to reaffirm freedom-of-navigation rights in the region. In order to reduce the sting of resource
competition in the SCS, and indeed to give parties some incentive to cooperate with each other, some observers
have also suggested that a moratorium on oil and gas drilling should be imposed until all agree upon a formula for
resource-sharing. Much discussion in the SCS, at least, has referred to the importance of establishing a good code
this hasnt amounted to much and

what preliminary agreement has already materialized clearly hasnt restrained
anybody. I think the problem lies deeper than simply a lack of clarity about how one
should approach interactions; the real problem seems to have more to do with
whether parties want to interact peaceably. Fundamentally, most current proposals for
of conduct for regional interactions. I dont disagree, but so far,
managing these problems fail to address one of the key factors that I believe is contributing to these problems: the
destabilizing effect of Chinas growth combined with its increasing willingness to take confrontationally selfassertive positions vis--vis its neighbors. The problem with Chinese behavior goes beyond simply taking positions
playing to nationalist sentiments prior to the 18th Party Congress. The deeper difficulty is due to the Party-States
adoption of legitimacy narratives that encourage and to some extent require foreign affairs positions that are
increasingly confrontational. If what Ive suggested about the internal debate between low-profile strategic caution
and more self-assertively confrontation is true, however, it is possible that we can still influence Chinas decision-
strategic
caution is losing ground in Beijing because China feels it now has less to
gain from congenial engagement and less to lose from confrontation.
making for the better even if they do continue to perceive us as being in decline. As noted,
Impact Taiwan
Appeasement emboldens Chinese invasion of Taiwan
Navarro 1/20 (Peter, author of Crouching Tiger: What China's Militarism Means for the
World, Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University, Is It Time For America to Surrender
Taiwan?, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/is-it-time-foramerica-to-surrender-taiwan_b_9003450.html) KR
no mystery: The US economy is heavily dependent

on trade with China - and many of Washingtons elected officials are just as heavily
dependent on massive campaign contributions from American multinational
corporations that have a strong vested interest in the growing China trade. To
experts like Professor Yoshihara, however, such American restraint spells increasing
danger. He fears these signals of American indecision and appeasement may one
day embolden a rapidly militarizing China to make its final invasion push - a
possibility that dramatically increased in probability with last weeks election. So
Washingtons vacillations and restraint are
what should America do? Thats a good question not just for the White House and Congress but also for each of the
2016 presidential candidates. In thinking about the best answer ,
it should be noted that its not just

that the US has significant moral and ideological stakes in Taiwans survival as a
thriving democracy committed to free and peaceful trade . There is also this cold geostrategic
reality described by Heritage Foundation scholar Dean Cheng: Taiwan is perhaps the single most
developed piece of the First Island Chain once you leave Japan and Okinawa. So to
walk away from Taiwan would, in a sense, be to open the gates for Chinas navy to
be able to access the central Pacific with very little in the way of other obstacles. To
this, Yoshihara adds: If China were to ever take Taiwan either peacefully or by force,
China gets to cut that First Island Chain in half, essentially cutting in half the US
forward posture in the Asia-Pacific region. This would be unprecedented in the
history of US military posture in the Asia-Pacific since the end of World War II. While its
now Beijings move, how Washington responds to any hard line will have an enormous impact on peace and stability
in the region. Let the presidential debate begin.
The impact is nuclear war

Washington University, Will China's Rise Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 90(2), p8091) MLJ
THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may
nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly
regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago,
China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification

remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use
force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional
military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan
and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such
high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to-have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and
A crisis
over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step
along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved . Current U.S.
challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea.
policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare

independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to
Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under
pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it
originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control
Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events
rather than leading them.
Impact Asian Primacy

Appeasement undermines US Asian hegemony ensures
regional conflict
KR
The central message of Whites Americas China Choice, however, is that primacy is no longer a viable or wise
choice for the United States. Rather, its only option is to remain in Asia on a new basis (i.e., sharing power with,
and accommodating, China). It is the option with the best chance of avoiding or mitigating strategic rivalry. The
difference between White and Friedberg is that White wants the United States to do the accommodating, to share
Friedbergs
preference is for America to maintain its predominance, primarily because for him, and
many others not just in the United States but also in Asia, it is U.S. hegemony that has
upheld regional peace and stability.25 Perhaps ceding power also smacks too
much of appeasement (pp. 254, 263); it may whet Chinas appetite for more, and
history suggests that is too perilous a path to take.
power (i.e., cede some of its predominant power), whereas Friedberg resists the suggestion.
AT: China not a Threat

The autocratic nature of the Chinese regime ensures a desire
for expansionism and opposition to US goals
KR
The debate over what to do about Chinas rise and aspirations is not just about
military and economic power. For Friedberg, the identity of the potential challenger
matters greatly. In fact, it is decisive. He would be less worried if it were Japan or
Australia, but that fact that it is Chinaan illiberal and autocratic regimemakes it
worrisome. An unrepresentative government responsible for crushing the
Tiananmen Square protests, denying religious freedom, suppressing political
dissent, and oppressing minorities to use Hugh Whites words (p. 167) is, in the end, not a
government that the United States can treat as a political equal, accommodate, or
cooperate with (p. 167). The crux of the matter, for Friedberg, is the nature of Chinas
political regime: autocratic governance is anathema to the American political credo;
moreover, there is also a link between autocracies and their propensity to resort to
military force externally (pp. 4245, 159163). In a revealing passage, Friedberg stipulates the conditions
under which the United States may be willing to share or even cede power to China: In the long run, the United
States can learn to live with a democratic China as the preponderant power in East Asia, much as Great Britain
came to accept America as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere.... Having kept the peace, encouraged
the transition of all the major regional players from authoritarianism to democracy, and overseen the re-emergence
of Asia as a leading center of world wealth and peace, Washington will be free to call home its legions (pp. 251
252).
China is pursuing regional hegemony to supplant US primary

Blackwill 16(Robert, Former Ambassador to India & Senior fellow @ CFR, Chinas Strategy: Asia Maximizes
power balance to replace America, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-strategy-asia-maximize-powerreplace-america-16359)RR
Chinas primary strategic goal in contemporary times has been the accumulation of
comprehensive national power. This pursuit of power in all its dimensionseconomic,
military, technological and diplomaticis driven by the conviction that China, a great
civilization undone by the hostility of others, could never attain its destiny unless it
amassed the power necessary to ward off the hostility of those opposed to this
quest. This vision of strengthening the Chinese state while recovering Chinas centrality in international
politicsboth objectives requiring the accumulation of comprehensive national power suggests that the
aims of Beijings grand strategy both implicate and transcend the United States and
Chinas other Asian rivals, to replace U.S. primacy in Asia writ large . For China, which
is simultaneously an ancient civilization and a modern polity, grand strategic objectives are not
simply about desirable rank orderings in international politics but rather about
fundamental conceptions of order.
China will never accept the US as a partner challenges are

inevitable
Blackwill and Tellis 15 (Robert, , Senior Fellow @ CFR, Former Ambassador to India, Ashley, PhD
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense,
and Asian strategic issues, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, March) RR
It is unrealistic
to imagine that Chinas grand strategy toward the U nited States will evolve in a wayat
least in the next ten yearsthat accepts American power and influence as linchpins of Asian peace and
security, rather than seeks to systematically diminish them. Thus, the central question
concerning the future of Asia is whether the U nited States will have the political will; the
geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic capabilities ; and, crucially, the right grand strategy to deal with
China to protect vital U.S. national interests .(39)
The profound test that the rise of Chinese power represents for the United States is likely to last for decades.
Dont believe misleading statements from Chinese officials

their motivation is regional domination
Blackwill and Tellis 15 (Robert, , Senior Fellow @ CFR, Former Ambassador to India, Ashley, PhD
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense,
and Asian strategic issues, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, March) RR
Policy experts critical of the grand strategy toward China proposed in this report will likely fall into at least six categories. First, some
will argue that China has no grand strategy. Although there may be those in Beijing who disagree with Chinas current strategic
Chinese officials insistently argue that the U.S.

alliance system in Asia is a product of the Cold War and should be dismantled ; that
the United States Asian allies and friends should loosen their U.S. ties and that failure
to do so will inevitably produce a negative PRC reaction; that U.S. efforts to maintain its current presence
approach, its dominating elements are not a mystery.
and power in Asia are dimensions of an American attempt to contain China and therefore must be condemned and resisted; that
U.S. military power projection in the region is dangerous and should be reduced (even
as the PLA continues to build up its military capabilities with the clear objective of reducing U.S. military options in the context of a
the U.S. economic model is fundamentally exploitative and should

