Professional Documents
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CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
HANDBOOK OF
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
SIXTH EDITION
RICHARD M. LERNER
Editors-in-Chief
Copyright 2006 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.
Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.
Published simultaneously in Canada.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:
Handbook of child psychology / editors-in-chief, William Damon & Richard M. Lerner.
6th ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. Theoretical models of human development / volume editor,
Richard M. Lerner v. 2. Cognition, perception, and language / volume editors,
Deanna Kuhn, Robert Siegler v. 3. Social, emotional, and personality development /
volume editor, Nancy Eisenberg v 4. Child psychology in practice / volume editors, K.
Ann Renninger, Irving E. Sigel.
ISBN 0-471-27287-6 (set : cloth)
ISBN 0-471-27288-4 (v. 1 : cloth) ISBN 0-471-27289-2 (v. 2 : cloth)
ISBN 0-471-27290-6 (v. 3 : cloth) ISBN 0-471-27291-4 (v. 4 : cloth)
1. Child psychology. I. Damon, William, 1944 II. Lerner, Richard M.
BF721.H242
2006
155.4dc22
2005043951
Printed in the United States of America.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contributors
Paul B. Baltes
Max Planck Institute for Human Development
Berlin, Germany
Kurt W. Fischer
Graduate School of Education
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Peter L. Benson
Search Institute
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Thomas R. Bidell
Denver, Colorado
Jacqueline J. Goodnow
School of Behavioural Science
University of Sydney
Sydney, Australia
Jochen Brandstdter
Department of Psychology
University of Trier
Trier, Germany
Gilbert Gottlieb
Center for Developmental Science
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Urie Bronfenbrenner
Department of Human Development
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
Stephen F. Hamilton
Department of Human Development
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
Anton Bucher
University of Salzburg
Salzburg, Austria
Giyoo Hatano
Human Development &
Education Program
University of the Air
Chiba City, Japan
Beverley D. Cairns
Social Development Research Center
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Richard M. Lerner
Department of Child Development
Tufts University
Medford, Massachusetts
Robert B. Cairns
Social Development Research Center
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Robert A. LeVine
Graduate School of Education
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
Claremont Graduate University
Claremont, California
Robert Lickliter
Department of Psychology
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
viii
Contributors
Ulman Lindenberger
Max Planck Institute for Human Development
Berlin, Germany
David Magnusson
Department of Psychology
Stockholm University
Stockholm, Sweden
Hazel R. Markus
Department of Psychology
Stanford University
Stanford, California
Peggy J. Miller
Department of Speech Communication
University of Illinois
Champaign, Illinois
Pamela A. Morris
MDCR
New York, New York
Fritz K. Oser
Department of Education
University of Freiburg
Freiburg, Switzerland
Willis F. Overton
Department of Psychology
Temple University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Kevin Rathunde
Department of Family and Consumer Sciences
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah
Peter C. Scales
Search Institute
Minneapolis, Minnesota
W. George Scarlett
Department of Child Development
Tufts University
Medford, Massachusetts
Arturo Sesma Jr.
Search Institute
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Michael J. Shanahan
Department of Sociology
University of North CarolinaChapel Hill
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Richard A. Shweder
Committee on Human Development
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
Linda B. Smith
Department of Psychology
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
Margaret Beale Spencer
Department of Psychology
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Hkan Stattin
Department of Social Sciences
rebro University
rebro, Sweden
Ursula M. Staudinger
Jacobs Center for Lifelong Learning and
Institutional Development
International University Bremen
Bremen, Germany
Esther Thelen
Department of Psychology
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
Jaan Valsiner
Department of Psychology
Clark University
Worcester, Massachusetts
Douglas Wahlsten
Department of Psychology
University of Windsor
Ontario, Canada
Scholarly handbooks play several key roles in their disciplines. First and foremost, they reflect recent changes
in the field as well as classic works that have survived
those changes. In this sense, all handbooks present their
editors and authors best judgments about what is most
important to know in the field at the time of publication.
But many handbooks also influence the fields that they
report on. Scholarsespecially younger oneslook to
them for sources of information and inspiration to guide
their own work. While taking stock of the shape of its
field, a handbook also shapes the stock of ideas that will
define the fields future. It serves both as an indicator
and as a generator, a pool of received knowledge and a
pool for spawning new insight.
not only has endured over time but has evolved into a
thriving tradition across a number of related academic
disciplines.
All through its history, the Handbook has drawn on,
and played a formative role in, the worldwide study of
human development. What does the Handbooks history
tell us about where we, as developmentalists, have been,
what we have learned, and where we are going? What
does it tell us about what has changed and what has remained the same in the questions that we ask, in the
methods that we use, and in the theoretical ideas that we
draw on in our quest to understand human development?
By asking these questions, we follow the spirit of the science itself, for developmental questions may be asked
about any endeavor, including the enterprise of studying
human development. To best understand what this field
has to tell us about human development, we must ask how
the field itself has developed. In a field that examines
continuities and changes, we must ask, for the field itself,
what are the continuities and what are the changes?
The history of the Handbook is by no means the whole
story of why the field is where it is today, but it is a fundamental part of the story. It has defined the choices
that have determined the fields direction and has influenced the making of those choices. In this regard, the
Handbooks history reveals much about the judgments
and other human factors that shape a science.
politics, and the criminal mind; and compiled an assortment of handbooks, psychology texts, autobiographies of
renowned psychologists, and even a book on psychic beliefs (Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Harry Houdini were
among the contributors). Murchisons initial Handbook
of Child Psychology was published by a small university
press (Clark University) in 1931, when the field itself
was still in its infancy. Murchison wrote:
Experimental psychology has had a much older scientific
and academic status [than child psychology], but at the
present time it is probable that much less money is being
spent for pure research in the field of experimental psychology than is being spent in the field of child psychology. In spite of this obvious fact, many experimental
psychologists continue to look upon the field of child psychology as a proper field of research for women and for
men whose experimental masculinity is not of the maximum. This attitude of patronage is based almost entirely
upon a blissful ignorance of what is going on in the
tremendously virile field of child behavior. (Murchison,
1931, p. ix)
Murchisons masculine allusion, of course, is from another era; it could furnish some good material for a social
history of gender stereotyping. That aside, Murchison
was prescient in the task that he undertook and the way
that he went about it. At the time Murchison wrote the
preface to his Handbook, developmental psychology was
known only in Europe and in a few forward-looking
American labs and universities. Nevertheless, Murchison
predicted the fields impending ascent: The time is not
far distant, if it is not already here, when nearly all competent psychologists will recognize that one-half of the
whole field of psychology is involved in the problem of
how the infant becomes an adult psychologically
(Murchison, 1931, p. x).
For his original 1931 Handbook, Murchison looked to
Europe and to a handful of American centers (or field
stations) for child research (Iowa, Minnesota, the University of California at Berkeley, Columbia, Stanford,
Yale, Clark). Murchisons Europeans included a young
genetic epistemologist named Jean Piaget, who, in an
essay on Childrens Philosophies, quoted extensively
from interviews with 60 Genevan children between the
ages of 4 and 12 years. Piagets chapter would provide
American readers with an introduction to his seminal
research program on childrens conceptions of the
world. Another European, Charlotte Bhler, wrote a
chapter on childrens social behavior. In this chapter,
xi
in the Handbook tradition, made an appearance as author of a major chapter ( by far the longest in the book)
on prenatal and perinatal growth. Three other physiologically oriented chapters were added as well: one on
neonatal motor behavior, one on visual-manual functions during the first 2 years of life, and one on physiological appetites such as hunger, rest, and sex.
Combined with the Goodenough and Gesell shifts in
focus, these additions gave the 1933 Handbook more of a
biological thrust, in keeping with Murchisons longstanding desire to display the hard science backbone of
the emerging field.
Leonard Carmichael was president of Tufts University when he organized Wileys first edition of the
Handbook. The switch from a university press to the
long-established commercial firm of John Wiley &
Sons was commensurate with Carmichaels wellknown ambition; indeed, Carmichaels effort was to
become influential beyond anything that Murchison
might have anticipated. The book (one volume at that
time) was called the Manual of Child Psychology, in
keeping with Carmichaels intention of producing an
advanced scientific manual to bridge the gap between
the excellent and varied elementary textbooks in this
field and the scientific periodical literature
(Carmichael, 1946, p. viii).
The publication date was 1946, and Carmichael complained that this book has been a difficult and expensive
one to produce, especially under wartime conditions
(Carmichael, 1946, p. viii). Nevertheless, the project was
worth the effort. The Manual quickly became the bible of
graduate training and scholarly work in the field, available virtually everywhere that human development was
studied. Eight years later, now head of the Smithsonian
Institution, Carmichael wrote, in the preface to the 1954
second edition, The favorable reception that the first
edition received not only in America but all over the
world is indicative of the growing importance of the
study of the phenomena of the growth and development of
the child (Carmichael, 1954, p. vii).
Carmichaels second edition had a long life: Not until
1970 did Wiley bring out a third edition. Carmichael was
retired by then, but he still had a keen interest in the
book. At his insistence, his own name became part of the
title of the third edition; it was called, improbably,
Carmichaels Manual of Child Psychology, even though it
had a new editor and an entirely different cast of authors
and advisors. Paul Mussen took over as the editor, and
once again the project flourished. Now a two-volume set,
xii
the third edition swept across the social sciences, generating widespread interest in developmental psychology
and its related disciplines. Rarely had a scholarly compendium become both so dominant in its own field and so
familiar in related disciplines. The set became an essential source for graduate students and advanced scholars
alike. Publishers referred to Carmichaels Manual as the
standard against which other scientific handbooks were
compared.
The fourth edition, published in 1983, was now redesignated by John Wiley & Sons to become once again
the Handbook of Child Psychology. By then, Carmichael
had passed away. The set of books, now expanded to four
volumes, became widely referred to in the field as the
Mussen handbook.
xiii
xiv
no limits of budget, we would have invited a large number of other leading researchers whom we did not have
the spaceand thus the privilegeto include. With
very few exceptions, every author whom we invited
agreed to accept the challenge. Our only real, and great,
sadness was to hear of the passing of several authors
from the 1998 edition prior to our assembly of the present edition. Where possible, we arranged to have their
collaborators revise and update their chapters.
Our directive to authors was simple: Convey your
area of the field as you see it. From then on, the authors
took center stagewith, of course, much constructive
feedback from reviewers and volume editors. No one
tried to impose a perspective, a preferred method of inquiry, or domain boundaries on any of the chapters. The
authors expressed their views on what researchers in
their areas attempt to accomplish, why they do so, how
they go about it, what intellectual sources they draw on,
what progress they have made, and what conclusions
they have reached.
The result, in my opinion, is still more glorious profusion of the English garden genre, but perhaps contained a bit by some broad patterns that have emerged
over the past decade. Powerful theoretical models and
approachesnot quite unified theories, such as the
three grand systemshave begun once again to organize
much of the fields research and practice. There is great
variety in these models and approaches, and each is
drawing together significant clusters of work. Some
have been only recently formulated, and some are combinations or modifications of classic theories that still
have staying power.
Among the formidable models and approaches that
the reader will find in this Handbook are the dynamic
system theories, the life span and life course approaches, cognitive science and neuronal models, the
behavior genetics approach, person-context interaction
theories, action theories, cultural psychology, and a
wide assortment of neo-Piagetian and neo-Vygotskian
models. Although some of these models and approaches
have been in the making for some time, they have now
come into their own. Researchers are drawing on them
directly, taking their implied assumptions and hypotheses seriously, using them with specificity and control,
and exploiting their implications for practice.
Another pattern that emerges is a rediscovery and
exploration of core processes in human development
that had been underexamined by the generation of researchers just prior to the present one. Scientific interest
xv
xvi
Acknowledgments
A work as significant as the Handbook of Child Psychology is always produced by the contributions of numerous
people, individuals whose names do not necessarily appear on the covers or spines of the volumes. Most important, we are grateful to the more than 150 colleagues
whose scholarship gave life to the Sixth Edition. Their
enormous knowledge, expertise, and hard work make
this edition of the Handbook the most important reference work in developmental science.
In addition to the authors of the chapters of the four
volumes of this edition, we were fortunate to have been
able to work with two incredibly skilled and dedicated
editors within the Institute for Applied Research in
Youth Development at Tufts University, Jennifer Davison and Katherine Connery. Their can-do spirit
and their impressive ability to attend to every detail
of every volume were invaluable resources enabling
this project to be completed in a timely and high
quality manner.
It may be obvious, but we want to stress also that
without the talent, commitment to quality, and professionalism of our editors at John Wiley & Sons, this edition of the Handbook would not be a reality and would
not be the cutting-edge work we believe it to be. The
breadth of the contributions of the Wiley staff to the
Handbook is truly enormous. Although we thank all
these colleagues for their wonderful contributions, we
wish to make special note of four people in particular:
Patricia Rossi, Senior Editor, Psychology, Linda Witzling, Senior Production Editor, Isabel Pratt, Associate
Editor, and Peggy Alexander, Vice President and Publisher. Their creativity, professionalism, sense of balance and perspective, and unflagging commitment to the
tradition of quality of the Handbook were vital ingredients for any success we may have with this edition.
We are also deeply grateful to Pam Blackmon and her
Contents
89
10
258
313
Jochen Brandtstdter
xix
516
465
400
xx
11
12
13
Contents
569
665
14
15
793
16
17
894
Peter L. Benson, Peter C. Scales, Stephen F. Hamilton, and Arturo Sesma Jr.
Author Index
999
Subject Index
1037
942
CHAPTER 1
genetic and sociobiological instances of such split conceptions); ( b) irreparable problems with the methods
associated with the empirical tests of ideas derived
from the theory (e.g., see Gottlieb, Walhsten, & Lickliter, Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume, Garcia
Coll, Bearer, & Lerner, 2004, and Lerner, 2002, for discussions of such problems in behavior genetics and sociobiology); or (c) substantive overreaching, that is,
attempting to account for phenomena beyond the scope
of the model (e.g., see Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg,
Hetherington, & Bornstein, 2000; Elder & Shanahan,
Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume; Horowitz,
2000; Shweder et al., Chapter 13, this Handbook, this
volume; Suomi, 2004a, 2004b, for discussions of this
problem in genetic reductionist accounts, as occur in
behavior genetics and sociobiology, of social behavior
or of the social and cultural institutions of society; see
Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume, and Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook,
this volume, for discussions of this problem in neonativist accounts of cognitive development; and see
Bloom, 1998, for a discussion of this problem in behaviorist accounts of language development).
A Relational Metatheory
Predicated on a postmodern philosophical perspective that transcends Cartesian dualism, developmental systems theories are framed by a
relational metatheory for human development. There is, then, a rejection of all splits between components of the ecology of human
development (e.g., between nature- and nurture-based variables), and between continuity and discontinuity and between stability and
instability. Systemic syntheses or integrations replace dichotomizations or other reductionist partitions of the developmental system.
The Integration of Levels of Organization
Relational thinking and the rejection of Cartesian splits is associated with the idea that all levels of organization within the ecology of
human development are integrated, or fused. These levels range from the biological and physiological through the cultural and historical.
Developmental Regulation across Ontogeny Involves Mutually Inf luential Individual Context Relations
As a consequence of the integration of levels, the regulation of development occurs through mutually inf luential connections among all
levels of the developmental system, ranging from genes and cell physiology through individual mental and behavioral functioning to society,
culture, the designed and natural ecology and, ultimately, history. These mutually inf luential relations may be represented generically as
Level 1 , Level 2 (e.g., Family Community), and in the case of ontogeny may be represented as individual context.
Integrated Actions, Individual Context Relations, Are the Basic Unit of Analysis within Human Development
The character of developmental regulation means that the integration of actionsof the individual on the context and of the multiple levels
of the context on the individual (individual context)constitute the fundamental unit of analysis in the study of the basic process of
human development.
Temporality and Plasticity in Human Development
As a consequence of the fusion of the historical level of analysisand therefore temporalityin the levels of organization comprising the
ecology of human development, the developmental system is characterized by the potential for systematic change, by plasticity. Observed
trajectories of intraindividual change may vary across time and place as a consequence of such plasticity.
Relative Plasticity
Developmental regulation may both facilitate and constrain opportunities for change. Thus, change in individual context relations is
not limitless, and the magnitude of plasticity (the probability of change in a developmental trajectory occurring in relation to variation in
contextual conditions) may vary across the life span and history. Nevertheless, the potential for plasticity at both individual and contextual
levels constitutes a fundamental strength of all human development.
Intraindividual Change, Interindividual Dif ferences in Intraindividual Change, and the Fundamental Substantive Significance
of Diversity
The combinations of variables across the integrated levels of organization within the developmental system that provide the basis of the
developmental process will vary at least in part across individuals and groups. This diversity is systematic and lawfully produced by
idiographic, group differential, and generic (nomothetic) phenomena. The range of interindividual differences in intraindividual change
observed at any point in time is evidence of the plasticity of the developmental system, and makes the study of diversity of fundamental
substantive significance for the description, explanation, and optimization of human development.
Optimism, the Application of Developmental Science, and the Promotion of Positive Human Development
The potential for and instantiations of plasticity legitimate an optimistic and proactive search for characteristics of individuals and of their
ecologies that, together, can be arrayed to promote positive human development across life. Through the application of developmental
science in planned attempts (interventions) to enhance (e.g., through social policies or community-based programs) the character of
humans developmental trajectories, the promotion of positive human development may be achieved by aligning the strengths (operationized
as the potentials for positive change) of individuals and contexts.
Multidisciplinarity and the Need for Change-Sensitive Methodologies
The integrated levels of organization comprising the developmental system require collaborative analyses by scholars from multiple
disciplines. Multidisciplinary knowledge and, ideally, interdisciplinary knowledge is sought. The temporal embeddedness and resulting
plasticity of the developmental system requires that research designs, methods of observation and measurement, and procedures for data
analysis be change-sensitive and able to integrate trajectories of change at multiple levels of analysis.
Finally, this exciting and innovative period in developmental theory and methodology has been framed by
a renewed appreciation of the philosophical grounding
of developmental science in postmodern ideas. The
philosophical ideas that have had the most attraction to
developmental scientists are relational conceptions that
transcend fruitless debates (e.g., regarding maturation
versus early experience as the basis for learning, or
neonativist versus empiricist bases of early cognitive
development; e.g., see Spelke & Newport, 1998) predicated on false dichotomies that split apart the fused developmental system (e.g., see Overton, 1998, 2003,
Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, 1998,
Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume).
IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIONAL
METATHEORIES FOR
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE
The ascendancy of a developmental systems frame for
the conduct of developmental science has been a product and a producer of a shift in the paradigm, or philosophy of science, framing discourse within the field
(Overton, 1998, 2003, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this
volume). As noted, the field has changed from being
predicated on a positivist and reductionist metatheory,
wherein a key assumption was that the universe was
uniform and that it was permanent. It has shifted to a
postmodernist conception that transcends Cartesian
splits between the real and the epiphenomenal (e.g., as
instantiated within past eras as nature versus nurture,
maturation versus learning, continuity versus discontinuity, stability versus instability, or simply constancy
versus change; Brim & Kagan, 1980; Lerner, 2002;
Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). The
integrative, relational metatheory that has emerged by
avoiding all splits (Overton, 1998, Chapter 2, this
Handbook, this volume) focuses instead on the construction of relations across the range of levels of
organization constituting the ecology of human development (e.g., Baltes, 1997; Baltes et al., Chapter 11,
this Handbook, this volume; Bronfenbrenner, 2005;
Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook,
this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this
Handbook, this volume).
TABLE 1.2 Policy and Program Implications That Arise If the Hereditarian (Genetic Reductionist) Split Conception of Genes
(A) Were Believed to Be True or False; and (B) Were in Fact True or False
A. Hereditarian split conception is believed to be:
1. True
2. False
B. Public policy and social program implications if hereditarian split position were in fact:
1. True
Repair inferior genotypes, making
them equal to superior genotypes
Miscegenation laws
Restrictions of personal liberties of
carriers of inferior genotypes
(separation, discrimination, distinct
social tracts)
Sterilization
Elimination of inferior genotypes from
genetic pool
2. False
Same as A.1, B.1
1. True
Wasteful and futile humanitarian
policies
Wasteful and futile programs of
equal opportunity, affirmative
action, equity, and social justice
Policies and programs to quell social
unrest because of unrequited
aspirations of genetically
constrained people
Deterioration of culture and
destruction of civil society
2. False
Equity, social justice, equal
opportunity, affirmative action
Celebration of diversity
Universal participation in civic life
Democracy
Systems assessment and engagement
Civil society
TABLE 1.3 Policy and Program Implications That Arise If the Strict Environmentalist (Radical Contextual) Split Conception
of Context (A) Were Believed to Be True or False; and (B) Were in Fact True or False
A. Strict environmental split conception is believed to be:
1. True
2. False
B. Public policy and social program implications if environmentalist split position were in fact:
1. True
Provide all children with same
educational or experiential regimen
to maximize their common potential /
aptitude
Eliminate all individualized
educational or training programs
Standardized assessments for all
children
Penalties for parents, schools, and
communities when children manifest
individual differences in achievement
Educate all parents, caregivers, and
teachers to act in a standard way in
the treatment of all children
2. False
Same as A.1, B.1
1. True
2. False
10
Similarly, he explains:
Moving beyond behavior genetics to the broader issue of
biology and culture, conclusions such as contemporary
evidence confirms that the expression of heritable traits
depends, often strongly, on experience (Collins et al.,
2000, p. 228) are brought into question for the same reason. Within a relational metatheory, such conclusions
fail because they begin from the premise that there are
pure forms of genetic inheritance termed heritable
traits and within relational metatheory such a premise
is unacceptable. (Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this
volume, p. 36)
with genetic reductionist approaches to human development, found in both behavior genetics and sociobiology,
subtle and nuanced problems of language continue to
suggest that these split approaches to human development remain legitimate. I have noted the potentially
enormous negative consequences of such problematic
language in our scientific discourseespecially if the
Person in the Street believes that employing such terms
means that the genetic reductionist ideas about social
policy should be countenanced. As a consequence, we
must be assiduous and exact in the terms we use to explain why split conceptions in general, and genetic reductionist ones in particular, fail as useful frames for
scientific discourse about human development. Indeed,
as Lewontin (1981, p. 245) has cautioned, The price of
metaphor is eternal vigilance.
11
diversityseen as the potential for systematic intraindividual change, represents a potential for life-span
change. Therefore, diversity, characterized as intraindividual plasticity, is a key asset or developmental strength
that may be capitalized on to promote a persons positive, healthy developmental change. Across people, diversity, characterized as interindividual differences,
represents a sample of the range of variation that defines
the potential material basis for optimizing the course
of human life. Any individual may have a diverse range of
potential developmental trajectories and, as well, all
groupsbecause of the necessarily diverse developmental paths of the people within themwill have a diverse
range of developmental trajectories. Diversity, seen as
both intraindividual change and as interindividual differences in intraindividual change, is both a strength of individuals and an asset for planning and promoting means to
improve the human condition (Benson et al., Chapter 16,
this Handbook, this volume; Lerner, 2004c; Spencer,
Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume).
The diversity of individual context relations that
comprises change within the dynamic developmental
system, along with the optimism about improving
human life that derives from the relative plasticity of
humans, means that it is possible to apply developmental
science to promote positive development across the life
span (Benson et al., Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume; Damon, 1997, 2004; Lerner, 2002, 2004a, 2004b,
2004c). As such, it is useful to describe the features and
implications for science and application of the positive
human development perspective derived from developmental systems theories.
12
Conclusion
13
CONCLUSIONS
Contemporary developmental sciencepredicated on a
relational metatheory and focused on the use of developmental systems theories to frame research on dynamic
relations between diverse individuals and contextsconstitutes a complex and exciting approach to understanding and promoting positive human development. It offers
a means to do good science, informed by philosophically,
conceptually, and methodologically useful information
from the multiple disciples with knowledge bases pertinent to the integrated, individual context relations
that compose human development. Such science is also
more difficult to enact than the ill-framed and methodologically flawed research that followed split and reductionist paths during the prior historical era (Cairns &
Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume; Overton,
Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter
4, this Handbook, this volume). Such science is also more
difficult to explain to the Person in the Street.
As illustrated eloquently by the work discussed in
this volume, the richness of the science and the applications that derive from developmental systems perspectives, as well as the internal and ecological validity of
this work, are reasons for the continuing and arguably
still growing attractiveness of this approach. Moreover,
this approach underscores the diverse ways in which humans, in dynamic exchanges with their natural and designed ecologies, can create for themselves and others
opportunities for health and positive development. As
Bronfenbrenner (2005) eloquently puts it, it is these relations that make human beings human.
Accordingly, the relational, dynamic, and diversitysensitive scholarship that now defines excellence in developmental science may both document and extend the
power inherent in each person to be an active agent in
14
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CHAPTER 2
METATHEORY 20
THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT 22
What Changes in Development: Expressive-Constitutive
and Instrumental-Communicative Functions
of Behavior 22
The Nature of Developmental Change: Transformational
and Variational 25
A Unified Concept of Development 28
SPLIT AND RELATIONAL METATHEORIES 30
Split Metatheory 30
Relational Metatheory 32
DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION: RELATIONAL
HISTORY AND RELATIONAL MODELS 39
DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION:
SPLIT APPROACHES 41
DEVELOPMENTALLY ORIENTED EMBODIED
ACTION METATHEORY 47
Embodiment 47
Person-Centered Embodiment, Action, and
Development 49
EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES 54
Plato and Aristotle and the Relational
Developmental Tradition 55
Modernity and the Rise of the Split Tradition 56
Modernity and the Elaboration of
Relational Metatheory 58
The Marxist Split Tradition 65
Culture and Development in Split and
Relational Metatheories 66
Pragmatism 68
METHODOLOGY: EXPLANATION
AND UNDERSTANDING 70
Split Mechanical Explanation 71
Relational Scientific Methodology 75
CONCLUSIONS 80
REFERENCES 80
Throughout its history, psychology and its sub disciplines, including developmental psychology, have been
captives of numerous fundamental contradictory positions. These basic dichotomies, called antinomies,
include subject-object, mind-body, nature-nurture,
biology-culture, intrapsychic-interpersonal, structurefunction, stability-change, continuity-discontinuity,
observation-reason, universal-particular, ideas-matter,
unity-diversity, and individual-society. While often explicitly denying the relevance of philosophy to its operations, psychology has implicitly used the philosophical
assumptions of a seventeenth-century ontological dualism, a nineteenth-century epistemological empiricism,
and an early twentieth-century neopositivism, to build a
standard orthodox approach to the resolution of the antinomies. This approach elevates one concept of the pair to a
19
20
Any discussion of metatheory requires a constant reminder of the importance of maintaining distinctions
between various levels of analysis or discourse (Figure
2.1). Theories and methods refer directly to the empirical world, while metatheories and metamethods refer to
the theories and methods themselves. The most concrete and circumscribed level of analysis or discourse is
the observational level. This is ones current commonsense level of conceptualizingnot pristine, interpretation free seeingthe nature of objects and events in
the world. For example, one might describe the developmental changes in some domain as smooth and continuous, abrupt and discontinuous, or some combination of
both. Regardless of which characterization is chosen,
or whether this characterization is treated as a narrow
observation or a broad inductive inference, the assertion functions at the observational level of dealing with
the world.
Although the observational, commonsense, or folk
level of analysis has a sense of immediacy and concreteness, we can and do focus our attention on this common-
Metatheoretical Discourse
Ontological-Epistemological Groundings
METATHEORY
In scientific discussions, the basic concepts to be explored in this chapter are often termed metatheoretical.
Metatheories transcend (i.e., meta) theories in the
sense that they define the context in which theoretical
concepts are constructed, just as a foundation defines
the context in which a house can be constructed. Further,
metatheory functions not only to ground, constrain, and
sustain theoretical concepts but also functions to do the
same thing with observational methods of investigation.
When specifically discussing background ideas that
ground methods, these are here termed metamethods.
Methodology would also be an appropriate term here if
this were understood in its broad sense as a set of principles that guide empirical inquiry (Asendorpf & Valsiner,
1992) and not as particular methods themselves.
The primary function of metatheoryincluding
metamethodis to provide a rich source of concepts out
of which theories and methods grow. Metatheory also
provides guidelines that help to avoid conceptual confusions and what may ultimately be unproductive ideas
and methods.
Metatheoretical Discourse
Metatheories
Theoretical Discourse
(Reflective)
Observational Discourse
(Commonsense)
Domain of Inquiry
Figure 2.1
of inquiry.
Metatheory
21
22
clear that although age may operate fairly well at an observational level of discourse, at a reflective level it fails
to make any meaningful distinctions. Age has no unique
qualities that differentiate it from time; age is simply
one index of time. Most important, there is nothing
unique or novel about units of age-time, such as years,
months, weeks, minutes, and so on. Should we then say
that development is about changes that occur in time as
some have (e.g., Elman, 2003), or that time is a theoretical primitive? Time can hardly be a theoretical anything, as time, in and of itself, does nothing. As
Wohlwill (1973) once pointed out, time cannot be an independent variable, it is merely a dimension along which
processes operate. All changeeven if entirely transitoryoccurs in time, so we come back to simply saying that development is about change. The implication
here is that to arrive at meaningful distinctions that can
direct a broad area of scientific inquiry we must explore
further the nature of change itself. Before doing this,
however, we shall consider a second problematic outcome of defining development as something like
changes in observed behavior across age. This is the
problematic meaning of change of observed behavior.
What Changes in Development: ExpressiveConstitutive and Instrumental-Communicative
Functions of Behavior
Behavior is clearly the observational focus of our empirical investigationsthe dependent variable of our
research efforts. The problem is whether change in observed behavior introduces the reflective distinction
needed to articulate a broad inquiry. Observed behavior,
or action more generallyat any level from the neuronal
to the molarcan reflect both expressive-constitutive
and instrumental-communicative functions. Expressive
action expresses or reflects some fundamental organization or system. For example, in human ontogenesis behavior is often understood to be diagnostic of some
cognitive, affective, or motivational system (see the systems described in the cubes on the left of Figure 2.2).
These systems have characteristic forms of activity that
are expressed as actions and patterns of action in the
world (center horizontal lines of Figure 2.2). A verbalization may reflect the nature of the childs system of
thought. A cry, in a particular context, may reflect the
status of the childs attachment system. A series of behaviors may reflect the childs intentional system. This
expressive function is constitutive in the sense that it en-
23
Figure 2.2 The development of the psychological subject: Levels of transformational and variational change emerging through
embodied action in a sociocultural and physical world.
2.2) through their action (center horizontal lines of Figure 2.2). We see in the next section that dynamic systems
(as a what of developmental change) and transformation (as a type of developmental change) are closely
related.
Instrumental action is behavior that serves as a means
to attaining some outcome; it is the pragmatic dimension
of action (see center horizontal lines of Figure 2.2). For
example, in human ontogenesis an expressive cognitive
act or thought may also be the means to solve a problem.
24
25
press). An interesting example of an approach that begins to promote this kind of integration is found in the
in the work of Dodge and colleagues on the development of aggressive behavior. Information processing
generally, and Dodges (1986) social information processing theory specifically, are fundamentally concerned with the instrumental deployment of behaviors
during real-time social and physical interactions in the
world. However, Dodge and Rabiner (2004) make a
very strong, explicit, and clear case for the expressive
significance of latent mental structures in the developmental process as these impact on how the child encodes, interprets, and responds in a variety of social
situations (p. 1005; see also Arsenio & Lemerise,
2004; Crick & Dodge, 1994).
To acknowledge both the distinction between expressive-constitutive and instrumental-communicative functions of action, and to acknowledge that they constitute
two legitimate parts of a single whole, is to make an assertion of inclusivity. This acknowledgment recognizes
that each function assumes a legitimate role in a unified
whole of developmental inquiry and that the nature of
any specific inquiry is always relative to the goals of
that inquiry. From this relational perspective, issues associated with ambiguities arising from contextualizing
development as changes in observed behavior are reduced significantly by insisting on the substitution of
the phrase changes in expressive-constitutive and
instrumental-communicative features of observed behavior. This substitution does not, however, resolve the
problem of exactly what kinds of change should be
called developmental. For this problem, further reflection is needed on change itself.
The Nature of Developmental Change:
Transformational and Variational
If developmental inquiry is to be an inclusive discipline,
the issue of developmental change needs to be approached from as broad a perspective as possible. Perhaps, the broadest conceptualization of developmental
entails the recognition and incorporation of two fundamental types of change; transformational and variational (see Figure 2.2). Transformational change is
change in the form, organization, or structure of any
system. The caterpillar transforms into the butterfly,
the tadpole to the frog, water transforms into ice and
gas, the seed transforms into the plant, and cells transform into the organism. All nonlinear dynamic systems,
including the human psyche, undergo transformational
26
change. Transformational change results in the emergence of novelty. As forms change, they become increasingly complex. This increased complexity is a
complexity of pattern rather than a linear additive complexity of elements. As a consequence, new patterns exhibit novel characteristics that cannot be reduced to
(i.e., completely explained by), or predicted from, earlier components (indicated by the four system cubes on
the left side of Figure 2.2). This emergence of novelty is
commonly referred to as qualitative change in the sense
that it is change that cannot be represented as purely additive. Similarly, reference to discontinuity in development is simply the recognition of emergent novelty
and qualitative change (Overton & Reese, 1981). Concepts of stages, phases, or levels of development are
theoretical concepts, which reference transformational
change with the associated emergent novelty, qualitative change, and discontinuity. Each of the grand developmental figures of the twentieth centuryPiaget,
Vygotsky, Werneracknowledged the centrality of
these features of transformational development; Piaget
and Werner via their ideas of development proceeding
through phases of differentiation and reintegration;
Vygotsky (1978) in his argument that development
is not the gradual accumulation of separate
changes . . . [but] a complex dialectical process characterized by . . . qualitative transformations of one form
into another [with an] intertwining of external and internal factors (p. 73). (See also Schneirla, 1957.)
The philosopher E. Nagel (1957) articulated the
broad dimensions of transformational change when he
described development as entailing two fundamental
features: (1) the notion of a system, possessing a definite structure [i.e., organization] . . . and (2) the notion of a set of sequential changes in the system yielding
relatively permanent but novel increments not only in its
structures [i.e., organization] but in its modes of operation [i.e., functions] as well (p. 17).
It is important to emphasize that transformational
change references relatively enduring and irreversible
changes in dynamic systems (e.g., the biological system;
the psychological subject or person as a system; the cognitive, affective, and motivational systems) and changes
that are sequential in nature. The enduring and irreversible characteristic of transformational change eliminates relatively transient or easily reversible changes as
developmental change, while the sequential character
establishes its teleological (goal oriented) nature. Sequence implies an order and any order is necessarily di-
27
28
nonlinearity), sequence, and directionality are associated with transformational change. Variational change
has been identified with differential issues across and
within individuals and groups. Interest has focused on
local individual and group differences that suggest a
particularity, and a to-and-fro movement of change.
Concepts of reversibility, continuity, and cyclicity are
associated with variational change. When change is considered both in terms of life forms and physical systems,
transformational change is identified with what has
been called the arrow of time, and variational change
is identified with the notion of the cycles of time
(Overton, 1994a, 1994c; Valsiner, 1994).
Incorporating transformational and variational
change into a broad understanding of development
raises the issue of how these two forms are to be related. The same three metatheoretical solutions that
have historically appeared with respect to the concept
of the expressive-instrumental appear again for the
transformational-variational. The first solution splits
the pair, thus forming a dichotomy, and treats the instrumental as privileged bedrock. This solution marginalizes transformational change by claiming that it is
mere description, which itself requires explanation. Essentially, this claim is the promise that all apparent
transformational change will ultimately be explained
perhaps as our empirical knowledge increasesas the
product of variation and only variation. An important
consequence of this solution is that the associated
metamethod will prescribe methods that can assess linear additive processes, but will marginalize methods
that assess nonlinear processes. A classic example of
this general solution was the Skinnerian demonstration
that given only variations in pecking and reinforcement, it was possible to train pigeons to hit Ping-Pong
balls back and forth over a net. Thus, it was claimed that
the apparent developmental novelty of playing PingPong was in reality nothing-but the continuous additive modifications in variation. This solution is also
adopted by those who portray cognitive development as
either a simple increase in representational content (see
Scholnick & Cookson, 1994) or as an increase in the efficiency with which this content is processed (Siegler,
1996; Sternberg, 1984).
The second metatheoretical solution treats transformational change as the bedrock reality and marginalizes
the significance of variation. Variation is seen as rather
irrelevant noise in a transformational system. While this
solution is seldom explicitly articulated, some stage theories such as Erik Eriksons (1968) theory of psychosocial development have elevated transformational change
to a point that the importance of the variational seems to
disappear below the horizon.
As described earlier, the third metatheoretical approach does not split transformation and variation into
competing alternatives, but rather it understands the
transformational-variational as a fundamentally necessary and real whole containing co-equal complementary
processes. This solution asserts a reality in which the
processes assume differentiated functional roles, but
each process in itself explains and is explained by the
other. Transformational systems produce variation and
variation transforms the system (this solution is illustrated in Figure 2.2). This relational metatheoretical
stance is described in detail later as a take on reality
that, as suggested earlier, resolves many of developmental inquirys most controversial problems, and opens
new paths of investigation.
A Unified Concept of Development
When transformational-variational change and changes
in expressive constitutive instrumental communicative
action are cast into a relational matrix, they reflect
complementary images of the totality of developmental
change. The expressive-constitutive and instrumentalcommunicative dimension articulates what it is that
changes during development. In the domain of developmental psychology, it is the psychological subject (or dynamic systems that explain the functioning of the
subject) and the subjects action that become foreground. Piaget and Skinner, for example, each construct
a radically different vision of the nature of the changing
subject, but both focus on the subject. Piaget considers
both the expressive and instrumental to each be essential
features of what changes. Schemes and operations
are identified as the source of the subjects expressiveconstitutive action, while procedures are conceived as
instrumental strategies designed to succeed in the actual
world. For Skinner, the expressive is denied or marginalized, and operants represent the subjects instrumental adjustments to a changing environment.
The transformational-variational dimension articulates the nature of the change taking place. It is the
action rather than the function of the action that becomes the foreground. Here, actions that are expressive-
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30
extended discussion of split and relational metatheories, there is a section devoted to epistemologicalontological issues. There, a history of the philosophical
traditions that establish the conceptual frameworks
for split and relational approaches will be described
along with further implications for concepts and theories of development drawn from these traditions.
Finally, these traditions will serve as background for
a section exploring split and relational approaches
to the metamethods and methods of developmental
psychology.
31
The field of behavior genetics provides a second example of an approach to inquiry that is grounded and defined within a split metatheory. The broad goal of
behavior genetics, using the methods of family, twin,
and adoption studies, is to partition (split) the variation
in any behavioral score (e.g., a measure of personality,
psychopathology, intelligence, language, cognition) into
the proportion of the variation caused by foundational
32
Relational Metatheory
In an analysis of the historical failures of split metatheory, as well as the emptiness of its seeming rivalpostmodern thoughtBruno Latour (1993) has proposed a
move away from the extremes of Cartesian splits to a
center or middle kingdom position where entities and
ideas are represented not as pure forms, but as forms
that flow across fuzzy boundaries. This is a movement
toward what Latour terms relationism a metatheoretical space where foundations are groundings, not
bedrocks of certainty, and analysis is about creating categories, not about cutting nature at its joints. Relational
metatheory builds on Latours proposal. It begins by
clearing splitting from the field of play and in so doing it
moves toward transforming antinomies into co-equal, indissociable complementarities. As splitting and foundationalism go hand in hand, removing the one also
eliminates the other. Splitting involves the conceptual
assumption of pure forms, but this assumption itself
springs from the acceptance of the atomistic assumption
that there is a fixed unchanging bedrock bottom to reality composed of elements that preserve their identity regardless of context. Thus, acceptance of atomism leads
directly to the belief that the mental (ideas, mind) and
the physical (matter, body) are two absolutely different
natural kinds of things. And if nature were composed of
such natural kinds, then it would seem reasonable to believe in the possibility of cutting nature at its joints. A
relational metatheory rejects atomism and replaces it
with holism as a fundamental guiding principle. Within
this conceptual frame, fixed elements are replaced by
contextually defined parts with the result thatas the
philosopher John Searle (1992) has suggested the fact
that a feature is mental does not imply that it is not physical; the fact that a feature is physical does not imply
that it is not mental (p. 15). Similarly, the fact that a
feature is biological does not suggest that it is not cultural; the fact that a feature is cultural does not suggest
that it is not biological. Building from this base of
holism, relational metatheory moves to specific principles that define the relations among parts and the relations of parts to wholes. In other words relational
metatheory articulates principles of analysis and synthesis necessary for any scientific inquiry, which include (a) the identity of opposites, ( b) the opposites of
identity, and (c) the synthesis of wholes.
Holism
Holism is the conceptual principle that the identities of
objects and events derive from the relational context in
which they are embedded. The whole is not an aggregate
of discrete elements, but an organized and selforganizing system of parts, each part being defined by
its relations to other parts and to the whole. Complexity
in this context is organized complexity (Luhmann, 1995;
von Bertalanffy, 1968a, 1968b), in that the whole or
dynamic system is not decomposable into elements
arranged in additive linear sequences of cause-effect relations (Overton & Reese, 1973). Nonlinear dynamics
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34
metatheory, the goals of sociocultural or social constructivist approaches in attempting to elevate society
and culture to a privileged primary position is simply a
conceptual confusion.
If the principle of the identity of opposites introduces
constraints, it also opens possibilities. One of these is
the recognition that, to paraphrase Searle (1992), the
fact that a behavior is biologically or person determined
does not imply that it is not socially or culturally determined, and, the fact that it is socially or culturally determined does not imply that it is not biologically or
person determined. The identity of opposites establishes
the metatheoretical position that genes and culture, like
culture and person, and brain and person, and so on, operate in a truly interpenetrating manner.
Because the idea and implications of suspending the
law of contradiction in some contexts and applying it in
others is not a familiar one, some clarifying comments
are needed. Relational metatheory, owes much to the
notion of the dialectic as this was articulated by the nineteenth-century philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (17701831).
For Hegel, historicaland by extension developmental
change is a dynamic expressive-transformational process
of growth, represented and defined by the dialectic. Central to Hegels dialectic is the idea of a process through
which concepts or fundamental features of a dynamic
system dif ferentiate and move toward integration. Any
initial concept or any basic feature of a dynamic systemcalled a thesis or an affirmationcontains
implicit within itself an inherent contradiction that,
through action of the system in the world, becomes differentiated into a second concept or featurethe antithesis or negation of the thesis. As a consequence,
even in the single unity of thesis there is the implicit contradictory relation of thesis-antithesis, just as in the
unity of the single organic cell there is the implicit differentiation into the unity of multiple cells. This points
to the fundamental relational character of the dialectic.
As thesis leads to antithesisproducing the differentiation of a relational polarity of oppositesa potential
space between them is generated, and this becomes the
ground for the coordination of the two. The coordination
that emergesagain through the mechanism of action of
the systemconstitutes a new unity or integration
called the synthesis. The coordinating synthesis is itself a system that exhibits novel systemic properties
while subsuming the original systems. Thus, a new
relational dynamic matrix composed of three realms
thesis-antithesis-synthesisis formed. The integration
that emerges from the differentiation, like all integrations, is incomplete. The synthesis represents a new dynamic action systema new thesis. Thus, begins a new
growth cycle of differentiation and integration.
In this relational scheme, the polarity of opposites
(i.e., thesis and antithesis) that emerges from the initial
relatively undifferentiated matrix (i.e., thesis) does not
constitute cut-off (split) contradictory categories that
absolutely exclude each other. Having grown from the
same soil as it were, the two, while standing in a contradictory relation of opposites, also share an identity.
Hegel referred to this relation as the identity of opposites (Stace, 1924) and illustrated it in his famous example of the master and slave. In this example, Hegel
demonstrated that it is impossible to define or understand the freedom of the master without reference to the
constraints of slavery; and consequently impossible to
define the constraints of slavery without the reference to
the freedom of the master. Freedom thus contains the
idea of constraint as constraint contains the idea of freedom, and in this we see the identity of the opposites
freedom and constraint.
The justification for the claim that a law of logic
for example, the law of contradictioncan reasonably
both be applied and relaxed depending on the context of
inquiry requires a recognition that the laws of logic
themselves are not immutable and not immune to background ideas. In some metatheoretical background traditions, the laws of logic are understood as immutable
realities given either by a world cut off from the human
mind or by a prewired mind cut off from the world.
However, in the background tradition currently under
discussion the traditional laws of logic are themselves
ideas that have been constructed through the reciprocal
action of human minds and world. The laws of logic are
simply pictures that have been drawn or stories that have
been told. They may be good pictures or good stories in
the sense of bringing a certain quality of order into
our lives, but they are still pictures or stories, and it is
possible that other pictures will serve us even better.
Wittgenstein (1953/1958), whose later works focused
on the importance of background or what we are calling
metatheoretical ideas, made this point quite clearly
when he discussed another law of logicthe law of the
excluded middleas being one possible picture of the
world among many possible pictures:
The law of the excluded middle says here: It must either
look like this, or like that. So it really . . . says nothing at
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36
more radically interdependent [emphasis added] role of organismic and environmental factors. (p. 272)
37
organism, the person (see Figure 2.4a). Personsas integrated self-organizing dynamic system of cognitive,
emotional, and motivational processes and the actions
this system expressesrepresent a novel level or stage of
structure and functioning that emerges from, and constitutes a coordination of, biology and culture (see Magnusson & Stattin, 1998, for an analysis of a methodological
focus on the person).
At the synthesis then, there is a standpoint that coordinates and resolves the tension between the other two
members of the relation. This provides a particularly
broad and stable base for launching empirical inquiry.
A person standpoint opens the way for the empirical
investigation of universal dimensions of psychological
structure-function relations (e.g., processes of perception, thought, emotions, values), their individual differences, and their development across the life span.
Because universal and particular are themselves relational concepts, no question can arise here about
whether the focus on universal processes excludes the
particular, it clearly doesnt as we already know from the
earlier discussion of polarities. A process viewed from a
universal standpoint in no way suggests that it is not contextualized. The general theories of Jean Piaget (1952),
Heinz Werner (1940/1957), James Mark Baldwin (1895),
William Stern (1938), and Erik Erikson (1968); the attachment theory and object relations theories of John
Bowlby (1958); Harry Stack Sullivan (1953); and Donald Winnicott (1965, 1971) all are examples of developmentally oriented relational person standpoints.
It is important to recognize that one standpoint of
synthesis is relative to other synthesis standpoints. Life
and society are coordinated by matter, and thus, within
psychological inquiry, biology represents a standpoint as
the synthesis of person and culture (Figure 2.4b). The
implication of this is that a relational biological
approach to psychological processes investigates the
biological conditions and settings of psychological
Person
Standpoint
Biology
Culture
(a)
Biology
Standpoint
Person
Culture
(b)
Culture
Standpoint
Biology
Person
(c)
38
structure-function relations and the behaviors they express. This exploration is quite different from split
foundationalist approaches to biological inquiry that
assume an atomistic and reductionistic stance toward
the object of study. The neurobiologist Antonio Damasios (1994, 1999) work on the brain-body basis of a
psychological self and emotions is an excellent illustration of this biological relational standpoint. And in the
context of his biological investigations Damasio (1994)
points out:
A task that faces neuroscientists today is to consider the
neurobiology supporting adaptive supraregulations [e.g.,
the psychological subjective experience of self ]. . . . I am
not attempting to reduce social phenomena to biological
phenomena, but rather to discuss the powerful connection
between them (p. 124). . . . Realizing that there are biological mechanisms behind the most sublime human behavior
does not imply a simplistic reduction to the nuts and bolts
of neurobiology. (p. 125)
A similar illustration comes from the Nobel laureate neurobiologist Gerald Edelmans (1992; Edelman & Tononi,
2000) work on the brain-body base of consciousness:
I hope to show that the kind of reductionism that doomed
the thinkers of the Enlightenment is confuted by evidence
that has emerged both from modern neuroscience and
from modern physics. . . . To reduce a theory of an individuals behavior to a theory of molecular interactions is
simply silly, a point made clear when one considers how
many different levels of physical, biological, and social interactions must be put into place before higher order consciousness emerges. (Edelman, 1992, p. 166)
39
40
concern with the complementarity of evolution and individual development led him to explorations of the relation between the genome and the phenotype, and
specifically questions concerning how individual adaptations during the course of ontogenesis might impact on
species evolution (1902/1976). An important outcome of
this work was the proposal of a process termed organic
selection (1895) and known later as the Baldwin effect (see Piaget, 1967/1971, 1974/1980; see also
Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume), which
offered a non-Lamarckian alternative to Darwins split
mechanistic process of natural selection. Broadly, organic selection refers to the possibility of a phenotypic
adaptation coming to be replaced by a genetic mutation.
Such a replacement runs counter to the classical Darwinian and neo-Darwinian gene centered position that the
sole function of the environment is to select from what
the genome provides.
In Europe, the work of another founder of developmental psychology, William Stern (1938), also presented a framework for a developmental psychology in
which evolutionary and individual developmental
processes were tightly interwoven: In the concept of
development lies not merely a bare sequence of states
and phases, but evolution; preparation, germination,
growth, maturation, and recession as a meaningful process that is by nature of an organized kind (p. 30).
Heinz Werner later carried this framework to North
America in his Comparative Psychology of Mental
Development (1940/1948). Here, and in other works,
Werner articulated the complementarity of evolution
and development through an insistence that developmental psychology entails a comparative approach to formal
similarities as well as material and formal differences
among ontogenetic, phylogenetic and other change sequences, as follows:
Such a developmental approach rests on one basic assumption, namely, that wherever there is life there is growth
and development, that is, formation in terms of systematic, orderly sequence. This basic assumption, then entails
the view that a developmental conceptualization is applicable to the various areas of life science. . . . Developmental psychology does not restrict itself either to ontogenesis
or phylogenesis. . . . (1957, p. 125)
41
42
External
EnvironmentAdaptation
Selection
Genotype
Altruism
Hostility
Response 1
Response 2
Phenotype
Genes
Random Variation
Figure 2.5
Natural Selection
43
treating the inside story as epiphenomenal, while arguing that the outside story provides the fundamental
causes of behavior. The claim here is that there is sufficient genetic variability for either violence or gentleness, and social-cultural factors are the real cause of
violent behavior. Both strategies usually decry the idea
of dualism, but they deal with the dualism by suppressing the functional reality of one or the other sides of the
neo-Darwinian narrative.
A third split nature-nurture strategy has been
called conventional interactionism (Oyama, 1989; see
also, Lerner, 1978; Overton, 1973). Dualism, although
clearly a functional part of the scheme, is ignored by
this strategy, and it is insisted that any characteristic
is partially the effect of each factor. This strategy
sometimes places the duality on a continuum and argues that various characteristics are more or less determined by one or the other factor (e.g., see Scarr,
1992). This is the quantitative additive compromise
that was mentioned earlier with respect to split issues
generally. In the final strategy, bio/social interactionism, dualism is celebrated. Generally, this approach
makes claims that the biological sets the limits, or establishes predispositions, or constraints for behavior and the social-cultural determines behavioral
expression. This compromise is the most direct reflection of the neo-Darwinian metatheory of the nature of
change (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1991).
These four nature-nurture strategies do not exhaust
the list of possible solutions, nor are they necessarily
mutually exclusive. Each tends at times to merge into another. However, neither the complexities of naturenurture nor even the details of alternative nonsplit solutions are central here (see Overton, 2004a, for an extended discussion). Rather, the central point of emphasis
is that the whole class of traditional solution strategies
emerges because and only because of the acceptance of a
particular metatheoretical story about the nature of
things. This is the story in which nature (genetics, biology) is identified with an ontologically real inside
called nurture that is radically split from an ontologically real outside called nurture (experience, socialcultural). If this conceptual distinction is rejected as an
ontological description of the Real, the controversies
themselves evaporate.
A second example of the use of the neo-Darwinian
metatheory as a template for understanding developmental phenomena emerges from the behaviorist literature. In this arena, several have noted (Oyama, 1989;
44
Internal
External
EnvironmentAdaptation
Selection
Analogy
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Strategy 3
Strategy 4
Associate
Phenotype
Strategy
Genes
Random Variation
Natural Selection
Figure 2.6 The neo-Darwinian metatheory and mechanisms of development (variational change).
(cause) is improvement in stored knowledge. Improvement here refers either to increases in amount of knowledge stored or to the effectiveness of the machinery that
stores and accesses the knowledge. Thus, ultimately, development is defined in terms of stored knowledge. This
in itself limits developmental change to variational
change; there is no room here for transformational
change as a fundamental type of change. To account for
the change in stored knowledge, Siegler proposes five
broadly conceived mechanisms of development: (1)
synaptogenesis (a member of the broader class of neural
mechanisms), (2) associative competition, (3) encoding,
(4) analogy, and (5) strategy choice.
Each proposed developmental mechanism is understood as being analogous to an individual gene. Each is
an internal packet with an outward flow of causality
from genotype to phenotype. The strategy choice gene,
to take one example of the five mechanisms (see Figure
2.6), causes variation in the phenotype. The result is
variation in external behavior as in learning Strategy 1,
Strategy 2, or Strategy 3, and so on. As a specific analogy, consider the idea of tail length in an animal. The
human would have an innately prewired set of alternative strategies just as the rat would have a set of alternative genes for tail length (or technically, alleles at a
particular locus).
Having presented the inside story of variational and
only variational change, the outside story then comes
into play for Siegler. The alternative strategies are conceived as being in competition for survival. The environment selects (i.e., causes) the strategy that is to
survive, and that strategy is the one that best facilitates
the processing of information and, hence, the building
of stored knowledge. The rat might phenotypically appear with a tail length of 1, 2, or 3 depending on
which had been selected; individual children might
come with Strategy 1, Strategy 2, or Strategy 3.
In summary, for Siegler, fast and effective knowledge
acquisition defines human development and is explained
by phenotypical behaviors, which are a result of underlying causal mechanisms that are built into the system.
Considering knowledge acquisition, the phenotypical behavior, and the underlying mechanism as a totality constitutes both a description and an explanation of development. Siegler and Munakata (1993) have said: The
centrality of variation and selection within . . . change
mechanisms does not seem coincidental. Multiple competing entities seem essential for adaptation to changing
45
46
47
48
Person
Embodiment
Biological
Embodiment
Figure 2.7
Cultural
Embodiment
Sociocultural Embodiment
From the cultural point of synthesis, social constructivists not committed to a split metatheoretical approach
(e.g., Harre, 1995; Sampson, 1996) have come to embrace embodied action as a relational anchoring to the
relativism of split-off discourse analysis. Sampson
(1996) argues for embodied discourses as these refer
to the inherently embodied nature of all human endeavor, including talk, conversation and discourse itself (p. 609; see also, Csordas, 1999; Ingold, 2000;
Overton, 1997). Perhaps the most fully articulated contemporary employment of embodiment in a developmentally oriented cultural psychology is found in Boesch
(1991). Boeschs presentation of The I and the body is a
discussion of the centrality of embodiment for a cultural
psychology. Thus, he states The body, obviously, is
more than just an object with anatomical and physiological properties: it is the medium of our actions, it is with
49
Living Body
Embodiment
Person-Level
Cognition (Knowing)
Conation (Wishing)
Emotion (Feeling)
Subperson-Level
Agency
Self-Organizing
Action Systems
Instrumental Action
Sociocultural
and
Physical
World
Expressive/
Constitutive
Action
Inquiry Focus
(Points-of-View)
Biological
Systems
Figure 2.8
A. Person-centered
B. Sociocultural-centered
C. Biology-centered
50
Reflections of
Culture and Biology
(Conceptualized as
Person Factors)
Cause
(Correlate)
(Risk Factor)
(Predictor)
Instrumental Behavior
Sociocultural
and
Physical
World
Factors
Cause
(Correlate)
(Risk Factor)
(Predictor)
Biological
Factors
Figure 2.9
Inquiry Factors
biology, culture, discourse, narrative, or computer science. Psyche initially referenced soul and later
mind, and if psychology is not to again lose its mind
as it did in the days of the hegemony of behaviorism
keeping the psychological subject as the center of action
is a necessary guard against explanatory reduction to biology, culture, discourse, and so on.
The second benefit that accrues to maintaining, a
person-centered approach as a necessary point of
view is that this perspective again highlights the fact
that any act can be profitably understoodin a complementary bipolar fashionas both expressive-constitutive
and as instrumental-adaptive. Split or dichotomous
approachesespecially split-off variable approaches
lead to the illusion that acts exhibit only adaptiveinstrumental-communicative functions. A personcentered approach argues that any act may also be
understood as an expression of an underlying dynamic
organization of cognitive, affective, and conative meanings, and this expression operates to constitute the
world as known, felt, and desired. Here, Blooms work
(Bloom & Tinker, 2001) on the development of language provides an excellent illustration of the power of
conceptualizing language acquisition in the context of
the expression of person-centered cognitive, affective,
and conative-motivational meanings, rather than exclusively as an instrumental tool operating solely for communicative ends.
A third benefit derived from a person-centered point
of view is that it provides the necessary context for the
resolution of certain important problems related to our
general understanding of psychological meaning.
Specifically, a person-centered approach is a necessary
frame for solving the so-called symbol-grounding problem. This is the question of how to explain that representational items (i.e., a symbol, an image) come to have
psychological meaning (Bickhard, 1993). I return to this
problem in a more detailed fashion later.
With these examples of some of the benefits of a
child- or person-centered approach to developmental inquiry as background, it is possible to turn to a specific
description of this metatheoretical approach, which entails the five critical interwoven concepts of person,
agent, action, experience, and person-embodiment.
Person-Agent
Person and agent are complementary Escherian levels of
analysis of the same whole (see Figure 2.8A). The person
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Here, experience is both defined exclusively by the stimulus and the stimulus is conceptualized as causally acting on. The consequence of such split understandings is
that they again draw us back into a fruitless naturenurture debate in which experience become pitted
against innate or against biological maturation as
one of two competing alternative explanation of behavior; thus, empty questions such as Does experience influence behavior and change? How much does
experience count in adolescence? rise to the fore. When,
on the other hand, experience is conceptualized as the
complementary act-environment, these and all other
nature-nurture questions disappear, being replaced by
empirical explorations that examine acts in relation to
their source (person-agent) or acts in relation to the environment (see Overton & Ennis, in press).
When experience is understood as entailing the developmental action cycle of projection-transformation
(of the known world) exploration-transformation (of
the system), experience also becomes the psychological
53
ness that arise from the coordination of practical actions; reflective and transreflective (reflective symbolic
understandings of reflective symbolic understandings)
meanings describe further developmental advances in
the coordination of action systems.
In summary, to this point the nucleus of a relationally informed person-centered developmental action
metatheory of mind has been described, where mind is
conceptualized as a dynamic self-organizing system of
cognitive ( knowings, beliefs), emotional (feelings), and
conative or motivational (wishes, desires) meanings or
understandings, along with procedures for maintaining,
implementing, and changing these meanings. Mind,
through expressive projectionstransforms the world
as known, andthrough adaptive explorationtransforms itself (i.e., develops). However, this remains a nucleus and only a nucleus, because it lacks the critical
necessary feature of embodiment.
Person-Agent Embodied Actions
Person-agency is the source of action, and action is the
source of meaning; but this action itself is embodied. As
discussed earlier, embodiment is the claim that our perception, thinking, feelings, desiresthe way we experience or live the worldis contextualized by our being
active agents with this particular kind of body. At the
agent level, embodiment specifies the characteristic nature of the activity of any living system (e.g., the actual
world of the fly is necessarily shaped by the nature of
the flys embodied acts). At the person level, embodiment affirms thatfrom the beginningbodily acts
constrain and inform the nature of intentionality (Margolis, 1987). Intentionality is not limited to a symbolic,
reflective, or transreflective system of psychological
meanings. Intentionality also extends to a system of psychological meanings that characterize practical embodied actions operating at the most minimum level of
consciousness. These most basic meanings and all others
come from having a body with particular perceptual
and motor capabilities that are inseparably linked
(Thelen, Schner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001, p. 1). They
ariseas Piaget repeatedly insistedfrom the sensorymotor functioning that represents a concrete instantiation of embodied actions.
Varela et al. (1991) have sketched a general outline
for an embodied theory of cognition. Sheets-Johnstone
(1990) provides an evolutionary anthropological perspective on human embodiment and thought, and
Santostefano (1995) has detailed the emotional and
54
cognitive dimensions of practical, symbolic, and reflective embodied meanings. Further, many who have studied psychopathology, from R. D. Laing (1960) to
Donald Winnicott (1965) and Thomas Ogden (1986),
argue that disruptions in the embodied actions of the
person-agent are central to an understanding of the development of severe forms of psychopathology (see
Overton and Horowitz, 1991).
At the level of practical actions (see Figure 2.2),
Bermudezs (1998) work on the development of selfconsciousness is central to an understanding of the
impact of an embodied person conceptualization.
Bermudezs fundamental argument is that late emerging
forms of meaning found in symbolic and reflective consciousness develop fromand are constrained byembodied self-organizing action systems available to the
infant. Most important, these early systems entail
person-level somatic proprioception and exteroception.
As these person-centered processes interpenetrate the
physical and sociocultural worlds, proprioception operates as the differentiation mechanism for the emergence
of a self-consciousness action system, and exteroception
operates as the differentiation mechanism for the emergence of an object-consciousness system. Hence, over
the first several months of life a basic practical action
associated with me and other develops, which in
turn becomes transformed into the symbolic me and
other of early toddlerhood. Thelens (2000) work on
the role of movement generally, and specifically body
memory, in infant cognitive functioning is another
closely related area that illustrates the importance of
embodiment at the level of practical actions.
Langers (1994) empirical studies represent important demonstrations of the intercoordination of embodied action systems as these intercoordinations move
development from the practical to the symbolic plane of
meaning (see Figure 2.2). Earlier work by Held and his
colleagues (e.g., Held & Bossom, 1961; Held & Hein,
1958) illustrates the significance of voluntary embodied
action at all levels of adaptation. Goodwyn, & Acredolo
(1993) research on the use of bodily gestures as signs
expressing practical meanings in older infants suggests
the expressive and instrumental value of embodied practical gesture. Other work has elaborated on the significance of bodily representations at the symbolic and
reflective levels of meaning. For example, while the use
of fingers for counting is well documented (Gelman &
Williams, 1998), Saxes (1981, 1995) research has
shown cross-culturally that other bodily representations
enter into counting systems. Further, earlier research by
EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES
In broad outline, to this point the chapter has explored
the nature of the concept of development and related
concepts as they are grounded and sustained within a
hierarchy of metatheories. The discussed metatheoriessplit, relational, embodied action, developmental
systemsare themselves contextualized by metatheoretical concepts that operate at yet a higher level of discourse (see Figure 2.1). These are the epistemological
(i.e., issues of knowing) and ontological (i.e., issues of
reality) level of metatheory to which we turn next. The
conceptual issues that are illustrated at these levels
have evolved across the course of history, and any clear
exposition of these issues itself necessitates an historical approach.
Metaphysics is the broad area of philosophical inquiry
concerned with conceptual inquiry into the nature, origin, and structure of the world or being. Ontology is
the domain of metaphysics concerned with question of
what constitutes the Real with a capital R (Putnam,
1987). Epistemology is about knowing, and its primary
question concerns the validity of what and how we
know. Understood relationally, epistemology is a narrative about how we know what is Real, and ontology is a
narrative about the Real as we know it. Historically,
Epistemological-Ontological Issues
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56
Epistemological-Ontological Issues
57
58
of Leibnizs philosophy is therefore to be looked for neither in the concept of individuality nor in that of universality. These concepts are explicable only in mutual
relationship; they reflect one another (p. 33).
Leibniz
With ontology as the line of sight, Leibniz, a contemporary of Locke, refused to split off being from becoming.
Activity and ceaseless change were fundamental to the
nature of the Real. In his concept of substance, Leibniz
substituted a pluralistic universe in place of
Descartess dualism and Lockes materialist monism.
Leibnizs monad is the fundamental unit of this universe. The monad is only in so far as it is active, and
its activity consists in a continuous transition from one
new state to another as it produces these states out of itself in unceasing succession. . . . Never is one of these
elements just like another; never can it be resolved into
the same sum of purely static qualities (Cassirer,
1951, p. 29). In Leibnizs philosophy an inalienable
prerogative is first gained for the individual entity. The
individual no longer functions as a special case, as an
example; it now expresses something essential in itself. . . . Every individual substance is not only a fragment of the universe, it is the universe itself seen from
a particular viewpoint. And only the totality of these
unique points of view gives us the truth of reality
(Cassirer, 1951, pp. 3233).
From an epistemological line of sight, if substance is
in continuous transition from one state to another,
then understanding entails the rational discovery of the
rule of this transition and the laws according to which it
occurs. This is Leibnizs rationalism. It differs significantly from Descartess in that there is no return to God
as the imprinter of these universal ideas, nor is reason
split from observation. Universal ideas as rules and
laws, and particular experiences as observations, are relational or co-relational. Knowing may begin in observation, but observation proceeds in the context of some
system, idea, or form. Analysis is not suppressed in
Leibnizs system; it occupies a significant place in his
thought. However, analysis is not privileged over synthesis; all analysis implies a whole or synthetic aspect according to which the analysis proceeds. Cassirer (1951)
points out that, for Leibniz, the concept of the whole
has gained a different and deeper significance. For the
universal whole, which is to be grasped can no longer be
reduced to a mere sum of its parts. The new whole is organic, not mechanical; its nature does not consist in the
sum of its parts but is presupposed by its parts and con-
Epistemological-Ontological Issues
59
60
features of a system dif ferentiate and move toward integration. This process, suggests a grounding for understanding change as directional. In split understandings,
there must always be a controversy over whether change
is best characterized as either cyclical (variational) or directional (transformational). Within the dialectical context, this dichotomy is resolved through recognition that
the polarities of thesis-antithesis constitute the cyclical
dimension of change. However, such cycles are never
closed, as they would be in a circle. When a circle is
opened a bit, it does not return precisely to its starting
point. As a consequence, with the continuation of activity, the open cycle forms a spiral (the synthesis or integration). With the repetition of spirals, a direction is
formed (see Overton 1994a, 1994c).
In the nineteenth century, the principle of Becoming
was extended in the works of social theorists such as
Comte, Marx, and Spencer and in the writings of biologists such as Wolff, Goethe, and von Baer. And James
Mark Baldwin (1895, 1897/1973) first formulated a developmental psychology specifically in terms of dialectical categories. As Broughton (1981) points out, his
[Baldwins] . . . orientation came to be tempered with a
Hegelian view of dialectical progress through qualitatively distinct levels of consciousness (p. 399; see also,
Freeman-Moir, 1982).
In the twentieth century, Heinz Werner (1948, 1957)
drew his own theoretical approach from the dialectical
feature of the principle of Becoming. In this context, he
proposed the orthogenetic (normal development) principle as a universal explanatory principle, or law, of transformational change. The orthogenetic principle asserts
that whenever there is development it proceeds from an
initial state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation,
and hierarchic integration (1957, p. 126). But Werner
was not alone among twentieth-century developmentalists in constructing metatheoretical and theoretical understandings framed by the dialectic of Becoming.
Piaget, for example, draws from the same image in laying
out the metatheoretical grounding for his equilibration
explanation of human transformational development:
These global transformations . . . gradually denote a
sort of law of evolution which can be phrased as follows:
assimilation and accommodation proceed from a state of
chaotic undifferentiation to a state of differentiation
with correlative coordination (Piaget, 1954, p. 352).
Similarly, Vygotsky (1978) maintains that development
is best characterized as a complex dialectical process
characterized by periodicity, unevenness in the development of different functions, metamorphosis or qualitative transformation of one form into another (p. 73).
It is significant also that these three major developmentalists of the last half of the twentieth centuryPiaget (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, p. 8), Werner (Werner &
Kaplan, 1963, p. 11) and Vygotsky (1978) all considered
development to be change entailing a spirality that
emerges from cycles and yields direction (see Figure
2.6). As Vygotsky noted specifically with respect to
higher psychological functions, Development, as often
happens, proceeds here not in a circle but in a spiral,
passing through the same point at each new revolution
while advancing to a higher level (p. 56).
Along with classical developmental theorists like
Werner, Piaget, and Vygotsky, dynamic theorists, both
from the British object-relations (e.g., Fairbairn, 1952;
Winnicott, 1965) and the ego psychology schools (Erikson, 1968) have found the core dialectical Becoming notions of activity, differentiation, and integration
central for understanding both normal and pathological
human ontogenesis (Overton & Horowitz, 1991).
This discussion has focused on the historical impact
of the Leibnizian-Hegelian tradition as it advanced and
articulated the principle of Becoming. More broadly, the
philosophical grounding of the relational developmental
tradition was progressively elaborated from Leibniz to
Kant to Hegel, and it was Kants own contribution that
simultaneously both advanced and retarded this process. Kants line of sight was epistemological, and because knowing is a human activity, his focus was on the
human conditions necessary for knowledge. Hume, after
splitting reason (mind) from observation, had come to
argue that valid (universal and necessary) knowledge
cannot be found in the observational world, which yields
only the particular and the contingent. Kant agreed, but
adopting a relational stance, he argued that this fact
does not lead to the dismissal of valid knowledge.
Rather, it simply demonstrates that if contingent knowledge is a feature of the observational world, then valid
knowledge must be a feature of thought, of mind.
Kant
Arguing from the relational perspective, Kant maintained that both valid and contingent knowledge are
essential aspects of human experience (i.e., both
the universal and the particular, the necessary and the
contingent are features of human experience). Consequently, the question was notas assumed in the
Epistemological-Ontological Issues
61
edge and the accessing and application of that knowledge became the background for a later cognitive developmental distinction between the development of a
cognitive competence and the development of procedures for accessing and applying that competence
(Chandler & Chapman, 1994; Overton 1990, 1991a;
Overton & Dick, in press).
Kant and the Phenomena-Noumena Split
Although this sketch of human cognition is grounded in
the relational, two additional features of Kants position
are inconsistent with the relational developmental tradition: Kants Cartesian split of phenomena and noumena,
and that Kant considered the categories and forms of intuition to be fundamentally unchanging. Noumena were described as things-in-themselves, or objects and events
independent of any representation of the object or event.
Phenomena were described as representations of objects
and events as they are known by the knower. For Kant,
these spheres were split. The thing-in-itself was disconnected from knowing, and knowing was disconnected
from the thing-in-itself. A direct consequence of this split
is that the (person) point of view became a privileged position, in the same way that the Newtonian-Humean tradition had made the point of view a privileged position.
One broad impact of this Kantian split for developmental inquiry is that it came to form the background
logic for the nativist side of the nature-nurture debate,
just as the Newtonian-Humean split formed the background logic for the nurture side. This nativism
whether with respect to Chomskyian (1975) explanations
of language (see Jackendoff, 1994; Overton, 1994b;
Pinker, 1997), or with respect to other contemporary
forms of neo-nativism (e.g., Astuti, Solomon, Carey,
2004; Baillargeon, 1993; Karmiloff-Smith, 1991; J. M.
Mandler, 1992; Spelke & Newport, 1998)presents a
picture of the human mind as a set of innate rules, untouched by history and culture; an inversion of the empiricist tradition, which presents a picture of history and
culture, untouched by the human mind.
Hegels Relational Developmental Reconciliation
of Mind and Nature
Hegel resolved Kants split and moved his static categories back into a more fully coherent relational developmental context. Hegel (1807, Introduction) began his
work from the position that there could be no detached
thing-in-itself, just as there could be no detached
knowing-in-itself. Rather, the world of knowing and
62
Epistemological-Ontological Issues
63
64
Epistemological-Ontological Issues
65
66
Epistemological-Ontological Issues
67
From this base, Boesch (1980, 1991, 1992) and Eckensberger (1989, 1990, 1996) formulate the beginnings of
a developmentally oriented cultural psychology that is
more inclusive than those founded in the Marxist tradition. Boeschs system and Eckensbergers extension of
this system draw from Piagetwhom Boesch calls the
first action theoristas well as from Janets dynamic
theory, psychodynamic theory, and Kurt Lewins fieldtheory. Elaborating on the relational theme of expressiveconstitutive/instrumental-communicative action they
argue for a cultural psychology that aims at an integration
of cultural and individual change . . . individual and collective meaning systems . . . [and one that] should try to
bridge the gap between objectivism and subjectivism
(Eckensberger, 1990).
Inclusive relational developmental models of the individual and culture are not limited to the European
continent. For example, as described earlier, Damon
(1988, 1991; Damon & Hart, 1988), presents the outline
of just such an approach in his discussion of two complementary developmental functions, . . . the social and
the personality functions of social development (1988,
p. 3). Moving within the broader Leibnizian-Hegelian
concepts of differentiation and integration, Damon
presents the interpenetration of the two functions as an
identity of opposites. Furth (1969), also explicitly presented a relational view of social development in which
self and other as isolated entities are denied in favor of
relations (Youniss, 1978, p. 245), and this perspective
has been the continuing focus of Youniss and his colleagues (e.g., Davidson & Youniss, 1995; Youniss &
Damon, 1992). This relational perspective has most recently been expanded in the literature on infant development (Mueller & Carpendale, 2004; Hobson, 2002)
through a focus on the contrast between individualist
(split) and relational approaches to the origin and nature
of social development:
Bosech begins with the notion that any action and any goal
has two dimensions or aspects: one . . . is the instrumental
aspect, that an action is carried out instrumentally in order
68
Pragmatism
A final epistemological-ontological tradition that requires a brief exploration to establish a grounding for an
inclusive understanding of development is the American
pragmatism of Pierce, James, and Dewey. Pragmatisms
fundamental postulates cohere as a contextualist worldview (Pepper, 1942) that draws on many LeibnizianHegelian themes, including holism, action, change, and
the dialectic. The focus of these themes is located on the
instrumental rather than the expressive pole of the relational dialectic. If Gadamer and Taylor (see also
Ricoeur, 1991) can be said to represent the phenomenological perspective of the relational developmental
philosophical grounding, then pragmatism, particularly
the work of James and Dewey, can be read as representing the instrumental perspective.
Putnam (1995) describes holism as one of the chief
characteristics of James philosophy. This holistic commitment leads to an obvious if implicit rejection of
many familiar dualisms: fact, value, and theory are all
seen by James as interpenetrating and interdependent
(p. 7). James (1975) addresses virtually all the traditional dichotomies of split-off traditions, and he, along
with Dewey (1925), argue for a relational interpenetrating understanding of universal-particular, inner-outer,
subject-object, theory-practice, monism-pluralism, and
unity-diversity. Although affirming the ontological reality of the dialectic of interpenetration, the stress and the
focus of pragmatism is, however, on the particular, the
outer, object, practice, pluralism, and diversity.
Epistemologically, pragmatism repudiates the foundationalism of an ultimate fixed object of knowledge,
and insists on the connection of knowledge and action.
Knowledge arises out of action, out of particular practices or praxis. In this respect, James and Dewey differ
little from Habermas, Gadamer, Bahktin, and Taylor.
Rather than specifically elaborating the notion of dialogue as the mediator of knowing (expressive and instrumental), the concept of experience carries this function
in pragmatism. Experience manifests its relational dialectical as well as its embodied character in being what
Epistemological-Ontological Issues
69
cance of integration in contextualism. He argues relationally that the integration the pragmatist should stress
is an integration of conflicts (1979, p. 411); hence, a
dialectical integration. He also warns the contextualist
against the danger of an overemphasis on the contingent,
the accidental, and the variable. For Pepper, the contextualist has been so impressed with evidences of historical change and cultural influences and the shifting
contexts of value that he cannot easily bring himself to
accept any degree of permanence (p. 414). Pepper
chides the constricted contextualist by arguing that
there is much more permanence in the world than the
contextualist admits (p. 414). Similarly, Hilary Putnam
has elaborated an extensive contemporary relational
reading of pragmatism. Putnam sometimes refers to
this reading as internal realism and sometimes as
pragmatic realism (1987, 1990, 1995). In either case,
therealism is the commonsense realism discussed
earlierneither the Realism of mind (idealism), nor the
Realism of world (materialism). The internal and
pragmatic features of his system assert the position of
a pragmatism that includes both the expressive and the
instrumental.
Finally, that pragmatism need not be read as a split
tradition, which suppresses order and change of form,
can even be gleaned from the writings of one of the
founders of pragmatism:
There is in nature . . . something more than mere flux and
change. Form is arrived at whenever a stable, even though
moving, equilibrium is reached. Changes interlock and
sustain one another. Whenever there is this coherence
there is endurance. Order is not imposed from without but
is made out of the relations of harmonious interactions
that energies bear to one another. Because it is active . . . order itself develops. It comes to include within
its balanced movement a greater variety of changes.
(Dewey, 1934, p. 14)
70
(1998) for cognitive development. Piaget (1985)considering the relation between his earlier investigations
of operational knowing (expressive-transformational)
and contemporary explorations of procedural knowing
(instrumental-variational)found in this new arena a
possible synthesis of genetic structuralism, the focus of
all of our previous work, with the functionalism found in
the work of J. Dewey and of E. Claparede (p. 68).
The aim of this section has been to establish a broad
epistemological-ontological grounding for an inclusive
understanding of development as formal (transformational) and functional (variational) changes in the
expressive-constitutive and instrumental-communicative
features of behavior. This has been done by following the
historical thread of the Leibnizian-Hegelian tradition
and noting the locations where this thread splits-off toward exclusivity. Ultimately, the illustrations given do
not aim to categorize particular writings. Rather, they
suggest the consequences that follow for the domain of
developmental inquiry when a particular path is taken. In
the concluding section, the epistemological-ontological
grounding, the relational developmental metatheory, developmental systems, developmentally oriented embodied action metatheory and the integrative concept of
development become the interwoven context for a discussion of the nature of the scientific understanding and explanation of developmental phenomena. This section
centers on issues of methodology, where methodology is
understood broadly as metamethods for empirical scientific inquiry. Methods, in the narrow sense of specific
techniques for designing, conducting, and evaluating empirical research, are considered within the context of alternative methodologies.
In an important sense, the discussion to the present
point has constructed our developmental landscape, and
populated it with certain types of psychological subjects (expressive-instrumental), who change in certain
ways (transformationally-variationally), and act in a
biological-cultural world that both creates and is created by them. Now, the task is to inquire into how best
to investigate the changing character of these persons
and this world. This is the task of methodology.
METHODOLOGY: EXPLANATION
AND UNDERSTANDING
The focus to this point has been developmental inquiry
as a broad-based knowledge-building activity. Now, we
turn more specifically to developmental psychology as
an empirical science. The historical dialogue has arrived at a common agreement that whatever else it may
be, any empirical science is a human activityan epistemological activitywith certain broad orientations
and aims. The historical dialogue has further led to
common agreement that the most general aim and orientation of empirical science is the establishment of a systematic body of knowledge that is tied to observational
evidence (Lakatos 1978b; Laudan 1977; Nagel, 1979;
Wartofsky, 1968). Any empirical science aims at building a system of knowledge that represents patterns of
relations among phenomena and processes of the experienced world. These patterns constitute explanations
of the phenomena and processes under consideration.
Further, to be properly empirical, the explanations must
have implications that are in some sense open to observational-experimental assessment.
If science aims toward order, it begins in the flux
and chaos of the everyday experience that is often
termed common sense (see earlier discussion of
commonsense level of observation, Figure 2.1, and see
also, Nagel, 1967, 1979; Overton, 1991c; Pepper, 1942;
Wartofsky, 1968). As the philosopher Ernst Nagel
(1967) has described it, All scientific inquiry takes its
departure from commonsense beliefs and distinctions,
and eventually supports its findings by falling back
on common sense (p. 6). This commonsense base is
what Gadamer refers to as the anticipatory meanings
of preunderstanding (see earlier discussion of the
hermeneutic circle).
For the science of developmental psychology, this
starting point includes actions that are commonly
referred to as perceiving, thinking, feeling, relating, remembering, valuing, intending, playing, creating, languaging, comparing, reasoning, wishing, willing,
judging, and so on. These actions, and the change of
these actions, as understood on a commonsense level of
experience or discourse (see Figure 2.1), constitute the
problems of developmental psychology. They are problems because, although they represent the stability of
practical everyday life, even the most meager reflection
reveals they appear as inconsistent, contradictory, and
muddled. Refined, critically reflective theories and
metatheories, including systems, embodiment, cultural,
biological, information processing, Piagetian, Gibsonian, Vygotskian, Eriksonian, Chomskyian and the rest,
all represent attempts to explain (i.e., to bring order
into) the contradictory, inconsistent, muddled features
of these various domains of inquiry.
TABLE 2.1
Scientific Methodologies
Split Tradition
Relational Tradition
Aristotle
Leibniz-Hegel
Newton-Humean
Positivism
Research Programs
Research Traditions
Instrumentalism
Conventionalism
Context of Discovery
(Deduction,
a heuristic
device)
Metatheories
Models and Theories
(Heuristic Devices)
Context of
Justification
Laws
Generalization
Laws
Generalization
(Induction)
(Induction)
Observation
Experiment
Assessment
(Reduction
and Causality)
Observation
Experiment
Assessment
(Reduction
and Causality)
There is little disagreement among scientists, historians of science, and philosophers of science about where
science beginsin common sense and the contradictions
that show up when we begin to examine common sense
and where it leadsto refined theories and laws that explain. Science is a human knowledge building activity
designed to bring order and organization into the f lux of
everyday experience. Disagreement emerges only when
the question is raised of exactly how, or by what route,
science moves from common sense to refined knowledge.
This issuethe route from common sense to science
constitutes the methodology of science. Historically, two
routes have been proposed, and traveled. One emerges
from the Newtonian-Humean split epistemologicalontological tradition. Those who follow this route are directed to avoid interpretation, and to carefully walk the
path of observation and only observation. On this path,
reason enters only as an analytic heuristic; a tool for
overcoming conflicts by generating ever more pristine
observations, free from interpretation. The second route
emerges from the Leibnizian-Hegelian relational tradition. Those who follow this route are directed toward a
relational dialectical path on which interpretation and
observation interpenetrate and form an identity of opposites. On this path, interpretation and observation, become co-equal complementary partners in conflict
resolution.
The following discussion discusses these two pathways (see Overton 1998 for a more extensive historical
discussion). We begin from the Newtonian split tradition
of mechanical explanation and move to a contemporary
relational methodology. This evolution of these scientific methodologies including the empiricist variants of
positivism, neopositivism, instrumentalism, and conventionalism as well as relational metamethod is outlined in Table 2.1.
71
Metatheories
Models and Theories
Laws
Abduction
Hermeneutic Circle
Transcendental Argument
Observation
Experiment/Assessment
72
73
74
context of the legacy of the Newtonian-Humean tradition that was now coming to be called analytic philosophy. At this point, analytic philosophy was taking its
linguistic turn away from traditional epistemological
questions of how the Real is known and replacing these
with questions of what it means to make the language
claim that the Real is known. In this context, logical
positivism concerned itself not with knowing the Real
but with the nature of statements that claim to know the
Real (Schlick, 1991, p. 40).
Logical positivism focused on the reductionist and
inductive features of Newtonian mechanical methodology. These were presented as the descriptive features of
science, and as they go hand in hand with (causal) explanation as formulated in the covering law model, science
from a positivist point of view is often characterized as
the description and explanation of phenomena. This reductionistic focus ultimately led to the articulation of
two complementary criteria for the demarcation of science from nonscience (Lakatos, 1978a, 1978b; Overton,
1984). First, a proposition (e.g., a hypothesis, a theoretical statement, a law) was acceptable as scientifically
meaningful if, and only if, it could be reduced to words
whose meaning could be directly observed and pointed
to. The meaning of the word must ultimately be shown,
it has to be given. This takes place through an act of
pointing or showing (Schlick, 1991, p. 40). The words
whose meaning could be directly observed constituted a neutral observation languagecompletely objective and free from subjective or mind-dependent
interpretation. Thus, all theoretical language required
reduction to pristine observations and a neutral observational language. Second, a statement was acceptable as
scientifically meaningful if, and only if, it could be
shown to be a strictly inductive generalization, drawn
directly from the pristine observations. Thus, to be scientifically meaningful, any universal propositions (e.g.,
hypotheses, theories, laws) had to be demonstrably nothing more than summary statements of the pristine observations themselves (see Table 2.1).
Although logical positivism was formulated primarily within the natural sciences, its tenets were exported
into behavioral science through Bridgmans (1927) operationalism. The reductionism of positivism culminated in A. J. Ayers (1946) Principle of Verifiability.
According to this principle, a statement is scientifically
meaningful to the extent that, in principle, there is the
possibility of direct experience (pristine observation)
that will verify or falsify it. Bridgmans operationalism
extended this principle by not only setting the criteria of
scientific meaning, but also identifying the specific nature of this meaning: Within operationalism, the meaning of a scientific concept resides in the application of
the concept (i.e., in the definition of the concept in operational or application terms).