To not take seriously official Chinese government
statements along these lines is to not take China seriously . That Beijing does not hope
to realize these policy goals in the short term does not reduce their potential undermining effect in the decades ahead. In short, if
China were to achieve the policy objectives contained in these official statements, it
would clearly replace the United States as Asias leading power. If that does not represent a PRC grand
U.S.-China confrontation); and that
have no application in Asia.
strategy, what would? (34)
Aff
N/U No Containment Now

SQ policies are not aimed at containing China
Roy 13 (Denny Roy, The Problem with Premature Appeasement, Survival, 55:3, 183-202,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2013.802861)
White mischaracterizes the struggle between China and the U nited States. Firstly, he
perpetuates the unfortunate argument that US policy towards China is essentially
one of containment. Specifically, he alleges that this involves preventing China from getting a larger
leadership role or additional influence or authority (p. 118). This argument resonates with many Chinese but is
inaccurate. The Chinese understand the term containment to mean trying to keep their country from becoming
This interpretation is easily dismissed by looking at the US trade deficit

with China, which rose from $202 billion in 2005 to $315bn in 2012 .13 This massive
transfer of US wealth, and along with it technology and expertise, is the biggest single
contribution to Chinas economic development, the foundation of its growing power. Even if we accept
Whites interpretation of containment, his allegation is untrue. In many cases, Washington has
encouraged rather than suppressed Chinese international leadership and activism .
For example, it praised China for organising and hosting the Six-Party Talks , which began in
more powerful.
2003 and aim to defuse the North Korean nuclear crisis. In 2012 the US Department of Defenses annual report on
Chinese military developments, which is routinely maligned by Beijing for making China look overly threatening,
noted that the PLA deployed assets to support non-combatant evacuation operations from Libya, extended its
presence in the Gulf of Aden for a third year of counter-piracy operations, took on leadership roles in United Nations
peace operations, and conducted medical exchanges and a service mission to Latin America and the Caribbean
Kurt Campbell, in one of his last interviews as outgoing US

assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said with some frustration that
we have done everything possible to encourage China to play a leading role in the
G20, in the East Asia Summit, just every imaginable institution and venue. But in many
using the PLA Navys hospital ship.14
respects, China is ambivalent about playing that role.15 Using Whites definition of undermining leadership and
influence, China is also trying to contain the United States. Beijings 1997 New Security Concept, aimed chiefly at
Southeast Asia, disparaged US alliances in the region as part of a mentality of Cold War.16 In negotiations over the
shaping of the East Asian Community at the East Asian Summit in 2005, Beijing manoeuvred to limit the
participation of US allies. In 2010 then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton diplomatically intervened in the South
China Sea territorial dispute in response to requests from several regional governments. The Chinese Foreign
Ministry described her call for a collaborative solution and adherence to international law as, in effect, an attack
Washington has shown itself willing to adjust to accommodate Chinas

rise. This further undercuts the allegation of containment and also undermines Whites
on China.17
argument that a Concert is needed to manage security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. Prior to the rise of China, a
pillar of post-war US grand strategy was to prevent a rival great power from challenging American pre-eminence in
an important region. As recently as 1992, a draft of the Pentagons Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years
1994 1999 held that post-Cold War US grand strategy requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power
from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global
power. This goal called for precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor and deterring
China, under the rule of a

Communist party hostile to many US values, emerged as a competitor in Asia and
aspired to a larger regional role with minimal US resistance. Washington
accommodated Beijings demand for more international space . In the early 2000s it was
the policy of the United States to dissuade other countries from initiating future
military competitions [against it] or pursuing a military build-up in hopes of
surpassing, or equaling, [its] power .19 Washington watched Beijing push ahead with
a large and rapid military modernization and build-up programme that was clearly
intended to close the gap with the United States . In 2010 Admiral Robert Willard, then
head of US Pacific Command, concluded that elements of Chinas military
modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region .20
Again, China challenged a US preference and Washington adjusted ; on this occasion, by
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.18
strengthening its hedging posture with the AirSea Battle concept and a rebalance towards Asia
SQ policy is engagement, not containment

Shulsky 2k(Abram, neoconservative scholar who has worked for U.S.
government, RAND Corporation, and the Hudson Institute, pg. 2) S.J
In this context, the issue for U.S. policy is how to handle a rising power, a problem that predominant powers have faced many times
throughout history. The various possible fundamental policy directions that predominant powers have pursued are well known:
preemption, containment, balancing, and accommodation (or appeasement). These policies are all understandable within the realist
tradition, which sees other powers as having essentially fixed goals and objectives (such as security, prosperity, and the
The current U.S. policy of

engagement, by contrast, is more ambitious than these realist strategies in that it
seeks to change the nature of, and, hence, the goals and objectives sought by, the
Chinese regime: It seeks to make the Chinese regime more democratic and more
willing to cooperate with existing international norms in such areas as
nonproliferation, respect for human rights, and free trade. Ultimately, it aims at
inducing China to adjust to current international norms to such an extent that its
increase in political-military power and influence will have minimal effects on the
rest of the world. According to DoDs strategy for the East Asia Pacific region: Prospects for peace and prosperity in Asia
enhancement of their own influence and power within the international system).3
depend heavily upon Chinas role as a responsible member of the international community.
U.S. appeasement now

Carpenter 2k (Appeasing China, Humiliating Ourselves, 8/14/00, Ted
Carpenter: VP for denfense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4620, EHS MKS)
In addition to its campaign of diplomatic appeasement regarding the Lee and Chen
visits, the administration acquitted itself poorly in May 1999 in responding to
attacks on the U.S. embassy in Beijing following NATO's inadvertent bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade. It was certainly appropriate for Washington to apologize - once - for the bombing
and to offer generous compensation to the victims and their families. It was troubling, though, to see U.S. officials apologizing to
Even worse, the administration responded to the violent,

weeklong attacks on the U.S. embassy and the U.S. ambassador's residence clearly conducted with the connivance of the Beijing regime - with nothing more
than anemic diplomatic protests. The proper response would have been to recall the
ambassador (who was scheduled to retire in any case) and, more important, announce that appointment of
his successor would be delayed until Beijing apologized and made explicit
assurances that it would provide appropriate protection for embassy property in the future. Other
contacts between the two governments should have been curtailed as well, to show Washington's displeasure. Such actions
would have made it clear to Beijing that the U nited States was not about to be bullied
and intimidated. Unfortunately, the administration's actions conveyed precisely the
opposite message. Few people would dispute that it is important for the United States to maintain a cordial relationship
with China. But there is a big difference between that goal and having U.S. officials abase themselves
when China's Communist rulers make outrageous demands or engage in outrageous
conduct. The Clinton administration seems incapable of grasping that distinction.
China again, and again, and again.
Appeasement Doesnt Spillover

Appeasement doesnt lead to U.S. lack of credibility- still seen
as a superpower
Kurth 12 (James, Senior Fellow at Center for the Study of America and the West,
Confronting a Powerful China with Western Characteristics,
http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/01/confronting-a-powerful-china-with-westerncharacteristics/) KR
regional appeasement does not inevitably entail global appeasement, i.e.

appeasement in other arenas. When Britain gave up its strategic position in the
Western Hemisphere to the United States, it did not then give up its strategic position in
the rest of the world. It continued to remain the leading maritime power in all of the oceans and seas of the Eastern Hemisphere for the
next thirty years. This suggests that were the U nited States to relinquish its dominant position in
the three littoral seas or even in the Western Pacific, it still could retain its dominant
position elsewhere. This could be true not only in the obvious case of the Eastern
Pacific (where the United States would have strategic advantages comparable to
those that China has in the Western Pacific), but in other oceans and seas around
the world. The most important of theseand a strategic counterpoint to the three littoral seasis the Indian Ocean.13 In this regard,
the traditional naval concept of a distant blockade might become useful. A near
blockade seeks to prevent an adversary from using his littoral waters for his naval
and commercial purposes. This requires that the blockading power have a great naval superiority over the adversary. In contrast, a
However,
distant blockade allows the adversary the use of his littoral waters, but denies him the use of the waters beyond. If the adversary is largely self-sufficient
(as was the Soviet Union and its alliance system in many respects) a capability to impose a distant blockade upon him will not be a major factor in his
strategic calculations. However, if the adversary relies a great deal upon seaborne commerce, its SLOCs (sea lanes of commerce or, in the conventional
notation, sea lines of communication) will be a major strategic factor. Traditional, imperial China was supremely self-sufficient. In this respect, it was
thoroughly Chinese. However, contemporary China is very dependent upon seaborne commerce, upon both its enormous exports of industrial products
and its enormous imports of the raw materials that are necessary for the continuing functioning of its economy (and the continuing stability of its social
In this sense, contemporary China certainly has Western characteristics .
system).
This vital
seaborne commerce passes, of course, through the three littoral seas. But much of it, including the necessary raw materials and especially the necessary
oil, also passes through the Indian Ocean. If China acquires a dominant positionand denial capabilityin the three littoral seas or even in the Western
Pacific, the United States can retain a dominant positionand denial capabilityin the Indian Ocean and in other seas beyond, through which passes
if China acquires a dominant position in the Western Pacific,

it will only be the beginning of a grand and protracted bargaining process, engaging
both China and the United States and involving both the Western Pacific and the Indian
Ocean and both the regional and the global arenas. In the end, there might be
constructed an explicit and effective system of mutual deterrence, based upon such
concepts as red-lines, salient thresholds, and tit-for-tat actions and reactions.
China's vital exports and imports. In short,
No Impact Military Force Deters Expansionism