Neopositivism reached its zenith in the 1940s and
1950s, but ultimately both the friends and the foes of
positivism recognized its failure as a broad demarcationist strategy. It failed for several reasons:
1. It became clear, as demonstrated in the work of
Quine (1953) and others (e.g., Lakatos, 1978b; Popper, 1959; Putnam, 1983), that rich theories are not
reducible to a neutral observational language.
2. There was a demonstrated inadequacy of induction as
the method for arriving at theoretical propositions
(Hanson 1958, 1970; Lakatos, 1978a; Popper, 1959).
3. It became evident that the covering law model that it
introduced was highly restricted in its application
(Ricoeur, 1984) and faulty in its logic (Popper, 1959).
4. It was recognized that there are theories that warrant
the attribution scientific despite the fact that they
lead to no testable predictions (Putnam, 1983; Toulmin, 1961).
Instrumentalism-Conventionalism
With the failure of neopositivism, there arose out of the
Newtonian-Humean tradition a revised methodology
called instrumentalism or conventionalism (Lakatos,
1978b; Laudan, 1984; Kaplan 1964; Overton, 1984; Pepper, 1942; Popper, 1959). This demarcationist strategy
accepted the failure of reductive-inductive features of
positivism and admitted the introduction of theoretical
interpretation as an irreducible dimension of science
(see Table 2.1). However, metatheories, theories, and
models were treated as mere convenient or instrumental
heuristic devices for making predictions. Thus, theories
in instrumentalism were restricted to the same predictive function that formal deductive systems (the covering law model) performed in neopositivism. Popper
(1959) added a unique dimension to instrumentalism
through the claim that theories and models should become acceptable in the body of science, if and only if,
they specify observational results that, if found, would
disprove or falsify a theory.
Instrumentalism opened the door for interpretation to
reenter science but hesitated in allowing it to become a
full partner in the scientific process of building a systematic body of knowledge. The movement to a dialecti-
cally defined full partnership of interpretation and observation required a radical change; one that would (a)
abandon the splitting and foundationalism that had established pristine observation as the exclusive final arbiter of truth and ( b) free up the notion of scientific
explanation that was fossilized by this splitting and
foundationalism. This move to a Libnizian-Hegelian relational alternative path from common sense to refined
scientific knowledge emerged in the 1950s and it continues to be articulated today.
The concepts that constitute this relational methodology arose from diverse narrative streams including analytic philosophy, the history and philosophy of the
natural sciences, the philosophy of behavioral and social
sciences, and hermeneutics. Despite their often complementary and reciprocally supportive nature these narratives have frequently failed to connect or enter into a
common dialogue. Yet, their cumulative effect has been
to forge at least the outline of an integrated story of
scientific methodology that moves beyond the split
Cartesian dichotomies of natural science versus social
science and explanation versus understanding, observation versus interpretation, and theory versus data.
Here briefly are some of the central characters in
the 1950s emergence of this new metamethod: The later
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958)whose seminal book
Philosophical Investigations was first published in
1953represented analytic philosophy, and he was followed by his pupil Georg Henrik von Wright and later
Hilary Putnam. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989)whose
Truth and Method was first published in 1960represented the hermeneutic tradition and later came Jurgen
Habermas, Richard Bernstein, and Paul Ricoeur. Steven
Toulmin (1953)whose Philosophy of Science was published in 1953and N. R. Hanson (1958)whose Patterns of Discovery was published in 1958represented
the natural sciences. They were later followed by
Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and, most
recently, Bruno Latour. Elizabeth Anscombe (1957)
whose Intention was published in 1957, as were William
Drays (1957) Laws and Explanation in History, and
Charles Frankels (1957) Explanation and Interpretation in History, represented the social sciences as did
Peter Winch (1958) and Charles Taylor (1964).
Relational Scientific Methodology
The story of the development of an integrated relational
methodology of the sciences is obviously detailed and
complex (see Overton, 1998, 2002). I outline its main
75
76
77
78
Abductive
Hypothesis
Abductive
Hypothesis
Background
Figure 2.10
Observation
Background
Observation
Becomes
Abductive
Hypothesis
Background
Observation
Becomes
Abductive
Hypothesis
Figure 2.11
Observation
in virtually any psychological work that assumes a centrality of emotional, motivational, or cognitive mental
organization. Piagets work is particularly rich in abductive explanation. Consider the following example:
There is the phenomenal observation (O) that it is the case
that certain persons (i.e., children generally beyond the
approximate age of 7 years) understand that concepts remain quantitatively invariant despite changes in qualitative appearances (conservation).
Piaget then infers (E) a certain type of action system
having specified features including reversibility (concrete
operations). Thus, the conditional If (E) concrete operations, then (O) conservation, is what would be expected.
And the conclusion, given the O, Therefore, concrete
operations explains the understanding of conservation.
79
80
opposites, the broad issue of the validity of our scientific observations also becomes a central issue. Validity
has always been a concern of scientific methodology,
but in the split understanding of science, validity had
nothing to do with interpreted meaning. In that story,
validity became a content issue dependent to a great degree on the outcome of experimental design. In the relational story, the validity of our scientific observations,
or what Messick (1995) terms score validity, becomes
a complementary process involving, on the one Escherian hand, the distinctive features of construct validity as
it involves interpretative meaning, and, on the other Escherian hand, content validity as it involves denotative
meaning (see Overton, 1998 for an extended discussion).
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has explored background ideas that ground,
constrain, and sustain theories and methods in psychology generally, and developmental psychology specifically. An understanding of these backgrounds presents
the investigator with a rich set of concepts for the construction and assessment of psychological theories. An
understanding of background ideas in the form of
metatheories and metamethods also helps to prevent
conceptual confusions that may ultimately lead to unproductive theories and unproductive methods of empirical inquiry. The ideas in the chapter are presented in the
context of Hogans (2001) earlier mentioned comment:
Our training and core practices concern research methods;
the discipline is . . . deeply skeptical of philosophy. We
emphasize methods for the verification of hypotheses and
minimize the analysis of the concepts entailed by the hypotheses. [But] all the empiricism in the world cant salvage a bad idea. (p. 27)
The ideas in this chapter are also presented in the service of ultimately proving wrong Wittgensteins (1958)
comment that in psychology there are empirical methods and conceptual confusions (p. xiv).
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CHAPTER 3
90
sources. To that end, a reprint series containing historically significant original articles and volumes has been
prepared by Wozniak (e.g., 1993, 1995).
Other recent volumes include the contributions of
professional historians and others who are not enmeshed in current empirical debates of the discipline
(e.g., Broughton & Freeman-Moir, 1982; Elder, Modell,
& Parke, 1993). In addition, the social relevance and
the making of the discipline in U.S. society have been
told expertly by Sears (1975) and White (1996). Any
single overviewincluding this onecan tell only part
of the story.1
Adopting the convention used in the previous Handbook of Child Psychology, 20 years must lapse before a
contribution or event qualifies as historical. Two
decades constitute approximately one generation in the
life of our science. This rule makes the task manageable
and sharpens the focus on the events of the past.
spective, and the genetic theme was influential in philosophical and biological thought in the late nineteenth
century. Alfred Binet in France, William Preyer and
William Stern in Germany, Herbert Spencer and George
J. Romanes in England, and several U.S. psychologists
(from G. Stanley Hall and John Dewey to James Mark
Baldwin and John B. Watson) agreed on the fundamental
viewpoint of development, if little else. What is the fundamental viewpoint? Watson, who is often depicted as
an opponent of the developmental approach, indicated
that developmental methods require the continuous observation and analysis of the stream of activity beginning when the egg is fertilized and ever becoming more
complex as age increases (1926, p. 33). For Watson, the
developmental approach was:
[the] fundamental point of view of the behavioristviz.
that in order to understand man you have to understand the
life history of his activities. It shows, too, most convincingly, that psychology is a natural sciencea definite part
of biology. (p. 34)
Nor was the kernel idea of development a new one for biological science or for psychology. It had guided the
work and thinking of physiologist Karl von Baer (1828)
and those who followed his early lead in the establishment of comparative embryology. It was also a basic
theme in the earliest systematic statements of psychology (Reinert, 1979).
But not all of the founders of the new science subscribed to the developmental perspective or the assumption that psychology was a definite part of biology. Some
of the most influentialincluding Wilhelm Wundt himselfhad a different view. Noting the difficulties that
one encounters in efforts to study young children in experimental settings, Wundt argued that it is an error to
hold, as is sometimes held, that the mental life of adults
can never be fully understood except through the analysis of the childs mind. The exact opposite is the true position to take (1907, p. 336).
Even the father of child psychology in America, G.
Stanley Hall, relegated developmental concerns to
minor league status in the new psychology. In the inaugural lectures at Johns Hopkins, Hall (1885) followed
his mentor Wundt in holding that psychology could be
divided into three areas: (1) experimental psychology,
(2) historical psychology, and (3) the study of instinct.
The study of children and adolescents was assigned to
historical psychology, which included as well the study
91
of primitive people and folk beliefs. Instinct psychology dealt with those processes and behaviors that were
considered innate, thus encompassing much of what
is today called comparative and evolutionary psychology. Of the three divisions, Hall considered experimental psychology to be the more central and reduced
to far more exact methods. These methods included
the use of reaction time, psychophysical procedures,
and introspection to examine the relations between
sensation and perception. Historical and instinct psychology necessarily relied on observational and correlational methods, hence were seen as less likely to
yield general and enduring principles. Halls divisions
were consistent with the proposals of numerous
writersAuguste Compte, John Stuart Mill, Wilhelm
Wundtwho called for a second psychology to address
aspects of human mind and behavior that were based in
the culture (Cahan & White, 1992; Wundt, 1916). In
Halls account, the second psychology was a secondclass psychology.
The division between experimental and developmental psychology has proved to be remarkably durable
but that is getting ahead of the story. The main point is
that developmental issues could have been nuclear concerns for the new science, but they were not. They have
not even played a significant role in the history of experimental psychology (see Boring, 1929/1950).
There is also consensus that the initiation of the scientific study of children represents the convergence of
two forces, one social and the other scientific. The scientific background is the primary focus of this chapter,
and our principal attention is given to the intellectual
and empirical foundations of the discipline.
But there were also social and political roots. Sears
(1975) observed, in his classic chapter titled Your Ancients Revisited, that:
By the end of the [nineteenth] century, there had developed a vaguely cohesive expertise within the professions
of education and medicine, and the origins of social work
as a helping profession were clearly visible. During the
first two decades of the twentieth century, these professions began relevant research to improve their abilities,
but their main influence on the future science was their
rapidly expanding services for children in the schools,
hospitals, clinics, and social agencies. This expansion continued after World War I, and it was in the next decade,
the 1920s, that scientists from several nonprofessionally
oriented (pure science) disciplines began to join the
92
ized models thus generated may be transformed over development into age-appropriate expression, but not in underlying type.
The other major nineteenth-century approach to development was epigenetic. Novelties were brought about
through progressive transformations in development.
But what determines the course of the transformations
and, ultimately, the nature of the finished product?
The earlier vitalistic answerentelechy, the Aristotelian vital forcewas no longer acceptable to most
nineteenth-century epigeneticists. Among other problems, the teleological answer looked to be an admission
of ignorance. But without developmental regulation and
direction, what would prevent growth from occurring
willy nilly into diverse and monstrous forms? The concept of epigenesis-as-developmental-transformations
could not stand alone. It required additional assumptions to account for the sequential properties of development and its orderly nature (von Bertalanffy, 1933;
Gould, 1977).
This theoretical void was filled in nineteenth-century
biology by the recapitulation concept prominent in
Naturphilosophie, a significant philosophical movement
in Germany. Recapitulation bound together the two main
forms of organic creation, ontogeny (individual development) and phylogeny (species development), into a single
framework. In embryonic development, organisms are
assumed to pass through the adult forms of all species
that had been ancestral to them during evolution. Organisms in embryogenesis experience a fast-forward replay
of evolutionary history. With this predictable and
orderly progression, novel features may be added only in
the terminal or mature phases of development. This
concept, labeled the biogenetic law by Ernst Haeckel
(1866), was enormously influential in nineteenthcentury biology. The recapitulation hypothesis also provided the biological metaphor for Halls account of
adolescence and S. Freuds original formulations of
repression and psychosexual stages (Sulloway, 1979,
pp. 198204, 258264).
In opposition to prominent biologists of his day,
von Baer argued that recapitulation was based on
faulty observations and romanticism rather than
logic. In his own research, he found that organisms of
related species were indeed highly similar in anatomy during their early stages of embryonic growth.
However, contrary to the expectations of the recapitulation interpretation, species-typical differences appeared early in the course of development, not only in
93
its final stages. Moreover, the organization at successive stages seemed to uniquely fit the organism for
its current circumstances. It was not merely the
mechanical repetition of earlier ancestral forms, as
implied by the recapitulation model (de Beer, 1958).
To sharpen the epigenetic account, von Baer
(18281837) offered four laws by which development
could be described:
1. The general features of a large group of animals appear earlier in the embryo than the special features.
2. Less general characteristics are developed from the
more general, and so forth, until the most specialized appear.
3. Each embryo of a given species, instead of passing
through the stages of other animals, departs more and
more from them.
4. Fundamentally, therefore, the embryo of a higher
animal is never like a lower animal, but only like
its embryo.
Von Baer held that development was a continuing process of differentiation and organization; hence, novelties could arise at each stage, not merely the terminal
one. When this embryological principle was later applied to structures, actions, thoughts, and social behaviors (e.g., Piaget, 1951; Werner, 1940/1948), it produced
far-reaching consequences. The conclusion proposed in
1828 was that developmental processes demand rigorous
study in their own right; they cannot be derived from
analogies to evolution.
Although von Baer was recognized as a leading embryologist, his generalizations on the nature of development were not immediately accepted. They were
inconsistent with broadly held beliefs in biology, and
von Baers rejection of the Darwinian account of evolution probably did not help matters. Despite compelling
empirical and comparative evidence, for most of the
nineteenth century von Baers developmental generalizations fared poorly in open competition with the recapitulation proposal.
Von Baers developmental ideas were not entirely ignored in his time, however. It was in Carpenters (1854)
influential physiological textbook that Herbert Spencer
discovered von Baers formulation of the developmental
principle. Spencer (1886) wrote that von Baers work
represented one of the most remarkable indications of
embryology and stated:
94
Spencers work, in turn, inspired the genetic epistemology of James Mark Baldwin and his successors, including Jean Piaget. Von Baers other line of influence
on psychology appears in animal behavior and comparative psychology through the work of Z.-Y. Kuo,
Schneirla, and Carmichael in the twentieth century. The
modern dynamic systems model, transactional theory,
developmental psychobiology, and developmental science have von Baers principle of development as a kernel concept (e.g., see Lerner, Chapter 1; Thelen &
Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). Moreover, time and timing are central in von Baers formulation, consistent with modern concepts of critical periods
in embryogenesis and sensitive periods in behavior development, and with the concepts of neoteny and heterochrony in behavioral evolution (Cairns, 1976; de Beer,
1958; Gottlieb, 1992; Gould, 1977).
There have been some major revisions, of course. The
developmental principle identified a key feature of
epigenesishomogeneity giving way to heterogeneity
through progressive differentiation, then integration
into reorganized structuresbut it did not solve the
problem of how development is directed. In his writing,
he remained vaguely teleological, a position that seemed
consistent with Naturphilosophie but out of line with his
rigorous experimental work and careful theoretical
analysis. Leaving the directionality issue open-ended invited continued application of the recapitulation proposition. The puzzle of directionality in embryological
development took almost 100 years to solve (von Bertalanffy, 1933).
EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT
To what extent and in what manner has the work of
Charles Darwin influenced developmental psychology?
(Charlesworth, 1992, p. 5). In answering his question on
Darwins impact, Charlesworth concludes that the influence is much less direct and much weaker than has
been traditionally accepted. He finds only few direct
links to Darwinian propositions or to evolutionary the-
chology concern its strong implications for the heritability of behavior and the evolution of behavioral propensities. At least one modern model of sociobiology views
ontogenetic variation as developmental noise (Wilson,
1975). This is because sociobiological emphasis is on (a)
variations in structures of societies, not variations in individual life histories, and ( b) the biological contributors to those variations in group structures, including
the genetic determinants of aggressive behaviors, altruism, and cooperation. As in the logic of Wundt, immature expression of these phenomena in individuals is
seen as ephemeral and individualistic; genetic and evolutionary forces may be viewed more clearly when they
are aggregated across persons into societal structures
(see Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, Chapter 5, this
Handbook, this volume).
In contrast, evolutionary concepts have had a major
impact on research in comparative studies of development in animals from the mid-nineteenth century to the
present. In England, Douglas Spalding (1873) reported
the remarkable effects of early experience in establishing filial preferences in newly hatched chicks. His experimental demonstrations seemed to confirm that
phyletic and ontogenetic influences must operate in tandem, that the young animal was predisposed to form
preferences during a period of high sensitivity shortly
after hatching, and that the experiences that occurred
then were especially effective in the rapid establishment
of preferences.
George John Romanes, a young scientist who had
the confidence of Darwin, was impressed by Spaldings
demonstrations and, with him, emphasized the early
formation and plasticity of behavior within the framework of its evolutionary foundation. More generally, Romaness analysis of the stage-paced development of
sexuality and cognition served as a basic text for the two
most important theorists in developmental psychology,
Sigmund Freud and James Mark Baldwin. Mental Evolution in Man (Romanes, 1889) was one of the most annotated books in Freuds library, and Sulloway (1979)
suggests that it provided inspiration for Freuds later
emphasis on the early appearance of infantile sexuality.
In accord with recapitulation theory, Romanes had
placed the onset of human sexuality at 7 weeks. J. M.
Baldwin (1895), for his part, gives explicit credit to Romanes and Spencer as providing inspiration and direction to the work embodied in his Mental Development in
the Child and the Race. It should also be observed that
Romanes, whose aim was to clarify the evolution of the
mind and consciousness, is also regarded as the father of
95
96
sufficiently diverse so that one can point to several landmark dates, depending on which movement or which pioneer one wishes to commemorate. The founding of the
child development research institute at Clark University
and the establishment of the journal Pedagogical Seminary, by Hall, were clearly of signal importance for the
area. But to celebrate Halls contributions over those of
Alfred Binet can hardly be justified. Binet, at almost
the same time, was laying the foundations for modern
experimental child psychology at the Sorbonne and establishing LAnne Psychologique as a prime source for
developmental publications. Perhaps the dilemma may
be eased by recognizing that these major advances were
themselves beneficiaries of a zeitgeist that seems to
have begun about 1880 and gained significant momentum with the publication of William Preyers The Mind
of the Child in 1882/18881889.2
The book has been called the first work of modern
psychology (see Reinert, 1979), providing the greatest
stimulation for the development of modern ontogenetic
psychology (Munn, 1965).
Not everyone agrees with these high evaluations of
Preyers work or of its originality (see, for instance,
Bhler, 1930; Kessen, 1965; and below). Nonetheless,
Preyers book served as a powerful catalyst for the further study of development in psychology and in biology,
and 1882 seems to be a reasonable date for us to begin
this story of the development of modern developmental
psychology. In addition to Hall and Binet, two other personsJames Mark Baldwin and Sigmund Freudcontributed much to the molding of the area. The nature
and extent of their contributions are the main focus of
this section.
Embryos and Infants
When The Mind of the Child was published, William T.
Preyer (18411897) intended it to be only the first in2
97
enterprise. The procedures that he endorsed, and followed, belied the proposition that children, even immature and unborn ones, could not be studied objectively
and with profit.
Preyer was not the first person to undertake detailed
observations of his offspring for scientific purposes. A
professor of Greek and philosophy at the University of
Marburg, Dietrich Tiedemann (17481803), had earlier
employed the method, and his 1787 monograph Observations on the Development of Mental Capabilities in Children (Murchison & Langer, 1927), seems to have been
the first known published psychological diary of longitudinal development in children, according to Reinert
(1979). In the 100 years between Tiedemann and Preyer,
several studies appeared, some of which were sufficiently free of parental bias and distortion from other
sources to be considered useful scientific contributions
(Reinert, 1979, has an informative account of this work).
An article by Charles Darwin played an important
role in stimulating further interest in the endeavor. In
1877, it appeared in the new psychological journal Mind,
having been triggered by the appearance, 2 months earlier, of a translation of H. Taines (1876) parallel observations in the immediately preceding issue. Darwins
article was based on 37-year-old notes he made during
the first two years of one of his sons. Although inferior
to the other reports in terms of systematicity of observation and depth of reporting, Darwins contribution
served to legitimize the method and promoted research
with children.
The methodological standards that Preyer established
for himself are admirable, even by todays criteria. He
reports that he adhered strictly, without exception, to
the following rules:
Only direct observations were cited by the investigator, and they were compared for accuracy with observations made by others.
All observations were recorded immediately and in
detail, regardless of whether they seemed uninteresting or meaningless articulations.
To the extent possible, observations were unobtrusive and every artificial strain upon the child
was avoided.
Every interruption of ones observation for more
than a day demands the substitution of another observer, and, after taking up the work again, a verification of what has been perceived and noted down in
the interval.
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The third part of The Mind of the Child, Development of Intellect, includes the consideration of language comprehension and production as well as the
development of social cognition, including the concept
of the self. Preyers discussion proceeds, with uncommonly good sense, from a description of the onset of
landmarks of language development to an attempt to determine when the notion of ego, or the self, develops.
For Preyer, it occurs when the child can recognize as
belonging to him the parts of his body that he can feel
and see (p. 189). Whatever the other merits of that proposal, it permits Preyer to undertake a series of observations and mini-experiments on the matter. One section
deals with the ability of children to respond to their reflections in a mirror; another, with the uses and misuses
of personal pronouns by young children.
In addition to his study of infancy and early childhood, Preyer left another legacy to modern developmentalists, The Special Physiology of the Embryo (1885). To
complete his analysis of the origin of separate vital
processes, Preyer conducted experiments and made observations on the embryos of invertebrates, amphibia,
birds, and various mammals. Some of these observationson the prenatal development of sensory and
motor functionshave only recently been confirmed
and extended using modern techniques. In line with recent interpretations of early development, Preyer concluded that (a) integrated, spontaneous motor activity
was antecedent to the development of responsiveness to
sensory stimulation, and ( b) motor activity may provide
the substrate for later mental, emotional, and linguistic
performance. Because of his pioneering studies, he is
acknowledged to be the father of behavioral embryology
(Gottlieb, 1973).
Preyer has sometimes been depicted as the prototypic
methodologistcareful, precise, compulsive, and pedestrian. On this score, Karl Bhler (1930) writes that The
Mind of the Child was a remarkable book full of interesting and conscientious observations, but poor in original ideas (p. 27) and that Preyer himself was no pioneer
in psychology (p. 27). Others have echoed the exact
words, along with the sentiment that his book was more
like a developmental psychophysiology than a developmental psychology (Reinert, 1979).3
3
Did cultural stereotypes play a role in the evaluation of The
Mind of the Child? For instance, Compayr (1893) called the
book a monument of German assiduousness. Mateer (1918)
remarked (in the context of comparing Frenchman Perzs
Has Preyers empirical reputation outrun his theoretical contribution to developmental psychology? The answer depends in part on what aspects of theory one
chooses to focus on. Preyers main concern in preparing
both Mind of the Child and Special Physiology was the
clarification of a basic issue of development: the relations between ontogeny and phylogeny of behavior, and
how these two processes influenced each other. His categorization of the dates of onset was not an end in itself,
to develop a behavioral timetable. Rather, his aim was to
establish the lawful sequence of development of sensory
and cognitive systems so that meaningful generalizations could be drawn between species and among systems in development.
Hence, for Preyer (1882/18881889), one key theoretical issue was how to reconcile competing claims of
the nativists and the empiricists in the origin and
perfection of the vital processes of behavior and
thought. As far as human vision (or other sensory
processes) was concerned, he concluded that my observations show that . . . both parties are right (vol. 1,
p. 35, emphasis added). In a discussion that constitutes
an early model for the developmental landscape of C. H.
Waddington (1971), he speculates that The brain
comes into the world provided with a great number of
impressions upon it. Some of these are quite obscure,
some few are distinct (vol. 2, p. 211). Through experience, some of the pathways are obliterated, and others
are deepened.
Lest Preyer be written off as a nave nativist, it should
be added that his position was closer to the bidirectional
approach of modern developmental psychobiology than
to the innate ideas of Immanuel Kant. Drawing on studies of the comparative anatomy of the brain as well as
cross-species comparisons of behavior, he concluded
(1882/18881889) that there is feedback between experience and normal structural development in the brain.
He offered a foresightful statement of the bidirectional
structure-function hypothesis, reaching the conclusion
that The brain grows through its own activity (vol. 2,
p. 98, emphasis added). How then does the individual
contribute to his or her own development? Preyers anlogical, brilliant style with that of Preyer) that: The
French write brilliantly and convincingly but their technique
is apt to be at fault. They seem to hit intuitively upon right
premises and conclusions, although their data may be unconvincing or scanty. The German work is more stolid, more convincing in its facts but less inspiring in application (p. 24).
99
100
and phylogeny, between nature and nurture. Surprisingly, he was perhaps as influential in embryology as in
developmental psychology. Through his work, talented
young men and women were recruited to experimental
embryology (including Hans Spemann, who identified
critical periods and organizers in embryological development). Perhaps most important, Preyer demonstrated, by his successful integration of experimental
studies of human and nonhuman young, that the investigation of behavioral development could be as much a scientific enterprise as a social, humanistic movement.
Happily, other colleagues in America and Europe understood the message.
Memory and Intelligence
In an article on the scientific contributions of Alfred
Binet (18571911), Siegler (1992) observes: It is ironic
that Binets contribution should be so strongly associated with reducing intelligence to a single number, the
IQ score, when the recurring theme of his research was
the remarkable diversity of intelligence (p. 175). That
is only one of the ironies in Binets work and life. Another is that he was arguably the greatest French psychologist of his day; yet, he was unable to obtain a
professorship in France. Moreover, the intelligence test
that he developed with Simon, which was intended to
provide guides on how to learn to learn, has been used
over the past century as a basis for classifying children
and adults into intellectual categories that are presumed
to be constant over life.
Statements about historical priority and influence are
delicate matters, but among non-French observers there
is no serious debate over the claim that Alfred Binet was
Frances first significant experimental psychologist.4
What makes his work of special importance for this
chapter is that he was the premier early experimental
child psychologist whose observations extended beyond
the laboratory. The results have been far-reaching. Jenkins and Paterson (1961) observed, Probably no psychological innovation has had more impact on the societies
of the Western world than the development of the Binet4
Simon scales (p. 81). Given the influence of this procedure identified with Binets name, it is understandable,
yet regrettable, that his other contributions to developmental psychology have gained so little attention. As it
turns out, it took experimental child psychology some 70
years to catch up with some of Binets insights on cognition and the organization of memory.
Throughout his career, Binet was characterized by an
independence of thought and action, starting with his
introduction to psychology. It was his third choice in careers, after he had dropped out of law school and medical training (Wolf, 1973). In 1879/1880, Binet began
independent reading in psychology at the Bibliothque
Nationale in Paris. Curiously, he selectively avoided experimental psychology (the Wundtian version) by reading little or no German, and he took no trips to Leipzig.
Shortly after he began work in psychology, he published
his first paper, a useful discussion of experiential contributions to the psychophysics of two-point tactile discrimination. For research training, Binet affiliated
himself with the distinguished neurologist, Jean Martin
Charcot, at the Salptrire (a noted Paris hospital). Over
a period of seven years, Binet collaborated with Charcot
and Charles Fr in studies of hypnotism and its expression in normal persons and in the patient population.
Binets introduction to experimental methods thus was
some distance removed from the then-acceptable laboratory procedures. His apprenticeship in research led to
some spectacular controversies, with young Binet in the
middle of the fray. The problem was that certain phenomena reported by the Salptrire group defied credibilityfor example, that the effects of hypnotic
suggestion migrate from one side of the body to the
other by virtue of electromagnetic influences (a very
large magnet was used in demonstrations). Attempts to
replicate the phenomena elsewhere proved unrewarding.
As it turned out, the research procedures followed by
Binet and Fr were remarkably casual, and they gave
scant attention to the possible suggestibility of their subjects or of themselves (see Siegler, 1992).
An absurd idea? In light of our present knowledge
about the brain and hypnotism, it was a thoroughly nave
proposition. But this is the stuff out of which discoveries
are made. Fr shortly afterward (1888) became the
first investigator to discover that emotional changes
were correlated with electrical changes in the human
body. Nave or not, he is credited with discovering the
resistance method of measurement and developing the
101
is only a factitious one, artificial, produced by the suppression of all troublesome complications. (Binet, Phillippe,
Courtier, & Henri, 1894, pp. 2830)
These hardly were the sorts of comments that would endear him to his U.S. and German colleagues, and
Howard C. Warren, one of the more generous reviewers,
reciprocated by confessing to a feeling of disappointment when it is considered what even a short book like
this might have been (Warren, 1894).
What Binet had to offer psychology was a pragmatic,
multimethod, multipopulation approach to the problems
of behavior. Instead of relying merely on introspection
and psychophysiological experimentation, Binet thoroughly dissected behavioral phenomena. To explore
memory, for instance, he varied the nature of the stimuli
(memory for figures and for linguistic material; memory for meaningful sentences versus individual words),
the subjects tested (chess masters and superior calculators who performed on the stage; normal children and
retarded children), measures employed (free recall,
recognition, physiological measures of blood pressure,
and electrical activity), type of design ( large group
samples, individual analysis over long-term periods),
and statistics employed. Through it all, Binet selected
designs, procedures, and subjects with a purpose, not
merely because they were available. To investigate imagination and creativity, he studied gifted playwrights and
explored new techniques (inkblots, word association,
and case history information).
Such methodological catholicism is not without pitfalls. He was open not only to new discoveries but to new
sources of error. In his day, he received high praise and
devastating criticism for his work, and both seemed
earned. The early studies were vulnerable: Binet was in
the process of learning a trade for which there were, as
yet, no masters. He came out on the short end of a devastating exchange on the magnetic nature of hypnotism (Siegler, 1992), and there was equally justified
102
criticism by H. S. Jennings (18981899) on Binets interpretations of his studies on the psychic life of the
lower beasts. S. Franz (1898), a student of J. M. Cattell,
took him to task for the quality of his statistical presentation in a series of studies on the relation between
cognition and physical measures in children. Florence
Mateer (1918) doubtless had Binet in mind when she
commented that the French write brilliantly and convincingly but their technique is apt to be at fault
(p. 24). Such errorsand the attitudes they fedunfortunately masked the fundamental brilliance of Binets
work. Though shy in personal demeanor, Binet as a scientist was not a timid man; he was outspoken, and his
criticism of nave generalizations and wrongheaded
conceptualizations placed him at odds with beliefs held
by then-dominant leaders of the discipline. He published
what he believed, and seems to have judged the longterm gains to be worth the short-term costs to his career
and influence.
Binet reported demonstrational studies of memory
and perception that he had conducted with his two
young daughters. The work was extended in succeeding
years not only with his children (through adolescence)
but also with diverse subjects and areas of memory.
Along with his collaborators, notably Victor Henri, the
work was extended to persons who were extraordinarily
talented or retarded. Because Binet operated on the
working assumption that the study of normal processes
was the key to understanding special talents or deficits,
his laboratory also made a major investment in the
analysis of memory in normal children, adolescents, and
adults. Binet was highly sensitive to the need for convergent analyses that intersect on a common problem. He
argued in 1903 that our psychology is not yet so advanced that we can limit our analyses to information
obtained in the laboratory; rather, complex intellectual
functions are best understood in studies of persons
whom we know intimately, to relatives and friends.
Binet did not, however, disdain large-scale research
designs; he simply believed that they were insufficient
in themselves to tell the full story about the nature of
memory processes. In collaboration with Henri, he conducted a remarkable series of studies on memory development that involved several hundred children.
In one of their analyses, Binet and Henri (1894)
found that the children reconstructed material into
chunks of information that were meaningful to them. It
should be noted that this idea of active reorganization
has now returned to occupy the attention of modern
103
104
Binet eschewed identification as a theorist, even declining initially to offer a definition of intelligence, a
problem of fearful complexity. He added, in 1908:
Some psychologists affirm that intelligence can be measured; others declare that it is impossible to measure intelligence. But there are still others, better informed, who
ignore these theoretical discussions and apply themselves
to the actual solving of the problem. (p. 163)
TH E NEW PSYCHOLOGY IN TH E
UNITED STATES
In leading the organization of the new science of psychology in the United States, Hall (18441924) had no
peer. In his long career, he proved to be an effective
and durable advocate, writer, and spokesman for psychology and for children in the United States. The story
of Halls career has been expertly told by Ross (1972)
and White (1992), with the latter providing fresh insights on Halls role in science and social policy. Born
in Massachusetts, Hall was a minister, professor of philosophy, experimental psychologist, child psychologist,
educational psychologist, university president, and
leader of the child study movement. He was also a premier figure in U.S. psychology: the first professor of
psychology in the United States (at Johns Hopkins,
1883) and the first president of the American Psychological Association (1891). As is the case with truly effective teachers, Hall had great enthusiasm and
tolerance for ideas, and he was a master at conveying
his enthusiasm to others. He had a large vision for psychology and its destiny in creating better persons and a
more perfect society.
But how did he fare as a scientist and a theorist in the
light of history? In the previous edition of the Handbook, this chapter concluded that Hall had a large influence on the growth and organization of the new
psychology in the United States, and that he provided a
foundation for the scientific study of children and adolescents. It was concluded that Halls own research contributions were modest and his theoretical proposals
were flawed by being too tightly woven to the informed
beliefs of his day and too loosely linked to empirical
data. The grand vision of the science that he offered had
only modest substance. After spending several years
carefully sifting the evidence, Sheldon White (1992) has
arrived at a radically different conclusion regarding
Halls contributions. He observes:
Recent writings usually picture Hall as a functionary and
figurehead, condense his ideas into a few slogans, quote
criticisms of his work by his often rivalrous peers, and effectively concede Hall his administrative trophies while
ignoring most of what he had to say. (p. 33)
105
106
107
108
109
In Baldwins eyes, development proceeds from infancy to adulthood through stages, beginning with a reflexive or physiological stage, continuing through
sensorimotor and ideomotor stages, and progressing to a stage of symbolic transformations (Baldwin,
1895). Only in the most advanced stage do syllogistic
forms come to have an independent or a priori force, and
pure thought emergesthought, that is, which thinks of
anything or nothing. The subject of thought has fallen
out, leaving the shell of form (Baldwin, 1930, p. 23).
From its earliest formulation, Baldwins stage theory of
mental development focused attention on process as
much as on structure. Many of the terms that he employedaccommodation, assimilation, imitation,
110
circular reactionare commonplace in todays textbooks, although it cannot be assumed that Piagetian
meanings are necessarily the same as Baldwinian ones.
Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: A Study in Social Psychology (Baldwin, 1897/1906)
appeared only 2 years later. This book is the first work by
a U.S. psychologist on social-cognitive development
in childhood; it is also the first volume in English that
includes social psychology in its title (R. H. Mueller,
1976). In this work, the cognitive-stage model is extended to issues of social development, social organization, and the origins of the self. Baldwin (1895) felt that
the essential issues of social psychology had been neglected because of the void that existed between the concepts of psychology and sociology:
And it is equally true, though it has never been adequately
realized, that it is in genetic theory that social or collective psychology must find both its root and its ripe
fruitage. We have no social psychology, because we have
had no doctrine of the socius. We have had theories of the
ego and the alter; but that they did not reveal the socius is
just their condemnation. So the theorist of society and institutions has floundered in seas of metaphysics and biology, and no psychologist has brought him a life-preserver,
nor even heard his cry for help. (p. ix)
The self becomes progressively and inevitably accommodated to others and to the traditions of society. This
social heredity is mediated through imitation and the
operation of an internal circular reaction. From each relationship, there emerges a refined sense of oneself and
of others. The only thing that remains more or less stable is a growing sense of self which include both terms,
the ego and the alter (Baldwin, 1897/1906, p. 30).
Sociogenesis
One other primary developmental concern of Baldwin
involves the relations between nature and nurture and
the cross-generational transmission of modifications in
individual development. In light of the metaphysical synthesis that guided Baldwins thinking, it was entirely
fitting for him to argue that the nature-nurture dichotomy falsely supposes that these two agencies are
opposed forces and that it fails to entertain the possibility that most of mans equipment is due to both
causes working together (Baldwin, 1895, p. 77). Evolutionary adaptations and developmental accommodations
operate toward the same goals, although they are established over vastly different time intervals. Extending
this analysis to the problem of how this synchrony is established and maintained, Baldwin (1895) wrote:
It is clear that we are led to relatively distinct questions:
questions which are now familiar to us when put in the
terms covered by the words, phylogenesis and ontogenesis. First, how has the development of organic life proceeded, showing constantly, as it does, forms of greater
complexity and higher adaptation? This is the phylogenetic question. . . . But the second question, the ontogenetic question, is of equal importance: the question, How
does the individual organism manage to adjust itself better
and better to its environment? . . . This latter problem is
the most urgent, difficult, and neglected question of the
new genetic psychology. (pp. 180181)
Beginning in his first developmental volume (Baldwin, 1895) and continuing through Development and
Evolution (Baldwin, 1902), Baldwin expanded on his
view of the cross-generational transmission of behavior
tendencies through organic selection. He proposed
that accommodations that occur in the lifetime of the
individual could be transmitted to the next generation in
111
112
A modern reviewer, otherwise sympathetic to Baldwin, indicated that there is much in Baldwins work
that is unfinished and confusing (Broughton, 1981,
p. 402). Examples of the unfinished business included
theoretical discontinuities in Baldwins social theory,
and internal inconsistencies in the description of stages.
Baldwins style may have been more than an inconvenience for readers. It permitted him to reform explanations and concepts so that one and the same term
could take on fresh nuances or alternative meanings,
depending on its context. Imprecision in presentation
thereby promotes projection in interpretation. Perhaps
this explains the considerable dispute as to what exactly
was meant by Baldwin in his use of such terms as organic selection, imitation, and genetic method.
Baldwin tended to incorporate new ideas into his own
developmental view, and he did not always appear to be
sensitive to possible contradictions between the new and
the old. Baldwin seems to have benefited greatly from
Josiah Royce and William James in his concepts of the
social self (Valsiner & van der Veer, 1988). He also introduced some of the ideas of Osborn (1896) and Morgan (1896) in his revision of the concept of organic
selection. It was, however, a process of assimilation,
not imitation. Most of the ideas were transformed when
they became incorporated into a genetic framework.
This long-term pattern of intellectual reformulation and
reconstruction may account for why Baldwin invented
new terms for old ideas and was particularly sensitive to
the issue of intellectual priority and ownership. In his
eyes, the concepts were new inventions. Priority and
recognition were especially important for Baldwin, and
this concern may help explain his haste to publish.
To illustrate, consider the concept of organic selection. The aim of the concept was clear from the beginning: to link the accommodations that occur in the life
history of the individual to the adaptations that occur in
the life history of the species. But the identification of
the precise mechanisms has proved to be something of a
knowing them first egocentrically. Development is a progressive movement toward objectivity. In contrast, for
Baldwin all experience is experience of a self, not just of a
bodily and cognitive ego. This means first that central to
the self is not cognition but will. Second, it means that
from the start experience is social and reflective. The
childs sense of self is a sense of will and capacity in the
relation of self to others. The individual is fundamentally
a potentially moral being, not because of social authority
and rules (as Durkheim and Piaget thought) but because
his ends, his will, his self is that of a shared social self.
(pp. 311312)
It is also an integrative self. Baldwin (1897/1906) himself indicated: In spite of the large place which I assign
to Imitation in the social life, I should prefer to have my
theory known as the Self or the Self Thought theory
of social organization (p. xviii).
Baldwins theoretical work anticipated much of Piagets theory of cognitive and moral development. Piagets use of Baldwins distinctive termsfrom circular
reaction and cognitive scheme to accommodation, assimilation, and sensorimotorpoint to a direct line of
intellectual descent. More importantly, as Cahan (1984,
p. 128) has observed, the goals, genetic approach, and
epistemological assumptions underlying Piagets inquiry into cognitive development found explicit statement around the turn of the century in Baldwins work.
The mediational linkages from Baldwin are readily
identified. From 1912 to his death in 1934, Baldwins
primary residence was in Paris. His work was well regarded in French intellectual circles in general, and by
Pierre Janet in particular. As Piaget wrote to Mueller
(1976, p. 244):
Unfortunately, I did not know Baldwin personally, but his
works had a great influence on me. Furthermore, Pierre
Janet, whose courses I took in Paris, cited him constantly
and had been equally very influenced by him.
113
difference in the scientific styles of the two investigators that, in turn, gave rise to marked differences in the
content of their approaches. Baldwin used the methods
and analyses of experimental psychology to illustrate
developmental theory. He learned early that the methods
of experimental psychology were inadequate to evaluate
the developmental theory that he was constructing.
Given this dilemma, he chose to abandon the scientific
issues and address the philosophical ones.
Piaget, alternatively, was trained in biology rather
than philosophy. As an empirical scientist, he employed
observations to understand phenomena rather than
merely demonstrate principles. Piaget was challenged to
invent methods appropriate to the empirical issues he
sought to comprehend. The clinical method of direct observation and the creation of developmentally appropriate tasks provided him with the tools for revising,
extending, and evaluating his proposals. They also permitted others to assess the replicability of the phenomena and determine the adequacy of the theory. More
important, the objective tracking of phenomena over
time permitted Piaget and those who followed his lead to
arrive at insights that were not self-evident to experimentalists or armchair observers. The insights, in turn, contributed to the vitality of Piagets developmental model.
Despite the shortcomings in Baldwins theoretical
system and empirical work, his proposals have nonetheless exercised a large direct and indirect influence on
developmental theorists in the twentieth century. As
Valsiner and van der Veer (1988) document, there are
direct connections between Baldwins (1897/1906) concepts of the development of the self in social context
and George H. Meads (1934) symbolic interactionism,
on the one hand, and L. S. Vygotskys (1962) propositions on the social-contextual origins of personality, on
the other. Baldwins work was the common denominator, since neither Mead nor Vygotsky referred to the
other directly. The Valsiner and van der Veer (1988)
analysis is consistent with independent evidence that (a)
Baldwins work had a significant influence on C. H.
Cooley as well as Mead, in formulations of symbolic interactionism; and ( b) Baldwins influence on Vygotsky
was mediated primarily through Janets writings.
Valsiner and van der Veer (1988) point out that the assimilation of Baldwins influence was selective. On the
one hand, Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) tended to discard the developmental features of Baldwins self theory. On the other hand, Vygotsky (1962) preserved both
114
Paris may have facilitated the acceptance of his concepts. European psychologists tended to be more receptive to developmental concepts and methods than their
U.S. counterparts.
Beyond these contributing factors, the unfinished
business in Baldwins agenda was to create methods,
techniques, and analyses that are appropriate for developmental study. Piaget and Vygotsky, who helped establish those methods and revised their concepts in the
light of their results, had an enormous impact on modern
developmental thinking. Recent methodological critiques have suggested that the systematic study of developmental processes requires not only different statistics,
but also different research designs and different ways
to organize empirical observations (Cairns, 1986;
Valsiner, 1986; Wohlwill, 1973). Furthermore, it was
explicit in Baldwins proposals that the task of disentangling development-in-context was necessarily an interdisciplinary activity that extends beyond the traditional
boundaries of psychology. Sully (1896a) was probably
correct when he observed that Baldwins Mental Development in the Child and the Race was as relevant to biology as it was to psychology. And R. H. Mueller (1976)
was likely accurate when he noted that Baldwins Social
and Ethical Interpretation of Mental Development was as
relevant to sociology as to psychology.
The broader point is that Baldwin may have failed in
his larger goal even if he had written more precisely, recruited more students, and died of old age in Baltimore
rather than Paris. He would have failed because he had
envisioned a science different from any that could be accommodated by the new psychology. It appears that
many of the obstacles that precluded the adoption of developmental concepts into the psychology of the 1890s
remain in place.
What might we conclude about James Mark Baldwin?
Beyond whatever shortcomings may have existed in his
writing and teaching, and beyond whatever honors he
coveted and disappointments he endured, he ultimately
succeeded in reaching the part of the goal that was
within his grasp. He had insight and vision to describe
developmental ideas that continue to inspire and challenge after 100 years.
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Sigmund Freud (18561939) stood in curious relationship to the founding of developmental psychology. Un-
Developmental Psychopathology
115
were attracted by Charcots demonstrations of the interrelations between physical symptoms and the mind, including the use of hypnotism in the remission of hysteric
symptoms and in probing the unconscious mind.
Binet, characteristically, was the first of the two to publish on issues of sexual perversions and their origins. In
a remarkable yet almost forgotten paper titled Le
Ftichisme dans lAmour, Binet (1887) described the
ease with which sexual attractions and impulses could
be associated with neutral objects, and the abnormal
could be brought about by normal mechanisms of associative learning. In this paper in an early volume of the
Revue Philosophique, Binet anticipated three of the
major themes identified with psychoanalysis; namely,
(1) the continuity between mechanisms that regulate
normal and abnormal behaviors and emotions, (2) the
significance of sexuality in psychopathology, and (3) the
essential lawfulness of human behavior.
Returning to Vienna, Freud began his neurological
practice, leading to a collaboration with Josef Breuer in
the writing of Studies in Hysteria (1895/1936). When
Freud substituted free association and dream analysis
for hypnotism in reaching the unconscious, psychoanalysis was invented.
Might Binets concepts of unconscious have contributed to the psychoanalytic movement? In a remarkable passage in Breuer and Freud (1895/1936), we find:
The continuation of the hysterical symptoms which originated in the hypnoid state, during the normal state, agrees
perfectly with our experiences concerning posthypnotic
suggestions. But this also implies that complexes of ideas
incapable of consciousness co-exist with groups of ideas,
which function consciously; that is to say, there is a splitting of the psyche. . . . It seems certain that this too can
originate without hypnoidism from an abundance of rejected ideas which were repressed, but not suppressed from
consciousness. In this or that way here develops a sphere of
psychic existence, which is now ideationally impoverished
and rudimentary, and now more or less equal to the waking
thoughts, for the cognition of which we are indebted above
all to Binet and Janet. (p. 188, emphasis added)
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of intellectual revolution so often the history of conscious and unconscious attempts by the participants to
obscure the true nature and roots of their own revolutionary activity? (p. 6). His answer is that there generally exists a powerful underlying tension between the
forward-looking orientation of the would-be discoverer
and the backward-looking orientation of the historian
(p. 7). Innovation, novelty, and discovery are the stuff
out of which new scientific movements are created.
There is strong temptation to ignore or denigrate research and researchers who threaten the illusions of
novelty or validitydespite a commitment of the scientist to balanced and thorough scholarship. Although psychoanalysis illustrates this temptation, it hardly
constitutes a unique case in the past of developmental
psychology.
As Freud (1926/1973) has pointed out, psychoanalysis in the course of time came to have two meanings:
(a) a particular method of treating nervous disorders
and ( b) the science of unconscious mental processes,
which has also been appropriately described as depth
psychology (p. 720). Psychoanalysis, the theory, involves strong assumptions about the development and
evolution of personality that psychoanalysis, the method
and therapy, does not. Why did psychoanalysis-as-theory
emerge as a developmental one?
One answer would be that it was demanded by the
data. The roles of, say, infant sexuality and the primacy
of early experiences would be seen as having been revealed by the use of psychoanalysis-as-method. A second
possibility, not incompatible with the first, is that Freud
may have been intellectually prepared to focus on the
formative nature of ontogenetic events by virtue of
his research training and experience in neurobiology. Recall that Freud had, in his physiological work, undertaken analyses of embryogenesis. Finally, broader
intellectual-scientific forces appear to have been at
work. As Gould (1977) and others have noted, parallels
to the then-contemporary evolutionary developmental
assumptions seem to be liberally represented throughout
psychoanalytic thought. That Freud should draw on biological approaches in the formulation of his theory of
personality and psychopathology seems entirely reasonable, in light of his scientific training in the area.
Contrary to the view that Freud employed physics as
the basic model for psychoanalysis, the theory seems
more analogous to the biological thought of the day than
to either physical or even medical models. Hence,
certain psychoanalytic propositions appear to be imme-
analysisFreud eventually expressed a disdain for systematic experimental work, and the validity of the results it produced. For instance, in response to what
seemed to be the experimental demonstration of repression in the laboratory, Freud observed: I cannot put
much value on these confirmations because the wealth of
reliable observations on which these assertions rest
makes them independent of experimental verification
(cited in Shakow & Rapaport, 1964, p. 129). Freud had
earlier held that the rejection of psychoanalytic teachings had been for emotional and unscientific reasons. Here the suggestion appears to be that they should
be accepted on the same grounds. In time, the validity of
psychoanalytic assertions came to be evaluated by
dogma, not by data. Thats a pity on two counts. First,
the history of developmental research indicates that
Freud was correct in holding that idiographic methods
are no less scientific than are nomothetic ones, though
the more enduring advances have occurred when the two
methods have been coupled. Second, the scientific status
of the entire area was compromised when it became permissible to denigrate the value of a conclusive empirical
observation or experiment if it happened to be in conflict
with a kernel hypothesis.
In any case, psychoanalysis has thrived for 100 years
in science and society. Its direct impact upon the health
and social sciences and literature cannot be overestimated. As a scientific orientation, the breadth of its
roots in the evolutionary-developmental thought of Darwin and Haeckel, on the one hand, and the psychological
associationism of J. S. Mill and British empiricism, on
the other, made it especially susceptible to hybridization. For example, psychoanalysis-as-theory was as readily married to the hypothetico-deductive behavioral
model of C. Hull as it was to the ethological theory of
K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen. Both synthesessocial
learning theory and attachment theoryhave proved to
be exceedingly influential in developmental research, a
matter that we revisit.
One kernel assumption that has made psychoanalysis
particularly attractive to developmentalists has been its
focus on the very early years as formative and determinative. The events of infancy and early childhood are
presumed to provide the foundation for adult personality
and psychopathology. This broad assumption demands
research on infancy and early childhood and on the
events that occur in the familial relationships. Ironically, the assumption also implies that the events that
occur later in ontogenyduring childhood and adoles-
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and to apply the principles of the newly established science to everyday concerns. What were those principles?
In Witmers view, the study of children required a multidisciplinary approach, and from the beginning he
brought together different professions, including social
workers, physicians, and practicing psychologists. In the
absence of a treatment model, he created one. Although
the clinic was essentially a local Philadelphia operation,
it grew and prospered under Witmers leadership, and a
journal, the Psychological Clinic, was founded to describe its activities. The concept of an applied psychology, as well as a clinical psychology, caught on, and one
of the students from Witmers group at Pennsylvania,
Morris Viteles, led the way in the establishment of industrial psychology in America (Viteles, 1932).
Developmental Theory
From 1900 forward, when theoretical activity in developmental psychology was on the wane in the United
States, it began to thrive in Europe. Following the impetus provided by Preyer, developmental work in Germanspeaking countries expanded, with the young William L.
Stern (18711938) playing a leading role. Stern was instrumental in extending the theoretical and institutional
foundations of the new science in Germany from the
turn of the century through the early 1930s (Kreppner,
1992). In 1909, he was sufficiently prominent in the discipline that he was awarded an honorary degree from
Clark University.
Kreppner (1992) has recently argued that Stern
should be viewed as the peer of Preyer, Binet, Freud,
Hall, and Baldwin as a pioneer in developmental psychology. Remembered in U.S. psychology mostly for his
proposal that the mental ages could be converted into an
intellectual quotient (J. Peterson, 1925; Stern, 1911,
1914)a transformation that was designed to equate intelligence scores across chronological ageslittle systematic recognition has been given to his fundamental
role in establishing three areas of psychology as scientific disciplines: (1) differential psychology, (2) personality psychology, and (3) developmental psychology.
Sterns influence is seen in the ideas on development
that he generated, in the institutions he created, and in
the students whom he influenced, including Heinz
Werner and Martha Muchow.
Although he completed his dissertation with Hermann
Ebbinghaus, Stern saw early that the study of human
development required a unified perspective (Kreppner,
Consistent with the dialectic philosophy, Stern described the tug-of-war between personal dispositions
and environmental constraints in development. This
brings up the issue of how plastic or malleable are actions in ontogeny. The individual is a complex unit that
is not entirely determined by the forces within or the
forces without. In this regard, Stern wrote:
This is the fact of personal plasticity or malleability, a domain of intentional education or unintentional influences
of the milieu. This domain is narrower than many empiricists might be aware of. For the person is not only a passive recipient of the environmental forces impinging on
him, but he is also reacting to these forces. The way he
shapes and keeps a kind of plasticity is not only a symptom of the conflict between activity and passivity, it is
also a tool for overcoming it: It is a mirror which is a
weapon at the same time. (W. Stern, 1918, pp. 5051,
quoted from Kreppner, 1994, p. 318)
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120
Hence, educational theory becomes political theory, and the education is inevitably cast into the struggle for social reform (Cremin, 1964, p. 118). In
Deweys framework, there is an explicit fusion among
the science of human development, educational applications, social reform, and morality. Viewed in historical
perspective, Deweys work and vision may be seen as
yet another legacy of his former teacher at Johns Hopkins, Hall.
establish the linkage, it was necessary to undertake studies of animal consciousness and of animals apparent
intelligent adaptations to the varied circumstances of
life. Why continuity? For Romanes, continuity would
demonstrate that human beings were on the same continuum as animals in the evolutionary scheme. Using
information brought to him from varied and informal
sources, Romanes collected anecdotes on how various
beasts (dogs, chickens, spiders, cats) demonstrated high
levels of intelligence in their adaptations, and transmitted this knowledge to descendants through Larmarckian
mechanisms of hereditary transmission.
Here C. Lloyd Morgan entered the scene. Recall
that Morgans major contribution to developmental
and evolutionary thought was his elegant refutation of
the concept of hereditary transmission of acquired
characteristics, a variation of which Baldwin labeled
organic selection (Klopfer & Hailman, 1967; Morgan, 1896, 1902). The logic of his argument against
Larmarckianism extended beyond psychology and beyond behavior.
Morgan was also instrumental in helping establish
some limits on the projection of higher-order cognitive
processes to lower organisms. Initially a skeptic about
interpreting the mental status of nonhuman animals, he
formulated a canon (or criterion) by which such attributions may be permissible. Now known as Morgans
Canon, it reads In no case may we interpret an action
as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological
scale (Morgan, 1894/1903, p. 53). In its assumption
that the psychic facility of nonhuman animals can be
qualitatively different from those of human beings,
Morgans criterion helped put a break on the more blatant forms of nineteenth-century anthropomorphism
(see also Schneirla, 1966). As a by-product, it invited a
shift from a focus on animal consciousness to a focus on
animal behavior, including analyses of the roles of biophysical and chemical processes within the organism
and physical and social forces without.
The shift was nontrivial. By 1906, H. S. Jennings entitled his magnificent study of the activities of paramecia as The Behavior of Lower Organisms. Earlier,
Binets work on infusoria and other lower beasts was labeled, The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms (emphases added). Through Jennings and J. Loeb, the shift
in focus paved the way for J. B. Watsons behaviorism
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but, again, with different emphases and different conclusions. Binet and Freud, in part because of their experience with hypnotism and their exposure to the work of
Charcot, were concerned with the role of unconscious
processes in the direction and control of behavior, both
normal and pathological. Binets (1892) studies of alterations of personality dealt with the effects of unconscious forces, and Breuer and Freud (1895/1936) made
motivation and unconscious control the central theme of
psychoanalytic theory. On this score, one of the more interesting observations from this period is the discovery
of the linkage between Binets and Freuds views of unconscious processes. Similarly, Baldwin (1897/1906)
considered how conscious acts, with practice and
time, become unconscious, and how awareness and intentionality develop in step with cognitive development.
Nonetheless, the study of intentionality posed formidable methodological problems that were not solved (although Preyer launched an early assault on the problem
in his studies of infants).
Ontogeny and Phylogeny
How may development be defined: in terms of the ontogeny of individuals, or the ontogeny of the species?
Developmental psychology was born in the wake of the
biological revolution created by the formulation and
widespread adoption of the Wallace-Darwin theory of
species origins. The challenge to produce a similarly
powerful theory of individual genesis was felt by biologists and psychologists alike. The initially popular candidates for such a general developmental theory were
unfortunately limited.
Doubtless the most influential early developmental
theory was the biogenetic law. Virtually all early important developmental writers were recapitulationists of
one sort or another. Adoption of the recapitulation perspective did not, however, preclude consideration of
alternative or supplementary views. On this score,
the delayed maturation hypothesis of Preyer and the
Baldwin-Morgan-Osborne proposal on organic selection
represented efforts to solve the puzzle of how development could contribute to evolution as well as the reverse.
The biogenetic law collapsed shortly after the turn
of the century, when the cornerstone assumption of recapitulation was discredited in biology (Gould, 1977).
Embryological studies indicated that morphological
steps in development could not be simply accounted for
in terms of ancestral analogs. Even in embryogenesis,
world (see Elder, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume). For Hall, individual experience played a major
role in adolescence; early experience was virtually irrelevant because evolutionary forces laid the course for development up through adolescence. For Freud, it was
just the opposite: Infancy was key; he assumed very
early development to be basic in laying the foundations
for adult behavior. Beyond infancy and early childhood,
the person resisted enduring changes (except under psychoanalytic treatment). For Preyer, it was embryogenesis. And for Baldwin, personality development was a
continuing, never-to-be-exhausted process over the life
course, so turning points could occur throughout
ontogeny.
When the details of timing and plasticity of development were left unspecified, investigators could talk past
each and share a happy illusion that they referred to the
same issues and outcomes. A basic premise of psychoanalytic theory is the strong hierarchical assumption that
very early experiences are foundational for the thoughts,
actions, and relations that follow. Psychoanalytically
oriented writers could be radical developmentalists, but
only for one phase of the life course. Once the personality structures, motives, and working models become
established, focus was given to the processes of maintenance, not those of establishment and change. Investigators in a Baldwinian life-course perspective could look
to events that occurred over ontogeny.
In the absence of longitudinal information on the behavioral adaptations of human beings, there was no adequate basis for selecting or rejecting these theoretical
assumptions about the timing and functions of early experience. Although Mills (1898) called for systematic
longitudinal study, it took a half-century before this
method was systematically explored, and still another 90
years before it became a method of choice.
Morality and the Perfectibility of Humans
The concern with intentionality and willfulness can be
viewed as part of a broader question of ethics: How can
science help understand how human perfectibility may
be achieved and imperfections avoided? This core issue
was clearly pervasive in the moral psychologies of
Tetens and Carus, and it was also a matter of no little
import for Spencer, Hall, Baldwin, and several others of
the era. A goal shared by many of them was to formulate
a developmental science, which, in its highest application, would supplementor supplantreligion.
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By 1900, the key empirical findingthat stages existed in the development of moral judgmentshad been
established; in that, older children gave greater weight to
the motivation and intentions of a transgressor than did
younger children. Similarly, striking age-developmental
differences were obtained in the level of abstraction of
the moral judgments, and in the extent to which older
children as opposed to younger (12 to 16 years versus 6 to
10 years) took the point of view of the offender. These
generalizations were drawn from voluminous questionnaire studies, based on the responses of thousands of
children at each age level (e.g., Hall, 1904; Schallenberger, 1894). The methodology, but not the conclusions,
was severely criticized at home and abroad. On matters
of moral conduct, J. M. Baldwins proposals adumbrated
both Hartshorne and May on the specificity of moral conduct, and the proposals of Kohlberg on the development
of the self and moral reasoning.
Social Applications
The application to the needs of society presented both
opportunities and problems. To promote the application
of scientific principles to rearing and educating children, child study movements arose in America, and similar efforts were initiated on the continent and in
England. The problem was that scientific principles
were in short supply. On this point, William James
noted, in Talks with Teachers (1900), that all the useful
facts from that discipline could be held in the palm of
one hand. Not everyone, including Binet and Hall,
agreed with James. Then, as now, the temptation was
great to go beyond commonsense beliefs in writing
about children.
The ideas and claims of some early developmentalists
had political ramifications as well. One of the outcomes
was the establishment and rapid growth of the eugenics
movement, with Francis Galton as its intellectual leader
and the protection of superior genes as its goal in England. One by-product of Social Darwinism was the
importance attached to the newly devised metric scale
of intelligence and the belief that it would permit rapid
identification of innate, stable differences in talent. A
movement in Germany, promoted by Haeckel (1901),
carried a message of biological ethnic superiority and
led to dark political goals.
There was also a very bright side to the application of
developmental principles and ideas (see Sears, 1975).
Persons concerned with the science tended to act as
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2. Longitudinal study. Most thoughtful developmental psychologists recognized the need for gaining adequate information about behavior and development over
a significant portion of the life span. But the lack of resources inhibited such long-term, large-scale investigations of behavior and cognition. Here is where the
institutes were invaluable. Two of the institutesBerkeley and Felslaunched systematic longitudinal investigations. The work complemented the already initiated
study by Terman at Stanford.
3. Behavioral and emotional development. The study
of childrens fears and how they arise was undertaken at
Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Minnesota, California, and
Washington University (St. Louis). This work, essentially an extension of the projects launched by Watson
and his collaborators at Johns Hopkins (see below),
dealt with the problems of how emotions arise in ontogeny and how fears are learned and unlearned (Jersild,
Markey, & Jersild, 1933; M. Jones, 1931).
4. Growth and physical maturation. The early work
of the Iowa group was concerned with the study of childrens physical development, including the care and
feeding of children (Baldwin & Stecher, 1924). Similarly, Arnold Gesells institute at Yale led the way in establishing graphs of normal development for use in
identifying instances of aberrant behavior or developmental disorders (see below). The Fels Institute early
established a tradition for clarifying the relations between physical and behavioral development, leading to,
among other things, significant advances in assessment
and diagnosis of psychosomatic relations.
5. Research methods. John Anderson and Florence
Goodenough at Minnesota, Dorothy S. Thomas at Columbia, and H. McM. Bott at Toronto recognized the
need for more adequate observational research methods
(see Anderson, 1931; Bott, 1934; Goodenough, 1929;
D. S. Thomas, 1929). But the methodological work was
not limited to observational techniques. Goodenough
(1930a) continued to explore alternative and flexible
methods for personality and intellectual assessment (including her Draw-a-Person test), and these workers led
the way in ensuring that high levels of statistical sophistication would be employed in research design and
analysis. Dorothy McCarthy at Minnesota and Jean Piaget at the J. J. Rousseau Institute began their influential
studies of the origins of childrens language and thought.
This is a mere sampling of the major concerns and
issues. Without detracting from the intellectual and
Mental Testing
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vice proved to be an exceedingly powerful tool for categorization and for differentiation of cognitive abilities.
Second, this comment concerns the relation of the
testing movement to the rest of psychology, especially
the rest of developmental psychology. Interest in the
use of the procedure as a research device initially rode
a wave of enthusiasm, followed by a period of neglect.
When experimental studies of how performance on intelligence tests could be modified were conducted in
the 1930s, it became clear that increments of one or
more standard deviations (e.g., 10 to 20 IQ points)
were not uncommon and could be brought about in a
relatively brief period (4 to 16 weeks; see H. E. Jones,
1954, for a review of this work). In addition, Sherman
and Key (1932) demonstrated that a negative correlation was obtained between IQ and age among children
living in culturally deprived Appalachia. Such findings
raised questions about the environmental contributions
to IQ scores, and much debate about the nature and
meaning of the findings followed (see McNemar, 1940;
Minton, 1984). A parallel controversy arose over the
interpretation of twin data, and the implications of
findings from the tests of monozygotics, dizygotics,
and other types of siblings for the inheritance of intelligence. The issues subsided, without clear resolution,
in the late 1930s, then came to the forefront again some
30 years later.
Third, the method of intelligence testing did not
give rise to a coherent theory of the development of intelligence. The theoretical debates centered mostly
around matters of test structure and statistical analysis
(e.g., whether a single factor could account for the variance or whether two or multiple factors were required)
and whether the results of the experimental tests were
being properly interpreted. There was a significant gap
between the emerging theories of cognition (following
the model of Baldwin and Piaget) and the methods of assessment being employed. Neither Piaget nor Baldwin
are mentioned in Goodenoughs (1954) comprehensive
chapter on mental growth. The gap was not unprecedented: A parallel problem could be found between the
methods of social interactional assessment and the theories of personality and social learning patterns (see
below). But the test procedures proved their worth in education and in the marketplace, even though they could
not be readily integrated into the existing body of psychological theory. Hence, the testing movement evolved
and prospered outside the mainstream of developmental
psychology (Dahlstrom, 1985).
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LONGITUDINAL STUDIES
According to Wesley Mills (1899), the discipline needed
(a) longitudinal studies of individual organisms from
birth to maturity, and ( b) systematic experimental manipulations of the long-term conditions for development.
Without that information, one could scarcely hope to
achieve a firm grasp of the processes of development,
whether nonhuman or human. Because the major hypotheses about development were concerned at their root
with these processes, one would have thought that longitudinal studies would have been given the highest priority in the new discipline. They were not. Perhaps the
practical difficulties in mounting life-span projects in
humans seemed too formidable, or the investment and
risks seemed too great. For whatever reasons, the information available about longitudinal development by the
end of the first period of the areas history was either
sketchy (e.g., Binets study of his two daughters) or subjective and retrospective (e.g., psychoanalytic interviews). But, on this fragmentary information, the most
influential psychoanalytic and behavioristic theories of
cognitive and personality development were formulated,
and few data were available to assess their implications
or correct their shortcomings.
One of the obstacles for longitudinal studythe need
for measurementseemed to be solved by the development of a reliable device for the metric assessment of
cognitive abilities. That advance was sufficient for Lewis
M. Terman, who perfected the instrument and pioneered
the first large-scale longitudinal study of behavioralcognitive characteristics in 1921. He selected 952 boys
and girls in California, from 2 to 14 years of age, who
achieved a test score of 140 IQ or above. This group comprised the brightest children (in terms of test performance) who could be found in a population of about a
quarter-million (Terman, 1925). His initial aim seems to
have been the planning of educational procedures for
gifted children. As it turned out, the sample provided the
core group for follow-up studies that continued through
most of the twentieth century. At several stages in childhood and early adulthood, these gifted children-cumadults were reassessed, with the behavioral net widened
to include personality characteristics, life accomplishments, and social adaptations. Later, their spouses and
children were included in the study, and each group of
subjects was followed through the 60th year of life
(Sears, 1975). Despite shortcomings in the original design (e.g., absence of a matched nongifted control or
comparison group), the data provide a rich yield of development through the life span. Overall, the work constitutes one of the major achievements of the science in its
first century, incorporating the efforts of three of its
most influential figures (Binet, Terman, & Sears).
Another factor that had inhibited longitudinal studies
was the need for research institutes that would survive
as long as their subjects. That problem was solved in the
1920s by the formation of the several child research
institutes across the United States. Soon afterward,
longitudinal projects were initiated at Berkeley, Fels
Institute, Minnesota, and Harvard. Initially, smaller
short-term projects were undertaken to investigate particular issues. Mary Shirley (1931, 1933a, 1933b), for
instance, completed a 2-year-long investigation of the
motor, emotional, and social development of infants. In
contrast to the cross-sectional studies of Gesell, her longitudinal work permitted her to identify particular sequences in growth and change.
Experimental intervention studies of the sort that
Mills (1899) had called for in animals were undertaken
with children. Myrtle McGraws (1935) work with
Jimmy and Johnny, twins who were given different
training experiences, is one of the better instances of
the use of what Gesell called the co-twin control procedure. By providing enrichment experiences prior to
the normal onset of basic motor functions, McGraw
was able to demonstrate that experiences can facilitate
the appearance and consolidation of climbing and other
movement patterns. The enriched twin continued to
show a modest advantage over the control twin, even
though age and associated growth greatly diminished
the apparent gains (see Bergenn, Dalton, & Lipsitt,
1994, for a more detailed account of McGraw and her
contributions). Along with these well-known works, a
large number of lesser-known investigations were
addressed to the same issues, using short-term longitudinal interventions to influence intelligence test performance (e.g., Hilgard, 1933) and motor skills (e.g.,
Jersild, 1932).
These studies of longitudinal development were limited to children, at least in the initial stages. What about
development beyond childhood? Since the early investigations of Quetelet, there had been few attempts to address directly the problems of developmental change
during maturity. The exceptions are noteworthy because
they provide part of the foundation for contemporary
emphasis on the study of development over the entire
life span of human experience. One of the first texts on
Diaries provided an innovative substitute for prospective longitudinal data, providing an account of the adolescents most intimate thoughts, concerns, hopes, and
wishes. But it also had certain hazards, with the problems of selection paramount (e.g., who keeps a diary,
what is selectively omitted or recorded). Because of its
inherently private nature, the method has few safeguards against fraud. On this score, Sigmund Freud
wrote a laudatory introduction to the published version
of a diary that, upon critical examination, proved to be a
fake. It is a modest irony that the young Cyril Burt
(19201921) exposed the fraud. Some 50 years later,
Kamin (1974) and others raised questions about biases
and the accuracy of data in Burts own work on twins
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nate reflexes and inherent emotions provided the substrate, and conditioning and learning mechanisms permitted the elaboration of emotions and behavior in
development. Personality thus was the outcome of a hierarchical structure, and discrete learning experiences
provided the essential building blocks. The conditioning
of early emotionslove, fear, or rageprovided the
foundation for all that followed. In his stress on emotions and early experience, Watson seems to have been
influenced directly by Freud (as Watson suggested in
1936, in his autobiographical statement), as well as by
other views of personality current in the day (including
McDougalls, 1926, theory of sentiments). In any case,
the study of emotional development in infancy became
the focus for Watsons experimental and observational
work from 1916 to 1920. Because of his work, Watson
(along with E. L. Thorndike) was credited in an early
Handbook of Child Psychology as having initiated experimental child psychology (Anderson, 1931, p. 3). Binet
was overlooked again.
The infant work was conducted in the laboratories
and newborn nursery at Johns Hopkins Hospital from
1916 through 1920; it was interrupted by Watsons service in World War I and terminated by his being fired
from Hopkins in 1920. The series involved controlled
observation of stimuli that elicit emotional reactions in
infants (Watson & Morgan, 1917), a systematic attempt
to catalogue the behavior responses present at birth and
shortly afterward (Watson, 1926), and the experimental
conditioning and manipulation of fear reactions (Watson & Rayner, 1920).
Although Watsons conditioning studies were only
demonstrational and would hardly deserve publication
on their methodological merit, they proved to be enormously influential. Following the lead of the more extensive and careful work of Florence Mateer (1918) and
of the Russian investigator N. Krasnogorski, who first
reported in 1909 the conditioning of salivation in children (see Krasnogorski, 1925; Munn, 1954; Valsiner,
1988), Watson boldly attacked the problem of the conditioning of emotions in infancy in the case of Albert.
What was impressive about this work was the finding
that fear was conditioned and, once established, resisted
extinction and readily generalized. As M. C. Jones
(1931) pointed out, conditioned emotional responses
differ from earlier demonstrations of reflexive conditioning in that there was one obvious discrepancy:
Whereas the conditioned reflex is extremely unstable,
emotional responses are often acquired as the result of
one traumatic experience and are pertinacious even in
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tical implications of child research, particularly for education. After earning his PhD degree, Gesell worked initially in schools and curriculum (as did most of the Clark
graduates in developmental psychology in that period).
He returned to complete an MD degree at Yale, then
founded a child study laboratory in 1911, which permitted him to extend the tradition of W. Preyer and M.
Shinn. Gesell (1931, 1933) early demonstrated himself
to be an innovative and careful methodologist. He was
one of the first to make extensive use of motion pictures
in behavioral analysis and to explore the advantages of
using twins as controls in experimental studies (i.e., one
twin is subjected to the experimental manipulation, the
other serves as a maturational control).
In 1928, Gesell published Infancy and Human
Growth, a remarkable report on several years of study of
the characteristics of infancy. According to Gesell, one
of his aims was to provide objective expression to the
course, the pattern, and the rate of mental growth in normal and exceptional children (p. viii). The other aim
was theoretical, and the last section of the book takes on
the broad problem of heredity in relation to early mental growth and personality formation . . . and the significance of human infancy (p. ix).
Gesell (1928) was characteristically thorough in
dealing with both problems, and his normative tables
and descriptions of how Baby Two (2 months old) differs
from Baby Three and Baby Nine ring true to the contemporary reader. On basic characteristics of physical,
motor, and perceptual development, children showed
reasonably constant growth and age-differentiation. If
the infants selected did not, as in a couple of instances,
they may be substituted for by more representative
ones. All in all, the business of establishing appropriate
norms was seen as an essential part of his medical practice and the practical issues of diagnosis. As Gesell later
described it:
[The clinical practice] has always been conducted in close
correlation with a systematic study of normal child development. One interest has reinforced the other. Observations of normal behavior threw light on maldevelopment;
and the deviations of development in turn helped to expose
what lay beneath a deceptive layer of obviousness in
normal infancy. (Gesell & Amatruda, 1941, p. v)
Few psychologists nowadays regard Gesell as a theorist. That is a pity, for his contributions might have provided a useful stabilizing influence during a period that
became only nominally committed to developmental
study. Growth was a key concept for Gesell. But what
did he mean by growth? Horticultural terms have long
been popular in describing children (a classic example
being Froebels coining of kindergarten). But Gesell
was too astute to become trapped in a botanical analogue;
he recognized human behavioral and mental growth as
having distinctive properties of its own. He wrote:
Mental growth is a constant process of transformation, of
reconstruction. The past is not retained with the same
completeness as in the tree. The past is sloughed as well
as projected, it is displaced and even transmuted to a degree which the anatomy of the tree does not suggest.
There are stages, and phases, and a perpetuating knitting
together of what happens and happened. Mental growth is
a process of constant incorporation, revision, reorganization, and progressive hierarchical inhibition. The reorganization is so pervading that the past almost loses its
identity. (1928, p. 22)
What does this lead to? For Gesell, it led to a new perspective on the relations between heredity and environment. Similar to what Preyer had written some 50 years
before, Gesell (1928) concluded:
The supreme genetic law appears to be this: All present
growth hinges on past growth. Growth is not a simple function neatly determined by X units of inheritance plus Y
units of environment, but is a historical complex which reflects at every stage the past which it incorporates. In other
words we are led astray by an artificial dualism of heredity
and environment, if it blinds us to the fact that growth is a
continuous self conditioning process, rather than a drama
controlled, ex machina, by two forces. (p. 357)
These are not the only similarities to the interpretations offered by earlier students of infant development.
Recall Preyers analysis of infancy, and the functions of
the extended immaturity of children for the plasticity of
behavior. The concept of neoteny was elegantly restated
by Gesell, along with a fresh idea on the social responsiveness that is unique to humans:
The preeminence of human infancy lies in the prolongation and deepening of plasticity. There is specific maturation of behavior patterns as in subhuman creatures; but
this proceeds less rigidly and the total behavior complex
133
is suspended in a state of greater formativeness. This increased modifiability is extremely sensitive to the social
milieu and is constantly transforming the context of
adaptive behavior. In the impersonal aspects of adaptive
behavior of the nonlanguage type (general practical intelligence) there is a high degree of early correspondence
between man and other primates. This correspondence
may prove to be so consistent in some of its elements as to
suggest evolutionary and even recapitulatory explanations. But transcending, pervading, and dynamically
altering that strand of similarity is a generalized conditionability and a responsiveness to other personalities, to
which man is special heir. This preeminent sociality exists even through the prelanguage period, long before the
child has framed a single word. Herein lies his humanity.
(1928, p. 354)
134
135
136
Moral Development
137
Hartshorne and May had concluded that traditional religious and moral instruction have little, if any, relationship to the results of experimental tests of honesty and
service to others.
With questionnaire procedures generally in disfavor by
the 1920s, the essential problem of how to quantify attitudes remained. L. L. Thurstone, a pioneering quantitative psychologist at the University of Chicago, was
recruited by the Payne Foundation to determine the effects that moviegoing had on the social attitudes and prejudices of children. The assignment provided Thurstone
the opportunity to develop a new technology for the assessment of moral /ethnic attitudes. In a series of studies,
Thurstone and his colleague, R. C. Peterson (Peterson &
Thurstone, 1933), introduced new methodologies for
gauging the effects of specific motion pictures on attitudes toward national /ethnic groups. They used a pre- and
posttest design, coupled with a 5-month follow-up test
(post-posttest). Although these studies seem to be little
known to contemporary writers, Thurstone himself
(1952) considered them to be highly influential for his
development of an attitude assessment methodology.
Moreover, the work provided a wholly convincing demonstration of the strong effects that certain films had in decreasing, or increasing, racial and religious prejudice. In
some cases (such as the inflammatory Birth of a Nation),
138
TH E DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE
AND COGNITION
From 1924 onward, the problem of how language and
thought develop attracted the attention of the brightest
talents of the discipline. Some of themincluding
Jean Piaget and L. S. Vygotskywere concerned with
language as a vehicle for understanding how thought
patterns develop in the child. Others focused on language as a phenomenon in itself, with attention given
to the amazingly rapid acquisition of an extremely
complex system of symbolic habits by young children
(McCarthy, 1954).
The comprehensive review articles by Dorothy
McCarthy that span this period provide an excellent
overview of the era (McCarthy, 1931, 1933, 1946,
1954). At one time or another, virtually all major developmental investigators have been drawn to the study of
language development, and so were some nondevelopmentalists as well. The intimate relationship that exists
between language and thought was brought brilliantly to
the attention of psychologists by Jean Piaget in a small
book that he published to report the results of his new
functional approach to the study of language development. Piagets study of language breathed fresh life into
one of the oldest questions of the area: How do thought,
logic, and consciousness develop? Language was a mirror to the mind, for Piaget; it was to be used to reflect
the nature and structure of the mental schemas that gave
rise to verbal expressions. In this work, Piaget seems to
This was a key point for Bhler, who had just spent
several years of her life demonstrating the quality and
nature of the social patterns of children in infancy and
early childhood. She had conclusively shown the truly
social nature of their behaviors. Note that Bhler attributes the discrepant findings to the contextual-relational
specificity of Piagets initial observations. Piaget seemed
to accept that explanation, at least for the time being. In
the foreword to the second edition of The Language and
Thought of the Child (1923/1926), he wrote:
[Our] original enquiries dealt only with the language of
children among themselves as observed in the very special
scholastic conditions of Maison des Petits de LInstitut
Rousseau. Now, Mlle. M. Muchow, M. D. Katz, Messrs.
Galli and Maso, and M. A. Lora [Luria], after studying
from the same point of view children with different
scholastic environments in Germany, Spain, and Russia,
and especially after studying childrens conversations
in their families, have reached results which, on certain
139
points, differ considerably from ours. Thus, while the little pupils show in their conversations coefficients
of ego-centrism more or less analogous to those we have
observed, M. Katzs children, talking among themselves or with their parents, behave quite differently.
(pp. xxiiixxiv)
140
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY
AND ETHOLOGY
The Gesellian emphasis on growth and maturation was
part of a broader attempt within developmental psychology and developmental biology to unlock the secrets of
ontogeny (see McGraw, 1946). On this count, the understanding of the mechanisms of genetic transfer was significantly advanced by (a) the rediscovery of the work
of Mendel, and ( b) the revolutionary discoveries of the
loci of units of chromosomal transmission. But these
events raised a significant question for developmentalists. If all somatic cells have the same genetic code, how
does differentiation occur in development and why do
cells at maturity have distinctly different functions and
properties? Where is the master plan for development,
and how can particular cells be induced to perform their
unique and special services for the organism?
Among the embryologists who addressed these issues, Hans Spemann (1938) provided a provocative suggestion following his discoveries that cellular tissues
could be successfully transplanted from one area of pre-
sumptive growth to another. If the transplantation occurs at the appropriate time in development, tissues
from the presumptive area of the neural plate of amphibia could be successfully transplanted to areas where
limbs would arise. The tissue would then develop in accord with its surroundings, so that the tissue would take
on the characteristics of skin or muscle, not of the brain.
On the basis of these experiments, Spemann proposed
that extranuclear or contextual forces served to organize the development of cellular materials in the course
of ontogeny. Once organization occurred, during the period that was critical for the development of its form and
function, then the effects would be irreversible or highly
resistant to change (see Waddington, 1939).
Such demonstrations provided the substantive empirical examples for the formulation of a view on development that has come to be known as organismic theory
or system theory of biological development (von
Bertalanffy, 1933). In its initial form, organismic theory
was concerned with the question: What directs development? The answer, simply stated, is: the organism. Development is directed by the constraints inherent in the
relationship among elements of the living system as they
act on themselves and on each other. These elements can
be cells, clusters of cells, or entire subsystems, such as
those formed by hormonal processes. The kernel idea is
that the several features of the organism, including its
behavior, depend on the whole reciprocating system of
which they form parts. The mutual regulation among
components permits, among other things, possible feedback to the original source and self-regulation.
Organismic theory was compatible with the Darwinian perspective of evolution as a dynamic, adaptive process. Development is equally dynamic. It required only a
modest conceptual leap to consider behavior as being an
essential component of the organismic system, and its development could be understood only in terms of other
biological and social features of the system. Hence,
the system in which the organism developed was
not merely under the skin. Organization could be broadened to include feedback from other organisms and
from the social network in which development occurred. Two developmental-comparative psychologists,
T. C. Schneirla and Zing-Yang Kuo, led the way, in the
early 1930s, for the application of the organismic perspective to the problems of behavioral ontogeny.
The problem that Schneirla tackled was how to unravel the complex social structure of army ants, who despite their lack of gray matter, were highly coordinated
141
142
143
144
All this is to say that the experimental testing of psychoanalytic proposals was not a profitable enterprise.
Sears was to follow his own advice, as we shall see, and
would pave the way for the modern generations of social
learning theory.
Despite the equivocal returns on the scientific analysis of the theory, its influence gained, not faded, during
the 1930s and 1940s. Virtually every major theoretical
system concerned with human behaviorsave those that
dealt with purely physiological, motor, or sensory phenomenawas accommodated to psychoanalytic theory.
Behaviorism (whether radical Watsonianism or conventional Hullian theory) and Piagetian cognitive
theory alike were significantly influenced in that era,
just as ethology and social learning theory were influenced in the present one. The immediate effects on
child-rearing practices were as great, if not greater, than
the earlier ones associated with Holt and Watson. With
the publication of the first edition of Benjamin Spocks
(1946) best-selling manual on infant care, the U.S. public was encouraged to adopt practices not inconsistent
with psychoanalytic training. The rapid growth of professional clinical psychologyWorld War II had demanded specialists in diagnosis and therapyalso
underscored the need for a theory of assessment and
treatment. The major tools available for the task included projective tests (typically based on psychoanalytic assumptions) and methods of psychotherapy
(derived, directly or indirectly, from the psychoanalytic
interview). Psychology as a profession and a science became increasingly indebted to psychoanalytic theory
and practice.
But psychoanalysts themselves proved to be an intellectually heterogeneous lot, and the theory could hardly
be viewed as a static, unchanging view of personality.
Among the more prominent heretics were Carl Jung, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, Eric Fromm, and Harry Stack
Sullivan. They shared in common an emphasis on the interpersonal implications of dynamic theory, as these
were expressed in the family system and in interpersonal exchanges of later childhood and maturity. With
this focus on object relations, there was a concomitant
de-emphasis on the importance of infantile sexuality
and the reversibility of very early experiences (see
Munroe, 1955). Horney (1937) and Sullivan led the way
in the neo-Freudian theory of interpersonal relations. In
1940, in a lengthy article in Psychiatry, Sullivan outlined a rapprochement between theories of symbolic interaction that had become associated with sociology and
anthropology and a neoanalytic interpersonal theory of
psychopathology. Sullivans position was that the selfdynamism arises from the recurrent interpersonal situations of life. Ideas about the self-dynamism (which is
not an entity but a process) are derived from the inter-
145
146
147
148
149
Not all of the outcomes were negative, nor were all unreliable. But the overall pattern of the findings provided
150
scant support for the ideas that had inspired the work in
the first place. What was to blamethe theory or the
methods employed to test it? The methods could be criticized, and so could the theory.
In an incisive and courageous evaluation published at
the height of the social learning era, Marian Radke
Yarrow and her colleagues wrote:
Childrearing research is a curious combination of loose
methodology that is tightly interwoven with provocative
hypotheses of developmental processes and relationships.