Conventional forces, nukes, and allies still deter Chinese
aggression
Washington University, Will China's Rise Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 90(2), p8485) MLJ
Advocates of selective engagement, in contrast--an approach similar to existing U.S. policy--claim

that their chosen strategy is also consistent with the broad outlines of structural realism. Whereas neo-isolationists
want the United States to withdraw from forward positions in order to avoid being sucked into a regional conflict,
argue that preserving U.S. alliance commitments in

Europe and Asia is the best way to prevent the eruption of a conflict in the
first place. Examining how existing U.S. alliance commitments are likely to
interact with China's rise is thus a crucial issue, with implications for both
regional policy and U.S. grand strategy more generally. If the United States maintains its
those favoring selective engagement
key alliance commitments, as is likely, it will need to extend its deterrent to Japan and South Korea while facing
In many ways, this

challenge will be analogous to the one the United States faced in extending its
deterrent to Western Europe during the Cold War. Both superpowers had
robust nuclear retaliatory capabilities, and the Soviet Union was widely
believed to have superior conventional forces that were capable of invading
Europe. Back then, experts debated whether U.S. capabilities were sufficient to deter a massive Soviet
significantly larger and more capable Chinese conventional military forces.
conventional attack against Europe. They disagreed over whether NATO'S doctrine of flexible response--which
combined large conventional forces with an array of nuclear forces-- enabled the United States to make nuclear
threats credible enough to deter a Soviet conventional attack. Doubts about U.S. willingness to escalate reflected
the clear danger that U.S. escalation would be met by Soviet nuclear retaliation. Nevertheless, the stronger
U.S. strategy did provide an adequate deterrent to a

Soviet conventional attack, because even a small probability of U.S. nuclear
escalation presented the Soviets with overwhelming risks. The same logic
should apply to a future Chinese superpower. The combination of clear
alliance commitments, forward deployed conventional forces, and large
survivable nuclear forces should enable the United States to deter a Chinese
attack on either Japan or South Korea.
argument in this debate held that
Nukes deter Chinadoesnt matter if appeasement fails

Friedman 14 (Benjamin H., research fellow in Defense and Homeland Security
Studies at the Cato Institute, 6/4, "Cut Away: The U.S. Military Still Deters China,"
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/cut-away-us-military-still-deters-china
) MLJ
U.S. nuclear weapons go far to deter China. Even if Chinese leaders doubt that
the United States would risk nuclear war for an ally, the consequences of being wrong
about that quell aggression. And Chinese leaders still cannot be sure that their
nuclear arsenal can survive a U.S. first strike . Finally, there is little reason to assume
China will become more aggressive. Economic and demographic trends militate
against China sustaining its rate of military spending. And fear of major war , even a
Fourth,
conventional one with a state like Japan, tempers Chinas territorial ambitions. In that, China follows
other historically big powers, including the Soviet Union. Washingtons foreign policy elites have narcissistic take on
East Asias
stability remains robustinsensitive to the annual fights in Congressbecause war remains a
losing prospect for all major powers.
deterrence; they see it teetering with every foreign policy decision that troubles them. But
No Impact China Isnt a Threat

China faces internal issues they cannot afford to lash out
China has not yet caught

up economically. Its gross domestic product is about half that of the U nited States. No
serious military analyst suggests the PLA is a match for US military forces in the
Pacific. If war broke out today, the most the Chinese could realistically aspire to would be to
destroy a major US warship, while it would not be an unrealistic goal of US forces to
sink the entire PLA Navy. Beijings increasing confidence in challenging the US role in the Asia Pacific
Whites policy recommendation asks Washington to accept defeat prematurely.
region is largely based on the expectation, which White shares, that present trends will continue and Chinas
strength, relative to that of the United States, will increase. This expectation is certainly defensible, as Chinas
faster rate of economic growth suggests it will overtake the United States in economic output in approximately a
China would have the wherewithal to build strong

military forces and wield unparalleled influence with its many trading partners,
laying the foundation for its challenge to US supremacy in the Asia-Pacific . But this
decade.21 With the worlds largest economy,
premise is highly controversial, and the obstacles that could prevent China from achieving such regional dominance
are significant. Former US ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, one of the United States foremost China experts, is among
those who conclude that it is foolish to postulate that the twenty-first century will belong to China.22 Over the next
decade, China will face many internal obstacles to its rapid economic growth . The factors
that have driven its expansion in the post Mao era chiefly an abundant supply of cheap labour and capital,
alongside worldwide demand for Chinese exports are diminishing .
Many economists believe that

Chinese economic growth will decrease to a rate closer to those of todays
developed economies within a decade or two .23 The effect of Beijings one-child policy will begin
to impair the countrys productive capacity. Chinas fertility rate has dropped to 1.4 births per woman: below the
developed country rate of 1.7 and far below the population replacement level of 2.1. The majority of Chinese
factory workers are between the ages of 20 and 24, and the number of people in this age bracket will decrease by
42% in 201030. This reduction in factory workforce will be compounded by an increasing number of young adults
pursuing university studies. It is estimated that the number of people in this age bracket available for factory work
will therefore soon shrink by around 50%. Additionally, national savings will decline as the population ages, and the
number of Chinese over the age of 60 will double in 201030. During this period, the number of workers supporting
To maintain the economys growth, Chinese leaders

must rebalance and restructure it to rely on innovation and domestic consumption
rather than infrastructure investment and exports. Beijing is aware of the need for changes.
each retiree will drop from five to two.24
Outgoing Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao famously said Chinas growth is unbalanced, unsustainable and
uncoordinated.25 The Chinese Communist Party, however, is conservative and wary of social turmoil. The required
The
greater transparency and rule of law needed to boost entrepreneurship and
innovation are implicit political challenges to Beijings leadership . It is unclear whether
Chinas rulers will be bold enough to fully implement the necessary reforms. China is a major economic and
military power. It is not, however, strong enough to dominate the region. War with the U nited
States would be so devastating that the Chinese leadership could not contemplate it
unless a vital Chinese interest was under attack . Chinas continued ascension to a position of
changes would be opposed by powerful special interest groups and would roil much of Chinese society.
strength from which it could expect to prevail at acceptable cost in a regional conflict against US forces or against
two or more of its neighbours is uncertain. It would be unwise for the United States to make large concessions to
China to prevent a scenario that may not occur.
China isnt an immediate threatno harm in appeasement

Etzioni 13 (Amitai, professor of international affairs at George Washington
University, Accommodating China, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Survival,
55(2), p. 47) MLJ
The United States and its allies therefore have little reason to replay the Cold War
by seeking to contain China. Instead, the West could readily tolerate some
expansion of Chinas regional influence by allowing it to secure access to vital resources as long as it
abides by international law.3 Accommodating such expansion is more likely to lead to a
peaceful, limited rebalancing of power than seeking to block China on all
fronts by establishing counter-alliances. Crucially, China does not pose an
immediate threat to US interests in the same way as Iran or Pakistan. It is still in the early stages of buildingup and modernising its military. Rather than rushing to preempt China as a military threat
with a more aggressive defence policy, the United States has time to help bring
about a peaceful coexistence.
Appeasement does not lead to controversial Chinese policies

they have too much to lose
Whites case relies on inconsistent predictions about Chinese decisionmaking .
Presenting his policy advice to Washington, he follows the classic bureaucratic method of offering three choices, two
of which are bad and one of which is good. If the United States continues on its present course of trying to maintain
its primacy, the likely result will be war because China will fight to gain great-power status. If the Americans
withdraw their strength and influence from the western Pacific Rim, war is also likely. White argues that China is not
strong enough to dominate Asia against the will of the regions middle powers because it has neither the hard nor
White expects that Beijing will

strive for domination anyway. The result would be a protracted, bitter struggle between China and its
neighbours, with balancing punctuated by serious wars (p. 103). This prediction is somewhat
surprising. Beijings record of resorting to military force follows a pattern of picking
fights it expects to win and avoiding long wars. 26 In the two US policy options he rejects, White
soft power to do so. But if the United States pulls out of the region,
foresees Beijing dramatically departing from this pattern, and instead acting impetuously by entering into military
conflicts without the decisive superiority that would make a quick victory likely .
It is difficult to imagine
Beijing opting for a campaign of aggression against either formidable US forces in
the region or the determined opposition of its neighbours . A long or difficult war
would threaten Chinas continued economic development and, both directly and indirectly,
public support for Beijings leadership . In his preferred option, however, White predicts that the
Chinese will make a sensible calculation by settling for great-power status and equality with the United States.
China war not likely- 5 reasons