The compelling legend of maternal influences on child behavior that has evolved does not have its roots in solid
data, and its precise verification remains in many respects
a subject for future research. The findings from the preceding analyses of data make it difficult to continue to be
complacent about methodology, and difficult to continue
to regard replication as a luxury. The childs day-to-day
experiences contribute significantly to his behavior and
development and are in many respects the essence of developmental theory. An exact understanding is important
to science and society. In attempting to build on this
knowledge, each researcher is a methodologist and as such
has a responsibility for excellence. (Yarrow, Campbell, &
Burton, 1968, p. 152)
Two noteworthy contributions by Sears and his colleagues require mention. In a presidential address to the
American Psychological Association, Sears (1951)
brought renewed attention to the theoretical concept of
social interaction and the bidirectionality of familial relations. Although the research methods employed by the
Sears group made it difficult to study interactional phenomena directly, these concepts figured importantly in
the conceptions that were offered in each of Searss
major subsequent publications. They provided the impetus for renewed attention to the issues that had been initially raised by James Mark Baldwin, and were then
represented in the work of psychiatrist H. S. Sullivan
(1940, 1953) and sociologist Leonard Cottrell (1942).
The second contribution was the reintegration of
child development research into the mainstream of psychology, a position that it had not held for most of the
previous half-century. By linking the study of children
to the then-current theoretical systems of psychology,
the door was opened for a fresh generation of psychologists to enter the field. The gains were not without cost,
however, in that much of the earlier developmental work
was set aside or ignored by the new group. Traditional
developmental studies, as embodied in the chapters of
In a century-long cycle, social cognition-learning reformulations came to embrace not only J. M. Baldwins
concept of imitation but also his concept of the self as a
central organizing theme.
151
Some characteristics of behaviorist models have remained virtually unchanged in the several generations
of social learning theories. Social learning researchers
have maintained a curious stance toward the concept of
development. From Watson onward, learning theories
have been developmental in the sense that they have
shared the fundamental point that humans activities
should be studied historically. Social learning views
have been slow to consider processes of age-related
shifts in development (Cairns, 1979; Grusec, 1994). The
implicit assumption has persisted that the incremental
changes in cognition and learning are sufficient to account for the major phenomena of social development,
including their establishment, maintenance, and change.
152
infant monkey to inanimate surrogate mothers. According to the initial interpretation of these findings,
tactile stimulationor contact comfort was a more
powerful determinant than hunger in the infants formation of a social attachment. Subsequent work by Harlow
and others led to significant modifications in the initial
interpretationson the necessary and sufficient conditions for the development of mammalian attachments
(e.g., Cairns, 1966), and on the stability and plasticity
of effects induced by early social experience (e.g.,
Mason & Kinney, 1974; Suomi & Harlow, 1972).
Nonetheless, the image of motherless monkeys had a
catalytic effect in stimulating studies of mother-infant
relations and, more generally, investigations of the development of social interactions.
Given the critical role assigned to early experiences
in most developmental theories, it is curious that so little systematic work had been conducted on motherinfant attachment before the modern era. It is especially
surprising because the intense relationship established
between infants and mothers is perhaps the most easily
detected and robust social phenomenon observed across
mammals. At about the time when infants begin to locomote independently, they become extremely distressed when removed involuntarily or separated from
their mothers (or mother-surrogates). Reunion tends to
produce an immediate cessation of distress (e.g., the
young quit crying, screaming, or bleating). Infants in
this age range also express heightened weariness or fear
when confronted with strange persons and strange
placesor even familiar persons in strange places.
These phenomena can be demonstrated in virtually all
mammalian species; human babies show intermediate
levels of intensity.
The multiple dimensions of early formed bonds were
investigated in experimental and observational work
with birds (i.e., imprinting) and mammals (i.e., attachment). By the mid-1960s, a comprehensive picture could
be drawn of the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of and for change in attachment relationships
(Harlow, 1958; Rosenblatt & Lehrman, 1963; Scott,
1963). The findings permitted four empirical generalizations about the nature of mammalian attachment
(Cairns, 1966):
1. At birth and in the immediate postnatal period,
there is an elegant synchrony between the actions and
physiological states of the mother and of the infant.
Moreover, the actions of the infant serve to maintain the
mother in a maternal condition and sculpt her physiology so that it supports the contemporaneous needs of the
infant. A parallel feedback loop serves similar functions
for the infant, and a reciprocal relationship becomes established between the actions and states of the infant
and those of the mother (Rosenblatt & Lehrman, 1963).
Biological needs and social actions become mutually
supportive (Hofer, 1994). In effect, the actions and biological conditions of the infant and mother rapidly become organized around each other.
2. Proximity and mutual mother-infant engagement
promote the establishment of a social attachment that
persists in the absence of the psychobiological conditions that originally promoted the interaction. In most
mammalian species, the bond is intense, and involuntary
separation triggers disorganization, distress, and disruption in both the infant and the mother. The distress is
so extreme that it can be assessed by a host of behavioral
and biological assessments.
3. Intense social attachment can be established under
diverse conditions (e.g., the absence of milk, the absence of contact comfort, and, paradoxically, the presence of intense punishment). The influence of these
conditions depends, in large measure, on the contexts of
reciprocal exchange. Moreover, attachment can develop
in older as well as younger animals (maternal attachment
is but one of the special conditions). Experimental studies have indicated that social attachment strength increases with interaction, time spent, and exclusivity of
relationship.
4. Maturational changes trigger modifications in the
nature and the quality of attachment; maturation of
the young is synchronized with maternal behavioral
and physiological changes that are consistent with the
mothers preparation for the next generation of offspring. New attachments are formed typically within
minutes and hours rather than weeks and months, possibly to balance the tension between conservation and survival (Cairns & Werboff, 1967; Mason & Kinney, 1974).
In this regard, the adaptation had to be rapid in order for
the vulnerable infant to live.
Attachment Theory
Studies of infant-mother attachment came in the wake
of these systematic investigations, and they stimulated
enormous scientific and public interest (Maccoby &
Masters, 1970). Psychoanalyst John Bowlby began a series of seminars on these issues at the Tavistock Clinic
Cognitive Reemergence
153
ject relations theory, is to provide a comprehensive account of psychopathology. Like ethological assumptions,
it emphasizes the formative effects of early experiences.
Any discussion of modern attachment theory must
include Mary D. S. Ainsworth, Bowlbys long-term collaborator. Ainsworth conducted a pair of influential observational studies on mother-infant relations in Uganda
(Ainsworth, 1967) and Baltimore (Ainsworth, Blehar,
Waters, & Wall, 1978). One of the procedures to emerge
from the later study was a controlled observation procedure labeled the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al.,
1978).7 This assessment involved a series of very brief
separations (i.e., 1 to 3 minutes), with special attention
given to the quality of the reunions. The coding of a reunion provided a classification procedure by which children were diagnosed as securely attached (Type B) or
insecurely attached (Types A and C), along with various subtypes (Ainsworth et al., 1978). A primary attraction of attachment theory is its presumption that these
types are linked to the quality of later relationships and
to psychopathology.
An extended discussion of attachment theory and its
strengths and shortcomings is beyond the limits of this
chapter and would catapult the account into the contemporary period. For the current state of affairs on this
enormously influential theory, the modern developmental version of neopsychoanalysis, see Bretherton and
Waters (1985) and Goldberg, Muir, and Kerr (1995).
COGNITIVE REEMERGENCE
If growth is to proceed smoothly, the tissues must be exposed to the influence of the appropriate organizer at critical periods. In the same way, if mental development is to
proceed smoothly, it would appear to be necessary for the
undifferentiated psyche to be exposed during certain critical periods to the influence of the psychic organizerthe
mother. (p. 53)
This era also saw the reemergence of cognitive-developmental questions as a central focus for thinking and research. Stimulated by a national reexamination of the
educational process (e.g., Bruner, 1960), in part because
of influential volumes on Piaget (Flavell, 1963; Hunt,
1961) and Vygotsky (Cole, 1978), and in part because of
the fading vigor of social learning approaches, the problem of how mental development occurs became a dominant concern for developmental researchers. It is a
reemergencerather than a revolutionbecause the issues of mind, consciousness, and mental development
were central to the discipline at its founding.
Virtually all aspects of the field were touched by the
fresh emphasis. Investigations of language development,
Unlike ethological /animal behavior work, Bowlbys object relations/attachment theory has a distinctive focus
on individual differences. In addition, its goal, like ob-
7
The Strange Situation seems to have been modeled after
the assessments of attachment employed with nonhuman
mammals (see Scott, 1963).
154
thinking, sensation, and information processing in children flourished as they had in no earlier era. Even
hard-core behavioristic models proved to be vulnerable
to cognitive modifications, with the new directions
on mediational mechanisms being provided by T. and
H. Kendler (Kendler & Kendler, 1962) and M. Kuenne
(1946). Information-processing approaches were challenged to build bridges to cognitive developmental
studies and interpretations. Given the thrust of the movement, it seemed inevitable that the barriers between social development and cognitive development should be
transcended, and that it should become once again permissible to refer to concepts of others and of self (see
Harter, 1983, 1998, Chapter 9, this Handbook, Volume 3;
Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). The recent history of this
movement and the statement of the rapprochement among
experimental-cognitive concepts, social cognition, and
cognitive-developmental concepts are covered in other
chapters of this Handbook (e.g., see, Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, Chapter 11, this Handbook, this
volume; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Kuhn & Franklin, Chapter 22, this Handbook, Volume 2; Overton, Chapter 2, this
Handbook, this volume).
155
156
and management of systems of governance directed toward children and families. (p. 413)
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et al., 1968).
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CHAPTER 4
they exist in some state of status quo. The study of children is developmental only if it is done from an axiomatic
standpoint that highlights processes of transformation
and emergence (Valsiner & Connolly, 2003).
Children are of social interest in any societyand
so is the area of child psychology. Over the twentieth
century, child psychology developed in different
ways in different societies. Not surprisingly, it is the
cultural-historical niche that children occupy in a given
country at the given time that guides the implementation of child-oriented social action programs (Salvatore & Pagano, 2005; Valsiner, 2003d). In Europe, child
psychology was historically built on developmental biology and reflects the issues of both biological growth
and psychological development. In North America, it
was built on the social utility of child-related knowledge. Child psychology borrowed its focus from the
child study (paedology) movementwhich was from
the beginning an interdisciplinary effort to understand
childrens ways of being, including development (Hall,
1883). The focus of understanding children was practical rather than theoretical, and the social utility of
knowledge about children prevailed over basic science.
Concerns about the welfare of children in a given society seem to motivate psychologists to study children.
In contrast, basic developmental science was built on
empirical knowledge from other species (e.g., ants
T. C. Schneirla; ducksG. Gottlieb).
My goal in this chapter is to demonstrate how our
contemporary efforts to create general developmental
science can transcend the historically established blinders of child psychology. Developmental science is built
on the comparative perspective (Valsiner, 2001a) in
three ways:
1. Contrasting the development (ontogenetic and phylogenetic) of different species,
2. Considering variability within the species (of humans,
first of allbut also those of higher primates), and
3. Emphasizing historical transformations of the minds
and societies.
Knowledge about child development needs a methodological framework that equally emphasizes the theoretical and empirical sides of investigation. Our research
efforts are empirical, yet their goal is general knowledge and not the mere accumulation of data. Science is
about universal knowledgeand psychology deals with
167
LOOKING AT CHILDREN:
ADULTS PLAYGROUND
We study children in child psychology, yet the questions
we ask and how we attempt to answer those questions
remains anchored in our adult psychological concerns.
We study infants to prove that certain early psychological functions are precociousknown as inborn (see
Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume,
on the fallacy of that argument). The contrast of nature
versus nurture haunts child psychology, forcing researchers into numerous disputes about their role (rather
than leave the contrast behind). For example, we may
find the at-risk or delinquent behavior of adolescents
smoking, lies, and music videos; often a part of the exploration of their lives (e.g., thrill-seeking: Lightfoot,
1997)and investigate these problems. Yet, study of
development usually ends in young adulthood. Thus,
child development textbooks fit under the heading of
psychology of adolescents and are written from the
sociomoral perspective of the parents of these adolescents (Lightfoot, 1997; Valsiner, 2000c, see chap. 13 for
detailed coverage).
There are curious gaps in unstudied areas. The closer
in age the children comes to the researcher, the less their
development is focused on. We do not include playfulness of 35-year-olds (or 75-year-olds) in our studies of
development, even if human beings are gregarious all
through their life course. But there had not been much
attention to adults as developing personsuntil the new
areas of life-span development (Baltes, Lindenberger,
& Staudinger, 1998; C. Bhler, 1934) and life-course
development (Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this
Handbook, this volume) emerged. The role of human action in its cultural contexts is relevant from birth to
death (see Brandtstdter, Chapter 10, this Handbook,
this volume).
Child psychology seems to pride itself for being
an empirical science, thus implying a contrast with a
168
169
170
and hormones to those of families, social networks, communities, and cultures. (Carolina Consortium on Human
Development, 1996, p. 1)
Any society is exceptional in its historical uniqueness, but some were more conducive to the growth of
basic ideas than others. In addition to the United
States, the social-ideological adoption of Marxist dialectics in Russia in the early Soviet period was also
based on a belief of exceptionalism (e.g., being chosen
to build communism in a backward country). But this
developmentally open philosophical stance saturated
the social worldfrom common life to scienceand
created a favorable ground for cultivating developmental science.
171
172
theories of the given target area, understanding of pertinent phenomena, and ways of constructing specific
methods to transform some aspects of the phenomena
into purposefully derived data. Data are always constructedor betterderived from phenomena, on the
basis of the investigators reasoning (Kindermann &
Valsiner, 1989; Valsiner, 2000b). The data are not collected just on the basis of the richness of phenomena but
in accordance with the researchers construction of axiomatic and theoretically relevant kinds of data.
Hypotheses Testing: Theory-Driven versus
Pseudo-Empirical
The reliance on abduction in knowledge construction
provides a new look at the practice of hypotheses testing
in psychology. Empirical proof of a hypothesis is productive when it leads to a new idea rather than confirmation of an existing conceptwhich would border on
pseudoempiricism:
[P]sychological research tends to be pseudoempirical,
that is, it tends to involve empirical studies of relationships which follow logically from the meanings of the
concepts involved. An example would be studying
whether all bachelors are really male and unmarried.
(Smedslund, 1995, p. 196)
173
(Valsiner, 2000c, chap. 5). Frames of reference are general conceptual positioning devices within the minds of
researchers who set up their research questions and
construct methods to unify different levels of the
methodology cycle. The same phenomenon can be studied using the different perspectives specified by the
multiple reference frames. Frames of reference narrow
down the focus of empirical research efforts, like the
magnification levels in a microscope; while some details become observable better in selecting a particular
frame, others vanish from the view.
The reference frames are necessary and needed
blinders or theoretical general orientation tools that
make focusing on our desired object possible, while
eliminating distractions. Although four frames can be
discerned in psychology, two of these are relevant to developmental science.
The Intra-Individual (Intra-Systemic)
Reference Frame
The intra-individual frame of reference treats all issues
of an individual systems (e.g., persons or societys) organization as if it is fully determined by relationships
within the system. Consider an intrinsic organization of
human (self-reported) personality structure such as
Freuds construction of generic personality structure as
involving the ideas of id, ego, and superego. These three
components are located within each person, and their
particular set of relationships gives rise to the immense
variety of psychological phenomena of personality-incontexts. For example, the intra-individual frame of reference separates the person from the environment, or
vice versa. A study of the environment as suchnot taking into account the environments relations with the
persons who inhabit itcould be equally expressed
within the intra-individual frame.
The Inter-Individual (Inter-Systemic)
Reference Frame
This frame involves comparison of features that are projected into the systems on the basis of external features
of the projected characteristics that differ between the
systems. In contrast with the intra-systemic frame, the
focus here is removed from the projection itself (which
is taken for granted) to the differences in the expressions of the projected characteristics from one system
to another.
This reference frame is most widely used in psychology. It involves comparisons of individuals (e.g., Mary
174
does better than Susie on test X), or samples of subjects (e.g., males and females). It is assumed the parties
compared have some characteristics inherent in themselves, but in a dif ferent quantity than in the others. So,
comparing males and females on the characteristic of
aggressiveness presumes that the quality of that characteristic is the same for men and women, but that its
quantity may differ in some systematic way between the
two genders.
The inter-individual frame of reference is widely
popular in psychologya discipline with idealized
quantitative tactics of data constructionwhich makes
comparisons between more and less having X
cases an appealing and easy empirical research goal.
Yet, such popularity is increasingly viewed as an obstacle for science (Essex & Smythe, 1999; Smyth, 2001)
because it obscures a number of relevant aspects of the
phenomena: their systemic organization, their stability
and dynamics, and finally, their development. The use of
the inter-individual reference frame guarantees that access to processes of development is denied by the very
actions of the researcher.
The result of the use of this reference frame is
demonstrated by the difference between the compared
subjects and usually fortified by statistical safeguards to
grant solidity to the finding (i.e., its replicability in the
overwhelming majority of similar samples, randomly
drawn). It is in the use of the inter-individual reference
frame that statistical methods are adequately usable because the assumptions of this frame and those of statistics fit in a vertically consistent way (see Figure 4.1).
The inter-individual frame of reference relies on
human propensity for evaluative competitive comparGeneral Assumptions
Theories
Intuitive
Experiencing
Phenomena
Methods
Data
The individual-socioecological reference frame is an extension of the individual-ecological one. It includes both
the focus on system environment and the role of
others social regulation of that relationship. The developing person faces ones environment, acts on it, and
transforms oneself. However, the environment is largely
pre-prepared by another person (e.g., parents set up appropriate environments for children), and the persons
175
176
Axiomatic System A
Theory A
Phenomenon A
Figure 4.2
Axiomatic System B
Theory B
Phenomenon B
177
FOUNDATIONS OF
DEVELOPMENTAL THINKING
Developmental science attempts to transcend our Western culturally structured knowledge of children. In that
effort, it extends itself toward understanding human development within varied societies (comparative-cultural
178
of their permanent exchange relations with their environments. Hence, models that explain processes of development are those that either imply their dynamic
interchange or take it into account in direct ways. Developmental phenomena are self-organizing systems rather
than ontological objects (Allen, 1981; Jantsch, 1980).
Developmental and Nondevelopmental Perspectives
In the most general terms, nondevelopmental and developmental perspectives are opposites that deal with
the same phenomena. They can be contrasted, but not
eclectically mixed (Branco & Valsiner, 1997; Valsiner,
2000c). The nondevelopmental perspective is based on
the axiom of identity:
X = [is] = X
Questions of development are ruled out from
that axiomatic basis. In contrast, the developmental
perspective is based on the axiom of becoming, which
takes two forms:
X [becomes] Y
X [remains] X
The axiom X [remains] X is not the same as the
identity axiom of nondevelopmental perspectivesX =
[is] = X. Being is conceptualized as an ontological entity, while remaining, as a process of maintaining an
emerged state of the system, is implied. Both becoming
and remaining are processes that guarantee both relative
stability and change in development. In the case of remaining, the system maintained in its general form depends on constant innovation of the form by new parts.
Biological organisms maintain themselves by both new
cell production and old cell death, while the form (the
structure of the organism) in general remains the same.
Behavior
Neural
Activity
Genetic
Activity
C
Time
Present
179
Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume; use of a catastrophe theory in looking at marriage, Gottmann, Murray, Swanson, Tyson, & Swanson, 2002; use of systemic
cycles in family, Stratton, 2003). A conclusive step here
would be the unification of qualitative and quantitative
sides of developmental transformationsomething from
the realm of chemical reactions (Prigogine, 1973) carried over to developmental science.
Third, the explanation of maintenance of coherently
functioning whole, the structure that sets the stage for
further development under some ( but not other) circumstances, requires a basic reformulation of causality in
open systems.
Psychology mixes the levels of functional organization of systems, and child psychology in its sociomoral
vulnerabilities has contributed greatly to such
confusion. Interestingly, it is the most biologically astutebordering on developmental sciencepart of
psychology, evolutionary psychology, that has been at
the forefront for creating such confusions (Crawford &
Krebs, 1998; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003a, 2003b).
Arguments within evolutionary frameworks leap over
the biological, psychological, and social phenomena organizational levels, as if the world were one primordial
soup in which all organisms are trying to cheat the others by gaining the upper hand for the control of resources (Strout, 2006). The environments of species
are sufficiently different, even if they share the same
habitat, that human higher psychological functions (of
morality, values, and meanings) cannot be explained
through evolutionary psychology unless these models
honor the hierarchicalyet mutually inclusiveseparation of levels of organization.3
If the previous framework is consistently put to practice in child psychology, it leads to basic reorganization
of the methodology of psychology. Each of the emphasized facets of this definition indicates a need to reconceptualize child psychologys socially conventional
ways of deriving the data from phenomena (Kindermann
& Valsiner, 1989).
First, the f low of interactions between person and context leads to the necessity of utilizing time-preserving analytic units in the empirical research. Such units would
be characterized by time-based description of transformation of the phenomenon under study in a specifiable direction. Ford and Lerner (1992, pp. 140142) formulate
behavior episode schemata as an example of time-based
units of analysis. In repeated everyday life contexts, persons construct generalized schemata that would guide
their actions in similar-looking settings, depending on
their goals.
Second, the focus on sequential transformation calls
for developing new techniques for both qualitative and
quantitative analyses of complex developing systems
(e.g., the use of a web metaphorFischer & Bidell,
The emphasis on the irreversible, constructive, and hierarchically redundant nature of development necessitates
clear methodological ground rules through which explanation of development is possible. The principle
of parsimony (Morgans Canon) has served as the
2
This point is relevant in the wake of abuses of the human
genome discoveriesit has become tempting to link the genetic level of organization with complex psychological phenomena (e.g., claims of discovery of the gene for intelligence
or schizophrenia).
3
Imanishi (2002, p. 43) provides a nice comparison with
grasshoppers: Where we see a steppe, the grasshopper may
see a forest. This continues the classic von Uexkll (1957)
demonstration of varied perceptual inputs of different
species.
180
constraint that has guided a number of generations of researchers toward creation of nonsystemic, elementarist
causal explanations. The canonical form of Morgans
Canon is usually presented as:
In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of
the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands
lower in the psychological scale. (Morgan, 1894, p. 53)
Leaving aside the selectivity of psychologists construction of the principle of parsimony by borrowing
this quote out of the context of the rest of Morgans texture of thought (see Morgan, 2003; Valsiner, 2003a), it
can be emphasized that this principle, as stated, effectively blocks the construction of systemic-causal explanations of development (Lerner, 1995). It forces the
investigator to overlook the emergence of new regulatory mechanisms that operate between adjacent (i.e.,
both lower and next higher ) levels of the psychological scale.
Developmentally, the emergence of a new regulatory
mechanism (e.g., a higher-level semiotic mediating device, in the intra- or interpsychological spheres) may be
initially fragile and ill formed. Development entails
such transitional forms between levels: The higher levels are constantly in formation, yet before they are
formed they cannot be clearly detected (see Figure 4.4).
Hence, the canonical interpretation of Morgans Canon
makes it impossible to explain development; while development entails the emergence of hierarchically complex
regulatory mechanisms (i.e., differentiation), research
efforts guided by Morgans Canon blind psychologys
methodology to such emerging mechanisms.
This contrast may be used as an example of high-level
semiotic constraining of the activities of scientists who
are interested in human development. The blind spot in
developmental psychologys activities is generated
through a highly abstract constraint that has operated
across the history of the discipline and over a varied
range of specific research topics. However, it is not constructive merely to demonstrate developmental psychologys self-constraints. Existing constraints need to be
adjusted to the nature of developmental phenomena.
The following reformulation could adjust the principle of parsimony to the systemic-structural conditions
of development:
If we assume development to be a multilevel probabilistically epigenetic process, in no case may we interpret an
This reformulation sets up a sequence of investigative activities in ways that at first require examination
of the lack of between-levels ties. If such inquiry rules
out such ties, then construction of causal explanations
(of a systemic kind) within the given level is possible. If
that examination fails to rule out possible ties between
levels, then the construction of explanatory frameworks
needs to retain the hierarchical ( between-levels) nature
of the phenomena under study, at least to the next immediate level of hierarchy.
As an example, consider Figure 4.4. The modified
canon requires that to consider explanations for transformation A D at the behavioral level only; it has to
be proven first that neither the higher level (E) nor the
lower level (B) phenomena are involved within the
causal system. Inferences of causality that bypass the
involved intermediary levels in linear causal terms (e.g.,
A causes C; see Figure 4.4) are inadmissible. Yet,
through the system A B C, the actual role of A in
transforming C may exist. Biological and psychological
systems operate by systemic causality models in which
catalytic processes are of special relevance.
Systemic Causality in the Biological and
Psychological Worlds
Psychologists are used to thinking of the analysis of
variance, in which the attribution of causes goes to
main effects and interactions, without much further thought about what the nature of such inductively
derived causes is. This may, for some time, suffice in
nondevelopmental psychology, but it fails in its developmental counterpart. The study of development cannot
productively make use of linear models of causality (X
causes Y or X causes Y given Z; see Valsiner, 1987,
2000c) and is in need of assuming systemic ones (e.g.,
system A-B-C leads to Y or system A-B-C given catalytic conditions P-Q leads to Y). These systemic versions of causality entail researchers focus on cyclical
systemic processes that lead to caused outcomes
mostly as by-products of the self-regenerating (main-
181
some abstract sense true (indeed, the cycle of transformation of C into C through C-A and C-A-B can be said to
cause A-B). Surely, such abstracted statements can
operate as mentally economical shorthand in scientists
interactions by implying the whole set of known
processes in the system; one does not need to repeat
them verbatim.
Autopoietic Systems and Generation of Novelty
Figure 4.5 tells us a story of a system maintaining itself,
while generating a composite (A-B). Developmental
science needs to go beyond maintenance of synthesis to
explain the synthesis of the novel and unexpected. Developmental systems need to be viewed not only as reverberating in their established regenerative cycles but
also as autopoietic in their nature (Maturana, 1980).
Under certain conditions, the causal systems innovate
themselves by constructing a new part to be incorporated into themselves or by reorganizing the processes
that unite the parts within the system. This possibility
creates a specific condition for the study of development, as it renders it impossible to infer from the outcomes of some developmental process anything about
the causal system that produces the outcome. If a new
outcome A-B-D (in terms of Figure 4.5) can be detected, it is not possible to infer that the previously
proven causal system (A + B mediated by C) has produced it. There is a possibility that the causal system has
modified itself (see also Figure 4.6). The structure of
P
A
C
Y
Q
AB
CA
Cat A
S
CAB
Locus of Rupture
Figure 4.6
rupture.
182
the causal cycle may have been altered, given the detection of the outcome such as a new by-product.
At first, it is necessary to prove that this new outcome
could not emerge from the functioning of the previous
system. The very same outcome in development can be
reached (or maintained) via different causal systems
(i.e., the equifinality principle that is characteristic of
all open systems), and different outcomes can be generated by the same causal system. This theoretical aspect
of development has been noted as a complicating issue
for empirical research practices (Baltes & Nesselroade,
1973) and has particular repercussions for human development (Bornstein, 1995; Kojima, 1995). The equifinality principle leads to new methods of sampling (e.g.,
historically structured sampling).
C then A
C, where
indicates a dominance relation in an otherwise mutual relationship); or
cyclical hierarchy, which is based on intransitive relations (see Figure 4.5; e.g., A
B and B
C and C
A). For example, if a dominance hierarchy is presumed, it is assumed to remain stable and fixed. This is
183
jectory Y) turns the intransitive hierarchy into a transitive one. It is only the case where a rupture of the
cyclea new transformation of the systemopens up
the creation of a new part of it (trajectory Z).
Evidence for such self-organized emergence of novelty is present in the genetic regulation of viruses. The
genome of Coccolithovirus, for example, includes its
own regulatory machinery for changing the basic structure of the genome under specific catalytic conditions of
the environment (Wilson et al., 2005). This is an empirical illustration of the catalyzed rupture of the previous
intransitivity cyclealbeit at the level of genome regulation. In the psychological realm, similar ruptures in
the existing intransitivity cycles operate at the level of
emergence of new sign hierarchies (Valsiner, 2001b; Zittoun, 2005).
Variability Is the Phenomenon and Not an Error
Variability, both within a system over time and between
systems, is crucial for any understanding of development (Molenaar, 2004); hence, the trajectories described at the data level form families of similar
trajectories. To arrive at such family descriptions, the
individual caseindividual trajectory of developmentis the crucial feature of the data. Generalizations in this perspective are made from single cases to
the generic functioning of the personality system
(Lamiell, 2003). The empirical task of the researcher is
first to analyze the systemic functioning of the single
systemic case, and once the single case is explained,
then to aggregate knowledge of the ways in which the
system works, across persons into a generic model
(Molenaar et al., 2003; Thorngate, 1986, 1992).
Contemporary psychology is used to the discourse
about individual differences, which at first glance
seems to be about variability. Yet, this is not the case;
talk about individual differences is about the description of quantitative deviations from some anchor point
(the average, or any other criterion) and its usual utilization is for the purpose of not recognizing variability that
exists within phenomena (Valsiner, 1986). Technically,
having evidence about individual differences makes it
possible to make statements about relationships between variables, which as qualities are not considered
to differ. A correlation coefficient found to represent a
relationship between X and Y reifies the assumed lack
of variability of X or Y and emphasizes their qualitative
homogeneity. In contrast, a view of the scatter plot of
184
the data from which the correlation coefficient is derived retains the evidence for variability.
The talk about individual differences is imprecise,
as in reality there are two individual differences: (1)
those within the system over time (intra-individual differences) and (2) those between systems at the same
time (inter-individual differences). Furthermore, it has
been proven that the two differences are not isomorphic
(Molenaar et al., 2003). This leads to a need for a radical
innovation of empirical research strategies. Reliance on
the averages or prototypes and modeling developmental
phenomena with the assumptions of the general linear
model need to be abandoned as misfitting with the realities of systemic phenomena in psychology, especially
of developmental phenomena.
The Intra-Systemic Variability
Developmental science separates this variability
fluctuations of the system < > environment relations
over timefrom the study of samples. Intra-systemic
variability is observable only by repeated observations
of the system and can be investigated either quantitatively (Nesselroade & Molenaar, 2003) or qualitatively
(Mey, 2005). It is characterized by the parameters of
the study of individual lives (C. Bhler, 1934): The description of the life course in relation to the environmental conditions (e.g., Chernoff, 2003; Mernissi,
1994; Shostak, 1981). Each life course is unique in its
details, and that uniqueness is knowable by comparing
its subsequent forms with the previous ones. Yet, behind such maximum uniqueness of the person over time
can be universal life course features, invariants that
can be discovered by abstracting and generalizing from
such individual courses. The study of intra-systemic
variability can include both unique local description
and the finding of universal principles from comparisons of the life courses.
The Inter-Systemic Variability
As Molenaar et al. (2003) have demonstrated, the variability encountered between systems (in a sample drawn
from some larger unit called population) is not, and
cannot in principle be, isomorphic with the intrasystemic one. This finding renders the study of groups
of peoplesamplesirrelevant for creating scientific
knowledge about general principles that are applicable
at the individual level. A generic model that emerges
from an analysis of samples is not applicable to individuals in the sample (except for the boundary case
Equifinality Region
(known by specifiable
constraints)
Developmental time
Figure 4.7 Sampling of developmental trajectories based on
the equifinality point (region)HSS or Historically Structured
Sampling. Source: From Whom to Study in Cultural Psychology: From Random to Historically Structured Sampling, by J.
Valsiner and T. Sato, in Pursuit of Meaning: Theoretical and
Methodological Advances Cultural and Cross-Cultural Psychology, J. Straub, C. Klbl, D. Weidemann, and B. Zielke (Eds.),
2006, Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript.
CENTRALITY OF
FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURING
The terms form (or structure) and function, as well as
construction, and transformation, are of key relevance
for models of development. Usually, we see these two
pairs of concepts as if they were opposites: Structure is
viewed as static (and function as dynamic) and transformation merely changes in pre-given ways (rather than by
185
186
Such generalization arises through the formal operations the researchers perform on the phenomena to make
sense of them. Its root metaphor has been the contrast
between water and its components (oxygen and hydrogen).5 Quite obviously the properties of water are not reducible to those of either hydrogen or oxygen. Yet, water
remains universal in its chemical composition independent of whatever biological system (e.g., human body,
cellular structure of a plant) or geological formation
(e.g., an ocean, or a coffee cup!) in which it exists.
The focus on holistic units of analysis leads to the
need of recognition of the existence of different organizational levels within any developing system and the
maintenance of these levels in our efforts to explain phenomena through appealing but far-off (in terms of neighborhoods of levels) causal mechanisms. As Kenji
Imanishi (2002, p. 22) wittily remarked, [It] is nonsense to explain why birds fly and fish swim in terms of
cells which cannot fly or swim. The explanation can
come from an organizational level that synthesizes the
work of cellssome form of network of cells in the
nervous system, providing the basis for the swimming
and flying. Yet, such a network includes cells as parts,
not as causes. Causality is in the functioning of the systemthe network of cellsnot in the individual components of the whole. The reduction of causality for
complex phenomena to the elementary components of
the phenomena creates confusion, not clarity. This becomes particularly visible when the contemporary fascination with the human genome project leads to claims
about locating the gene for some complex human phenomena ( be it schizophrenia, school performance, or
any other dependent variable) in the vast number of
base pairs. Actual evidence of genetic regulation
demonstrates that such simple one-to-one connections
are biologically impossibleas those traverse the multiple organizational levels of the system. Yet psychologists (and laypersons) minds continue their search for
simple ways to attribute causalityor blameto rhetorically socially accepted simple causes. Child psychology seems still far from abandoning the conceptual
impasse the nature or nurture problem.
It is important to note that the intricate link with the dialectical dynamicity of the unitspresent in the Russian originalis lost in the English translation, which briefly stated
the main point: Psychology, which aims at a study of complex holistic systems, must replace the method of analysis
into elements with the method of analysis into units (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 5).
5
This metaphor has been used in scientific discourse since
the time of J. S. Mill: Not a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is observable in those of their compound,
water (R. Keith Sawyer, personal communication, February
20, 2002).
187
mation of {XY} X) may refer to regression. Regression is included in the differentiation models. For
the sake of completeness, we should speak of dif ferentiation and de-dif ferentiation models, following the lead
of Kurt Goldstein (1933, p. 437). It is important to reiterate that any process of de-differentiation (often subsumed under the label regression, which implies a
return to a previous state) is a part of an ongoing process
of development. Any return to a previous state is ruled
out by the irreversibility of time, which renders every
new developmental state to be unique. However, states
that can be viewed as similar (see Sovran, 1992) to previous ones can be detected when we study human life
courses. Development can be conceptualized graphically as a helix that is unfolding in irreversible time. At
different parts of the curves of the helix, a new state can
resemble a previous state; yet, a new state never repeats
a preceding one.
Numerous examples of differentiation models have
been used in different areas of child psychology. These
models have emerged on the basis of biological (Sewertzoff, 1929; von Baer, 1828) and linguistic (its diachronic focus, la SaussureEngler, 1968) research
targets. In the studies on child language development,
we encounter descriptions of how childrens recognition
or production of phonemes or words is transformed in
ontogeny. Stage models of cognitive development indicate differentiation of cognitive structures (Case, 1985;
Fischer, 1980; Fischer, Yan, & Stewart, 2003), and microgenetic analyses of childrens mental operations reveal transformation of problem-solving strategies with
age (Valsiner & van der Veer, 2000, chap. 7). Despite
their wide de facto usage, general axiomatic formulations have been rare in developmental psychology.
James Mark Baldwin and the Developmental
Logic (Genetic Logic)
Baldwins work has been seminal in various aspects of
developmental psychology (Valsiner & van der Veer,
2000). His role in the elaboration of the differentiation
models was equally profound, as it took place in the
context of his creation of the ideas of genetic logic
or logic for development (Baldwin, 1906). This logic
for development has to take into account the openendedness of the developmental process: how novel
forms may emerge at some junction, given a previously
existing structure and its current relation with the environment. The organism is active within its environment
188
From such heterogeneity of the persons social environment follows the need for selective treatment of that
heterogeneity by the person. The previously established
schema (see Baldwin, 1908, p. 184) allows the person
to become selective as to the variety of actual environmental inputs. According to Baldwin (1898), the person:
becomes a law unto himself, exercises his private judgment, fights his own battles for truth, shows the virtue of
independence and the vice of obstinacy. But he has
learned to do it by the selective control of his social environment, and in this judgment he has just a sense of this
social outcome. (pp. 1920)
It is obvious that the social nature of a person is expressed in his personal individuality. That individuality
becomes differentiated from its social roots and acquires relative autonomy. Mere slavish mirroring of the
social world is rendered impossible by the heterogeneity of the autonomy, which triggers the need for systematic determination of new knowledge by way of
internalized selection mechanisms that operate within
mental processes: cognitive schemata (Baldwin, 1898,
p. 10). Such schematanot as representations of the
world but as anticipatory preorganizers of the persons
future encounters with the worldcontinued in the
structure. This tension leads to focusing of the psychological work on them, so that:
The patients who are ill-satisfied with their action watch
themselves and by dint of observations, through anxiety
about themselves, they fall into a sort of perpetual autoanalysis. They become psychologists; which is in its way a
disease of the mind. (Janet, 1921, p. 152)
189
The orthogenetic law was not meant to be a unilinearity prescribing principle at the level of concrete developmental phenomena. In actuality, Werner recognized the
multilinearity of developmental trajectories (Werner,
1957, p. 137). Differentiation included de-differentiation
as its complementary part. The process of hierarchical integration involved qualitative reorganization of the
lower (i.e., previously established) levels of organization, when the higher levels emerged in their specificity:
[D]evelopment . . . tends toward stabilization. Once a
certain stable level of integration is reached, the possibility of further development must depend on whether or
not the behavioral patterns have become so automatized
that they cannot take part in reorganization. . . . The individual, for instance, builds up sensorimotor schemata
. . . these are the goal of early learning at first, but later
on become instruments or apparatuses for handling
the environment. Since no two situations in which an organism finds itself are alike, the usefulness of these
schemata in adaptive behavior will depend on their stability as well as on their variability (which is a case of
paradoxical stable flexibility).
. . . if one assumes that the emergence of higher levels
of operations involves hierarchic integration, it follows
that lower-level operations will have to be reorganized in
terms of their functional nature so that they become subservient to higher functioning. A clear example of this is
the change of the functional nature of imagery from a
stage where images serve only memory, fantasy, and concrete conceptualization, to a stage where images have
been transformed to schematic symbols of abstract concepts and thought. (Werner, 1957, pp. 139140)
190
terms, these mediating devices emerge in the differentiation process and lead to planful behavior and specifically personal motivation (Werner, 1940, p. 191).
Werners inclusion of motivation among the emerging set of mediating devices serves as an example of theoretical alleys in psychology that have been suggested
and forgotten. Persons as constructors of their own motivationvia construction of cultural meaningsallow
new forms of self-regulation to emerge in ontogeny and
innovation of cultural meaning systems (as well as differentiation of language forms, e.g., metaphoric devices)
in human history.
Werner was explicit about the directiveness of developmental processes (see Werner, 1957, p. 126 footnote),
although most of his contemporary (and subsequent) developmental psychology has been wary of introducing
teleological ideas into its core. Werners thinking entailed a clear distinction between primitive ( lower)
and civilized ( higher) forms of thinking (e.g., see
Werner & Kaplan, 1956). This distinction was common
in cognitive psychology of the 1920s and 1930s and was
not a prey to ideologies for its value inclusiveness. Lev
Vygotskys thought explicitly accepted that notion, as
did that of significant other contributors to our knowledge of development (e.g., Goldstein, 1971).
Microgenetic Investigations
Werners own empirical credo was that of the experimental study of unfolding psychological phenomena in
time. His microgenetic experimental focus was developed in parallel with Friedrich Sanders methodology of
Aktualgenese (for an analysis, see Valsiner and van der
Veer, 2000, chap. 7). If Werner, in the 1950s, had remained consistent with his method and the principle, all
hypotheses generated at that intellectual junction would
have needed to have been developmental (posit that one
or another course of differentiation or de-differentiation
be observable under specifically set experimental conditions). The hypotheses should have been about the actual process of unfolding of structure in development
rather than about the outcomes of such development.
Previously, Werner himself had argued against the elimination of the processes from consideration (Werner,
1937). However, by the 1950s, Werners research program had changed: The range of empirical studies conducted under his supervision was rarely oriented to the
processes under investigation, and he began using the
outcomes-oriented statistical inferential techniques of
the time (Lane, Magovcevic, & Solomon, 2005).
The inner and outer worlds of acting persons thus become differentiated in coordination, and transformation in one leads to transformation in the other (see
Figure 4.8).
Outward Projection
I
Me
Immediate
Feedback Loop
191
(b)
Person
Enters
Researcher
Suggests
Goal Area
Full
QuasiStructured
Field =
Study
Setting
StimulusObjects
(Goals)
StimulusMeans
Action
Tools (c)
(a)
Signs
Background Reserve
of Meanings/Memories
192
1. They allow the person to give meaning to the act of instrument construction or selection (a in Figure 4.9).
2. They provide meaning for the act of striving toward
reaching the goal (b).
3. They maintain the persistence of the effort of using
the tools to reach the goal (c).
Human intrinsic motivation is semiotically constructed;
the meaning of trying, and trying again (persistent
imitation, Baldwin, 1906) is based on the personal culture (Valsiner, 2000c) and fortified through affectively
hyper-generalized semiotic means.
This interpretational activity of the subject is not
controllable by the experimenter, and the subjects
emerging meanings of the research situation cannot be
eliminated. Human psychological research is necessarily personological and historical in its nature. Generations of psychologists since Ebbinghaus have tried their
utmost to eliminate that inter-individual variability of
past knowledge carrying over into the study context.
They failed. Vygotskys methodological ingenuity was
in his decision to turn that inevitably uncontrollable moment of human interpretation around and make a virtue
of something that would usually be considered vice
(Toomela, 2003). The meaning-making process in a
study was investigated. The equivalent of the dependent variable in his method was the microgenetic process by which the subject attempted to reach the goal
and the corresponding construction of meanings. The
empirical basis of Vygotskys ideas was that of Gestalt
psychological experimentation with primates and of
Mikhail Basovs investigations of childrens behavior.
The Zone of Proximal Development
The zone of proximal development (ZPD) is usually defined as the difference between what a child can accomplish with guidance, relative to individual performance
(i.e., the sociocentric definition), or the process in
which the child transcends the present level of development in constructive play (Vygotsky, 1966). In both
cases, the concept is a hostage to the realities of irreversible time.
Irreversibility of time sets up very specific demands
for the developing person. First, the person is always the
agent in any ongoing interaction with the environment.
Other agents are only episodically involved; that is, no
which denigrates the role of the researchers because they also
are participants in the encounter with persons they want to
study.
social other can live the life of the particular developing child. The experience of the developing child is
unique (as was emphasized by Bergson), and although
that flow is constituted through social interaction, its
psychological nature remains personal and inevitably
subjective. The nature of this experience can be called
the time-dependent egocentrism of development. The
idea of the central role of intra-psychological affective
and mental processes does not diminish the role of the
social others in the course of human development, but
merely keeps the focus on the developing child who is
the only person knowledgeable about his or her life experiences (Valsiner, 1989).
Second, the personal experiencing process of microgenesis of action within environment determines the
possible conditions for the construction of the immediate next moment in a personal experience. Out of those
possibilities, the actual experiencing dictates the actual
next present moment (formerly the nearest future). The
crucial role here remains in the synthesizing functions
of the persons psychological system, which accomplishes that with, or without, immediate social support
(in the form of scaffolding or teaching). Thus, the role of
the social other in the learning process is both important
and unimportant. It is important because the social others set up the environments that are experienced by the
developing person. At the same time, the presence of the
social others in each and every encounter of the child
with the environment is not necessary (or is it possible);
the developing child experiences both individually and
socially guided encounters with the world as a singular
person. The origin of the ZPD can be found in Henri
Bergsons thinking:
[C]onsciousness is the light that plays around the zone of
possible actions or potential activity [French: activit
virtuelle] which surrounds the action really performed
[French: qui entoure laction ef fectivement accomplie] by
the living being. It signifies hesitation or choice. Where
many equally possible actions are indicated without there
being any real action (as in a deliberation that has not
come to an end), consciousness is intense. Where the action performed is the only action possible (as in activity of
the somnambulistic or more generally automatic kind),
consciousness is reduced to nothing. Representation and
knowledge exist none the less in the case if we find a
whole series of systematized movements the last of which
is already prefigured in the first, and if, besides, consciousness can flash out of them at the shock of an obstacle. From this point of view, the consciousness of a living
being may be defined as an arithmetical dif ference be-
193
194
195
reality (Lyra & Rossetti-Ferreira, 1995). Differentiation of the speech and action lines in ontogeny, and the
establishment of relative autonomy between them, allows semiotic mediating devices to take over regulation
of development in dynamic, flexible ways. In the domain
of social actions, childrens construction of social roles
in play (Oliveira, 1997; Oliveira & Rossetti-Ferreira,
1996) as well as adolescents construction of personal
secret meanings (Oliveira & Valsiner, 1997), are also
examples. All these examples demonstrate how general
principles of differentiation guide a developing person
toward autonomy of the intrapsychological and interpersonal domains. Georg Simmels (1906, 1908) ideas of
the emergence of secrecy as a cultural phenomenon fits
the differentiation notion. In the opposite end of the personal /social separation, the processes of coregulation
of interaction give rise to differentiated systems of
metacommunication (Branco & Valsiner, 2005; Fogel &
Branco, 1997).
Dynamic Systems Theory
Contemporary work using differentiation models received positive impetus from dynamic systems theory
(DST), and particularly from the potentials that experimental theoretical psychology (van Geert, 1998, 2003)
provides for its formal modeling efforts. In the recent 2
decades, the use of DST has increased in developmental
psychology (Lewis, 1995, 2000; 2005; Smith & Thelen,
1993; van Geert, 2003). It has an appeal for psychologists
that most other recent formal analysis methods lack.
DST is sensitive to nonlinearity of processes, it builds
its models on phenomena of variability, and it allows the
researchers to see unity within the diversity (Aslin,
1993). DST introduces a future state of the systemthat
of attractor stateinto its theoretical core. In a discipline where future is largely ignoredas it entails behavior that is not yet presentsuch theoretical insight is
certainly revolutionary. DST has reintroduced to psychology the focus it needs: dynamic processes. These dynamic processes include emergence of novel structures
from the relations between previously existing ones,
under some circumstances of the system-environment relations (such as far from equilibrium states; Nicolis,
1993). This makes DST into a fitting suitor for the developmental sciences that have suffered from the absence of
models that take emergence of novelty into account
(Fogel, 1999; Lewis, 2000, 2005; van Geert, 2003).
The two central concepts of the dynamic focus include the trajectory (movement through time) and the
196
attractor. Trajectories represent the outcomes of dynamic processes. These outcomes can be described by
their direction: extrapolating from the previously observed part of the trajectory to its continuation or from
an expected continuation to the present, which is the
basis for the introduction of attractors. For a dynamic
system, the attractor is the end point of the trajectory. Dynamic processes tend toward a relatively stable
state of the system; thus, the idea of an attractor entails
tending toward. An attractor is the region of the state
space toward which all nearby trajectories tend (Clark,
Truly, & Phillips, 1993, p. 74). Specifying such points
or areas of convergence in the future provides the present movement toward this future specifiable state.
Progressing Equilibration
The ideas of differentiation and integration have
reemerged consistently in the history of developmental
psychology. Nevertheless, these ideas have been used to
capture the external picture of development as it unfolds
over time. The internal (process) mechanisms of such differentiation are rarely made explicit (Janets tension
idea, alongside various efforts to consider synthesis in
the differentiation process are steps in that direction).
This has led some leading developmental scientists to
admit a state of stagnation in our science, particularly
when the issues of application are of importance:
[M]ost of the research falls well short of identifying the
crucial mediators of the causal processes or the effective
elements of prevention or treatment. We know a lot about
risk and protective indicators, but much less about risk
and protective causal processes. (Rutter, 2003, p. 376)
It is in the equilibration models where the issue of organization of the making of new differentiated states
comes to the focus of attention. Equilibration models
expand our thinking about differentiation. Some such
models focus on the actual synthesis of the novel form at
a higher level of hierarchical integration. These models
include systems that entail:
An initial state of harmonious existence of a system
Emergence of some disruption in that state, due to
perturbations in the organism-environment relations
Time-dependent (as well as teleological) movement
toward the restoration of the initial state of har-
Peirce here undoubtedly antedated the popular fascination with chaos theory of our time. He emphasized
that it is through the constant process of disequilibrationtaking place in irreversible timethat conditions
are created for the living organisms to construct new
preadaptational forms. The irreversibility of time arrives, slowly and painfully, into the theoretical models
of developmental scientists of the twentieth century
through the philosophy of Henri Bergson.
Bergsons (1889, 1896/1988, 1907/1911) philosophy
is widely known, but not well known in its substance. He
borrowed greatly from the traditions of organic evolution thought of the 1890s, which were the focus of discourse thanks to the efforts of Henry Osborn, James
Mark Baldwin, and C. Lloyd Morgan. Bergsons emphasis on the contrast between living and nonliving objects
related closely with the natural-scientific debates of the
1890s. The idea of duration is the basis for his claim of a
drastic difference between the living systems and the
isolated ones (i.e., physical objects), as living systems
are always in the process of becoming. Bergsons criticism of the science of his time was directed at the unwarranted transfer of analytic ideas from the study of
the inanimate world to that of natural systems. In natural systems, the past (through selective memory) enters
into the construction of novelty in the present. The process of becoming is that of creative adaptation that goes
beyond the immediate needs of the environment.
Constructive Orientation to the Dynamic World:
Anticipatory Preadaptation
Bergsons developmental thought was based on the concept of adaptation. That concept, popular as it was (and
is), can carry different meanings. First, it has been seen
as a direct reaction to the conditions that are causing
changeeither positive ( by way of giving rise to new
variations) or negative (elimination of emerged variations that do not fit the environmental demands). Bergson (1907/1911) disagreed with both of these meanings
(on the basis of their mechanistic elaboration, p. 63) and
called for seeing adaptation in the process of the emergence of novel mechanisms in ways coordinated with
context demands ( but not molded or shaped by
them). Thus, in psychological development, the psychological functions develop new organizational forms that
make it possible for them to encounter new conditions in
the future (as opposed to the idea of fitting in with the
environmental demands of the present). The adaptations
are organic (systemic) growths, oriented toward a set of
197
future possibilities (which, as those do not exist in present, cannot be precisely defined). Nevertheless, these
new forms canalize the further encounters of the organism and the environment (e.g., Bergsons discussion of
canalizing involved in vision, pp. 105108; and in the
role of concepts in canalizing conscious processes,
pp. 305308). In creative adaptation, the organizational
forms that emerge in adaptation go beyond a fit-with
the present state of the survival conditions and set the
basis for facing the challenges of the possible future demands. Bergsons kind of adaptation is a prime example
of the relevance of the goodness of misfit in the process of development (Valsiner & Cairns, 1992).
Jean Piagets constructivist perspective on personal
and social knowledge creation emerged at the intersection of his psychodynamic orientation and psychometric
work tasks (Amann-Gainotti, 1992; Amann-Gainotti &
Ducret, 1992; Chapman, 1988; see also an autobiographic retrospect in Piaget, 1952). In his work, Piaget
looked at genetic epistemology from his dynamic structuralist perspective, being ambiguous about the stance
of this perspective in terms of evolutionary thought
(Hooker, 1994). Piagets structuralism was a continuation of the Gestalt psychological thought, yet it posed as
a third alternative to both elementaristic empiricism
and holistic philosophizing (Piaget, 1970a, 1971a, chap.
1). Thus, by genetic epistemology, Piaget had in mind
study of the way in which the subject constructs and
organizes his knowledge during his historical development (ontogenetic and sociogenetic) (Piaget, 1965,
p. 31). The study of the construction of the structure of
knowledge allows for the understanding of that very
structure that is being constructed.
A structure contains certain unifying elements and
connections, but these elements cannot be singled out or
defined independently of the connections involved (Piaget, 1971b, p. 139). As the structures are dynamic, they
are involved in functioning in the context of their wider
structural ties:
[F]unction is the action exerted by the functioning of a
substructure on that of the total structure, whether the latter be itself a substructure containing the former or the
structure of the entire organism. (p. 141)
Piagets dynamic structuralism was aimed at capturing both the developmental process and the continuous
maintenance of existing organizational forms. The latter
aspect has led investigators to trace the philosophical
influences of Immanuel Kant in his thought (e.g.,
198
199
200
Focus on Participation
The desire to see persons as becoming involved in social events has fascinated researchers in the social sciences over the decades (Valsiner & van der Veer,
2000). Barbara Rogoff has attempted to make sense of
the teaching/ learning processes through a focus on participatory observational learning in cultural contexts
for activities (Rogoff, 1990, 1992, 1993, 2003; Rogoff
for his system. The multiplicity of voicesappropriated by the person from the sociocultural environment
led to the study of the complexity of these messages
(Wertsch, 1990, 1991, 1995). The result is a consistent
return to the study of ambivalences embedded in communicative messages. Different voices can be seen in the
utterances in ways that interanimate or dominate each
other during speaking in situated-activity contexts. On
the basis of these contexts, macrolevel psychological
phenomena, like historical identity, emerge in the process of development (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995).
Dialogical Models of the Self
In the second half of the 1990s, the tradition of looking
at complex phenomena of the self in the dialogicality of
voices gained greater popularity (Hermans, 1995,
2001, 2002, 2003). That perspective has yet to become
utilized in developmental science or in the German tradition of cultural psychology (Boesch, 1983, 1989, 1991,
2003) that has focused on the construction of personal
meanings (fantasms) at the intersection of acting and experiencing collective-cultural myth-stories in society.
The parallel processes of striving-for-the-far-off (Fernweh) and striving-for-the-feeling-of-home (Heimweh)
provide many possibilities for developmental science.
The systemic activity approach is further advanced by
Eckensberger (1995, 1997, 2003).
A recent tradition of looking at the uses of symbolic
resources in the coping process with ruptures in the life
course is a novel development of great promise (PerretClermont, Pontecorvo, Resnick, Zittoun, & Burge,
2004; Simo, 2003; Valsiner, 2001b; Zittoun, 2005; Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003). The
field is poised at a major breakthrougha development
of new methodology will allow us to look at meaningful
phenomena in the process of their transformation into
new states. Such a breakthrough cannot come through
accumulation of empirical research into the literature and by determining majority trends in that
(democracy of the literature; Valsiner, 2000a). Instead, consistent science of development can emerge
from the inter-disciplinary enrichment between the theoretical cores of all sciences where development as a
direction of investigation mattersanthropology, sociology, protein genetics, embryology, and so on. Child
psychology can participate in this progress if it adopts
abstract thought models that fit the nature of developmental phenomena in the realm of psychology.
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209
CHAPTER 5
A DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL
SYSTEMS VIEW: HISTORY AND
CURRENT STATUS 211
The Triumph of Epigenesis over Preformation 211
The Birth of Experimental Embryology 211
Systems versus Mechanico-Reductive and
Vitalistic-Constructive Viewpoints 214
Influences of Sensory Stimulation on
Genetic Activity 217
The Developmental Manifold Concept 217
Developmental Causality (Coaction) 218
Significance of Coaction for Individual Development 218
The Triumph of Probabilistic Epigenesis over
Predetermined Epigenesis 219
Experience Defined as Functional Activity 220
Summary of the Features of a Developmental
Psychobiological Systems View 221
DEVELOPMENTAL BEHAVIOR GENETICS 221
Approaches to the Genetic Analysis
of Development 221
The Nature of Heredity 225
also reviewed in Gottlieb (1996). G. G.s research and scholarly pursuits are supported in part by NIMH Grant MH52429 and NSF Grant BCS-0126475. D. W.s support comes
from NIH Grant 2 RO1 AA012714 and OGP-45825 from the
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of
Canada. R. L.s research is supported in part by NIMH Grant
MH-48949.
210
A DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS VIEW:
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS1
The current definition of epigenesis holds that individual
development is characterized by an increase in novelty
and complexity of organization over timethe sequential emergence of new structural and functional properties and competenciesat all levels of analysis as a
consequence of horizontal and vertical coactions among
its parts, including organism-environment coactions
(Gottlieb, 1991). Our present understanding of the various defining features of epigenesis has been laboriously
worked out over the past 200 years.
The Triumph of Epigenesis over Preformation
The triumph of epigenesis over the concept of preformation ushered in the era of truly developmental thinking.
Namely, that to understand the origin of any phenotype
it is necessary to study its development in the individual.
This insight has been with us since at least the beginning
of the 1800s, when Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire
(1825) advanced his hypothesis that the originating
event of evolutionary change was an anomaly of embryonic or fetal development. The origin or initiation of
evolutionary change was thus seen as a change in the
very early development of an atypical individual. Although not a believer in evolution (in the sense that a
species could become so modified as to give rise to a
new species), Karl Ernst von Baer (1828) used the description of individual development as a basis for classifying the relationships among species: Those that
shared the most developmental features were classified
together, while those that shared the fewest features
were given a remote classification. Von Baer noticed
that vertebrate species are much more alike in their
early developmental stages than in their later stages.
1
This first section heading introduces A systems view, not
The systems view. For a partial illustration of the variety
of developmental systems views in the behavioral sciences,
interested readers are referred to Ford and Lerners (1992)
description of their version of a systems view of human development and, at even more abstract level, Oyamas (1985)
depiction of her ideas about developmental systems and evolution. Figure 5.6 gives the essence of Gottliebs notion of a
developmental psychobiological systems approach as it has
been worked out, beginning with the central concepts of bidirectionality and probabilistic epigenesis in 1970.
211
A muchdeveloped
allantois
Gills. . . . . .
An umbilical
cord,
Mammalia,
No unbilical
cord.
which persists
longer. The
yelk-sac.
The allantois
grows . . .
grows little;
grows for a
long time
The allantois
grows . . .
very long.
Placenta
in scattered
masses.
evenly
distributed.
little . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Umbilical cord very long.
much . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
moderately . . . . . . . . . . . . .
very little . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
remain external . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
become enclosed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
No true lungs
formed.
Sirenid.
Urodela.
Anura.
Reptilia.
Aves.
Monotremata.
Margupialia.
Rodentia.
Insectivora.
Carnivora.
Quadrumana.
Man.
Ruminantia.
Pachydermata.
Celacea.
Cartilaginous
fishes.
Osseous fishes.
Figure 5.1 Von Baers scheme of the progress of development. Von Baers developmental classification of various classes of vertebrate animals (fish, amphibians,
reptiles, birds, and mammals [Monotremata through Cetacea]) appears along the right vertical axis. His three other types of bodily organization are briefly designated in the upper left portion of the figure. Von Baers scheme is not evolutionary in the conventional sense of ancestors giving rise to descendants. Rather, he sees
an increasing complexity of prenatal structural organization going from the top to the bottom of the figure. For von Baer, the most complex prenatal organizations reflect the highest grade of ontogenetic development. Grades of development proceed from lowest ( beginning on the left side of the figure) to highest (right side of the
figure), whereas structural organizational complexity goes from the lowest (top) to the highest ( bottom) on the right vertical axis. Source: From ber Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere: Pt. 1. Beobachtung und Ref lexion, by K. E. von Baer, 1828, Konigsberg, Germany: Borntrager; and Scientific Memoirs, Selected from the Transactions of Foreign Academies of Science, and from Foreign Journals: Natural History, by A. Henfry and T. H. Huxley, 1853, London: Taylor & Francis.
or an
ovum
with a
germ.
In this
arises: Doubly symmetrical development. . . Vertebrata.
They have a chorda
dorsalis, dorsal plates,
visceral plates, nerve
tubes, gill-clefts, and
acquire. . . .
212
213
214
The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
Nowadays, we make von Bertalanffys point by distinguishing between theoretical and methodological reductionism. Theoretical reductionism seeks to explain
the behavior of the whole organism by reference to its
component partsa derivative of the older additive,
physical concept of mechanism. Methodological reductionism holds that not only is a description of the various
hierarchically organized levels of analysis of the whole
organism necessary, but a depiction of the bidirectional
traffic between levels is crucial to a developmental understanding of the individual.3 For purposes of recogniz3
215
Figure 5.4 Embryologist Paul Weisss hierarchy of reciprocal influences from the lowest level of organization (gene) to
the highest level (external environment). Source: From Cellular Dynamics, by P. Weiss, 1959, Reviews of Modern
Physics, 31, pp. 1120. Copyright 1959 by Reviews of Modern
Physics. Reprinted with permission.
216
The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
Behavior
Extraorganic
Structure
External
Environment
Organic
Structure
Histogenesis
Morphogenesis
Cell
Constitution
Gene
Duplication
Genome
DNA
Cell
Product
Nucleotide
Metabolism
Enzyme
Amino
Acid
Ribosome
Structural
Protein
t-Enzyme
t-RNA
Genome
DNA
m-RNA
Figure 5.5 The fully coactive or interactional organismic system, as presented by Sewall Wright, a physiologically oriented
population geneticist. Source: From Evolution and the Genetics of Populations: Vol. 1. Genetic and Biometric Foundations, by
S. Wright, 1968, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
217
With noted authorities on the development of the nervous system making such statements in books and articles
apt to be read by biologically oriented psychologists, it is
not surprising that a genetically predeterministic view
entered into psychology, especially when psychology was
trying to recover its balance from accusations of the other
errorenvironmentalism. One of the values of a systems
view of development is the explicit utilization of both genetic and experiential influences, not merely a nervous
(and often empty) lip service averring that both are
surely necessary.
218
The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
truly rule in the critical importance of the embryonic vocalizations in perfecting the perceptual selectivity of the
response that was evident after hatching. With the help of
John Vandenbergh, I was able to devise an embryonic
muting operation that did not otherwise interfere with
the health of the embryo and hatchling (Gottlieb & Vandenbergh, 1968). Now, the selectivity of the postnatal response to the species maternal call could be examined in
ducklings that had not experienced their own or sibling
vocalizations. And the result showed the devocalized
mallard ducklings usual auditory selectivity was not in
place: They could not distinguish the mallard maternal
call from the chicken maternal call. The control birds that
had been allowed to hear their own embryonic vocalizations for 18 to 23 hours before being devocalized did
show the usual preference for the mallard maternal
call over the chicken maternal call (Gottlieb, 1971a,
pp. 141142). This experiential influence is not attributable to any conventional or obvious form of learning because the embryonic and maternal calls have different
primary acoustic features and do not sound at all alike to
the human ear.
The outcome of these experiments led to the formulation of the developmental manifold concept:
The present results indicate that the epigenesis of speciesspecific auditory perception is a probabilistic phenomenon, the threshold, timing, and ultimate perfection of
such perception being regulated jointly by organismic and
sensory stimulative factors. In the normal course of development, the manifest changes and improvements in
species-specific perception do not represent merely the
unfolding of a fixed or predetermined organic substrate
independent of normally occurring sensory stimulation.
With respect to the evolution of species-specific perception, natural selection would seem to have involved a selection for the entire developmental manifold, including
both the organic and normally occurring stimulative features of ontogeny. (Gottlieb, 1971a)
In 1987, West and King took the developmental manifold idea a step further by pointing out that: In addition
to our genes, we not only inherit a fairly standard embryonic and fetal stimulative environment but also parents, peers, and the places they inhabit. They coined the
term ontogenetic niche to signify the species-typical
ecological and social legacies that accompany genes.
Thus, we not only inherit nature (genes) but also nurture
(the usual prenatal and early postnatal environmental
conditions that prevail in any given species).
219
determined epigenesis saw a genetically inspired structural maturation as bringing about function in an essentially unidirectional fashion, whereas probabilistic
epigenesis envisaged bidirectional influences between
structure and function. The range of application of the
probabilistic conception did not seem very broad at the
time. In 1976, Gottlieb explicitly added the genetic
level to the scheme so that the unidirectional predetermined conception was pictured as
Genetic activity Structure Function
in a nonreciprocal pathway, whereas the probabilistic
notion was fully bidirectional:
Genetic activity Structure Function.
Now that spontaneous neural activity as well as
behavioral and environmental stimulation are accepted
as playing roles in normal neural development, and
that sensory and hormonal influences can trigger
genetic activity, the correctness and broad applicability
of the probabilistic notion are undeniable and widely
confirmed. In this sense, the probabilistic conception of epigenesis has triumphed over the predetermined view.
Building on the probabilistic notion, Gottlieb (1991,
1992) has more recently presented a simplified scheme
of a systems view of psychobiological development that
incorporates the major points of von Bertalanffy, Weiss,
and Wright on the subject, and adds some detail on
the organism-environment level that seems useful for a
thoroughgoing behavioral and psychobiological analysis.
Any merit this way of thinking about development may
have must be traced to the pioneering efforts of psychobiological theoreticians such as Z.-Y. Kuo (summarized in 1976), T. C. Schneirla (1960), and D. S.
Lehrman (1970). At present, the probabilistic, bidirectional conception is being used both implicitly and explicitly by a number of more recent psychobiologically
oriented theorists (e.g., Cairns, Garipy, & Hood, 1990;
Edelman, 1988; Ford & Lerner, 1992; Griffiths & Gray,
1994; Hinde, 1990; Johnston & Edwards, 2002; Magnusson & Trestad, 1993; Oyama, 1985).
As shown in Figure 5.6, Gottlieb has reduced the
levels of analysis to three functional organismic levels
(genetic, neural, behavioral) and has subdivided the
environmental level into physical, social, and cultural
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
Figure 5.7 The various roles of experience (functional activity) during the course of development at the neural and behavioral levels of analysis. Source: From Individual Development
and Evolution: The Genesis of Novel Behavior, by Gilbert
Gottlieb, 1992, New York: Oxford University Press. Copyright
2002 by Gilbert Gottlieb.
221
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
Behavior
Sensory
Stimulation
Patterned
Neural Activity
Neural
Connectivity
Non-neural
Structures
Neural
Growth
Non-neural
Growth
Individual
Nerve Cell
Activity
Cell Membrane
Extracellular
Biochemistry
Intracellular
Biochemistry
Protein
Synthesis
Physical
Influences
Genetic
Activity
Figure 5.8 Model of behavioral development showing all
factors involved in developmental construction of behavior
and interactions among them, as proposed by Johnston and
Edwards (2002). Nonneural elements encompass hormones
(part of extracellular biochemistry), bones, muscles, feathers, and so forth. Sensory stimulation is influenced by behavior as the animal moves in its milieu, both producing and
modifying the stimulation, but also by connectivity of the
nervous system and the current state of neural activity. The
elliptical arrow shows the effect of spontaneous neural activity. All enduring experiential effects on development act by
modifying events at the cellular level, but there is no direct
connection between genetic activity and behavior. Solid lines
represent causal relations, whereas dotted lines indicate one
thing is nested within another. Source: From Genes, Interactions, and the Development of Behavior, by T. D. Johnston
and L. Edwards, 2002, Psychological Review, 109, pp. 2634.
Reprinted with permission of the authors and the American
Psychological Association.
a double helix consisting of two long chains of the nucleotide bases adenine (A), cytosine (C), thymine (T),
and guanine (G), in a linear sequence that provides a
code for the linear sequence of amino acids in a protein. At this molecular level, one might say that the
gene codes for or programs the structure of the protein
(Stent, 1981). What the consequences of this protein
223
vere mutation with widespread phenotypic effects discovered in 1969 (Beasley & Crutchfield, 1969), and it
proved to be an allele of the Glutamate receptor interacting protein 1 gene (Grip1). Meanwhile, no fewer than 58
alleles in 27 genes have been created by gene targeting,
thereby greatly expanding the range of mutations available for research on glutamate function.
The elegant and even fantastic experiments that can
be done with nonhuman genes and embryos are of
course not available for research on humans. Although a
detailed description of the usual sequence of events in
early human prenatal development has been compiled,
and similarities with other mammalian species are apparent (ORahilly & Mller, 1987), our most reliable information about mammalian embryogenesis comes from
laboratory animals. Ethical considerations rightfully restrict what can be done to the human neonate in the
name of science, and we rely on animals to teach us
about many biological processes.
Considering the power of molecular biology to alter
the genome, it is important to recognize the substantial
degree of common origin or homology of humans and
other animals at the molecular level. At least 99% of
the genes found in humans also occur in mice (Mouse
Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2002). Many genes in
the lowly fruit fly also occur in both mice and humans
(Adams et al., 2000; Sokolowski, 2001). As a general
principle, developmental processes viewed at the molecular level tend to be broadly applicable across a wide
range of species, whereas higher-level functions involving behavior or cognition are more apt to be species
specific. A psychology of language development in
children may find little benefit in attempting to converse with mice and fruit flies, whereas genetic analysis of synapses in the human nervous system can be
illuminated by well-controlled studies of insect or
worm nervous systems.
Mice are proving especially valuable in the search for
animal models of human dysfunction because they are
mammals and are readily adapted to a wide range of experimental alterations of their genes (Phillips et al.,
2002; Tecott, 2003). While it has been possible to reproduce several single-gene defects of humans in a mouse
model, it is also apparent that neurological disorders created in mice to mimic Alzheimers or Parkinsons disease nevertheless differ in important ways from the
human condition (Dodart, Mathis, Bales, & Paul, 2002).
What appears to be an identical defect at the molecular
level in a single gene often proves to have species-typical
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
225
226
The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
227
228
The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
10
Phenotypic Mean
H2 = 4
6
When E1 = E2 = 4
P = H = 2
H1 = 2
0
0
When E1 = E2 = 4
P = EH = 4(2)
20
Phenotypic Mean
229
16
12
H2 = 4
8
4
H1 = 2
0
0
Value of Environment
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
Attack Frequency
30
28.8
28.4
20
13.4
10.3 10.5
10
10.9 10.8
5.8
Home Neutral
High
Isolation Rearing
Home Neutral
Low
Home Neutral
High
Group Rearing
520
510
F1 hybrid mother
500
490
480
470
2
10
11
Litter Size
Figure 5.11 Brain weight in 100-day-old mice from the
highly inbred BALB strain. All were derived from BALB
ovaries grafted into a host female who was later mated with a
BALB male. The host female was either a genetic BALB or a
hybrid between BALB and the C57BL/6J strain. Hybrid mice
are markedly superior to inbred mice in their reproduction
and nurturing of offspring. For both kinds of mothers, mice
from smaller litters had substantially larger adult brain size.
The slope of the linear norm of reaction that expresses the environmental effect on brain growth was itself dependent on
the maternal environment. Inbred mothers were relatively less
capable of nurturing larger litters. Source: From Effects of a
Hybrid Maternal Environment on Brain Growth and Corpus
Callosum Defects of Inbred BALB/c Mice: A Study Using
Ovarian Grafting, by B. Bulman-Fleming and D. Wahlsten,
1988, Experimental Neurology, 99, pp. 636646.
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
The basic ideas of the norm of reaction and heredityenvironment interaction apply to any species: protozoa,
insects, vertebrates, and even plants. Human beings have
no special properties that render heredity and environment additive. Nonetheless, it is often claimed by quantitative behavior geneticists that twin and adoption studies
can separate the effects of H and E. The assertion that
the adoption method can effectively separate H and E
presumes that the prenatal environment is of no account
for individual differences or that the uterine environment
of all women is virtually the same. This is not at all realistic (Boklage, 1985; Lerner, 1995, p. 152). The state of
the mothers health and nutrition during pregnancy has a
major impact on the brain development of the fetus, and
every mode of sensory experience except vision is active
in the fetus during the last trimester of human pregnancy
(e.g., Busnel, Granier-Deferre, & Lecanuet, 1992; DeCasper & Spence, 1986; Gottlieb, 1971b). Precisely how
significant each of these effects may be in the context of
an adoption study cannot be determined when rigorous
control of conditions is lacking. Prior to being separated
from its biological parent(s), the fetus and then the child
lives in an environment provided by its genetic benefactors. Consequently, the adoption method cannot conclusively separate the effects of H and E.
In some situations, adoption provides an excellent
means to study differences in the postadoption environment. For example, Schiff, Duyme, Dumaret, and
Tomkiewicz (1982) compared school performance and IQ
test scores of French siblings who had the same povertystricken mother; one or two children were adopted into a
high socioeconomic status (SES) home, while another
child remained with the mother. The mean IQ of the
adoptees was elevated by 16 points. The two groups had
Control
Environment
Mean=5.8
Phenotypic Mean
average scores may be thought of as an average of numerous individual norms of reactions, whereas the
within-group variance reflects departures of individual
norms of reaction from the group average (Figure 5.12).
This interactionist perspective on designed experiments
conflicts with the usual analysis of variance (ANOVA)
model used to evaluate the results statistically. We expect that individuals in the same treatment group will
differ in their response to the experimental treatment,
partly because of their genetic differences, whereas the
ANOVA model posits that all individuals in a group are
affected equally by a treatment and individual differences within a group arise from things that are independent of treatment.
Separating Heredity and Environment in Humans
Enriched
Environment
Mean=6.9
0
0
Control
Environment
Mean=5.7
Phenotypic Mean
232
Enriched
Environment
Mean=7.0
0
0
Value of Environment
Figure 5.12 Test scores for six individuals under two environmental treatment conditions when the shape of the norm of
reaction relating test score to environment is different for each
genetically unique person. (1) If each person in a group is indeed exposed to exactly the same amount of environment, it is
evident that environmental enrichment will have different magnitudes of effect on different individuals. Some might even do
worse than under the control condition. Group means would
then be averages of points on several different norms of reaction. (2) It is more likely that people in a particular treatment
condition would not experience exactly the same value of environment, although values under the enriched condition would
generally be higher. Nevertheless, group mean test scores
would differ under the two conditions.
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
50
within = 20
40
Test Score
234
20 Units
30
10 Units
20
10
Environment: 1
Strain A
Strain B
The question of interaction effects when environments are confined to the normal range has only been
addressed recently in animal research. It is quite true
that most studies in neural and behavioral genetics apply
strong environmental treatments to substantially different genetic strains to maximize the likelihood of seeing
real effects. Recent concerns about the replicability of
experiments across laboratories have inspired systematic evaluations of the importance of everyday, ubiquitous variations in how we raise and test our animals in
different labs. In these studies, serious efforts were
made to minimize environmental differences. Crabbe,
Wahlsten, and Dudek (1999) even implemented simultaneous shipping, breeding, and testing of animals in three
labs. Nevertheless, strain differences on tests of open
field activity and cocaine activation but not ethanol
preference were significantly related to the lab where
the experiment was conducted (see Wahlsten, Metten,
Phillips, et al., 2003). One ineradicable difference
among animal testing labs is the technician who administers the test, surely a mild environmental treatment but
potentially important nonetheless. In an analysis of data
on pain reactions in various strains of mice over a period of 8 years, Chesler, Wilson, Lariviere, RodriguezZas, and Mogil (2002) found that the largest effect on
pain sensitivity, larger than even the genetic effects,
was indeed the technician giving the test!
Interactions do occur when environments differ only
moderately but are unlikely to be detected statistically
unless adequate samples are studied. Just as in the cosmos where dim objects require powerful telescopes to be
perceived from Earth, statistically small effects in factorial designs demand larger samples to ensure they are
visible above the level of unexplained, seemingly random variation within treatment groups.
The Hardware-Software Distinction
Additivity of effects of genes and environment presumes that the two things act separately in the process
of development. A theory, often implicit but sometimes
explicit, of how this might occur asserts that genes
code for brain structure (the hardware) whereas experience stores information (software) in this inflexible
matrix of prewired connections. The electronic computer thus serves as a convenient metaphor for the G +
E formulation.
The hard-soft distinction originates in early theories
of genetics and mental ability. Bateson (1913) held that
Mendelian unit-characters or genes are the fundamen-
235
tal elements, and consequences of environmental interferences are subordinate to them, and he claimed that
nongenetic variability among individuals is due to interference which is external. Spearman and Burt in
psychology explicitly connected heredity with brain
structure. Spearman (1904) asserted the existence of
natural innate faculties and argued that all such individual circumstances as after birth materially modify
the investigated function are irrelevant and must be adequately eliminated mathematically. Cyril Burt (1909)
maintained of intelligence that we may eventually seek
the psycho-physical basis, underlying this capacity, in a
particular characteristic of general neural constitution;
the accentuation of such a neural characteristic would
then produce the type of mind known as intelligent,
while its biological inheritance would form the condition of the transmissibility of the mental trait (p. 169).
More recently, the ethologist Konrad Lorenz (1965) held
that genes provide a genetic blueprint for the structure
of the brain. The quantitative behavior geneticist Wilson
(1983) wrote that the brain is the ultimate structure
underwriting human behavioral development and its
precise wiring is coded in the DNA (p. 10). The behavior geneticists Scarr and McCartney (1983) claimed
that: Maturational sequence is controlled primarily by
the genetic program for development. In development,
new adaptations or structures cannot arise out of experience per se (p. 424).
The theory of a genetically hard-wired brain was proposed before the basis for neural connections and transmission was understood and prior to the emergence of
modern neuroscience. The existence of neural plasticity
in early ontogeny has been widely accepted for some
time (Harris, 1981), but only in the past 2 decades has
the notion of rigid adult brain structure been subjected
to rigorous experimental tests. It is now well established
that the synaptic connections in the cerebral cortex are
substantially dependent on and altered by sensory and
motor experience (Black & Greenough, 1998; Purves,
1994). According to Greenough, Black, Klintsova,
Bates, and Weiler (1999), there is a multifaceted brain
adaptation to experience even in mature individuals.
New synapses can be added in mere hours while older,
less active ones are eliminated (Kasai, Matsuzaki,
Noguchi, Yasumatsu, & Nakahara, 2003). Synaptic
turnover and changes in synaptic spine density are
thought to be crucial for learning and memory (Rampon
& Tsien, 2000). Gene expression arrays reveal that numerous genes related to formation of new synapses and
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
are silent and never become expressed in protein. Furthermore, an alternative and sophisticated approach to
gene counting suggested the total could be as high as
45,000. In October of 2004, the International Human
Genome Consortium (2004) reported progress on assembling the DNA sequence and conservatively set
the likely number of protin-encoding genes at between
20,000 and 25,000. The history of assembling the
human genome and the latest estimates are available at
the Ensembl Human web site ( http://www.ensembl.org
/Homo_sapiens/index.html).
When the genome sequence of the laboratory mouse
was completed (Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2002), there were 22,011 stretches of DNA that
looked like a gene, but researchers cautioned that some
genes are missing, fragmented or otherwise incorrectly
described, and some predicted genes are pseudogenes or
are otherwise spurious. What was abundantly clear was
the great similarity of the human and mouse genome resulting from homology or descent from a common ancestor. Fully 99% of mouse genes also exist in humans, and
in many long regions of a chromosome, amounting to
about 90% of the total genome, the linear order of genes
seen in mouse is identical to the order evident in humans.
Mouse-human homology at the gene level provides
strong support for the use of lab mice as experimental
models of many human genetic disorders, but caution is
warranted. The Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium
(2002) identified 687 mouse genes that were highly similar to human genes where mutant forms are known to
be important for medical diseases. The surprise was in
the fine details of the sequence for each gene. The specific form (allele) of a gene causing disease is usually
rare in the human population because it reduces reproductive fitness, while the normal allele predominates.
For several human genes where the sequence of the
disease-producing allele has been determined, the normal allele in the mouse is the same as the mutant form
in humans, yet the mice are healthy. These include familial Parkinsons disease, cystic fibrosis, Becker muscular dystrophy, and Crohns disease. This finding
demonstrates the importance of the developmental context of a gene. One species genetic disaster may be another species sustenance.
The vast number of genes is itself exceeded several
fold by the rich diversity of proteins, which number in
excess of 1 million kinds in humans (Anni & Israel,
2002). A gene in mammals typically consists of several
exons whose DNA codes for the sequence of amino acids
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
they could be seen as high points in a three dimensional plot. Mountain number 6 contained 909 genes
whose mRNA levels were correlated with each other at
a median Pearson r = .21, and many were especially
active in neural tissue.
The genome-wide assessment of expression has provided overwhelming evidence that environmental conditions alter the activity of very large numbers of genes.
For example, the circadian light-dark cycle entrains a
24-hour expression pattern for about 10% of all genes
expressed in a particular tissue in mice, amounting to
1,000 or more genes, but the set of genes that fluctuate
most widely with time of day depends on the specific
tissue (Storch et al., 2002). It is also apparent that some
genes are regulated to a greater degree than others in response to environmental change (Lee et al., 2002).
Given the large numbers of genes (more than 10,000)
being assessed in one experiment with arrays, the risks
of detecting false positive relationships are substantial
and criteria for claiming a real change in expression
tend to be somewhat arbitrary. Other difficulties in interpreting these experiments exist (Nisenbaum, 2002),
and it is prudent to exercise caution at this early stage of
the investigations. By far the biggest problem with gene
arrays is that, at present, the results using different systems from different manufacturers show little overlap,
so data from different studies are difficult, if not impossible, to compare (Marshall, 2004). The magnitude of
the problem is suggested by the fact that, in 2003 alone,
there were approximately 3,000 published microarray
studies (Marshall, 2004).
Targeted Mutations
When the DNA sequence of a gene is well documented,
this knowledge can be used to construct a molecular
probe that will insert a fragment of foreign DNA at a targeted location in the specific gene of interest to the investigator. This is a transgenic method because it
transfers DNA from one species to another. When the insertion event is transmissible to progeny, the new mutation is an allele at the genetic locus. Targeted mutations
have been created in hundreds of genes in mice to generate allelic diversity at loci where previously only the
normal, wild type allele had been known (Mller,
1999; www.informatics.jax.org). In many instances the
allele is termed a null mutation or knockout because it
completely abolishes the capacity to synthesize protein
that normally depends on that gene. The mouse has special importance in this realm because targeted mutations
239
APPLICATION OF A DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
VIEW: THE CASE OF
INTERSENSORY DEVELOPMENT
As the two previous sections of this chapter have made
clear, there is a growing appreciation of the value of
grounding the study of human development in a system
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
Lewkowicz & Lickliter, 1994; Rose & Ruff, 1987), developmental biology (Edelman, 1987, 1992), cognitive
science (Bertelson & de Gelder, 2004; Smith & Katz,
1996), and the neurosciences (Calvert, Spence, & Stein,
2004; Stein & Meredith, 1993). Recent empirical and
conceptual advances in these related fields have served
to guide a growing number of investigators away from
simple, single-cause explanations and toward an increasing appreciation of the multiple influences, at various
levels of analysis, that contribute to the emergence of intersensory integration.
What follows here is not intended as a comprehensive
review of these burgeoning areas of research; rather, it is
a brief examination of traditional and emerging conceptual and operational frameworks associated with this
area of investigation. The principal goal is to explore
how the application of a biologically plausible developmental systems perspective can provide students of
perceptual development with a framework that both acknowledges the complex and dynamic nature of development and attempts to integrate developmental data from
genetics, neuroscience, and psychology into a coherent
and complementary account of how young organisms
come to integrate distinct sensory inputs in a coordinated way that allows for a unitary perception of objects
and events. Intersensory integration is a fundamental
characteristic of normal perception, and to successfully
answer the question of how it is achieved over the
course of development requires an interdisciplinary,
multilevel, comparative approach to developmental
analysis, as advocated by Kuo (1967) and, more recently, by Gottlieb (1991, 1996, 1997).
Traditional Approaches to
Intersensory Development
During the past several decades, there has been substantial research on the intermodal capabilities of human infants (Aslin & Smith, 1988; Bahrick, Lickliter, & Flom,
2004; Lewkowicz, 2000; Lewkowicz & Lickliter, 1994;
Meltzoff, 1990; Rose & Ruff, 1987). In a general sense,
this research has been largely descriptive in nature and
has been directed at establishing the timing of the emergence of various perceptual competencies over the
course of the 1st year following birth. This work has
successfully documented that young infants display a
large and diverse repertoire of intersensory abilities, including the ability to match faces and voices on the basis
of voice-lip synchrony (Dodd, 1979), speech sounds
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
Perhaps most important, integration and differentiation theories of intersensory development have generally
assumed that intersensory functioning is a unitary phenomenon that can be characterized by a single developmental pathway. However, as noted by Ryan as long ago
as 1940, and as echoed more recently by Turkewitz and
his colleagues (Botuck & Turkewitz, 1990; Turkewitz &
Mellon, 1989), there are a number of different types or
categories of intersensory functioning, including intersensory inhibition and facilitation, association of multimodal characteristics (multimodal coordination), and
abstraction of common information (intersensory equivalence). There is no reason to necessarily assume that
these different instances of intersensory functioning
share common developmental mechanisms or pathways.
Indeed, each distinct type of intersensory functioning
may have its own developmental trajectory and be influenced by different neural, physiological, psychological,
and social mechanisms. In this light, Turkewitz and
Mellon (1989) argue:
It is therefore possible for intersensory equivalence to be
both present and absent at birth, for the senses to be simultaneously unified and separate, and for development to
proceed by both differentiation and integration. That is,
development may be characterized not by the presence or
absence of intersensory functioning at various stages, but
by the prevalence or conspicuousness of different types of
intersensory functioning at different stages of development. (p. 289)
The insight that intersensory perception is not a unitary process (Lewkowicz, 2002; Turkewitz, 1994;
Walker-Andrews, 1994) is not yet widely appreciated,
despite growing evidence to indicate that diverse intraorganismic and extraorganismic factors can interact
probabilistically to determine whether information to
the different sensory modalities will or will not be integrated. Besides the factors briefly reviewed above (i.e.,
the changing functional properties of the sensory systems, the differential salience hierarchies of the various
modalities, and the processes of differentiation and integration), nonspecific stimulus characteristics such as
the relative intensity or amount of stimulation presented
to the various modalities (Lewkowicz & Turkewitz,
1980; Lickliter & Lewkowicz, 1995; Radell & Gottlieb,
1992), and specific organismic characteristics such as
the state of arousal of the infant (Gardner & Karmel,
1984; Gottlieb, 1993; Reynolds & Lickliter, 2004) have
been shown to contribute to the infants emerging capacity for specific intersensory functions.
243
Thus, individual intersensory functioning is multidetermined, with diverse internal and external variables
interacting, often in a nonlinear fashion. As pointed out
by Thelen and Smith (1994), moving and perceiving
provides infants with varied, multimodal takes on
how the world looks, feels, sounds, tastes, and smells.
These experiences of hearing and seeing and touching
and moving are all time-locked and are known to change
together as the infants activity, state, and actions
change. What is needed to more fully unpack and assess
these varied factors and their interactions is a developmental systems view that approaches the study of intersensory development at a suitable level of complexity
that does justice to these varied influences and provides
a biologically plausible, yet conceptually nonreductionistic, account of the development of intersensory functioning. Steps are being made in this direction.
Developmental Psychobiological Systems
Approach to Intersensory Development
Recently, there has been increasing appreciation of the
need to move beyond descriptive studies and toward the
experimental examination of the various sensory and
nonsensory factors that contribute to the emergence of
infants intersensory functioning (Bahrick & Lickliter,
2002; Lewkowicz, 2002; Lewkowicz & Lickliter, 1994;
see Turkewitz, 1994 for an alternative view). As suggested earlier, this shift in focus from what and
when questions to how questions is requiring investigators to reconsider and even revamp several of the traditional conceptual and methodological approaches that
have been employed in the study of early perceptual organization. The larger goal of this reorientation is to understand and explain individual functioning and its
organization without denying the complexity of the phenomena to be understood.
In our view, such a change in focus will best be
served by adopting research strategies that are explicitly
interdisciplinary in nature and that place strong emphasis on comparative developmental studies (Lickliter &
Bahrick, 2000). In other words, an empirical concern
with the complexity of the processes and mechanisms
underlying intersensory development will profit from information obtained from a variety of analytical levels
and drawn from a variety of animal species. Given that
the development of any specific behavioral capacity is
the product of dynamic, bidirectional interaction among
multiple, hierarchically organized levels (see Figure
5.6), we believe that the utilization of interdisciplinary,
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
comparative, and convergent research strategies is essential to discovering and defining the various conditions, experiences, and events ( both internal and
external to the organism) necessary and sufficient to understand normal perceptual development.
As discussed earlier, Gottlieb (1991, 1992) has distinguished three functional organismic levels (genetic,
neural, and behavioral) and three environmental levels
(physical, social, and cultural) of analysis central to a
developmental psychobiological systems approach (Figure 5.6). The complex network of interdependent
bidirectional relationships among gene action, neuroanatomy and physiology, behavior, and social influences clearly poses a challenge for those who still hope
to identify simple unidirectional linkages between levels
of organization. This complexity also poses a challenge
for researchers committed to unraveling the intricate
web of nested influences involved in early development,
but for different reasons. Such a complex network requires the discovery of dynamic, bidirectional relationships rather than single antecedent-consequent linkages.
Despite this challenge, some initial progress is being
made in this regard. Although the genetic and cultural
levels of Gottliebs psychobiological systems framework
remain relatively unexplored in the study of early intersensory capabilities, several researchers have taken first
steps toward attempting to integrate neural and behavioral levels of analysis (e.g., Knudsen & Brainard, 1991;
Knudsen & Knudsen, 1989; Stein & Meredith, 1990;
Stein, Meredith, Huneycutt, & McDade, 1989; R. L.
Tees, 1994) and the physical and social levels of analysis
(Columbus & Lickliter, 1998; Gottlieb, 1993; Lickliter
& Gottlieb, 1985, 1988; McBride & Lickliter, 1993).
These initial efforts at multilevel analysis are all comparative studies and have employed a variety of avian
and mammalian subjects.
Operationally, these varied experiments have manipulated the sensory experiences of developing animals
and produced systematic changes in neural and/or behavioral responsiveness to multimodal information. For
example, Knudsen (1983) raised developing barn owls
with one ear plugged, changing the relative timing and
intensity of inputs to the two ears and altering the relative weights of the binaural cues used to construct the
birds auditory receptive fields (e.g., auditory map) in
the optic tectum, the brain region involved in the localization of sensory events. Despite the fact that these earoccluded birds had to learn to function on the basis of
abnormal binaural cues, they nonetheless developed an
auditory map in surprisingly good register with their vi-
245
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The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
jects and their situations. The relation between the organism and its environment, rather than the nature of
the organism itself, was viewed as the appropriate object of study for psychology. For example, J. J. Gibson
(1966, 1979) advocated an ecological approach to the
study of perception in which the researcher would be
explicitly concerned with the structure of the environment, how the organism moves about in it, and what
sorts of perceptual information the environment provides to the perceiving organism. From this approach,
perception depends on the kinds of experiences that
come from having a body with various sensory and
motor capacities that are themselves embedded in a
more encompassing physical, biological, psychological,
and social context (Thelen et al., 2001; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). Developmentalists are thus faced
with the challenge of determining both how the environment of the fetus or infant contributes to and constrains the perceptual information available to the
young organism and how these contributions and constraints are themselves specified by the changing sensorimotor structure and capacities of the developing
organism (see Adolph, Eppler, & Gibson, 1993; Lickliter, 1995; Ronca, Lamkin, & Alberts, 1993). For example, Bertenthal and Campos (1990) found that
infants perceptual responsiveness to objects and surfaces can change significantly following some experience with crawling. As new actions become available to
the maturing infant, new opportunities for exploring
the environment also emerge. This bidirectional approach stresses the fundamental connectedness of the
organism to its surroundings and recognizes that empirical investigation beyond the boundaries of the organism is essential to a full understanding of the
organism and its behavior.
Ironically, this approach is sometimes viewed as
being environmentalist in orientation and thus in opposition to a biological approach to the study of
human development. This dichotomous view derives
from an implicit developmental dualism, still common
in some quarters of developmental psychology, that attempts to delineate between the relative causal power
of internal versus external factors thought to be associated with any given behavioral trait or ability. This dualism and its excessive reductionism are explicitly
rejected by the developmental psychobiological systems view advocated in this chapter. We believe that a
hard-line distinction between genetic and environmental causation, between internal and external sources of
control, between nature and nurture, is no longer tenable in developmental science. As a case in point, the
multilevel, nonlinear, and activity-dependent processes
revealed in comparative work on intersensory development are not adequately captured by the traditional dichotomy of internal versus external causation that is
still common in much of developmental psychology.
What is needed is an approach to intersensory development in which factors within and outside the organism
are studied in explicitly relational terms (Gottlieb &
Halpern, 2002).
The need for this relational approach is perhaps best
illustrated by the notion of effective stimulation, an
idea originally put forth by the comparative psychologist T. C. Schneirla (1959, 1965). In brief, the idea of
effective stimulation holds that the effectiveness of a
particular stimulus depends not only on its specific
quantitative (physical) value, but also on the properties
of the organisms receptors, the organisms general
state of arousal, the organisms experiential history,
and its developmental condition. In support of
Schneirlas insight, there is now a substantial body of
evidence showing that an infants responsiveness to external sensory stimulation is not determined simply by
the physical nature of the sensory input provided;
rather, the same stimulus can have markedly different
effects on the neonate, depending on the amount of
concurrent stimulation to which the infant is exposed
and on the infants current level of arousal (see Gardner, Lewkowicz, Karmel, & Rose, 1986; Lewkowicz &
Turkewitz, 1981; Lickliter & Lewkowicz, 1995; Radell
& Gottlieb, 1992, for examples from both animal and
human infants). Quantitative variations in stimulation
in one modality can produce systematic changes in responsiveness in another modality, and it is possible to
modify the attentional value of a given stimulus by
altering either the infants internal state or the amount
of external sensory stimulation provided.
This principle of reciprocal determination underscores the insight that early intersensory relationships
are affected by the stage, state, and experiential history
of the organism, the nature and history of sensory stimulation provided or denied, and the larger physical, social, and temporal context in which development occurs.
In other words, context and specific stimulus features
both become dominant behavioral determinants, and a
depiction of the bidirectional traffic between levels is
crucial to a developmental understanding of individual
functioning.
247
BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF A
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL
SYSTEMS VIEW
In this chapter, we have applied the systems view of psychobiological development only to developmental behavior genetics and to intersensory integration in the infant;
therefore, we wish to close our account by calling attention to the wider applicability of the systems concept to
human development.
Although there is considerable evidence for vertical
as well as horizontal bidirectionality of influences
among the four levels of analysis depicted in Figure 5.6
(environment, behavior, neural activity, genetic expression), the top-down flow has not yet been widely understood and appreciated in developmental psychology.
Waddingtons (1957, p. 36, Figure 5.5) unidirectional
understanding of genetic canalization has been the predominant approach for many years and is still promoted
in some quarters of developmental psychology (Fishbein, 1976; Kovach & Wilson, 1988; Lumsden & Wilson, 1980; Parker & Gibson, 1979; Scarr, 1993;
Scarr-Salapatek, 1976; Sperry, 1951, 1971).
Because the influence of environmental factors on
genetic expression is presently being pursued in a number of neuroscience and neurogenetic laboratories, there
is now considerable evidence to document that genetic
activity is responsive to the developing organisms external environment (Gottlieb, 1992, 1996). In an early
example, Ho (1984) induced a second set of wings on
fruit flies by exposing them to ether during a certain period of embryonic development; the ether altered the cytoplasm of the cells and thus the protein produced by the
DNA-RNA-cytoplasm coactional relationship. This particular influence has the potential for a nontraditional
evolutionary pathway in that it continues to operate
transgenerationally, as do the effects of many drugs and
other substances (Campbell & Perkins, 1988). Because
there are now so many empirical demonstrations of external sensory and internal neural events that both excite
and inhibit gene expression, the phenomenon has been
labeled immediate early gene expression (e.g.,
Anokhin et al., 1991; Calamandrei & Keverne, 1994;
Mack & Mack, 1992; Rustak et al., 1990).
In contrast to the (usually) unidirectional bottom-up
flow still prominent in developmental psychology, at the
behavior-environment level of analysis, bidirectionality
was prominently recognized as early as J. M. Baldwins
(1906) circular reaction, Vygotskys (van der Veer &
248
The Significance of Biology for Human Development: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View
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CHAPTER 6
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The value of dynamic systems is that it provides theoretical principles for conceptualizing, operationalizing,
and formalizing these complex interrelations of time,
substance, and process. It is a metatheory in the sense
that it may be (and has been) applied to different species,
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ages, domains, and grains of analysis. But it is also a specific theory of how humans gain knowledge from their
everyday actions (e.g., Thelen & Smith, 1994).
What do we mean when we say that an organism develops? Usually, we say that it gets bigger, but always
we mean that it gets more complex. Indeed, the defining
property of development is the creation of new forms. A
single cell and then a mass of identical cells are starting
points for legs, livers, brains, and hands. The 3-monthold infant who stops tracking a moving object when it
goes out of sight becomes an 8-year-old child who can
read a map and understand symbolically represented locations, and, later, an 18-year-old student who can understand and even create formal theories of space and
geometry. Each of these transitions involves the emergency of new patterns of behavior from precursors that
themselves do not contain those patterns. Where does
this novelty come from? How can developing systems
create something from nothing?
Understanding the origins of this increasing complexity is at the heart of developmental science. Traditionally, developmentalists have looked for the sources of
new forms either in the organism or in the environment.
In the organism, complex structures and functions
emerge because the complexity exists in the organism in
the form of a neural or genetic code. Development consists of waiting until these stored instructions tell the organism what to do. Alternatively, the organism gains
new form by absorbing the structure and patterning of
its physical or social environment through interactions
with that environment. In the more commonly accepted
version, the two processes both contribute: Organisms
become complex through a combination of nature and
nurture. For instance, the guiding assumption of developmental behavior genetics is that the sources of complexity can be partitioned into those that are inherent,
inherited, and absorbed from the environment. But
whether development is viewed as driven by innate
structures, environmental input, or a combination of the
two, the fundamental premise in the traditional view is
that information can preexist the processes that give
rise to it (Oyama, 1985, p. 13).
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260
261
Figure 6.1 Waddingtons phase-space diagram of development. Time runs along the z-axis, from plane PQRS at the time
of fertilization to PQRS which is adulthood. The other
two dimensions represent the composition of the system. The
diagram shows how the egg, which has continuous composition gradients becomes differentiated into specific tissues.
Some areas in the state space act as attractors, pulling in
nearby trajectories. Source: From The Strategy of the Genes:
A Discussion of Some Aspects of Theoretical Biology (p. 28),
by C. H. Waddington, 1957, London: Allen & Unwin. Copyright 1957 by Allen & Unwin. Reprinted with permission of
Mrs. M. J. Waddington.
state (the ball could be anywhere on the landscape), development creates hillocks and valleys of increasing
complexity. As development proceeds, the tissue types
become separated by higher hills, signifying the irreversible nature of development. However, the pathways
down the landscape also show buffering; that is, development proceeds in globally similar ways despite somewhat different initial conditions, and despite minor
perturbations or fluctuations along the way. In his last
book, published posthumously in 1977, Waddington
called the epigenetic landscape an attractor landscape
(p. 105). He asked, How do we find out the shape of the
landscape? He suggested: So what we should try to do
is to alter it, slightly, in as many ways as possible and
observe its reactions. We will find that the system resists some types of changes more than others, or restores
itself more quickly after changes in some directions
than in others (Waddington, 1977, p. 113). Similarly, in
our version of a dynamic systems account, probing the
systems stability is also a critical step.
Since Waddington, theorists and mathematicians
have offered numerous dynamic models of morphogenesis, the emergency of form (see, e.g., Gierer, 1981;
Goodwin & Cohen, 1969; Meakin, 1986; Tapaswi &
Saha, 1986; Thom, 1983; Yates & Pate, 1989, among
others). The common features of these models are initial
conditions consisting of very shallow gradients, differential mechanical factors such as pressures or adhesions
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263
No one would assign any geological plan or grand hydraulic design to the patterns in a mountain stream.
Rather, the regularities patently emerge from multiple
factors: The rate of flow of the water downstream, the
configuration of the stream bed, the current weather
conditions that determine evaporation rate and rainfall,
and the important quality of water molecules under particular constraints to self-organize into different patterns of flow. But what we see in the here-and-now is just
part of the picture. The particular patterns evident are
also produced by unseen constraints, acting over many
different scales of time. The geological history of the
mountains determined the incline of the stream bed and
the erosion of the rocks. The long-range climate of the
region led to particular vegetation on the mountain and
the consequent patterns of water absorption and runoff.
The climate during the past year or two affected the
snow on the mountain and the rate of melting. The configuration of the mountain just upstream influenced the
flow rate downstream. And so on. Moreover, we can see
the relative importance of these constraints in maintaining a stable pattern. If a small rock falls into a pool, nothing may change. As falling rocks get larger and larger, at
some point, the stream may split into two, or create a
new, faster channel. What endures and what changes?
Process accounts assume that behavior patterns and
mental activity can be understood in the same terms as
the eddies and ripples of a mountain stream. They exist
in the here-and-now, and they may be very stable or
easily changed. Behavior is the product of multiple,
contributing influences, each of which itself has a history. But just as we cannot really disentangle the geologic history of the mountain from the current
configuration of the stream bed, we also cannot draw a
line between the real-time behavior and the lifetime
processes that contribute to it. Likewise, there is no
separation of the patterns themselves from some abstraction of those patterns.
The mountain stream metaphor depicts behavioral
development as an epigenetic process; that is, truly constructed by its own history and system-wide activity.
This is a venerable idea with a long history in developmental theorizing.
Epigenesis in Developmental Psychobiology
No one understood a systems approach more deeply than
a group of developmental psychobiologists working
largely in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, especially T. C.
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265
266
267
268
von Bertalanffy provided dynamic equations to illustrate these principles: Wholeness or self-organization,
openness, equifinality (self-stabilization), and hierarchical organization. In his discussion of systems applications to psychology, von Bertalanffy was especially
critical of homeostasis models of mental functioning,
especially the Freudian assumption that organisms are
always seeking to reduce tensions and seek a state of
equilibrium. Rather, organisms are also active; as an
open system, they live in a kind of disequilibrium (what
we will call dynamic stability) and actively seek stimulation. This disequilibrium allows change and flexibility; the idea that too much stability is inimical to change
recurs in many developmental accounts (e.g., Piaget,
Werner) and is an assumption we also find essential for
understanding development.
The Nobel chemist Ilya Prigogine was the second
principal contributor to systems theory and an eloquent
popularizer as well (see, e.g., Prigogine, 1978; Prigogine
& Stengers, 1984). Prigogine was primarily interested in
the physics of systems that were far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Recall that, in Newtonian thermodynamics, all systems run to disorder. The energy of the
universe dissipates over time. The universe increases in
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270
Adoption of such a systems model, with its assumptions of wholeness, self-stabilization, self-organization,
and hierarchical organization, has implications for
every aspect of developmental psychology, according to
Sameroff. For instance, theories of socialization must
become thoroughly contextual, because the notion of
open systems means that the individual is always in
transaction with the environment. Biological vulnerability or risk, in this case, does not exist in a vacuum, but
within the rich network of a more or less supportive
family and community culture. Outcome is a joint product of the child and the cultural agenda of the society,
and the total system has self-organizing and selfstabilizing characteristics.
Likewise, the issue of change motivates the developmental system theory of Ford and Lenrer (1992). In reasoning that closely parallels our own, Ford and Lerner
begin with a view of humans as multilevel, contextual
organizations of structures and functions (p. 47) who
exhibit varying kinds of stability and variability and
who can change both in and between levels. Individual
development, according to these theorists:
involves incremental and transformational processes that,
through a f low of interactions among current characteristics of the personal and his or her current contexts, pro-
Figure 6.5
duces a succession of relatively enduring changes that elaborate or increase the diversity of the persons structural
and functional characteristics and the patterns of their environmental interactions while maintaining coherent organization and structural-functional unity of the person as a
whole. (p. 49, italics in original)
The definition, they maintain, implies a lifelong possibility of change, multiple (although not infinite) and
nonlinear developmental pathways, discontinuities, and
the emergence of new forms. Furthermore, the definition specifies that development is never a function of
person or context alone, but indeed results as a function
of their dynamic interaction. Figure 6.5 is Ford and
Lerners model of developmental change as a series of
probabilistic states, where control systems interact in
the person and the environment. States are thus the current configuration of the system, based both on current
status and on the systems immediate and long-term history. We will repeat these themes throughout the remainder of this chapter.
Ford and Lerners treatise is ambitious in scope; it
ties biological and social development into a single developmental systems theory. Their intellectual debt is
directly to the organismic and contextual school of developmental theory, and less so to physical and mathe-
matical dynamical systems. Likewise, they are not primarily concerned with operational verification of a systems approach, nor do they connect directly with the
experimental and observational studies of individual
child development.
This overview of the historical heritage shows systems approaches to have enduring appeal to developmentalists. This makes sense. As developmentalists, we are
continually faced with the richness and complexity of
the organisms we study and the elaborate causal web between active individuals and their continually changing
environments. The recent contribution of the dynamic
systems theories to this tradition is that such theories allows us to express, in words and in mathematical formalisms, complexity, wholeness, emergence of new
forms, and self-organization. They provide a way to express the profound insight that pattern can arise without
design: Developing organisms do not know ahead of time
where they will end up. Form is a product of process.
271
these complex systems form patternsan organized relationship among the partsremain largely a mystery.
In the past decade or so, however, physicists, mathematicians, chemists, biologists, and social and behavioral scientists have become increasingly interested
in such complexity, or in how systems with many, often
diverse, parts cooperate to produce ordered patterns.
The scientific promise is that a common set of principles and mathematical formalisms may describe
patterns that evolve over time, irrespective of their material substrates.
Order from Complexity
The key feature of such dynamic systems is that they are
composed of very many individual, often heterogeneous
parts: molecules, cells, individuals, or species, for example. The parts are theoretically free to combine in
nearly infinite ways. The degrees of freedom of the system are thus very large. Yet, when these parts come together, they cohere to form patterns that live in time and
space. Not all possible combinations are seen; the original degrees of freedom are compressed. But the patterns
formed are not simple or static. The elaborate shapes or
forms that emerge can undergo changes in time and
space, including multiple stable patterns, discontinuities, rapid shifts of form, and seemingly random, but
actually deterministic changes. The hallmark of such
systems is that this sequence of complexity to simplicity
to complexity emerges without prespecification; the patterns organize themselves. Our mountain stream shows
shape and form and dynamic changes over time, but
there is no program in the water molecules or in the
stream bed or in the changes of climate over geological
time that encodes the ripples and eddies.
Developing humans are likewise composed of a huge
number of dissimilar parts and processes at different
levels of organization, from the molecular components
of the cells, to the diversity of tissue types and organ
systems, to the functional defined subsystems used in
respiration, digestion, movement, cognition, and so on.
But behavior is supremely coherent and supremely complex, again showing complexity from simplicity from
complexity. The self-organization of mountain streams
is manifest; we argue here that the patterns seen in developing humans are also a product of the relations
among multiple parts.
Both mountain streams and developing humans create order from dissimilar parts because they fall into a
class called open systems, or systems that are far from
Velocity
thermodynamic equilibrium. A system is at thermodynamic equilibrium when the energy and momentum of
the system are uniformly distributed and there is no
flow from one region to another. For instance, when we
add alcohol to water or dissolve salt in water, the molecules or ions mix or react completely. Unless we heat the
system or add an electric current, the system is stable.
Nothing new can emerge; the system is closed. Systems
such as moving stream beds or biological systems evolve
and change because they are continually infused with or
transfer energy, as the potential energy of water at the
top of the mountain is converted to the kinetic energy of
the moving water. Biological systems are maintained because plants and animals absorb or ingest energy, and
this energy is used to maintain their organizational complexity. Although the second law of thermodynamics
holds that systems should run down to equilibrium, this
is only globally true. Locally, some systems draw on energy and increase their order.
Open systems, where many components are free
to relate to each other in nonlinear ways, are capable
of remarkable properties. When sufficient energy is
pumped into these systems, new ordered structures
may spontaneously appear that were not formerly apparent. What started out as an aggregation of molecules
or individual parts with no particular or privileged relations may suddenly produce patterns in space and
regularities in time. The system may behave in highly
complex, although ordered ways, shifting from one pattern to another, clocking time, resisting perturbations,
and generating elaborate structures. These emergent
organizations are totally different from the elements
that constitute the system, and the patterns cannot be
predicted solely from the characteristics of the individual elements. The behavior of open systems gives truth
to the old adage, The whole is more than the sum of
the parts.
The condensation of the degrees of freedom of a complex system and the emergence of ordered pattern allows
the system to be described with fewer variables than the
number needed to describe the behavior of the original
components. We call these macroscopic variables the
collective variables (also called order parameters). Consider human walking, a multidetermined behavior. At
the microscopic level of all the individual components
muscles, tendons, neural pathways, metabolic processes,
and so onthe system behaves in a highly complex way.
But when these parts cooperate, we can define a collective variable that describes this cooperation at a much
Velocity
272
Position
Position
Frictionless
with Friction
273
berger & Rigney, 1988), electrical activity in the olfactory bulb (Freeman, 1987), and patterns of movements
in human fetuses (Robertson, 1989).
For developmentalists, the most important dimension
of a behavioral pattern preference or attractor is its relative stability. The concept of dynamic stability is best
represented by a potential landscape. Imagine a landscape of hills and valleys, with a ball rolling among
them depicting the state of the collective variable as
shown in Figure 6.7. A ball on the top of a hill (a) has a
lot of stored potential energy; with just a very small
push, it will roll down the hill. Thus, the state of the system, represented by the ball, is very unstable. Any nudge
will dislodge it. A ball in a deep valley ( b), in contrast,
has very little potential energy and needs a large external boost to change its position. The latter is a very stable attractor; the former is called a repellor because the
system does not want to sit on the hill. A ball in a shallow well (c) is moderately stable, but will respond to a
sufficient boost by moving into the neighboring well
(while not dwelling very long on the hillock in between).
Over a long enough time, all the balls in the landscape
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 6.7 Stable and unstable attractors. The stability of
the attractor depicted as potential wells. The ball on the top of
the hill (a) has a lot of potential energy, and even a very small
push will dislodge it; it is a repellor. The ball at the bottom of
the step hill ( b) requires a large energy boost to send it over
the top. If perturbed, it will quickly return to the bottom. It is
a stable attractor. The ball in the shallow well (c) is in a less
stable situation. Relatively small perturbations will push the
ball around, although, given enough time, it will probably end
up in the deeper well because of its own stochastic noise. A behavioral system (d) may have multistability.
274
niment of complex systems. These fluctuationsthe evidence that a system is dynamically activeare the
source of new forms in behavior and development.
How Systems Change: Fluctuations
and Transitions
We have defined behavioral patterns as variously stable,
softly assembled attractor states. How do patterns
change, as they do in development or in learning? Here
we invoke the notion of nonlinearity, a hallmark of dynamic systems. A pattern in a dynamic system is coherent because of the cooperation of the components. This
coherence is maintained despite the internal fluctuations of the system and despite small external pushes on
it. Thus, because walking is a very stable attractor for
human locomotion, we can walk across the room in highheeled shoes, on varied surfaces, and even while we are
talking or chewing gum. But as the system parameters or
the external boundary conditions change, there comes a
point where the old pattern is no longer coherent and stable, and the system finds a qualitatively new pattern. For
example, we can walk up hills of various inclines, but
when the steepness of the hill reaches some critical
value, we must shift our locomotion to some type of
quadrupedal gaitclimbing on all fours. This is an example of a nonlinear phase shift or phase transition,
highly characteristic of nonequilibrium systems.
In the case of our locomotor patterns, the parameter
change was simply the steepness of the hill to climb.
Gradual changes in this parameter engendered gradual
changes in our walking until a small change in the slope
causes a large change in our pattern. In dynamic terminology, the slope changes acted as a control parameter
on our gait style. The control parameter does not really
control the system in traditional terms. Rather, it is a
parameter to which the collective behavior of the system
is sensitive and that thus moves the system through collective states. In biological systems, any number of organismic variables or relevant boundary conditions can
be relatively nonspecific, and often may be changes in
temperature, light, speed of movement, and so on.
For example, Thelen and Fisher (1982) discovered
that body weight and composition may act as a control
parameter for the well-known disappearance of the
newborn stepping response. Newborn infants commonly
make stepping movements when they are held upright,
but after a few months, the response can no longer be
elicited. Although the traditional explanation has been
inhibition of the reflex by higher brain centers, Thelen
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276
view, development can be envisioned as a series of patterns evolving and dissolving over time, and, at any point
in time, possessing particular degrees of stability. Expanding on the potential landscape representation we introduced earlier, we can depict these changes, in an
abstract way, in Figure 6.8 our depiction closely parallels
Waddingtons famous epigenetic landscape (Figure 6.2)
in both its early (1957) and later (1977) incarnations.
The first dimension in Figure 6.8 is time (Muchisky,
Gershkoff-Stowe, Cole, & Thelen, 1996). The landscape
progresses irreversibly from past to present, from background to foreground. The second dimensionthe surfaceis that of the collective variable, or a measure of
the cooperative state of the system. Each of the lines
forming the landscape represents a particular moment in
time. These lines depict the range of possibilities of the
system at that point in time. The configuration of each
line is a result of the history of the system up to that
point, plus the factors acting to parameterize the system
at the timesuch as the social and physical context, the
277
Stability
Landscape
A
Activation
Profiles
Time
Figure 6.9 Effect of repeating behavior over time. Each activation may act to prime or to lower the threshold for the next
repetition. A lowered threshold may make behavior more stable, acting as a local attractor.
278
studies of cognitive development, researchers present infants and children with tasks designed to assess what the
children really know. Thus, experiments that show infants
possible versus impossible physical events purport to reveal whether infants know that objects are solid, cannot
occupy the same space as another object, obey the laws of
gravity and momentum, and so on (e.g., Baillargeon,
Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; see also Cohen & Oakes,
1993). Or, on the basis of their performance with a series
of colored rods, children are assumed to have the ability to make transitive inferencesto infer a third relation
from two others. (If the blue rod is longer than the green
rod and the green rod is longer than the yellow rod, is the
blue rod longer than the yellow rod?) If children fail on
these tests, they do not have the knowledge of physical
properties of objects or the ability to think about two
things at the same time.
The core assumption here is that knowledge or abilities are stored things that are timeless and exist outside their here-and-now performance. An experimental
task is good only as it reflects a true reading of the
underlying mental structure. This common viewpoint
has run into serious difficulties, however, both empirically and theoretically. First, literally thousands of
studies have demonstrated that childrens knowledge or
their ability to use certain procedures is extremely fluid
and highly dependent on the entire context of the experimental situation, including the place of the experiment,
the instructions and clues, their motivation and attention, and very subtle variations in the task (Thelen &
Smith, 1994). For example, based on the colored rod
task, Piaget concluded that preschoolers could not make
transitive inferences. However, when Bryant and Trabasso (1971) drilled preschoolers in the premise information until they learned and remembered that the
blue rod is longer than the green one, the preschoolers
could make these inferences. Similarly, the failure of 6month-old infants to search for hidden objects led Piaget
to believe that infants cannot mentally represent objects
when they are out of sight (Piaget, 1954). Yet, at the
same age, infants act surprised when they watch objects
disappear from expected locations.
To explain these strange resultshow children can
know things in one situation, but not anotherdevelopmentalists have proposed that the child has the real
competence all along, but the failure lies in some performance ability. In the case of transitive inference, Bryant
and Trabasso (1971) reasoned that the failure was not in
lacking the mental structure, but in remembering the
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TABLE 6.1
ping at 2 months, but changes in these anatomical parameters may be far less important in the transition to
independent walking at 12 months. At the later age, although infants need sufficient leg mass and strength to
support their weight, the ability to maintain balance
using vision and proprioception may be the critical component. Likewise, although focused attention may determine success in early stages of learning new skills, as
skills become more automatic, the relative contribution
of attention is diminished.
Because the components themselves have a developmental history and relationships among them are continually altered, a fuller representation of our dynamic
landscape would look like Figure 6.10 That depiction
shows three landscapes layered on top of one another,
indicating that the components of the dynamic system
themselves have a dynamic. The arrows connecting the
layers show that the coupling between the components is
complex and contingent, and may change over time. This
means that the coupling is always multidirectional, and
that effects of the subsystems on one another may cascade over time. To continue our infant stepping example,
increasing leg muscle strength through activity in the
first months of life facilitates standing, crawling, and
walking. Independent locomotion induces change in spatial cognition, probably because as infants move around
they pay more attention to their spatial landmarks
(Acredolo, 1990; Bertenthal & Campos, 1990). But
changes in cognition also feed back to locomotor behavior as more skilled infants explore and exploit more and
different aspects of their spatial environment, change
their motor planning, and are able to make rapid adjustments to unexpected events.
Mood
Personality
Timescale
Seconds to minutes
Hours, days
Years
Description
Lasting interpretative-emotional
habits
Dynamic system
formalism
Attractor
Possible
neurobiological
mechanism
Orbitofrontal-corticolimbic
entrainment, motor rehearsal, and
preafference, sustainded neurohormone
Higher order
form
Intention, goal
Intentional orientation
Sense of self
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nisms at very different levels of organization. For example, by discovering that the deposition of body fat acts as
a control parameter in the disappearance of newborn
stepping, we have supplied a mechanism of change. A
physiologist might ask about the metabolic processes
that accelerate the deposition of fat in the postnatal period, and that could also constitute a process-based explanation of change. But the metabolic explanation
should not be construed as any more basic and more real
than one at any other level. Indeed, because levels and
processes are mutually interactive, it is impossible to assign one level as the ultimate causation. Descriptions of
change of many components are needed so that multilevel processes and their mutual interactions can be
fully integrated.
Importantly, explanations at every level must be consistent and ultimately reconcilable. This is especially
important when considering the neural basis of behavior.
Since the time of Myrtle McGraw (1932), there has been
a tradition in human developmental studies to seek explanation at the neural level, to look for some observed
change in behavior as caused by a preceding and determining change in the brain. For example. GoldmanRakic (1987) and others have suggested that massive
reorganization of synaptic connections in the prefrontal
cortex are the reason why 8- to 12-month-old infants
show improvements in spatial cognition, inhibition of
prepotent response tendencies, and even the onset of
language. Thatcher and others seek to explain Piagetian
stages as a result of stagelike changes in brain activity
(Thatcher, 1991, 1992).
A successful search for the mechanisms of change
during development may require integration of mecha-
282
Vision
Touch
maps are what Edelman calls the reentrant maps: Activity in the visual system is mapped to the haptic system,
and activity in the haptic system is mapped to the visual
system. Thus the two independent mappings of the stimulusthe sight and the feelprovide qualitatively different glosses on the world, and by being correlated in
real time, they educate each other. At the same time, the
visual system is activated by time-varying changes in
shading and texture and collinear movement of points on
the apple, the haptic system is activated by time-locked
changes in pressures and textures. At every step in real
time, the activities in each of these heterogeneous
processes are mapped to each other, enabling the system
in its own activity to discover higher-order regularities
that transcend particular modalities.
Experience-Dependent
Plasticity. Neuroscientists have known for nearly half a century that the surface of the cerebral cortex contains maps of the sensory
input and movements of various parts of the body
arranged in roughly topographic order. The prevailing
assumption was that these neatly ordered representations were established in early life by the maturation of
the neural anatomy and remained static thereafter.
These old truths have been discarded. In the past
decade, it has been discovered that, in monkeys, these
maps are established and maintained by function, and
the adult brain has heretofore unimagined plasticity.
Brain plasticity has now been found not just in the somatosensory cortex, but also in somatic senses in subcortical areas and in the visual, auditory, and motor
cortices in monkeys and other mammals (Kaas, 1991,
see also Stein & Meredith, 1993). These demonstrations
of adult plasticity are very important for understanding
development because (a) they demonstrate that brain
representations, even those that can be geographically
located, are dynamic processes, and ( b) they provide
clues to the very processes by which development may
take place.
The now classic experiments were performed by
Merzenich and his colleagues on New World monkeys,
which have relatively unfissured brains with a clear somatotopic representation of their sensitive hands. A
painstaking mapping of the sensation on the finger and
hand areas to electrophysiological responses on the
cortical surface revealed detailed maps of adjacent
areas that were similar, but not identical, in individual
monkeys (Jenkins, Merzenich, & Recanzone, 1990).
That these areas are plastic, not anatomically rigid,
was demonstrated in several ways. First, when the experimenters amputated digits, the maps reorganized
so that adjacent areas enlarged to fill in the finger
spaces where input was eliminated. Second, when the
Merzenich group fused two fingers of adult monkeys
together, the monkeys brains eliminated the boundaries between the digits, and the receptive fields overlapped. When the skin-fusion was surgically corrected,
distinctive digit areas returned. Enhanced function of a
single finger through training enlarged its cortical
representation, which again could be reversed when
training ceased. Finally, even when no experimental
manipulations were imposed, borders of digit representations changed somewhat over time, presumably
reflecting the immediate use history of the finger.
These and other experiments revealed, in the words of
Merzenich, Allard, and Jenkins (1990) that the
specific details of cortical representationsof the distributed, selective responses of cortical neuronsare established and are continually remodeled BY OUR
EXPERIENCES throughout life (p. 195; emphasis and
capitals in original).
We end this section with a point to an intriguing new
idea: Synesthesia in adults is a remnant of the pervasive
interconnectivity and exuberant multimodal nature of
the developing brain. Synesthesia is defined as the regular involuntary experience of external, durable, and
generic perceptions in senses not commonly associated
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284
opaquehiding the toyor transparent so that the infants could see the toy under the box. The key result is
that 9-month-old infants are better able to retrieve the
toy from the opaque than from the transparent container.
The problem with the transparent container is that infants attempt to reach for the toy directly, through the
transparent surface, rather than searching for and finding the opening.
Infants readily solve this problem, however, if
they are given experience with transparent containers.
Titzer, Thelen, and Smith (2003) gave 8-month-old babies either a set of opaque or transparent buckets to play
with at home. Parents were given no instructions other
than to put these containers in the toy box, making them
available to the infants during play. The infants were
then tested in Diamonds task when they were 9 months
old. The babies who had been given opaque containers
failed to retrieve objects from transparent ones just as
in the original Diamond study. However, infants who
played with the transparent containers sought out and
rapidly found the openings and retrieved the object from
the transparent boxes.
Why? These babies in their play with the containersin the inter-relation of seeing and touchinghad
learned to recognize the subtle visual cues that distinguish solid transparent surfaces from no surface whatsoever and had learned that surfaces with the visual
properties of transparency are solid. The haptic cues
from touching the transparent surfaces educated vision,
and vision educated reaching and touch, enabling infants
to find the openings in transparent containers. These results show how infants multimodal experiences in the
world create knowledgeabout openings, object retrieval, and transparent surfaces.
Experimental studies of human cognition suggest that
many concepts and processes may be inherently multimodal in ways that fit well with Edelmans idea of reentrance (e.g., Barsalou, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak,
2002; Gogate, Walker-Andrews, & Bahrick, 2001; Lickliter, 1994; Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae,
2003). One line of evidence for this conclusion is that
even in tasks meant to be explicitly unimodal, multiple
modalities contribute to performance. For example, visual object recognition appears to automatically activate the actions associated with the object. In one study,
adults were shown a picture of a water pitcher such as
that illustrated in Figure 6.13. The task was simple, to
press a button indicating whether the object was a
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286
287
a.
b.
c.
d.
I see a dax in
here.
288
one were building an artificial device, would you construct a device that could do this, that could know the
name applied to an object not physically present when
the name was offered?
There are a number of solutions that one might try,
including reasoning and remembering about which objects came out of which containers and about the likely
intentions of speakers when they offer names. Smith
showed, however, that young children solve this problem
in a much simpler way, exploiting the link between objects and locations and space. What children do in this
task is make use of a deep and foundationally important
regularity in the world: a real object is perceptually distinguished from others based on its unique location; it
must be a different place from any other object. The key
factor in the Baldwin task is that in the first part of the
experimental procedure, one object is presented on the
right, the other on the left. The containers are also presented the same way and the name is presented with the
experimenter looking into one bucket or at one location,
for example, on the right. The child solves this task by
linking the name to the object associated with that location. We know this is the case because we can modify
the experiment in several crucial ways. For example, one
does not need containers or hidden objects to get the result. One can merely present the target object on the
right and have children attend to and play with it there,
then present the distracter object on the left and have
children attend to and play with it there. Then, with all
objects removed, with only an empty and uniform table
surface in view, one can direct childrens attention to
the right and offer the name (dax) or to the left and offer
the name. Children consistently and reliably link the
name to the object that had been at this location.
Young childrens solution to this task is simple, a
trick in a sense, that makes very young children look
smarter than they perhaps really are. But it is a trick that
will work in many tasks. Linking objects to locations
and then directing attention to that location to link related events to that object provides an easy way to bind
objects and predicates (Ballard et al., 1997). People routinely, and apparently unconsciously, gesture with one
hand when speaking of the protagonist in a story, but
with the other hand when speaking of the antagonist. By
hand gestures and direction of attention, they link
events in a story to the characters. American Sign Language formally uses space in this way in its system of
pronouns. People also use space as a mnemonic, looking
in the direction of a past event to help remember that
event. One experimental task that shows this is the Hollywood Squares experiments of Richardson and Spivey
(2000). People were presented at different times with
four different videos, each from a distinct spatial location. Later, with no videos present, the subjects were
asked about the content of those videos. Eye tracking
cameras recorded where people looked when answering
these questions and the results showed that they systematically looked in the direction where the relevant information had been previously presented.
This is all related to the idea of deictic pointers (Ballard et al., 1997; Hurford, 2003) and is one strong example of how sensory-motor behaviorswhere one looks,
what one sees, where one actscreate coherence in our
cognition system, binding together related cognitive contents and keeping them separate from other distinct contents. In sum, one does not necessarily need much
content-relevant knowledge or inferential systems to connect one idea to another. Instead, there is a easier way; by
using the world and the bodys pointers to that world.
An emerging field pertinent to these ideas of embodiment is epigenetic robotics (Zlatev & Balkenius, 2001).
This field results from the mutual rapprochement of developmental psychology and robotics, with a focus on the
prolonged epigenetic process through which increasingly
more complex cognitive structures emerge in the system
as a result of interactions with the physical and social environment (Zlatev & Balkenius, 2001). Epigenetic robotics emphasizes three key ideas relevant to developmental
processes in biological and artificial systems:
1. The embodiment of the system
2. Its situatedness in a physical and social environment
3. A prolonged epigenetic developmental process through
which increasingly more complex cognitive structures
emerge in the system as a result of interactions with
the physical and social environment
This new interdisciplinary developmental research
purposely borrows the term epigenesis from Piaget to
development determined primarily by the interaction
between the organism and the environment, rather than
by genes. Current research within this field does not
just emphasize sensorimotor interactions but also social
processes with particular attention to the ideas of Vygotsky (1962). Current topics of study within epigenetic
robotics that should be of interest to developmental psychologists are joint attention (Bjrne & Balkenius,
2004), imitation (Schaal, 1999), and observational
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290
relevant change. In infancy, for instance, when new behaviors appear almost daily, even weekly observations
may miss the critical transitions. Later in life, transitions may be relatively prolonged and much less frequent measures are needed.
Longitudinal studies are designed to probe the stability of systems over time; however, we are really testing
systems over two related timescales. The obvious one is
change over age or developmental time. Less explicit is
the real time of the experimental task. By assessing performance over various trials and conditions within the
single experimental session, we ask about the minute-tominute dynamics. Thus, the history of the system within
the experimental session may be very important. Effects
of the number of trials and their order are also indexes
of the systems stability. Does performance change
after many repetitions, or is it stable whatever the preceding tasks?
Probing these two timescales is important because
they must be inextricably interwoven in real life: When
we observe infants and children at any point in time,
their behavior reflects both their long-term developmental history and their immediate history within the task
session. Likewise, developmental changes reflect childrens repeated everyday experiences, which themselves
modulate performance dynamics. It is useful therefore
to consider the participants intrinsic dynamics, or histories, as the background on which the experimental
tasks are imposed: The intrinsic dynamics are the preferred stability landscapes, given previous history and
organic conditions.
Identify Points of Transition. Transitions can be
qualitative shifts to new forms, such as the first word
spoken or the ability to do a transitive inference task, or
they can be quantitative changes in the collective variable such as a shift in speed or the accuracy of a task.
Transitions are critical because when a system is in transition its mechanisms of change can be identified and
manipulated. Stable systems do not change; only when
the coherence of the components is weakened are the
components able to reorganize into a more stable form.
The branch of dynamics known as catastrophe theory
is particularly concerned with sudden shifts from one
form to another. These sudden jumps are associated
with a number of catastrophe f lags or indicators of
shifts without intermediate forms. As discussed earlier, van der Maas and Molenaar (1992) have applied
catastrophe theory to Piagetian conservation tasks to
ask whether the shift from nonconservation to conservation can be explained by a catastrophe model. Although they did not find strong evidence for a number of
the flags, the flags are useful indexes of systems in
transition. The flags are:
Bimodal score distribution: Performance is either on
or off, without intermediate forms.
Inaccessibility: Related to bimodality; intermediate
states are not accessible, they are unstable and
rarely seen.
Sudden jumps: People switch from one form to another rapidly without intermediate states.
Hysteresis: The dependence of performance on the
immediately past performance. For example, responses might be different when the task is speeded
up through a range of speeds as compared to when it
is slowed down through the same range.
Divergence: The system may respond differently to
changes in different control variables.
Divergence of linear response: Nonlinearity suggests
that a small change in a control variable or perturbation can lead to a large effect.
Delayed recovery of equilibrium: From earlier terminology, a slow relaxation time after a perturbation.
Anomalous variance: Increased and unusual variability.
Identify Potential Control Parameters
The purpose of mapping the dynamics of the collective
variable is to discover when systems change. The next
step is to find out how and why they change. What are
the organic, behavioral, or environmental factors that
engender developmental shifts?
Thoughtful experimental design is needed to identify
potential control parameters. In some cases, the possible
agents of change are fairly obvious; for example, practice facilitates learning to ride a bicycle or doing arithmetic. But, in many instances of developmental change,
the critical processes and events are nonobvious and
may indeed be in components that seem at first only incidental, or so commonplace as to be overlooked. West
and Kings (1996) study of songbird learning, described
in an earlier section, is a good example: Female cowbirds subtle wing flicks are critical determinants of
male song development. Another example is Thelen and
Ulrichs (1991) description of treadmill stepping in infants, where improvements in treadmill stepping were
related to overall changes in dominant muscle tone.
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292
parents to allow their children to play with the containers for 10 minutes twice a day, with no other specific
instructions. By 9 months of age, infants in the experimental group were more facile in retrieving toys than a
control group of 10 months of age who did not have enriched experience. Enriched experience pushed the system into new forms.
In a similar vein, Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith (1997)
used training to investigate the disruption observed in
word retrieval errors, which we described earlier. These
authors reasoned that the disruption in word retrieval
with accelerated vocabulary growth was the product of
a lexicon crowded with many new and unstable additions. If the retrieval of words in a newly crowded lexicon is easily disrupted because word retrieval is
relatively unpracticed, then naming errors during this
period should decrease with practice at word retrieval.
Here, the control parameter for developmental change
was the repeated seeing and naming of objects by the
child. These experimenters provided 17-month-olds
with extra practice in producing one set of object names.
When these childrens rate of productive vocabulary
began to accelerate, the researchers observed increased
word retrieval errors for many known words but not for
the words that had received extra training. This training
study demonstrates how seeing and naming objects may
be the cause of more stable and less perturbable lexical
retrieval, and how the activity of the system itself may
be the cause of developmental change.
Equally as informative as long-term interventions for
testing control parameters are what Vygotsky (1962)
called microgenesis experiments (e.g., Kuhn & Phelps,
1982; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). The experimenters try
to push children into more mature performance by manipulating possible control parameters over a shorter
time period, sometimes within an experimental session.
For example, Thelen, Fisher, and Ridley-Johnson (1984)
tested their hypothesis that the control parameter for the
disappearance of the well-known newborn stepping
response was the rapid deposition of subcutaneous fat,
making the babys legs relatively heavy. If, they reasoned, the weight of the legs was critical for whether babies stepped or not, changing leg weights should mimic
developmental changes, and indeed it did. Decreasing
the mechanical load on the legs by submerging the legs
in water increased stepping, and adding weights decreased the response.
We emphasize again that many developmental studies
manipulate potential control parameters. Those that pro-
293
(Thelen, Corbetta, & Spencer, 1996). Overall, the infants became better reachers; they converged on relatively straight and smooth hand paths by the end of the
first year. These performance results are consistent
with previous reports showing improvement with age
(von Hofsten, 1991). But the picture revealed by this
dense longitudinal study is much richer, and more surprising, than that painted by previous work.
Most notably, the dynamics of reaching performance
over the first year were highly nonlinear (in contrast to
the seemingly linear improvement revealed by less dense
and group data). First, infants differed dramatically in
the age of the first transition (from no reaching to reaching). Whereas Nathan reached first at 12 weeks, Hannah
and Justin did not attain this milestone until 20 weeks of
age. Second, the infants showed periods of rapid change,
plateaus, and even regressions in performance. All infants were poor reachers at first. But three of the four infantsNathan, Hannah, and Gabrielalso showed an
epoch where straightness and smoothness appeared to
get worse after some improvement ( labeled as A in Figure 6.16). Finally, there was in Nathan, Justin, and Hannah a rather discontinuous shift to better, less variable
performance (indicated by T in Figure 6.16 on p. 295).
Gabriels transition to stability was more gradual, but
clearly nonlinear overall. These phase shifts to different
states were confirmed statistically.
The developmental course of reaching looks very different when the individual trajectories of change are
plotted using dense sampling. Although all four infants
converged on remarkably similar values by 1 year, they
did not get there by identical means. Can these collective
variables dynamics provide insight to the processes underlying the onset and improvement of reaching? Are
there control variables that are common to all four infants? What accounts for their individual differences?
The First Transition: The Onset of Reaching.
The longitudinal design allowed Thelen and colleagues
to pinpoint with some accuracy the first phase shift, the
appearance of successful reaching for and contacting
the offered toy. (Note that these weeks of onset were
confirmed by the more naturalist observations of these
babies.) Having identified a developmental transition,
the next step in a dynamic approach was to look for potential control parameters. Recall that we make strong
assumptions of continuity across levels and timescales;
discontinuities must arise from, and be part of, these
continuous dynamics.
294
Figure 6.15 Changes in the straightness and smoothness of reach trajectories of four infants followed longitudinally over the
first year. The collective variables are number of movement units (fewer = a smoother reach) and straightness index, where a value
of 1 = perfectly straight from start to target. Source: From The Development of Reaching during the First Year: The Role of
Movement Speed, by E. Thelen, D. Corbetta, and J. Spencer, 1996, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 22, pp. 10591076. Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permissions.
295
Figure 6.16 Average speed of reaching, speed at toy contact, and speed of nonreaching movements for the four infants in Figure 6.15. Source: From The Development of Reaching during the First Year: The Role of Movement Speed, by E. Thelen, D.
Corbetta, and J. Spencer, 1996, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 22, pp. 10591076.
Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permissions.
These authors found that the preferred states of infants motor systems in nonreaching movementstheir
individual intrinsic dynamicsprofoundly influenced
the nature of the transition to reaching. In particular,
the four infants differed in the amplitude, and especially in the vigor, of their spontaneous arm movements
in the months previous to reach onset. Two infants,
Gabriel and Nathan, had large and vigorous movements; the other two were quieter and generated fewer
296
that Gabriel and Nathan were using their muscles primarily to counteract the passive inertial forces generated by the rapid movements of their arms, while
Hannah and Justin were using their muscles to counteract gravity.
Many components are necessary for infants to begin
to reach. They must be able to see the toy (or other target) and locate it in space. And they must want to get it.
The visual and motivational aspects of reaching are
probably not the control parameters because other evidence suggests that infants can locate objects in threedimensional space rather well, if not perfectly, by age 3
months, and that they grasp and mouth objects and show
interest in them. More likely, selecting the correct muscle patterns and scaling the activation appropriately
allow infants to fashion their first reaches from their
undirected movements.
Indeed, analysis of infants muscle synergies from
electromygraphic (EMG) recordings reveal that reaching onset was associated with changes in functional muscle use. Spencer and Thelen (1995), comparing EMG
patterns in reaching and nonreaching movements before
and after reach onset, discovered that when reaching infants frequently recruited their anterior deltoid muscle,
alone and in combination with other muscles. (This
shoulder muscle raises the upper arm.) Before reaching,
infants sometimes also raised their arms, but they used
other combinations of muscles to do this. The ability to
selectively activate and control this muscle group was
associated with goal-directed movements.
Thelen and colleagues speculated that infants learn
specific functional muscle patterns through experience in
moving during the weeks and months before reaching actually emerges. Infants real-time activities of moving
sensing the feel of their limb dynamics and perceiving
the consequences of their movementsare time-locked
input to the degenerate and reentrant neural nets we described in an earlier section. As a consequence, categories of limb parameters emerge from all the possible
combinations that are appropriate to the spatial location
of the toy.
Changes in other system components may facilitate
this discovery. For example, Thelen and colleagues found
that infants did not reach until they could also stabilize
their heads in a midline position. Possibly, strength and
control of neck and head muscles are necessary before
the arm can be lifted independently. Stable head and eyes
also facilitates accurate localization of the to-be-reached
object in space.
Percentage of Reaches
12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52
Bimanual
Age (Weeks)
Unimanual
Nathan
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Percentage of Reaches
12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52
Bimanual
Age (Weeks)
Unimanual
Hannah
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Percentage of Reaches
Bimanual Coordination
Gabriel
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52
Bimanual
Age (Weeks)
Unimanual
Justin
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Percentage of Reaches
at the moment and carry with them the state of the system at that moment, which, in turn, is determined by the
systems history.
297
12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52
Bimanual
Age (Weeks)
Unimanual
298
Transition to Stable
Reach Trajectories
What Is Skill?
It is useful here to digress briefly and ask: What is involved in controlling the arm (or any body part) for successful and adaptive movement?
According to Bernstein (Bernstein, 1996), one of
the hallmarks of skilled activity is the ability to flexibly adapt movements to current and future conditions.
What constitutes skilled performance is not just a repeatable and stable pattern, but the ability to accomplish some high-level goal with rapid and graceful, but
flexible solutions that can be recruited online or in anticipation of future circumstances. Consider, for example, a skilled equestrian whose goal is to stay on the
horse and maintain a graceful posture, while leading
the horse through an intended course. Skill in this case
means making minute, online adjustments in response
to the horses movements while anticipating changes in
the terrain.
Indeed, in movement, as well as in cognitive or social activities, we can define skill as being able to
rapidly recruit appropriate strategies that meet the
changing demands of the social, task, or physical environment. For reaching, good control means being able
to efficiently reach in all directions, for moving or stationary objects, when the light is bright or dim, from
any posture, while our attention is focused or distracted, and so on. On further analysis, we can identify
the sources of potential disruption as affecting one of
three levels of control of the reach. As depicted in Figure 6.18, reaching must be stabilized first against transient mechanical perturbationsvarious forms of
external forces acting on the moving limb in a way that
would tend to push the intended trajectory off course.
(We know that adults are very good at maintaining
their movement trajectory in the face of little bumps
against the limb; e.g., Hogan, Bizzi, Mussa-Ivaldi, &
Flash, 1987.) Second, reaching must be stabilized in
the face of different task demands of the timing of the
5
6
7
8
Age (Months)
10
11
12
299
gest, the systems discovery of a stable trajectory solutionthat is, the isolation and protection of the timespace parameters of getting the felt hand to the seen toy.
Thus, by this age, reaches were no longer buffeted by
load-level dynamics. Infants could reach smoothly and in
a relatively straight manner, and they could control the
segments against their own inertial forces.
Although 8- to 12-month-old infants, under ordinary
and everyday conditions, look like pretty good reachers,
we can create conditions that reveal that they have not
yet mastered the highest level of skillthe ability to
protect the goal from the lower-level dynamics. In the
following section, we report on studies where the goal
levelthe location and the nature of the object to be
reachedwas perturbed. These experiments revealed
that, in this unstable period, infants were not flexible;
they were held captive, so to speak, by the arm pathways
they had previously produced. Their trajectory formation was good but not flexible; they were stuck in the
habits of previous reaches. We focus on classic object retrieval experimentsPiagets A-not-B error. A dynamic systems account challenges the traditional
explanations that object retrieval tasks tap into enduring
knowledge about objects. Rather, we suggest that infants
show traces of obligatory coupling between the goal and
timing levels of trajectory control.
The Task Dynamics of the A-Not-B Error
One of the primary tasks of infancy is to learn about the
properties of objects to act on them, think about them,
and, eventually, talk about them. Literally thousands of
papers have been written about the nature of object representation: When and how babies come to understand
the spatial and temporal permanence of objects. One
signature task that has been used to measure infants understanding of objects asks infants to retrieve a hidden
object. Odd patterns of search errors and dramatic
developmental changes characterize performance between the ages of 6 and 12 months. We briefly review
here our dynamic systems account of one of these search
errors, the classic Piagetian A-not-B error (Smith,
Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999; Spencer, Smith, & Thelen, 2001; Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001;
Thelen & Smith, 1994).
The A-Not-B Error. We present an example of how
we have used the dynamic concepts of multicausality
and nested time to revisit a classic issue in developmental psychology. The question originally posed by Piaget
300
(1962) was when do infants acquire the concept of object permanence? He devised a simple object-hiding
task, which has been adopted by several generations of
researchers. The experimenter hides a tantalizing toy
under a lid at location A and the infant reaches for the
toy. This A-location trial is repeated several times.
Then, there is the crucial switch trial: the experimenter
hides the object at new location, B. At this point, 8- to
10-month-old infants make a curious error. If there is a
short delay between hiding and reaching, they reach not
to where they saw the object disappear, but back to A,
where they found the object previously. This A-not-B
error is especially interesting because it is tightly linked
to a highly circumscribed developmental period: Infants
older than 12 months of age search correctly on the crucial B trials. Why this dramatic shift?
Do 12-month-old infants know something that 10month-old infants do not? Piaget suggested that only at
12 months of age do infants know that objects can exist
independently of their own actions. Others have suggested that during that 2-month period, infants shift
their representations of space, change the functioning of
their prefrontal cortices, learn to inhibit responses,
change their understanding of the task, or increase the
strength of their representations (Acredolo, 1979;
Bremner, 1985).
There is merit to all of these ideas, but none can explain the full pattern of experimental results (Smith,
Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999). This might be because
these accounts seek an explanation in terms of a single
cause when there is no single cause. We offer a formal
theory, the dynamic field model (Thelen et al., 2001) to
explain how the A-not-B error is the emergent product of
multiple causes interacting over nested timescales. The
account begins with an analysis of the looking, reaching,
and memory events that comprise the task, as illustrated
in Figure 6.19.
Task Dynamics. The dynamic field simulates the
decisions of infants to reach to location A or B by integrating, over time, the various influences on that decision. The field model is neurally inspired, of the
type described and characterized analytically by Amari
(1977), but it is abstract and not anatomically specific.
The model has a one-dimensional activation field,
defining a parameter space of potential activation states
(in this case the locations of targets A and B). Inputs
are represented by their location and their influence on
the field. Most important, points in the field provide
Specific
Task
Look
Plan
Reach
Remember
Figure 6.20 (a)The time evolution of activation in the planning field on the first A trial. The activation rises as the object
is hidden and due to self-organizing properties in the field is
sustained during the delay. ( b) The time evolution of activation in the planning field on the first B trial. There is heightened activation at A prior to the hiding event due to memory
for prior reaches. As the object is hidden at B, activation rises
at B, but as this transient event ends, due to the memory properties of the field, this activation is pulled in the direction of
the longer-term memories, toward A.
301
302
Figure 6.21
ics systems model), Munakata (1998) simulates development by stronger self-sustaining memories for the
hiding event.
If self-sustaining memories drive the successes of
older children, then we must ask where they come from.
What are infants doing every day that improves their location memory? One possibility is their self-locomotion.
Crawling appears to improve the spatial memories of infants (Bertenthal & Campos, 1990). But there are also
other possibilities. Their fine motor control improves
markedly during the last part of an infants first year.
Perhaps more experience perceiving objects and manipulating them improves the flexibility of infants to notice
differences in the targets or to be less tied to their previous actions. Simply practicing the A-not-B task repeatedly improves performance (Diamond, 1990a). In this
way, real-time activity in the task is unified with developmental time. Developmental change evolves from the
real-time activities of the infant.
Implications of a Dynamic Approach. A dynamic
systems theory of development helps to resolve an apparent theoretical contradiction. At a very global level,
the constraints imposed by our biological heritage and
by the similarities in human environments seem to result
in similar developmental outcomes. All intact human infants learn to walk, progress from making the A-not-B
303
We think to act. Thus, knowing may begin as and always be an inherently sensorimotor act. Our dynamic systems account thus stands on common ground with Piaget
in the origins of thought in sensorimotor activity but also
on common ground with Johnson (1987); Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991); Churchland (1986); and Edelman
(1987) in the newer ideas of Barsalou (2005) and Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) that cognition emerges in the
recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be
perceptually guided.
Dynamic Systems and Other Theories of Development. How different is dynamical systems as a theory
of development from other approaches? Thelen and
Bates (2003) recently considered this question and their
conclusions are summarized in Table 6.2. They specifically considered the following theoretical frameworks:
1. Chomskys (1968, 1975, 1988) nativist theory of language development (which has inspired nativist theories in other domains as wellfor a discussion, see
Fodor, 1983)
2. E. J. Gibsons (1969) theory of perception and perceptual development (which is empiricist in emphasis)
3. Vygotskys (1978) theory of cognitive development
in a social framework (a theory that is strongly empiricist in flavor, though it is certainly a complex and
interesting example of an empiricist approach)
4. Piagets (1952, 1970) constructivist theory of cognitive development (a direct predecessor to todays
emergentist approach)
5. Connectionism as laid out in Elman et al. (1996)
6. Dynamic systems as laid out in Thelen and Smith (1994)
304
TABLE 6.2
Theory
Chomsky
Gibson
Vygotsky
Emphasized mechanism of
change
Maturation
Perceptual
learning
Internalization
Experience
No
Yes
External information
No
Social
No
Biological constraints
Brain development
Piaget
Thelen /Smith
Elman / Bates
Consruction
Self-organization
Emergence/ learned
connections
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Embodiment
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Mental representations
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No (not in
traditional sense)
Yes
Dynamical systems
No
No (yes)
No
No
Yes
Yes
Formal models/simulations
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Adapted from Connectionism and Dynamic Systems: Are They Really Different? by E. Thelen and E. Bates, 2003, Developmental Science, 6,
pp. 378391.
305
306
SUMMARY
The point of Thelen and Batess exercise was to situate
dynamic systems in the larger landscape of developmental theories. As should be evident, dynamic systems is a powerful framework in which many different
ideasfrom triggers to associative learning to embodiment to socializationmay be realized. Dynamic systems is not so much in opposition to these other
perspectives but a new way of unifying the many
threads that comprise developmental change. What dynamic systems adds to this current landscape is both an
emphasis on understanding development as a complex
system of nested dynamics, and a complex system of
self-organizing interactions at many levels of analysis,
including those between the brain and the body, and
between the body and world.
307
308
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CHAPTER 7
Human activity is both organized and variable, dynamically changing in principled ways. Children and adults
are flexible and inventive in their action and thought,
adapting old ideas to new situations and inventing concepts, formulating plans, and constructing hypotheses
while participating in a wide variety of cultural practices. Few developmentalists today would disagree, as, for
half a century, psychologists have been accumulating a
314
structure. Tools from dynamic systems analysis provide ways of embracing the variability to find the order
in it.
With this chapter, we present a framework for conceptualizing psychological structure in dynamic systems constructed by human agents. We show how
this model describes and explains patterns of developmental variability in terms of the structures human beings build. The chapter begins with an introductory
overview of dynamic structuralism as a general approach to development, elaborating a theoretical model
of psychological structure as the dynamic organization
of self-constructed, socially embedded skills and activities (actions and thoughts). We contrast this position with traditional static views of psychological
structure, which dominate scientific dialogue in what
amounts to a modern synthesis of traditionally opposed
viewpoints of nativism and empiricism. These static
views derive from reductionist scientific theory inherited from the Cartesian tradition in philosophy, which
leads to systematic misunderstanding of the nature of
psychological structure and blatant failures to explain
the extent of developmental variability.
The dynamic framework and research tools specifically crafted for analyzing development and learning
provide a research methodology for the study of psychological structures including both their variability and
the order in the variation. These concepts and tools
apply to both long-term development and short-term microdevelopmental variations in the building of dynamic
structures, providing powerful methods for testing dynamic hypotheses about variation, change, and stability.
Broad in scope and applicability, the dynamic structural
model and methodology elucidate relations between
cognitive, social, emotional, and neurological developmentwhich all work together in the activities of
human beings in all their rich complexity.
DYNAMIC STRUCTURALISM
One reason psychological structure has so often been
treated as static is that theorists have confounded structure with form. Structure refers to the system of relations
(Piaget, 1970) by which complex entities such as biological organisms and psychological activities are organized.
There are systematic relations, for instance, between the
nervous system and the cardiovascular system such that
each supports and responds to the other. The relations
between these systems are in a constant balance or equi-
Dynamic Structuralism
librium, which can only be maintained by constant activity on the part of each subsystem. Thus, systems of relationsstructuresare necessarily dynamic.
Form is an abstraction from structurea fixed pattern that can be detected in a dynamic structure. An orange has cellular and tissue-level structure, which lead
to its cohesion in a spherical shape. The structure of the
orange is dynamic, emerging developmentally, maintaining a dynamic equilibrium for a time, and then decaying.
The concept of sphere, on the other hand, is an abstract
form that we apply to describe one characteristic of the
dynamic structure: the shape it produces. Beyond the orange, the concept of sphere is an ideal form that applies
across myriad realities. The fact that this formal concept is unchanging across many situations is what makes
it useful in describing similarities in many different objects such as balls, plums, or planets.
A structure/form problem arises when an abstraction used to describe reality is confounded with the reality described. People commonly expect patterns of
phenomena in the world to conform to their underlying
abstractions, instead of determining which patterns fit
an actual object or experience. In personality and social relations, people commonly expect others to fit the
stereotype of, for example, a shy, introverted person or
a mother (Greenwald et al., 2002). Similarly, in science, researchers who focus on the sphere form may be
surprised that baseballs, basketballs, and soccer balls
are so different from one another, and researchers who
focus on innate knowledge may be surprised to find
that a 3-year-old really does not understand the numbers 1, 2, and 3 even though an infant can distinguish
arrays of 1, 2, and 3 dots (Spelke, in press). For the
sphere, the logical fallacy is obvious: The spherical
shape is an abstraction of a common pattern across different objects, not an independently existing form that
somehow dictates what the objects should be like. The
same fallacy applies to the stereotypes and the nativist
explanation of number.
This form fallacy has frequently led to perplexity
among scientists and educators who expect patterns of
thought and action to conform to an independently existing form such as stage, cognitive competence, or core
knowledge. Scholars have been puzzled when a child
reaches a certain stage or competence for one task or situation and he or she does not evidence the same ability
in other tasks or situations, as if an underlying abstract
logic could determine an individuals performance in
the real world (Piaget, 1985). The attempt to preserve
315
formal conceptions of structure in the face of ever growing evidence of variability in cognitive performance has
led developmental theorists into pointless arguments
over, for example, which of many varying performances
represent an individuals real logical ability, or at
what age children really acquire a concept like object
permanence. We demonstrate later how the confounding
of form with structure has led to an explanatory crisis in
developmental science with ever more tortured attempts
to explain the pervasive evidence of variability in static
conceptions of structure as form. (We also see hopeful
signs that the field is shifting to deal more centrally
with the dynamics of variation.)
Dynamic structuralism offers an alternative to static
conceptions of structure, starting with the recognition
of the complexity inherent in human psychological development and the central role of the person in constructing dynamic systems of action and thought.
Instead of trying to eliminate or get beyond the complexity of relations among systems, dynamic structuralism uses the tools of contemporary developmental
science to analyze patterns in the complexityhow the
constructive activity of human agents leads to new relations among systems of action and thought. The analysis
of the dynamic structures of human behavior provides a
way of simplifying without discarding complexity, identifying the essential relations among systems, and explaining activities and developmental pathways in terms
of those essential system relations. Dynamic structuralism thus differs from the classic structuralism of Piaget
(1983), Chomsky (1995), and others, which isolates
structure from the variability of mental dynamics, treats
it as static, and attempts to explain development in
terms of the static forms.
Variability in the Middle of Things: An
Example of Representing Social Interactions
Focusing on the pervasive variability of human activity,
dynamic structuralism analyzes the patterns of stability
and order in diverse patterns of activity in the variation
(Bidell & Fischer, 1992; Fischer, Yan, & Stewart, 2003;
Siegler, Chapter 11, this Handbook, Volume 2; Thelen &
Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume; van
Geert, 1998). As in the study of ecology, the analysis
begins in medias res, in the middle of things. Starting in
the middle of things means that peoples activities are
embodied, contextualized, and socially situatedunderstood in their ecology (Bronfenbrenner & Morris,
316
Dynamic Structuralism
Highest Step/Level
Rp3
5
4
3
Rp2
High
Support
High
Support
Low Support
Low Support
2
1
0
Rp1
Best Story
Free Play
Elicited Imitation
Free Play
Best Story
Prompt
Condition
Figure 7.1 Variation in competence for stories as a function
of social-contextual support. In the high-support assessments
the interviewer either modeled a story to a child (Elicited Imitation) or described the gist of a story as well as some content
cues (Prompt), and then the child acted out or told a similar
story. In the low-support assessments the interviewer provided
no such support but either asked for the best story the child
could produce (Best Story) or let the child make up a number
of stories in free play with the most complex story determining
the childs competence for this context (Free Play). Children
had performed similar stories several times before the assessments graphed here. The y-axis indicates steps in the assessed
developmental sequence, as well as skill levels (Rp1 to Rp3),
which will be explained later. Sources: From The Dynamics
of Competence: How Context Contributes Directly to Skill
(pp. 93117), by K. W. Fischer, D. H. Bullock, E. J. Rotenberg,
and P. Raya, in Development in Context: Acting and Thinking
in Specific EnvironmentsThe Jean Piaget Symposium Series,
R. H. Wozniak & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), 1993, Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum; and The Effects of Development, Self-Instruction,
and Environmental Structure on Understanding Social Interactions, by E. J. Rotenberg, 1988, Dissertation Abstracts International, 49(11), p. 5044B.
317
318
Dynamic Structuralism
Father
Mother
Development
319
Figure 7.2
320
1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977). The concept of strategy has a long history of illuminating variations in the
organization of problem-solving activity (Bruner,
Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989;
Siegler, Chapter 11, this Handbook, Volume 2). Concepts such as apprenticeship (Rogoff, 1990), environmental niche (Gauvain, 1995), and setting (Whiting &
Edwards, 1988) facilitate analysis of the dynamic social
organization of activities across contexts.
A construct that we find especially useful for facilitating a dynamic approach to psychological structure is
dynamic skill; it provides a useful way of integrating
many of the necessary characteristics of dynamic psychological structure into a single, familiar idea (Fischer,
1980b; Fischer & Ayoub, 1994; Fischer, Bullock, et al.,
1993). This construct is based on concepts that were
central to the cognitive revolution of the late 1950s and
1960s (Bruner, 1973; Gardner, 1985), the ecological
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s (Bronfenbrenner &
Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume; Gibson,
1979), and the emotive revolution of the 1980s and
1990s (Campos, Barrett, Lamb, Goldsmith, & Stenberg,
1983; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). These revolutions
have emphasized, for example, the importance of goals,
self-regulation, organism-environment interaction, bias
or constraint, and the social foundations of activity.
Most importantly, Piaget (1970) and Vygotsky (1978)
insisted on activity as the basis of cognitive structures,
defined as systems of relations among activities.
In the following discussion, we explicate the construct of dynamic skill, using it to articulate essential
characteristics of psychological structures. We show
how the dynamic analysis of structure can both predict
and explain specific patterns of developmental variability, focusing on three key types of variability frequently
observed in developmental research: (1) sequence, (2)
synchrony, and (3) range. In subsequent sections, we
show how these dynamic characteristics differ from
those in static views of structure, and we describe key
methodology for studying the dynamics of change, microdevelopment in learning and problem solving, development of emotion, and the role of brain functioning in
development of cognition and emotion.
Psychological Structure as Dynamic Skill
In ordinary English usage, the term skill both denotes and connotes essential characteristics of the dynamic organization of human activities (Bruner, 1973;
Welford, 1968). Skill is the capacity to act in an organ-
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system in the human body is composed of multiple subsystems whose boundaries defy definition. The cardiovascular system, for example, participates in the
functioning of every organ system, because every organ
depends on receiving oxygenated blood. At the same
time, the cardiovascular system includes components
from the nervous system, the muscular system, and so
forth, so that these other systems in turn participate in
the circulatory system. It makes little sense to think of
any of these systems as functioning outside the context
of the other systems: Living systems die when cut off
from the other systems with which they interparticipate.
For living systems, conceptions of structure must reflect
the interparticipation of one system in another.
Systems of activities are central parts of living systems, especially in complex systems such as human beings. Activities organize into skills, which have many
interparticipating components. When Susan creates a
story of social reciprocity between the positive actions
of the doll Susan and her doll father, the actions of each
character affect each other intimately and reciprocallythey participate in each other. Skills normally
involve this interparticipation of components.
Context Specificity and Culture
Skills are context-specific and culturally defined. Real
mental and physical activities are organized to perform
specific functions in particular settings. The precise
way a given skill is organizedits structureis essential to its proper functioning, as well as specific to that
skill at any moment. Good basketball players do not automatically make good baseball players; good storytellers in one culture do not automatically have their
stories understood and appreciated in other cultures.
The context specificity of skills is related to the characteristics of integration and interparticipation because
people build skills to participate with other people
directly in specific contexts for particular sociocultural
systems. In turn, people internalize (Cole, 1996;
Wertsch, 1979) or appropriate (Rogoff, 2003) the skills
through the process of building them by participating in
these contexts; and as a result, the skills take on cultural
patterning. Similarly, component systems such as memory, perception, emotion, and even physiological regulation all participate in the culturally patterned skills.
The context specificity of skills thus implies more than
simply a fit with an environment. Even systems like perception or memory, which are often thought of as being
isolated from sociocultural systems, are linked to them
Tiers
Levels
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Age of Emergence
Abstractions
2325 years
Ab4. Principles
1820 years
Ab3. Systems
1416 years
Ab2. Mappings
Representations
Rp4/Ab1. Single Abstractions 1012 years
Rp3. Systems
67 years
Rp2. Mappings
34 years
Actions
Sm4/Rp1. Single Representations
2 years
1113 months
Sm3. Systems
78 months
Sm2. Mappings
34 months
Sm1. Single Actions
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A
F
Level 3: Systems
Development
Level 2: Mappings
A
E
B
E
A
E
>
B
E
dence for further levels marked by clusters of discontinuities beyond single principles (Fischer et al., 2003).
Contrary to static approaches to development and
learning, the levels on the scale do not indicate the use
of one psychological structure or module across domains, like one of Piagets (1985) generalized logical
structures or Chomsky and Fodors (1983) modules.
People do not use the same structure across situations,
but they build skills along the same scale. The processes
of growth and variation produce skills that fit a common
scale across tasks and domains, but the skills used differ, being dynamically adapted to context, emotional
state, and goal. The complexity of separate activities
varies in similar ways for different contexts and states.
Think of temperature, for which physicists discovered a
common scale over the last several hundred years. The
same scale can be used to measure the temperature in
the sun, Antarctica, a refrigerator or furnace in New
York, a persons mouth, or the bottom of the ocean.
Thermometers measure with a common scale across radically different situations and methods, even with great
differences in the ways that heat and cold occur.
In this way, skills are organized in multilevel hierarchies that follow the scale in Figures 7.3 and 7.4. People
construct skills through a process of coordination, as
when 5-year-old Susan built stories about emotionally
loaded social interactions that coordinated multiple actions into social categories and then coordinated social
categories into reciprocal activities. Susan used a skill
hierarchy in which individual pretend actions (Sm3 systems of actions) were embedded in social categories
(Rp1 single representations), which were in turn embedded in socially reciprocal activities (Rp2 representational mappings). Existing component skills, controlling
activities in specific contexts, were intercoordinated to
create new skills that controlled a more differentiated
and integrated range of activities. In the newly integrated skills, the component skills still functioned as
subsystems in the new skill as a whole. They also could
still be used alone, as when Susan dropped back to simpler actions with less contextual support or with emotional upset. We use representations of positive and
negative social interactions to ground the explanation of
dynamic skills and to illustrate how the skills in the diagrams both develop in the long term (macrodevelopment or ontogenesis) and vary from moment to moment
(microdevelopment).
The skill hierarchy in the scale embodies the principles
of self-organization and interparticipation of dynamic
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326
NICE
ME
3 YOUNICE
ME
NICE
>
MEAN
ME
NICE
4 YOUNICE
MEAN
YOU
ME
NICE
YOU
NICE
Rp2
MEAN
ME
Rp1
ME
MEAN
ME
MEAN
ME
YOU
>
NICE
YOU
MEAN
MEAN
MEAN
ME
ME
NICE
MEAN
YOU 1
NICE
YOU 1
YOU 2
MEAN
NICE
NICE
YOU 2
MEAN
ME
MEAN
YOU 1
NICE
Rp3
YOU
NICE 1
NICE 2
ME
NICE 1
NICE 2
YOU
NICE
MEAN
YOU 2
MEAN
ME
NICE
MEAN
YOU
MEAN 1
MEAN 2
ME
MEAN 1
MEAN 2
Figure 7.5 Developmental web for nice and mean social interactions. The numbers to the left of each set of brackets indicate
the step in complexity ordering of the skill structures. The words inside each set of brackets indicate a skill structure. The left
column designates the first step at each skill level.
NICE
ME
NICE
(1)
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328
NICE
MEAN
ME
NICE
ME
YOU
NICE
NICE
ME
>
NICE
YOU
YOU
MEAN
MEAN
ME
NICE
YOU 1
NICE
YOU 2
ME
ME
NICE
NICE
MEAN
3
4
YOU
NICE
ME
NICE
>
YOU
YOU
ME
MEAN
MEAN
ME
MEAN
MEAN
ME
MEAN
YOU 1
MEAN
NICE
YOU 2
MEAN
ME
MEAN
YOU 1
NICE
YOU 2
MEAN
Figure 7.6 Developmental web biased toward nice interactions. This web includes only the first two-thirds of the skills from
the web in Figure 7.5.
predict patterns of variability that have eluded traditional static accounts of psychological structure. In this
section, we show how three basic forms of systematic
developmental variability(1) complexity level, (2) sequence, and (3) synchronycan each be explained by
the characteristics of dynamic skills. In a subsequent
section, we consider issues of methodology and measurement used in the precise description and prediction
of variability in development.
Nice
Nice and Mean
Mean
4
Rp2
Rp1
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1.5
2.5
Age in Years
3.5
Figure 7.7 Growth functions showing a bias toward nice interactions. Skill Step refers to the complexity ordering in
Figure 7.5. Level refers to the level of hierarchical complexity in Figure 7.3.
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Skill Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Rp1
Performance Level
Social Support
Rp2
Functional level
None
Rp3
Optimal level
Ab1
Scaffolded level
Note: Functional and optimal levels are upper limits on performance, which show stability for a task. Scaffolded level involves a range of performance indicated by the
vertical line on the left, with the specific step depending on the nature of the scaffolding in combination with the 7-year-olds skill.
Ab3
Abstract Mappings
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Degree of Support
Automatic
Ab2
Single Abstractions
Optimal Level
Ab1
Rp3
Optimal Level
Functional Level
0
0
10
11
12
13
Development
Functional Level
Grade
Figure 7.8 Range of developmental levels for Selfin-Relationships Interview in Korean adolescents.
Scaffolded Level
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sequences, but this variability is neither random nor absolute. The number and order of steps in developmental
sequences vary as a function of factors like learning
history, cultural background, content domain, context,
coparticipants, and emotional state. In addition, the variability in steps appears to be contingent on the level of
analysis at which the sequence is examined (Dawson &
Gabrielian, 2003; Fischer, 1980b; Fischer et al., 2003).
Developmental sequences tend to appear mainly at
two levels of analysis: (1) large-scale, broad sequences
covering long times between steps, relatively independent of domain, and (2) small-scale, detailed sequences
found within particular domains. Large-scale sequences
appear to be relatively invariant. Children do not, for instance, exhibit concrete operational performances
across a wide range of tasks, and then years later begin
to exhibit preoperational performance on related tasks.
On the other hand, small-scale sequences have often
been found to vary dramatically (Ayoub & Fischer, in
press; Wohlwill & Lowe, 1962).
Typically, variation in small-scale sequences is associated with variation in task, context, emotion, coparticipant, or assessment condition. For instance, Kofsky
(1966) constructed an eleven-step developmental sequence for classification of objects based on Inhelder
and Piagets (1964) concrete-operational thinking and
used scalogram analysis to rigorously test the sequence.
Her predicted sequence followed a logical progression,
but it drew on an assortment of different tasks and materials to evaluate each step. The results showed weak
scalability with several mini-sequences.
Other sources of variation in small-scale sequences
include cultural background, learning history, learning
style, and emotion. Price-Williams, Gordon, and
Ramirez (1969), for instance, examined the order of acquisition of conservation of number and substance in
two Mexican villages. The villages were comparable in
most ways except that in one village the children participated in pottery making from an early age. Children of
the pottery-making families tended to acquire conservation of substance (tested with clay) before conservation
of number, while nonpottery-making children showed
the opposite tendency.
Affective state can also powerfully affect developmental sequences (Ayoub & Fischer, in press; Fischer &
Ayoub, 1994). For example, inhibited and outgoing children show different sequences in representing positive
and negative social interactions, especially those involving the self. Inhibited children often show the positive
Word Definition
Letter
Identification
Reading
Recognition
Rhyme
Production
Letter
Identification
Reading
Recognition
Reading
Recognition
Rhyme
Recognition
Letter
Identification
Rhyme
Recognition
Reading
Production
Reading
Production
(a)
Word Definition
Word Definition
Rhyme
Recognition
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Rhyme
Production
(b)
Reading
Production
Rhyme
Production
(c)
Figure 7.10 Developmental pathways of good and poor readers. The normative pathway for most good readers is shown in (a:
Pathway 1: Normative developmental pathway for reading single words), whereas the two less integrated pathways followed by
poor readers are shown in ( b: Pathway 2: Independence of reading and rhyming), and (c: Pathway 3: Independence of reading,
letter identification, and rhyming). From Growth Cycles of Mind and Brain: Analyzing Developmental Pathways of Learning
Disorders, by K. W., Fischer, L. T. Rose, and S. P. Rose, in Mind, Brain, and Education in Reading Disorders, K. W. Fischer,
J. H. Bernstein, & M. H. Immordino-Yang (Eds.), in press, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press; From Learning
to Read Words: Individual Differences in Developmental Sequences, by C. C. Knight and K. W. Fischer, 1992, Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 13, pp. 377404.
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as-form paradigm. In the subsequent section, we describe a set of methods for moving beyond these approaches to do research that deals with variability more
powerfully within a dynamic structural framework, including an outline of how to turn theories about developmental process into specific mathematical models that
can be tested against growth patterns of individual children and adults.
The Cartesian Dualist Framework
The debate over nature-versus-nurture explanations of
the origin of knowledge assumes the Cartesian framework, which is accepted by both sidesnature/nativist
and nurture/empiricist. Grounded in the dualism of
mind and world, the two sides necessarily imply one
another. The nativist-rationalist tradition and the
empiricist-learning tradition are two sides of the same
Cartesian coin. The nativist branch of the Cartesian
framework explains the origin of psychological structure as preformed innate structures such as concepts.
The empiricist branch explains it as experience stamping its shape on the natural mind. Psychological structure, conceived as innate form, implies some outside
input to be stored and manipulated. Environmental information conceived as preexisting packets of knowledge requires some sort of preexisting receptacle or
organizing structure in the mind to receive, contain,
and organize them. In this framework, only two explanations for the origin of psychological structure seem
possiblenature or nurtureand they become the
basis for the two branches of Cartesian epistemology.
The Cartesian tradition in philosophy and science
brings with it the methodologies of reduction and reification. These methods, which have been profitably employed in many areas of science, result in systematic
misconceptions when applied to dynamic processes like
development of action, thought, and emotion. The dynamic organization of human mental activity is abstracted from the living systems of which it is a property
and treated as a separately existing thing, giving birth
to the conception of static structure. The reification of
psychological structure as a separately existing static
form leads scientists down false paths in trying to understand the origins and development of psychological
organization. Instead of seeking to understand the constructive, self-organizing processes by which children
build new relations among contextually embedded mental activities, theorists have been led into the futile
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nature-nurture debate about whether statically conceived psychological structure is somehow insinuated in
the genome or is built up through analysis of perceptualmotor experience. These reductionist assumptions support static views of structure and limit the explanatory
power of developmental theories.
The Cartesian method, emerging in the seventeenth
century philosophy of Ren Descartes (1960) and others, gave science a powerful analytical tool to sort out
the complexity of the world and focus on one aspect at a
time for study. This tool, known as Cartesian reductionism, derives simplicity out of complexity by isolating
one aspect of a process from its relations with other aspects of the process or from related processes, to be
studied independently. Descartes tried to extract mind
from nature by creating a dualism in which a separately
existing mental structure receives impressions from
the outside world through the sensory apparatus.
Descartess famous dissection of the cows eye, revealing the image projected on the retina, supported his
view that innate structures are fed with sensory images
from the environment. Similarly, in his logical empiricism the philosopher John Locke (1794) asserted that
some preexisting logical structure is required to explain
how environmental input leads to higher order knowledge. Locke saw that the simple mechanism of association of sensory impressions could not account for
higher-order knowledge involving induction, deduction,
and generalization. Like Descartes, Lockes account of
knowledge acquisition involved a dualist conception in
which a preexisting psychological structure receives and
processes sensory input from the outside.
Although Cartesian reductionism has been and will
continue to be an indispensable tool of scientific analysis, its strengththe isolation of phenomena from complex relationsis also its weakness (Wilson, 1998).