Thompson 14 (Five Reasons China Won't Be A Big Threat To America's Global
Power, 6/6/14, Loren Thomspon: writes about national security,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/06/06/five-reasons-china-wont-bea-big-threat-to-americas-global-power/#7bf7df91b5cd, EHS MKS)
Chinas rapid economic rise and growing assertiveness in relations with other nations has provoked concern in
Washington that America is facing a new rival for global dominance. World Bank estimates suggest China may
surpass the purchasing power of the U.S. economy as early as this year, meaning that America will cease being the
worlds biggest producer of wealth for the first time since it overtook Britain on the eve of the 1876 centennial. U.S.
critics of Beijing frequently ascribe Chinas success to mercantilist trade policies, and point to other irritants such as
growing military investment and state-directed cyber attacks to depict the Middle Kingdom as a menace on the
march. It certainly doesnt help matters when Chinese military leaders attending international forums describe
America as a nation in decline, and attribute the Obama Administrations restrained response in Ukraine to erectile
dysfunction. However, there is no need to make the administrations Pacific pivot the prelude to a new Cold War,
China looks unlikely to be any more successful in dethroning

America from global preeminence than Japan and Russia were . This is partly due to
because for all its dynamism
intrinsic economic and cultural advantages America enjoys, and partly to limits on Chinas
ability to continue advancing. Those limits dont get much attention in Washington, so I thought I would
spend a little time describing the five most important factors constraining Chinas power potential. 1.
Geographical constraints. Unlike America, which spent much of its history expanding under doctrines such
as Manifest Destiny, Chinas potential for territorial growth is severely limited by
geography. To the west it faces the barren Tibetan plateau and Gobi Desert. To the south the Himalayan
mountains present an imposing barrier to the Indian Subcontinent. To the north vast and largely empty grasslands
known as the Steppes provide a buffer with Russia. And to the east stretches the worlds largest ocean (there are
over 6,000 miles of water between Shanghai and San Francisco). So aside from the hapless Vietnamese who share
the southern coastal plain and Chinas historical claim to Taiwan, there isnt much opportunity for wars of conquest
Chinas disputes with neighbors over the disposition of minor

islands and reefs underscores how little real potential Beijing has for growing its
territory the way other powers have. 2. Demographic trends. At 1.3 billion, China has the
on Chinas periphery. Ironically,
largest population of any country. However, that population is aging rapidly due to the one-child policy imposed in
1979. The current fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman is well below the level of 2.1 required to maintain a stable
population over the long run, and also far below the birthrates seen in other emerging Asian nations. What this
within
a few years, the working age population will reach a historical peak and then begin
a sharp decline. The vast pool of cheap labor that fueled Chinas economic miracle has already begun
disappearing, driving up wages and leading some labor-intensive industries to move out . In the years
ahead, a growing population of old people will undermine efforts to stimulate
internal demand while creating pressure for increased social-welfare spending. 3.
Economic dependency. China has followed the same playbook as its Asian neighbors in using trade as a
means in economic terms, to quote a paper recently published by the International Monetary Fund, is that
springboard to economic development. According to the CIAs 2014 World Factbook, exports of goods and services
comprise over a quarter of Chinas gross domestic product. But even if the low-cost labor that made this possible
wasnt drying up, the reliance of an export-driven economy on foreign markets makes Chinas prosperity per
capita GDP is below $10,000 much more vulnerable than Americas. China has sold over $100 billion more in
goods to the U.S. so far this year than it has bought, but that longstanding boost to the Chinese economy wont
persist if the labor cost differential between the two countries keeps narrowing or Washington decides Beijing is a
China is so dependent on offshore resources, markets and

investors to keep its economy growing that it cant run the risk of really scaring its
trading partners. 4. Political culture. Because the Communist Party monopolizes
power in China, there is little opportunity for fundamental reform of the political
system. Party officials at all levels routinely leverage that monopoly to engage in epic corruption. Bribery,
embezzlement, kickbacks and property theft are endemic. The Guardian reports that military posts are sold
for the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of pounds each, creating a vicious
circle as officers who have paid for their places seek to recoup the cost. Favoritism
towards state-controlled industries and well-connected industrialists results in
massive inefficiencies. President Xi Jinpings crackdown on graft resulted in over 8,000 cases being
real danger to its interests.
investigated during just the first three months of this year, suggesting a culture of corruption reminiscent of New
Yorks Tweed Ring. But Tweed was driven from power through democratic processes, whereas Chinas political
Military weakness. That brings me to the subject with which most defense
the
Pentagon is out with its latest ominous assessment of Chinas military buildup,
which is said to encompass everything from stealthy fighters to maneuvering antiship missiles to anti-satellite weapons. Those programs actually exist, but the threat
they pose to the U.S. at present is not so clea r. For instance, Beijing doesnt have the
reconnaissance network needed to track and target U.S. warships, and if it did the
weapons it launched would face the most formidable air defenses in the world. Much
culture offers no such solution. 5.
analysts would have begun this commentary Chinese military power. Military.com reports today that
has been written about Chinas supposedly growing investment in nuclear weapons, but the best public information
available suggests that China has about 250 warheads in its strategic arsenal, most of which cant reach America;
the U.S. has 4,600 nuclear warheads available for delivery by missile or plane, and an additional 2,700 in storage.
Beijings decision to sustain only a modest some would say minimal nuclear
deterrent seems incompatible with the notion that it seeks to rival U.S. power . Until
recently it has not possessed a credible sea-based deterrent force, it still does not have a single operational aircraft
carrier, and many of its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion rather than nuclear power. When these less-thanimposing features of the Chinese military posture are combined with widely reported deficiencies in airlift,
reconnaissance, logistics and other key capabilities, the picture that emerges is not ominous. China is an emerging
regional power that is unlikely to ever match America in the main measures of military power unless dysfunctional
political processes in Washington impair our nations economy and defenses. In fact, secular trends are already at
work within the Chinese economy, society and political culture that will tend to make the Middle Kingdom look less
threatening tomorrow, rather than like a global rival of America.
China will not become a military threat

The Guardian 15 (The Guardian is a British national daily newspaper founded in
1821, China not a military threat to U.S. says Powell, http://guardian.ng/news/china-not-amilitary-threat-to-u-s-says-powell/) KR
Former U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on Thursday stressed the importance of
U.S.-China cooperation and dismissed the assertion that China would be a military
threat to the U.S. I do not think China will be a military threat. It is not in their interest to be a
military threat to the U.S., Powell said in a lecture at the Library of Congress in Washington. He
encouraged the U.S. to work with China, saying that such cooperation would not
result in a military conflict. The former top diplomat said Chinas economic
development in recent decades was `astonishing, pointing out that China is making
efforts to invest in its future. The U.S. has to have a proper relationship with
China, Powell said. Another speaker of the lecture, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, shared Powells views on the importance of U.S.-China ties . Albright said that
there was never a time the two major powers had been so dependent on each other
and their economies so intertwined. The cooperation part of U.S.-China relations is
very important, said Albright, emphasising that it is the essential relationship. At the invitation of U.S.
President Barack Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping would pay a State visit to the U.S. in September.
China is not recognized as a military threat because of lack of

economic stability
GMF & IAI 15 (German Marshall Funding of the U.S. & Istituto Affari Internazionali,
Transworld Final Conference The West and the Global Shift of Power: Transatlantic Relations
and Global Governance, http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/Washington_150713_rep.pdf) KR
Ambassador OSullivan also commented on the strategic role of China, arguing that the
only threat that should worry the transatlantic partners more than a successful
China, was a weak China. He also agreed with Congressman Meeks that, while China would
challenge the West in economic and political terms, it would not emerge as a
military threat. With regard to TTIP, Ambassador OSullivan, however, disagreed with the Transworld report
findings, which projected that diverging views on agricultural standards on both sides of the Atlantic would be a
great impediment to reaching a transatlantic trade agreement. Ambassador OSullivan contended that the only
significant sticking point was the issue of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), and even on this front the
negotiations were progressing steadily, according to his assessment. In an elegant closing argument ,
Ambassador Grossman resolved that ultimately, both the US and Europe would have
to get past non-issues like bananas and chlorinated chicken, which continued to define the
public TTIP debate, if the transatlantic partners are to strengthen the transatlantic partnership going forward.
China military or nuclear threat unlikely