When Cartesian reductionism is used exclusively as an
analytic method, it eliminates an essential characteristic that needs to be understoodthe interrelations of
psychological systems both internally among component
processes and externally with other systems. Understanding relations is a requisite for understanding
change and variation in developmental or historical phenomena. In the real world, it is the interrelations among
systems and processes that effect movement and
change. The gravitational relation between the earth
and the moon is key to sustaining the moons orbit,
which generates the changing cycles of the moon seen
on earth. To ignore the gravitational relation between
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mind from environmental context, a concomitant reification of the mind as a container or mechanistic
processor, and a dualist separation of mental structure
from mental content.
Information processing theories, in the empiricist
tradition, have focused on the input and storage of information, building the analysis of cognitive structure on a
model of information flow in a computer. These theories came late to the problem of where cognitive structures come from and how they change over time. A few
information processing theories have posited qualitative
hierarchies of cognitive structures (Anderson et al.,
2004; Klahr & Wallace, 1976; Pascual-Leone, 1970),
but they have provided only sketchy accounts of the origins of these structures and the mechanisms of transition from one structure to another.
Despite years of vociferous debate with empiricists,
nativists share this set of dualist assumptions but privilege them in different ways (Fischer & Bullock, 1984;
Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). Nativists and the closely associated rationalists also start
from an acceptance of mind-environment, mind-body,
and thought-action dualisms. The difference with empiricists is that the structure of the mind is primary instead of the structure of the environment. Nativists
accept the dualism of inner structure and outer sensory
information, but they simply assign them different roles.
Instead of filling up preexisting mental containers with
experience, the nativist role for sensory information is
to provide inputs, which trigger the emergence or activation of preexisting psychological structures such as the
syntax of language or the properties of objects. The dualist separation of psychological structure from its contextual relations with human activity has led to the
reification of psychological structure and the inevitable
conclusion that the structure must be innate. The outside
world provides grist for the cognitive mill, or sometimes
a triggering stimulus to kick off a new level of maturation, but plays a minimal role in the development of the
psychological structures themselves.
When a dynamic system is approached statically, the
complex relations by which it is organized and by which
it develops are lost. The inescapable fact that it is organized is abstracted and reified as static form. When psychological structure is conceived as static form, with no
activity and no inter-systemic relations to explain its
origin and development, it appears to have an existence
of its own, separate from the reality from which it is abstracted. Therefore, psychological structure must be innate, according to this argument.
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with their world and each other. For this reason, the
Cartesian synthesis is not any more successful in explaining the broad data of variability in cognitive development. Linking static conceptions of psychological
structure to mechanistic information processing models
does not provide us with better explanations for variability in cognitive performance than either tradition did on
its own. Understanding why Cartesian models
whether empiricist, nativist, or a combination of the
twohave trouble explaining variability requires considering in more depth the static conceptions of psychological structure inherent in this tradition and the
explanatory limitations they carry with them. This
analysis lays the foundation for understanding how dynamic structuralism provides a path to analyzing the dynamics of structure in development starting from
activities in context.
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other animals. The structure is a property of the selforganizing systems that create itthe dynamic organization exhibited by self-organizing systems of mental
and physical activity, not a free-floating ghost of competence or logic that dictates behavior to its human machine. Before we explicate concepts and methods of
dynamic structure, however, we need to ground our argument with analysis of key problems with the static
conceptions of structure that pervade developmental
and psychological science.
The Stage Debate and the Discovery of
Variability in Cognitive Development
The strength of the stage structure concept, as with all
structure-as-form models, is its account of stability in
development. Skills exhibit patterns of stability both in
the ways they function and the ways they develop. What
would account for such stable patterns in the functioning
and development of cognition? Piagets (1983, 1985)
conception of formal logical stages addressed this question with what seemed to be a powerful and reasonable
explanation: Individuals construct logical structures
that preserve the organization of their interpretive or behavioral activities to be applied again at later times or in
different situations. The existence of these structures
accounts for the ability to apply the same concept or
skill across many situations. Similarly, the emergence of
concepts in specific sequences is accounted for by the
fact that the logical structures underlying the concepts
are constructed gradually, so that a partially complete
logic would give rise to one concept (e.g., one-to-one
correspondence) and the later completion of the logical
structure would give rise to a more extensive and logically complete concept (e.g., conservation of number).
Piagetian stage theory places all human cognitive activities into a sequence of abstract logical forms, but it has
proved incapable of explaining the vast array of deviations from stage predictions (Bidell & Fischer, 1992;
Flavell, 1971; Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983).
However, the strength of the stage structure concept
was also its greatest weakness: Whereas universal logical
structures accounted elegantly for stability, they offered
hardly any explanation for variability in the functioning
and development of cognition. Because the stage concept
equated psychological structure (the organization of dynamic mental activity) with static form (formal logic), it
provided no model of the real psychological mechanisms
that might lead to variability and change in development.
The idea of a fixed logical structure underlying all of a
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childs conceptions at a given stage seems to explain observed consistencies in the form of childrens thinking,
but it predicts much, much more consistency than children show, and it has proven incapable of explaining departures from the predicted consistency.
Departures from the consistency predicted by stage
theory proved to be more the norm than the exception as
proliferating replication studies introduced a myriad of
variations on Piagets original tasks and procedures. On
the one hand, opponents of Piagets theory, doubting the
reality or usefulness of formal stage structures, focused
their research on identifying conditions in which stage
theory predictions failed. In contrast, supporters of
Piagets constructivist view tried to validate the purported products of developmentstage sequences, timing of cognitive achievements, and universality. These
researchers focused a great deal of attention on demonstrating conditions in which stage predictions were
empirically supported. Today, many researchers still
continue along these independent paths, mostly ignoring
or dismissing findings of people from the other camp.
The outcome of this protracted and often heated empirical debate has been the discovery of remarkable variability in every aspect of cognitive development studied.
As researchers implemented variations in the nature of
task materials, complexity of tasks, procedures, degree
of modeling, degree of training, and methods of scoring
across a multitude of replication studies, a consistent
pattern of variation emerged (Bidell & Fischer, 1992;
Case, 1991b; Fischer, 1980b; Halford, 1989; Loureno
& Machado, 1996). To the extent that studies closely approximated the assessment conditions used by Piaget,
the findings were similar to those he had reported. When
tasks and procedures varied greatly from Piagets, the
findings also varied greatly within certain limits.
A classic example of this pattern of variation is found
in research on number conservation. In Piagets theory,
number conservation (the ability to conceptually maintain
the equality of two sets even when one set is transformed
to look much larger than the other) was seen as a product
of an underlying stage of concrete operational logic. In the
original number conservation studies, Piaget and
Szeminska (1952) had used sets of 8 or 10 objects each
and had identified 6 to 7 years as the typical age of acquisition for this concept. In one group of replication studies,
Gelman (1972) showed that the age of acquisition for
number conservation could be pushed downward from Piagets norms if the task complexity was simplified by (a)
reducing the size of the sets children had to compare and
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A well-known case is Baillargeons research on object permanence in young infants (Baillargeon, 1987,
1999). To appreciate the problems with focusing on
only selective aspects of variability, it is useful to place
this study in the context of Piagets (1954) original
findings and interpretations regarding infant object permanence. Piaget described a six-stage sequence in infants construction of object permanence, which
subsequent research confirmed with some revision and
clarification (McCall, Eichorn, & Hogarty, 1977; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1987).
Piaget offered a constructivist interpretation of his
observations: a simple activity-based mechanism to
explain transitions from one stage to another. By coordinating early sensorimotor activities on objects to
form new, more comprehensive action systems, infants
gradually construct more inclusive understandings of
what they can do with objects and therefore how objects can behave. For instance, by coordinating the
sensorimotor actions for looking at and grasping objects at Stage 2, infants of about 5 to 6 months of age
move to a new Stage 3 structure for dealing with objectsvisually guided reaching, in which they simultaneously hold and observe an object. Piaget described
an especially important transition at stage 4, when infants of about 8 months coordinate different visually
guided reaching skills into a system for searching out
objects that have been displaced or hidden. For instance, infants coordinate two skills (what Piaget
called schemes): reaching for a rattle to grasp it, and
reaching for a cloth that is covering the rattle to remove it. With this stage 4 coordination, they can begin
to understand how objects come to be hidden by other
objects and why hidden objects remain available to be
retrieved. Later stages in this understanding extend to
late in the second year of life, when infants become
able to search exhaustively for hidden objects in many
possible hiding places.
In contrast to Piagets model of gradual construction of object permanence, Baillargeon focused on the
lower end of the age range and a simple looking task.
Infants from 3 to 5 months of age were habituated to
the sight of a small door that rotated upward from a flat
position in front of them, tracing a 180% arc away from
them to lie flat again on a solid surface. They were then
shown two scenes with objects inserted behind the rotating door. In the possible event, the door swung up
but stopped at the object. In the impossible event, the
object was surreptitiously removed and the door was
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mance theories do not require that psychological structures exist innately, but only that they are firmly separated from the actions that instantiate them. The
dynamics of construction of activities leading to wide
variation are lost in the muddy mediators that somehow
prevent competence from being realized in activity. Such
conceptions of disembodied structure seem not too distant from the humorous idea of bottling up the structure
of the Golden Gate Bridge. Why is it necessary to posit
separate levels of structure, existing somewhere (it is unclear where) outside the real activity in question? Why
not model the organization of the actual mental and physical activity as it exists in its everyday contexts?
In short, domain specificity, nativist, and competence/performance models share the same fatal limitations as the logical stage models they were meant to
replace. Although the newer models do not make the
cross-domain claims that stage models did, they retain a
conception of psychological structure as static form
existing separately from the behavior it organizes.
Whether such static forms are seen as universal logics
or domain-specific modules, they offer accounts only of
stability in the organization of behavior while ignoring
or marginalizing variability. The challenge for contemporary developmental science is not to explain away evidence of variability in performance. Instead, scholars
need to build dynamic models of psychological structure, using concepts such as skill, hierarchical complexity, contextual support, and developmental web to build
methods for analyzing and explaining both the variability and the stability in the organization of dynamic
human activity.
The Constructivist Alternative
The constructivist alternative takes as its starting point
what the Cartesian framework rules out: the constructive agency of a human being acting in the context of relationships among systemsbiological, psychological,
and sociocultural. As we have shown in the opening sections of this chapter, the dynamic structural framework
provides a straightforward, comprehensive alternative
to the conundrums created by the Cartesian synthesis
and the related structure-as-form paradigm. Human
knowledge is neither passively received from the environment nor passively received from the genome. Instead, people construct knowledge through the active
coordination of action systems beginning with the earli-
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which developmental variability can be used to understand and describe the development of dynamic psychological structure.
METHODOLOGY OF DYNAMIC
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
To overcome the limitations of structure as static form,
we need to articulate a framework for dynamic development, which includes a set of methods that embody dynamic concepts. Classical research methods use static
notions, indicating the age when a competence emerges
(really, the mean or modal age for one context and one
group), forcing growth into linear models, and partitioning analysis of activities into dichotomies such as heredity and environment or input and output (Anderson
et al., 2004; Horn & Hofer, 1992; Plomin et al., 1997;
Wahlsten, 1990). Most importantly, effective research
needs to be designed so that it can detect variability and,
in turn, use the variability to uncover sources of order or
regularity in development.
Effective research should be built with designs, measures, analytic methods, and models that can detect
variations in growth patterns. Research must be designed to deal with variability, or it is doomed to fail to
provide an adequate analysis of development. This chapter focuses on activities in which people coordinate and
differentiate lower-order components to form higherorder control systems, which encompasses most activities of interest to developmental and educational
researchers. The components of these control systems
range from neural networks to parts of the body, immediate contexts (including objects and other people), and
sociocultural frameworks for action. Moment by moment, people construct and modify control systems, and
the context and goal of the moment have dramatic effects on the nature and complexity of the systems. Frequently, people do the construction jointly with others.
To go beyond static stereotyping of development and
learning, research must deal directly with these facts of
variation. Research must be designed to deal with the
wide range of shapes of development that occur for different characteristics of action and thought in diverse
contexts and conditions.
Developmental regularities can be found at several
levels of analysis, from brain activities to simple actions,
complex activities, and collaborations in dyads or larger
groups. In analyzing these developmental regularities, it
348
is important to avoid a common mistake. No one regularity applies to all characteristics of developing activity or
all levels of analysis. The same developmental regularities will not be found everywhere. That is an essential
principle of the variability of human activity.
In one major realization of this principle, development has many different shapes! Some behaviors and
brain characteristics show continuous growth, others
show clusters of spurts and drops, still others show
oscillation, and some show growth followed by decay
(Fischer & Kennedy, 1997; Siegler, Chapter 11, this
Handbook, Volume 2; Tabor & Kendler, 1981; Thatcher,
1994; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this
volume; van Geert, 1998). Ages of development likewise
vary dynamically, even for the same child measured in
the same domain: Assessment condition, task, emotional
state, and many other factors cause ages to vary dramatically. There are no legitimate developmental milestones,
stones fixed in the developmental roadway in one position. Instead, there are developmental buoys, moving
within a range of locations affected dynamically by various supports and currents.
It is remarkable how pervasively researchers ignore
or even deny variations in shape and age of development.
Scholars committed to a continuous view of development
typically ignore the spurts and drops in many developmental functions, insisting that development is smooth
and continuous despite major evidence to the contrary.
Physical and psychological development are both routinely graphed with smooth curves, as in the charts in a
pediatricians office, even though research on individual growth consistently shows patterns of fits and starts
in virtually all aspects of physical growth (Lampl &
Johnson, 1998). The distortion is just as pervasive in
psychological development. For example, Diamonds
(1985) findings of linear growth of memory for hidden
objects in infancy are frequently cited, even though
replications by others with the same tasks and measures
show nonlinear, S-shaped growth (Bell & Fox, 1992,
1994). Many data sets show powerfully nonlinear individual growth as the norm in infant cognitive and emotional development as well as development at later ages
(Fischer & Hogan, 1989; McCall, Eichorn, & Hogarty,
1977; Reznick & Goldfield, 1992; Ruhland & van
Geert, 1998; Shultz, 2003).
In a similar manner, at the other pole of argument,
scholars committed to stage theory often ignore the evidence for continuous growth, even in their own data.
For example, Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, and Lieberman
(1983) asserted that their longitudinal data on moral development showed stages in growth even in the face of
clear evidence that growth was gradual and continuous
(Fischer, 1983). In the same way for age, scholars routinely talk as if there are developmental milestones at
specific ages, despite the massive evidence of variability
in age of development with variations in conditions of assessment (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Case, 1985; Spelke, in
press). Common claims, for example, are that object permanence develops at 8 months in Piagetian assessments,
conservation at 7 years, and combinatorial reasoning at
12 years, although no such statement is tenable without
more specification because the ages vary greatly with
task, support, and so on. Classic research on reflexes in
very young infants even demonstrates variability in the
ages at which they emerge and disappear (Touwen, 1976).
Starting in the Middle of Things:
Implications for Design
To study development in medias resin the middle of
thingsresearch designs need to be broadened so that
they capture the range of variation and diversity of
human activities in real-life settings. If development is
assessed with an instrument that places all behavior on a
single linear scale, for example, then nothing but that linear change can be detected. The limitations of most classical research arise from assumptions that restrict
observation and theory to one-dimensional analysis.
When those assumptions are changed, research opens up
to encompass the full range of human activity. By limiting developmental observation and explanation to onedimensional processes, the static assumptions have
stymied investigation of the richly textured dynamic
variations of development. To do research that facilitates
multidimensional-process explanation requires building
research designs that go beyond one-dimensional assumptions to provide for detection of the dynamics of
variability (Edelstein & Case, 1993; G. Gottlieb,
Wahlsten, & Lickliter, Chapter 5, this Handbook, this
volume; Lerner, 2002; Thelen & Smith, 1994, Chapter 6;
Valsiner, Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume; van
Geert & van Dijk, 2002).
Here are four important one-dimensional assumptions that are typically incorrect and that are embodied
in research designs that implicitly assume static structure. These all need to be avoided in designs for assessing the dynamics of change by addressing variability
and diversity.
7
6
Level
4
3
2
1
0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Events or Age
Figure 7.11 Three different growth curves based on the
same growth model. The growth curves are all generated by
the same nonlinear hierarchical model of development of selfin-relationships used in this chapter, but variations in the values of the parameters in the equations produce vastly different
shapes. The same growth processes produce essentially monotonic growth (Grower 1), growth with stagelike spurts and
drops (Grower 2), and fluctuating change (Grower 3).
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Step
Word
Definition
Letter
Identification
Rhyme
Recognition
Reading
Recognition
Rhyme
Production
Reading
Production
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Number of Pronouns/Session
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One convincing case of a general structure in a domain is the central conceptual structure documented by
Robbie Case and his colleagues (1996). It provides a
model for defining a general structure and testing its
generality. Assessment of the development of a general
concept of number requires an array of tasks that all require the use of that concept. Case and his colleagues
have constructed such a task array for the elementary
number line, which represents number as quantitative
variation along a line. This representation constitutes
what they call a central conceptual structure for number
in young children, a framework for thinking about number that facilitates numerical understanding across many
situations. Tasks like reading the time on a clock, counting gifts at a birthday party, and doing simple arithmetic
problems in school all make use of this same structure.
Discovery of general conceptual structures like the
number line would be a strong boon for educators,
greatly streamlining their efforts to teach children the
basic concepts and skills required by modern society.
From approximately 4 to 8 years of age, children
build the central conceptual structure for number.
When instructors and curriculum explicitly teach the
structure, children evidence a major improvement in
performance across a wide array of number tasks but
not for tasks in other domains such as understanding social interactions. The change amounts to as much as
50% of the variance in test scores, which is a remarkably large effect. The use of many tasks allowed Case
and his colleagues to determine how general the structure iswhere children apply it and where they do not.
Note also that along with the general change across
number tasks, the researchers still found large task effects and considerable developmental variation in level.
The generality of the structure operates within this
substantial variability.
In the behavioral sciences, researchers commonly
wish to generalize from their data to the development
of a domain, but the two standard methods preclude legitimate generalization by artificially reducing variation instead of analyzing it. First, in the psychometric
method, commonly used in intelligence, education, and
personality testing, many tasks are summed and only
the summary scores are considered. A boys IQ score is
116, or the college entrance test score for a young
woman is 575. Most of the variation in each persons
performances on the tasks is ignored. Second, in the
experimental method, commonly used in experimental
psychology and neuroscience, a researcher analyzes one
task by varying a parameter and calculating mean per-
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formance differences for specific values of the parameter. Variations in performance in the task other than the
means are treated as error variance and not analyzed
further. Also, variations among diverse tasks are ignored because only one task is examined.
The psychometric strategy is evident in ability theories, where researchers study some hypothesized general ability such as spatial intelligence or verbal
intelligence (Demetriou et al., 2002; Sternberg, Lautrey,
& Lubart, 2003). The evidence for the coherence of
these supposedly modular abilities is modest in comparison to Cases evidence for a central conceptual structure for number. Most tasks or items that measure each
ability or intelligence have only minimal variance in
common, with correlations between pairs of items typically accounting for approximately 4% of the variance
(an average correlation of .2 between individual items).
Educational researchers have regularly thrown up
their hands in dismay that they have found so little generalization or transfer of concepts to tasks that are distinct from those taught (Salomon & Perkins, 1989). For
example, when instructors teach a concept such as gravity, evolution, or working memory, they commonly find
that even intelligent students have difficulty using the
concept in tasks different from those explicitly taught in
class. The reason for the difficulty of this far generalization (use of knowledge in tasks far from the original
object of learning) is that the construction of generalized skills requires time and effort (Fischer & Immordino-Yang, 2002). Furthermore, even with a strong
conceptual structure like Cases number line, generalization is not perfect. For a weak structure such as spatial intelligence or ego resiliency, generalization should
not be expected. Learning is not a simple transmission of
information through a conduit from one person to another or from one task to another.
Researchers using the second strategy, experimental
manipulation of a task, typically restrict their investigations to one task and variations of it. Their intent is to
control for extraneous sources of variability, such as
task effects, but at the same time, they wish to generalize about broad abilities or concepts such as object permanence (Baillargeon, 1999), the concept of number
(Spelke, in press), or working memory (Diamond,
1985). Unfortunately, the cost of restriction to a single
task (or even two) is an absence of generalizability of results beyond that task.
When researchers use different tasks to assess a domain, they typically find very different portraits of development for each task. Indeed, many of the central
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Least Important
Less Important
Most Important
Outgoing
Sch +
Relaxed
Sch +
Fun
Sib +
Cheerful
Rom +
Enjoy
Sch +
Attentive
Sch +
Estranged
Sib
Inferior
Sib
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Real +
Fun
OFr +
Uneasy
Moth
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Fath
Valuable
BFr +
Overjoyful
BFr +
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Honest
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BFr +
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Extrovert
Real +
Joyful
Rom +
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Rom +
Cheerful
Real +
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Real +
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Fath
Peaceful
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Real +
Feel good
Moth +
Comfortable
Moth +
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OFr +
2
Cheerful
BFr +
3
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Sib +
Awkward
Rom
4
Peaceful
Real +
Troublesome
Sib
Bossy
Sib
Real: Real Me
A-C: Opposite
Fath: Father
1-4: Similar
Moth: Mother
Sch: School
+: Positive
Sib: Sibling
: Negative
+ : Positive and Negative
Figure 7.13
port on the variability of levels of self-complexity. Because Eastern cultures typically discourage a focus on self
in conversation, people are likely to show low levels of
self-description unless they are given strong socialcontextual support for describing themselves. That explains why the difference between optimal and functional
356
is minimized in the emotional concepts of most middleclass adults (Li, Wang, & Fischer, 2004; Shaver, Wu, &
Schwartz, 1992).
Developmental researchers need to explain such similarities and differences by examining major sources of
variation, such as task, assessment condition, emotional
state, and culture. Then they need to characterize the
variations effectively, relating their findings explicitly
to concepts about development and variation. Traditionally, theories of development and learning have been replete with complex conceptions of change and variation
processes, but there has been no way to test adequately
the process claims, to determine whether the processes
specified actually produce the growth patterns predicted. That deficit no longer exists.
Building and Testing Models of Growth
and Development
Developmental theories require complex, sophisticated
tools for analysis, going beyond the models of linear main
effects that have dominated the behavioral sciences.
Methods based on nonlinear dynamics, including both dynamic growth models and neural networks, provide powerful ways of representing and analyzing the dynamics of
change. These dynamic methods mesh naturally with developmental theories to allow developmental scholars to
begin to capture the complexities of human development
(Fischer & Kennedy, 1997; Shultz, 2003; Thelen &
Bates, 2003), and they can be easily programmed on computers with common software such as Excel.
With these new tools for building models of change,
the claims of virtually any theory can be explicitly
tested in what van Geert (1994) calls experimental
theoretical psychology. Developmental or learning
processes can be represented in equations, and computers can be used to run experiments by varying parameters to test whether the growth functions that the
models produce fit theorists predictions and empirical
findings. A model of growth defines a basic growth
function or set of functions for each specified component, which is called a grower. These growth models
can simulate not only quantitative growth, such as complexity level, frequency of an activity, or preference but
also qualitative developments such as emergence of a
new stage, coordination of two strands into one, or splitting of a strand into branches.
One important kind of nonlinear dynamic model represents networks in the brain and nervous system. Re-
searchers have built many neural network models to depict and analyze processes of learning and adaptation
that involve coordinating and differentiating activities
at one or two levels of complexity (Bullock et al., 1993;
Elman et al., 1996; Grossberg, 2000; van der Maas, Verschure, & Molenaar, 1990). For example, word inputs
are compared to infer how to make a past tense verb in
English. Visual scanning and object characteristics are
integrated to infer how an infant looks for objects of a
particular type following a specific path. Or visual input
and arm-hand control are integrated to produce visually
guided reaching.
An important characteristic for evaluating the models is whether they reflect the real architecture of the
activities that they represent. Many models use global,
generalized programs to analyze the development or
learning of an activity. Although these generalized approaches make models easier to design, their structure
typically does not closely match the architecture of
the real activities. Models that have been constructed
specifically to fit the real architecture of the behavior,
social interaction, or nervous-system network being
modeled have been more successful. For example, the
adaptive resonance theory of neural networks has been
used to construct models that carefully match the architecture of the nervous system, the body, and the senses
(Raizada & Grossberg, 2003). A model of eye-hand coordination is based closely on how eye, hand, and related cortical networks are actually built (Bullock et al.,
1993). Many models have paid much less attention to the
specific architecture of the activity being modeled. A
question to ask in evaluating a model is whether it plausibly reflects the architecture of the activity of interest.
Nonlinear Dynamic Models of Growth
and Development
For decades, systems theory and nonlinear dynamics
have been popular as broad theoretical interpretations of
development (Sameroff, 1975; von Bertalanffy, 1976),
but the tools needed for precise developmental analysis
were missing. When the computer revolution began to
produce a powerful array of new dynamic modeling
tools, investigators began with models of a few tractable
psychological problems, especially involving motor coordination (Bullock et al., 1993; Thelen & Smith, 1994).
Now there is an explosion of dynamic systems research,
including diverse models for analyzing activity and its
development (e.g., Case et al., 1996; Fischer & Kennedy,
1997; Hartelman, van der Maas, & Molenaar, 1998;
357
Shultz, 2003; van Geert, 1998). Our focus in this chapter is on models of hierarchical growth of action,
thought, and emotion. We define basic growth processes
for psychological growers and how they are connected in
a developmental process.
An important consequence of these new tools is that
they lead to more powerful and precise definitions of
growth, development, and learning. Traditionally, these
three terms for patterns of change have been defined restrictively in terms of directional change, usually, linear
increase (Willett, Ayoub, & Robinson, 1991; Wohlwill,
1973). In dynamic structural analysis, they are defined
instead by specific models of change processesany systematic mechanism of change, resulting in not only linear increase and decrease but also complex patterns such
as increase occurring in successive jumps and dips, or
oscillation between limits. Equations specify these
growth processes systematically and predict a family of
growth curves, often of many different shapes. In common usage, growth is the most general term, development
tends to be used for systematic increase over long time
periods, and learning typically means short-term increase based on experience. We expect the meanings of
the terms to be revised over time as a result of the more
precise definitions of change in dynamic models. The
most important point for our purposes is that growth, development, and learning are no longer identified by the
shape of any one particular curve. There is no need for
restrictive definitions such as monotonic increase.
Logistic Growth
The best starting point for growth models is usually logistic growth because most growth processes in biology
show this kind of growth. Figure 7.14 shows three examples of logistic growth, all produced by the same basic
equation, which generates the S-shaped curve that typifies much simple growth. Note that even this simplest
curve is not linear. The model is called logistic because
the equation includes log values (squares or higher powers of the growers level).
Many basic growth processes involve this form of
growth, where the change at a given time is derived
from three parameters: (1) the prior level of the grower,
(2) the growth rate of the system, and (3) a limit on the
systems growth, called the carrying capacity. The
term level refers to some quantity that a grower has
reached, potentially involving a wide array of different
characteristics such as developmental level, frequency
of response, or amount of activity. In many of our
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6
1.5
Level
4
1
5
0.5
0
0
Figure 7.14
50
100
Trials
150
200
examples, level (L) refers to the complexity of an activity along the skill complexity scale in Figure 7.3, as
applied to the development of self-in-relationships
(Fischer & Kennedy, 1997). Models have also been
built for other domains such as King and K. Kitcheners (1994) reflective judgment, which develops
through seven stages that show growth curves similar
to those for self-in-relationships (K. Kitchener & King,
1990; K. Kitchener et al., 1993).
By itself, without connection to other growers, the
equation produces mostly S-shaped growth, as with
Growers 4 and 5 in Figure 7.14. Even without connection, however, there is significant variation in the growth
curve, as illustrated by the turbulence in Grower 6 as it
nears its carrying capacity. The three growth curves in
Figure 7.14 all derive from the same equation, and only
values of the growth parameters differ.
Logistic growth equations can take several different
forms, and van Geert (1994) recommends the following
as the best starting point for modeling hierarchical
growth for an action, thought, or emotion, designated
as Grower B:
LBt + 1 = LBt + RB
L2Bt
K B2
RB
L3Bt
K B3
The equation is divided into three terms, which together produce the level of B in the current trial. The first
term is the level in the previous trial. Next is the growth
termthe growth rate times the square of the level in the
previous trial divided by the square of the carrying capacity. With modest growth rates, this factor produces an
increase on each trial. Level is divided by carrying capacity to base growth on a ratio with the systems capacity
instead of its absolute value, because of an assumption
that the level operates as a function of the capacity.
The growth term in this logistic equation squares the
ratio of level to carrying capacity, in contrast to a simpler form of the equation, which uses the ratio without
squaring. The squared form of the equation seems to
represent psychological growth processes more accurately, and that growth depends on the persons prior
level in two simultaneous ways: (1) current understanding is built on earlier understanding, and (2) level affects the probability of encountering situations that
promote growth. van Geert (1994) elaborates this argument and shows that this form of the growth equation
fits individual growth curves better than the squared
equation. The growth curve for pronoun use by the
Dutch child Tomas in Figure 7.12 fits this version of the
equation well, but not the nonsquared version (Fischer &
Kennedy, 1997; Ruhland & van Geert, 1998).
The third term provides a form of regulation based on
the limits of the system. Without some limit, the level
will eventually explode to ever larger quantities. In real
biological systems, there is always some limit, based on
the availability of food, space, energy, and the like. The
regulation term subtracts an amount to limit the system
based on its carrying capacity and keeps it from exploding. The amount subtracted is the product of the growth
term (the second term in the equation) multiplied by the
ratio of the level to the carrying capacity. The result is
the cubing of level, which leads to this equation being
called the cubic logistic equation. (The simpler equation
is called the squared version.) When the current level is
low in relation to carrying capacity, little is subtracted;
but when the current level rises, the amount subtracted
becomes larger. As the level approaches the carrying capacity, the amount subtracted becomes large enough to
cancel out growth, and thus the level approaches the carrying capacity as a limit. This growth process does not
always produce smooth S-shaped growth, however.
When the growth rate is high, the level can show turbulent fluctuations as the level approaches the carrying capacity, illustrated by Grower 6 in Figure 7.14. Note, in
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CbC B
LCt LCt 1
LCt
posited as the major source of competition, not the absolute level of skill. For example, when an adolescent is
working to construct an abstract mapping for comparing
her feelings of being comfortable with her mother to her
feelings of being uneasy, her new understanding is likely
to disrupt her prior understandings temporarily until she
can work on the understanding for a while. In addition,
the time and effort she spends on building that understanding competes with further learning of her skill at
the prior level because that time is used up. That is how
Grower C competes with Grower B as a function of the
change in level, not the absolute level itself.
Support of Grower B by Grower C in this model takes
a different formthe product of a support parameter
times the level of Grower C divided by the carrying capacity of C. This term is added to the growth equation
for Grower B:
+ SbC B
LCt
KC
LCt
KC
KB
K B
7
Relationships
1
2
3
4
5
Level of Growth
5
4
High Support
3
2
Low Support
1
0
0
10
15
20
25
30
Age in Years
Figure 7.15 Growth model for development of self-inrelationships: Optimal and functional levels for five relationships and five hierarchical levels.
361
the contextual support referred to in high and low support is different from the support between growers in the
model. Contextual support is not included directly in the
model, but is varied through the parameter of growth
rate. All parameter values for the curves in the figure are
the same, except that high-support growers have a high
rate and low-support growers have a low one. With differences in rate alone and no other differences among
the equations, the shapes shift from strongly stagelike
hierarchical growth to more mono-tonic and variable
growth. All the high-support curves approximate the empirical curve for self-in-relationships under high support.
The low-support curves for relationship 3, which has the
slowest growth rate, approximates the empirical curve
for low support. Included in the variability of some of the
low-support curves is a jump or drop, which presumably
represents likely growth patterns when the growth rate is
a little higher than it was in the Korean sample. In general, low rates produce relatively monotonic growth, and
high rates produce a series of discontinuities (spurts and
drops).
This change from growth through a series of discontinuities to growth that is variably monotonic defines a
broad set of the growth patterns for the model, but the
model also produces other patterns. For example, in Figure 7.11, which shows curves generated by the same
model, Growers 1 and 2 represent similar variation from
discontinuous to more monotonic growth. However,
Grower 3 represents a more unstable pattern, which is
common when the growth curves are less stable or
equilibrated.
According to Piaget (1985) cognitive development is
usually equilibratedregulated to produce a series of
successive equilibria (times of stability) marking the
stages in his developmental hierarchy. Spurt-and-plateau
growth patterns like those for high-support growers in
Figure 7.15 show an equilibration process, in that the
growers for different domains tend to seek the same levelswhat is referred to as an attractor in nonlinear dynamics, because there seems to be something pulling the
curves toward a common place. For example, when one
grower moves higher than the others, which can be construed as a disturbance from equilibrium, it is pulled
back toward the common level. At the same time, the
growers for functional level do not show any clear attractorno tendency to seek the same level.
This pattern is also called U-shaped growth because of the decrease after each spurtwhich scholars
have often puzzled about (Strauss, 1982). The U shape
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10
Level of Growth
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0
10
15
Age in Years
20
25
30
363
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Development
Emergence
Zones of New
Skill Levels
Figure 7.17 Developmental web with concurrent discontinuities across strands. The boxes show three zones of concurrent discontinuities. Additional zones occur earlier and later
in the web.
consistency in emergence of a level. For example, understanding of self-in-relationships spurts in individual adolescents at approximately 15 to 16 and 19 to 20 years in
macrodevelopment, but microdevelopmental analysis of
changes over hours, days, and weeks shows each individual gradually constructing these new skills.
The clustering of discontinuities in macrodevelopment arises not from a mysterious underlying stage
structure but from the dynamics by which people build
skills through the integration of earlier components in a
gradual process with constraints. The constraints include sociocultural meanings and settings (Rogoff,
2003; Whiting & Edwards, 1988), biological changes in
neurological and anatomical supports for skills (Carey
& Gelman, 1991; G. Dawson & Fischer, 1994; Fischer &
Rose, 1996), and the limits that available time places on
the speed and scope of skill construction. These same
dynamics also cause the opposite patternmajor disparities in ages of skill emergence in some domains
under some circumstances, as shown in Figures 7.10,
7.15, and 7.16.
Developmental clustering is a macrodevelopmental
phenomenon that does not appear directly in microdevelopment. Yet it arises from the combination of microdevelopmental processes in many contexts leading to
clusters of discontinuities for each developmental level.
Conversely, macrodevelopmental constraints limit mi-
365
and integrate the skills to form a new hierarchically inclusive skill that is more adequate to the task.
Shapes of Growth Curves in Construction and
Generalization of New Skills
Microdevelopmental analysis illuminates the real-time
process of coordination and differentiation of the cooccurring skills to form a new skill. Individual growth
curves are analyzed, not combinations of standardized
data from many students (Estes, 1956; Fischer, 1980a;
Granott & Parziale, 2002; Siegler & Crowley, 1991; Yan
& Fischer, 2002). Changes in learning and generalization
can be analyzed and compared across skills and tasks,
tracing, for example, the progress of generalization of
new knowledge to different tasks and contents by individual students or ensembles. Commonly, the progress of
learning can be directly detected, including the nature of
construction of a skill and the generalization of that skill
to new situations. The skill complexity scale in Figures
7.3 and 7.4 greatly facilitates the research by providing a
common scale for comparison of growth of diverse skills.
A key tool for analysis is the shapes of growth curves.
In everyday learning activities, people produce complex
growth patterns, with activities that differ widely in
complexity, varying from moment to moment within a
range that does not show simple upward progression.
With the insights of dynamic systems theory, many cognitive scientists recognize that complex trajectories capture the true shapes of learning and development.
Real-time trajectories do not move along a straight line,
but instead they typically fluctuate up and down within
a range that reflects constraints.
Analysis of growth curves shows a prototypic pattern
for building and generalizing a new skill: People build a
skill and then repeatedly rebuild it in a wavelike pattern
of construction and reconstruction, not in a straight line
or monotonic upward progression. Encountering a new
task or situation, people first move down to a low level
of complexity as illustrated in Figure 7.18, using basic
skills similar to those of young children. They then
gradually build a more complex skill for coping with
the task by repeatedly rebuilding it with variations (Fischer et al., 2003; Granott, 2002). That is, when they encounter some change in the narrow context, their skill
collapses and they regress back to a low level and then
rebuild the skill again in this new context. With naturally occurring changes in context or state, their skill
collapses over and over, and they adapt and rebuild it
each time in a different way. This pattern is often called
18
21
24
Figure 7.18 Building a new skill through repeated reconstruction, or scalloping. Source: From Adult Cognitive Development: Dynamics in the Developmental Web (pp. 491516),
by K. W. Fischer, Z. Yan, and J. Stewart, in Handbook of Developmental Psychology, J. Valsiner and K. Connolly (Eds.), 2003,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
scalloping, as in Figure 7.18, because it builds gradually and then drops, forming the approximate shape of a
scallop shell. Through this slow process, people gradually build a more general skill that they can sustain
across a set of variations in context. Scientists have described this process extensively for infants and young
children, where it is called a circular reaction, (Piaget, 1952; Wallon, 1970), but it occurs at all ages in
new learning situations (Fischer & Connell, 2003).
Figure 7.19 illustrates this phenomenon in a dyad of
graduate students learning a new skill in a study by Nira
Granott (1994, 2002). Ann and Donald were trying to understand a Lego robot that changed its movement in response to light. (The study was done when Lego robots
were under development at the Media Laboratory at MIT
before they were available in toy stores.) Ann and Donald
knew nothing about how the robot worked or what it responded to. They tried to figure out what it was and how it
functioned. Beginning at a very low level of complexity in
understanding the robot, they worked closely together
over a period of half an hour to gradually build a more
complex shared understanding of the robot. Their understanding of how the robot moved across the floor fluctuated in skill complexity, as shown in Figure 7.19, starting
from primitive egocentric actions that confused the
robots properties with their own actions and moving to
complex representational systems that specified the
robots concrete characteristics.
Instead of a single upward trend toward a more adequate understanding, Ann and Donalds skill was frag-
15
Wi
re
12
Interchange
do
ary
Re
mm
Su
Wi
re
do
Re
rt
Skill Level
Drop and
Rebuild
Sta
Drop and
Rebuild
Build
Representations
Drop to
Low Level 6
Skill Level
Actions
366
6
5
4
3
2
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40
60
80
100
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140
Interchange
Intermediate:
Scalloping
Skill Level
Novice:
Chaotic
Development
367
Expert:
Stable
Interchanges
368
Abstractions
8
Communicating
Skill Level
Representations
6
5
4
Understanding Robot
Actions
3
2
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Interchange
Figure 7.21 Two strands in Ann and Donalds first problemsolving sequence. Source: From Beyond One-Dimensional
Change: Parallel, Concurrent, Socially Distributed Processes
in Learning and Development, by K. W. Fischer and N. Granott, 1995, Human Development, 38, pp. 302314.
courses and their ages, they were capable of using complex abstract skills, at least mappings at Level Ab2 and
systems at Level Ab3, but they did not show these levels
in their activities with the robot. People use the skill
levels that are required for a task and do not employ the
higher levels of which they are capable unless the situation demands it.
Detecting the dynamic nature of learning in microdevelopment requires (a) finding the strands or threads
that are growing and ( b) distinguishing them from the
ones that are merely varying without growing. Methods
that recognize the multiple levels of functioning in an
activity facilitate distinguishing these different threads
and thus uncovering microdevelopment. With such
methods, it becomes possible to see how people build
skills from low levels and how they rebuild them repeatedly to generalize and consolidate them. Generally, the
complex webs of macrodevelopment derive from these
microdevelopmental strands, which grow, join, and separate to produce nonlinear long-term development of
skill and understanding.
Bridging: A Process of Building New Knowledge
One of the mysteries of learning has been that people
somehow build knowledge that is new for them. That is
how different people end up with very different knowledge. The origins of new knowledge have puzzled
philosophers for centuries (Kant, 1958; Plato, 1941) and
continued to puzzle twentieth-century scholars (Fodor,
1975). When people appear to have no knowledge of,
say, a Lego robots functioning, how can they build new
knowledge of the gadget? How can they build new
knowledge out of nothing?
The reason for this dilemma lies (again) in the limitations of the paradigm of structure-as-form. People do
not build new knowledge from nothing! It only seems
that way because scholars assume that people function at
only one level of knowledge. In fact, people function at
multiple levels, and so they can use one level of functioning to direct their activities at another level. They
can build up new knowledge by using old knowledge
from other contexts to bootstrap themselves (Dunbar,
2001; Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner, 2001).
One important way that people do such bootstrapping
to build knowledge is the process of bridging in which
people direct the construction of their own knowledge
by functioning at two levels simultaneously (Case,
1991a; Granott et al., 2002). They unconsciously establish a target skill or understanding, which lies unconstructed beyond their current level of functioning, and
(X)
(Y)
(2)
Shell
369
UNDER
SHADOW
CHANGES
BEHAVIOR
(3)
370
gradually through processes of coordinating these components to form higher-level skills. To facilitate their
own skill construction, they build shells at higher levels
to bridge or bootstrap themselves to new knowledge.
Over time, they build and rebuild each skill again and
again with each small change in task and context until
they consolidate their performance to form a skill of
some generality. Once new skills are consolidated,
people can use them as bases for further constructive
activity, including generalizing to new situations and
building additional coordinations. Even when skills are
consolidated, of course, they are not uniformly available at will. They remain subject to the many dynamically interacting factors that make up human activity.
Microdevelopmental analysis of learning and problem
solving makes especially evident the great variability in
the structures of human activity from moment to moment. Another traditional domain in which variability is
prominent is emotional development. Traditionally, emotion has been treated as separate from cognition (another
instance of reductionist distortion), but the revolution
in emotion research in the last 25 years has radically
changed that view. Emotion and cognition are not in fact
separate but are two sides of the same coin. Indeed, microdevelopment and emotion are two of the domains
leading the way in moving beyond the structure-as-form
paradigm to create dynamic structuralism.
EMOTIONS AND THE DYNAMIC
ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVITY
AND DEVELOPMENT
Emotions show powerfully how dynamic structural
analysis illuminates human activity and its development.
In the past 25 years, emotions have reclaimed center
stage in the study of human action and thought, after
decades of neglect in the mid-twentieth century during
the eras of behaviorism and cognitivism (Damasio,
1994; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Wranik,
Sangsue, Tran, & Scherer, 2004). Scholars have constructed a new framework for understanding emotion
that belongs in the center of the new dynamic structuralism, combining traditional concerns about both structure and function in a single analytic system. The
general framework is typically referred to as the functional approach because of its emphasis on the adaptive
(functional) role of emotions in human activity. Consistent with dynamic structuralism, however, the functional focus is combined with structural analysis, so
a more appropriate label would be the functional-
structural or functional-organizational approach to emotions (Fischer et al., 1990; Mascolo et al., 2003; Sroufe,
1996). We illustrate the use of several interrelated kinds
of structures to analyze emotional functioning, including information flow, script, categorical hierarchy, dimensional split, developmental level, developmental
web, and dynamic growth curve. No single analysis by
itself can capture all the important aspects of the organization and functioning of emotionswhich is typical
of dynamic phenomena.
Emotion and Cognition Together
Contrary to common cultural assumptions, emotion and
cognition operate together, not in opposition to each
other. The official journal of the International Society
for Research on Emotion is entitled Cognition and Emotion to reflect this point. Cognition generally refers to the
processing and appraising of information, and emotion
refers to the biasing or constraining effects of certain action tendencies that arise from appraisals of what is beneficial or threatening to a person (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus,
1991; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Thus, cognition and
emotion are two sides of the same coin as characteristics
of control systems for human activity. Emotion is together with cognition at the center of mind and activity.
Analysis of emotion highlights the role of the body
and social world. Minds are not merely brains that happen to be in bodies. Peoples minds are parts of their
bodies, and their mind-bodies act, think, and feel in a
world of objects and other people. This ecological assumption is fundamental to the dynamic structural
framework and applies to analysis of all human activity.
Emotions are one of the most important organizing influences on peoples mind-bodies in contextfundamental
biological processes that shape action and thought. Contrary to common parlance and much classic theory, emotions are not merely feelings or inner experiences of
individuals but integral parts of human activity, shaping
action and thought, and founded in social interactions.
In the history of psychology, a distinction has often
been made between emotion and affect, with emotion
referring to biologically driven reactions and affect emphasizing individual experience and meaning (T. Brown,
1994). By these definitions, modern functional /structural analysis deals with affect rather than emotion, but
recent researchers emphasis on biological factors has
led to general preference for the term emotion. In this
modern meaning, emotion is used in a broad sense to include the classical meaning of affect. We use emotion
Notable
Change
Figure 7.22
Appraisal of
the Change in
Relation to:
1. Individual's
Concerns:
Goal
Attainment,
Evaluation
of Self
2. Coping
Potential
Emotion-Specific
Action Tendencies
and Accompanying
Physiological
Changes
Emotion process.
Action,
Expression,
Explicit
SelfCategorizing
371
372
373
374
Emotions
Positive
Ch
ina
U.S
. , It
aly,
ina
Ch
Anger
Wrath
Jealousy
Sadness
Sorrow
Fear
Shame
Panic
(Sad) Love
Shame
Anxiety
Distress
Disgust
Guilt/
Loneliness Nervous
Regret
Anticipation
Disheartenment
Superordinate
Ind
one
sia
Negative
Sorrowful
Love
Unrequited
Love
Happiness
Subordinate
Joy
Liking
Basic
Families
Exuberant
Arousal
Figure 7.23 Hierarchy of emotion categories. This hierarchy represents the organization of emotion families in Chinese based
on the findings of Shaver and his colleagues. Results for the United States, Italy, and Indonesia are also represented. For subordinate categories, the diagram lists only the largest categories from the Chinese sample. Dashed lines indicate findings that held
for only the Chinese sample; dotted lines those for only the United States, Italian, and Indonesian samples. Source: From
Structure of the Indonesian Emotion Lexicon by P. R. Shaver, U. Murdaya, and R. C. Fraley, 2001, Asian Journal of Social
Psychology, 4, pp. 201224; Cross-Cultural Similarities and Differences in Emotion and Its Representation: A Prototype Approach (Vol. 13, pp. 175212), by P. R. Shaver, S. Wu, and J. C. Schwartz, in Review of Personality and Social Psychology, M. S.
Clark (Ed.), 1992, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Shaver and his colleagues began with a standard dictionary in each language, asking informants to pick words
that involved emotions (Shaver et al., 1992, 2001). Then
they used the selected words with another set of informants, who sorted the words into categories. Hierarchical
cluster analysis of the sortings produced the dimensions,
basic families, and subordinate families. Chinese, Indonesian, Italian, and American / English showed five
common emotion familiesanger, sadness, fear, love,
and joyas well as the three affective dimensions.
Other researchers examining different cultures have
found groupings of emotions in similar families and dimensions (Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi, & Markam,
2002; Heider, 1991). Claims that emotions differ fundamentally across cultures do not take these broad family
groupings into account.
Alongside cultural similarities, however, cultural
differences are strong and important. The hierarchies
for China, Indonesia, Italy, and the United States illustrate those differences. First, the Chinese organization
of love was substantially different from the Ameri-
375
Shame Emotions
State in Self
Fear of
Losing Face
Shy and
Blushing
Hushing Up
Scandal
Ashamed
Self-Inferior
Embarrassed
Dishonored
Guilt
Guilt
Reaction in Others
Disgrace
Shamelessness
Embarrassment
Superordinate
Basic
Families
Casting
Embarrassing
Shame
Subordinate
Disgusted
Others
to Rage
Voices
Saving Others
Disgraceful/
Despising
Condemning
from
Humiliating
Someone
for Lack
Embarrassment
of Shame
Figure 7.24 Hierarchy of shame categories in Chinese. This hierarchy shows the organization of shame categories in Chinese.
For subordinate categories, only the first degree of categories is shown. Source: From The Organization of Shame Words in
Chinese, by J. Li, L. Wang and K. W. Fischer, 2004, Cognition and Emotion, 18, pp. 767797.
376
shame words in their early vocabulary, nor do they develop well-differentiated scripts and categories for
shame. Instead, they develop other negative affective
scripts and categories such as ones for anger, aggression, sadness, and depression (Ayoub & Fischer, in
press; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990; Noam, Paget,
Valiant, Borst, & Bartok, 1994; Selman, Watts, &
Schultz, 1997).
In the web metaphor for the structure of development, the American experience with shame promotes
little growth of this branch of affective development.
The shame family develops minimally, at least for concepts and conscious experiences of shame. (Scheff &
Retzinger, 1991, argue that in America, shame continues to shape activity and experience, operating unconsciously because of its fundamental biological nature in
human beings.) The Chinese experience with shame, on
the other hand, produces rich growth of the shame
branch of affective development, with differentiation of
many subsidiary branches to form the multidimensional
hierarchy in Figure 7.24.
Along with shame also goes highly differentiated
development of honor and respect, which are the opposites of shame in China, unlike U.S. culture, where
pride is considered the opposite of shame. This
elaborate development of shame and honor leads to developmental pathways not seen in most people in
English-language cultures such as the Chinese emotions of self-harmonization and social honor. Chinese
children focus on succeeding in their efforts in school
and other activities but always remaining modest about
their achievements. The goal is to bring social honor to
their family through their achievements: My family is
honored even though I am unworthy of your praise.
Development of the strand for self harmonization and
social honor in China contrast with development of the
strand for pride in the United States, where the focus
is on the child as the achiever rather than on the family (Mascolo et al., 2003).
Attachment, Working Models, and Temperament
Two domains where emotional-development research
has been extensive are attachment and temperament. In
both cases, the model of emotions is that they have a
persistent, one-way effect on developmental pathways.
According to attachment theory, childrens and adults
relationships, curiosity, and general emotional security
depend on the nature of their early close relationships
with caregivers, usually mothers and fathers. According
377
5
Nice
Nice and Mean
Mean
Level
378
0
0
Age in Years
understood better than MENICE and preferred. As one 3year-old said, Can we do more of these mean stories?
Theyre more fun! Within a few years, however, the
childrens negative bias disappeared and was replaced by
the usual positive bias, which gradually became stronger.
This dynamic shift from a negative bias to a positive one
is represented in the growth model in Figure 7.25.
Developmental Shifts in Emotions about Self in
Family Roles
Such shifting affective biases are pervasive in development. In a general developmental principle, each new
level brings with it specific emotional reactions and distortions, and many of these emotions change as children
develop to higher levels. For example, the research literature illustrates transient emotional defensiveness in
early development, based on childrens developing
(mis)understanding of themselves and their social roles.
For the behavioral role of baby, MEBABY , preschoolers
show early skill at acting out the baby role in pretend
play, even before the role of mother, MEMOTHER (Pipp,
Fischer, & Jennings, 1987). As they reach the age of 3
years or so (and firmly identify as not a baby), however,
many of them become unable to act out the baby role,
even though they are now capable of acting out many
other simple roles such as mother, child, doctor, and patient (Watson, 1984). Other cases of emotional defensiveness affecting performance in 3-year-olds include
African American children categorizing themselves as
White even though they can accurately categorize other
people as Black or White (Clark & Clark, 1958; Fischer,
MOTHER
WALTER
FATHER
(4)
MOTHER
WALTER
FATHER
(5)
379
That is why she says things like, Daddy, kiss me a hundred times more than you kiss Mommy.
This understanding globs together or condenses
parental and spousal roles, treating the mother role as
including the wife role and the father role as including
the husband role. When the roles are differentiated and
coordinated in a representational system, children see
that they cannot assume the parental role for themselves
( becoming their own father or mother), and they see
other limitations as well such as that they are too young
to marry their parent and that people are not supposed to
marry other family members. This emerging, more complete understanding of role relationships in the family
leads the child mostly to lose the wish to replace the
same-sex parent, unless there are role confusions in the
family such as incest (Fischer & Watson, 2001). She
comes to understand the intersection of spousal and
parental roles in practice in the family:
JANE
WIFE
MOTHER
WALTER
HUSBAND
FATHER
(6)
380
tions (Putnam, 1997; Terr, 1991). For example, 8-yearold Shirley used dissociation to cope with her fathers
abuse of her (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
1990). Shirleys father repeatedly raped her in her bed
in the basement of their home, and he beat her up if she
ever resisted his advances. To cope during the rape, she
concentrated on a small hole in the wall above her bed,
dissociating from her body and feeling that she put
herself into the hole. Inside the hole, she could get
through the trauma without major distress and without angering her violent father. One day, her father
raped her upstairs in the main house instead of in the
basement. Without the hole in the wall to support her
dissociation, she began screaming and fighting her father. He lost his temper, knocked her unconscious, and
then continued with the rape. (Although the father was
never arrested for his crimes, Shirley did eventually
find help, and she became a competent adult crusading
to stop child abuse.)
In a situation like Shirleys, dissociation was an
adaptive achievement in which she created a coordination to actively dissociate, building skills to keep herself
from experiencing the full pain of the trauma. By 4 to 6
years of age, children first demonstrate active dissociation of a few components from one another, as when
Shirley put herself in the hole in the wall (Fischer &
Ayoub, 1994):
ME-SHIRLEY
IN HOLE
SHE-SHIRLEY
RAPED
(7)
The block on the line relating the two Shirley roles denotes that the coordination is dissociative. With development, people can construct more complex, sophisticated
dissociative coordination, actively separating multiple
components.
Although research is still young on the developmental
pathways of abused children, available data guide an initial sketch of the pathways, including disorganized attachment(type D) described earlier. In severely
abused or neglected children, the organization of development along the positive-negative dimension is powerfully affected. For many maltreated children, the
normal positive bias in representations disappears at a
young age to be replaced by the oppositea negative
bias, in which the tilt in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 is shifted to
the negative side. Instead of focusing their representations of self and important relationships toward the positive, many maltreated children characterize the self in
60
Abused
Percent Negative
50
Nonabused
40
381
These traumatic environments produce distinct developmental pathways that are powerfully shaped by the
experiences of abuse and trauma (Ayoub & Fischer, in
press). Children growing up in such environments often
produce remarkably sophisticated dissociation, which
like Shirleys dissociation, demonstrate great developmental complexity. Figure 7.27 describes an early developmental pathway for a boy named John, who was
growing up in a situation of hidden family violence
where there is a rigid, socially maintained dissociation
between public good and private violent worlds. In private, his father treated him tyrannically, abusing him
physically whenever he disobeyed. In public, his father
treated him as a good child whom he was proud of. In
general, the parents maintained a consistent public
image as good citizens and neighbors and model members of the community, but at home they were violent
and abusive.
As John developed working models of close relationships, he constructed his own version of the privatepublic dissociation that his family maintained. He built
increasingly complex and generalized representations
of tyrant-victim relationships in private and modelfamily relationships in public (Ayoub et al., 2003; Fischer & Ayoub, 1994). Figure 7.27 illustrates three major
levels in this development between 2 and 7 years of age
for the first three levels of the representational tier
(Rp1 to Rp3). At the first level, John represented himself in his private and public roles with his father, but
did not maintain a firm dissociation between the two (as
indicated by the permeable line dividing the domains).
At the second level, he built role relationships, connecting his own and his fathers roles and dissociating public and private more firmly. The third level brought a
30
Private
20
Public
Private
Public
ME
ME
Rp1
10
GOOD
BAD
Private
Rp2
0
Most
Less
ME
BAD
Public
DAD
BOSS
ME
GOOD
DAD
PROUD
Least
Degree of Importance
OBEY
Rp3 FOLLOWER
BAD
Private
DEMAND
BOSS
PUNISH
SMART
CHILD
OBEY
Public
PROUD
ADULT
COMMAND
382
clear generalization of those roles beyond his relationship with his fatherrelationships with other adults
and children.
These results do not mean that only abused or traumatized children show emotional splitting and dissociation. These are normal processes that everyone shows
under many circumstances. Abuse produces different
developmental pathways in which the persons working
models of relationships are organized powerfully by the
abuse, yielding characteristics such as a negative bias
and a sharp dissociation between public good and private violent relationships. Tools for dynamic analyses of
development provide ways of detecting these distinctive
pathways and avoiding the common error of characterizing complex forms of dissociation and splitting as developmentally primitive.
In summary, emotions act as biasing forces that
shape development along particular pathways, including
normative emotional splitting of positive and negative in
representations of self and others. When children have
severe emotional experiences such as abuse, their emotional reactions contribute to shaping their development
along unusual pathways that are built on their emotionladen relationships. Developing understandings affect
emotional reactions through changing appraisals, which
lead to consequences at certain points in development,
such as emotional reactions in 4-year-olds similar to
those that Freud attributed to the Oedipus conflict.
Emotions thus constitute a prime example of the usefulness of dynamic structural concepts and methods for
analyzing how different components work jointly to produce development.
Emotion and cognition work together, affecting each
others development so extensively that they are difficult to separate. In the big picture of macrodevelopment,
many of the large developmental reorganizations occur
concurrently for emotion and cognition. Through dynamic structural analysis, it has become possible to
build the first detailed models of how these changes in
emotion and cognition relate to brain development.
ability of human activity. Dynamic analysis has been especially useful in dealing with variability in the search
for relations between psychological and brain development, producing the first specific models of relations
between brain and activity in developmenthypothesized growth cycles linking developmental levels of cognition and emotion with growth of cortical functioning
(Fischer & Rose, 1994; Thatcher, 1994). Using dynamic
analysis, researchers have uncovered rich new findings
and built the first detailed models of relations between
brain and psychological development.
Most developmental research fails to deal with the
facts of variability, but neglecting those facts is especially perilous for research on relations between brain
and behavior. Development has many different shapes!
Some activities and brain functions show continuous
growth, while others show various discontinuities. Research on relations between brain and behavior needs to
start with analyzing different growth patterns to find
relations amid all the variability. The varying shapes
provide tools for unpacking growth processes in brain
and activity. If the variations are left out, the research is
doomed to become swamped by the combined variability in brain and behavior development.
Joining Nature and Nurture: Growth Cycles of Psychological and Brain Activity
383
hierarchical, epigenetic growth shared by neural networks and optimal levels in behavior. Investigation of
these common growth patterns in both psychological
and brain activity gives evidence for two recurring
growth cycles. We first explicate five principles described by Fischer and Rose (1996) to describe their
model of brain / behavior growth cycles, which was
strongly influenced by the work of Thatcher (1994) and
van Geert (1991, 1994).
Both brain activity and optimal cognitive functioning
show nonlinear dynamic growth, often developing in fits
and starts, which is characteristic of human physical
growth in general (Lampl & Johnson, 1998). Growth
speeds up and then slows down, demonstrating spurts,
plateaus, drops, and other discontinuous shifts in
growth patterns. For some types of growth, the fits and
starts are systematic, and for others they are disorderly,
showing the variability that is typical of dynamic systems affected by many different factors, as illustrated in
Figure 7.11. For certain properties of brain activity and
for the optimal levels of cognition and emotion, the fits
and starts are systematic and form clusters of discontinuities at particular age intervals. Understanding the
systematicity, however, requires understanding the variability. The principles for the dynamic structural framework range from clusters of discontinuities to processes
of variability and regularity in growth functions.
Principle 1: Clusters of Discontinuities in Growth of
Brain and Behavior. Development of both brain activity and psychological activity moves through a series of clusters of discontinuities (spurts, drops, and
other forms of abrupt change) indicating levels of reorganization of control systems for action, thought,
and feeling. An important focus for analyzing discontinuities is the leading edge of change such as the
onset and peak of a spurt.
A broad array of evidence indicates a sequence of
discontinuities in development of brain and behavior
marking a succession of levels and reflecting basic
growth processes, as was discussed in the section on the
Common Ruler for Skill Development. The growth patterns for different variables are not identical but variable, showing the normal diversity of dynamic systems.
At the same time, the processes of development (what
Piaget, 1985, called equilibration) produce important
regularities across growth curves, as shown by the dynamic model for linked growers in Figure 7.15.
384
Joining Nature and Nurture: Growth Cycles of Psychological and Brain Activity
cortex as measured by EEG coherence. In contrast, infants who did not demonstrate clear spurts in search
skills produced no growth spurts for cortical activity.
By relating dynamic variations in growth functions,
researchers can move beyond the difficulties of comparison across domains and regions. They can use similarities in growth functions to analyze development of
brain-behavior relations, detecting when concurrent
discontinuities mesh across behaviors and cortical activities, and when they do not mesh. Clusters of discontinuities seem to reflect emergence of new organizations of
brain and behavior, new action control systems linked to
neural networks. Discontinuities in EEG activity, cortical connectivity, and psychological activity demonstrate
concurrence and reflect the emergence of new control
systems and neural networks.
Principle 4: Emergence of Neural Networks and Action
Control Systems. With each developmental level, a new
kind of control system for action emerges, supported
by growth of a new type of neural network linking several brain regions and built on lower-level skills.
Across different brain regions and skill domains, similar (independent) networks and control systems emerge
concurrently. They produce clusters of discontinuities
in characteristics of cortical activity and optimal level.
Careful analysis of growth functions allows detection
of correspondences beyond global concurrence between cortical regions and skills.
After emergence, the new systems undergo a lengthy
period of consolidation during which they are tuned gradually to form efficient behavioral-neural control systems.
Eventually, another new type of control system starts to
grow, and another developmental level and cluster of discontinuities begins. In this way, the growth cycle creates
the hierarchy of psychological and brain development.
385
all-or-none changes, occurring everywhere at once as suggested by classical conceptions of stage. The cycles may
involve a number of different neural processes such as
synaptic growth and pruning across cortical regions (Huttenlocher, 2002; Rakic et al., 1986), dendritic growth
(Marrs, Green, & Dailey, 2001; Scheibel, Conrad, Perdue,
& Wechsler, 1990), the formation of myelin to insulate
neurons and thus produce faster neural impulses and improved coordination (Benes, 1994; Yakovlev & Lecours,
1967), and diverse other processes that improve communication among brain regions.
Cycles of Reorganization in Development
These principles specify a model for growth along the
developmental scale for psychological activity in relation to brain activity10 levels between 3 months and
25 years of age, as shown in Figure 7.3 for optimal levels. (An additional three levels are hypothesized for the
first 3 months of life, Fischer & Hogan, 1989.) The levels on the scale are supported by an array of evidence of
discontinuities and growth cycles for both behavior (action, thought, and feeling) and brain (anatomical growth
and cortical activity). The ages for appearance of each
level are highly variable, except under optimal assessment conditions. At the age of emergence, most people
can first control several skills at the new level of complexity, and by hypothesis they are growing a new kind
of neural network in diverse brain regions, evidenced by
clusters of discontinuities in neural activity. Even under
optimal conditions, however, exact age of emergence
varies across individuals and domains (see Figure 7.28).
2.2
2.0
Optimal Level
1.8
1.6
Relationships
3
4
5
1.4
1.2
1.0
10
11
Age in Years
12
13
Figure 7.28 Close-up view of optimal level for three growers in the model of Self-in-Relationships (Figure 7.15).
Stage 7
100
6
Stage 6
75
5
Stage 5
50
25
3
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
386
28
Age in Years
Figure 7.29 Development of reflective judgment: Optimal
and functional levels. Performance at optimal level spurts on
emergence of Stages 5, 6, and 7 of reflective judgment, but
functional level performance shows slower, more gradual increase. The top line (solid) shows the general score for reflective judgment across all tasks. The two dotted lines show
percentage of correct performance for the subset of tasks assessing Stage 6, which is the beginning of true reflective thinking. The upper dotted line shows optimal level for Stage 6, and
the lower line shows functional level. Source: From Developmental Range of Reflective Judgment: The Effect of Contextual Support and Practice on Developmental Stage, by K. S.
Kitchener, C. L. Lynch, K. W. Fischer and P. K. Wood, 1993,
Developmental Psychology, 29, pp. 893906.
Joining Nature and Nurture: Growth Cycles of Psychological and Brain Activity
Correlation
0.6
0.4
Level Sm4/Rp1
Level Sm2
0.2
Level Sm3
Level Rf4/Sm1
0
4
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
Age in Months
Figure 7.30 Changes in stability of infant behavior scores
for girls in the Berkeley Growth Study. Source: From Transitions in Early Mental Development, by R. B. McCall, D. H.
Eichorn, and P. S. Hogarty, 1977, Monographs of the Society
for Research in Child Development, 42(3, Serial No. 171).
1.6
Level Sm3
Maximum
Average
Minimum
1.4
1.2
Relative Power
0.8
387
Level Sm2
1.0
0.8
0.6
Level Sm1
0.4
0.2
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Age in Months
388
80
Level Ab3
Level Ab2
70
Level Rp4/
Ab1
Relative Power
60
Level Rp3
50
40
30
20
Level Rp2
Level Sm4/
Rp1
10
0
1
10
15
20
Age in Years
Figure 7.32 Development of relative power in alpha EEG in
occipital-parietal (O-P) area in Swedish children and adolescents. Relative power is the amplitude in microvolts of absolute
energy in the alpha band divided by the sum of amplitudes in
all bands. Sources: From Functional Neuroscience: Vol. 2. Neurometrics, by E. R. John, 1977, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; and
Frequency Analysis of the EEG in Normal Children and Adolescents (pp. 75102), by M. Matousek and I. Petersn, in Automation of Clinical Electroencephalography, P. Kellaway and
I. Petersn (Eds.), 1973, New York: Raven Press.
Left
P
F
C
T
P
O
Frontal
Central
Temporal
Parietal
Occipital
F
Right
C
O
F F F F
389
she functions on multiple developmental levels simultaneously, not just on a single level. As a person grows, his
or her activities develop in many different shapes, not
according to one or two basic patterns, as in linear
change. Although the complexity of activities is great
and their variability ranges widely, researchers can use
powerful tools from dynamic systems and skill analysis
to investigate the structures or organizations (patterns
of components) and find the order in the variation.
The classic frameworks for analyzing structures have
not acknowledged either the dynamics or the selforganizing properties of human action, feeling, and
thought. They have relied on a static conception of
structure as form, seeking simple main effects and
stabilities instead of appreciating the power of analyzing variation. This static conception has reduced structures to one-dimensional forms with most of their
components missing. It has reified psychological structures by treating them as logic, innate ideas, or sociocultural systems instead of placing them directly in the
activities themselves. In its current guise, it forms the
modern synthesis, in which nativist and empiricist positions are no longer in opposition but instead form a common framework based on Cartesian epistemology,
reducing people to separate parts and analyzing them
statically in separated nature and nurture.
Doing research within the dynamic structural framework leads to a different place. Analyzing the variability of human activities turns out to help illuminate the
order within the variation; that is, designing research to
analyze dynamics leads to new insights about the stabilities inside the variability. When development is analyzed as a constructive web instead of a linear ladder,
clearly distinct pathways become evident for different
people. For example, poor readers are not simply low on
the ladder for development of reading, but they are developing their reading skills along more branched, less
integrated pathways than normal readers. Abused children are not simply immature on the ladder for emotional stability and social reciprocity, but they have
created distinct branched (often dissociated) pathways
to cope with their abuse.
When multiple levels of skill are analyzed in each person, the debate about the existence of stages disappears.
There is a common complexity scale for development and
learning across domains, marked by discontinuous jumps
at regular points in the scale, but it functions dynamically, not as a fixed ladder. Under optimal, highly supported conditions, people show jumps in performance
390
that act much like stages; but under ordinary, lowsupport conditions, the same people show no systematic stages, often progressing in smooth, monotonic
growth. The complex shapes of growth curves under
these various conditions provide important tools for
analyzing relations among different components of
human activity because the shapes can serve as clues
for discovering such relations. Analysis of these shapes
suggests relations between development of brain electrical activity and behavior, leading to new models of
cycles of growth that relate brain activity to levels of
skill development.
Recognition that individuals function at multiple simultaneous levels also allows the detection of strong
microdevelopmental progressions reflecting peoples
construction of new skills and knowledge. It illuminates
previously unrecognized mechanisms of transition such
as co-occurrence of alternative strategies for approaching a task, repeated reconstruction of a skill to make it
generalized, and construction of empty algebra-like
shells to guide ones learning and facilitate building
more complex skills. The common complexity scale in
combination with growth models facilitates relating the
short-term processes of microdevelopment to the longterm patterns of macrodevelopment.
When the collaborative nature of most activities is
recognized and analyzed (instead of isolating people
and studying them as separate individuals), important
aspects of development become clarified. Processes of
construction of skills can be straightforwardly detected
in many situations because people interact with each
other about their common activities with a task or problem. Many patterns of emotional development become
clear because so much emotion arises from peoples social relationships. Emotions such as shame and love are
obviously social as well as biological, but even emotions
such as fear, anger, sadness, and joy grow up in relationships and are defined by social scripts. Emotions
act dynamically to shape or bias activity and development, and persistent, strong emotional experiences create distinctive developmental pathways such as richly
textured shame concepts in China and elaborated negative self-in-relationship models in children who suffer
abuse and trauma.
Scholars and researchers now have many new tools
and concepts for analyzing the richness of human development, moving beyond Cartesian paradigms that
reduce dynamic organization to static form and dichotomous analysis in nature versus nurture. Many ex-
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CHAPTER 8
Peers 426
Distal Environments 428
The Environment as a Changing Stage for Individual
Functioning and Development 428
Individual-Environment Synchronization 429
A Cross-Cultural Perspective 430
Summary 431
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE HOLISTICINTERACTIONISTIC MODEL 431
The Holistic Principle: From Variables to Individuals 431
Transformation; Emergence, and Novelty in Structures
and Processes 433
Functional Interaction 434
Temporality 436
Organization 437
Integration of Processes: Synthesis 439
Summary 439
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS 439
Toward a Developmental Science 439
Methodological ImplicationsLooking
for Mechanisms 440
Tools in the Acquisition of Information: Methods for
Data Collection 440
Generalization 441
Measurement Models 443
Comments 447
Statistics 447
RESEARCH STRATEGY 448
A Multivariate Approach 448
A Longitudinal Design 448
Comment 449
Cultural and Cross-Cultural Research 449
Multidisciplinary Collaboration 449
Prevention, Treatment, and Intervention 450
CONCLUSION 451
The Mind: Worldviews and Self-Perceptions 452
REFERENCES 453
400
401
402
common theoretical framework allows astrophysicists to communicate with those concerned with
problems at the atomic level, and vice versa. In his
comments on scientific development, Montgomery
(2004) notes that fragmentation results from a lack
of coherent scientific models: Language in science
is in the midst of change and appears as dominated
by two contradictory trends. Globalization of scientific English seems to promise greater international
unity, while growth of field-specific jargon suggests
communication diasphora (p. 1333). To summarize:
A general model for human functioning and development will help to overcome fragmentation in research
by serving as a common theoretical framework for
the specification of issues and the design and interpretation of empirical studies on specific phenomena
and for effective communication among researchers
on central issues.
THE ENVIRONMENT
In psychological research, the idea that individual functioning cannot be understood without considering the
environment in which it occurs was explicitly expressed
early on in Lewins well-known formula B = f(PE), when
he focused on the individuals life space (Lewin,
1935, p. 1112). However, the environment is a fuzzy
concept with a variety of interpretations, and its application here calls for some specification. For a discussion of
the environmental role in individual functioning and development, the environment can be ordered along the dimension of proximity to the individuals experiences. In
the following discussion, three environmental positions
along that dimension are distinguished: (1) the immediate situation, (2) the proximal environment, and (3) the
distal environment.
An individuals current functioning always takes
place in a situation with specific features. Individual
functioning inevitably relates to specific situational
conditions and cannot be understood in isolation from
them. It is in momentary situations that we meet
the world, form our conceptions of it, and develop our
specific way of handling new situations. Individual experiences are fundamental for the developmental socialization process. Situations presentat different levels
of specificationthe information that we need to act
adequately and they offer us the necessary feedback for
building valid conceptions of the outer world. By assimilating new knowledge and experiences into existing
In this chapter, the concept the physical environment includes the biological components. In Western cultures, other
individuals constitute the most important component. In
other cultures, various forms of domestic and wild animals
also contribute to form the integrated environment.
403
phenomena function as they do at various levels of complexity. This goal is as relevant to the study of human
functioning and development as it is to the study of
physics. The remarkable advances in the physical sciences, and the resulting rapid development of a highly
technological society, have resulted in physics becoming
the model for other scientific disciplines, including behavioral and social sciences. Unfortunately, other fields
have sometimes adopted the goals and values espoused
by physicists without considering whether the phenomena involved are congruent with the model that physics
provides. For example, a central concept in the search
for precise laws in the framework of the Newtonian
mechanistic model of nature is prediction. Ever since
J. B. Watson (1913) defended psychology as a natural
science by proposing that prediction and control of behavior are the goals of scientific psychology, accurate
prediction has often been regarded as a main criterion
for the validity of a scientific law in psychology. Fostered by the development and application of technically
sophisticated statistical tools, prediction has also become a central goal for research on human ontogeny.
The psychological importance of single variables or
composites of variables in individual development is
often measured by how well they predict later outcomes
in statistical terms. The claim that prediction and control are central goals for developmental research continues to be espoused even in areas where it is not very
appropriate.
Exact prediction of individual functioning and development as the ultimate goal for psychological research
can be questioned for two interrelated reasons. The first
has to do with individual functioning as integrated
processes; the second concerns the laws that direct this
type of processes.
One of the fundamental propositions behind modern
models for dynamic complex processes is that these
processes are guided by specific principles but tend to
be unpredictable except under specific, restricted conditions (e.g., Kelso, 2001). Research on human functioning belongs to the life sciences. The Nobel laureate
Frances Crick (1988) discussed the kinds of laws sought
in different disciplines and concluded that the phenomena that are studied in biological systems are such that
the universally valid, strong laws that define physics are
not applicable to biology. Mayr (1997), a leading biologist of the twentieth century, took the same position and
concluded that biology needed to abandon the paradigm
of classical physics to develop as a scientific discipline
404
PERSPECTIVES
An individuals thoughts, feelings, actions, and reactions
can be the object of study from three complementary
perspectives: synchronic, diachronic, and evolutionary.
It should be recognized that the three perspectives are
complementary, not contradictory. This chapter focuses
on the diachronic perspective; that is, the developmental
processes of individuals. The holistic-interactionistic
perspective of individual functioning in a synchronic
perspective was reviewed and discussed in Magnusson
(1990) and Magnusson and Trestad (1993) and the interested reader is referred to those articles. In the following presentation, current functioning is included
when it is appropriate. The evolutionary perspective is
not considered here.
Research on psychological phenomena in a synchronic perspective is concerned with the processes of
thoughts, feelings, actions, and reactions within the
framework of existing mental, biological, and behavioral
structures. Accordingly, synchronic models analyze
and explain why individuals function based on their contemporaneous mental, behavioral, and biological states
and independent of the developmental processes that
may have led to the present state of affairs (e.g., most
cognitive models). In contrast, diachronic models analyze current functioning in terms of the individuals
developmental history. They are concerned with how
relevant aspects of the individual and his or her environment have operated in the process leading to the current
functioning.
Research on individual development refers to
changes in mental, behavioral, and/or biological factors
that are involved in the integrated processes of individual current functioning. In its most general form, development of an organism refers to any progressive or
regressive change in size, shape, and/or function. Research on individual development is concerned with this
process over the life span, from conception to death
(Baltes, Lindenberger, and Staudinger, 1998; Cairns,
405
1998; Overton, 1998; Valsiner & Conolly, 2003, presented elaborated overviews and discussions of the concept of development, its theoretical, conceptual, and
methodological implications).
406
3
As reported above, different concepts and formulations
have been proposed and used for what is here designated
interaction and interactionism, including transaction,reciprocal determinism, dialectic-contextualistic,
process-person, and developmental dualism. Our reason
for using the terms interaction and interactionism is that in
all other life sciences these terms are well established as representing a fundamental aspect of the life processes of living
organisms (e.g., Lindberg, 2000). In social ecology, the interaction concept is a fundamental one. In our view, it can only
be harmful and detrimental to scientific progress in our own
discipline, which is dependent on collaboration with neighboring sciences for successful scientific progress, if we continuously invent and apply new terms instead of adopting
concepts that are already well established in disciplines with
which we want to collaborate.
processes and manifest behavior into the model in a systematic, explicit way.
An essential aspect of a holistic-interactionistic
model is that at all levels of the PE system, from the
macro- to micro-level of cell systems, the operating
components function and develop as integrated systems.
Accordingly, the way integrated processes function and
change is dependent on the interaction among all involved elements, vertically and horizontally, in the hierarchical organization of the organism. This proposition
has decisive implications for effective methodology and
strategy in research on human ontogeny (see the
Methodological Implications section).
Holistic interactionism rests on five basic propositions:
1. The individual is an active, intentional part of a complex, dynamic PE system.
2. The individual functions and develops as a total, integrated organism.
3. Individual functioning in existing psychobiological
structures, as well as developmental change, can
best be described an integrated, complex, and dynamic processes.
4. Such processes are characterized by continuously ongoing interactions (including interdependence)
among mental, behavioral and biological components
of the individual and social, cultural, and physical
components of the environment.
5. The environment functions and changes as a continuously ongoing process of interaction and interdependence among social, cultural, and physical factors.
The holistic-interactionistic model, summarized in
the five propositions, has been fertilized from various
sources at a rapidly increasing pace, largely as a result
of scientific progress in neighboring life sciences (e.g.,
Magnusson, 1999a). Research on psychobiological and
behavioral components of individual functioning and development have contributed to form a model that can
serve as the framework for the design, implementation,
and interpretation of empirical studies on specific issues.
Modern models for dynamic processes, developed in natural sciences, have enriched the holistic-interactionistic
framework, both theoretically and methodologically.
Well-planned longitudinal studies have demonstrated
the uniqueness of individual developmental processes.
This has strengthened the notion of a holistic-interactionistic view as essential for understanding the mech-
407
408
409
410
Data for each of these groups showed coherent but different sets of correlations to various aspects of the adolescent life situations. More than 20 years after the first
observation, other-focused values, relative to selffocused values, in adulthood were related to (a) stronger
interest in other people, preference for being together
with others, and a need to affiliate with other people or
higher sociability; ( b) more attached, than detached, interpersonal style; and (c) more warm and caring partner
relations and a better family climate.
Overall, values and valuations can be seen to have a
co-coordinating role, underlying functioning and development in diverse domains with implications for the life
situation later on. This does not mean that values have a
unidirectional impact on behavior. Values as well as cognitions, emotions, norms, and attitudes are part of the
individual acting as a whole. At the same time, they are
an effect of experiences and socialization, on the one
hand, and influence the selection and interpretation of
information from the external environment, on the other.
For developmental research, the role of values and valuations in the socialization process and the role of various
agents in the transfer of values and norms to youngsters
should be highly central issues (Costanzo, 1991). This
topic was addressed by Stattin, Janson, KlackenbergLarsson, and Magnusson (1995), when concerned with
how parents punishment practices were reflected in
their childrens behaviors after they became parents.
Self-Consciousness, Self-Perceptions, and
Self-Evaluations
In the processes of the individuals inner world as well
as in his or her dealings with the environment selfconsciousnessincluding self-perceptions and selfevaluationsis an important aspect of the mental system.
James (1890) devoted a whole chapter to this issue (e.g.,
Epstein, 1990). In addition, in The Wonder of Being
Human: Our Mind and Our Brain, the Nobel laureate
John Eccles and Donald Robinson (1985) used the term
self-conscious mind for what they saw as the highest
mental experiences and discussed the emergence of selfconsciousness and analyzed it as a central element in the
brain-mind processes.
An expanding body of research has demonstrated
that the ability of individuals to adjust to and cope with
their environment depends on their beliefs and trust in
their capacities, as was empirically demonstrated in
a longitudinal study of females educational careers
411
(Gustafson & Magnusson, 1991). What matters are individuals internal representations of situation-outcome
contingencies and the mental representations of their
roles as active participants in exercising control (e.g.,
Bandura, 1997). Childrens experiences of handling
their environment, of perceived control and predictability, have consequences for their view of themselves as
(a) competent or noncompetent or as confident or nonconfident in their abilities, ( b) for their motivation to
cope with demands of particular situations, and (c) for
mobilization of behavioral and emotional resources.
Harter (1990) described the prototype of the child with
high self-esteem as the child who is confident, curious,
takes initiatives, tolerates frustrations, and adjusts to
environmental changes.
The development of the individuals self-perception,
self-evaluation, and self-respect forms a main element in
the process of learning and experience through which he
or she gains the ability to exert predictive and active control over the environment (Bandura, 1977; Brandtstdter,
1993; Harter, 1983). The issue of personality and self in
a developmental perspective is dealt with comprehensively by Baltes, Lindenberger, and Staudinger (Chapter
11, this Handbook, this volume). Pulkkinen and Rnk
(1994) empirically investigated the relation between
self-identity in personal control over development and
future life orientation and the role of school achievement, school success, and socioeconomic status in the
home for these developmental aspects. In an article on
the interaction between the self and the environment,
Karli (2000) analyzed the interconnected brain regions
that are involved in the socially adaptive functions of affect and emotion.
During developmental transitions, a central role is
played by self-definitions in relation to formal and informal environmental age-graded developmental norms
and expectations. Recent studies have convincingly
shown that teenagers are well aware of whether they are
early, on time, or late with respect to behaviors,
such as formal age-prescribed behaviors and other less
formal behaviors, connected with periods of transition;
for example, time to be in at evening, bedtime, spending
money, choosing clothes, and so on (e.g., Brooks-Gunn
& Petersen, 1983). Stattin and Magnusson (1990) found
that the definition of oneself as early among midadolescent girls tended to be associated with perceiving
oneself as popular among boys, having more advanced
drinking habits, more norm-breaking behaviors, but also
412
more school adjustment problems, and more psychosomatic and depressive reactions. Studies in Norway and
Germany (Alsaker, 1995; Silbereisen & Kracke, 1997)
have also demonstrated that self-definitions of oneself
as being early maturing go hand-in-hand with engaging
in more socially advanced behaviors in adolescence.
In his studies of illiterate inhabitants of isolated villages in Uzbekistan, Luria (1976) empirically demonstrated the basic role of culture in the development of
individual self-perceptions. Brooks-Gunn and Paikoff
(1992) dealt with this issue in their integrated approach
to an analysis of what they designated self-feelings
during the adolescent transition period.
Language and Language Acquisition
A crucial factor in processes of individual functioning
and development is language and language acquisition. In
a current perspective, access to a functional language
plays a fundamental role for internal processes such as
thinking and abstraction, as well as for behavior, for example in social contexts, regardless of cultural context,
age, and level of intelligence. Access to a functioning language is central for the individuals interpretation of
meaning in the environment. Language acquisition in the
development of thinking was a central issue for Piaget
(1964). In his empirical study of isolated and illiterate
Uzbekistanis, Luria (1976) observed the link between access to linguistic ability and abstract thinking. The main
topic of Science in February 2004 Evolution of Language is an indication of the current interest in this area
from a broader scientific perspective. Recent research on
individual language and language acquisition was summarized by Tomasello (1999; see also Lundberg, 2006).
Emotions
Everyday experiences show the importance of affective
tones attached to inner life and external activities, with
effects on our own behaviors and the behaviors of
others. Scientists have recognized this in discussions of
the human nature since ancient times. Darwin (1872)
devoted a book to this issue, The Expression of Emotions
in Man and Animals and William James in Principles
(1890) discussed emotions and their relations to biological processes. From this perspective it is noteworthy,
how empirical research on emotions was underestimated in the postwar period until the final decades of
the twentieth century. A central role in the revival of research on emotions has been played by the work that has
been presented, in the tradition of William James, on
Similarly, Forgas (2002) argued for a multiprocess theory when he discussed the role of affects in interpersonal processes. Tracy and Robins (2004) indicate the
growing awareness of the integrated nature of individual
mental life, focusing on self-conscious emotions, such
as shame and pride, in contrast to basic emotions,
such as sadness and joy (cf. Damasios, 2003, distinction
between feelings and emotions).
Motivation
One of the most important concepts in individual functioning and development is that of motivation, closely
connected with goals, values, emotions, and actions.
Motivation is a fundamental issue for understanding
human functioning and development: In everyday life, it
is easy to recognize motivated individuals. Since the
first centuries A.D., motivation has been a central topic
in models of learning and education. A renewed interest
has been demonstrated in several ways: For example, in
modern action theory it has become a central topic, and
there was a recent issue of European Psychologist focused on motivation and learning in different contexts
(see Jrvel & Volet, 2004). Another issue of the same
journal was devoted to the central issue of motivation
and affect in self-regulation of behavior (Efklides,
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414
Comments
Cautions are advocated when components of the mediating system are the target of theoretical and empirical
analyses. The foregoing discussion of various facets of
the mental system uses a number of concepts, some of
which reflect hypothetical constructs such as values,
goals, norms, attitudes, and self-perceptions. When
using such concepts it is easy to fall into the trap of
reification, to forget that these constructs are only abstractions covering different aspects of an organism
that functions as an organized whole. Perceptions, cognitions, emotions, values, norms, and attitudes are components of the same integrated process.
There are empirical studies to support the old idea
that knowledge is acquired, not innate (Locke, 1690). In
addition, the brain we are born with has properties that
offer both potentials and restrictions for developmental
processes. What becomes of a newly born fetus over the
lifetime is the result of a continuous interaction process
involving person-bound factors as well as factors in the
proximal and distal environments. In this section, we
have drawn attention to basic aspects of the functioning
and development of individual mental life. To understand the functioning of an individuals mind and its
role in the functioning and development of the integrated
individual, all these aspects must be incorporated in a
general model. (From different perspectives, an enormous number of theoretical and empirical studies have
reported on what has been briefly reviewed here. Neither the space available nor our competence permits an
exhaustive treatment of the field. The references given
here do not do justice to all the relevant reports. They
should be regarded as suggestions for further reading.
Harr & Gillett, 1990, among others, provided an
overview of the main topics discussed here.)
Behavior in a Holistic-Interactionistic Model
In the unidirectional models of individual functioning,
behavior is usually regarded as just an outcome. A holisticinteractionistic model, however, views behavior in all
its manifestations, including verbal and motor behavior,
as playing an essential role in the current personsituation interaction, as well as in the processes of individual development.
As previously illustrated, if an individual interprets a
situation as demanding or threatening, the individuals
manifest behavior is an element of a continuously ongoing interaction process. It also serves to change the na-
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416
social interactionsthe calm-connection system (UvnsMoberg, 1998a, 1998b; Uvns-Moberg, Arn, & Magnusson, 2005). The corresponding physiological pattern
consists of muscle relaxation and lowered levels of cortisol and cardiovascular activity as well as enhanced activity in the gastro-intestinal tract promoting digestion and
anabolism. The vagal, parasympathetic nervous system is
activated and the hypothalamo-pituitary axis and the
sympatho-adreno-medullary system are shut down. At the
central level, hypothalamus oxytocin plays an important
integrative role.
From the holistic-interactionistic perspective, the introduction of the calm-connection system fills a vacant
space in the model of the integrated psychobiological
system. It complements and balances the fight-flight
systemintroduced by Cannon (1914) and further developed by Selye (1976)which has played a central
role in research on stress and antisocial behavior. As an
integrated part of the functioning of the total organism,
the concept of the calm-connection system enriches the
theoretical basis for empirical research in the recently
developed positive development area (see Aspinwall
& Staudinger, 2003). As argued by Magnusson and Mahoney (2003), successful research in that area requires a
holistic-interactionistic frame of reference to enable the
formulation of the necessary synthesis of knowledge.
The brain plays a central role in the integration and
coordination of the fight-flight and stress system, on the
one hand, and the calm-connection system, on the other.
During infancy, the brain is particularly open to and dependent on stimulation from the social and physical environment. Under optimal conditions, the brain develops
so that adequate positive and negative emotions are attached to the information offered by the environments
as well as to conscious and subconscious mental activities and behavior.
Comments
The brief overview of the role of biological components
shows the importance of considering such components
in theorizing and empirical research in integrated developmental processes. Two characteristics of the biological tradition in psychological research are noteworthy.
First, for example, despite Angells (1907) incorporation of biological factors into what might be seen primarily as a holistic view of individual functioning,
biological factors have not been consistently integrated
into psychological models. Rather, they have mostly
formed an independent line of research with little im-
The onset and course of certain developmental sequences may be determined genetically to the extent
that they are common to all individuals. However, even
such developmental sequences as the onset of the menstrual cycle and the regulation of growth in height are to
some extent modifiable by environmental factors (Tanner, 1981). That there is a hereditary predisposition for
a certain type of behavior does not mean that it cannot
be changed by environmental intervention (Angoff,
1988). The individual phenotype develops within the
framework offered by the genotype along with the environment, a process that starts at conception and goes on
throughout the life span. On the stage set by inherited
factors, many different dramas are possible (Waddington, 1962).
Accordingly, in most respects, individual development
takes place in a process of maturation and experience in
interaction with the environment, on the basis of and
within the limits set by inherited factors. Kagan (1992),
who argued for a hereditary component in temperament,
emphasized how the environment modifies this influence.
Cairns (1996), in a 20-year evaluation of the roles of
heredity and environment in individual differences in aggression, concluded that the differences in mice obtained
by selective breeding over 30 generations show strong environmental specificity. The aggressive behaviors in descendant lines can be modified by environmental social
conditions to such an extent that the inherited differences
are eliminated. In well-planned longitudinal studies of
newborns, Meyer-Probst, Resler, and Teichmann (1983)
demonstrated that favorable social conditions acted as
protective factors for later social development among
children identified at birth as biologically at risk. With
reference to the results of a training program for animals
and humans, Schrott (1997) concluded that:
environmental stimulation has been found to increase
brain weight (especially forebrain), cortical thickness, the
417
A general model was previously discussed for the interplay of mental, biological, behavioral, and situational
components involved in current functioning of an individual. In this model, the individuals interpretation of
environmental events leads to activation of the sympathetic nervous system and excretion of stress hormones
such as adrenaline and cortisol. Under normal conditions
the process is an adaptive response, with no detrimental
consequences for the individual. However, when persistent stress leads to overproduction of such hormones,
they can override genetic regulation and may cause
harm rather than protection (see Lundberg, 2005).
Biological Age: A Marker of Maturation Rate
As illustrated in the empirical study in IDA, described
earlier, the rate of maturation is a powerful operating
component influencing a girls dealing with the environment and the environments reaction to the girl. Effects of the rate of maturation have also been observed
in studies of boys (Andersson, Bergman, & Magnusson,
1989).
Traditionally, individual development has been expressed in chronological age; that is to say that an individuals level of development is represented by the time
the earth has circled around the sun since he or she was
born. That is the one thing that all individuals with the
same birthday have in common. It is a distressing fact
that most studies on puberty and adolescence still neglect this observation even though alternative bases for
the study of individual differences in developmental rate
have been called for for decades (e.g., Baltes, 1979; Horn
& Donaldson, 1976; Thomae, 1979; Wohlwill, 1973).
The existence of strong interindividual differences in
growth rate may have profound consequences, not only
for individual differences in various aspects of functioning, but also with respect to the way the environment reacts to the individual. Differences in developmental
timing are thereby related to individuals social relations, as well as to their capacity to meet environmental
demands and to use environmental opportunities effectively. However, to control for biological age rather than
chronological age when designing empirical studies is
only a remedy under specified conditions. Biological
and chronological factors are nested; the expression of
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420
Greenspan ended his talk by emphasizing that the challenge now is to find appropriate ways of analyzing
the specific nature of individual organismic processes.
These statements are equally valid for the human being.
The hypothesis of personality crystallization may
help to shed light on the issue of developmental individuality (Magnusson & Mahoney, 2003). According to the
hypothesis, the developmental process of individuals
whose systems organization differ at a certain point in
timeas a result of different constitutional factors, mat-
Comments
The presentation and discussion in this section leads
to two conclusions with fundamental implications
for empirical research on individual, developmental
processes. First, the target of analysis is the individual
as an integrated element in a sociocultural environment
with its specific norms, rules, attitudes, values, and
valuations. Accordingly, these characteristics should
be taken into account in the appropriate way when
designing and interpreting studies on specific issues.
Second, if the researcher wants to generalize about developmental processes across cultures, a careful theoretical and, in some cases, empirical, cultural, and
cross-cultural analysis is required.
ment of the integrated PE system. It is rather to draw attention to environmental aspects that should be considered when designing, implementing, and interpreting
empirical studies on specific developmental problems.
For a fuller conceptual treatment of the role of environmental factors in developmental processes, the reader
is referred to Bronfenbrenner and Morris (1998) and
Schweder et al. (1998).
The Concept of Context
A key concept in models for individual current functioning and development is that of context. The total, integrated, and organized PE system, of which the
individual forms a part, consists of a hierarchical system of elements, from the cellular level of the individual
to the macrolevel of environments (Hinde, 1996; Lerner,
1978; Riegel, 1975). In actual operation, the role and
functioning of each element depends on its context of
other, simultaneously working components, horizontally
and vertically. The development and functioning of a
cell depends on the functioning and development of surrounding cells with which it communicates; that is, it depends on an influx of information from surrounding
cells (Damasio & Damasio, 1996; Edelman, 1987). The
development and functioning of the cardiovascular system is dependent on how other bodily systems, for example, the immune system, develop and function. An
individuals socialization process depends on the functioning and development of other individuals with which
he or she associates. The way an element of a certain
culture functions, such as the proximal environment of
the individual, is dependent on how other, related elements function.
The total PE system is hierarchically organized
with respect to structures as well as to accompanying
processes (Koestler, 1978, used the concept holarcy
to denote this characteristic feature of a system). Each
level of the system is simultaneously a totality in relation to lower levels and a subsystem in relation to higher
levels. Systems at different levels are mutually interdependent. The functioning and development of the proximal sociocultural system, of which the individual is a
part, depends on the characteristic features of the society and culture (e.g., Bateson, 1996; Hinde, 1996). In
sociology, Coleman (1990) presented a comprehensive
theory of the functioning of the individual and the environment and the interactive characters of this process.
This section is restricted to identifying and discussing
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422
Current individual functioning and individual development are dependent on the sociocultural environment at
by the environment. The perceptual-cognitive-emotional process of selecting and interpreting relevant information from the environment is largely affected by
prior learning and experiences of similar past events,
as underscored in adaptation-level models (e.g.,
Schneirlas, 1957, discussion of trace effects). Prior
exposure has generated cognitive schemata, attitudes,
and more or less habitual ways of handling, coping
with, and securing control of the environment
(Thompson, 1981).
Experiences are interpreted in the current frame of
reference. Helsons (1964) adaptation level theory
couches this process as an influence from earlier, repeated experiences of stimuli of a similar kind, present background factors, and residual memories of
cognitions, emotions, and actions associated with previously experienced situations that are now recurring.
Or, in the words of the Nobel laureate Aron Klug:
One doesnt see with ones eyes, one sees with the
whole fruit of ones previous experience (Fensham &
Marton, 1991). Krupat (1974) also subscribed to similar
notions about human functioning when he stated that:
prior experiences with danger (as well as confidence in
ones own ability) act to decrease the subjects sense of
vulnerability (p. 736). Repeated exposure to the same
type of environmental event has a variety of effects. It
might, for example, lead to a decreased strength of reactivity (Magnusson & Trestad, 1992), to a more positive
attitude with mere exposure effect (Moreland & Zajonc, 1982), or to substituting the original quality of reaction with its opposite opponent process (Landy,
1978; Solomon & Corbit, 1974). Accordingly, individual differences in preceding person-environment interactions and the functioning of the individuals mental
systems, lead to individual differences in the interpretation of the stimuli and events of a current situation. Such
individual differences account for the partly unique way
in which individuals cope with situational conditions.
The concept of the environment as a source of stimulation is best illustrated in experimental psychology. An
essential tenet of the experimental tradition is that the
stimulus is defined in objective terms. This assumes that
the impact of a certain contextual factor is general and
has the same meaning and the same stimulus value to all
individuals (e.g., Fechners reasoning about the objective character of physical stimuli).
Learning theories, which are of interest for our discussion, emphasize the role of the environment as a
source of information. For example, in Bolles (1972)
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425
426
and preoccupation with the complex mechanisms involved in parenting: moderating and mediating factors,
multiple determination, and interaction processes. Recently, Maccoby (2003) again emphasized the bidirectional view on research:
Nowadays, most students of family dynamics adopt a
much more nuanced view of influence among family
members. They see it as a set of reciprocal processes unfolding over time, with each family member adapting to
the overall configurations of family roles and functions,
as well as to each other family member individually.
(p. 193)
research on peer relations can be distinguished: (1) individual behavior associated with peer relations, (2) the
characteristics and the functioning of the peer group for
individual behavior, and (3) the contextual embeddedness of the peer group.
Individual Behavior Dependency of
Peer Association
The first theme focuses on the individual and the peer
group and is of interest only insofar as it yields information about the individual. During the 1970s and
1980s, hundreds of studies were conducted on individuals peer status (i.e., popular versus unpopular; neglected, controversial, and rejected children) and
associated characteristics such as peer interaction, coping and problem solving, social skills and competence,
school adjustment and achievement, different aspects
of personality, emotions, loneliness, and prosocial and
agonistic behavior (e.g., Coie, Dodge, & Coppotelli,
1982; Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983). In a developmental
perspective, data for social-skill problems and low peer
status of children and adolescents were statistically related to data for adjustment problems later in life such
as school dropout, delinquency, and mental health problems (e.g., Cowen, Pederson, Babigian, Izzo, & Trost,
1973; Kohlberg, LaCross, & Ricks, 1972). This line of
research was to a large degree a psychometric and sociometric approach, and reflected in the main a unidirectional view of causality.
Characteristics and Functioning of the Peer Group
The object of interest in the second line of research is
the functioning of the peer group and its psychosocial
processes. Bronfenbrenner (1943) made an essential
point that is in line with the general view of this chapter:
Social development applies not only to the individual but
to the social organization of which he is a part. Variations
occur not only in the social status of a particular person
within the group, but also in the structure of the group itselfthat is, in the frequency, strength, pattern, and the
basis of the inter-relationships which bind the group together and give it distinctive character. (p. 363)
427
In contrast to the traditional sociometric and psychometric approach, a process-oriented approach was
adopted by Cairns and Cairns (1994) in their longitudinal research program, as well as implemented in the theoretical framework of this chapter. Based on data
collected on an individual basis over the whole adolescent period for a large sample, almost without attrition,
they were able to study in depth and in process terms the
dynamics of peer relations and the role of these relations
for the developmental processes of individuals during
adolescence (Neckerman, 1992). A program with the
same goal, of depicting action in, was the Berlin Youth
Longitudinal Study. Among other things, empirical
studies in that program (see Silbereisen & Noack, 1988)
revealed the dual quality of many adolescent behaviors
in both compromising momentary or future psychosocial
health and being tools in the pursuit of satisfying the individuals personal and social goals.
Seen in the life-course perspective, a central question is how peer characteristics come into the picture of
changing behaviors. Studies from the IDA program, reported by Magnusson et al. (1985) and Stattin and Magnusson (1990), verified how social behaviors, in both a
short- and long-term perspective, are systematically
linked with characteristics of the peers with whom one
associates in early adolescence. For further empirical
research, the interesting observation is that it is relationship to peers outside the classroom that matters
most, a finding that restricts the generalizability of
findings obtained by studying relations to classmates.
Studies from the same program have documented that
association with nonconventional peers together with
low educational motivation in adolescence, is an antecedent factor in the background to an adult homemaking orientation rather than a career orientation among
females (Gustafson, Stattin, & Magnusson, 1992).
The wealth of studies on peer relations has been more
informative about relationships between peer status and
behavior, and the social and personal characterization of
the individual relative to the group, than about how the
peer climate reinforces individual behavior, what characterize the peer group and its stabilization, group
processes, and how behavior develops in the peer group
(Hartup, 1996). One line of research has contributed
new information on how delinquency escalates in friendship groups. In videotaped experimental settings, Dishion and colleagues (Dishion, McCord, & Poulin, 1999)
examined how rule-breaking talk develops when boys
speak and respond to each others comments; the authors
428
Distal Environments
Family and peers are not the only socializing influences
on children and adolescents. Proximal environments are
embedded in economic, social, and cultural systems of a
higher order. The specific nature of these distal systems
in a particular society determines the opportunities
and restrictions for the functioning and development of
proximal environments, such as the family and peer
groups, as well as the opportunities and restrictions for
the functioning and development of individuals. A great
deal of research has been focused on the broader sociocultural influences, as represented in the community,
the neighborhood, at school, and in leisure-time settings
(e.g., Lerner, 1995). For example, whether or not pubertal maturation affects girls social adjustment has been
found to be dependent on the school setting (Caspi,
1995), neighborhood conditions (Ge, Broady, Conger,
Simons, & Murry, 2002), and characteristics of the
community (Dick, Rose, Viken, & Kaprio, 2000).
Social and Economic Conditions
The best-known example of how distal economic and social factors and changes in these respects affect individual behavior is the seminal work by Elder and coworkers
using data from the longitudinal studies at the Institute
of Human Development at Berkeley, California (see,
e.g., Elder, 1998). A series of studies systematically
mapped the impact on family cohesion, parenting, and
child behavior of the economic crisis during the depression in the early 1930s. One of the findings is that the
economic pressure of severe income loss mainly affected the husbands (Elder, Van Nguyen, & Caspi,
1985). The increased arbitrary discipline of fathers,
elicited by income loss, then affected problem behavior
of the boys. A longitudinal study of how hard times, economic crisis, and value changes in Albania have affected
family relations and child behavior, was reported by
Kloep (1995). The psychosocial timetable may be heavily influenced by the broader macro social conditions
and institutions, as demonstrated by Silbereisen (1995)
in a series of studies with respect to vocational choice,
when he compared adolescents raised in the former East
and West Germany.
Formal and Informal Societal Regulations
To a varying extent, opportunities and restrictions for
the functioning and development of individuals and of
proximal environments are determined by formal, societal rules. Some are bound to chronological age such as
entering and ending compulsory education, joining the
army, or age of retirement. Some are nationally regulated, while others may be locally determined. The extent to which legal norms exist varies across countries
and societies. The socialization process is also dependent on and influenced by informal societal norms and
rules such as the rules for dating in the traditional U.S.
culture or for female dress in fundamentalist Muslim
countries. Informal rules for individual behavior may be
general and even hold across societies; others are more
specific and bound to certain groups (e.g., religious
sects) or temporary trends (the hippie movement of the
1960s and 1970s). To some extent they are normative, for
example being based on chronological age, and to some
extent they are more individual, and bound to, for example, intellectual competence or membership of a certain
class. Even the societal regulations that are informal
may create implicit, sometimes very strong elements of
expectations in the individuals sociocultural setting. In
that sense, they are forceful in regulating individual behavior, particularly during puberty and adolescence.
429
timetable of demands and opportunities for the individual; a timetable that is sometimes strongly age graded
(Caspi, 1987). Despite the wealth of specific options, a
countrys broader institutional infrastructure and legal
system are often similar for the majority, spelling out
normative social roles and norms at different ages. This
is not to say that children and adolescents have only one
route to follow. On the contrary, one of the central
problems in individual development lies in the synchronization of the individuals mental, biological and behavioral capacities with the demands, opportunities,
and restrictions of the proximal and distal environments. The diversity of possible life paths may generate
stress and insecurity among young people. What can be
considered a favorable pathway toward adulthood in a
society depends on the cultures implicit theory of success (Klaczynski, 1990; Ogbu, 1981). It also depends
on local variations in the ecology. For example, a rural
environment typically offers less educational and occupational opportunities, and adolescents and their parents educational aspirations tend to be lower than in
more urban milieus (Sarigiani, Wilson, Petersen, &
Vicary, 1990).
It can be argued that much of young peoples thinking
about the future (occupation, education, family and
marriage, and material standards) and about themselves
is linked with formal contextual and age-dependent
changes (Nurmi, 1991, 2002). Rather than being strictly
related to cognitive development or due to an unfolding
of cumulative earlier experiences, thoughts about oneself (identity and self-concept) and ones future (plans,
decisions concerning the future, wishes, and fantasies),
and the restructuring of these self-views and worldviews
are likely to depend on the chronological age for formal
transitions, particularly in education. Entering the gymnasium or not in Sweden, just like entering college or not
in the United States, has a major consequence for future
work roles (e.g., Petersen, 1993). Accordingly, the unfolding structure of the educational system in a given
society can provide much of the incentives for change in
adolescence and for decisions that have effects on the
adult roles of parent, spouse, and worker (e.g., Klaczynski, 1990). It has also been argued that what may be seen
as a general trend (e.g., declines in educational motivation in early adolescence) and interpreted as a consequence of characteristics of the developmental period in
question, may actually be a reflection of specific
changes in the school environment in mid-adolescence,
which are at odds with individual aspirations (Eccles
et al., 1993). With a shared timetable for youngsters in a
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Summary
This section summarizes and refers to a number of empirical studies on specific aspects of environments and
their significance for individual development. Taken together, they demonstrate the broad range of proximal
and distal aspects of the environment that are involved
in individuals current functioning and in the developmental processes that should be considered in a general
model for these processes.
For a proper interpretation of the empirical studies
we have referred to, it should be observed that individuals adaptation to and handling of environmental conditions is a complex, dynamic process that needs a
general, overriding theoretical framework in the final
analyses of individual developmental processes. With
few exceptions, the studies reported here have dealt
with one or a few environmental components at a time
at the group level, applying unidirectional models for
PE relations. This approach has contributed to the
identification of possible working environmental factors in the developmental processes. Empirical research has seldom dealt with the process of interaction
in which environmental conditions operate at the individual level. The implications for theorizing about developmental processes are dealt with in a later section
on measurement models.
One of the major challenges for further progress in
research on the role of environmental factors in developmental processes is to develop and apply strategies and
measurement tools that are appropriate for studying this
issue at the level of the individual. This is an exceedingly difficult task but that cannot be a reason for not attempting it.
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A change in one aspect affects related parts of the subsystem and sometimes the whole organism. Mayr (1997)
emphasized the concept of emergence as one of the two
major pillars of a holistic view on living organisms:
that in a structured system, new properties emerge at
higher levels of interaction which could not have been
predicted from a knowledge of the lower-level components (p. 19). At a more general level, the restructuring of structures and processes at the individual level
is embedded in and part of the restructuring of the
total PE system.5
Accordingly, individual development implies continuous reorganization of existing patterns of structures and processes and creation of new ones.
Sometimes totally novel behaviors appear. Research
from the longitudinal program at Chapel Hill is illustrative (Cairns, Cairns, Neckerman., Fergusson, &
Garipy, 1989). In late childhood, girls develop new
techniques of aggressive expression, including the
ability to ostracize and ridicule peers in such a way
that the target is unaware of who is attacking her. Females employ this strategy with increasing frequency
in late adolescence. Boys, on the other hand, are more
characterized by the developmental continuation of
confrontational techniques that leave them open to direct and violent reprisals. What on the surface seems
to be the same behavior for all individuals at various
age levels may differ in its psychological significance
for different individuals of the same age and for the
same individual over time. This consequence of the
434
principle of novelty in the holistic, integrated developmental process of an individual is often ignored in traditional developmental research.
Functional Interaction
Much of the debate on individual functioning in the
framework of classical interactionism has been based on
empirical studies that investigated person-environment
interactions across individuals in statistical terms at the
group level, using traditional experimental designs. In
contrast, a fundamental characteristic of the processes
of all living organisms at all levels is functional interaction among operating factors at the individual level
(Miller, 1978; von Bertalanffy, 1968). Components of
open systems do not function in isolation, and usually do
not function interdependently in a linear manner within
individuals. The processes are much more complex, particularly when mental, biological, and behavioral components are involved in joint operations.
Functional interaction is a characteristic of the developmental process of an individual in the life-span perspective;
from the interaction that takes place between single cells in
the early development of the fetus (e.g., Edelman, 1989;
OLeary, 1996) to the individuals interplay with his or her
environment across the life span. The building blocks of all
biological organs are the cells. Behind individual development as an organized, functional totality from a single cell
lies the process of interaction among cells. Each cell develops, functions, and dies as a result of cell-cell interaction in
which information is received from and sent to neighboring
cells. The application of techniques from molecular biology
and biophysics to unicellular model systems and nowadays
even to transgenic organisms has opened up new avenues to
an understanding of the mechanisms that regulate the
growth, division, and development of new forms of cells
and cell structures. In biological sciences, interaction is a
central concept in models for the functioning and development of all living organisms, as emphasized by Mayr
(2000b). In the annual report for 1998/1999 from the
Swedish Council for Research in Natural Sciences, a central chapter was devoted to discussing the fundamental role
of interaction in biological processes from cellular protein
to brain level (Lindberg, 2000).6
6
for the study of interaction in data sets. Functional interaction as a characteristic of developmental processes should
be distinguished from statistical interaction models as tools
in the treatment of data. In principle, they have only the word
interaction in common (Magnusson, 2001).
Nonlinearity
As stated previously, much psychological research is focused on the statistical relations among variables at the
group level. The most frequently used methods assume
(a) that the relation among the variables is linear across
individuals, and ( b) that the relation obtained across individuals holds for the relation among factors operating
within an individual.
Our concern here is linearity versus nonlinearity in
the interrelations among components operating at the
individual level. Nonlinearity, more often than linearity, is a characteristic of individual processes. The principle implies, for example, that the effect of hormone A
on the dependent hormone B is not necessarily linear;
the relation may assume very different functions. The
same holds true for the interplay of a single individual
with his or her environment. For example, individuals
psychological and physiological stress reactions to increasing stimulation from the environment are often
nonlinear. The inverted U-relation found between performance as well as psychological and physiological
stress reactions for individuals, on the one hand, and
the strength of the demand from the environment, on
the other, is one example. The nonlinear function for the
relation between two operating person-bound factors or
the relation between the individual and his or her environment may differ among individuals.
Causality in Functional Interaction
Understanding an individuals way of functioning and
developing includes a discussion about causal mechanisms. These mechanisms are of special concern when
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436
Temporality
Another central concept in a holistic-interactionistic
model is that of process. A process can be characterized as a continuous flow of interrelated, interdependent
events. This definition introduces time as a fundamental
element in any model for individual functioning and development. In modern models of dynamic processes, a
central concept is motion. Further, key aspects of biological processes are rhythm and periodicity (Weiner, 1989).
Faulconer and Williams (1985), drawing on Heidegger,
emphasized the importance of annexing temporality in
our endeavors to understand individual functioning.
Without the principle of temporality, the fundamental dynamic aspect of the processes of current functioning and
development is ignored (e.g., Dixon & Lerner, 1988). The
earlier referenced study by Li et al. (2004) shows how
cognitive structure varies across ages in a nonlinear way
and empirically demonstrates the importance of considering the temporal aspect of central individual processes
in life-span research.
The temporal perspective varies with the character of
the system under consideration. Individual differences in
biological age among girls had consequences for current
behavior during puberty and early adolescence but also
for the further lifestyle in unexpected ways. Processes in
systems at a lower level are generally characterized by
shorter time perspectives than processes at a higher level.
Cairns and Cairns (1985) made a distinction between
short-term interactions in the perspective of seconds and
minutes and developmental interactions in the perspective of months and years. They proposed that social
learning processes, which are central for short-term, current adaptations, may be reversed or overwhelmed in the
long-term by slower-acting maturational, biosocial
processes (see also Riegel, 1975, in his presentation of a
dialectical theory of development).
The pace at which structures and processes in the individual change as a result of maturation and experiences
varies with the nature of the systems, especially the level
of subsystems (see the discussion by Lerner, Skinner, &
Sorell, 1980, about nonequivalent temporal metric).
The anatomical structure of the fetus changes, as a result
of cell-context interaction, much faster than the individual changes during adolescence. P. W. Sternberg (2004)
pointed to a characteristic feature of cell development
that should be considered in research on the development
of biological mechanisms at the basic level, by stating:
The amazing precision with which different cell types
find their correct location in developing tissues has fascinated biologists for decades. Models of cell fate patterning during development emphasize the contrast between
spatial gradients of developmental signals that act at long
range and cell-to-cell signaling events that act locally.
(p. 637)
Implications
To understand them, transformation processes must be
followed over time. Short-term processes can be followed, observed, and studied by applying an experimental design. For long-term processes (e.g., pubertal
change), the most frequent approach is systematized observation over time: a longitudinal study. Only by following girls up to adult age could the relevance of the
teenage behavior in life course be traced in our study of
biological age.
A fundamental circumstance with decisive consequences for empirical research is the existence of sometimes very strong interindividual differences with
respect to the pace of developmental transformation
processes. The study of individual differences in biological maturation among teenage girls, referred to above,
demonstrates the inadequacy of cross-sectional studies
on long-term developmental processes. Overwhelming
numbers of empirical studies on adolescence have been
and are being performed with reference to data from
samples of a certain chronological age. The effect is
to introduce an irrelevant and, with respect to size,
unknown part of the total variance in sample data.
Studying problems among girls at that age using a crosssectional design, without considering the interindividual
differences in the psychobiological timing of pubertal
processes, may lead to erroneous conclusions and to
negative consequences for the girls if the results are
used as a basis for interventions.
Organization
The holistic-interactionistic model does not imply that
developmental processes are random. A fundamental
basis for the scientific analysis of individual development is the proposition that processes are guided by
basic principles and specific mechanisms in structures
that are organized and function as patterns of operating
factors at all levels of the individual. Organs and components of organs constitute functional units of the total,
integrated organism. Principles and mechanisms in the
orderly organization serve to maintain integration and
stability both of current functioning and of developmental change.
The orderly organization of behavior in a developmental perspective was emphasized and discussed by
Fentress (1989). An interesting question is whether the
differences between early development and aging are es-
437
40
438
30
SPB
DBP
HR
20
10
0
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
THEORETICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
A characteristic feature of scientific progress in empirical sciences is increasing specialization. When specialization in a subfield of the natural sciences has
reached a certain level, it becomes apparent that further progress lies in integration with what has been
achieved in neighboring disciplines. In the introduc-
439
tion, we drew attention to the role of the theory of evolution for scientific progress in biological sciences. In
general, the most important steps forward in natural
sciences have been taken by integration at the interfaces of what were earlier conspicuously different disciplines; for example, at the interface of physics and
chemistry and later at the interface of biology, chemistry, and physics. The earlier unambiguous and clear
boundaries between subdisciplines changed to new disciplines, as scientific progress toward a better understanding of the physical and biological world required
general models of nature.
We have briefly referred to what is the rule in natural
sciences, including biology, to emphasize the fundamental
role played by an overriding general theoretical framework for progress in those disciplines: The same holds for
psychology as a scientific discipline. A general theoretical
framework, a general model of the individual and society,
is sorely needed for further, real progress in research on
human ontogeny. The holistic-interactionistic model for
individual development is suggested to meet that need.
The basic principles of the holistic-interactionistic
modelthe holistic principle, transformation with
emergence and novelty, functional interaction, temporality, organization, and synthesishave decisive
consequences for the planning, implementation, and interpretation of empirical studies when the task is to contribute to the understanding of developmental processes.
Now, that this perspective is increasingly accepted theoretically, the scientific challenge is to take its consequences seriously in empirical research.
To dispel a common misunderstanding and criticism,
let us emphasize again that a holistic, integrated model
for individual functioning and development does not
imply that the entire system of an individual must be
studied in every research endeavor. The acceptance of a
common model of nature in natural sciences has never
meant that the whole universe should be investigated in
every study of specific problems.
Toward a Developmental Science
A consequence of the view advocated here is that for a
full understanding and explanation of the developmental
processes of individuals, knowledge from what is traditionally incorporated in developmental psychology is not
enough. We need contributions from the interface of a
number of traditional scientific disciplines: developmental biology, cognitive sciences, developmental psychology, physiology, endocrinology, neuropsychology,
440
social psychology, sociology, anthropology, and neighboring disciplines. The total space of phenomena involved in the process of lifelong individual development
forms a clearly defined and delimited domain for scientific discovery. This domain constitutes a scientific discipline of its own, developmental science (Cairns, 2000;
Magnusson, 1999b, 2000; Magnusson & Cairns, 1996).
The contributions by excellent scientistsrepresenting
different aspects of individual development, from the
fetal period to aging and from the cellular level to the interdependence of biology and cultureat a Nobel symposium under the auspices of the Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences in 1994, conspicuously attested to
the underlying principles and the need for the establishment of Developmental Science (Magnusson, 1996b).
The organization of research on individual development
in the interface of well-established disciplines is in line
with the growing urge for cross-disciplinary collaboration (e.g., Kafatos & Elsner, 2004). The proposition that
research on individual development constitutes a field of
research with its special demands on theory, methodology, and research strategy, does not mean that psychology loses its identity as a scientific discipline. Physics,
chemistry, and biology did not lose their special merits
as a result of the new developments at their interfaces.
Contributing essential knowledge to developmental science instead strengthens psychology as an active partner
in the mainstream of scientific progress.
Methodological Implications: Looking
for Mechanisms
At an early stage, we proposed three main tasks for psychological research; the third was to identify the mechanisms that guide the operation of working factors in
individual functioning and developmental processes.
This goal requires the application of methodological
tools that are explicitly linked to the character of the relevant phenomena and considering the basic principles of
developmental processes.
The formulation of holistic interactionism draws attention to some earlier methodological issues of developmental research and raises some new ones. If the basic
principles of the holistic-interactionistic model are
taken seriously, there are specific implications for planning, implementing, and interpreting empirical studies.
Nature of Phenomena: Levels of Analysis
The nature of the structures and processes involved at
different levels of the integrated person-environment sys-
In empirical research, the classical method for observation and acquisition of information is the experimental design. Experimental designs are also
important tools in a study concerned with current or
developmental processes. Such designs are indispensable and particularly useful for the study of short-term
transformation processes, such as during the fetal period of life, and of brain development at the cellular
level as an effect of external information, for instance,
in brain research on learning (e.g., E. R. Kandel &
Schwartz, 1982). OConnor (2003) emphasized the advantages of natural experiments in research on early
experiences. This research strategy is an important
tool both in experimental research on short-term
processes and in studies on developmental processes
over longer periods (e.g., Cairns, 1986a; Cairns &
Rodkin, 1998).
The focus of this chapter is on individual development as a dynamic process of change across the life
span. The basic principles that characterize the target
of analysis restrict the application of the classical experimental design in empirical studies on basic developmental issues. The main reasons for this conclusion
are the individuality of the processes and the individual differences in the way the basic principles of developmental processes function simultaneously. In this
situation, systematized observation becomes an indispensable complementary tool. The history of science is
full of illustrations to support this proposition.
Charles Darwins theory of evolution was based on
his systematization of careful observations. Johannes
Keplers ingenious trio of laws for the earths movement around the sun stemmed from Tycho Brahes
careful and systematic observations of the movement
of the planets. Carl von Linnaeuss system for the
categorization of plants was likewise the result of systematic observations, as was Flemings discovery
of penicillin. These contributions are only examples
of all those that have formed the necessary conditions
for further theoretical progress in their respective
disciplines.
The basic principles of developmental processes
lead to the conclusion that progress in research on
working mechanisms requires further development
and application of appropriate methods for systematic
observation and description under controlled conditions. Sometimes nature offers conditions for systematized observation. An illustration of how knowledge
can be obtained by observations that use variation in
441
442
(see also von Eye & Bergman, 2003). Borkenau and Ostendorf (1998) came to the same result with empirical
studies on individuals.
Third, results cannot be generalized from group
means to individuals. Lewin (1931) strongly argued for
this proposition. For example, representative sample
means for a specific performance at a certain age are
sometimes used as reference points for the evaluation of
performance by individuals or groups of individuals.
However, any parent can observe that their child does
not necessarily follow the age curves presented in developmental research. Using group means as a basis for
conclusions about the complex, dynamic processes of
the individual will inevitably conceal important mechanisms. Kagan, Snidman, and Arcus (1998) discussed and
emphasized, with reference to empirical studies of children, the value of studying statistically extreme groups.
Fourth, results concerning possible operating factors
in one cultural context cannot be generalized to others
without careful considerations. Neither can results concerning the role of specific components operating in one
generation be generalized to another generation independent of the nature of the structures and processes
under study.
An example of cross-national differences, important to consider in generalization of results on individual development, is a series of studies on how
German, Russian, and American childrens beliefs
about their ability relate to school performance. In
general, few cross-national differences were found
with respect to childrens views of what factors are
important for performance. However, American children systematically reported stronger beliefs that they
could inf luence these factors and their performance.
Despite this, considerably lower belief-school grade
correlations were obtained for the American than
European children (Little, Oettingen, Stetsenko,
& Baltes, 1995; Oettingen, Little, Lindenberger, &
Baltes, 1994). Silbereisen and coworkers have
compared youngsters raised in the former East Germany with similar groups in West Germany with
respect to correlates and background conditions
of transition behaviors. Their analyses revealed that
many correlates in the East were quite different
from those of the West, while youngsters raised
in West Germany were often similar to those found
in U.S. studies. One illustration is the timing of
leaving home (Silbereisen, Meschke, & Schwartz,
1996).
443
Measurement Models
Methods are tools for analyzing data to understand
the processes operating within given psychobiological
structures and involved in developmental change.
The development of sometimes sophisticated statistical tools has helped to strengthen empirical developmental research. However, for a correct application
of statistical methods it is crucial to recognize that
they are tools for analysis of data in the same way
as axes, knives, and razors are tools for cutting. Tools
are never good or bad in themselves. The appropriateness of a particular statistical method for a particular
study depends on how effectively it contributes to
a correct answer to the problem. The degree of statistical sophistication can never be a criterion of the
scientific value of an empirical study.
Traditionally, statistics are most often applied in the
following strategy framework:
Problemdatastatistics
No statistical tool has a value on its own in the research process, it is only when a statistical tool
matches the character of the phenomena, that is, when
it is linked to an analysis of the phenomena under investigation, that it can contribute scientifically solid answers to relevant questions. The claim here is that
adequate application of any statistical method presupposes a research strategy that includes a measurement
model linking the statistics to the problem; that is, the
following general schemata:
Problemmeasurement modeldatastatistics
Two basic complementary measurement models
(MMs), with specific implications for the data to be
used and the relevant statistical tools, were proposed
by Magnusson (1998, 2003). The fundamental difference between both MMs lies in the way in which the
psychological significance of a single datumrepresenting a response to a stimulus, a response to a test or
questionnaire item, a rating of observed behavior, and
so onis derived. The theoretical framework for the
conceptual distinction between both measurement
models is expressed in what has been designated
the variable approach and the person approach,
respectively.
444
Measurement Model 1
According to measurement model 1 (MM1), a single
datum for individual A on a latent dimension k derives its
psychological significance from its position on that dimension in relation to positions for other individuals, B,
C, D, and so on as shown in Figure 8.2a.
MM1 is the measurement model for what has been
designated the variable approach. In general, empirical
developmental research is dominated by the application
of MM1. This is the case for most of the studies on the
role of environmental conditions in the developmental
processes of individuals, which we referenced earlier.
The approach also dominates empirical studies on relationships among person-bound variables. The focus is on
a single variable or a combination of variables, their interrelations (R-R and S-R relations), and their relations
to a specific criterion. The problems are formulated in
terms of variables and the results are interpreted and
generalizations made in such terms. Commonly used statistical models include comparisons between means and
other location parameters, correlation and regression
analyses, factor analysis, structural equation modeling,
contingency tables, and the original version of LISREL.
An abundant arsenal of statistical tools is available and
applied in these analyses (see, e.g., Bergman, Magnusson,
& El-Khouri, 2003).
Latent dimension k
(a)
A
Latent dimension k
Latent dimension l
Latent dimension m
Latent dimension n
(b)
Figure 8.2 (a) Measurement model 1: The variable approach. ( b) Measurement model 2: The person approach.
These assumptions should be observed for the correct application of linear models in MM1. Two interrelated features of data matrices for individual variables
are involved.
The first has to do with the existence of statistical
colinearity at the data level, reflected in sometimes
very high functional interrelations among the large
number of operating components involved in most developmental processes (e.g., Darlington, 1968). At the individual level, the variables in the data analyses cover
different aspects of the functioning of one and the same
organism as a totality. Thus, it is not surprising that data
pertaining to one latent variable also contains information about other, simultaneously operating latent variables in the process. The high correlations often found in
data at group level, for example, among various aspects of
manifest behavior such as aggression and motor restlessness, reflect the fact that they largely overlap with respect
to content at the individual level. Therefore, studies of
data for single variables will, sometimes greatly, overestimate the unique contribution of single components to the
process of developmental change, as well as the unique
role of specific aspects of the environment in these
processes. The strength of this effect was empirically illustrated by Magnusson, Andersson, and Trestad (1993)
in a study of the developmental background of adult alcohol problems. This effect is most often overlooked because frequently the role of only one or a few variables is
studied and reported, independent of each other.
The second feature is the existence of statistical interactions among operating variables (e.g., Hinde &
Dennis, 1986). To a certain extent, statistical interactions can be handled in, for example, structural modeling, but these possibilities are limited. As shown by
Bergman (1988a), in spite of the existence of interactions in data, variable oriented linear analyses do not always consider these interactions when the model is
tested against the correlation matrix.
From a historical point of view it is interesting to note
that Baltes already in 1979, with reference to reviews of
life-span developmental research, emphasized the inappropriateness of one-factor and unidimensional conceptions of development and concluded: On the contrary,
German writers have espoused a position that includes
multidimensionality, multidirectionality, and discontinuity as key factors of any theory of human development
through the life span (p. 263). However, on the whole empirical research did not draw the necessary consequences
445
A
E
F
Aggressiveness
Motor restlessness
Lack of concentration
Lack of school
motivation
446
standard deviation does not dominate the pattern analysis. However, this is a medicine with side effects because
it may be important to retain differences in variation between variables. Sometimes this can be achieved approximately, for instance by using quasi-absolute scaling. This
issue was dealt with in detail by Bergman, Magnusson,
and El-Khouri (2003, pp. 3842).
With reference to different theoretical models of the
phenomena being investigated, a number of methods for
pattern analysis have been presented and applied: cluster analytical techniques (Bergman, 2002; Bock, 1987;
Manly, 1994), Q-sort technique (Block, 1971; Ozer,
1993), latent profile analysis (LPA; Gibson, 1959), configural frequency analysis (CFA; Lienert & zur Oeveste,
1985), latent transition analysis (Collins & Wugalter,
1992), log-linear modeling (Bishop, Feinberg, & Holland, 1975), and multivariate P-technique factor analysis (Cattell, Cattell, & Rhymer, 1947; Nesselroade &
Ford, 1987). (See also, Cronbach & Gleser, 1953, who
discussed four cases for profile similarity.) Overviews
and discussions of models were presented by Bergman
et al. (2003) and von Eye and Bergman (2003).
For the study of developmental issues, the approach
has primarily been applied in studies linking patterns
observed at different ages. Relatively few attempts have
been made to develop and apply methods for the empirical analyses of dynamic, developmental processes in
patterns. For further progress in research on human ontogeny, an important challenge lies in the development
and application of such methodological tools.
447
448
RESEARCH STRATEGY
The foregoing sections have outlined a number of implications for successful research strategies in psychological research in general and in developmental research in
particular. Instead of repeating them, attention is drawn
to a few consequences, which ensure naturally from the
perspective developed in this chapter.
A Multivariate Approach
When our concern is the functioning and development of
a systemat the subsystem level, at the level of the total
person, at the group level, or at the level of the PE systemthe emphasis on multiple causation and the interdependency of operating factors at each level has as the
consequence that the analysis should include a broad
range of components, which have been identified as essential for the understanding of the processes at the appropriate level. This follows from the definition of a
developmental science.
A Longitudinal Design
Two interrelated elements form the basis for the conclusion that longitudinal research on individual develop-
Research Strategy
In a series of workshops, topics of central interest for understanding and explaining individual development were discussed and presented in eight volumes (Baltes & Baltes,
1990; de Ribaupierre, 1989; Kalverboer, Hopkins, & Geuze,
1993; Magnusson & Bergman, 1990; Magnusson, Bergman,
Rudinger, & Trestad, 1991; Magnusson & Casaer, 1993;
Rutter, 1988; Rutter & Casaer, 1991).
449
ate method for systematic observation of changelaboratory experiments, natural experiments, systematic, descriptive analyses of phenomena over longer periods of
time, narrative reports, and so onvaries with the nature of the process(es) being studied and the conditions
under which observations can be made.
Cultural and Cross-Cultural Research
We have drawn attention earlier to the extreme ethnocentric view that is reflected in planning, implementing, and
interpreting psychological research, including developmental research, in Western countries (see, e.g., Graham,
1992). Both in theory and practice, the Western human
being is often regarded as the norm and the behavior of
human beings from other cultures as deviant. This is expressed in many ways. One implication of the view on individual functioning and development as dependent on
and related to the nature and functioning of the environment is the need for systematic cultural and cross-cultural research. The role of the environment is not
restricted to stimuli and events in the immediate situation. As we have argued, each specific event is embedded
in social and cultural systems at different levels and is
interpreted by the individual in the specific framework
of these systems. Results of studies of differences in the
developmental processes among children being raised in
different cultures contribute essential knowledge, both
with respect to the factors operating in the individual
and in the environment, and with respect to the mechanisms by which these factors operate. The enormous importance of cultural research for our generalizations
about human nature was demonstrated in the research
reported by Luria (1976) on illiterate and isolated humans. Today, further information has accumulated about
the variation in parenting in different cultures (Harkness
& Super, 2002).
Multidisciplinary Collaboration
Understanding and explaining individual functioning
and development presupposes knowledge of the role of
psychobiological components of the individual and of
environmental factors involved in the PE system. As
argued in the earlier discussion of developmental science, this implies the need of knowledge from research
at the interface of a number of neighboring disciplines.
Shanahan, Valsiner, and Gottlieb (1997) presented an
interesting analysis of developmental concepts across
450
disciplines. Such knowledge comes as the result of collaboration between researchers in the traditional field
of psychology, and also between researchers from psychology and those from other disciplines concerned. A
prerequisite for such collaboration and for real scientific progress is the formulation of and reference to a
general, common model of the individual and society.
Systematic, well-planned collaboration in the field of
developmental science with reference to such a common model has strong potentialities. In an editorial in
Science, Leshner (2004) concluded, among other
things, after the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) annual conference on
Science at the Leading Edge: We are learning another
important lesson: that no field stands alone. Progress
in any one domain is absolutely dependent on progress
in many other disciplines (p. 429). This conclusion
is equally valid for research on individual developmental processes.
Prevention, Treatment, and Intervention
Research on the mental and sociocultural structures and
processes operating in individual life courses constitutes
a central scientific concern in its own right. However, the
societal implications are also important, in as much as
knowledge about the positive and negative aspects of
human development can be used to promote healthy and
prevent harmful development. The holistic-interactionistic
model has important implications for the knowledge that
is needed for effective intervention and treatment in societal policy, manifested in the formation of agencies, programs and other initiatives.
Empirical studies indicate that the existence of single
individual problems and/or single problems in the social
environment during childhood and adolescence have
only a limited negative influence on the future adjustment of individuals. An increased risk for later maladjustment problems appears in individuals for whom
problem behaviors accumulate during late childhood
and adolescence and/or in social settings characterized
by a broad range of risk factors (e.g., L. N. Robins, 1966;
Stattin & Klackenberg, 1992). Adjustment problems of
different kinds tend to gravitate toward a limited number of individuals, and this group is responsible for a
large portion of adjustment problems manifested in
early drug and alcohol abuse, criminality, bullying, and
so on (Stattin & Magnusson, 1996).
In spite of these well-known circumstances, discussions of and research on these types of problems are
often focused on a certain variable (e.g., aggressiveness), or a certain problem (e.g., alcohol abuse),
applying a specific perspective (e.g., a sociological,
psychological, or criminological perspective). In this
situation, intervention programs are often implemented
in isolated environments, concentrated on a single
problem, and focused on a special age group with reference to a single perspective. Often the prophylactic
actions and treatment programs are temporary projects, not anchored in an overriding, long-term strategy based on available scientific knowledge and
experiences from a broad range of expertise among
those involved in the applied field. Different actors and
agencies are active in the same area, often in parallel
but sometimes in competition; that is, without coordination and collaboration.
Empirical research indicates that negative aspects of
the development process of individuals tend to go together. For example, Magnusson (1988) reported from
the IDA program that 52% of those who were registered
for criminal activities during the ages of 18 to 23 were
also registered for alcohol abuse and/or psychiatric
care. Of those who were registered for alcohol abuse,
77% were also registered for criminal activity and/or
psychiatric care. The corresponding figure for those
with psychiatric records was 58%. More than a matter
of, for example, alcohol problems or violence, it is a
matter of general lifestyles. The broader range of adjustment problems during adolescence cannot be isolated from the earlier development process and social
context. The implications for societal organization of
prevention and treatment of asocial and antisocial behaviors are obvious.
The holistic-interactionistic model for individual development implies that the total person-environment
system must be considered, not single problems of individual functioning and single risk factors in the social
context, in the organization and implementation of societal programs for intervention and treatment. Long-term
programs and strategies must be worked out based on
knowledge from all relevant fields of developmental
science, and planned and implemented in close collaboration among professionals representing multiple agencies, programs, and initiatives, which must be integrated
so that the breadth of the individual person-environment
system is adequately engaged.
Conclusion
CONCLUSION
As a background to some conclusions, some of the conspicuous tendencies in theoretical and empirical research on individual functioning and development can
be briefly summarized:
1. To the extent that empirical studies refer to theory,
hypothesis testing is done with reference to piecemeal theories holding for the subarea(s) to which the
issue under consideration belongs; there is a lack of
reference to an integrated, overriding theoretical
framework (e.g., Lfgren, 2004).
2. Problems are investigated and the results discussed in
statistical terms as if statistical significance were
synonymous with psychological significance. This
often applies, for example, in discussions of causal
models and causal relations. The tradition has been
fostered by the development of sophisticated data analytic methods.
3. The study of personality and individual development
is defined as the study of interindividual differences
(e.g., Block, 2003). Results of studying individual differences at group level sometimes form the basis for
conclusions about functioning at the individual level.
4. Theoretical and empirical research is very ethnocentric. It is often implicitly assumed that results of
studies performed in Western cultures can be used as
basis for conclusions about human nature.
Each of these approaches has its merits and has contributed essential knowledge in some subfields in which
it is appropriately applied. Each of them also has its limitations, which become particularly clear when the
purpose of studies is to contribute to understanding individual developmental processes. A number of prominent scientists have emphasized the hampering effect of
the fragmentation of psychology on scientific progress,
as reflected in the points summarized above (e.g., Sanford, 1965). Lately, Rom Harr (2000) gave the following evaluation in an article in Science:
It has been about thirty years since the first rumblings of
discontent with the state of academic psychology began to
be heard. Then, as now, dissident voices were more audible
in Europe than in the United States. It is a remarkable feature of mainstream academic psychology that, alone
among the sciences, it should be almost wholly immune to
critical appraisal as an enterprise. Methods that have long
451
452
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CHAPTER 9
AN EXPERIENTIAL PERSPECTIVE ON
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 465
An Experiential Turn: Putting the Study of Experience
in Historical Context 466
The Developing Person in Context 468
Human Nature and Optimal Arousal 469
Instigating Ones Own Development: The Potential SelfRegulation of Experience 471
Ideal Outcomes of Adult Development: The Role of
Psychological Complexity 472
OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE THEORY 474
A Phenomenological Extension of Piaget 474
Other Perspectives on Self-Environment Equilibrium 476
The Optimal Experience of Flow 477
Flow and Development 479
Psychological Complexity and Development 480
EXAMPLES OF COMPLEXITY IN LATER LIFE 482
Dimensions of Complexity 484
AN EXPERIENTIAL PERSPECTIVE ON
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
466
interrelations of biological, psychological, and sociocultural forces (Lerner, Chapter 1, this Handbook, this volume). To avoid any misunderstanding on these points, it
is useful to begin the chapter by briefly articulating a
few of our assumptions about experience and the developing person and suggesting how these assumptions fit
with other contemporary theories.
An Experiential Turn: Putting the Study of
Experience in Historical Context
There are many difficult and provocative questions implicit in the study of experience and its ramifications for
the scientific study of the person. What is the nature of
experience and consciousness? Can first-person, subjective data be reconciled with objective, third-person
techniques? Are the data reliable or hopelessly biased?
How does a phenomenological method challenge the traditional assumptions of experimental science? What is
the best method for systematically exploring subjective
experience? None of these questions are dealt with at
length in this chapter, although our position on some of
them becomes clear while exploring other topics (for a
discussion of these methodological and epistemological
issues, see Chalmers, 1995; Rathunde, 2001c; Taylor &
Wozniak, 1996; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).
Nevertheless, it is useful to take time to put the study of
experience in historical context.
William James did much to establish the relevance of
subjective experience for psychology. Jamess interest in
experience and its relation to optimal functioning were
unique for his time. He initiated what might be considered an experiential turn in U.S. psychology that laid the
foundation for current work in a number of related
areas. For example, one of his most important achievements was linking immediate experience and relatively
permanent mental structures. Only those items which I
notice shape my mind, he said, without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos (James, 1890,
p. 402). This statement signals Jamess inclusive and holistic view of consciousness and his attempt to understand how immediate interests and emotions affected
the ongoing stream of thought. His stream-of-thought
metaphor highlighted the crucial importance of understanding the moment-to-moment use of attention as a
foundation for understanding many other outcomes,
such as lifelong learning, and even genius.
The experiential turn initiated by James resulted
from his interests in the stream of experiencing and the
human being as an experiencing agent (Taylor & Wozniak, 1996). This underlying focus distinguished his
work and integrated his many areas of inquiry. Other
psychologists writing at the time tended to remove outcomes and behaviors from the stream of experience,
reify them, and set them off as objective facts in contrast to a murky subjective realm. Jamess epistemological approach of radical empiricism (Taylor & Wozniak,
1996) did not operate in this dualistic fashion. He understood the constant interplay of subjective and objective
content in the stream of thought; what was taken to be
objective at one point in time was subjective at another,
and vice versa.
Jamess (1902) research on exceptional mental states
and transcendent /religious experiences was also important for the foundation of an experiential perspective
and for topics that are discussed later in this chapter
(e.g., deeply engaging or optimal experiences). Unlike many other psychologists, James did not discount
such experiences because he believed they could be a
primary source of energy that stimulated optimal
human functioning. In a presidential address entitled
The Energies of Men that was delivered before the
American Philosophical Association at Columbia University in 1906 (James, 1917, pp. 4057), James considered why some individuals live at their maximum of
energy. He posed two questions: (1) What were the
limits of human energy, and (2) how could this energy
be stimulated and released, so it could be put to optimal
use? He noted that these questions sounded commonplace, but added: As a methodological program of scientific inquiry, I doubt whether they have ever seriously
been taken up. If answered fully, almost the whole of
mental science and the science of conduct would find a
place under them (p. 44).
Another key thinker in the experiential turn of American psychology was John Dewey. If James set the focus
on the use of attention and energy, Dewey applied such a
perspective most consistently to the developing person,
especially in regards to education and lifelong learning
(Rathunde, 2001c).
That Dewey was a phenomenological thinker is undeniable. Like James, his methodological approach
shunned dualistic and positivistic approaches. Kestenbaum (1977) notes, For his entire philosophic career,
Dewey in one way or another was brought back to this realization that subject and object, self and world, cannot
be specified independently of each other. His conception of organic interaction, and later his conception of
transaction, were attempts to capture the reciprocal implication of self and world in every experienced situation (p. 1). There is a phenomenological sense to all of
Deweys thought because meanings must be had before they could be known in reflection and knowledge.
Ideas were not simply generalizations based on objectively observed facts, nor were they images or copies of
external objects; instead, they were functional in that
they helped to organize the world rather than replicate
it. Dewey conceived ideas as tools for transforming the
uneasiness of experienced problems. Rational processes,
therefore, could suggest a solution to a problem and a
goal, but if the goal became an end in itself and was disconnected from the stream of experience, it corrupted
energy, attention, and development.
This basic postulate of Dewey is key to understanding
one of the most important points in this chapter: Intrinsic motivation provides an invaluable and continually
renewable source of energy for development. Intrinsic
motivation, as conceptualized here, is not another instance of dichotomizing inner and outer as is sometimes
the case with intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation debates. Rather, intrinsic motivation can be thought of as
the energy that results when momentary involvement
and goals are not artificially or forcefully divorced from
one another. Dewey often relied on dialectical terminology (e.g., synthesis-analysis, concrete-abstract, and
subjective-objective) to illustrate the healthy interrelation or tension of such motivated thinking (Dewey,
1933). He often described a rhythm between complementary opposites such that one pole emphasized a mode of
immediate participation or a feeling of being wrapped up
in an activity, and the other pole corresponded to a distancing from momentary involvement to assess the directionality of the learning process. Such a contrast in
consciousness furnished essential feedback allowing
spontaneous involvement to stay on track toward a valued
goal (see also Kolb, 1984; Rathunde, 1996, 2001a).
The part of the dialectic that is overlooked by many
psychologists is immediate experience. Much of the
seminal work of phenomenologists such as Husserl
(1960) and Merleau-Ponty (1962), in contrast, has focused on this prereflective experiencing that is embedded in the stream of consciousness and, therefore,
difficult to describe. If such immediacy is not considered in relation to consciously pursued goals, it is very
difficult to understand the motivational forces behind
them. Dewey understood this, as did James. It was the
primary reason that Dewey devoted so much time to un-
467
468
she grows old and has played every possible role that is
available in the community. In some cultures, a man or
woman is not considered a full-fledged person until
their first grandchild is born. Being a grandparent
means, among other things that: (a) one is fertile, and
therefore endowed with sacred power; ( b) one is successful, because only reasonably wealthy parents can
find spouses for their children; and (c) one is wise or at
least experienced, having lived this long (LeVine,
1980). Only when these qualities are finally achieved is
a person finally complete.
In Western societies, transitions to higher levels of
personhood are no longer well marked, except in terms
of educational progress, where various graduation ceremonies punctuate ones academic career. Religious
progress, marked by such ceremonies as the Jewish bar
mitzvah and the Catholic sacrament of confirmation,
are bare vestiges of the importance that the spiritual formation of personhood had in the Judeo-Christian tradition. But even though we no longer have clearly marked
transition points to higher levels of personhood, we do
expect, in our society also, different qualities from people at different stages of life.
So while we lack communal rites to celebrate a persons passage from one stage to another, developmental
psychologists recognize the importance of such transitions in their descriptions of the life cycle. For instance,
Eric Erikson (1950) focuses on the sequence of psychosocial tasks we must confront: Forming an identity in
adolescence, developing intimacy in young adulthood,
achieving generativity in middle age, and finally bringing together ones past life into a meaningful narrative
at the stage of integrity in old age (see also Vaillant,
1993). Robert Havighurst (1953) shifted the emphasis
more on social role demands, and developed a model of
life transitions based on changing expectations related
to agefor example, the student, the worker, the parent.
More recently, Levinson (1980) and Bee (1992) proposed similar models. Developmental theories usually
do not make the claim that these tasks are always resolved, or even that the person is necessarily aware of
them. But unless they are successfully resolved, the persons psychological adaptation is likely to be impaired.
Common to these models is the assumption that individuals who deviate from normative developmental stages
without good reason run the risk of compromising their
chances for full personhood.
Stressing the ways in which a person is socially constructed and embedded in their social contexts seems to
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Csikszentmihalyi, 2002) suggest that there is a remarkable consistency in the experiential process and the phenomenological state.
To understand the developing person from an experiential perspective, one could start from other common
human experiences besides flow. However, there are
certain advantages in focusing on optimal arousal, especially when a primary goal is to understand the developing person. Anxiety ignites a conservative response
(e.g., caution, consolidation of a position); it motivates
because of the need to protect things that are thought to
be essential, such as ones life, family, or beliefs. Conditions of low arousal, like boredom, spark an opposite
movement. Such experiences can motivate exploration
and can have a liberating or diversifying effect on a persons attention. Both of these aversive states, of course,
do not always prompt responses that solve a problem in
a way that promotes growth and leads to optimal
arousal. The highly anxious person may fail to take risks
that truly solve a problem and may opt, instead, for a
short-term solution that manages stress (e.g., accepting
the safety of the status quo). And to the extent that boredom turns into contentment or a desire for distraction
and entertainment, it can also stall meaningful growth.
In this case, the developmental impasse is due to a weakened focus of attention and a foolish waste of energy.
The experience of flow occupies a unique place on
this experiential continuum and represents a healthy solution to the problems of boredom and anxiety. When it
is unfolding, flow manifests an optimal combination of
order and novelty; it represents the coordinated operation of stabilizing and broadening uses of attention
(Fredrickson, 1998). In terms of the flow model (described in more detail later in the chapter), this combination is represented by the constructs of skill and
challenge: Flow occurs more often when a persons
skills and challenges are similarly strong and potent. In
such conditions, skills are being transformed by the new
challenges a person engages, and challenges are being
transformed by the application and expansion of skills.
Flow is a more difficult way forward as a solution to
boredom and anxiety than the short-term solutions of
distraction or retreat. The flow experience, therefore,
provides a valuable window for viewing the developing
person because of its status as a complex experience, or
one that lies at the very edge of stability and change
(Waldrop, 1992). This combination leads to that distinctive phenomenological state wherein one feels a sense of
being in control, but in circumstances one has never
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for flow experience can shape culture through the selection of memes. Similar to biological transmission, the
differential transmission of memes in cultural interaction has an eventual impact on the evolution of the
culture. To the extent that the self-regulation of optimal
experience is possible, individuals can play a conscious
role in the way a culture changes.
A person is subject to the socialization forces of a
culture, but he or she is capable of initiating change because the opposite is also true: Social practices must accommodate human nature and its parameters for
optimal experience. Just as the eye works best by avoiding the extremes of too little or too much illumination,
socialization processes will be rejected when they do
not provide opportunities for sustaining optimal arousal
through transforming anxiety and/or boredom (i.e., by
building new skills or finding meaningful challenges, respectively). When social practices consistently result in
aversive experiences, or offer only short-term solutions
to such experiences, they will not be replicated or endorsed by future generations. Individual actorsthrough
their own self-regulatory actionswill be compelled to
change them.
Rigid social practices, for example, authoritarian
regimes or unchanging traditional cultures, might survive for a time due to threat of violence, the pressure of
public opinion, or the safety and familiarity they provide to a people facing anxiety-provoking threats. However, if such contexts do not provide individuals with
opportunities to transform the challenges faced, experience is likely to alternate between anxiety and the deadening of the human spirit resulting from the inflexible
solutions. With time, the quality of life in such contexts works to undermine the stagnant system. Many
modern societies face the opposite dilemma: The absence of an external threat and the relative comfort of
life have resulted in socialization practices that are
geared toward entertainment and distraction rather than
growth. Such permissive systems protect the right for
self-indulgence, but they provide few opportunities to
really challenge the existing order that provides the
basis of comfort. Personal experience in such a society
can become increasingly frivolous and meaningless.
Therefore, pressure for change results from trying to escape the aversive cycle of solving the problem of boredom with endless new distractions.
Anxiety that is not effectively resolved through the
growth of new skills (i.e., finding a new sense of order)
is often resolved by a retreat to the status quo; boredom
that is not ameliorated with meaningful challenges is
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similarity in the ups and downs of arousal and the process of negotiating optimal experience. It is reasonable
to believe that a person with psychological complexity
will more often enjoy the full engagement of attention
and optimal arousal that it implies, and will have, therefore, a greater capacity to actualize their potential.
There are compelling reasons to take a position on
optimal patterns of development, despite the ambiguity
and risk involved. Bruner (1986) has argued that developmental psychologists cannot just describe, but must
also prescribe optimal ways of developing. If not, they
abdicate their role in the construction of the public
meanings that societies depend on for self-regulation.
When such metatheories about the good man and the
good society are explicitly delineated, they not only
add to the public dialogue, they also provide a selective
principle for determining the nature and direction of developmental research. Rogers (1969) said much the same
thing in defense of his conception of the optimal person;
he challenged others: If my concept of the fully functioning person is abhorrent to you . . . then give your
definition of the person . . . and publish it for all to see.
We need many such definitions so that there can be a really significant modern dialogue as to what constitutes
our optimum, our ideal citizen (p. 296). More recently,
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) have suggested
the same by urging more research be devoted to understanding positive developmental outcomes.
Starting with the fully developed person also allows
us to draw from a recent study of creativity in later life
in which we describe in detail the mature self-regulation
and complexity that potentially characterizes later life.
Because physical maturational changes culminate in
adolescence, and the periods of middle and late adulthood often are marked by declines in some physical and
cognitive skills, theorists have struggled to conceptualize whether adults are in fact developing, declining, or
simply changing (Pearlin, 1982). Our perspective on
this debate is similar to Baltes and Smiths (1990)
weak developmental hypothesis about the possibility
of adult development culminating in wisdom. This hypothesis states that increasing age does not necessarily
result in wisdom, and that on average older adults may
not demonstrate more wisdom than younger ones, but
because wisdom is conceptualized as an expertise that
requires cumulative practice, and because increasing age
provides for more experience and time for such practice,
notable outcomes of wisdom will be disproportionately
seen in older adults. Likewise, notable manifestations of
psychological complexity are more likely to occur in
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adulthood, although less developed forms of selfregulation occur at all stages of the life course.
A second reason for starting at the end of the life
cycle, therefore, is to facilitate our search for the beginnings of mature self-regulation and complexity in the
periods of infancy, childhood, and adolescence. If one
first articulates a clearer picture of desirable adult developmental outcomes, then it is easier to search the literature on early developmental periods and, it is hoped,
find the connections that link certain patterns in childhood with desirable adult outcomes. We explore in particular the link between psychological complexity and
the neotenous development of human children that
provides for extended periods of exploration and play
(Gould, 1977).
Few would disagree that the ideal outcome for adult
development is someone who is fit in body and mind, curious and interested in life, pursuing a vocation with
vigor, close to family and friends, helpful and involved
in the community, and concerned with making sense of
the world. However, different cultures would undoubtedly fill in a different set of outcomes for each of these
categories of adult success. Instead of suggesting specific criteria for optimal development, we propose to
look through an experiential lens at similarities in the
process of regulating experience. Attempts to negotiate
optimal experience, and sustain it using the dialectic of
integration and differentiation, may look different depending on the symbolic domain under observation, but
the dynamics involved are the same and have their basis
in optimal arousal and human nature. One of the main
tasks in this chapter, therefore, is to explore the selfregulatory skill of turning neutral or adverse everyday
situations into engaging experiences.
Before turning to specific examples of psychological
complexity, more is said in the next section about optimal
experience, complexity, and development. After providing examples of complexity in adulthood, the remaining
sections address its antecedents in child and adolescent
development. An emphasis is placed on the foundations
of complexity in family and school environments.
To locate our answers squarely in classical developmental theory, we first explore the notions of optimal experience and psychological complexity in terms made
familiar by the early developmental literature, starting
with the Piagetian perspective.
A Phenomenological Extension of Piaget
A number of familiar concepts from Piagets theory are
helpful for providing a preliminary understanding of
how optimal experience and complexity are related. For
instance, equilibration expresses a fundamental insight
of Piaget: that development is an evolutionary process
that exists between subject and object. While some
theorists before him explained development from the
side of the subject (e.g., through a priori structures, rationalism, or other nativist ideas), and others explained
it from the side of the environment (e.g., association,
positivism, or other nurture perspectives), Piaget tried
to solve the riddle of development with an interactionist,
open-systems model. Some may find this statement at
odds with the too common interpretation of Piaget as a
static stage theorist; this misunderstanding, however,
arises from his multiple uses of the term equilibrium.
For instance, it was sometimes used to refer to momentto-moment adjustments of assimilation and accommodation, sometimes to the temporary accomplishments of
the stages, and sometimes to the ideal endpoint of formal
operations. It is at the first level of moment-to-moment
interactions that Piaget is most clear concerning development as an ongoing relationship between self and
environment: assimilation and accommodation are in
constant search for equilibrium or balance. Acting in the
world continually introduces disequilibrium that must be
corrected. It is at also at this level, therefore, that an experiential interpretation of Piaget is best accomplished.
Despite the fact that maturationists and environmentalists both claim a part of his vision, the theory is more
accurately understood as derived from an open-systems
model of evolutionary biology: It [Piagets theory]
does not place an energy system within us so much as it
places us in a single energy system of all living things.
Its primary attention, then, is not to shifts and changes
in an internal equilibrium, but to an equilibrium in the
world, between the progressively individuated self and
the bigger life field, an interaction sculpted by both and
constitutive of reality itself (Kegan, 1982, p. 43).
Thus, equilibrium describes the state of the open system
such that the self and environment are related in a way
that is differentiated and integrated; to our way of thinking, such equilibrium would signal optimal arousal. Assimilation and accommodation are two facets of a
unitary and dynamic evolutionary process and must be
understood together: As an organism differentiates, it
moves, so to speak, through assimilation toward accommodation (i.e., from structure toward change). This
movement calls for a reverse movement through accommodation toward assimilation (i.e., from change to
structure) that integrates the organism with the environment in a new way.
By describing development in such general systems
terms that focus on the relationship between self and environment, some thorny conceptual dichotomies become
less troublesome (e.g., nature/nurture), and the person
can be seen less as the result of the relational process
(i.e., the more traditional interpretation), and more as
the process of organizing information and creating
meaning itself. A new burden, however, is then placed
on the theorist, namely, to describe and measure the
transitory state of equilibrium. There are at least two
basic ways to address this problem: from the inside,
emphasizing how the self experiences the relational process; and from the outside, looking at practical consequences. An experiential approach would adopt the
former approach. However, Kegan (1982) noted that Piaget took the latter course, viewing the assimilation /accommodation process descriptively from the outside; he
focused on the successes in problem solving associated
with different stages of cognitive development. Consequently, the approach ignored the assimilation /accommodation process from the participatory angle of the
self. Presumably, this is one reason why the theory is
often faulted for failing to provide a sufficient look at
the role of emotion and motivation in development
(Sternberg, 1984). In fairness to Piaget, however, there
were larger historical reasons that led many psychologists to ignore the internal reference. Aside from a few
existential and phenomenological approaches, these participatory questions have seldom been raised in the field
of developmental psychology; when they have, they
often lacked theoretical and methodological rigor to
allow intersubjective verification.
In summary, Piagetian theory is helpful for linking
optimal experience and complexity to foundational
ideas in the developmental literature, but for several reasons it does not suffice for the purposes of this chapter.
The theory tells us little about how the relational process between self and environment is experienced by the
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Other Perspectives on
Self-Environment Equilibrium
It is worth mentioning a few other early proponents of the
view that development is motivated by a search for selfenvironment equilibrium, and that such equilibrium is
linked with optimal experience and the full development
of the person. Although many thinkers could be mentioned
here, going as far back as Aristotle (MacIntyre, 1984), we
have selected three more recent authors whose insights are
relevant: Friedrich Nietzsche, Abraham Maslow, and Carl
Rogers. Their views are linked through an idea they
shared: love of fate. All three believed that love of fate was
the mark of the fully developed person, whether that person was called overman by Nietzsche, self-actualizing
by Maslow, or fully functioning by Rogers (1969); and
all of them depicted the love of fate as a deeply rewarding
synchrony between self and environment.
What does it mean to love ones fate? For Nietzsche, it
meant the affirmation of life through a full acceptance of
its circumstances. Despite hardship or obstacle, or perhaps more accurately, because of them, one would not
wish for ones life to unfold in any other way. This is so
because the process of overcoming obstacles provides the
opportunities through which the person is created. Amor
fati, or love of fate, is a central concept in Nietzsches
philosophy: My formula for greatness in a human being
is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not
forward, not backward, not in all eternity. . . . Not merely
bear what is necessary . . . but love it (1968, p. 714).
The fully alive person (i.e., the over man) is not content
with just surviving and adapting, but is intent on transcending himself or herself. Such experiences of transcendence provided his deepest motivation: I want to
learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary
in things; then I shall be one of those who make things
beautiful (1974, p. 223).
Maslows (1971) studies of self-actualization and
peak experiences led him to a similar conclusion. The
healthy person is not motivated just by deficits, simple
endurance in life, or by the survival of self or offspring, but also by growth. Based on his observations
and interviews with individuals he considered to be
self-actualizing, including creative artists and scientists, he concluded that the processes of growth were
often rewarded with fulfilling peak experiences. These
experiences coincided with a synchronous relationship
between self and environment; he referred to this synchrony as a balance of inner requiredness with outer
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suggests an analogous process; a skill is a practiced response, one that is habitual and automatic. A skilled pianist, therefore, primarily relies on an assimilative
mode when reading an easy piece of music. On the other
hand, if the challenge of reading the score moves beyond
the skills of the pianist, an accommodative mode comes
into play. Accommodation is a more effortful response
to novelty (Block, 1982). In attentional terms, accommodation uses more voluntary, controlled, or linear
processes, rather than immediate, automatic, or global
processes, as does assimilation (Schneider & Shiffrin,
1977). To say that a flow experience is more likely when
skills and challenges are in balance is to say that flow is
more likely when assimilation and accommodation are
in equilibrium and immediate and voluntary uses of attention work in concert to intensify concentration.
Rathunde (1993, 2001a) has also described this coming
together of immediate and voluntary modes of attention
as undivided interest, a synonym for flow that implies
something about the underlying attentional dynamics
(see also Rathunde & Csikszentmihalyi, 1993).
Piaget (1962, see pp. 147150) recognized that when
assimilation dominates accommodation the fit between
self and environment is too rigid and one-sided. In an
overassimilative mode, the self habitually perceives the
environment subject to its own preconceptions, and consequently one might say that objectivity is diminished
(Kegan, 1982). Overassimilation is equivalent to an imbalance of skills over challenges, and it feels like boredom. When bored, one is too subjective, too habitual,
and closed to new opportunities for action. Conversely,
when accommodation dominates assimilation, or when
novelty overwhelms the processing capacity of a preexisting structure, the self is unhinged and oriented outside of itself; it is so decentered toward the uncertainty
in the environment that the possibility for feelings of relatedness, connection, and meaning are diminished.
Overaccommodation is equivalent to the imbalance of
challenges over skills, and it is experienced as anxiety.
When anxious, one feels at the mercy of environmental
circumstances that are beyond ones control and thus
blinded by the excessive stimulation to ways of making
sense of the situation.
When skills and challenges are in equilibrium, action
is fully centered on the relationship between self
and environment. The skilled pianist who performs a
challenging score is drawn into a more involving relationship. The automaticity of existing skills provides
confidence, structure, integrity, and a foundation from
High
Anxiety
Flow
E
D1
Challenges
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B1
B2
D2
Boredom
Low
Low
Skills
High
by building skills. It is through this perpetual dialectical process that development proceeds; and it proceeds
in the direction of greater complexity because optimal
experiences cannot be recaptured through a regression
of skills and challenges, but only through their progression (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Csikszentmihalyi &
Rathunde, 1993).2
Figure 9.1 shows how the raising of skills and challenges has been depicted in previous discussions of the
flow model. To reenter the flow channel from states of
boredom or anxiety, challenges and skills must be raised
appropriately. In other words, flow can proceed from
boredom or from anxiety. Once inside the experience,
there are common features to flow, but seen in the
broader context of before and after, the experiences are
quite different. For instance, the transition from boredom is a process of finding something novel enough that
it tests ones skills. Boredom, in a healthy personality,
initiates a process of searching for a meaningful challenge, not just a diversion; as interest and curiosity draw
the self out of its shell, boredom wanes, and experience
becomes more intrinsically rewarding. In contrast, the
2
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contexts evoke different behaviors. Traditional conceptions of personality, however, fail to look for consistency
within the change, or the consistency in the ways that a
person varies his or her behavior as a function of the setting (for further discussion of this point, see Cairns &
Hood, 1983; Sroufe, 1979).
Physical scientists describing complex systems are
also aware of this phenomenon of consistency in change;
they call it emergent self-organization (e.g., Prigogine,
1980). Waldrop (1992) comments:
Self-organizing systems are adaptive, in that they dont
just passively respond to events the way a rock might roll
around in an earthquake. They actively try to turn whatever happens to their advantage. . . . Complex systems
have somehow acquired the ability to bring order and
chaos into a special balance. This balance pointoften
called the edge of chaosis where the components of a
system never quite lock into place, and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence, either. The edge of chaos is where
life has enough stability to sustain itself and enough creativity to deserve the name of life. . . . The edge of chaos
is the constantly shifting battle zone between stagnation
and anarchy, the one place where a complex system can be
spontaneous, adaptive, and alive. (pp. 1112)
EXAMPLES OF COMPLEXITY IN
LATER LIFE
The optimal developmental outcomes described in the
previous section are predicated on the achievement of
psychological complexity. Complexity describes dialectical polarities in the person that enable him or her to
continually negotiate, and renegotiate, an optimally rewarding self-environment fit. On the most general level,
these polarities involve structure breaking and building
and problem finding and solving. A person with such potentialities is presumably better able to instigate development by flexibly working at the edges of order and
novelty, without letting one or the other dominate. In
other words, they can negotiate a self-environment fit
that is integrated and differentiated or that attains an
optimally arousing balance of order and novelty.
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these dialectical thought processes are actually manifested by real persons. Recently, we had the opportunity
to gather information relevant to this underexplored issue
from a pool of interviews collected at the University of
Chicago about creativity in later life (Csikszentmihalyi,
1996; Nakaumura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2003). The 100
respondents in this study were individuals who were successful on the cultural stage (13 had been awarded Nobel
prizes, and the rest had achieved comparable renown), but
their lives can be used as examples of success in a broader
sense, as modeling optimal developmental trajectories. In
the interviews, they talked about many factors related to
their impressive accomplishments, but more important,
their words gave excellent descriptions of how complexity
is enacted in actual life situations. We draw from these
interviews to make more concrete the theoretical ideas
that have been presented thus far. These examples of
later-life complexity, in turn, set the stage for a discussion of some connections that can be made to current developmental research.
Individuals who have been recognized for their eminent creativity may seem inappropriate for illustrating
complexity. Creativity is often identified with one part of
the developmental dialectic we have described, namely,
the part associated with breaking structures and finding
problems. It is true that creativity is most often identified
with such differentiating responses; but that is probably
because many creativity studies have set out to measure
creativity in this way. However, creativity, which is
sustained over a great length of time and results in eminent achievement, is not something that rests on divergent
thinking alone; convergent, integrative thinking is
equally important.
A few perspectives on creativity have recognized a
bipolar psychological process that is characterized by the
coordination of an affective immediacy and cognitive detachment to drive the integration and differentiation process.3 For instance, Getzels (1975) has commented:
Despite the self-evident need for strenuous effort . . . creative thinking entails, at least in some degree, surrender to
freely rising playfulness (p. 332). Einsteins account
of his creative process suggested a similar duality
(Hadamard, 1954, p. 142): a phase of associative play
and a more laborious phase requiring logical coherence.
Gardner (1993, 1998) has recently suggested that a playful, childlike quality survives alongside the mature intellect of seminal creators (see also Simonton, 1984). Barron
(1969) described creativity as a synchrony of immediacy
and detachment in a chapter entitled Cycles of Innocence
and Experience. The title is drawn from the poetry of
William Blake and contrasts prelogical thought that is
concrete, spontaneous, and free of abstraction (i.e., innocence) with thought that utilizes reason and therefore
has a logical structure (i.e., experience).
Why is creativity associated with both immediacy and
detachment? Our model suggests that both uses of attention are needed to move toward the subjective rewards of
structure breaking and structure building. Creativity is
not just about what is gained by playfulness and spontaneity that is free from abstraction; it is also about what is
gained from the voluntary and directed control of attention that takes effort. Each use of attention creates the
conditions of the other; and both must work together to
integrate and differentiate information. Barrons (1969)
description of creativity said much the same thing, without the emphasis on subjective experience, In the
creative process there is an incessant dialectic and an essential tension between two seemingly opposed dispositional tendencies: the tendency toward structuring and
integration and the tendency toward disruption of structure and diffusion. . . . The task is to avoid sacrificing
one possibility to the other. We must be able to use discipline to gain greater freedom . . . tolerate diffusion, and
even occasionally invite it, in order to achieve a more
complex integration (pp. 177179).
Dimensions of Complexity
Next, we illustrate psychological complexity and optimal development by concentrating on seven polar dimensions. This number is arbitrary and could be
expanded or reduced depending on the number of examples under discussion. These polarities, we believe, reveal the capacity for finding optimal experience through
a process of differentiation and integration.
A central polarity that surfaced in the University of
Chicago study of creativity4 was the combination of
4
3
Although the focus here, as in much of the chapter, is on
psychological processes, creativity cannot be reduced to this
level.
Quotations not otherwise attributed are taken from interviews the authors and other members of the University of
Chicago research team collected in the course of a project entitled Creativity in Later Life, sponsored by the Spencer
Foundation (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).
agency and communion, that is, the drive toward both independence and interdependence (Bakan, 1966). This is
often seen as an androgynous trait, in that it combines
elements traditionally associated with both males and
females. Why has androgyny been linked to positive developmental outcomes (Baumrind, 1989), as well as to
eminent achievement (Spence & Helmreich, 1978)? Our
perspective suggests that both characteristics play a role
in negotiating optimal experience through structure
changing and building; therefore, persons with a predominance of either attribute (i.e., a highly sex-typed
individual) are at a disadvantage, at least in domains of
activity where these qualities are especially important
for competent performance.
One such domain is interpersonal relations or, more
concretely, the act of communicating. Skills of communication are essential for playing ones role on the cultural stage, no matter what that role is. It is equally
central to business management (Leavitt, Pondy, &
Boje, 1989), the emotional well-being of families (Larson & Richards, 1994), and political leadership (Gardner, 1995; Kouzes & Posner, 1995).
For instance, students who cannot speak their mind
to a teacher (agency) or listen to what that teacher has
to say (communion) will not get the most out of the
relationship, neither will the teacher. The teacher or
student, therefore, who is capable of agency and communion in interpersonal communicationspeaking
as an individual and listening in a posture of openness to the otherwould presumably be at an advantage for learning from such communication and for
experiencing optimal rewards in the process. Charles
Cooley (1961), though not discussing androgyny or optimal experience, said much the same thing about the
optimally healthy person. After suggesting that males
were, in general, less socially impressible and more inclined to an aggressive, solitary frame of mind than females, he commented: So long as a character is open
and capable of growth it retains . . . impressibility,
which is not weakness unless it swamps the assimilating and organizing faculty. I know men whose character is proof of stable and aggressive character who have
an almost feminine sensitiveness regarding their seeming to others. Indeed, if one sees a man whose attitude
toward others is always assertive, never receptive, he
may be confident that man will never go far, because he
will never learn much. In character, as in every phase of
life, health requires a just union of stability with plasticity (p. 828).
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will take a day gluing and then next day I glue the other
sideitll take 2 daysit doesnt bother me at all.
In this comment, contact with peopletalking, listeningis identified with keeping abreast of new
things and different points of view. While interaction is
a process of letting in information, closing the door for
solitude is a process of limiting information. The door,
so to speak, acts as a boundary between self and other
much as intellectual detachment creates distance
from spontaneous action so that feedback can be integrated. Others have noted that social interaction is a
dialectical process between forces driving people to-
Finally, complexity was manifested by attitudes toward work that were at once iconoclastic and traditional,
oriented toward blazing new trails while preserving the
integrity of their respective domains of action. Contrary
to the modern prejudice that holds that old ideas are
probably wrong, and that anything new must be better
than whatever is old, these individuals understood that
ideas and practices that have been passed down through
the generations must have had some advantages or they
would not have been preserved, whereas novelties have
not yet stood the test of time.
Without question, a strong and independent ego characterized many of those we interviewed; yet so did humbleness and a clear awareness that in their work they
stood on the shoulders of giants, and that their
achievements were made possible only by the tradition
in which they were trained. Confidence often fed into an
aggressive, iconoclastic disposition; for instance, the
Nobel-prize winning economist George Stigler stated:
Id say one of the most common failures of able people is a
lack of nerve. And theyll play safe games. Theyll take
whatever the literatures doing and add a little bit to
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But innovation for its own sake does not make sense,
except in relation to the tradition of thought that provides the background against which novelty can be recognized. The artist Eva Zeisel produces ceramics that
have been recognized by the Museum of Modern Art in
New York as masterpieces of contemporary design, yet
she feels rooted to the artistic folk tradition in which
she grew up as a young girl in the early decades of the
century. She shows a keen awareness of the interplay between innovation and tradition in the following excerpt:
This idea to create something different is not my aim, and
shouldnt be anybodys aim. Because, first of all, if you
are a designer or a playful person in any of these crafts,
you have to be able to function a long life, and you cant always try to be different. I mean different from different
from different . . . to be different is a negative motive, and
no creative thought or created thing grows out of a negative impulse. A negative impulse is always frustrating.
And to be different means not like this and not like that.
And the not likethats why postmodernism, with the
prefix of post, couldnt work. No negative impulse can
work, can produce any happy creation. Only a positive one.
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building skills, and thus also for understanding the temporary equilibrium of challenges and skills that trigger
flow experiences.
Why, for instance, has John Hope Franklin enjoyed
teaching so much? How are the qualities of agency and
communion related to his enjoyment of teaching? A phenomenological interpretation suggests that his complex
teaching style was self-correcting, thus allowing him to
avoid the negative experiences associated with being too
receptive to students or too directive toward them. The
former problem plagues those who try to accommodate
every encounter with the other; it transforms interaction
into an activity that is experienced as overwhelming,
lacking in control, and thus inviting anxiety. Conversely,
consistently ignoring the interests and points of view of
others, never changing ones behavior in response to the
encounter, makes interaction monotonous and boring.