Thompson 14 (Loren, Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown
University, taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Five Reasons
China Won't Be A Big Threat To America's Global Power,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/06/06/five-reasons-china-wont-be-a-bigthreat-to-americas-global-power/#71c5c24f1b5c) KR
Chinese
military power. Military.com reports today that the Pentagon is out with its latest ominous assessment of
That brings me to the subject with which most defense analysts would have begun this commentary
Chinas military buildup, which is said to encompass everything from stealthy fighters to maneuvering anti-ship
the threat they pose to the U.S.

at present is not so clear. For instance, Beijing doesnt have the reconnaissance
network needed to track and target U.S. warships, and if it did the weapons it
launched would face the most formidable air defenses in the world . Much has been written
about Chinas supposedly growing investment in nuclear weapons, but the best public information
available suggests that China has about 250 warheads in its strategic arsenal, most
of which cant reach America; the U.S. has 4,600 nuclear warheads available for delivery by missile or
plane, and an additional 2,700 in storage. Beijings decision to sustain only a modest some
would say minimal nuclear deterrent seems incompatible with the notion that it
seeks to rival U.S. power. Until recently it has not possessed a credible sea-based
deterrent force, it still does not have a single operational aircraft carrier, and many
of its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion rather than nuclear power. When
these less-than-imposing features of the Chinese military posture are combined with
widely reported deficiencies in airlift, reconnaissance, logistics and other key
capabilities, the picture that emerges is not ominous . China is an emerging regional
power that is unlikely to ever match America in the main measures of military
power unless dysfunctional political processes in Washington impair our nations
economy and defenses. In fact, secular trends are already at work within the Chinese economy, society and
missiles to anti-satellite weapons. Those programs actually exist, but
political culture that will tend to make the Middle Kingdom look less threatening tomorrow, rather than like a global
rival of America.
China is not a threat perceived aggressiveness is in response

to actions of others
Friedberg 15 (Aaron L. Friedberg, The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijings Assertiveness,
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 133150) RR
Despite the seeming weight of the evidence, some analysts have sought to challenge what political scientist Iain
Chinas behavior in recent

years has been neither especially new nor assertive. If on occasion, China has acted
in a more forceful or aggressive fashion, it has done so largely in response to the
provocative actions of others. While the events in question are complex and subject to varying
Johnston refers to as the new assertiveness meme.4 According to Johnston,
interpretation, on closer inspection neither of these arguments is persuasive. To take one notable example: Johnston
the 2010 arrest of a Chinese fisherman

charged with ramming a Japanese coastal patrol vessel. The ensuing crisis , which
resulted in an unprecedented heightening of SinoJapanese tensions , appears to have
been driven almost entirely by Beijing. Johnston acknowledges that it is true that China escalated its
diplomatic rhetoric, first demanding the captains immediate release and then,
once that had been obtained, insisting that Tokyo apologize for its actions . He
devotes considerable attention to the imbroglio that followed
speculates that the initial decision to ratchet up tensions may have had something to do with the impending
anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and dismisses the demand for an apology as possibly
The fact that domestic political

dynamics may have played a role does not change the fact that Beijings stance
was unusually confrontational; certainly this is how Tokyo perceived it.
perfunctory and clearly aimed at a domestic Chinese audience.5
SCS doesnt prove Chinese aggressiveness -- Japan/Philippines

push came first
The South China Sea is one area where even a skeptic like Johnston believes that
Chinas diplomatic rhetoric and practice have shifted fairly sharply in a more hard-line
direction.8 As he and others have argued, however, these shifts may have come in response to
actions by others.9 It is true that during the period 20092011, the Chinese government published a series of
maps and documents that one could interpret as expanding and intensifying its claims in the region. But these were
arguably part of a larger diplomatic and legal game in which other states may have made the opening moves.1 0
The most recent rounds of escalation and heightened tensions in the East and South
China Seas can also plausibly be blamed on Tokyo and Manila rather than Beijing . When
the Japanese government bought three of the five disputed Senkaku Islands from a private landowner in September
2012, China stepped up air and naval activity and, in November 2013, unilaterally declared an Air Defense
In April 2012, when the Philippines sent a

navy frigate to investigate the activities of a group of Chinese fishing boats, Beijing
accused Manila of militarizing their long-standing dispute over the cluster of rocks
and reefs known as Scarborough Shoal . The Chinese deployed several maritime patrol vessels to the
area, resulting in a protracted standoff that ended only when the Philippines backed
down and withdrew its ships, as Ely Ratner of the Center for a New American
Security explains, under the auspices of a face-saving typhoon .12
Identification Zone (ADIZ) over most of the East China Sea.11
No China threat theyve begun an era of dtente

Beijing made a number of moves that some interpreted as marking an end to

the period of assertiveness and the possible beginning of an era of detente .57 In May,
Xi Jinping gave a major address calling for a new approach to regional security issues, one in which the
people of Asia would run the affairs of Asia.58 In October, Beijing announced the formation of a new
In the latter half of 2014,
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that would provide capital for development projects across the region.59 One month later, at
Keqiang promised that China would step up its efforts to devise

a code of conduct for handling maritime disputes, proposed a new treaty of
friendship between China and the members of ASEAN, and for good measure
offered them $20 billion in loans.60 At the November 2014 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in
Beijing, Chinese and Japanese leaders held their first formal high-level meeting in two years. For their part, the United
States and China signed agreements pledging, among other things, to reduce carbon
emissions and calling for the development of procedures designed to avoid
accidents in the air or at sea.61 Most of these measures are extensions of the efforts to reduce tensions with the
the East Asia Summit, Premier Li
United States and many Southeast Asian nations that began as early as late 2010. Beijings apparent desire to cool the diplomatic
climate may reflect a concern that the risks of an unintended conflict were rising or a judgment that, at least for the moment, the
costs of further assertiveness would exceed the benefits. Whether the awkward handshake between Xi and Japanese Prime Minister
Abe will lead to a sustained easing of Chinese pressure on the Senkakus, and whether Beijing will back off in its ongoing
confrontations with the Philippines and Vietnam remains to be seen. If it does,
then the interval of forceful action
that began in 2009 may be at an end, and a more placid period in Chinas relations
with its neighbors, and with the United States, may be at hand.
Impact Turn - Containment Bad

Only accommodation can prevent US/China conflict
U.S. accommodation of China deserves serious analysis for two reasons. First, both
intuition and international relations theory suggest that a rising power, especially
one that has experienced tremendous growth, can reasonably expect to increase its
geopolitical influence and more fully achieve its goals, especially when these goals
involve its national security. Bargaining theories maintain that the probability of war
is greater when there is a larger disparity between the distribution of benefits in the
existing territorial status quo and the balance of power. Accommodation that
reduces this disparity can, under some conditions, reduce the probability of war
and increase the declining states security. Second, the pressures created by
the international structurethe combination of material and information conditions
that constrain states international optionsshould allow China to rise peacefully,
which, somewhat counterintuitively, increases the potential importance of
accommodation. If the international structure were driving the United States and
China toward a major conflict, the concessions required of the United States would
be extremely large and costly. Even then, they might do little to moderate the
intense competition. But, because the international structure is not creating such
intense pressures, concessions that do not compromise vital U.S. interests may
have the potential to greatly diminish growing strains in U.S.-China
relations, thereby moderating future military and foreign policy
competition between the two powers.
Containment leads to Chinese backlash

Fong 13 (Arthur Chi Wing, Commander United States Navy, Dancing with the
Dragon: U.S.-China Engagement Policy, pg.9) S.J
China believes that the U.S. wants to protect its hegemonic position and prevent
China from becoming an Asian regional power in which the U nited States has
dominated since the end of WWII. The island disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea have
generated friction between China and neighboring countries. China has criticized the United States for
siding with other nations against Chinas territorial claims. However, U.S. leaders have
proclaimed neutrality on the island disputes. As China has ascended to become the worlds
second-most economically powerful nation, it is becoming more assertive in its
foreign policy. China is indeed challenging the western dominated international
order.
Containment failsAsian leaders wont help with it