Both extremes are avoided in Franklins teaching
style because he is capable, as the changing situation
warrants, of shifting between the qualities of agency and
communion. In the example cited earlier, he did not hesitate to be emphatic in response to his students overly
enthusiastic discovery. He listened attentively to the
student, letting him take the lead. Yet, based on knowledge gained through this episode, Franklin will be better
able to find the right time to insist that the student check
his facts. In this way, his agency as a teacher is supported by insights gained through communion. And the
same can be stated in reverse: Franklins responsiveness
to his student was initially set up by taking his class to
North Carolina and assigning the study of the Reconstruction period. In this way, the polarity of agency and
communion helped to negotiate the most rewarding fit
between teacher and student and presumably made this
experience of teaching more enjoyable.
A similar reasoning would hold for the other polarities. The process of work (e.g., writing, research, sculpting) was presumably more rewarding for those who
described various combinations of playfulness with discipline, passion with detachment, and so on, because of
the greater flexibility in forging a self-environment fit.
For instance, Daviss notion of observing immediacy
(i.e., being of two minds at once) allowed her to recognize problems as they arose in the spontaneous course of
working. Curiosity elicited a need for detachment to
shape the material generated in this exploratory mode;
this feedback from active engagement led to the discovery of problems that needed to be recognized and solved.
Borrowing a phrase from the philosopher and theologian
Paul Tillich (Gilkey, 1990), it might be said of Davis and
Lerner (1984), in addition, contains an in-depth, multidisciplinary look at human plasticity, its foundation in evolutionary processes, and the developmental importance of flexible
self-regulation.
491
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ones, and vice versa. A wise response would therefore reflect what Rogers called the predictable unpredictability
of the fully functioning person: whether a particular response (i.e., seeking change or stability) is appropriate
may not be known in advance; yet, the action that best
fits the situation at hand will reliably be chosen, and such
actions may reflect either continuity or discontinuity (see
also Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981). Thus, wisdom is
yet another way to describe the flexibility of the complex
person who finds the best path toward growth and optimal experience (Rathunde, 1995).
Recently, a number of researchers investigating adult
development and postformal cognition have similarly depicted the flexibility and the dialectic performance of socalled wise persons (Brent & Watson, 1980; Clayton &
Birren, 1980; Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Kramer, 1983;
Labouvie-Vief, 1980, 1982; Pascual-Leone, 1990; Sinnott, 1984). Labouvie-Vief (1990), for instance, notes the
dualities described by Piaget (e.g., assimilation and accommodation), by Freud (e.g., primary and secondary
processes), by James (e.g., the spontaneous I and the
conceptual me), and even by contemporary neuropsychologists who contrast two different anatomically and
chemically based processing systems (Tucker &
Williamson, 1984). She utilizes the historical distinction
between mythos and logos to label these dual modes.
Mythos signifies a close identification of the self with the
object of thought (i.e., a mode of subjectivity where
knower and known are indivisible); logos signifies the use
of reason, or the ability of thought to separate subject and
object, to logically analyze a relationship.
Labouvie-Vief (1990) conceives wisdom as reconnecting these two important ways of relating to the
world. Traditionally, they are often set against each
other and dichotomized. Thus, mythos has come to be
identified with emotion, the body, subjectivity, and
other so-called feminine characteristics; logos, in contrast, because of its correspondence to rational thought,
the mind, objectivity, and so on, has been perceived as
more masculine.7 This is also the dichotomy that underlies the gender differentiation of children in our culture
(Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Lyons, & Hanmer, 1990). If
7
It is worth noting that this alignment of objectivity and subjectivity with masculine and feminine characteristics is best
suited to instrumental domains, where it is men who have traditionally had to learn to accommodate to reality demands;
this alignment would often be reversed in expressive, social
activities, where women have had to assume more objectivity.
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494
495
coordination with a primary caretaker. Through imitation, for instance, a child accommodates the other; but
imitation is never pure in the sense of a replication because actions are infused with private meaning, and
what is learned is always in relation to subjective experience. Similarly, when appropriating a word, one makes it
ones own by filling it with personal intention (Bakhtin,
1981). In this way, accommodation is creative and not
passive mimicking. Through a process of ejecting the
self, the child assimilates the other on its own terms;
when contradictions arise, the self is reconstructed.
Thus, the dynamics of development are much like Piagets, but relations with a primary caretaker are seen as
essential to the dialectical growth of the self, and social
dependency becomes essential for development to occur
(e.g., Tobach, 1981; Tobach & Schneirla, 1968).
Interaction with a more powerful person (in relation
to the child) will encourage accommodation; interaction
with a less powerful person will favor assimilation. A
mother might be thought of as less powerful when she
is reactive to the wants and desires of the infant; in other
words, when she accommodates, the child assimilates. A
mother is more powerful when the child must accommodate, perhaps by imitating actions, reacting to verbal
or physical stimulation, adjusting to schedules of feeding, and so on. One can see in this general dynamic how
the dialectical growth of the self might proceed in a positive direction through the mutual give and take of
mother and child, or how habits of unsuccessful assimilation or accommodation might develop through relations
with an overly active or a chronically passive mother.
The common terms love and discipline8 represent
parenting behaviors that encourage complexity: When a
parent appropriately mixes love with discipline, a child
develops successful habits of assimilation and accommodation, thus making the coordination of these modes,
and optimal experiences, more likely to occur. Over
time, children socialized in homes that balance love
with discipline develop a superior capacity to selfregulate their attention and respond to the environment
in ways that promote optimal experience and growth.
In other words, they are more likely to manifest the
8
Too often the word discipline is equated with punishment.
The word is a derivation of the Latin discipulus, meaning
pupil. This meaning reflects the idea that discipline is about
training the mind and character through experience. Insofar
as punishment furthers such training or instruction, its meaning is consistent with discipline.
496
497
ing care of everyday necessities, listening in a nonjudgmental way, allowing the adolescent to explore interests,
and so on, an adolescent can engage the world in a way
that is less self-conscious, less constrained by the demands of reality, and more attuned to his or her own
subjectivity and imagination. This theoretical reasoning
is consistent with other perspectives in the field that
stress the benefits of some combination of love and discipline in the family, but it is derived from our experiential approach.
There has been some empirical confirmation for
these assertions. For example, we used the ESM to operationalize these two modes of attention (i.e., immediate
involvement and a voluntary focus on goals) and collected information from adolescents about the levels of
support and challenge they received in their families. In
both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, and with
students from a variety of socioeconomic status (SES)
and ethnic backgrounds, results consistently showed: (a)
a relationship between the perception of high family
support and adolescents immediate moods and energy,
and ( b) a significant link between the perception of
family challenge and adolescents selective attention to
important goals. Furthermore, not only did adolescents
from families that combined high support with high
challenge report more flow and interest in their learning
activities, they invested more time in them, and developed their skills to a higher degree (Csikszentmihalyi
et al., 1993; Rathunde, 1996, 2001a). Our interpretation
of these results suggests that a supportive and challenging family, because it allows flexibility in the assimilation and accommodation dialectic, makes it easier for
adolescents to negotiate a good person-environment fit,
and such a fit is more likely to result in optimal arousal
and experience.
Repeated experience in such families is likely to result in the formation of self-regulative habits (i.e., preliminary signs of psychological complexity) that
facilitate turning boredom and anxiety into flow. In
contrast, the same studies showed that adolescents from
high support / low challenge families (i.e., permissive
environments) were more invested in passive leisure
(e.g., television viewing) and other modes of fooling,
and adolescents from low support / high challenge families (i.e., more authoritarian environments) spent a great
deal of time on important school activities, but reported
negative moods and more drudgery while doing them.
These family contexts, in contrast to ones that provide
strong support and challenge, may be reinforcing patterns of regulation that will increasingly prevent, rather
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500
attune to infant cues, they can undermine infants ability to evaluate their inner states. From an experiential
perspective, this result would seriously undermine later
abilities to evaluate boredom and/or anxiety and respond in ways that promote flow experiences.
Also relevant from an experiential perspective are
studies that show attachment patterns have carryover effects that influence childrens style of engaging activities. For instance, secure attachment at 12 months
predicted more adaptive communication in a problemsolving task too difficult for 2-year-olds to perform by
themselves. Securely attached infants tried to solve the
problem independently, but turned to the mother for
help when they got stuck; mothers, in turn, comforted
their children and helped them to focus on the task
(Matas, Arend, & Sroufe, 1978). Thus, the style of engaging the task reflected the style of interaction in a securely attached dyad (i.e., exploration in a context of
support). It is also noteworthy that securely attached
toddlers displayed more enthusiasm and task enjoyment.
In summary, several perspectives on parenting in
adolescence, childhood, and infancy converge around
the idea that parental combinations of support and challenge create optimal contexts for child development. A
deeper recognition of such continuities across parenting
studies is an important step toward more integrative theories of child development. One of the most important
areas to explore, we believe, is how the system flexibility created with combinations of support and challenge
affect childrens subjective experience and their emergent capacity to self-regulate arousal. Studies in each of
these areas inform the phenomenological perspective in
this chapter. Combinations of parental support and challenge were associated with adolescents reports of flow
experience in school (Rathunde, 1996, 2001a), childrens engagement in the zone of proximal development
(Rogoff, 1990), toddlers enthusiastic task performance
(Matas et al., 1978), and infants optimal arousal (Field,
1987). Common to all the perspectives reviewed was an
emphasis on childrens development through intersubjective experience in the family; the historical roots of
this perspective can be found in Baldwin (1906), Cooley
(1902), Mead (1934), and Vygotsky (1962).
Teacher-Child Interaction and the Growth
of Complexity
School contexts, like family contexts, play a fundamental role in socializing children and facilitating their de-
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504
505
506
507
Analogously, one can think of the scientific process as syntelic, as an oscillation between theoretical (subjective) and
empirical (objective) modes of control.
508
It is the syntelic character of play that makes it crucially important and links it to higher forms of human
thought. By allowing the oscillation between subjective
and objective modes, Baldwin perceives a developmental link to the emergence of basic human dualisms (e.g.,
mind/ body, self/other, truth/falsity) and the eventual
overcoming of such dualisms with full development. The
legacy of play can thus be seen in the syntelic character
of Baldwins highest form of thought: aesthetic contemplation. Like John Deweys (1934/1980) comments on
aesthetic experience, Baldwins descriptions of aesthetic modes are remarkably close to contemporary perspectives on postformal thought processes, and to our
remarks on flow experience: In aesthetic experience
the partial insights of intelligence and feeling are mutually conserved and supplemented (1911, p. 279). His
perspective, though, adds insight to the developmental
history of such outcomes; in other words, play is germinal to the highest forms of human thought as its syntelic
character is elaborated and reinstated on higher levels of
organization.
The essential benefits of playing lie in the manipulation of information in a pressure-free context that is informed by external and internal determinants, but
controlled by neither. Play can retreat from compulsion
and the have-to state of mind, or escape from the irrelevance of a dont-have-to consciousness. Thus, play
captures the same self-environment synchrony we described in flow experiences; in addition, the dynamics of
both are similar. Berlyne (1960, 1966), for instance,
viewed play as serving a stimulus-seeking function when
the organism was bored and an arousal-decreasing function when the organism was anxious. Other theorists
have emphasized the positives of one or the other function; for instance, Ellis (1973) viewed play as stimulus
seeking, and Freud (1959), Vygotsky (1962), and Erikson (1977) thought of play primarily as a safe way to reduce tension by dealing with problems in a symbolic way.
Also, like flow, play results in the differentiation and
integration of the self. When it is exploratory, it generates novelty (Fagen, 1976); when it is imitative (or
repetitive), it builds habits (Piaget, 1966). Vandenberg
(1981) likened these differentiating and integrating aspects of play to the functions of genetic mutation and
DNA, respectively, in providing for biological diversity
and continuity. Play may be no less important in providing for cultural diversity and continuity. A number of
theories have drawn connections among play and human
creativity, achievement, and flexibility (Bruner, 1972;
Rubin, Fein, & Vandenberg, 1983; Sutton-Smith, 1976).
509
510
environments that facilitate optimal arousal will develop the capacity for psychological complexity. We
have argued that supportive and challenging family and
school contexts help in this regard because they are
sensitive to the balance of childrens skills and challenges, and therefore to the interconnection of immediate and voluntary modes of attention that must work
together to transform anxiety and/or boredom. Although this perspective is still being developed and is
not yet based on extensive empirical examination, we
have reported the results of several studies that hold
promise for understanding how social contexts affect
the interconnection of these two modes and therefore
the likelihood of optimal experience.
If experiential considerations are ignored when attempting to understand positive self-regulation and development, we miss the fact that to become active agents
in their own ontogeny, individuals have to want to develop. And they will want to do so only if they enjoy it.
If they do not, development becomes alienating because
the child as well as the adult learn and grow primarily
for extrinsic reasons. The child will study to graduate
from school, the adult will work to get a paycheck and be
promoted, and both will endure their present conditions
listlessly in anticipation of a more pleasant future. This
is not a developmental trajectory that leads to complexity or a desirable old age. By contrast, development takes
an intrinsically motivated course if a child feels fully
engaged and fully present while learning and engaging
new challenges. Habits developed in the successful regulation of optimal arousal are ones that form a solid
basis for lifelong learning.
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CHAPTER 10
the consequences of our actions, we construe representations of ourselves and of our material, social, and
symbolic environments, and these representations guide
and motivate activities, which shape and influence our
behavior and personal development.
Action thus forms development, and development
forms action: The individual is both the active producer
and the product of his or her ontogeny. The central tenet
of an action-theoretical perspective thus holds that
human ontogeny, including adulthood and later life, cannot be understood adequately without paying heed to the
self-reflective and self-regulative loops that link developmental changes to the ways in which individuals, by
action and mentation, construe their personal development. This should not imply that individuals are the sole
or omnipotent producer of their biography. Just like any
other type of activity, activities related to personal development are subject to cultural, sociohistorical, and
physical constraints that lie partly or even completely
outside ones span of control but decisively structure the
range of behavioral and developmental options. Actiontheoretical perspectives on development must therefore
consider not only the activities through which individuals try to control their development over the life course,
but also the nonpersonal or subpersonal forces that
canalize such activities.
The idea that human individuals play an active part in
shaping their development and aging has never been
doubted seriously. Yet, at least until recently, no systematic effort has been made to frame this idea in an elaborated theoretical statement. Though actions have been
recognized as formative elements of every individual
life history, they have hardly figured as elements in developmental theories (Dannefer, 1989). Presumably, one
reason for this neglect lies in the traditional preoccupation of developmental research with the formative periods from early childhood to adolescence. Activities of
self-regulation and intentional self-development are related to personal goals, plans, and identity projects; such
orientations typically become more differentiated and
concrete in the transition to adulthood when developmental tasks of independence and autonomy gain importance. It is certainly no mere coincidence that early
proponents of action-theoretical perspectives were simultaneously advocates of a life-span perspective in development; Charlotte Bhler (1933) is a prominent
example. The neglect of action-theoretical perspectives
may also reflect deeper epistemological and methodological reservations. The applicability of causal explanatory schemes to actions is a long-standing and still
strongly contested controversy in philosophy of science,
and a final consensus is not in sight (e.g., Brand, 1984;
Lenk, 1978; Thalberg, 1977). Moreover, an action perspective that conceives of development as a process that
is shaped and canalized by collective and personal action appears to be barely compatible with the search for
deterministic laws and universal principles of development. These questions are discussed at more length
later. It should be noted at this juncture, however, that
notions of universality, ordered change, and determinism
in human development have recently come under attack
from various lines (e.g., Bruner, 1990a; Gergen, 1980).
In the same measure, interest in action-theoretical perspectives has grown during the past decades (e.g.,
Brandtstdter, 1984a, 1984b, 2001; Brandtstdter &
517
Development
Ontogenetic Change
Personal Development
Processes of Aging
Culture
Action
Self-Regulatory Activity
Intentional Self-Development
Developmental Goals
Figure 10.1
spheres.
518
The functional relationship between culture and ontogeny is captured even more cogently in the argument
that cultural institutionsand the developmental and
action potentials necessary for creating culturecompensate for the lack of specialized adaptive automatisms
in the human organism. This idea can be traced back to
the writings of Herder (1772); it has been taken up and
elaborated in the anthropological system of Gehlen
(1955/1988). As Gehlen pointedly puts it, the human individual is a deficient being, who is characterized by a
lack of physical specialization and of ties to a specific
environment, and for whom culture has thus become a
second nature:
Man is an acting being. In a narrower sense, he is also
undeterminedhe presents a challenge to himself. Actions are the expression of mans need to develop an attitude toward the outside world. To the extent that he
presents a problem to himself, he must also develop an attitude toward himself and make something of himself
. . . self-discipline, training, self-correction in order to
achieve a certain state of being and maintain it are necessary to the survival of an undetermined being. (Gehlen,
1955/1988, pp. 2425)
with sufficient latitude for variation and experiencebased modification. The excessive growth of the cortical and neocortical areas of the central nervous system
lends the requisite openness and variability to the cognitive and motivational control of behavior. Of particular
mention here are capacities of abstraction, categorization, and representation, which enhance extraction of
order and regularity from the flow of events and allow
for a mental simulation of actions and effects. Human
adaptive competencies are further boosted by language
and communication. Language enables the transmission
of knowledge, and provides the symbolic means for the
social control of behavior, as well as for self-control and
self-reinforcement (e.g., Luria, 1979; Zivin, 1979). The
markedly prolonged period of physiological maturation
and growth, the correspondingly long period of protection and care, and the emergence of family and group
structures form a complex of mutually supportive evolutionary factors that make for both the vulnerability and
the potential of human development (cf. Bruner, 1972;
Gould, 1977; Lerner, 1984).
Culture and development thus form a functional synthesis that can be assessed adequately only when the mediating role of actions and self-related activities is
considered. Cultures are aggregated systems of problemsolutions that have been developed during the process of
cultural evolution; they offer solutions to adaptive problems that arise from the biological constitution of the
human species, as well as to problems related to the
maintenance and further evolution of the cultural system
itself, and they also offer existential orientations that
guide human actors in their search for meaning and purpose. Most important, cultures augment action resources
and developmental options through compensatory strategies and prosthetic devices (Bruner, 1990b), thus enabling the developing subject to transcend constitutional
limitations. These compensatory arrangements also
comprise psychological tools (Vygotsky, 1960/1979),
which are embodied in cultural conventions, institutions,
and knowledge systems:
Psychological tools are artificial formations. By their nature they are social, not organic or individual. They are
directed toward the mastery or control of behavioral
processes. . . . By being included in the process of behavior, the psychological tool alters the entire flow and
structure of mental functions . . . just as a technical tool
alters the process of a natural adaptation. (Vygotsky,
1960/1979, p. 137)
519
The commonplace formula which defines development as the joint or interactive product of genetic and
environmental influences gives short shrift to the dynamic relationships that mediate development, action,
and culture. Environment is nature organized by organisms (Lewontin, 1982, p. 160); likewise, developmental
ecologies are intentional worlds (Shweder, 1990) that
constrain and enable intentional self-development.
The semantic and symbolic content that essentially
characterizes actions and cultural action spaces cannot
be reduced to physical or physiological processes. Although the meaning of actions may be related to, and
can partly be extracted from, the physical features of
actions, intentional and physical aspects of action are
not related in ways that would allow for reductive explanations (Dennett, 1987). This does not mean that an
actional stance would necessitate discarding the natural bases and constraints of action. Natural and cultural aspects influence and pervade each other in the
developmental process (Boesch, 1980; Brandtstdter,
1984a, 1984b; Dannefer & Perlmutter, 1990; Gibson,
1977), and I have already pointed to the interdependence between the cultural and phylogenetic bases of development. In developmental genetics, increasing
recognition is being given to the fact that the genetic
regulation of development is to a considerable extent
mediated by behavioral systems (e.g., Gottlieb, 1992).
Individuals choose and create their environments according to preferences and competencies that, as phenotypic dispositions, are linked to genotypic factors; such
dispositions also influence the ways in which individuals respond to environmental influences to which they
have exposed themselves selectively (e.g., the concept
of active genotype-environment covariation; Scarr &
McCartney, 1983; see also Plomin, 1986). Through
their actions, individuals form, and continually transform, their phenotype and extend it into their personal
culture and developmental history.
Personal Regulation of Developmental Processes
The cultural regulation of human ontogeny is closely intertwined with, and in part mediated by, processes of
intentional self-development. The active subject is a
constitutive and productive element of the cultural system, which is continually realized, maintained, and reformed through personal action. At the same time,
individual action in its physical and symbolic aspects is
inherently bound to the action space of a culture; it is
520
through transaction with the cultural context that individuals construe prospects of possible and desired developmental courses and acquire the knowledge and means
to implement these prospects.
Culture, therefore, is not a system of forces that is intrinsically opposed to self-development, as alienation
literature since Rousseau has maintained; rather, cultural contexts both constrain and enable self-regulatory
processes. Cultural demands and affordances may be
more or less congruent to and often conflict with the individuals developmental goals and potentials. The relational pattern of personal and contextual constraints of
development is continually redefined and transformed
in the course of cultural evolution and individual ontogeny. These changes, which occur in historical as well
as in personal-biographical time, permanently induce
conflicts and discrepancies in the transaction between
the developing individual and the cultural ecology: Developmental tasks, role expectancies, or performance
standards may overtax the individuals developmental
resources; social opportunity structures may impede
realization of personal goals and identity projects, and
so on. As dialectic approaches have emphasized (e.g.,
Kesselring, 1981; Riegel, 1976), such discrepancies and
conflicts are driving forces in cultural evolution as well
as in the individuals development over the life span because they promote readjustments and new syntheses
within the system in which they originate.
Individuals can respond to these adaptive problems in
a variety of ways. They can adjust personal goals and
projects to situational constraints and resources, or,
conversely, attempt to modify external circumstances to
suit personal interests and capabilities; they may try to
evade or neutralize normative demands, or accommodate to them. Such adaptive activities generally aim at
reducing discrepancies between factual or perceived
courses of personal development and the persons normative conception of self and future development; they
also serve to stabilize and maintain personal identity,
thus displaying the functional characteristics of autopoietic processes through which living systems maintain
and perpetuate themselves (e.g., Brandtstdter & Greve,
1994; for an explication of the concept of autopoiesis,
see Maturana & Varela, 1980; Zlny, 1981).
These considerations support and illustrate the argument that processes of intentional self-development are
integral to human ontogeny over the life span. However,
one should be aware that these processes, like any
human activity, involve elements beyond personal con-
trol. We organize our life and activities within a sociocultural matrix that structures and constrains personal
action and development; our possibilities to alter these
contextual constraints are limited. We even have limited
influence on the inner context of our actions; in particular, we cannot deliberately change our own motives
and beliefs (e.g., Brandtstdter, 2000; Gilbert, 1993).
Action-theoretical stances here reach limits that have to
be carefully fathomed. Finally, one should not discount
the influence of accidental, uncontrollable events and
chance encounters (Bandura, 1982a) in any individual
life history, although, even here, some degree of control
may be involved, as individuals may deliberately expose
themselves to or actively seek risks or chances.
From the point of view of the acting subject, development over the life span appears as a blend of expected
and unexpected, controlled and uncontrollable elements,
or as a story of gain and loss, of success and failure
(Baltes, 1987; Brandtstdter, 1984a). Efforts to keep
this balance favorable are essential aspects of human activity. Individuals differ in the degree to which they feel
able to alter the course of personal development, however, and such differences profoundly affect the emotional attitude toward self and personal future; feeling
incapable of achieving desired developmental goals, or
of becoming the person one wants to be, is largely coterminous with depression and loss of meaning in life.
Historical Notes
Action approaches to human development have a long
history that can be traced back to antiquity. The idea
that human beings make themselves is already expressed
clearly in the philosophical work of Aristotle, who conceived of action as the process by which the person
transforms self and life in accordance with ideals of
rationality (Mller, 1982). In the Renaissance, selfformation and self-perfection flowered and even became a dominant form of life. The Renaissance ideal of
uomo universale, of the individual who strives for selfperfection in all areas of development, resounds in the
works of Shaftesbury, Herder, Schiller, and Goethe
(Spranger, 1914); Tetens notion concerning the perfectibility of human development, which was mentioned earlier, is still clearly influenced by this ideal.
Giambattista Vico (1725/1948) even based his philosophy of history and culture on the argument that we can
truly understand only what we ourselves have created
(see also Bunge, 1979).
521
domains of research. Moreover, the traditional dichotomies of explanation versus understanding, freedom versus determinism, or causalism versus intentionalism
have lost much of their adversarial fervor; philosophical
positions that plea for compatibility or, at least, peaceful coexistence between these stances have been
advanced (e.g., Davidson, 1980; Dennett, 1987). The
resurgence of cultural perspectives in psychology, and
an increased theoretical concern with the cultural bases
of behavior and developmentBruner even presages an
impending contextual revolutionfinds a natural ally
in action-theoretical approaches:
A cultural psychology, almost by definition, will not be
preoccupied with behavior but with action, its intentionally based counterpart, and more specifically, with
situated actionaction as situated in a cultural setting,
and in the mutually interacting states of the participants.
(Bruner, 1990a, p. 15)
522
different types of actions, such as their actors, instruments, goals, objects, and further contextual elements
(e.g., Aebli, 1980; Bruner, 1982; Fillmore, 1968; Schank
& Abelson, 1977).
action (see also Cole, 1978; van der Veer & Valsiner,
1991; Wertsch, 1981).
This classification cannot claim to be exhaustive;
there are no sharp boundaries between the theoretical
clusters and there is a broader spectrum of research programs that, to various extents, borrow or integrate elements from the theoretical families described earlier.
Such programs focus on, for example, social-cognitive
aspects of action (e.g., Bandura, 1986, 1997), on cultural-symbolic perspectives (e.g., Boesch, 1980, 1991;
Bruner, 1990a, 1990b; Valsiner, 1998), or on processes
related to the formation and implementation of actions
and action plans (e.g., Frese & Sabini, 1985; Gollwitzer
& Bargh, 1996; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985; von Cranach,
1982). Influential contributions to action theory have
also been advanced in neighboring disciplines, particularly in sociology (e.g., Bourdieu, 1977; Parsons & Shils,
1962; Schtz, 1962) and in anthropology (e.g., Geertz,
1973; Gehlen, 1955/1988; Tyler, 1969). Last, analytical
philosophy of action has contributed significantly to elucidating the action concept (for overviews, see, Brand,
1984; Care & Landesman, 1968; Moya, 1990). Some of
the earlier-mentioned theoretical positions have been
cast from the outset in a developmental framework
or are framed as developmental theories; this is particularly true for structuralist and social-constructivist
approaches. These approaches contribute important elements to a more comprehensive theoretical perspective
of intentional self-development, which is outlined in
later sections.
These introductory comments should make it clear
that the different theories and research programs centering on the concept of action do not form a coherent system. Given the inherently cross-disciplinary nature of
the action concept, the vision of a grand unifying action
theory seems utopian. This compromises any effort to
formulate consensual definitions. To elucidate the concept of action, I concentrate in the following on some
general and rather uncontroversial elements that seem
particularly relevant for conceptualizing the interdependencies between action and development.
Explicating Action: Conceptual Constituents
Is it possible to identify a set of essential and discriminative features that is common to all instances of actions, and that separates actions from other forms of
behavior that would not count as actions? When speaking of acts, actions, or action-like activities, we obvi-
523
524
Constitutive Rules
When considering acts or action episodes such as marrying, formulating an excuse, promising something, or
taking a penalty kick, it is evident that such actions are
not simply regulated, but, in a stronger sense, are constituted by rules. Just as one can play chess only within the
framework of chess rules, one can marry someone, give
a promise, and so forth. Only according to specific semantic rules and social conventions that define, at least
in outline, in which ways and under which contextual
circumstances an action has to be performed to count as
a valid instantiation of that particular act. Describing or
understanding an action as an instance of a generic act
presupposes familiarity with the corresponding constitutive rules (Winch, 1958). The rules that constitute
particular acts are represented individually in scriptlike
cognitive structures or schemas (Schank & Abelson,
1977). These scripts or schemas enable us to organize
our activities according to socially shared meanings,
and to extrapolate, anticipate, and coordinate courses of
action in social settings.
Through constitutive rules, certain types of action
are linked inseparably to cultural institutions. As DAndrade (1984) has pointed out, changes in institutional
contexts alter the range of possible actions, eventually
creating radically new types of action:
Regulative Rules
Personal action is regulated by a variety of cultural prescriptions and restrictions, and these can be more or
less formal and explicit ( laws, norms, customs, social
expectations, etc.). Such rules delimit situationally defined zones and margins of action. The limits imposed
by regulative rules, however, are not rigid; cultural laws,
in contrast to natural laws, can be violated. Regulative
rules, however, have normative force (Toulmin, 1969);
they are linked to subsidiary social forces such as sanctions or patterns of reinforcement that tend to increase
the frequency and probability of rule-conforming
behavior. Regulative rules, whether they are externally
imposed or internalized and integrated into the
processes of self-regulation, generate regularities in
patterns of action and development. For example, the developmental tasks or normative timetables which determine the proper scheduling of biographical events in
social contexts (e.g., Chudacoff, 1989; Neugarten &
Hagestad, 1976) define systems of regulative rules that
institutionalize and synchronize individual life courses
and thus impose order and regularity on development.
One consequence of constitutive rule systems is the enormous expansion of the behavioral repertoire of humans
compared with the behavioral repertoire of other animals.
For example, without the system of constitutive rules
called football, the behaviors of scoring, blocking, passing, and so on would not exist. (p. 94)
From the polyvalent (or polysemous) nature of actions, it follows that one and the same basic action can
simultaneously instantiate a multitude of different acts.
When Mr. Doe mows the lawn, he is cutting the grass,
making noise, and exercising his muscles; by doing this,
he isdepending on the given causal, social, and symbolic contextperhaps pleasing his neighbors, evading
conflicts with his wife, showing a sense of responsibility, and so forth (Rommetveit, 1980). Some of these effects and implications may be intended, others may be
simply tolerated or even remain unnoticed. To capture
the multiplicity of levels on which a given action can be
described, Goldman (1970) has coined the metaphor of
an act tree whose branches are generated through
causal mechanisms, conventions, or language rules. The
ways in which actors construe the effects and implications of their own activities, and describe their actions,
may differ from the interpretations of external observers. Such differences may give rise to social conflicts and identity problems, the solution of which often
requires negotiation of consensual interpretations. Negotiating meanings is a basic strategy for establishing
consensus and co-orientation between developing individuals who have to coordinate their actions and developmental goals in, for example, martital relationships or
family systems (Berger, 1993; Brandtstdter, Krampen,
& Heil, 1986). As is evident from these considerations,
the meanings and motivating valences of actions, even
of everyday activities, can be and often are ultimately
rooted in global identity goals and life themes.
Different kinds of knowledge and expertise, and corresponding developmental steps, are is required for a
525
differentiated representation of the meanings and effects of action: Knowledge about the causal structure
of action spaces is required for gauging possible actionoutcome contingencies whereas the construal of semantic or symbolic implications requires corresponding
conceptual knowledge. The polyvalence of actional
meanings also implies emotional polyvalence; when different interpretive schemes can be applied to a personal
or observed action, different or mixed emotional evaluations may result. For example, an aggressive action
may be coded as an act of self-assertion, as an infringement of moral norms, as a lapse of self-control, and may
simultaneously invoke feelings of pride, guilt, or shame.
The emergence of such mixed feelings appears to be an
ontogenetic marker of the individuals developing ability to represent the causal and semantic implications of
observed events and behaviors (Harter, 1986).
Self-control and intentional self-development crucially hinge on the construction and deconstruction of
meanings and evaluative standards. Human actors can
take an evaluative stance with respect to their own intentions, emotions, and actions; for example, we may experience feelings of pride or shame with regard to our
own feelings. Such metaemotions or second-order evaluations are characteristic for a higher ontogenetic level of
action regulation, a level on which moral principles, social norms, and personal representations of ought
selves (Higgins, 1988) become integrated into the process of intentional self-development (see also Frankfurt,
1971). Again, ontogenetic requirements should be noted.
The polyvalence of actions reflects the embedding
of individual behavior into a hierarchy of contextual
levels thatto borrow terms from Bronfenbrenners
(1979; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998) model of developmental ecologiesextends from the encompassing
macrosystem of cultural institutions, norms, and symbols through intermediate mesosystems down to the social and physical microsystems that constitute the
proximal setting for the individuals activities. The representation of meanings proceeds ontogenetically in a
sequence that corresponds to the increasing abstractness
and complexity of the contextual levels in which actions
are situated. Whereas early in development, the focus
for evaluating ones actions is primarily on perceived
and anticipated effects in the immediate or proximal environment (e.g., reactions of parents or peers), the evaluative scope widens on subsequent developmental stages
so that more complex and abstract system perspectives
become progressively influential in self-regulation (see
526
DEVELOPMENTAL DIVERSITY
AND REGULARITY: ACTIONTHEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTIONS
The search for coherence and lawful regularity in
human development is a traditional heuristic ideal that
has inspired developmental psychology from its very beginnings: From the colourful play of human changes,
we must go back to an invariant order, back as far as
possible to the eternal source of phenomenal variation
(Carus, 1823, p. 94; trans. J. B.). This ideal can be
traced back to the philosophical teachings of Parmenides (540480 B.C.) and Plato (427347 B.C.): For
Parmenides, the phenomenal world in all its diversity
was merely the appearance of one immutable substance,
whereas Plato considered empirical phenomena to be the
reflection or imperfect instantiation of timeless and unchanging ideas (see also Toulmin, 1977).
To what extent are action-theoretical perspectives
compatible with this influential epistemic stance? At
least at first glance, it appears that the rise of action
perspectives signals the demise of a Parmenidean or
Platonic stance; the arguments that strengthen the latter
seem to weaken the former, and vice versa. First, a research heuristic aimed primarily at the disclosure of
universal ontogenetic principles tends to detract from
the institutional, symbolic, subjective-intentional condi-
527
tions of developmentconditions that seem to breed diversity rather than regularity in human ontogeny
(Shweder, 1990). Second, the search for universal laws
in ontogeny has not been an extraordinary success, to put
it mildly; it has generated massive evidence apparently
speaking against the assumption of lawful regularities in
development. Thus, longitudinal investigations have
documented considerable variability and heterogeneity
in developmental patterns for many behavioral domains;
correspondingly, long-term predictions have evinced a
high degree of indeterminacy (Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt,
1980; Lerner, 1984; Rutter, 1984; Schaie, 1983). Likewise, there is only scarce support for the traditional
claim that personality development over the life course
is shaped profoundly by early childhood experiences, as
has been argued by psychoanalytic theory and partly
also by learning theorists (Clarke & Clarke, 1976;
Oyama, 1979). O. G. Brim and Kagan (1980, p. 13) have
aptly described the situation: . . . growth is more individualistic than was thought, and it is difficult to find
general patterns.
Not surprisingly, these research experiences have
strongly encouraged theoretical views that programmatically emphasize the discontinuous, contextualized, and
aleatoric (i.e., coincidental or random) character of development over the life span (Baltes & Reese, 1984;
Baumrind, 1989; Emde & Harmon, 1984; Gollin, 1981;
Lerner, 1984). There even have been claims as to the
basic futility of any search for universality and invariance in ontogeny (e.g., Gergen, 1980; Shweder, 1990).
However, a note of caution is required here: As long as
we cannot rule out that difficulties in extracting structure and law-like regularity from developmental diversity merely reflect theoretical deficiencies, it would be a
weak argument to simply attribute such difficulties to an
allegedly unpredictable or inchoate nature of development. Allusions to the fundamental indeterminism of
phenomena in quantum physics that recently have become trendy among developmentalists do not seem to be
tenable; it may suffice here to note that the uncertainty
principle in quantum physics is not a declaration of theoretical ignorance but a powerful predictive device. In any
case, it would be a logical mistake to equate lack of evidence for lawful regularity with evidence for the lack of
such qualities. Coherence and universality in development are not observable facts that can be established
conclusively; these qualities emerge only by way of theoretical abstraction. In a similar way, plasticity and modifiability are not features that characterize development
528
in an essential or fundamental sense; they have to be conceived as qualities that relate to potentials of change and
modification in a given cultural and historical frame.
The Construction and Deconstruction of
Developmental Coherence
To account for continuity and coherence in developmental patterns, it is usual to invoke causal mechanisms
(e.g., Overton & Reese, 1981). A causal or deterministic
stance, however, is rendered problematic by the fact that
developing organisms have to be conceived as open systems (see also Ford & Lerner, 1992). Only in a system
that is closed to external influences can there be causal
chains such that subsequent states are linked in a necessary and invariant fashion; the developing organism,
however, is functionally coupled to its physical and social environment by the continuous interchange of stimulation and information. Defenders of a determinist
stance might argue that such difficulties could be handled simply by expanding the analytic perspective: If
determinism is assumed, alterations in a system which
do not appear to occur as the consequence of the presence or operation of antecedent factors or conditions,
must be regarded as belonging to a more inclusive system which is deterministic (Nagel, 1957, p. 17).
If we widen our explanatory scope to include the
physical and social ecologies of development, however, it
becomes obvious that regularities in human development
are not brought about by causal laws alone but, to a considerable extent, reflect the ways in which institutions,
collective agents, and the developing individuals themselves, purposefully or inadvertently, make use of such
laws. If the notion of causality is taken to refer to invariant sequences of events in which some antecedent condition inevitably generates some consequence (e.g., Bunge,
1979), the regularities that characterize human development as a product of personal and collective action can
hardly be described that way. In cultural contexts, developmental regularities are in large measure patterned and
mediated by individual and institutionalized actions,
and, by consequence, can also be transformed or suppressed through action. For example, connections between risk factors in early development and unfavorable
developmental outcomes generally depend on moderating or mediating variables such as prevailing attitudes in
the social environment or the availability of preventive
and therapeutic resources (e.g., Busch-Rossnagel, 1981);
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1
2
3
4
5
6
To gauge limits of performance and developmental variation, planned experimental interventions seem to offer
a stronger basis; efforts to boost memory performance
of elderly subjects through mnemonic training may be
considered as an example (Baltes, 1993; Kliegl, Smith,
& Baltes, 1989). Even through experimental manipulations, however, limits of potential development cannot
be determined in any definitive way because the results
of such interventions always depend on the theoretical
and procedural means available in a given cultural and
historical situation, and thus are themselves subject to
theoretical and technical limitations.
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532
length of levers and the suspended weights. The competencies implicated by these tasks, in turn, presuppose
more elementary ones such as detecting and monitoring
differences in size or length, and so on. Though such developmental sequences can be demonstrated empirically
by appropriate methods, such as scalogram analysis
(Siegler, 1981; Strauss & Ephron-Wertheim, 1986), they
obviously do not reflect simple empirical or causal contingencies but follow from the formal characteristics of
the particular tasks (see also Smedslund, 1984).
Constructive and Conventional Implications
Actions often involve the competent use of mediating
objects; particular skills (e.g., skiing, piano playing) are
inherently tied to the competent use of instruments,
tools, or other cultural artifacts. Efficient action here
presupposes accommodation to the particular constructional features and demands of these mediating means
(Kaminski, 1982; Leontev, 1978; Oerter, 1991). These
structural features often impose strong constraints on
the ordering of steps in the acquisitional sequence (e.g.,
Resnick, 1973). For example, children will not be able to
read the hands of a clock and tell the time unless they
have acquired other component skills such as distinguishing between big and little hands, translating the
positions of the hands into particular numerical relations, and so forth. Though there is no one-to-one relation between structural features of an object or
instrument and the developmental steps that lead to its
competent use (Fischer, 1980), we can safely assume
that in the ontogenetic sequence, a complex skill will not
emerge earlier than the constituent skills related to the
specific structural features and demands of the objects
and instruments involved.
It appears that these arguments apply to all activities
that are defined by specific production rules. Actions
such as making a promise, dancing a waltz, or cooking
spaghetti bolognese imply a recurrent configuration of
actional and contextual elements, which is encoded in
constitutive rules, prescriptions, or recipes. There may
be variants, creative modifications, as well as atypical
and less-then-successful realizations of the constitutive
rules. Categories may be fuzzy, so that there may even be
no criterial feature that would be common to all possible
instantiations (Rosch, 1977). In cases like the ones considered earlier, however, we can identify structural features that must invariantly be present because they
constitute the act in question: A waltz can only be performed in 34 time, a promise can only be given by a per-
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534
This assumption is captured in the postulate that principled or postconventional moral judgment presupposes
the development of a sociomoral perspective that is system-transcending or prior to society (e.g., Kohlberg,
1976). For basic conceptual reasons again, it is difficult
to conceive of an ontogenetic pattern that would not conform with this assumption because ethical principles
formally implicate a universal, system-transcendent
stance.
These examples give an impression of how the structure of language games influences ontogenetic forms.
This influence is, of course, particularly obvious in
the domain of language acquisition: Through learning
and instruction, communicative behavior is gradually
brought into forms that conform to the established semiotic order. This constructive process is reflected in what
Keil and Batterman (1984; see also Keil, 1989) have described as the characteristic-to-defining shift: When
using a concept, children initially focus on salient features that, by way of statistical association, characterize
typical instantiations of the concept (e.g., for the young
child, mother may be strongly linked to the feature of
making supper ; see Inhelder & Piaget, 1964). As language development proceeds, the child increasingly
heeds to structural invariants that structurally define
the concept (e.g., mother as defined by a specific kinship relation), and so eventually becomes capable of correctly categorizing atypical examples that do not exhibit
the expected characteristic features, as well as invalid
cases that do so, but lack the defining features.
Conceptual structures do not only shape language development, as the given examples might perhaps suggest. Rather, they impose constraints on ontogenetic
patterns wherever developmental phenomena are produced, defined, or assessed with reference to conceptual
categories. To briefly illustrate this point, I consider
some examples from the domain of emotional development. Emotion terms are embedded in, and derive their
meaning from, a network of other mental concepts that
we use when describing and explaining actions. For instance, envy is conceptually related to a process of social comparison; jealousy implies the perception of a
particular social constellation; worry or fear imply
the anticipation of aversive events, as well as doubts
concerning ones ability to avert these events; pride
points to the perception of a personal success, and so on
(Brandtstdter, 1987; Mees, 1991). In the guise of
causal hypotheses, relationships of this kind have also
been proposed in attributional theories of emotion (e.g.,
INTENTIONAL SELF-DEVELOPMENT
AND PERSONAL CONTROL
OVER DEVELOPMENT
The idea that individuals are producers or at least
coproducers of their own development is not novel. Interactionist, contextualist, and organismic-structuralist
approaches have embraced this notion and thus have
contributed to discrediting lopsided views that portray the developing subject as being only the passive recipient of formative influences (cf. Bronfenbrenner,
1979; Lerner, 1982; Magnusson, 1990; Reese & Overton, 1970; Sameroff, 1975). These approaches, howeverand the organismic models in particularhave
primarily conceived of development as the result of
person-environment transactions rather than as a target
area of intentional action; in other words, the relation
535
between action and development has been conceptualized primarily as a functional rather than an intentional
one. This focus seems appropriate for early phases of
development: The infant certainly does not engage in interactions with the social or material environment with
the intention of promoting his or her development. Even
if at very early developmental stages the childs activity
shows signs of intentionality, it is not intentionally
directed toward some developmental task or goal. Such
intentional orientations generally come into play indirectly through other agents, primarily through the caregivers who organize and constrain the childs space of
action according to intended developmental agenda, and
who thereby shape and canalize the childs further development in co-constructive interaction with the child
him- or herself, as well as with the cultural macrosystem (Goodnow & Collins, 1990; Lerner, 1985; Valsiner,
1988c; Wozniak, 1993).
It is during the transition to adolescence and early
adulthood that the individuals conceptions of self and
personal future become articulate enough to guide intentional activity. External directives and demands originating in the familial and larger social context become
increasingly internalized and integrated into processes
of self-regulation and self-evaluation; with the progression from a heteronomous, external mode of developmental control to an increasingly intentional and
autonomous mode of intentional self-development, a
new and higher level in the regulation of ontogeny is
reached. This reflexive-intentional mode has been given
rather short shrift in developmental research; however,
for an actional perspective, it is of focal interest.
In elaborating this point, it will be necessary to heed
the reciprocal character of the action-development relationship: Activities of intentional self-development are
themselves developmental outcomes, they change over
the life cycle in structure and intentional content. In the
following, I first try to elucidate the basic process features of such activities. Based on these analyses, I focus
more closely on the ontogeny of self-regulatory activities as well as on modifications and changes in these activities across the life span.
Activities of Intentional Self-Development:
Structure and Process
Self-regulative activities in contexts of intentional selfdevelopment comprise different functional components.
Models of self-regulation differentiate mostly between
536
Development-related
beliefs and
expectancies
(general or
self-referential)
Cognitive appraisals
related to
personal development
Initial
developmental
conditions
Developmental
goals, identity
projects
Evaluation of
developmental
prospects
Control beliefs
related to
personal
development
Planning and
execution of
corrective activities
Modified
developmental
conditions
537
538
During goal implementation, the focus of selfevaluation may shift to temporal, qualitative, or quantitative modalities of goal attainment (to reach a career
goal in a certain biographical span, to maintain a given
rate of progress toward a goal, and so forth). Such implementational standards are formed in the transition from
intention to action, and they are to some extent necessary for such a transition to occur. When implementational standards become salient as reference points
for self-evaluation, a new level of metamonitoring
(Carver & Scheier, 1986) is established, which is reflected, for example, by the fact that emotions such as
disappointment, pride, or shame are no longer determined by the perceived discrepancy or distance from
the goal as such, but rather by the perceived rate, quality, or smoothness of progress toward the goal.
Self-evaluative standards can change over the life
cycle; this once more highlights the reciprocal influence
between action and development. For example, with
advancing age, desired features such as health, intellectual efficiency, or professional success may assume
partly different meanings, and the corresponding selfevaluative standards may be raised or lowered. Changes
in action resources that result from the interaction of
age-graded, sociohistorical, and nonnormative factors
across the life course (Baltes, Cornelius, & Nesselroade, 1979) may affect the difficulty and, accordingly,
the personal costs of realizing certain goals or maintaining certain standards. Shifts in personal goals and standards over the life course may also reflect implicit
theories of development and normative age expectations.
By defining what expectations persons of a given age
should hold for themselves and their future development, normative expectations can legitimate or discredit
personal goals and aspirations. Individuals differ with
respect to the flexibility with which they adjust goals
and standards to changed developmental prospects; as I
discuss in more depth later, this accommodative flexibility plays an important role in coping with developmental losses and in securing a sense of personal
continuity and efficacy over the life span (cf. Atchley,
1989; Brandtstdter & Renner, 1990; G. Brim, 1992).
Activation and Inhibition of Self-Evaluative Reactions
Self-evaluative reactions depend on how individuals
construe the meanings and effects of their actions. It
follows that self-evaluative processes, and the ensuing
action tendencies, can be enhanced or weakened through
destruction or alteration of such meanings and implications. Self-corrective tendencies may be dampened by
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541
and ego integrity, respectively). In his model of developmental tasks, Havighurst (1948/1974) has made a similar attempt to define a basic pattern of priorities for
self-development across the life span, which he thought
to reflect the joint influence of biological changes and of
age-graded cultural demands. These concepts undoubtedly had a seminal influence in developmental research,
but they give short shrift to the variegation of developmental goals in content, complexity, and abstraction and
to the processes mediating the definition and implementation of goals. Recent approaches in personality and action research provide a more differentiated treatment of
these issues; for example, the concepts of personal
strivings (Emmons, 1986, 1989, 1992), personal projects (Little, 1983, 1998), life themes (Csikszentmihalyi & Beattie, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977), or
life tasks (Cantor & Fleeson, 1991; Zirkel & Cantor,
1990) are formulated with explicit reference to the regulative role of goals in personal development (see also
Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Maier, 1999).
Goals of intentional self-development are reflected in
the plans, projects, and courses of action into which the
individual invests time and effort. Only rarely, however,
are developmental goals represented from the outset in a
format that already specifies the means and procedures
necessary for goal attainment. Sociocultural developmental tasks (Havighurst, 1948/1974), too, are usually
framed with a degree of abstraction that allows the implementation to be tailored to personal and situational
circumstances. The implementation of goals basically
depends on three types of constraints: (1) how the goal
in question is interpreted, (2) which means are deemed
necessary for goal attainment, and (3) whether the relevant means and resources are available on social and
personal levels. In the following, I take a closer look at
the translation of goals into intentions and of intentions
into actions.
Levels of Regulation: Control-System Accounts
According to control-system accounts of action, the process of transforming goals into actions involves a hierarchy of feedback loops; goals on a superordinate level of
regulation are converted successively into more specific
plans or programs, and further into concrete behavioral
sequences (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1986, 1998; Powers,
1973). Thus, for example, the abstract principle of
being helpful may, depending on situational circumstances, activate specific programs such as helping an
elderly person to cross the street, which are then further specified and translated into behavioral sequences.
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tentions over longer periods (Bandura, 1986; Harackiewicz & Sansone, 1991; Pervin, 1991).
Sequences of action steps or subgoals that are instrumentally related to a common overarching life theme or
goal form what may be called an action path (Raynor,
1981). The individuals self-view and future perspective critically hinge on the temporal extension of and
progress in action paths. The initial steps are motivated
primarily through anticipation of further achievements
in the path; with further advancement, retrospection on
previous achievements becomes increasingly important
as a source of self-evaluation. When paths are terminated by the attainment of a desired final outcome
(closed paths; Raynor & Entin, 1982, 1983), a loss of
meaning and purpose may be experienced (e.g.,
Baumeister, 1986). The emotional quality of personal
developmental prospects thus depends crucially on how
far the subject succeeds in keeping action paths open or
avoiding closure through interlocking paths and creating new and meaningful commitments: The open
path . . . provides a means of understanding the difference between individuals who remain psychologically
young through continued becoming and those who become psychologically old through exclusive dependence
upon having been . . . (Raynor, 1982, p. 274). Often,
action paths may be extended by a motive to secure,
further improve, or embellish what has been achieved
(e.g., Schank & Abelson, 1977). The sequential
arrangement of developmental tasks and normative social expectations across the life cycle may also facilitate a meaningful interlocking of goals and action
paths. With advancing age, however, the shrinking of
the temporal horizon tends to cut short and finalize action paths; accordingly, reminiscing about biographical
achievements becomes increasingly important in later
life as a resource of personal continuity and selfrespect (Coleman, 1986).
As already mentioned, not all goals can be finally attained through a sequence of instrumental steps. Apart
from the trivial fact that goals might be too difficult for
the individual to achieve, some goals are chronic or persistent in the sense that they, by their very nature, cannot be reached conclusively. Goals may be rooted in
enduring motivational dispositions for which no conclusive consummatory event can be defined, for example, a
striving for health, social recognition, or professional
success may (perhaps under continual accommodation
of standards and criteria) shape and regulate intentional
self-development during an entire life. Other goals may
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understanding of personal agency presupposes the epistemic separation of self and nonself that gradually
evolves from the radically egocentric and syncretic
mode of experience that characterizes the primordial
phase of cognitive development (Kegan, 1983; Piaget,
1936/1952). It is this separation that is the developmental origin of a conceptually differentiated, categorical
self (Butterworth, 1990; Case, 1991; Filipp, 1980; Harter, 1983; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979).
As hallmarks of emerging intentionality, we may
consider early behavioral adaptations that obviously
aim at producing or evoking particular consequences
(Bell, 1974). In contexts of parent-child interaction,
such signs can be observed already in the first months
of life, for example, in the instrumental use of vocalizations to influence the parents behavior (Papousek &
Papousek, 1989):
How efficiently a 3-month-old infant can control parental
behavior is readily observable, for example, in early interactive tickling games, when the child evokes the next repetition by an irresistible squealing. . . . The effectiveness
of the contingency experience can be demonstrated easily
by temporarily disrupting the childs expectations (e.g.,
by having the mother briefly close her eyes or turning unresponsively away from her child). . . . When this happens,
even a 2-month-old child will activate a broad repertoire
of facial, gestic, or vocal behaviors in an attempt to bring
the mother back under his or her control. (Papousek & Papousek, 1989, p. 479; trans J. B.)
Recognition of regularities in behavior-effect contingencies is facilitated through the ritualization and mutual coordination of interactive exchanges between
parent and child (Brazelton, Koslowski, & Main, 1974;
Papousek & Papousek, 1987). The experience of transactional contingencies provides the raw material from
which a working model develops that, initially in a rudimentary way, represents causal structures and instrumental relationships. Children in this early phase of
development show exuberant emotional reactions when
they become aware of their growing ability to produce
interesting effects in a regular and reliable manner
(Case, 1991; J. S. Watson, 1966). As mentioned earlier,
caregivers arrange the childs action space to promote
particular achievements, thus providing a scaffold for
further development (Rogoff, 1990; Wood, Bruner, &
Ross, 1976). Through affording facilitative means as
well as through imposing external barriers and counterforces, the physical and social environment provides
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the level of concrete operational thinking. A central aspect of self-description, which also assumes a pivotal
role in the further elaboration of a stable identity, is gender (Guardo & Bohan, 1971; Harter, 1983; Kohlberg,
1966; Marcus & Overton, 1978); particularly in societies with marked sex-role stereotyping, conceptions of
an ought self are often introduced as prescriptions of
how a girl or boy should behave or typically behaves
(e.g., rules concerning the public display of emotions;
e.g., Case, 1991; Stangor & Ruble, 1987, 1989).
Self-regulatory activity is based on self-evaluative
standards or self-guides (Higgins, 1988) that form the
persons desired and ought self. Self-evaluation and
self-control originate from early, heteronomous states
that are characterized by the external regulation of behavior through directives and physical constraints; with
advancing representational capacities, children internalize external directives and apply evaluative and judgmental labels to themselves and their own actions. The
emergence of internalized control is certainly one of the
most central and significant achievements of early childhood (Diaz, Neal, & Amaya-Williams, 1991; Flavell,
1977; Kopp, 1982, 1987). The notion of internalization
of normative orientations may be misleading as far as it
connotes the simple transposing of external norms into
an inner language of control. Rather, internalization
should be seen as a constructive process by which external evaluations, standards, and norms are assimilated,
interpreted, and realized in a manner corresponding to
the childs actual developmental state and potential
(Lawrence & Valsiner, 1993).
The emergence of internalized control is marked
by the appearance of self-affects such as pride, guilt,
or embarrassment, which are typically observed in
achievement situations around the ages of 3 to 4 (H.
Heckhausen, 1984). Children at this age vehemently
protest against self-discrepant attributions (Im
not a bad boy!). Such early forms of self-assertion
foreshadow processes of self-enhancement and selfverification that later become central aspects of intentional self-development (Kagan, 1981a). It is not until
middle childhood, however, that self-evaluative concepts or standards are represented in episodic and semantic memory with sufficient complexity so that
children can explicitly describe situations in which
they would be proud or ashamed of themselves (Harter,
1983). Self-evaluative conceptsfor example, personal
notions of what it means to be good, competent, fair, or
responsibleare continuously redefined and endowed
with partly new meanings as cognitive and sociomoral
550
tions that often arise in an unpredictable fashion. In shaping and elaborating life plans, parents, partners, and significant others in general play a significant role, both as
models and as mentors (Goodnow & Collins, 1990;
Levinson, 1978; J. Smith, 1996). As individuals come to
participate in social role systems of partnership, family,
and occupation, it becomes increasingly necessary to
coordinate and synchronize personal life plans with
those of other individuals; quality and stability of marital partnerships largely depend on the compatibility and
mutual adjustment of life goals (Brandtstdter et al.,
1986; Felser, Schmitz, & Brandtstdter, 1998).
As the individual comes to relate his or her personal
development to the norms and role systems of family and
occupational cycles, social representations of normal
or desirable development gain further influence in personal life-planning. Age-graded societies constrain and
canalize intentional self-development through prescriptions or normative expectations concerning the proper
scheduling of developmental events and transitions; in
interaction with biological changes, such norms constitute a cultural script of a life course (Hagestad, 1991;
Neugarten & Hagestad, 1976). Deviations from this
script arouse attention and a need for explanation or justification. However, the normative force of cultural
scripts of the life course also stems from the fact that
deviations from the normal pattern have particular
symbolic and attributional valences. Divergence from
prescripted timetables for developmental transitions
may, depending on the particular domain, be taken as a
sign of incompetence, irresponsibility, indifference, or
carelessness (Kalicki, 1996). As the individual moves
through the life cycle, such symbolic valences gain influence in self-evaluation and intentional self-development.
A sense of personal identity and individuality is to an
essential degree tied to those elements in the personal
life course that deviate from normative or typical patterns; apparently, the cultural standardization of the individual life course tends to reduce its discriminative
and individuating value. This problem is somewhat
toned down by the fact that developmental tasks and normative expectations about the life course afford some
latitude for idiosyncratic interpretation and implementation; thus, it becomes a developmental task of its own
to interpret and implement the cultural script of the life
course in ways that are compatible with personal goals
and identity projects (e.g., Dittmann-Kohli, 1986).
The formation of personal identity does not end with
a final and stable outcome but involves continual revisions and readjustments (Gergen & Gergen, 1987). In
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goal that otherwise could not be attained involves an element of compensation (Vygotsky, 1960/1979). In later
life, acts of compensation specifically aim at maintaining some desired standard of performance in spite of
losses in task-relevant functions or skills. Because performance in particular tasks is generally determined by
different skill components and external factors, a deterioration of particular components can often be offset by
selective use or strengthening of those components that
are still functioning well; depending on the functional
domain under consideration, compensation may also involve the use of particular metacognitive strategies (e.g.,
mnemonic aids) or of external prosthetic means (Bckman & Dixon, 1992; Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Salthouse,
1987). Activities of compensation tend to be most pronounced in areas that have high discriminative and biographical relevance and are of central importance to the
persons identity. Like other activities of intentional
self-development, compensatory actions depend on the
availability of pertinent theoretical and technological
knowledge as well as on its personal accessibility.
A further important category of assimilative activity
comprises activities of self-verification (Swann, 1983).
The self-verification construct refers to a general ( but
differentially expressed) tendency to preferentially select social or informational contexts that are likely to
provide self-congruent feedback on those dimensions of
self-description that are central or constitutive to personal identity (Greve, 1990; Rosenberg, 1979; Wicklund
& Gollwitzer, 1982). To some extent, self-verification
tendencies are already operative on automatic levels; for
example, strong self-beliefs have an inherent tendency to
reject or discredit discrepant information. This conservative effect may ward off self-discrepant evidence (at
least as long as the evidence is not sufficiently strong
to override the protective forces) and, in this case, would
inhibit assimilative and accommodative responses
equally. Only those activities of self-verification that intentionally aim at the purpose of reducing the salience of
losses or avoiding self-discrepant feedback, however,
should be considered as assimilative. For example, elderly people may strategically select social interactions
to serve such self-enhancing intentions (e.g., Carstensen,
1993; Ward, 1984). People may even change their external appearance (e.g., through cosmetic surgery) in an attempt to elicit social feedback that conforms to their
self-views (Swann, 1983).
A common feature of all assimilative activities is a
tenacious adherence to certain goals, ambitions, or stan-
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sentially on the accommodation of goals to available resources (Brandtstdter & Rothermund, 1994; G. Brim,
1992). With advancing age, preferred modes of coping
shift from assimilative-offensive to accommodative
forms; in view of the increase of uncontrollable and irreversible losses in later life, this shift is consistent with
theoretical expectations.
The readiness or ability to accommodate goals to situational constraints depends on situational and personal
conditions. Individuals will find it most difficult to disengage from goals that are central to their identity and
for which substitutes or functional equivalents are
not easily available. High self-complexity (Linville,
1987), that is, a highly diversified and multifocal selfstructure may enhance disengagement from barren life
projects and commitment to new goals. A further significant factor that may differ across situations and
persons concerns the ability to shift the meanings of
aversive states or losses so that these eventually become
acceptable. In aversive mood states, accessibility of palliative meanings seems to be lowered by a tendency of
the cognitive system to generate mood-congruent cognitions (Blaney, 1986). We should therefore expect that
accommodative processes engage mechanisms that override such congruency effects (e.g., S. E. Taylor, 1991).
As suggested earlier, such auxiliary mechanisms presumably operate on a subpersonal, automatic level. Accommodation of goals and ambitions needs not to be
and often cannot be actuated intentionally, although it
may have a directive influence on the individuals intentions and decisions. The process of accommodation,
however, does not start but rather ends with a decision
to abandon a goal or dissolve a commitment. Disengagement from barren commitments can be enhanced to
some extent by the planful use of self-management and
self-instruction techniques, but, like other nonintentional or automatic processes, it can be brought under
personal control only in such mediated, technical ways.
Just as we cannot accept any beliefs apart from those
that seem sufficiently plausible within the context of
the beliefs we already hold, so too we are unable to discard a goal merely because it seems advantageous to do
so (e.g., Gilbert, 1993; Kunda, 1990). Action-theoretical
research increasingly pays attention to the role that such
unintentional or subpersonal automatisms play in the
regulation of action (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Brandtstdter, 2000).
Among the automatisms that support the accommodative process, mechanisms of attention regulation
are of prime importance. As already discussed, atten-
tion generally focuses on situational aspects that are relevant to an ongoing course of action: This suggests that
scarce attentional resources tend to be withdrawn from
problems that are perceived to be uncontrollable or have
turned out to be so (Brandtstdter & Renner, 1992).
Decentering of attention from uncontrollable problems
may be supported by a compensatory tendency to focus
on affectively incongruent stimuli (i.e., on stimuli
with positive affective valence) after negative feedback
(Derryberry, 1993; Rothermund, 2003; Tipper &
Cranston, 1985). Particular types of problems, however,
may continue to bind attention even after repeated futile
attempts to solve them; this is particularly true of problems that are personally so important that continued assimilative efforts have a high subjective utility even
under very low probability of success. Under such conditions, problem-focused thinking may degenerate into ruminative thinking that cycles around the blocked goal
and its implications (Martin & Tesser, 1989; Martin,
Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993); in the dual-process model,
such ruminative thought would be symptomatic of difficulties in shifting from assimilative to accommodative
modes. However, ruminative thinking may also promote
accommodation because it may enhance the finding of
positive meanings, which, due to their palliative effects,
should also have a greater chance to be accepted as valid
(Brandtstdter & Renner, 1992; Wentura, 1995). Generally, to deconstruct aversive implications of a problem,
information has to be generated that invalidates or undermines the aversive conclusions or the underyling
premises; this form of focused, preference-driven thinking involves a positivity bias because the search for further information tends to be stopped after the desired
positive result has been reached (Kruglanski, 1990;
Kunda, 1990).
The distinction between assimilative and accommodative processes that we have addressed in these
final considerations may recall traditional distinctions
between active and passive concepts of happiness
(Tatarkiewicz, 1976); philosophical notions of wisdom
have emphasized the importance of finding the right
balance between these two stances. Wisdom, however
defined, implies not only knowledge as to which goals
are important in life and how these goals may be
achieved but also involves a sense as to which limitations are unavoidable and how necessities can be
accepted (Kamlah, 1973; Nozick, 1989). Intentional
self-development across the life span is based on this
interplay between engagement and disengagement, between tenacious goal pursuit and flexible goal adjust-
555
ment. From the theoretical analysis of these complementary tendencies, a better understanding is gained of how
continuity and change both pervade and enable each
other in personal development during the life span.
556
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CHAPTER 11
Life span developmental psychology, now often abbreviated as life span psychology, deals with the study of individual development (ontogenesis) from conception
into old age (P. B. Baltes, 1987, 1997, 2005; P. B. Baltes
& Goulet, 1970; P. B. Baltes & Smith, 2004; Brim &
Wheeler, 1966; Dixon & Lerner, 1988; Li & Freund,
2005; Neugarten, 1969; J. Smith & Baltes, 1999;
Staudinger & Lindenberger, 2003; Thomae, 1979). A
core assumption of life span psychology is that development is not completed at adulthood (maturity). Rather,
ontogenesis extends across the entire life course and
lifelong adaptive processes are involved. A further
premise is that the concept of development can be used
570
fies an absolutist definition. The nature of what is considered a gain and what is considered a loss changes
with age, involves objective and subjective criteria, and
is conditioned by theoretical predilection and cultural
context, as well as historical time.
We offer one more introductory observation on the objectives of life span psychology that it shares with other
developmental specialties. Methodologically speaking,
the study of ontogenesis is inherently a matter of general
and differential psychology. Thus, life span research and
theory is intended to generate knowledge about three
components of individual development: (1) commonalities (regularities) in development, (2) interindividual
differences in development, and (3) intraindividual plasticity in development (P. B. Baltes, Reese, & Nesselroade, 1977; R. M. Lerner, 1984; S.-C. Li & Freund,
2005; J. R. Nesselroade, 1991a, 1991b; Staudinger & Lindenberger, 2003). Joint attention to each of these components of individual variability and intra-individual
potential, and specification of their age-related interplays, are the conceptual and methodological foundations
of the developmental enterprise. Recognizing the
methodological significance of the distinction among,
and subsequent theoretical integration of, commonalities
in development, inter-individual differences in development, and intra-individual plasticity has been a continuing theme in life span research and theory since its
inception (Tetens, 1777).
What about the status and location of life span psychology within the territory of developmental psychology? Is life span developmental psychology a special
developmental psychology, is it the overall integrative
developmental conception of ontogenesis, or is it simply
one of the many orientations to the study of development
(P. B. Baltes, 1987)? Perhaps most scholars view life
span psychology as one of the specializations in the
field of developmental psychology, namely, that specialization that seeks to understand the full age spectrum of
ontogenesis. In this case, the lens of life span psychologists is focused on the entire life course with less consideration for the details of age-related specificities.
Life span theory, however, can also be seen as the coordinated integration of various age-based developmental
specializations into one overarching, cumulative framework of ontogenesis. Using such a life span-coordinating
lens, one could argue that, if there is a general theory of
ontogenetic development, it needs to be a theory that
takes into account that ontogenesis extends from conception into old age. Thus, even if one is primarily inter-
Historical Introduction
571
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
While this section may seem to speak more about the
past than the present, it is important to recognize that
present theoretical preferences are in part the direct result of historical contexts of science and cultural scenarios rather than of carefully elaborated theoretical
arguments. Some of the current issues surrounding life
span psychology and its location in the larger field of
developmental psychology are difficult to appreciate unless they are seen in their historical and societal contexts (P. B. Baltes, 1983; Brim & Wheeler, 1966; R. M.
Lerner, 1983; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1999; Reinert,
1979). For instance, how is it that, especially in North
America, life span developmental psychology is a relatively recent advent? This is not true for Germany where
life span thinking has a long history.
Many German developmental historians, for instance, consider Johann Nicolaus Tetens as the founder
of the field of developmental psychology (P. B. Baltes,
1983; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1999; Mller-Brettel &
Dixon, 1990; Reinert, 1979). To Anglo-American developmentalists, however, Tetens is a relatively unknown
figure. When Tetens published his two-volume monumental work on human nature and its development Menschliche Natur and ihre Entwicklung more than 200
years ago, in 1777, the scope of this first major opus
covered the entire life span from birth into old age (see
also Carus, 1808, for another early contribution to the
572
field of developmental psychology). In addition, the content and theoretical orientation of this historical classic
by Tetens included many of the current-day signatures
of what has become known as the life span developmental theoretical orientation. For instance, development
was not only elaborated as a lifelong process by Tetens,
but also as a process that entails gains and losses, a process embedded in and constituted by sociocultural conditions, and as a process that is continuously refined and
optimized (vervollkommnet) by societal change and historical transformations (see Table 11.1).
The second major early work on human development,
written some 150 years ago by the Belgian Adolphe
Quetelet (1835/1842), continued in a similar tradition.
His treatment of human qualities and abilities was entirely life span in orientation, and because of his analysis of the dynamics between individual and historical
development, Quetelet prefigured major developments
in developmental methodology (P. B. Baltes, 1983). For
instance, he anticipated the distinction between crosssectional and longitudinal study designs as well as the
need to conduct successions of age studies in order to
disentangle effects of age from those of secular change
and historical period (P. B. Baltes, 1968; Schaie, 1965;
Schaie & Baltes, 1975).
The 1777 work of Johann Nicolaus Tetens was never
translated into English. It is unfortunate because reading Tetens deep, although largely conceptual and not
empirical insights into the interplay among individual,
contextual, and historical factors is a humbling experience. Equally impressive are his many concrete everyday examples and analyses of phenomena of human
TABLE 11.1
Table of Contents
Chapter
Title
2
3
4
5
6
7
Historical Introduction
573
574
life span development is a critical task of current developmental theory. Are theories of development the same
as theories of aging? Do we need different conceptions
of ontogenesis to characterize development and aging
(P. B. Baltes & Smith, 2004)? For instance, does one approach deal with phenomena of growth, and the other
with decline?
A third factor, and a major source of rapprochement
between child developmentalists and adult developmentalists, was the aging of the participants and of the researchers in the several classical longitudinal studies on
child development begun in the 1920s and 1930s (Elder,
1974; Kagan, 1964). What are the effects of child development on later life? Which childhood developmental
factors are positive or risk-prone for later healthy development? These were questions that were increasingly
pursued beginning in the 1970s as the children of the
classical longitudinal studies reached early adulthood
and midlife. Some of these studies have even provided
a basis for a better understanding of processes in the
last phases of life (Block, 1971, 1993; Eichorn, Clausen,
Haan, Honzik, & Mussen, 1981; Elder, 1985, 1986,
1994; Holahan, Sears, & Cronbach, 1995; Kagan &
Moss, 1962; Sears & Barbee, 1977).
Out of these developments has emerged new territory
in developmental scholarship. The need for better collaboration among all age specialities of developmental
scholarship, including child development, has become an
imperative of current-day research in developmental
psychology (Hetherington et al., 1988). But for good life
span theory to evolve, it takes more than courtship and
mutual recognition. It takes a new effort and serious exploration of theory thatin the tradition of Tetens
(1777)has in its primary substantive focus the structure, sequence, and dynamics of the entire life course.
Level 2:
Level 3:
Level 4:
Level 5:
575
Biological Plasticity:
Decreases with Age
More Culture to
Extend Stages of Life
Efficacy of Culture:
Decreases with Age
576
577
increasingly more and more differentiated cultural resources, especially if one considers the high levels of
knowledge and technology that adults need to acquire in
order to function well in modern societies. Thus, it is primarily through the medium of more advanced levels of
culture in the biocultural co-construction process that individuals have the opportunity to continue to develop
across the higher ages of the life course.
There is a second argument for the theory that, with
age, the need for the supportive role of culture increases. Because of the age-related biological weakening and reduced plasticity described in the left part of
Figure 11.1, an age-associated increase in need for
culture is also necessary because more environmental
support is necessary to maintain efficacy. Thus, if and
when individuals aspire to maintain their previous levels
of functioning as they age, culture-based resources (material, social, economic, psychological) are necessary to
maintain high levels of functioning. In the aging literature, the work of Craik (1986; Craik & Bialystok, in
press) on the role of environmental support to maintain
memory efficacy is exemplary.
Age-Related Decrease in Efficiency of Culture
The right panel of Figure 11.1 illustrates a further overall characteristic of the life span developmental dynamic between biology, culture, and age. Here, the focus
is on a third cornerstone of the overall architecture of
the life course, that is, the efficacy or ef ficiency of cultural factors and resources (P. B. Baltes, 1997).
During the second half of life, we submit that there is
an age-associated reduction in the efficiency of cultural
factors. With age, and conditioned primarily by the negative biological trajectory of the life course, the relative
power (effectiveness) of psychological, social, material,
and cultural interventions becomes smaller and smaller.
Take cognitive learning in old age as an example (P. B.
Baltes, 1993; Craik & Salthouse, 2000; Lindenberger,
2001; Salthouse, 2003; T. Singer, Lindenberger, &
Baltes, 2003). The older the adult, the more time, practice, and more cognitive support it takes to attain the
same learning gains. And moreover, at least in some domains of information processing, and when it comes to
high levels of performance, older adults may never be
able to reach the same levels of functioning as younger
adults even after extensive training (P. B. Baltes &
Kliegl, 1992; Kliegl, Smith, & Baltes, 1990; T. Singer,
Lindenberger, et al., 2003).
578
Toward Growth
In childhood and early adulthood, the primary allocation of resources is directed toward growth. During
adulthood, allocation toward maintenance and recovery
(resilience) is on the increase. Research by Freund and
colleagues has shown that individuals of different ages
hold mental scripts and preferences that are consistent
with this life span change in the focus of allocation
(Freund & Ebner, 2005; Riediger & Freund, in press).
In advanced adulthood and especially in old age, more
and more resources are directed toward regulation
(management) of loss, although this need may not be realized as often as desired since the application of compensatory behaviors is effortful (P. B. Baltes & Baltes,
1990a; Freund & Baltes, 2002b). In old age, few resources remain available to be allocated to growth.
Consistent with this general view, older adults invest
more time into compensation than optimization (M. M.
Baltes & Carstensen, 1996; Freund, in press). However,
some targets for positive change continue to be realistic, such as advances in emotional and spiritual regulation or wisdom (P. B. Baltes & Staudinger, 2000;
Carstensen, 1995; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles,
1999; Kunzmann, 2004; Staudinger, Freund, Linden, &
Maas, 1999). Such a characterization is an oversimplification because individual, domain, and contextual
differences need to be taken into account. Thus, the
characterization is one about relative probability.
In our view (e.g., P. B. Baltes, 1987; Freund & Baltes,
2002b; Staudinger et al., 1995; for related arguments,
see also Brandtstdter & Greve, 1994; Brim, 1992;
Edelstein & Noam, 1982; Heckhausen, 1997; LabouvieVief, 1982), the life span shift in the relative allocation
of biology- and culture-based resources to the functions
of growth, resilience, and the management of loss is a
major issue for any theory of life span development.
This is true even for those theories that, on the surface,
deal only with growth or positive aging (e.g., Erikson,
1959; Perlmutter, 1988; Ryff, 1984, 1989a). In Eriksons theory, for instance, the acquisition of generativity and wisdom are the positive developmental goals of
adulthood. Despite the growth orientation of these constructs, even in Eriksons theory their attainment is inherently tied to recognizing and managing issues of
generational turnover as well as of ones finitude and
impending death. Another example is research on another facet of positive aging, wisdom (P. B. Baltes &
Staudinger, 2000; Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003a, 2003b;
Sternberg & Jordan, 2005). The expression of wisdom
becomes more and more difficult as the oldest ages are
579
580
been much discussion in life span work about metatheory of development (e.g., P. B. Baltes, 1987; P. B. Baltes
et al., 1980; Labouvie-Vief, 1980, 1982; R. M. Lerner,
1991, 2002; J. R. Nesselroade & Reese, 1973; Overton &
Reese, 1973; Reese, 1994; Riegel, 1976). Included in
this discussion was a continuing dialogue about the
shortcomings of extant conceptions of development as
advanced primarily by child developmentalists (e.g.,
Collins, 1982; Harris, 1957). A family of metatheoretical
propositions intended to characterize the nature of life
span development was one outcome of this extensive discussion (P. B. Baltes, 1979a, 1987; R. M. Lerner, 1983).
In the following discussion, we attempt to update
this effort at a metatheory of life span development
(Table 11.3). In doing so, we also point out that similar
metatheoretical work exists in other quarters of developmental theory, particularly in conceptual work
associated with cultural psychology, evolutionary psychology, and systems theory (see also Fischer & Bidell,
Chapter 7; Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5; Thelen & Smith,
Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). In the present
context, however, we emphasize the uniqueness of the
positions advanced by life span scholars.
Reformulating the Concept of Development from a
Functionalist Perspective: Development as Change
in Adaptive Capacity
From a life span theory point of view, it was important
to articulate concepts of development that go beyond
unidimensional and unidirectional models that had
flourished in conjunction with the traditional biological
conceptions of growth or physical maturation. In these
traditional conceptions (Harris, 1957; Sowarka &
Baltes, 1986), attributes such as qualitative change, ordered sequentiality, irreversibility, and the definition of
an end state played a critical role. Primarily by considering ontogenetic development from a functionalist perspective (Dixon & Baltes, 1986), the traditional
conception of development was challenged.
Development as Selection and Selective Adaptation (Optimization). The traditional concept of
development emphasizes a general and universal development of an entity geared toward a higher level of functioning which, in addition, continuously incorporates
most if not all previously developed capacities (Harris,
1957; R. M. Lerner, 1983, 2002; H. Werner, 1948). Historically, this view of ontogenetic development has been
pictured as the unfolding and emergence of an entity,
581
Life span development: Ontogenetic development is a lifelong process that is co-constructed by biology and culture. No age period holds
supremacy in regulating the nature of development.
Life span changes in the dynamic between biology and culture: With age and certainly after adulthood, there is a growing gap between
biological potential and individual-cultural goals. This gap is fundamental to ontogenesis as the biological architecture of life is incomplete
and inevitably results in loss of adaptive functioning and eventually death.
Life span changes in allocation of resources to distinct functions of development:growth versus maintenance versus regulation of loss:
Ontogenetic development on a systemic level involves the coordinated and competitive allocation of resources in three distinct functions:
(1) growth, (2) maintenance including recovery (resilience), and (3) regulation of loss. Life span developmental changes in the profile of
functional allocation involve a shift from the allocation of resources for growth (more typical of childhood) toward an increasingly larger and
larger share allocated to maintenance and management of loss.
Development as selection (specialization) and selective optimization in adaptive capacity: Development is inherently a process of selection
and selective adaptation. Selection is due to biological, psychological, cultural, and environmental factors. Developmental advances are due
to processes of optimization. Because development is selective and age-associated changes in potential, compensation is also part of the
developmental agenda.
Development as gain/loss dynamic: In ontogenetic development, there is no gain without loss, and no loss without gain. Selection and selective
adaptation are space-, context-, and time-bound. Thus, selection and selective adaptation imply not only advances in adaptive capacity but also
losses in adaptivity for alternative pathways and adaptive challenges. A multidimensional, multidirectional, and multifunctional conception of
development results from such a perspective.
Plasticity: Much intraindividual plasticity (within-person variability) is found in psychological development. The key developmental agenda is
the search for the range of plasticity and its age-associated changes and constraints.
Ontogenetic and historical contextualism as paradigm: In principle, the biological and cultural architecture of human development is
incomplete and subject to continuous change with biological and cultural factors, conditions, and co-constructing and modifying each other.
Thus, ontogenetic development varies markedly by historical-cultural conditions. The mechanisms involved can be characterized as principles
associated with biocultural contextualism. As an illustration, development can be understood as the outcome of the interactions (dialectics)
between three systems of biological and environmental inf luences: (1) normative age-graded,
(2) normative history-graded, and (3) nonnormative (idiosyncratic). Each of these sources evinces individual differences and, in addition, is
subject to continuous change.
Toward a general and functionalist theory of development: The ef fective coordination of selection, optimization, and compensation: On a
general and functionalist level of analysis, successful development, defined as the (subjective and objective) maximization of gains and
minimization of losses, can be conceived of as resulting from collaborative interplay among three components: (1) selection, (2) optimization,
and (3) compensation. The ontogenetic pressure for this dynamic increases with age, as the relative incompleteness of the biology- and culturebased architecture of human development becomes more pronounced.
Updated from Erfolgreiches Altern als Ausdruck von Verhaltenskompetenz und Umweltqualitt (pp. 353377), by M. M. Baltes, in Der Mensch im Zusammenspiel von Anlage und Umwelt, C. Niemitz (Ed.), 1987, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Suhrkamp; see also P. B. Baltes, 1987,
1997, and P. B. Baltes et al., 2006.
582
Behavior-Change Process
Ontogenetic Time
Figure 11.3 Hypothetical examples of life span developmental processes. Developmental functions ( behavior-change
processes) differ in onset, duration, termination, and directionality when charted in the framework of the life course.
Moreover, developmental change is both quantitative and qualitative: Not all developmental change is related to chronological age, and the initial direction is not always incremental.
Source: From Plasticity and Variability in Psychological
Aging: Methodological and Theoretical Issues (pp. 4166),
by P. B. Baltes and M. M. Baltes, in Determining the Ef fects of
Aging on the Central Nervous System, G. E. Gurski (Ed.), 1980,
Berlin, Germany: Schering.
lection and selective adaptation displays many attributes. For instance, it can be active or passive, conscious
or subconscious, internal or external, and continuous or
discontinuous. Moreover, in the long run or in different
circumstances, it can be functional or dysfunctional.
This intellectual movement toward a broadly based
functionalist conception of ontogenesis entailed a number of features. For instance, to reflect more accurately
their understanding of the empirical evidence about life
span changes, and also drawing from alternative conceptions of ontogenesis such as canalization and selective
neuronal growth (Edelman, 1987; Waddington, 1975),
self-organization (Barton, 1994; Maturana & Varela,
1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984), as well as expert systems (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Ericsson & Smith,
1991; Weinert & Perner, 1996), life span researchers
began to emphasize that any process of development is
not foremost the unfolding of an entity. Rather, they focused on development as ontogenetic selection from a
pool of more or less constrained potentialities and the
subsequent selective optimization of the entered pathways including the construction of novel pathways that
were not part of the original system (P. B. Baltes, 1987;
Labouvie-Vief, 1982; Marsiske et al., 1995; Siegler,
1989). As a given pathway of ontogenetic development is
chosen and optimized, others are ignored or suppressed.
In short, some life span theorists ventured a new start
and suggested treating ontogenetic development as a process of dynamic and selective adaptation reflecting the
interaction of biological, cultural, and contextual factors
as well as the proactive role of individuals in shaping
their course of development (P. B. Baltes, ReuterLorenz, et al., 2006; Brandtstdter & Lerner, 1999).
Thus, with the focus on selection and selective adaptation, life span researchers were able to be more open
about the pathways of lifelong ontogenesis.
Development as a Gain-Loss Dynamic. Not surprisingly, a related change in emphasis advanced in life
span theory and research was on viewing development as
always being constituted by gains and losses (P. B.
Baltes, 1979a, 1987; P. B. Baltes et al., 1980; Brandtstdter, 1984; Brim, 1992; Labouvie-Vief, 1980, 1982;
J. Smith, 2003). Aside from functionalist arguments,
there were several empirical findings that gave rise to
this focus.
One example important to life span researchers was
the differing life span trajectories proposed and obtained for the fluid mechanics and crystallized prag-
583
584
Biocultural Co-Constructivism:
Toward Completing the Unfinished Biocultural Architecture of Aging
Bodily/Neuronal
Plasticity
Behavioral
Plasticity
Ontogeny/Development
Societal
Plasticity
Figure 11.4 Each of the major scientific disciplines concerned with human development have developed a focus on
plasticity to understand mechanisms and variations in outcomes: Genetic/neuronal / bodily, behavioral, and societal plasticity are important examples. Research Report of the
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 20032004.
See P. B. Baltes, P. Reuter-Lorenz, & F. Rsler, 2006, for further elaboration.
585
586
constructed by the interplay of biological, psychological, and social forces. Part of this construction relies
on agentic behavior of individuals. Individuals are
contributors to their own development. The resulting concept is that of developmental biocultural coconstructivism (P. B. Baltes, Freund, & Li, 2005;
P. B. Baltes & Smith, 2004; S.-C. Li, 2003). With the
advent of biocultural co-constructivism, the quest for
interdisciplinary collaboration has attained a new
state of urgency. In our view, the life span approach
with its emphasis on viewing the conditions of human
development as historically incomplete and more open
than traditionally assumed has been a major partner in
advancing this intellectual position.
Ontogenetic and Historical Contextualism
as Paradigm
Highlighting the notion of plasticity as a cornerstone
of life span research on human development alludes to
another key feature of life span metatheory, the paradigm of contextualism. In evolutionary selection theory
and the evolutionary basis of adaptive fitness, the role
of context is paramount. Recently, P. B. Baltes and
Smith (2004) have shown how modern versions of contextualism include the perspective of biocultural coconstructivism to avoid the idea that context is strictly
environmental in origin.
Therefore, as developmental psychologists attempted
to move beyond microgenetic representations of the
learning process as a marker of experience to capture
context as a system of influence, they engaged themselves into metatheoretical perspectives on contextualism. Such a contextualist view, rather than a focus on
mechanist or organismic models of development
(Overton & Reese, 1973; Reese & Overton, 1970),
evolved with force in the 1970s (Datan & Reese, 1977;
Riegel, 1976), and as already described in the preceding
section, it continues into the present. This approach was
similar to the evolution of ecological-contextualist perspectives offered by cultural psychology (Bronfenbrenner, 1977; Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994; Cole, 1996).
According to contextualism and also action theory
(see Brandtstdter, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume), individuals exist in contexts that create both special opportunities for, and limitations to, individual
developmental pathways. Delineation of these contexts
in terms of macrostructural features, like social class,
ethnicity, roles, age-based passages and historical periods, is a major goal for the sociological analysis of the
life course (e.g., Elder, 1994; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume; Heckhausen, 2000;
Kohli & Meyer, 1986; Mayer, 2003; Riley, 1987; Settersten, 2005). In fact, this was a time when sociologists
and developmental psychologists attempted to interrelate their various endeavors (e.g., Sorensen, Weinert, &
Sherrod, 1986). For life span psychologists, and perhaps
also for child developmentalists (P. B. Baltes, 1979b),
this dialogue opened their vista on the scope, temporal
patterning, and differentiation of biological and social
forces (incidentally much instigated by various committees on human development arranged by the U.S. Social
Science Research Council).