Saunders 13 (Phillip C., senior research fellow at the Institute for National
Strategic Studies at National Defense University, The U.S. Isnt Trying to Contain
China, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/23/the-u-s-isnt-trying-to-contain-china/ )
But Asian leaders want the United States to offset China, not contain it.
China is a major
market for all countries in Asia, including key U.S. allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Their nightmare
scenario is a military conflict between the United States and China that forces countries to pick sides. Almost as bad
would be a division into pro-U.S. and pro-China blocs, threatening the regions prosperity and undoing decades of
Even if the United States decided to try and contain China, Asian
countries would be extremely reluctant to participate in U.S.-led efforts to isolate
China economically. There is no enthusiasm in the region for an "Asian NATO" or for
hosting U.S. military forces that are clearly aimed against China. Asian countries
would not support Chinese efforts to curtail U.S. involvement in the region, nor
would they sign up for U.S. efforts to encircle or contain China. And without the
assistance of allies such as Japan and South Korea, the U nited States would lack the
forward bases necessary to implement a military strategy of containment. The U.S.
economic integration.
access to South Pacific airfields that Reed discusses may provide flexibility in contingencies and marginally enhance
deterrence, but is a wholly insufficient basis for a regional strategy aimed against China.
Containment fails increases expansionism

Harner 14 (Stephen, former U.S. Foreign Service Officer who served in Beijing ,
8/12, Time For Honesty And Change In Obama's Failed China Policy,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2014/08/12/time-for-honesty-andchange-in-obamas-failed-china-policy/#6b2eace37fdf ) MLJ
American
leaders constantly lie about U.S.-China policy , writes Justin Logan, director
of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute on the China-US Focus website July 23. They consistently
protest when people claim the United States is encircling or containing China.
But, in fact, Washington is encircling and containing China. As apparent as the U.S.
encircling actions are, and as hollow as U.S. denials ring in the ears of Chinas leaders, Logan asks the obvious
question of who Washington is seeking to convince. He answers that the rhetoric is not so much directed at China
as at other countries in the region. If the United States forthrightly explained that it seeks to contain Chinas
military powercountries in the region from which Washington seeks cooperation would have a harder time
providing it. Logans point turns on Washingtons more genuine and demonstrable actionsnaturally promoted by
U.S. business intereststhat have supported Chinas economic development. That the U.S. supports China
economically makes it easier and less risky for countries with important economic ties with China to remain aligned
with the United States. If this picture seems confused, it reflects the conflicts and contradictions of American
policies toward Asia, not least, indeed, perhaps more importantly, in the realm of grand strategy. In an important
new book entitled Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, MIT director of strategic studies Barry R.
Posen explains how U.S. grand strategy since the end of the Cold War, which he labels Liberal Hegemony. Posen
calls for the staged withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and South Korea (which can easily shoulder is defense
Why?
Because the United States has a strategic interest in preventing a single state [read:
China] from dominating Eurasia. and to do so it must preserve its access to Eurasia. China
presently does, and will certainly continue to, dominate the continental
East Asia (but never before and not now Eurasia), and has done so for most of the past
millennium, to the great benefit and peace of the regions people. It would seem that very existence of a
needs), but hedges on substantially reducing overwhelming U.S. military power in Asia from bases in Japan.
China that is sovereign and not prostrate is a clear and present threat to Obamas Liberal Hegemony and a worry
for Posens Grand Strategy of Restraint.
Appeasement is good- anything harder make them securitize

which leads failing US- China
Washington University, Will China's Rise Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 90(2), p.88)
MLJ
For example, the popular belief that a rising China will severely threaten U.S. security could become a self-fulfilling
Should Washington fail to understand that Chinas growing military

capabilities do not threaten vital U.S. interests, it may adopt overly
competitive military and foreign policies, which may in turn signal to China
that the United States has malign motives. Should China then feel less secure, it
will be more likely to adopt competitive policies that the United States will see as
more threatening. The result would be a negative spiral driven not by the
international situation the states actually faced but by their exaggerated insecurities.
prophecy.
Appeasement with China is the only chance for stability while

containment proves impossible to check Chinas power
KR
Putting aside Chinas political complexion leads White to a different conclusion. Arguing that most Chinese and most
the United States

and China must work together. They should be able to see beyond their politicalideological differences, especially now that China is as comfortable with capitalism
as anyone in Asia. The United States, as the extant hegemon, should be big and wise
enough to share power by giving China the greater political influence it desires . The
Asian nations do not question the legitimacy of the Chinese government, White believes that
rest of Asia, with the exception of Japan, is already adjusting to a more influential China.28 For White, this
adjustment has much to do with Chinas economic clout and how the latter predisposes most in Asia to give
serious consideration to Chinas political and strategic interests. It follows that for White, this is a decisive constraint
on the options available to the United States: few Asian states will line up to check or contain Chinas growing
influence. A comparison with the Cold War calculations of the Asian states (except for Indochina) reveals why this is
so. Back then, all the relevant considerations ideology, economic opportunity, and military securitymoved
noncommunist Asia in the direction of aligning with the United States .
Today, China is no longer the

ideological other for most Asianssocialism with Chinese characteristics is too
capitalistic for that. Chinas political complexion is also less central, in part because there is wide variation in
the political systems of the Asian states. It is only in the realm of security that China remains worrisome for some,
The rest of
Asia is less worried about China. The strategic orientations of these other countries
have been described as hedginga policy of engaging both the U nited States and
China in the hope of not having to choose between them .29 During the Cold War,
they were content to align themselves explicitly with the U nited States, in part because
of what China was (a communist state) and what it did (supporting local communist insurgencies). All
things considered, then, it will prove extremely difficult today for the U nited States to
corral a serious Asian coalition to check Chinas power. That is why, for White, the
United States, as the existing hegemon, has to share power . To be sure, for now and the
especially Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippinesall of which have serious maritime disputes with it.
foreseeable future, most countries in Asia would not want China to replace the United States as the hegemonthe
ideal would be a situation where neither is the hegemon (i.e., Whites power-sharing solution),
sees as the only guarantee of peace and stability.
which White
Accommodation with China allows us to eliminate the

possibility of a U.S and PRC war
Friedberg 05 (Aaron,Vice President of the United States as deputy assistant for
national-security affairs and director of policy planning The Future of U.S.-China Relations,
pg.35)
A thorough going liberal optimist would follow a similarly linear chain of reasoning to arrive at opposite conclusions.
Thus even as China becomes wealthy and powerful, the attractive force of shared economic interests and the
Chinas
inevitable transition to democracy will effectively eliminate the possibility of a U.S.PRC war and smooth the way for a lasting accommodation between the two great
powers. All the forces that might seem to oppose this development will appear in
retrospect to have been weak and, in the grand sweep of history, insignificant.
soothing effects of institutional integration will be sufficient to forestall any prospect of direct conflict.
Containment doesnt work- policies that work with and dont

encircle China, like the plan, solve best
Nye 13 (Joseph S., professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, 1/25, "Work With
China, Dont Contain It," http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/opinion/work-withchina-dont-contain-it.html?_r=0 ) MLJ
CITING an escalating dispute over islands in the East China Sea, The Economist warned last week that China and
Japan are sliding toward war. That assessment may be too alarmist, but the tensions have bolstered the efforts of
some American analysts who have urged a policy to contain China. During a recent visit to China, I was struck by
how many Chinese officials believe such a policy is already in place and is the central purpose of President Obamas
pivot toward Asia. The
pivot is a very stupid choice, Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations,

has achieved nothing and only annoyed China.
China cant be contained, he added. Containment was designed for a different
era, and it is not what the United States is, or should be, attempting now. At the
declared publicly. The United States
start of the cold war, containment meant economic isolation of the Soviets and regional alliances like NATO to deter
Moscows military expansion. Later, to the chagrin of George F. Kennan, the father of containment, the doctrine led
Cold war containment

involved virtually no trade and little social contact. But China now is not what
the Soviet Union was then. It is not seeking global hegemony, and the United
States not only has an immense trade with China but also huge exchanges of
students and tourists. When I worked on the Pentagons East Asia strategy in 1994, during the Clinton
to the domino effect theory behind the escalation of the Vietnam War.
administration, we rejected the idea of containment for two reasons. If we treated China as an enemy, we were
guaranteeing a future enemy. If we treated China as a friend, we kept open the possibility of a more peaceful future.
We devised a strategy of integrate but hedge something like Ronald Reagans trust but verify. America
supported Chinas membership in the World Trade Organization and accepted Chinese goods and visitors. But a
1996 declaration reaffirmed that the postwar United States-Japan security treaty was the basis for a stable and
prosperous East Asia. President Clinton also began to improve relations with India to counterbalance Chinas rise.
This strategy has enjoyed bipartisan support. President George W. Bush continued to improve relations with India,
while deepening economic ties with China. His deputy secretary of state, Robert B. Zoellick, made clear that
America would accept the rise of China as a responsible stakeholder. Mr. Obamas rebalancing toward Asia
involves moving naval resources to the Pacific, but also trade, human rights and diplomatic initiatives. As his
national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, said in November, the American-Chinese relationship has elements
of both cooperation and competition. Asia is not a monolith, and its internal balance of power should be the key to
our strategy. Japan, India, Vietnam and other countries do not want to be dominated by China, and thus welcome an
American presence in the region. Unless China is able to attract allies by successfully developing its soft power,
the rise in its hard military and economic power is likely to frighten its neighbors, who will coalesce to balance its
power. A significant American military and economic presence helps to maintain the Asian balance of power and
shape an environment that provides incentives for China to cooperate. After the 2008-9 financial crisis, some
Chinese mistakenly believed that America was in permanent decline and that this presented new opportunities. A
result was that China worsened its relations with Japan, India, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines a misstep
that confirmed that only China can contain China. But
Americas rebalancing toward Asia
should not be aggressive. We should heed Mr. Kennans warning against overmilitarization and
ensure that China doesnt feel encircled or endangered. The worlds two largest
economies have much to gain from cooperation on fighting climate change, pandemics, cyberterrorism and nuclear
proliferation.
Containment fails to check China- just motivates them to

assert itself into more things
Manicom 14 (James, Research Fellow in the Asian Institute at the University of
Toronto, September, Empathy: The Missing Link between Confidence and Trust in
East Asia, Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security
Dimensions of the Dispute, p. 108) MLJ
A third set of gaps exists between the United States and China. For its part, the United States does not appreciate
in China's
eyes the American rebalance supports the moti-vation for China to assert
itself. Although U.S. leaders are careful at every juncture to remind China that the
rebalance is not about containment, which should be patently obvious to anyone familiar with the
difficulties of a declining maritime power containing a rising continental one," the Chinese don't buy it.
Cheng Li from the Brookings Institution recently reported being struck that a
number of Chinese analysts perceived that the United States was either
encouraging smaller countries to provoke China or attempting to capital-ize
on regional tensions to justify the rebalance." By contrast, two prominent U.S. foreign policy
that, however incoherent and aggressive China's strategy in the South China Sea might appear,
experts recently suggested in the prominent journal Foreign Affairs that the onus is on China, more than the United
States, to improve relations in maritime East Asia. This betrays a lack of appreciation about stated Chinese
anxieties about the role of Us. forces in the region and their relationship with some of China's neighbors."
Containment fails because it construes China as an enemy

plan doesnt
Cronin 14 (Patrick M., Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific
Security Program at CNAS, The Rise of Tailored Coercion in the South China Sea,
Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of
the Dispute, p. 34) MLJ
China is pursuing a "strategic opportunity" to capitalize on its newfound and

growing power to expand its regional influences. Specifically in the S outh China
Sea, it appears to want to gain de facto and de jure control over a "nine-dash line"
claim covering the vast majority of the area. Such actions are tailored in several senses: They are tailored to be
sufficiently peaceful and thus not intended to escalate into full-fledged conflict or to trigger a unified, anti-China
alliance. They are tailored to appear sufficiently nonmilitary in nature and thus not intended to accentuate China's
rapidly modernizing military forces. They are tailored to send vary-ing messages to different audiences and thus to
signal internally that President Xi Jinping will protect core China interests and sovereignty and signal regionally that
each country looking for good trade and relations with China will have to give China greater control over security
and resource issues. And they signal to the United States that its preeminence is unsustainable, and it must do
more to accommodate a rising China (for instance, by coerc-ing allies such as japan and the Philippines to make
China may not expect to push the United States out of Asia, but
surely it hopes to expand its regional clout by reducing U.S. influence. What
concessions to China).
China fails to see or wishes to ignore is that its increasing assertiveness is desta-bilizing the region and remains the
most likely source of military escalation in Asia outside the Korean peninsula. By falling back on its own historical
narrative, growing capability and wealth, and a growing appetite for control over its vast periphery, China is
Major General Zhu

Chenghu recently claimed that "the Americans are making very, very
important strategic mistakes right now" in their dealing with China. "If you
take China as an enemy," he expanded, "China will absolutely become the
enemy of the U.S." In a subsequent interview on the margins of the Shangri-la Dialogue, General Zhu put
creating precisely the polarizing regional environment it blames on the United States.
U.S. national security policy in an even less flattering light, claiming that the United States suffered from erectile
dysfunction."' But while General Zhu seeks to defend Chinese coercion through punchy talking points, he glosses
over China's role In determining the fate of regional peace. As Joseph Nye Is fond of saying. only China can contain
China' because only its disregard for its neighbors can precipitate an arms race" Advancing strategic cooperation
while limiting competition with China is easier said Than done. Chinese leaders talk about a achieving a -new type
of major power relations: but they flinch from cooperation. whether on accepting regional norms on a binding code
of conduct. stanching North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. or desisting from cyber economic theft. to name
Just three areas of importance. Whereas the United States wishes to build an inclusive and open rules-based system
in the Asia-Pacific region. China is mostly focused on preserving internal stability and expand. lag its influence
around its periphery. Far instance. Its active buildup of conventional cruise missiles are aimed at bolstering its antiaccess and area-denial capability. and the People Liberation Army (PLA) navy has begun 'raining to prevent ... the
U.S. from interfering ... In a Taiwan. East China Sea or South China Sea conflict?'
Containment is not the greatest and most efficient way of

checking China, policymakers consider hedging and
accommodation the better way.
He 11(Baogang, Chair in International Studies of Deakin University, Politics of
Accommodation of the Rise of China: the case of Australia, Journal of
Contemporary China, 21(73), pg 53-70) DS
engagement and containment are

outdated leftovers from the Cold War and should be abandoned in favour of
the concept of constrainment. Engagement is usually based on the liberal premise that the benefits of
economic interdependence act to deter destabilizing behaviour, while containment is based on the idea
that Chinas rise is upsetting the balance of power in East Asia and must
therefore be restricted. Nowadays, policymakers talk more often about hedging rather than containment. The
The late Gerald Segal, however, argued that the concepts of
term hedge seems to be much less hawkish or stinging than the term containment. At the same time accommodation has also
been more frequently used. Scholarship on the new development of accommodation in East Asia, such as Robert Rosss examination
of policy in South Korea and Mochizukis discussion of Japanese policy, are testament to its emergence. Manicom and ONeil also
The
process of accommodation is a multiple-level and mutual-influencing
process, starting from small power to middle power (or secondary state)
and moving eventually to influence great-power policy. Small powers in Asia
have taken a leading role in making necessary adjustments to accommodate
the rise of China. Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and Australia have shifted towards an accommodation policy concerning China. Each nation comes to terms with China in its own manner combining the
show some evidence of it in the Australian context, although the Australian alignment with the US is still strong.
different elements of containment, engagement and hedging strategies in a variety of ways.
TURN: SQ policy of Asia Pivot causes China to retaliate in SCS

De Castro 13 (Renato Cruz, Professor in the International Studies Department,
De La Salle University-Manila, September, The Obama Administrations Strategic
Pivot to Asia: From a Diplomatic to a Strategic Constrainment of an Emergent
China?, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 25(3), p. 343-344) MLJ
All these boil down to the administrations realization that diplomacy will not be enough. The U.S. constrainment strategy must be
backed up by a military capability so that a comprehensive new rule-based system designed to resolve the competing territorial
claims can take root in a region made up of Westphalian states.86 On the Asia pivot policy, the March 2012 U.S. Congressional
China remains suspicious of the Obama administrations

strategic pivot to Asia. A month after its official pronouncement, the Chinese defense ministry denounced the policy
Research Service Report states:
as a product of Cold War thinking.88 Chinese leaders also foresee a revival of Sino-U.S. rivalry that will increase friction and conflict
in the region.89 Cognizant of their countrys growing military power, they also take note of the current U.S. fiscal crisis which casts
doubts on the Obama administrations ability to finance larger forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region.90
Consequently, China has responded to the strategic constrainment policy with

countervailing military power and renewed assertiveness in the South China Sea.
From July to August 2012, it was reported that China conducted flight tests of
a new multiple-warhead, ground-mobile missile and the JL-2 submarinelaunched ballistic missile.91 China also took extraordinary measures to
demonstrate its power over the disputed parts of the South China Sea, such as:92
a) Utilizing maritime and fishing security ships to coerce other claimant states to
respect Chinas sovereignty over the disputed islands and waters; b) unilaterally
exploiting marine resources; c) creating a multi-faceted administrative
structure backed up by a military garrison to govern the disputed territories;
and d) preventing ASEAN from coming up with a unified position on the
issue. These moves are reflective of Chinas displeasure with U.S. meddling in the maritime dispute and readiness to do
anything, short of war, to undermine the policy of strategic constrainment.
Polite appeasement policies are the only way to solve conflict

with China
Evans-Pritchard 11 (Evans, International Business Editor, Appeasement is the
proper policy towards Confucian China,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/8277143/Appeaseme
nt-is-the-proper-policy-towards-Confucian-China.html) KR
A cocky China needs to watch its step, as does a rancorous America, before
resentments feed on each other in a Wilhelmine spiral. The Chinese have no recent history
of sweeping territorial expansion (except Tibet). The one-child policy has left a dearth of
young men, and implies a chronic aging crisis within a decade. This is not the
demographic profile of a fundamentally bellicose nation. The correct statecraft for
the West is to treat Beijing politely but firmly as a member of global club, gambling that
the Confucian ethic will over time incline China to a quest for global as well as national concord. Until we face
irrefutable evidence that this Confucian bet has failed, 'Boltonism must be crushed.
Appeasement, your
hour has come.
Appeasement solves negotiations and increases economic ties

Newsham 14 (Grant, Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies,
China, America and the "Appeasement" Question, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226) KR
appeasement was more than simply disarming and letting unpleasant

people have their way. Appeasement actually had a coherent logic. The elites believed
that aggressive, authoritarian regimes act the way they do out of fear, insecurity, and
at least partly legitimate grievances such as German resentment of the harsh Treaty of Versailles.
Understand and address these issue, remove their fears, and the regimes will become
less aggressive and transform into responsible members of the international
community and operate under international norms . Or so the elites argued. Challenging
To these elites,
these regimes could dangerously isolate them and even needlessly provoke them
into miscalculations. The elites thought engagement and transparency were
beneficial in their own right, as only good things could come from familiarity with
one another. In the 1930s, the major Western powers all attended each others war games. The US Marine
Corps even took the German World War I fighter ace, Ernst Udet on a ride in a USMC dive bomber. This
engagement and transparency did not make the Nazis nicer, but perhaps gave them some ideas about dive
bombing and Blitzkreig. Even the Soviets and Germans had close ties with joint training, military technology
There was also extensive political and

diplomatic interaction. Close economic ties were believed to be a further hedge
against conflict breaking out, and companies such as Ford, IBM, and many others
did profitable business in Germany. The elites believed anything was better than
war. Preserving peace, even if sacrificing principles and certain small nations was
considered wise and statesmanlike. People who criticized appeasement policy in the 1930s, most
development, and raw material shipments to Germany.
notably Winston Churchill, were ridiculed as dolts and war mongers.
AT: Greentech/CCS
US and China are both highly motivated to cooperate
partnerships will succeed
CCF 14 (China Carbon Forum, Implications and Challenges of the US-China Joint
Announcement on Climate Change Cooperation, www.chinacarbon.info/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Implications-of-the-US-China-Joint-Announcement-onClimate-Change_.pdf
A basis of common interest and cooperation is found for building a new type of
major power relations between China and the US. Relative to other areas in which
they may have more differences, climate change action has emerged as an area in
which China and the US share a greater consensus , have a greater likelihood for
successful collaboration, and have greater incentives in terms of their partnership's
implications for the broader bilateral relationship. The two countries and humanity at
largeare faced with the challenge of climate change as well as the immense task
of economic rebalancing, low-carbon transition, post-crisis recovery, and the search
for new growth points to power future development. Climate change represents an
environmental challenge, but also challenges us to promote sustainable
development, emerge from recession, and work toward a new global
prosperity. The US and China have a bilateral trade volume of over 500 billion dollars, and their combined
emissions account for over 40% of the global total. Without cooperation between these two countries,
there can be little hope for the future of the global environment , for the world
economy, and indeed for the human race.
3)
Climate coop highlights dispute resolution and mutual

understanding Aff solves for the negs worries
SCMP 6/6, (South China Morning Post, China, US cooperation on climate change a
model of how two nations can resolve differences, says Chinese negotiator,
6/6/2016, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1967010/china-uscooperation-climate-change-model-how-two)
China and the United States cooperation in tackling climate change is an example of how
the two countries can work together to resolve their differences, Beijings top climate change
negotiator said on Monday. The way the two nations had cooperated on the issue was a model
example of a new type of power relations between the two countries that Chinas President
Xi Jinping is seeking, said Xie Zhenhua. Xie made his comments on the sidelines of the annual strategic and economic dialogue
between top US and Chinese leaders, which is now underway in Beijing. The two sides are discussing a range of issues, including
rising tensions between Beijing and Washington over Chinas increasingly assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea. [ As
long as we can] increase mutual understanding, build mutual trust and respect each others
core interests and major concerns, we can always find solutions to our differences, said
Xie. The climate deal negotiator dedicated a large part of his 30-minute briefing lauding how the two countries top leaders had
worked together on the issue. Their cooperation included three joint statements by Xi and Barack Obama since 2014 that laid some
of the foundations to secure a climate change deal in Paris last year. Ensuring that the Paris agreement goes into force as soon as
possible will be a major task for China and the US this year, said Xie. Cooperation
on climate change between

the two countries is a highlight in the new type of major power relations, as well as
an exemplar of a new global governance system, he said. The two countries
decided to bury the hatchet and stop challenging and blaming each other during
international climate talks after the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit to reach a global deal. Since Xi took
office three years ago he has repeatedly promoted the idea of a new type of major power relations to govern China-US ties based
on cooperation and mutual respect, receiving only a lukewarm response from Washington.
AT: Export Controls

Empirics prove plan solves trust and coop increased
technology transfer is key mitigates chances of Chinese
misconduct
Lieberthal and Wang 2012 (Kenneth Lieberthal, senior fellow in Foreign
Policy and Global Economy and Development, and Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of
International Studies at Peking University, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic
Distrust, http://yahuwshua.org/en/Resource-584/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf)
Second, the United States government is reviewing its regulations on exports of
technology with a view toward updating those regulations. The Obama
Administration has been engaged in this effort since its first year in office. The task
is complex both substantively and procedurally, but it will contribute substantially to
building mutual trust if it can be brought to a meaningful conclusion during
President Obamas current term. It is widely expected that the changes will
significantly reduce restrictions on technology transfers, limiting this to technologies
that more clearly have an impact on national security and are not readily available
elsewhere. Beijing has long seen Washingtons wide-ranging restrictions on
technology transfer as an indication of its fundamental distrust of the PRC. Updating
the regulations may reduce this suspicion among Chinese. As the Obama
Administration has already indicated its intention to take steps in this direction,
failure to produce results before the 2012 election, especially if a new-elected
Republican president then drops the effort, might damage Americas credibility and
further deepen Chinese distrust.

Appeasement DA - Berkeley 2016

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Appeasement DA - Berkeley 2016

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Appeasement Disad

The actions of the United States

reflect a containment strategy that seems to have evolvedrather than developedthrough

US efforts to contain China have not been limited to countering Chinese

The United States also seems to be diplomatically and economically working to

Concessions to China send a signal of appeasement which

accommodation can lead an adversary to doubt the states resolve to protect

If China is uncertain about U.S.

If Chinas leaders believe that the United States chose

would respond to appeasement as have virtually all

China could be expected to reason that U.S.

U.S. accommodation on Taiwan

The impact is US/China war appeasement risks outweigh any

History has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist

We must be clear that China is the only

UQ US Containing China Now

Containment happening now

While Washington and Beijing cooperate where

it is increasingly difficult to find a

US is using their allies in Asia to contain China

US containment policies are strong now perception and

China-U.S. military relations remain unstable, and it is the lack of

US adopting grand strategy focused on balancing Chinese

Never has US intentions in Asia been so obvious. Attempts to portray

U.S. flexes muscles as Asia worries about South

I hope that this

Because the American effort to integrate China into the liberal

the United States is so keen on the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Any challenge to Chinas claim to the Spratlys is

The plan disrupts successful status quo containment of China

Link - Greentech/CCS coop.

US-Chinese business partnerships are a one-way street China

many nations have also put in place a range of bad policies,

The decline in Americas innovative edge is due to a number of factors , not

a growing number of nations rely on forced technology transfer where

Specifically, US-China research partnerships fail China takes

A principal arrow in Chinas innovation mercantilist quiver

Link Engagement = Appeasement

China is a very good

Engagement will be perceived by China as appeasement

Engagement emboldens Chinese expansionism

Link - Appeasement Spillsover to Other Issues

a states credibility is connected across issues; making unmatched

concessions on an issue that an adversary believes is similar

The states action

if the adversary believes

Link Territorial Concessions

Link Naval Engagement

If the United States adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China

In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese

Given the economic and military dynamics now

Link AT: Aff Isnt Appeasement

In contrast to those who argue against

AT: Containment Inevitable - US

credibilitythat is, persuading the target that

As in Europe during the Cold

Controlling signals of US resolve is key to deterring China

Impact Appeasement Expansionism

Beijing would not be satisfied by

Concessions on Taiwan would thus risk encouraging China to pursue more

Appeasement signals fuel Chinese regional assertiveness

the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and

We should constantly stress that China is welcome as

Appeasement foments warfighting incentives