A Macro-Model of Developmental Influences
During this time of intensive collaboration between
life course sociologists (e.g., Riley et al., 1972) and
life span psychologists, the first author and his
colleagues (P. B. Baltes, Cornelius, & Nesselroade,
1979; P. B. Baltes et al., 1980) proposed a heuristic
model that attempted to integrate biological, sociological, and psychological considerations in one framework in order to understand the entire fabric of
development-producing contexts: Three biocultural
components were considered at the foundation of
human ontogeny: Normative age-graded inf luences,
normative history-graded inf luences, and nonnormative (idiosyncratic) influences. Normative in this
context refers to a high degree of generality. Nonnormative factors highlight the more individualized conditions such as winning in a lottery.
To understand a given life course, and interindividual
differences in life course trajectories, this model suggests that it is necessary to consider the operation and
interaction among these three classes of influences
(Figure 11.5). Note that these sources contribute to similarities in development, but also, because they exist in
systematic group variations, for instance by social
class, genetic dispositions, and ethnicity, they also
contribute to systematic interindividual variations and
subgroup-specific patterns of life span development
(P. B. Baltes & Nesselroade, 1984; Dannefer, 1989; Riley
et al., 1972).
Age-graded inf luences are those biological and environmental aspects that, because of their dominant
age correlation, shape individuals in relatively normative ways for all individuals. Consider the temporal
and domain structure of life span developmental tasks
(Havighurst, 1948), the age-based process of physi-
Basic Determinants
Influences on Development
Normative
Age-graded
Interaction
Environmental
Normative
History-graded
Interaction
Biological
Non-Normative
Ontogenetic Time
587
588
Figure 11.6 Illustration of cross-sectional and longitudinal sequences ( bottom). Source: From Longitudinal and
Cross-Sectional Sequences in the Study of Age and Generation Effects by P. B. Baltes, 1968, Human Development, 11,
pp. 145171; From A General Model for the Study of Developmental Problems by K. W. Schaie, 1965, Psychological
Bulletin, 64, pp. 92107.
589
yet been fully explored and understood (Hertzog, Lindenberger, Ghisletta, & Oertzen, 2004).
.
The Experimental Simulation of Development.
A further strategy developed primarily by life span researchers is the explicit use of simulation paradigms in
the study of human development. Again, use of such an
approach was enhanced by the fact that life span ontogenetic processes are time-extensive and, therefore, difficult to study without simulation (P. B. Baltes & Goulet,
1971; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1995b).
Table 11.4 summarizes the approach of developmental simulation. In a general sense, the experimental simulation approach is a theory-testing device that
arranges for conditions thought to be relevant for the
phenomenon of interest. Thus, experimental developmental simulations simulate or mimic variations that
are thought to exist in real-time and real-world ontogenesis. As a research strategy, the design of developmental simulation consists of a coordinated sequence of
seven steps that, however, do not need to be performed
in the sequence specified. A developmental phenomenon is considered to be well understood if knowledge
based on all steps is available.
In life span research, such simulations have been used,
for instance, to examine the effects of aging-associated
changes in sensory input. For this purpose, auditory and
visual acuity of adults was reduced to the level of older
590
Testing-the-limits research, however, is not only relevant for the study of long-term ontogenetic processes.
It is equally relevant for other important aspects of
developmental research and theory. Two examples illustrate this. The first is the question of sex or gender
differences in cognitive functioning. What would
be most necessary is to depart from simple, noninterventive comparative research and to invest scientific
resources into testing-the-limits work. A testing-thelimits approach would be based on the premise that the
relevant information is knowledge about differences in
asymptotic (peak) levels of functioning. Small, carefully selected samples could be used for this purpose
(e.g., P. B. Baltes & Kliegl, 1992; Kliegl & Baltes,
1987; Lindenberger, Kliegl, & Baltes, 1992). The same
perspective would hold true for another hotly debated
topic; that is, research into genetic differences. Rather
than investing most of the available resources into
largely descriptive behavior-genetics studies, an alternative would be to expose smaller samples of participants to time-compressed experiential interventions
and to search for interindividual differences at the
upper or lower levels of functioning (e.g., S.-C. Li,
Huxhold, & Schmiedek, 2004; Lindenberger &
Oertzen, in press).
An Example of a Systemic and Overall Theory
of Life Span Development: Selective
Optimization with Compensation (Level 4)
Next, we take one further step toward a more psychological level of analysis of the nature of life span development. For this purpose, we describe a model of
development, selective optimization with compensation (SOC), which Margret Baltes, Paul Baltes, and
their colleagues have developed over the past decade
(M. M. Baltes, 1987; M. M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996;
P. B. Baltes, 1987; P. B. Baltes & Baltes, 1980, 1990b;
P. B. Baltes, Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 1984; Freund &
Baltes, 2002b; S.-C. Li & Freund, 2005; Marsiske et al.,
1995; Riediger, S.-C. Li, & Lindenberger, in press; see
also Featherman et al., 1990). This model offers a systemic view of human development across the life span
involving many of the features of life span development
presented in the previous sections. Heckhausen and
Schulz (1995; Schulz & Heckhausen, 1996) developed a
similar model. Finally, the notion of vicariance, prominent in francophone differential and developmental psychology (e.g., Lautrey, 2003; cf. Reuchlin, 1978), bears
591
592
TABLE 11.5 Selection, Optimization, and Compensation: Brief Definitional Frames and Examples from Proverbs and
Questionnaire Items
Strategy
Selection1a
Optimization
Compensation
Role in
Development
Concerns directionality and focus of
developmental outcomes such as goals.
Sample Proverb
(Freund & Baltes, 2002a)
Two facets of selection are distinguished in SOC theory: (1) elective selection and (2) loss-based selection, which encompasses restructuring of goal hierarchy, reducing the number of goals or various processes such as adjusting the level of aspiration, or developing new possible
goals to match available resources.
the degree to which individuals report to use SOCrelated behaviors. The resulting definitions of selection,
optimization, and compensation may suggest that the
relevant processes are often conscious and intentional.
This is not necessarily so. Each of these elements or
components can be active or passive, internal or external, conscious or unconscious.
Six additional characterizations help to place SOC
into a larger perspective. First, we postulate that SOC is
akin to a general-purpose mechanism of development.
If available and well practiced, it will produce higher
functioning in all domains of functioning. Second, we
assume that SOC behaviors are universal processes
generative of development. Third, we assume that SOC
are inherently relativistic in that their phenotypic
expressions depend on person- and context-specific
features. Fourth, SOC in itself is a developmental construct. We assume that its peak expression is in adulthood. In childhood and adolescence, the system is
acquired and honed, in old age, individuals work on
maintenance (see Freund & Baltes, 2002b, for data on
age trajectories). Fifth, we acknowledge that the func-
593
ity to persist or delay gratification. In general, the complexity of the system of optimization depends on the
goal or outcome pursuit. If these are complex, optimization is not the refinement of a single means. Rather, in
more complex situations, optimization requires a mutually enhancing coalition of factors, including health, environmental, and psychological conditions.
As was true for selection, optimization can be active
and passive, conscious and subconscious, internal or external. Moreover, optimization can be domain- and
goal-specific as well as domain- and goal-general. The
most domain-general notion of optimization is the generation of what in our work we have called developmental reserve capacity (P. B. Baltes, 1987; Kliegl & Baltes,
1987), or what developmental life scientists might call
general plasticity at the neuronal, behavioral, and social
level. Because of its investability into many activities,
generating a high level of general plasticity is the perhaps most significant target for successful development.
Compensation. The component process called
compensation involves a functional response to the loss of
goal-relevant means (see also Brandtstdter & Wentura,
1995; Dixon & Bckman, 1995). This definition of compensation is more specific or restricted than the one
proposed by Bckman and Dixon (1992)that is, it restricts compensation to responses to losses of means (resources) once available for goal attainment.
Two main causes give rise to a compensatory situation (Freund & Baltes, 2002b; Marsiske et al., 1995).
Compensation can be the consequence of the very fact
of selection and optimization. For reasons of limited capacity of time and effort, selection of and optimization
toward a given goal implies the loss of time and meansrelated resources, relevant for the pursuit of other goals.
Development is always a gain-loss dynamic. When an
athlete aims for a high level performance in the shot put,
it is unlikely that comparable high levels of performance
can be achieved in other types of sports such as gymnastics. Another example is negative transfer. The acquisition of a targeted expert skill system A can result in
negative transfer to another skill system B (Ericsson &
Smith, 1991).
A second category of causes of compensation stems
from negative changes in biological, social, and environmental resources in the conditions that represent
the foundation of resources and their use for development (see also Hobfoll, 2001, on resource theory).
Changing from one environment to another may involve a
Elective
Selection
52
51
SOC (T-Scores)
594
50
Loss-Based
Selection
49
Optimization
48
47
Compensation
46
45
Young Adults
Middle-Age
Older Adults
in which they have fewer resources. SOC behaviors themselves are effortful and require resources. Therefore, it is
not surprising that older individuals show lesser frequency
of use of optimization and compensation. As shown in
Figure 11.7, the primary focus in older ages is on elective
selection and loss-based selection.
Processes of selection, optimization, and compensation also are present in mental representations associated with the management of everyday lives. Freund and
Baltes (2002a) have used proverbs to examine this question. They presented life problems to people and asked
which proverb fits this situation best. Adults preferred
proverbs that indicated SOC behaviors. Moreover, the
choice reaction times of the oldest adults, when selecting the fitting proverb, was as fast as those of younger
adults. Because reaction speed typically decreases with
age during the age span studied, the finding suggests that
SOC-based mental representations are well exercised.
Management and Mastery of Life Tasks. Another area of research is the management of the family
career interface (B. B. Baltes & Heydens-Gahir, 2003;
Wiese, Freund, & Baltes, 2002). Partners who reported
higher use of SOC-related behaviors obtained higher
scores on perceived developmental status in the two domains and higher levels of well-being; cross-sectionally
and longitudinally. Similar findings were obtained with
the task of college study behavior (Wiese & Schmitz,
2002). Regarding tasks of old age, work by Margret
Baltes, Frieder Lang, and their colleagues is relevant
(e.g., Lang, Rieckmann, & Baltes, 2002). They demonstrated that older individuals, especially when in situations of high difficulty, benefited from showing
behaviors that were consistent with SOC theory. Another topic of life span research concerns the management of critical life events including illness. In this line
of inquiry, Gignac, Cott, and Badley (2002) have shown
that older people suffering from osteoarthritis managed
their illness by use of behaviors that are consistent with
selection, optimization, and compensation.
Dual-Task Research and Behavioral Indicators.
An additional area where SOC theory turned out to be
promising is dual-task research. Dual- or multiple-task research explores the degree to which individuals can perform several tasks concurrently and whether concurrent
performance of several tasks (such as walking and memorizing) facilitates or interferes. Such multitask situations
are prototypical of the ecology of everyday behavior.
595
596
present this work such that the general theoretical perspectives outlined provide an umbrella under which
this research can be positioned and interpreted.
Throughout, we attempt to highlight also the pervasiveness of the concept of developmental biocultural coconstructivism (P. B. Baltes et al., 2006).
The productivity of a life span orientation to developmental change depends critically on articulating the theoretical propositions regarding the macroscopic overall
landscape of the entire course of ontogeny with more
microscopic research on specific developmental functions, processes, and age periods. Specifically, the
knowledge bases generated by researchers interested in
different aspects of infancy, childhood, adolescence,
adulthood, and late life need to be combined and compared with each other, and organized by the themes and
propositions that guide the life span approach. The resulting life span integration of perspectives and findings, in turn, is hoped to feed back into the more ageand process-specific developmental specialties, providing for larger interpretative frameworks and provoking
the investigation of new or formerly neglected research
questions (Lindenberger, 2001).
The field of intellectual development, that captured
early (Hollingworth, 1927; Sanford, 1902) and continuing
attention in life span psychology (e.g., Craik & Bialystok,
in press) is ideally suited to demonstrate the potential
of this dynamic. Central themes of intellectual development such as relative stability (i.e., covariance change
over time), directionality (i.e., mean change over time),
plasticity (i.e., the malleability of mean and covariance
changes), and the role of knowledge-based processes in
cognitive development also have played a prominent role
in life span theorizing, and are well suited to exemplify
the dynamics between specialized research contexts and
overarching conceptions of life span development.
The Biology and Culture of Life Span
Intellectual Development
Our proposed view of the overall landscape of ontogenesis as summarized in Figure 11.1 puts constraints on the
possible form and content of theories about life span intellectual development. Foremost, any model or theory
on life span intellectual development needs to recognize
that ontogenesis is a co-construction of two intertwined
streams of inheritance, the biological and the cultural
(Durham, 1991; see also P. B. Baltes et al., 2006; S.-C.
Li, 2003), and needs to provide a framework for the developmental investigation of these two streams of inher-
Mechanics
Pragmatics
Ackquired Knowledge
Content-rich
Culture-dependent
Experience-based
Pragmatics (Crystallized)
Me
cha
Intelligence
as Cultural
Knowledge
597
Performance
nic
s (F
lui
d)
Intelligence
as Basic
Information
Processing
ca. 25
ca. 100
Figure 11.8 Life span research on two components of cognition: (1) fluid mechanics and (2) crystallized pragmatics.
The top section defines the categories; the bottom section
illustrates postulated lifespan trajectories. Source: Modified
based on Psychological Aspects of Aging: Facts and
Frontiers (pp. 427459), by P. B. Baltes and P. Graf, in The
Life-Span Development of Individuals: Behavioural, Neurobiological and Psychosocial Perspectives, D. Magnusson (Ed.),
1996, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press;
From Major Abilities and Development in the Adult Period
(pp. 4499), by J. L. Horn and S. M. Hofer, in Intellectual Development, R. J. Sternberg & C. A. Berg (Eds.), 1992, New
York: Cambridge University Press.
childhood), age-based changes in the mechanics are assumed to consist, for the most part, in the unfolding and
active construction of more or less domain-specific and
genetically predisposed processing capabilities (Elman
et al., 1996; Wellman, 2003). In contrast, negative
changes in the mechanics of cognition late in life presumably result from brain-related consequences of less
effective phylogenetic selection pressures operating
during this period (Kirkwood, 2003; Thaler, 2002; see
The Mechanics and Pragmatics in Very Old Age). In
that sense, the life span trajectory of level changes in the
mechanics of cognition can be derived from the life span
changes shown in the left panel of Figure 11.1.
The cognitive mechanics, then, reflect fundamental
organizational properties of the central nervous system
(W. Singer, 1995). In terms of psychological operations,
we assume that the cognitive mechanics are indexed by
the speed, accuracy, and coordination of elementary
The Cognitive Pragmatics. In contrast to the mechanics, the cognitive pragmatics of the mind reveal the
power of human agency and culture (Boesch, 1997; Cole,
1996; Valsiner & Lawrence, 1997; S.-C. Li, 2003;
Shweder, 1991). The cognitive pragmatics also are at the
center of socialization events that follow the principles
of co-construction (P. B. Baltes et al., in press; S.-C. Li,
2003). Some of these events are normative but specific to
certain cultures (e.g., formal schooling), others are more
universal (e.g., mentoring), and still others are idiosyncratic or person-specific (e.g., specialized ecological
and professional knowledge). In any case, the corresponding bodies of knowledge are represented both internally
(e.g., semantic networks) and externally (e.g., books).
The pragmatics of cognition direct the attention of life
span developmentalists toward the increasing importance
of knowledge-based forms of intelligence during ontogeny (P. B. Baltes & Baltes, 1990a; Ericsson & Smith,
1991; Hambrick & Engle, 2002; Krampe & Baltes, 2003;
Labouvie-Vief, 1982; Rybash, Hoyer, & Roodin, 1986).
Typical examples include reading and writing skills, educational qualifications, professional skills, and varieties
of everyday problem-solving, but also knowledge about
the self and the meaning and conduct of life (P. B. Baltes
& Staudinger, 2000; Blanchard-Fields, 1996; Bosman &
Charness, 1996; Marsiske et al., 1995; Staudinger et al.,
1995; see Face and Facets of the Study of Personality
Development across the Life Span). Such bodies of pragmatic knowledge are acquired during ontogeny but may
build on evolutionarily prestructured, domain-specific
knowledge (Charness, 2005; Elman et al., 1996;
Tomasello, 1999).
Divergence in Life Span Trajectories between Mechanics and Pragmatics. The preceding considerations imply specific predictions regarding the shape of
598
ontogenetic trajectories for mechanic and pragmatic aspects of intellectual functioning (see lower portion
of Figure 11.8). Specifically, two different sources of influence are assumed to govern the level of performance
within these two categories: biological-genetic for the
mechanics, and environmental-cultural for the pragmatics. The expected divergence in age trajectories is seen as
a consequence of this difference in composition.
Empirical evidence in support of a two-component
conceptualization of life span cognition comes from a
great variety of different research traditions (see discussion that follows). Probably the most longstanding
supportive evidence is the difference between maintained and vulnerable intellectual abilities (Salthouse,
1991; cf. Jones & Conrad, 1933). Abilities that critically
involve the mechanics, such as reasoning, memory, spatial orientation, and perceptual speed, generally show a
pattern of monotonic and roughly linear decline during
adulthood, with some further acceleration of decline in
very old age. In contrast, more pragmatic abilities, such
as verbal knowledge and certain facets of numerical
ability, remain stable or increase up to the 6th or 7th
decade of life, and only start to evince some decline in
very old age.
Figure 11.9, based on the fifth data collection of the
Seattle Longitudinal Study (Schaie, 1996; see also
Schaie et al., 2005), may serve as an illustration. It displays cross-sectional adult age gradients based on multiple indicators for six intellectual abilities (Schaie &
Willis, 1993). Verbal ability and number ability peak
during middle adulthood and show little or no age
decrements before the age of 74, whereas perceptual
speed, inductive reasoning, spatial orientation, and verbal memory show steady monotonic decline. Recent
analyses based on longitudinal as well as longitudinal /
cross-sectional convergence data provide additional and
more direct support for a basic divergence between mechanic and pragmatic age gradients in adulthood and
old age (Salthouse, 1991; Schaie, 1996; Schaie, Maitland, Willis, & Intieri, 1998; T. Singer, Verhaeghen,
Ghisletta, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 2003).
In a recent cross-sectional study, Shu-Chen Li and colleagues (2004) investigated whether dissociations in age
trajectories between mechanic and pragmatic intellectual
abilities across can be observed across the entire life
span, as life span psychology would predict. The authors
administered a psychometric battery comprising fifteen
tests assessing three marker abilities of the fluid mechanics (perceptual speed, reasoning, and fluency) and two
(B)
7
6
(A) 70
65
611 Years
5
Eigen Value
60
T-Score
55
50
45
Crystallized Intelligence
(Culture/knowledge-based facet)
Processing Robustness
Processing Speed
Fluid Intelligence
(Biology/process-based facet)
40
35
30
5669 Years
4
7089 Years
3
2
1
0
25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Age
(C) 7
(D) 0,8
0,7
Correlation between gf and gc
1217 Years
1835 Years
5
Eigen Value
4
5
Dimension
3655 Years
4
3
2
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
70
9
56
5
36
18
4
5
Dimension
12
11
Age Group
Figure 11.10 Intellectual abilities across the life span. (A) Cross-sectional age trajectories for crystallized intelligence, processing robustness, processing speed, and fluid intelligence. Crystallized intelligence represents the cognitive pragmatics,
whereas processing robustness, processing speed, and fluid intelligence represent the cognitive mechanics. The divergence in
age gradients between pragmatics and mechanics lends support to two-component theories of cognitive development. (B, C) Results from principal component analyses of 15 intellectual ability tests for each of six age groups. The arrows indicate the estimated number of principal components with eigenvalues greater than unity. (D) Correlations between broad fluid and
crystallized intelligence for the same six age groups. Panels B-D support the hypothesis that the structure of intellectual abilities is less differentiated in childhood and old age than during adolescence and adulthood. Source: From Transformations in
the Couplings among Intellectual Abilities and Constituent Cognitive Processes across the Life Span by S.-C. Li, U. Lindenberger, B. Hommel, G. Aschersleben, W. Prinz, and P. B. Baltes, 2004, Psychological Science, 15, pp. 155163.
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600
the mechanics of cognition. We start with three constructs located at the information-processing level of
analysis, and end with a consideration of select agegraded changes at the neuronal level. Progress in understanding determinants of life span changes in the
mechanics of cognition field will depend on integrating
these two levels of analysis both empirically and conceptually (Buckner, 2004; Craik & Bialystok, in press;
S.-C. Li, in press; S.-C. Li & Lindenberger, 1999; Lindenberger, Li, & Bckman, in press).
At the information-processing level, processing rate
(Cerella, 1990; Salthouse, 1996), working memory
(Baddeley, 2000; Just, Carpenter, & Keller, 1996), and
inhibition (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) have been studied
most extensively. Apparently, functional levels of these
three mechanisms follow the inverse U-shape pattern
predicted by the two-component model for the mechanics of cognition. In principle, then, any combination of
these mechanisms could act as a pacemaker of life span
development in the mechanics of cognition.
Processing Speed. Across a wide variety of cognitive and perceptual tasks, speed of responding increases
dramatically from childhood to early adulthood, and
continuously decreases thereafter. This observation has
led to the processing rate hypothesis of life span cognitive development. Probably, this hypothesis holds a more
central place in cognitive aging research (e.g., Birren,
1964; Cerella, 1990; Salthouse, 1996; Welford, 1984)
than in research on child development (e.g., Hale, 1990;
Kail, 1996). In the case of cognitive aging, the general
slowing-down of cognitive behavior with advancing age
is portrayed as the consequence of a general decrement
in information processing rate. In cross-sectional studies, psychometrically assessed perceptual speed accounts for most or all negative adult age differences in
other intellectual abilities, even if these other abilities
are assessed under time-relaxed or untimed testing conditions (for a summary, see Verhaeghen & Salthouse,
1997). However, psychometrically assessed perceptual
speed is not a unitary construct or processing primitive
but a factorially complex entity whose composition may
change as a function of age. Also, attempts at identifying neuronal correlates of age-based differences in processing speed have yielded mixed results (e.g., Bashore,
Ridderinkhof, & van der Molen, 1997).
Working Memory. Generally, working memory
denotes the ability to preserve information in one or
601
more short-term stores while simultaneously transforming the same or some other information (Baddeley,
2000; Just et al., 1996). Age differences in working
memory have been invoked as a possible cause for intellectual growth during childhood (Case, 1985; Chapman
& Lindenberger, 1992; Halford, 1993; Pascual-Leone,
1970), and for age-based decrements during adulthood
and old age (Craik, 1983; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2001).
With respect to childhood, Neo-Piagetian theorists have
argued that changes in working memory are among the
primary pacemakers of intellectual child development
(e.g., Pascual-Leone, 1970).
Positive age differences during childhood and negative age differences during adulthood are more pronounced when demands on processing are increased
(Mayr, Kliegl, & Krampe, 1996). Despite this supportive evidence, the explanatory power of the workingmemory construct is difficult to judge. For instance,
age-based changes in working memory are often explained by alluding to changes in processing efficiency
or processing speed (Case, 1985; Salthouse, 1996). Another problem concerns our limited knowledge about a
central function of working memorythe (conscious)
control of action and thought. In the most influential
working-memory model (Baddeley, 2000), this task is
assigned to the central executive. Evidence from developmental psychology (Houd, 1995; McCall, 1994),
cognitive-experimental and differential psychology
(Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999), and the cognitive neurosciences (Miller & Cohen, 2001) suggests that the
abilities to inhibit actions and thoughts and avoid interference from competing processing streams are crucial
for the efficient functioning of this component, rather
than working-memory capacity per se.
Inhibition and Interference. During the past
decades, developmentalists from different traditions and
fields of research have intensified their interest in mechanisms of inhibition and interference (Bjorklund, 1997;
Engle, Conway, Tuholski, & Shishler, 1995; Hasher &
Zacks, 1988; Houd, 1995; McCall, 1994). Curvilinear
life span age gradients that resemble those found for
measures of perceptual speed have been obtained with
typical tests of interference proneness such as the
Stroop color-word test, suggesting that children and especially older adults have greater difficulties in suppressing currently irrelevant action tendencies than
young adults (Dempster, 1992; Hommel et al., 2004;
Mayr, 2001). However, it has proven difficult to separate
602
difficulty. Furthermore, and in line with the microgenetic approach to the study of change (Siegler & Crowley, 1991; Siegler, Chapter 11, this Handbook, this
volume), the testing-the-limits paradigm is based on the
assumption that the study of microgenetic change and
variability may help to identify mechanisms underlying
ontogenetic change (see H. Werner, 1948). Thus, in
addition to the more general goal of measurement purification, the detailed analysis of time-compressed developmental change functions is assumed to enhance our
understanding of the mechanisms and the range of
medium- and long-term developmental changes (Hultsch
& MacDonald, 2004; S.-C. Li, Huxhold, et al., 2004;
Lindenberger & von Oertzen, in press).
A Prototypical Example: Adult Age Differences in
Upper Limits of Short-Term Memory (Serial
Word Recall)
Figure 11.11 shows the result of a study involving a total
of 38 sessions of training and practice in the Method of
Loci, a mnemonic technique for the serial recall of word
lists. Two findings from this study are noteworthy. First,
adults in both age groups greatly improved their memory performance. This finding confirms earlier work on
the continued existence of cognitive plasticity in cognitively healthy (i.e., nondemented) older adults (P. B.
Correct Responses (Maximum = 30)
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Two main conclusions can be drawn from this research. First, expertise effects, or the consequences of
specific bodies of declarative and procedural knowledge, rarely transcend the boundaries of the target domain. Specifically, there is little evidence to suggest
that the mechanics of cognition are transformed by
domain-specific knowledge (Salthouse, 2003). Whenever there is evidence for effects of a more general kind,
at least after the age periods of childhood and adolescence, transfer of pragmatic knowledge (positive or
negative) appears to be a more plausible explanation
than a basic change in the mechanics. One example
comes from longitudinal work by Kohn and Schooler
(1983; Schooler, Mulatu, & Oates, 1999) on the relationship between the substantive complexity of work
and ideational flexibility. Kohn and Schooler found that
work complexity predicts increments in ideational flexibility over a period of 10 years, even after controlling
for initial differences in ideational flexibility. A related
finding is the recent observation that social participation attenuates decline in the cognitive mechanics in old
and very old age (Lvdn, Ghisletta, & Lindenberger,
2005). Note, however, that the interpretation of findings
of this type in terms of experiential factors is complicated through nonrandom placement of individuals into
experiential settings and the fact that the measures of
the cognitive mechanics used include crystallized pragmatic components (Scarr & McCartney, 1983).
The second major conclusion concerns the power of
pragmatic knowledge to make up for losses in the mechanics within the domain of expertise (Charness, 2005;
Krampe & Baltes, 2003). Here, the results from several
studies suggest that acquired knowledge endows aging individuals with a form of natural and local (e.g., domainbound) ability to withstand or at least attenuate the
consequences of aging-induced losses in the mechanics.
This finding is of central importance for the issue of successful intellectual aging, and supports the general life
span theory of selective optimization with compensation
(P. B. Baltes, 1993; Freund & Baltes, 2000; Staudinger
et al., 1995). The postulate of a compensatory relation between pragmatic knowledge acquisition and mechanic decline receives additional support by attenuated adult age
differences in knowledge-rich domains of everyday relevance. For instance, compared to standard psychometric
or cognitive-experimental assessments, negative adult age
differences tend to be less pronounced or absent in practical problem solving (Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, &
Hovath, 1995), social intelligence (Blanchard-Fields,
1996), memory in context (Hess & Pullen, 1996), and
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Expertise-specific Factors
e.g., Experience in Life Matters
Practice in Dealing with
Life Problems
Organized Tutelage
Mentorship
Motivational Disposition
(e.g., Strive for
excellence,
generativity)
Organizing Processes
Life Planning
Life Management
Life Review
Wisdom-related
Performance
Basic Criteria
Factual Knowledge
Procedural Knowledge
Meta Criteria
Lifespan Contextualism
Value Relativism
Uncertainty
tively with the search for personal enjoyment and material happiness.
In addition to illustrating how the pragmatics of cognition are intertwined with other sectors of human development, our research on wisdom also illustrates how culture
and culture-based activities shape development during
adulthood. During normal adulthood, the biology of the
body and brain is sufficiently developed and ready for investment. It is culture-based learning and development
that defines the agenda (see also P. B. Baltes, Freund, &
Li, in press; Lachman, 2001). In this sense, work on
wisdom serves to highlight the relative independence of
the pragmatics of cognition vis vis the biology-based
mechanics. Within the normal range of adult mechanic
functioning, the mechanics contribution to individual
differences on wisdom-related tasks is small, both in
absolute terms and relative to other factors such as personality and task-relevant life experience. The most important contributors to wisdom-related performance
during the adult life span tend to be personality characteristics as measured by the Neuroticism Extraversion Openness Questionnaire (NEO) as well as wisdom-relevant
professional training and the nature of lifetime experience, rather than psychometrically assessed intelligence
or chronological age. In very old age, however, the mechanics of cognition again appear to delimit wisdomrelated performance if they fall below a critical threshold
of functional integrity (P. B. Baltes et al., 1995).
Varieties of Mechanic/ Pragmatic
Interdependence
As has become clear by now, the mechanics and pragmatics of life span intellectual development are intertwined in many ways and at various levels of analysis
(cf. Charness, in press; Salthouse, 2003), both among
each other and with other aspects of behavior. Phylogenetically, they are connected in the sense that members
of the human species are biologically predisposed to acquire cultural knowledge (e.g., Plessner, 1965; Wellman,
2003). Ontogenetically, the interdependence also runs
both ways. For instance, the potential to acquire and use
pragmatic knowledge is conditioned by the development
of the mechanics. At the same time, mechanics alone are
of little use for problem solving in highly specialized domains of knowledge; in many cases, domain-specific
knowledge is critical (Gobet et al., 2001).
In the following discussion, we further elucidate different facets of this interdependence. This approach is
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Biological
Aging
Pragmatics
Knowledge-based
Compensation
Anticipatory Reading
of the Amount of Text
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general levels (e.g., Cardon & Fulker, 1994). In longitudinal analyses of hierarchically organized intellectual
abilities obtained from genetically informative data
sets, it is possible to determine the genetic and environmental contributions to stability and change in rank
order and mean level both at the level of specific abilities and at the level of a general factor (e.g., Cardon &
Fulker, 1994). An interesting example for the class of
findings that can be obtained with this method comes
from child cognitive development. Specifically, data
from the Colorado Adoption Project indicate that strong
novel contributions of genetic variance at the level of
general ability emerge at the ages of three and seven but
seem to be absent during the transition from childhood
to adolescence, when genetic variance contributes exclusively to continuity of individual differences.
Estimates of Heritability of Interindividual
Differences across the Life Span
Similar to life span changes in stability, heritability in
intellectual functioning (e.g., the amount of interindividual variance attributable to genetic differences) increases from about 20% to 50% during childhood and
adolescence to about 80% in early and middle adulthood (e.g., McGue, Bouchard, Iacono, & Lykken,
1993). Interestingly, in old age (e.g., beyond age 75),
heritability tends to decrease to values around 60%
(e.g., McClearn et al., 1997). In contrast, shared environmental influences on interindividual differences
generally do not persist beyond the period of common
rearing (McGue, Bouchard, et al., 1993). As stated before, these findings are based on samples representing
the normal range of environments and genes, and cannot be generalized beyond this normal range (e.g., to
extremes of environmental deprivation or reshuffled
environments). Within this normal range, however, the
life span increase in heritability of interindividual differences is consistent with the notion that adolescents
and adults have more of a chance to actively select environments that match their genes than infants and
children (Scarr & McCartney, 1983).
Based on the preceding summaries, it appears that
relative stability and heritability exhibit similar life
span age gradients (see Plomin & Thompson, 1988).
More multivariate and longitudinal behavior-genetic
evidence is needed to fully understand the covariance
dynamics of this life span parallelism. One possibility
would be that individual differences in intellectual
functioning around middle adulthood are highly stable
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Knowledge
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Prestige
70
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60
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50
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Income
40
30
20
70
80
90
100
110
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Variance Explained by Predictors (%)
Age
Memory
70
T-Score
60
50
40
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20
70
80
90
100
110
100
110
Age
Fluency
70
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60
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618
is based on SOC theory, that highest levels of pragmatic skills in the last third of life carry a strong individualized component.
5. The acquisition of expert levels of knowledge during adulthood may lead to an increasing fragmentation
of the intellectual system, but it also may offer the opportunity for acquiring bodies of knowledge with a wide
range of applicability, generality, and integration. Wisdomrelated knowledge, or knowledge about the meaning and
conduct of life, is a prototype. The likelihood of acquiring such domain-general bodies of person-specific
knowledge depends on a special coalition of experiential,
expertise-specific, and person-related factors (Krampe
& Baltes, 2003; Sternberg, 1985).
6. Throughout ontogeny, the pragmatics and mechanics of cognition are intertwined. In everyday life,
intellectual functioning and intellectual products represent joint effects of both. For instance, the emergence
of domains of pragmatic knowledge builds on, and presumably extends and modifies, evolutionarily predisposed core domains. The mechanisms of this pruning of
cultural knowledge onto species-specific architecture
await further study. Another example of pragmatic/mechanic interdependence concerns the acquisition and
use of pragmatic knowledge to compensate for mechanic decline. In close agreement with our general
conception of the overall landscape of life span development, this compensatory function of the pragmatics
increases in importance but loses in efficiency with advancing age.
7. The study of plasticity (malleability) of intellectual functioning has been a cornerstone of life span research (P. B. Baltes, 1987). Within the limits provided
by the mechanics, which remain to be fully explored, intellectual performance is malleable throughout life. Evidence in support of this contention comes both from the
study of long-term environmental change and from cognitive intervention studies. With some exceptions (e.g.,
dementia of the Alzheimer type), there is room for sizeable plasticity at all ages and for all individuals. However, plasticity decreases with advancing age, reflecting
losses in the mechanics of cognition. The resulting
bounded openness of life span intellectual development
is consistent with the biocultural contextualist framework of life span psychology.
8. The joint consideration of different strands of
research reveals a striking congruence between three
different life span trajectories: Heritability of interindividual differences, relative stability, and level changes
Second Level 5 Example: The Study of Personality Development across the Life Span
in the normative pragmatics (e.g., crystallized intelligence). In all three cases, there is an increase from
childhood to middle and late adulthood, coupled with
indications of decline in very old age. This life span
parallelism between the genetic component of interindividual differences, continuity of interindividual differences, and general knowledge is consistent with the
notion of gene-environment correlations in behavioral
genetics (Scarr & McCartney, 1983), and the notion of
niche picking in ethology (Dawkins, 1982). Whether one
likes it or not, this parallelism testifies to the existence
of a powerful life span synergism between sociostructural and genetic interindividual differentiation, at least
within the range of developmental conditions offered by
Western industrialized societies.
SECOND LEVEL 5 EXAMPLE: THE STUDY
OF PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT
ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN
In the following, we illustrate what life span theory
has to offer in organizing and stimulating the study of
personality development. To do so, we first introduce
three approaches that in our view need to be taken into account when studying personality development: (1) a trait
approach, (2) a self-system approach, and (3) a selfregulation approach.1 These three approaches are usually
treated in different literatures, and cross-links are still
rare, especially with regard to life span development. In
the following, we consider all three approaches whenever
using the term personality or personality system.
The levels-of-analysis approach introduced in the beginning of the chapter is used as an integrating framework for presenting research from the three approaches.
Thus, theory and evidence available on personality development across the life span are used to illustrate the
biology-culture interface and the notion of differential
1
Note that selecting personality as the overarching term
does not entail that we attribute greater importance to the trait
approach. In the 1998 edition of the chapter, we had chosen
self and personality as a label. This, however, seems impractical and is diverting from the goal to integrate the three
approaches. Therefore, we would like to suggest using personality or personality system as the overarching term to
denote the field of study comprising all three approaches. This
is also in line with early personality theorists such as Allport
or Murray who certainly did not link their usage of the term
personality exclusively to the trait approach.
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the ability to deceive others in turn is related to the crucial role of reciprocal relationships for reproductive fitness (e.g., Axelrod, 1984). We would like to suggest that
this ability to deceive oneself, or one could also say
redefine reality, indeed serves an important adaptive
function across the life span and probably increasingly
so in old age.
Thus, the fact that the evolutionary base has
been less optimized for the postreproductive phases
of life than for younger ages may not be as detrimental
for the ontogenesis of self and personality as for biological and cognitive functioning. Perhaps what is relevant here is that the mechanics of the mind which
evince definite aging losses (see earlier discussion),
either carry little implication for personality functioning, or that evolutionary selection in humans provided
a better basis for personality than for intellectual
functioning.
This interpretation of findings from evolutionary
psychology, that personality is less at a disadvantage
than cognition and biological functioning, is supported
by findings on the genetic component of interindividual
differences in personality functioning as advanced by
behavior-genetic research. Evidence from the crosssectional as well longitudinal analyses of the genotype
and the phenotype of personality characteristics indicate that none of the personality traits is without a 40%
to 50% genetic variance component. There are still too
few data sets, however, that would allow disentangling
methods effects. Mostly twin and adoption studies
have used self-report data to assess personality. When
comparing genetic variance components as derived
from self-report with those based on peer ratings clear
differences emerge that suggest that observational assessment and/or test-based assessment of personality
may still yield other results. Based on the few data sets
that allow for multimethod testing it seems that genetic
factors largely account for what is in common across
assessment methods (Plomin & Caspi, 1999). Across
the life span, genetic variance components seem to follow a different pattern than the one just reported for
the domain of intellectual functioning. During the life
course, stability or even slight decreases in heritability
coefficients have been found (e.g., Pedersen &
Reynolds, 2002).
This very general summary statement needs qualification and differentiation. So far, only few behaviorgenetic studies of personality based on longitudinal data
with extensive age intervals are available, let alone using
multiple assessment techniques. Highly complex statistical methods that allow modeling of the genetic architecture of development (Pedersen, 1991) by simultaneously
taking into account mean levels and growth curves (e.g.,
McArdle & Bell, 1999; J. R. Nesselroade & Ghisletta,
2003) have become available. However, due to the lack
of appropriate data sets and to the recency of their availability, they have not been widely applied yet. Therefore,
authors in the field of behavioral genetics consider the
available evidence as preliminary (e.g., Pedersen &
Reynolds, 2002).
Taking such limitations into account, the following
preliminary insights into the developmental behavioral
genetics of personality seem to find consensus among
behavioral geneticists (e.g., Pedersen & Reynolds,
2002). First, results of behavior-genetic analyses of personality assessments are difficult to compare with the
equivalent analyses of intelligence assessments because
the latter are based on behavioral performance measures, whereas personality measures typically refer to
self-reports. Thus, strictly speaking, personality-related
analyses refer to the heritability and its life span
changes in how people report about themselves. Second,
the extent to which genetic influences account for phenotypic variability in personality measures is smaller
than for measures of intelligence, with heritability coefficients between .4 and .6 depending on the personality
trait and the age of assessment. Third, the importance of
genetic influences on interindividual differences in
personality seems to decrease slightly with increasing
age (e.g., McGue, Bacon, & Lykken, 1993; Pedersen &
Reynolds, 2002). And fourth, there is initial evidence for
a quite high overlap in the genetic effects (i.e., stability)
operating on personality expression at different ages, although at each point in time they account for not more
than half of the variance (e.g., McGue, Bacon, et al.,
1993; Pedersen & Reynolds, 2002).
One of the more recent and exciting directions
for genetic research on personality involves the use of
molecular genetic techniques to identify some of
the specific genes responsible for genetic influences
on personality (Hamer & Copeland, 1998). It is too
early to be certain, but it is possible that ultimately this
molecular genetic analysis will become more and more
prominent. That it will shift our attention away from
focusing on quantifying genetic influences to a focus
on the causal mechanisms from cells to social systems
that will elucidate how genes affect and are affected
by personality development. Currently, progress is
Second Level 5 Example: The Study of Personality Development across the Life Span
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Second Level 5 Example: The Study of Personality Development across the Life Span
627
(e.g., Rothbart, 2001). On the level of physiological indicators, it is impossible to clearly separate from each other
aspects of the mechanics that underlie either cognition,
or emotion, or motivation. For instance, changes in heart
rate such as acceleration can be observed during negative
affective episodes, but also during mental arithmetic (cf.
Baltissen, 2005; Levenson, 2000). With regard to neuroanatomy, there is evidence for specialized brain areas
(e.g., the amygdala, prefrontal cortex) that contribute to
the formation of both basic emotions and basic motivational tendencies but not to higher cognitive functioning
(e.g., Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000). A further differentiation between emotion and motivation, however,
so far seems not possible. The emotion of fear, for instance, is inextricably linked to avoidance motivation.
Temperamental dimensions also tend to show substantial
interrelations, reflecting an underlying affective-motivational system rather than separate qualities (cf. Rothbart
& Bates, 1998).
The Pragmatics of Life as Relevant to Personality
Functioning. The pragmatics of life as they are relevant to personality functioning represent the power of
experiences and contextual influences. They encompass
self-related knowledge as well as self-regulatory competencies (Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2000). Knowledge
about the self pertains to trait conceptions of personality as well as to the self-concept. It includes all that we
know about our behavior, past experiences, anticipated
and idealized futures, needs and wishes, abilities, or
weaknesses that characterize our selves. The concept of
who we are and what we are like is closely related to
how we pursue goals, evaluate our selves or adjust our
self-views or goals under threat. Thus, self-regulation
constitutes the procedural part of our self-knowledge.
The Dynamic Interaction of the Mechanics and
Pragmatics of Life as Relevant to Personality Functioning. The mechanics and pragmatics of life mutually influence each other. As mentioned previously, we
follow Cattells (e.g., 1971) investment theory and consider the life mechanics as the building blocks promoting developmental progress in the life pragmatics
(Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2000). At first sight, it seems
that the mechanics constrain the pragmatics, and to a
certain degree that is true. But most genetic as well as
recent brain research has demonstrated that, for instance, the richness or poverty of the (factual and procedural) knowledge we accumulate feeds back into the life
mechanics and indeed may even change them (genetic
628
ity trait measures when adults are assessed. In our terminology, however, trait measures of personality are the
result of many cumulative interactions between the biological basis of personality, context and individual
choices. Thus, they are much closer to the pragmatic
than the mechanic end of the continuum.
Behavioral operationalizations of basic temperament
dimensions clearly are closer to the mechanic end of the
continuum even though we need to be aware that the
pragmatic component gains importance whenever selfreport is involved (cf. P. B. Baltes et al., 1998; Kagan,
1998). Nevertheless, with regard to affective tone it is
possible to consult basic behavioral findings from life
span emotion research. Also, there is some scarce behavioral evidence on the approach/avoidance system
stemming from research on the goal system.
In addition, one can have a look at neurophysiological
indicators of personality functioning in order to learn
about the development of the mechanics of life. Two neurophysiological indicators have beenreliably and across
different laboratoriesidentified as biological indicators
of basic dimensions of affectivity and motivation: (1) autonomic reactivity and (2) cerebral asymmetry (see also
Schindler & Staudinger, 2005a). Those two indicators
seem to be rather pure reflections of the life mechanics
given presently available measurement paradigms and
they have received most of the empirical attention.2 In the
following, we will first present developmental evidence
for the two neurophysiological indicators. Subsequently,
progressing from the mechanics a little further toward the
pragmatics end of the dimension, we present developmental evidence on the behavioral data about emotional tone
and about the approach/avoidance tendency.
Autonomic reactivity ( heart rate, heart rate variability). The parasympathetic and sympathetic branches of
the autonomic nervous system influence the activity of
the heart. Both higher sympathetic reactivity (e.g., Kagan,
1998) and a weaker influence of the parasympathetic
nervous system (e.g., Porges & Doussard-Roosevelt,
1997) have been linked to behavioral inhibition (i.e.,
withdrawal /avoidance). Our focus is on the relationship
2
These two indicators only present a subset of the physiological indicators of temperament and additional indicators that
may be discussed in this context are excitability levels of the
amygdala, asymmetric activation of the amygdala, norepinephrine, cortisol, or dopamine levels (e.g., Davidson et al.,
2000; Depue & Collins, 1999; Kagan, 1998; Rothbart &
Baltes, 1998).
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still very limited. Rank-order stability of baseline prefrontal asymmetries seems to be very low over an 8-year
period during childhood (Davidson & Rickman, 1999),
but stability is assumed to increase after puberty when
the prefrontal cortex has stopped to undergo developmental change (Davidson et al., 2000).
Again, there is no study yet that compares the relative
magnitude of prefrontal asymmetry between infants, children, and adults. Cerebral asymmetry has been demonstrated during the 1st year of life (cf. Davidson et al.,
2000), but it is unclear whether these interindividual
differences in brain activity stay stable during further
development. It has been speculated that the later development of left-brain abilities might be accompanied by a
maturational shift toward better emotion-regulation
(see Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Similar to research on
heart rate and its variability, there seems to be hardly
any evidence on the mean-level stability of prefrontal
asymmetry in old age. We only found one study of odor
perception in older adults that showed that left frontal
brain activation in response to pleasant stimuli was uncompromised. However, brain activity in response to unpleasant stimuli did not differ from that to neutral
stimuli (Kline, Blackhart, Woodward, Williams, &
Schwartz, 2000). This may imply that the right prefrontal cortex area undergoes stronger age-related losses
in functioning than the left prefrontal area. We will see
in the next section that on a behavioral level of assessment there is evidence accruing for differentially reduced frequency of negative emotions as well as reduced
reactivity to negative stimuli.
Some Conclusions about the Development of
Neurophysiological Indicators of the Mechanics of
Personality Functioning. To date, there are few
studies on either mean-level or rank-order stability of
the selected physiological indicators of the life mechanics of personality and the majority of extant findings come from studies on infancy and childhood.
Thus, we can only draw some very preliminary conclusions about life span development. Substantial stability
coefficients are attained past adolescence. Thus, these
physiological indicators may possibly contribute to
continuity on the behavioral level. The mechanics underlying basic motivational and emotional tendencies
show smaller mean-level changes than the cognitive
mechanics across the life span. But there are some decreases such as the declining physiological reactivity of
the ANS in old age and the possibly reduced asymme-
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Finally, what happens with the mean levels of personality traits? Do we become less extravert and less open,
but also less neurotic, as we move through adulthood
and old age? Taking into account cross-sectional and
longitudinal evidence, it seems that neuroticism decreases across adulthood (Mroczek & Spiro, 2003) and
may show some increase again very late in life (Small
et al., 2003). Some decrease is also found for openness
to experience and extraversion (e.g., Costa, Herbst, McCrae, & Siegler, 2000). In contrast, agreeableness and
conscientiousness increase to some degree (Helson &
Kwan, 2000).
This mean-level decrease in neuroticism, increase in
agreeableness and conscientiousness across adulthood
and into old age can be described as an increase in social
adaptation, in the sense of becoming emotionally less
volatile and more attuned to social demands (Helson &
Wink, 1987; Staudinger, 2005; Whitbourne & Waterman, 1979). The decrease in openness to experience, in
contrast fits a different developmental pattern that is
discussed next.
McCrae and others (e.g., 2000) lately offered an interesting proxy of a longitudinal study. Comparing samples between age 14 and 83 years from Korea, Portugal,
Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Turkey, they found
cross-country consistency with regard to the pattern of
mean-level changes just described. The authors argue
that the observed similarity across cultures makes it unlikelygiven the very different historical and cultural
circumstances in these different countriesthat such
age differences are indeed cohort differences. Instead
the authors suggest that this developmental pattern may
reflect changes in genetic expression selected for by
evolution (McCrae et al., 2000). Thus, using the terminology introduced in this chapter, McCrae and others
view those results as reflecting changes in the life mechanics underlying personality functioning.
Knowing the many different ways that genes and environment interact in order to produce stability (cf.
Plomin, DeFries, & Loehlin, 1977; Roberts & Caspi,
2003) and also how important specific life experiences
are in personality development (e.g., Magnus, Diener,
Fujita, & Pavot, 1993), we are somewhat reluctant in accepting this explanation as the only valid alternative.
For example, the transition to partnership during early
adulthood is accompanied by decreases in neuroticism
and shyness and increases in conscientiousness (Neyer
& Asendorpf, 2001). Thus, personality changes can also
be attributed to normative, in the sense of culturally
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Second Level 5 Example: The Study of Personality Development across the Life Span
The evidence on life span development of life priorities and personal life investment patterns reported
above indeed points to selection into individual life contexts and the importance of internal and external contexts in defining salient features of the self across the
life span (see also Brandtstdter & Rothermund, 1994;
Cantor & Fleeson, 1994; Carstensen, 1995; Staudinger
& Schindler, 2005). Socioemotional selectivity theory,
for instance, argues for systematic and adaptive life
span changes in social goals over the life span (e.g.,
Carstensen et al., 1999). So, temporal constraints like
impending end of life may shift the criteria used for selecting social relationships, requiring a corresponding
change in the criteria for judging a particular relationship as adaptive (e.g., Carstensen et al., 1999).
Beyond the social realm, the adaptive value of life
priorities in general seems to change. For example, older
adults find meaning in life predominantly by searching
for contentment, whereas younger adults report
searching for happiness (Dittmann-Kohli, 1991).
Younger people tend to assess their subjective wellbeing in terms of accomplishments and careers, whereas
older people associate well-being with good health and
the ability to accept change (Ryff, 1989a). These
changes are highly adaptive and illustrate the importance of flexibilitygiving up or reducing investment in
those roles and commitments that are no longer available, and investing in commitments which fit current
conditions of living (e.g., Brim, 1992; Dittmann-Kohli,
1991; Freund & Baltes, 2002b). Flexibility in goals and
investments, or priorities, is of course facilitated by a
rich variety of self-defining concepts to select from and
prioritize. In this sense, a rich variety of interrelated but
well-articulated life goals is part of a persons developmental reserve capacity (cf. Staudinger et al., 1995;
Riediger et al., 2005).
In addition to the repertoire and selection of goals,
other facets of goal pursuit also relate to adaptation.
Achieving a goal is usually adaptive, but the meaningfulness of the goal and the degree of commitment to it
may enhance or limit that adaptivity (see also Brunstein, 1993; Emmons, 1996). Further, one must act; one
study demonstrated that the relationship between peoples goals and well-being was primarily mediated
through doing more in the selected domain (Holahan,
1988; see also Harlow & Cantor, 1996). Recent evidence suggests that the pursuit of approach goals (or
hoped-for selves) is related to greater well-being, while
that of avoidance goals (or feared-for selves) relates to
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qualify the existing literature on the adaptivity of selfevaluations, which we address next.
Self-Evaluation: Social Comparisons. Goals shift in
any activity during the life span, and those shifts lead to
shifts in the selection and weighting of comparative information (Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Frey & Ruble,
1990). Individuals also modify their self-evaluative
standards within a given domain in order to adapt to decreases in their behavioral competence or negative
changes in their health condition, thus maintaining stability in their self-views (Buunk & Gibbons, 1997; Frey
& Ruble, 1990).
Social comparison and other forms of interactive
minds (P. B. Baltes & Staudinger, 1996a) are one important mechanism of self-regulation (e.g., Wood,
1996). New reference groups are selected or sometimes
even constructed in order to permit a reorganization of
personal standards of evaluation (e.g., Buunk, 1994).
Downward comparisons, in which individuals compare
themselves to people who are worse off in a relevant domain of functioning, may become more important with
age, increasing levels of risk, or losses that cannot be
remedied through instrumental action (e.g., Filipp &
Mayer, 2005; Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993; Heidrich &
Ryff, 1993). Of course, little is known about the level of
consciousness at which people make such comparisons
in everyday life.
The downward comparison story is not as simple as
it seems, however (see also Wood, 1996). The operationalization of downward social comparisons varies
markedly between studies. Some studies evaluate spontaneous reasons for self-evaluations provided online, which are later coded for comparison standards.
Other studies ask in retrospect for the frequency with
which social upward, downward, and lateral comparisons are made and relate this to measures of wellbeing (e.g., Filipp & Buch-Bartos, 1994). Still other
studies have participants rate themselves and a generalized other on certain personality dimensions, and
then indirectly infer upward or downward comparisons
(e.g., Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993). As suggested
above, the most critical issue for adaptivity may be the
use of the most functional comparison at the appropriate time during the person-situation transaction,
something seldom addressed in these studies.
Self-Evaluation: Lifetime Comparisons. Besides
social comparisons, comparisons with oneself at dif-
Second Level 5 Example: The Study of Personality Development across the Life Span
641
642
Concluding Commentary
Personality
Conscientiousness, extraversion,
openness to experience, behavioral
flexibility, ego resilience,
advanced ego level, and cognitive
investment
Self-concept
Interrelated, well-articulated
variety of self-conceptions and
life priorities
Positive agency (efficacy) beliefs
Systemic processes
643
644
those put forward in the short history of life span developmental theory. Work in cultural psychology, dynamic
systems theory, and on other forms of self-organization
in ontogenesis, are examples of this new theoretical
treatment of ontogenesis that is beginning to pervade
the developmental field as a whole.
As was true for life span psychology and the benefits
it derived from its contact with the biology of aging,
these new kinds of theoretical treatments have benefited
from transdisciplinary dialogue, especially with modern
developmental biologists but also anthropologists. Biologists have perhaps led the way in moving research away
from unilinear, organismic, and deterministic models of
ontogenesis to a theoretical framework that highlights
the contextual, adaptive, probabilistic, and selforganizational dynamic aspects of ontogenesis (P. B.
Baltes & Graf, 1996; Magnusson, 1996). Similarly, cultural psychologists and anthropologists (e.g., Cole,
1996; Durham, 1991; Valsiner & Lawrence, 1997) have
succeeded equally in convincingly demonstrating that
human ontogenesis is not only strongly conditioned by
culture, but that the architecture of human development
is essentially incomplete as to the culturally engineered
pathways and possible endpoints (P. B. Baltes, 1997).
Not the least because of this transdisciplinary dialogue, a new conception has emerged regarding the nature (Kagan, 1984) of human development. In the
modern context, the nature of human development no
longer refers to the fixed-biological (P. B. Baltes, 1991;
R. M. Lerner, 1984; Magnusson, 1996). Rather, in modern
versions of ontogenesis, its nature is both biological and
cultural, and both of these categories are subject to dynamic and interactive changes as well as systemic transformations. Of all developmental specialties, life span
development, because of its intimate connection with
long-term processes of individual development, cultural
evolution, and generational transmission is perhaps the
field most dependent on, and committed to, such views
(e.g., P. B. Baltes, Reuter-Lorenz, & Rsler, 2006; P. B.
Baltes & Smith, 2004; S.-C. Li, 2003). Most recently, the
emergence of the concept of biocultural co-constructionsim is another justification of this orientation.
The future of life span developmental theory will depend significantly on the extent to which the metatheoretical perspectives advanced turn out to be useful in
the conduct of empirical inquiry. On this score, the
1980s have witnessed impressive growth. In the area of
intellectual development (see following), for instance,
we now have available a cohort- and age-sequential
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664
CHAPTER 12
knowledge than ever before about behavioral adaptations in real-world settings. We are also increasingly
aware of individuals as agents of their own lives. New
avenues of research have opened, and the future offers
exciting promise for understanding how dynamic views
of context and the personincluding biological dimensionsinteract to influence achievements, physical and
psychological well-being, and social involvements.
To grasp the magnitude of this change, consider studies of person and society in the 1960s. In his widely read
The Sociological Imagination, C. Wright Mills (1959)
encouraged the study of biography, of history, and of
the problems of their intersection within social structure (p. 149). Mills started with the individual and
asked what features of society produce such a person.
He argued that the seemingly personal problems of
ones biography are better understood as repercussions
of broad social tensions. He had few empirical examples,
however, and was not concerned with dynamic views of
person and context. Rather, he focused on types of society and adult behavioral patterns, with little recognition
of social change, development and aging, or even human
diversity. Indeed, longitudinal studies of human lives
666
roles, health, and personality, with a distinctive emphasis on life patterns across the middle years (Eichorn,
Clausen, Haan, Honzik, & Mussen, 1981). Both historical cohort comparisons and intergenerational connections were part of this project.
At Stanford University, a research team headed by
Robert Sears actively followed members of the Lewis
Terman sample of talented children into their later
years. This was the oldest, active longitudinal study at
the time, with birth years extending from 1903 to the
1920s. By the 1990s, the project had assembled 13
waves of data spanning 70 years (Holahan & Sears,
1995), and research had begun to reveal the historical
imprint of the times on the study members lives (Elder,
Pavalko, & Hastings, 1991), from the 1920s to the post
World War II years and into later adulthood (Crosnoe &
Elder, 2004; Shanahan & Elder, 2002).
This extension of the early child samples to the adult
years provided initial momentum to the scientific study
of adult development and sharpened awareness of the
need for a different research paradigm that would give
attention to human development beyond childhood and
to contexts beyond the family. What social routes to
adulthood promoted behavioral continuity or change
from the early years of life? Which ones enabled problem children to turn their lives around and become effective adults? Child-based models of development had
little to offer because they did not address development
and aging in the adult life course and were not concerned with changing social contexts. For the most part,
studies of continuity and change from childhood to the
adult years were limited to evidence of correlational
patterns between measures at time 1 and time 2 (Jones,
Bayley, Macfarlane, & Honzik, 1971). The intervening
years and their mechanisms remained a black box.
Little, if anything, could be learned about linking events
and processes from such analysis.
Kagan and Moss (1962), for example, studied the Fels
children from birth to maturity by using correlation
coefficients to depict behavioral stability across the
years, but this approach ignored the diverse paths that
youth take into adult life. By age 23, some of the respondents followed a path to college, full-time employment,
and marriage, and others entered military service or
mixed employment and education. The timing of such
transitions was important in determining their meaning
and implications. For example, adolescent marriage and
parenting are coupled with more social and economic
constraints than the same transitions occurring according to a normative timetable, but late family formation
maximizes economic advantages and minimizes the disruptive effect of young children. However, these considerations of context and timingso richly descriptive of
liveswere of little interest. In large part, this inattention reflected the view that continuity of behaviors and
psychological dispositions required little explanation
aside from the label stability.
Empirical studies of children into their adult and
midlife years revealed major limitations to conventional
knowledge of human development, which, in turn, posed
major challenges for the future study of behavior:
To replace child-based, growth-oriented (ontogenetic) accounts of development with models that
apply to development and aging over the life course
To think about how human lives are organized and evolve
over time, exhibiting patterns of constancy and change
To relate lives to an ever-changing society, with emphasis on the developmental effects of social change
and transitions
As a whole, these challenges revealed a view of
human development that was advocated by proponents of
a contextualized psychology (e.g., Cairns & Cairns,
Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume) and many
decades earlier by the Chicago school of sociology (Abbott, 1997), especially by William I. Thomas. With the
close of the nineteenth century and through the first
decades of the twentieth century (a time of massive
changes in U.S. society), Thomas made a persuasive
case for studying change as experiments of nature in
the lives of immigrants and children. Inspired by
Thomas and Znanieckis The Polish Peasant in Europe
and America (19181920), researchers began to use
life-record data to investigate the impact of social
change. Before most of the innovative longitudinal studies had been launched, Thomas urged, in the mid 1920s,
that priority be given to the longitudinal approach to
life history (Volkart, 1951, p. 593). He claimed that
studies should investigate many types of individuals
with regard to their experiences and various past periods of life in different situations and follow groups of
individuals in the future, getting a continuous record of
experiences as they occur.
Social transformations of the twentieth century
raised many questions about historical variations in family life and contexts beyond the family, including schools
667
668
Recognition of a life-course perspective on human development, extending from birth to maturity, and the
rapid growth of longitudinal studies that link childhood and the adaptations of later life (Phelps, Furstenberg, & Colby, 2002; Young, Savola, & Phelps, 1991).
Life-history calendars for the collection of retrospective accounts of life events (Caspi et al., 1996; Freedman, Thornton, Camburn, Alwin, & Young-DeMarco,
1988).
New appreciation for the necessity of longitudinal,
contextually rich data (Hofer & Sliwinski, 2002; Little, Bovaird, & Marquis, in press); appropriate statistical techniques; and structural and dynamic, personand variable-centered approaches (e.g., Bergman,
Magnusson, & El-Khouri, 2003; Collins & Sayer,
2001; Little, Schnabel, & Baumert, 2000).
Cross-disciplinary models of collaboration (Elder,
Modell, & Parke, 1993), particularly with psychology
and history, but now extending to exciting developments in subfields devoted to the study of physical and
emotional well-being (Halfon & Hochstein, 2002;
Hertzman & Power, 2003; Kuh, Ben-Shlomo, Lynch,
Hallqvist, & Power, 2003). This chapter draws liberally from these sources in exploring the relevance of
contemporary progress for studies of child, adolescent, and adult development.
A growing awareness that, beyond history and the
differing experiences of cohorts, social change may
refer to dynamic contextual patterns experienced
within cohorts through diverse life histories (Shanahan et al., 2000). Further, many contextual features
are correlated, and their synergistic interactions are
critical to understanding time and place.
669
Multi-directionality of development
Person-Context Interaction
The emergence of life-course theory (1960s to present): research traditions and their concepts.
670
671
some attention to the role of social, cultural, and historical forces in developmental processes.
However, concepts of life-span development generally fail to apprehend social structure as a constitutive
force in development. The problem stems from the lifespan frameworks conceptualization of context, which
refers to age-graded, history-graded, or nonnormative
influences: Age-graded influences shape individual development in largely normative ways for all persons,
history-graded influences shape development in different ways for different cohorts, and nonnormative influences reflect idiosyncrasies (e.g., losing a leg in an
accident). Such a view has been unduly restrictive in
two senses. First, within-cohort variability largely reflects nonnormative influences, which are not easily
subject to scientific study (Dannefer, 1984). As a result,
the social basis for within-cohort differences becomes a
residual category. Second, as Mayer (2003) has noted,
life-span psychology views historical and nonnormative
influences as idiographic (i.e., unique, nonrepeating),
leaving only age-graded influences, which are thought to
be largely based in biology and age norms.
Because the larger social forces that lead to age
norms are of little interest, within-cohort regularities
in behavior are explained solely by personal attributes
( biology and internalized norms). In the final analysis,
the study of contextual influences in cohorts is hampered because it produces largely invariant patterns
through such age-graded influences, or it cannot be
studied because of its seemingly random nature. Despite these conceptual difficulties, life-span studies
are beginning to investigate links between broader social contexts and individual functioning (e.g., Heckhausen, 1999).
The important issue to recognize is that there is not
one optimum point of entry for studying human development across the life span (see also Shanahan & Porfeli,
2002). Indeed, the multilevel nature of human development invites different points of entry (each with specific
research questions) ranging from cultures and social
institutions to the human organism. Entry points frequently link or cross adjacent levels in the developmental process. Studies commonly employ different entry
points in the same research, although framed by a central question. Thus, a project motivated by the impact
of rural change on childrens social and emotional development should be framed by an initial focus on some
aspect of this social process such as the degree of economic hardship and displacement. Inquiry would explore
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thinking about age, including an appreciation for its diverse meanings and consequences (see third column of
Figure 12.1). These new thoughts include an emphasis on
subjective experiences with the age structures of society
and the individuals own construction of a life course, as
expressed in the pioneering work of Bernice Neugarten
(Neugarten, 1996; Neugarten & Datan, 1973). In the University of Chicagos Committee on Human Development,
post-World War II studies, such as the Kansas City project, were more successful than other efforts at the time in
linking human development through the adult years to the
social structures in which people lived. For example,
Neugarten and Peterson (1957) observed a relationship
between age-linked concepts of self and life stage by socioeconomic position. Working-class people were older
when they entered the self-defined middle years of life,
compared to upper-status people. Neugarten contributed
to this early work by connecting socioeconomic careers
to adult psychology, role transitions, and generations. We
return to these important contributions in the context of
age-based perspectives on the life course. Through the
innovative work of Norman Ryder (1965) and Matilda
Riley (Riley et al., 1972), a more developed articulation
of the relation between historical time and lives was proposed, as expressed through membership in age cohorts
and successive age strata. For the first time, this work
joined two relatively independent lines of research on age
(Elder, 1975): (1) sociocultural and (2) cohort-historical.
Sociocultural Patterns in Human Experience
The relevance of age for a sociocultural understanding
of life organization has evolved over many decades of
ethnographic study by anthropologists, as in research on
age-grading and age-set societies (Kertzer & Keith,
1984). This work has generally focused on age structures in culture; however, the new inquiry explored individual experiences of age and age-grading, giving fresh
insights to the social and psychological variability of
peoples lives.
Contrary to a structural view of age patterns in cultures (Eisenstadt, 1956; Kertzer & Keith, 1984), studies
began to show that people of the same age do not march
in concert across major events of the life course; rather,
they vary in the pace and sequencing of their transitions
and they do so in ways that have real consequences for
family pressures, child socialization, and personal wellbeing. This variation also appears in accounts of differential aging among people who follow different social
trajectories.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Bernice Neugarten directed a research program that featured a concept of normative timetables and individual deviations
from such expectations (Neugarten & Datan, 1973). The
timetable of the life course refers to social age, as defined by peoples expectations regarding events. In theory, age expectations specify appropriate times for
major transitions, and violations of these expectations
may lead to punitive responses from others. There is an
appropriate time for entering school, leaving home, getting married, having children, and retiring from the
labor force. Neugarten, Moore, and Lowe (1965) observed a high degree of consensus on age norms across
some 15 age-related characteristics in samples of middleclass adults. The data reveal general agreement among
men and women on the appropriate age for a woman to
marry and support the hypothesis that informal sanctions are associated with relatively early and late marriage. Moreover, the women were aware if they were on
time, late, or early with respect to marriage and other
major role transitions.
Although subsequent studies have extended this line
of research (Settersten & Mayer, 1997), relatively little
is known about age expectations and their boundaries
and related sanctions; thus, doubts have been raised
about age norms (Marini, 1984). These topics deserve
far more attention than they have received to date.
Some notions about the proper phasing of the life
course take the form of cognitive descriptions or predictions rather than normative accounts, whether prescriptive or proscriptive. However, the process by
which these descriptions or age expectations are constructed, transmitted, and learned remains largely unexplored territory.
For many decades, age-grades or categories were inferred as possessing common significance without evidence of their meaning to the individuals involved. At
what point do young children take the perspective of a
student? When do young adults begin to take an adult
standpoint and view themselves accordingly? Is the
main transition point for an adult perspective marriage,
the birth of a child, or stable employment? Such questions were of interest in Neugartens research program,
and she broke new ground in testing the proposition that
life stage is partially a function of ones socioeconomic
status and career.
In the mid-1950s, Neugarten found that men in the
lower-economic strata were likely to perceive a more
rapid passage through the major age divisions of life
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Adjacent birth cohorts are most sharply differentiated during rapid change, and represent a vehicle of
social change when cohort differences arise. As successive cohorts encounter the same historical event, they
do so at different stages in their life course. This means
that adjacent cohorts bring different life experiences to
the change. Consequently, the impact of the event is
contingent on the life stage of the cohort at the point of
change. Ryder (1965) stressed this life-stage principle in his account of cohort differences in the life
course. As each cohort encounters a historical event,
whether depression or prosperity, it is distinctively
marked by the career stage it occupies (p. 846). Examples include the differential age of military entry
among U.S. veterans who served in World War II. The
age range spanned 20 years: Some recruits had just left
high school while others were in their mid-30s with
families and careers.
From this vantage point, historical influence in life
experience can take different forms in cohort studies.
One form is expressed as a cohort effect when social
change differentiates the life patterns of successive cohorts such as the older and younger children of the
Great Depression who were born in the 1920s. Consistent with the life-stage principle, younger children, and
especially the boys, were most adversely influenced by
the economic stresses of the economic collapse (Elder,
1974/1999). Cohort differences were also expressed in
the prevalence of a behavior or practice such as lifecourse reorganization or the proportion exposed to
trauma in World War II.
A cohort effect may also be expressed in a changing
social mechanism, as expressed in the transition to
parenthood across four birth cohorts of White women
in upstate New York, United States (Forest, Moen, &
Dempster-McClain, 1995): 1907 to 1918, 1919 to
1923, 1924 to 1928, and 1929 to 1933. The first cohort
came of age during the Great Depression, the second
moved into adulthood during World War II, the third
made the transition in the early post-World War II
years, and the fourth became parents during the 1950s.
The study found employment before marriage to be a
primary source of childbearing delay for women in the
first two cohorts. However, in the younger cohorts,
educational advancement played a significant role in
the delay of the first birth, far more than premarital
employment. Advanced education was becoming
increasingly important in the lives of women, including
womens return to school following marriage and
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strategy has more to offer in developmental and lifecourse implications because research is directed to the
explication of a specific change process such as family
adaptations to migration.
Cohort membership has specific implications for
lives when a particular cohort size is paired with available economic opportunities. Richard Easterlin (1980)
has pursued this issue in his account of postwar change
in the work lives of men. His point of departure was the
link between the supply of younger men and their relative economic position, and between changing cohort
size relative to options and life chances. Other things
being equal, the greater the relative supply of young
male workers, the weaker their relative economic status and gains. Before 1960, the relatively small birth
cohorts of younger men experienced a wide range of
advancement opportunities, and their relative economic position (compared with older men) increased
significantly. After 1960, the baby boom cohorts
began entering the young adult category, producing a
labor surplus and restricting economic progress.
The behavior of these birth cohorts was symptomatic
of the relative economic squeeze they encountered.
The economic position of young men has deteriorated
relative to that of older men, family formation has been
delayed by increasing numbers of young adults, and the
employment rate of young women has increased more
rapidly than that of older women. Among young adult
cohorts during this period, an upward trend in the divorce, suicide, and crime rates is observed, as well as a
leveling off in the college enrollment rate, which has
climbed steadily since the 1940s. Research inspired by
Easterlin has led to mixed results, however, suggesting
that the model may be over-simplified (Pampel & Peters, 1995).
In part, this simplification reflects a problem shared
by cohort studies as a whole: when theory and research
focus on the cohort level, the linking mechanisms between lives and changing times are difficult to pin down.
Cohorts can be merely black boxes with no information on causal dynamics and linkages. Behavioral differences between cohorts also do not readily yield an
understanding of the social or historical factors that account for them. Speculation frequently takes the place of
disciplined explication. The problem with cohort studies
has much to do with exposure of people in a birth cohort
to varied environmental changes. Thus, some grade
school children are exposed to the economic stress of a
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At the time of maximum hardship in the early 30s, the Oakland children were well beyond the dependency state of early
childhood, with its consequences for intellectual and emotional development, and they reached the age of majority
after opportunities had improved through nationwide mobilization for war. Persons born 10 years before the Oakland
children would have entered the labor force during the worst
phase of the economic collapse, while the welfare of persons
in the 1929 cohort would have been entirely dependent on
conditions in their families. (Elder, 1974/1999, p. 16)
As noted in this account, Children of the Great Depression (Elder, 1974/1999) began with concepts of the
life cycle and relationship tradition, such as role sequences and generation, but soon turned to the analytic
meanings of age for linking family and individual experience to historical change (especially birth cohort and
life stage), and for identifying trajectories across the life
course, using a concept of age-graded events and social
roles. Both theoretical strands provide essential features
of life-course theory on matters of time, context, and
process. The life course is age-graded through institutions and social structures and embedded in relationships that constrain and support behavior. In addition,
people are located in historical settings through birth
cohorts and they are linked across the generations by
kinship and friendship. The 25th anniversary edition of
Children of the Great Depression (Elder, 1974/1999) includes another chapter, which compares the Oakland cohort in life patterns to that of a younger birth cohort, the
Berkeley Guidance study members, born in 1928 to
1929. The Berkeley males were more adversely affected
by Depression hard times than all other gender/cohort
subgroups in the comparison.
Contemporary theory on the life course and its social
dimensions thus differs from perspectives of an earlier
era by joining the life cycle processes of social relationships with the temporality and contextual aspects of
age. For examples of this shift, we need only compare
Thomas and Znanieckis The Polish Peasant in Europe
and America (19181920) with its analysis of generations and lineages in a relatively timeless, abstract realm,
to the birth cohort, age-graded life course, and intergenerational themes of Family Time and Industrial Time
(Hareven, 1982)a study of successive worker cohorts
and their families in a large textile mill with declining
economic prospects during the 1920s and 1930s. Though
explicitly historical, The Polish Peasant does not locate
the immigrants according to birth year and historical setting, nor does it describe their life stage at the time of
their emigration. Harevens study provides these markers and uses them to assess the implications of industrial
change for worker families (parents and children) in the
textile city of Manchester, New Hampshire.
Through the integration of social relationship concepts and age-based distinctions, along with life-span
concepts of the person and human organism (see Figure
12.1), the life course became a vital, expanding field of
inquiry in the 1970s and 1980s. Both the individual life
course and a persons developmental trajectory are inter-
connected with the lives and development of others. Lifecourse theory thus took issue with life-span studies that
viewed human development as an unfolding process,
which was not coactive with social and cultural processes
in historical time. However, it is responsive to Lerners
(1991, p. 27) call for more attention to contextual variability, and continues to be an emerging perspective on
developmental science (Cairns, Elder, & Costello, 1996;
see also Ford & Lerner, 1992; Thelen & Smith, Chapter
6, this Handbook, this volume) that extends across system
levels and disciplines.
The contextual perspective of the life-course framework has much in common with Urie Bronfenbrenners
ecology of human development, now called bio-ecological
theory (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994), but it differs in
emphasis on the temporal dimension of historical, family, and life contexts. Bronfenbrenners Ecology of Human
Development (1979) proposed a multilevel view of the
sociocultural environment, from macro to micro, but it
did not include a temporal perspective on individual development across changing environments. In life-course
studies, this perspective includes age-graded social trajectories or pathways as well as historical contexts.
Some years later, after making a case for the personprocess-context model, Bronfenbrenner (1989, p. 201)
noted a major lacuna in his work that also applied to
Lewins original thinkingthe dimension of time. To
correct this limitation, he proposed the general concept
of chronosystem, with its three interacting components over time: (1) the developing person, (2) the changing environment, and (3) their proximal processes.
Although this concept has not been widely adopted,
the ecological perspective itself has generated many
contextual studies of child development (Moen, Elder, &
Lscher, 1995; see also Bronfenbrenner & Morris,
Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume).
Human development in life-course theory represents a
process of organism-environment transactions over time
in which the organism plays an active role in shaping
its own development. The developing person is viewed as
a dynamic whole, not as separate strands, facets, or domains such as emotion, cognition, and motivation. The
course of development is embedded in a dynamic system
of social interchanges and interdependencies across and
within levels. As noted by Bronfenbrenner (1996), this
dynamic in life-course theory is illustrated well by the interlocking lives and developmental trajectories of family
members who are influenced differentially by their
changing world.
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of the individual actor, some decision pressures and constraints are linked to federal regulation, some to the social regulations of an employer, and some to state and
community legislation.
Mayer (1986) had the nation-state in mind when he
identified important societal mechanisms, which impose order and constraints on lives (pp. 166167).
These include the cumulative effects of delayed transitions, institutional careers, the historical circumstances associated with particular cohorts, and state
intervention. Growth of the state in social regulation
counters the potentially fragmenting effects of social
differentiation. At the individual level, the state legalizes, defines and standardizes most points of entry and
exit: into and out of employment, into and out of marital
status, into and out of sickness and disability, into and
out of education. In doing so the state turns these transitions into strongly demarcated public events and acts
as gatekeeper and sorter (p. 167). These are what
Buchmann (1989, p. 28) properly calls events in the
public life course.
Multilevel accounts of the life course are well illustrated with cross-national studies of the transition to
adulthood (Settersten, Furstenberg, & Rumbaut, 2005),
particularly in relation to the social pathways from secondary school to work (Kerckhoff, 2003; Marshall,
Heinz, Krueger, & Verma, 2001). In Great Britain, secondary school-leavers can follow a path to work that
consists of technical training programs or schools that
provide credentials for a particular craft. With the freedom to make a wide range of choices, students also miss
opportunities and desirable job placements. Far more
structure is provided working-class German youth in a
secondary-level system that in theory joins industrial
training and education in an apprenticeship system. In
principle, placement in a skilled craft is assured for
youth who complete their apprenticeships. In Japan, occupational recruitment typically occurs in schools from
the secondary-level to higher education, and the hiring
firm provides specific job training, not the schools or
craft institutes. American adolescents encounter the
least amount of articulation between schooling and
workplace. Vocational training in secondary schools is
not closely linked to specific industries, their recruitment, and skill needs. In many less-developed countries,
youth are forced to leave school early to support their
families; in turn, their lowered educational attainment
results in low wages, which forces their children to leave
school early as well (Shanahan, Mortimer, & Krueger,
2002). This intergenerational cycle of disadvantage il-
lustrates how pathways from school to work can reproduce across the generations.
In societies, role sequences become established or institutionalized in the culture with the passage of time.
With respect to work, for example, Spilerman (1977)
has used the term career lines to refer to pathways defined by the differentiated and aggregated work trajectories or histories of individuals. In his view, career
lines are shaped by the nature of industry structures
(e.g., occupational distribution, mode of recruiting into
upper status slots such as promotion from below versus
hiring from outside the firm) and by the institutional demography of the labor market (p. 552). In an expanding
market, these career lines extend across company and
industry boundaries. Career lines vary in their receptivity to different times of entry: The trades frequently require early entry through a training program in contrast
to the less age-graded nature of public school teaching
and service occupations. The selection and timing of career entry are major determinants of subsequent earnings and work trajectories.
Prior to entry into work, however, young people encounter educational pathways. Studies of the educational system in the United States reveal that these
pathways begin very early in life and that their effects
cumulate to produce marked differences among students and workers. Thus, drawing on data from the
Beginning School Study in Baltimore, Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson (2003) have documented educational
pathways that begin to take form in the first grade. In a
school where 88% of the students were on subsidy,
every first grade student received a failing mark in reading in the first quarter. In low-SES schools more generally, the average first grade reading score was 1.64
( below a C), in contrast to students in high-SES schools,
who averaged 2.15 (above a C). They also report that,
even controlling for family background and standardized test scores, Black children received lower first
grade reading and math scores, and these racial differences were subsequently magnified.
While students of all races and socioeconomic groups
benefited from schooling to the same degree, low-SES
students reading ability decreased during the summer
vacation, while high-SES students reading improved.
Given initial differences in reading and math ability and
these invidious summer trends, Entwisle et al. (2003)
concluded that the long-term persistence of early rankings means that inequities visible in the first grade
translate into deficits all along the line (p. 239). Indeed, recent studies drawing on this sample show that
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Characteristics of paid work are known to be associated with psychological and physical functioning, although little research has investigated temporal patterns
of work characteristics. A notable exception is Amick
and his colleagues (2002), who report that men who
spend their work lives in jobs with low levels of control
have a 43% increase in chance of death when compared
with men who have jobs with high levels of control over
their work life. Thus, multiple aspects of social class are
likely to matter for well-being, but such relationships
depend on the duration of experiences.
Many cumulative processes refer not to the duration
of a particular social circumstance but rather to the triggering of chains of interrelated events, which have significant implications for later well-being and attainment
(Rutter, 1989). Behavioral continuities across the life
course are likely to be found in social interactions that
are sustained by their consequences (cumulative) and by
the tendency of these styles to evoke maintaining responses from the environment (reciprocal; Caspi, Bem,
& Elder, 1989). In cumulative continuity, both individual dispositions and family values are likely to favor the
choice of compatible environments, and this reinforces
and sustains the match. Thus, antisocial youth tend to
affiliate with other problem youth, and their interaction
generally accentuates their behavior, producing over
time what might be described as cumulative disadvantages (Cairns & Cairns, 1994; Sampson & Laub, 1997;
Simmons, Burgeson, Carlton-Ford, & Blyth, 1987).
Among problem youth from inner-city neighborhoods,
those who were most negative toward their life chances
lacked the support of close kin and friends, did not have
a supportive older sibling, and were most likely to be involved with deviant friends (Furstenberg, Cook, Eccles,
Elder, & Sameroff, 1999).
Reciprocal continuity refers to a continuous interchange between person and environment in which reaction forms action and then by another cycle of action and
reaction. As with cumulative continuity, the net result of
reciprocal continuity is the cumulation of experiences
that tend to maintain and promote the same behavioral
outcome. Baldwin (1895) refers to such interchanges
as circular functions in ontogeny. The ill-tempered
outburst of an adolescent may provoke a cycle of
parental rage and aggression, a widening gulf of irritation, and, finally, parental withdrawal, which reinforces
the adolescents initial aggression (Pepler & Rubin,
1991). Over time, the interactional experiences of aggressive children can establish attitudes that lead them
to project interpretations on new social encounters and
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illness, providing powerful evidence for cumulative effects. By implication, recent employment compensates,
at least in part, for prior spells of unemployment, as
does improvements in ones occupational status (see
Poulton et al., 2002).
Experiences may cumulate because social circumstances are largely stable or lead to functionally equivalent relationships with people and involvements with
organizations and institutions. In the latter case, chains
of interrelated experiences all encourage the same behavioral outcomes.
Trajectories, Transitions, and Turning Points
Social pathways and cumulations of experience present
temporally sensitive descriptions of context. Trajectories provide a dynamic view of behavior and achievements, typically over a substantial part of the life span.
Transitions refer to a change in state or states such as
when youth leave home. A substantial change in the
course of a behavioral trajectory, often during transitions, may represent a turning point.
Trajectories and transitions are elements of established pathways, their individual life courses, and developmental patterns. Among individuals, social roles evolve
over an extended span of time, as in trajectories of work
or family; and they change over a short time span. The
latter may be marked by specific events such as children
entering school for the first time, completing the first
grade successfully, and graduating from high school.
Each transition, combining a role exit and entry, is embedded in a trajectory that gives it specific form and
meaning. Thus, work transitions are core elements of a
work-life trajectory, and births are important markers
along a parental trajectory.
Trajectories and transitions refer to processes that are
familiar in the study of work careers and life events. The
language of careers has a distinguished history in the
field of occupations and the professions, and it still represents one of the rare languages that depict a temporal
dimension or process. Career lines, as pathways, refer to
sequences of positions, while careers, as trajectories,
refer to coinciding behaviors and achievements. Work
careers have been defined as disorderly and orderly, and
achievements have been represented as career advancement, whether early or late, rapid or slow (Wilensky,
1960). The term career has also been applied to the trajectories of marriage and parenthood (Hill, 1970). All of
these uses fall in the more inclusive definition of a life-
course trajectory. The term does not prejudge the direction, degree, or rate of change in its course.
A developmental trajectory refers to change and constancy in the same behavior or disposition over time, but
consistency of measurement may be difficult to achieve
in many cases, especially in the measurement of aggression and dependency (Kagan & Moss, 1962). Nevertheless, trajectories of intraindividual change tell a
different story from life stories based on cross-section
analysis, and this concept is compatible with widely
shared views of development (Molenaar, Huizenga, &
Nesselroade, in press; Tremblay, 2004). Further, the
modeling of trajectories has become increasingly sophisticated, offering the analyst increasing options for
thinking about patterns of change (e.g., Collins & Sayer,
2001; T. E. Duncan, Duncan, S. Strycker, Li, & Anthony, 1999; Singer & Willett, 2003).
Developmental trajectories are also integral to lifecourse theory, especially when they are studied as interdependent with the changing dynamics of social
trajectories. In a four-wave study of early adolescents,
based on growth-curve models, Ge and his colleagues
(Ge, Lorenz, Conger, Elder, & Simons, 1994) found that
(a) the trajectories of depressive symptoms increased
sharply among White girls, surpassing the symptom
level of boys at age 13; ( b) the increase for girls was
linked to their exposure to an increasing level of negative events; and (c) the initial warmth and supportiveness of a mother minimized the subsequent risk of
depressed states and negative events among daughters.
Studies such as these have inspired many efforts to interrelate developmental trajectories and context, although frequently neglecting the changing nature of
social circumstance.
Increasing attention is being devoted to the study of
classes of behavioral trajectories based on the supposition that people may be qualitatively distinct in their developmental patterns (Bauer & Curran, 2004; Nagin,
1999; Nagin & Tremblay, 2001). According to this perspective, the population is heterogeneous with respect to
behavioral trajectories; as such, distinct subgroups can
be identified, and their covariates examined. For example, Moffitt (1993; see also Moffitt, Caspi, Harrington,
& Milne, 2002) hypothesized that aggregate patterns in
antisocial behavior conceal two distinct groups: (1) A
small percentage of youth engaged in antisocial behavior
at every stage of life (life-course persistent ), and (2) a
larger percentage of youth engaged in antisocial behavior during adolescence only (adolescence-limited). In-
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course dynamics and explanations. The process of becoming an adolescent mother requires sexual activity,
failure to use, or ineffective use of, contraception, and,
once pregnant, the decision to bear and raise the child.
Across these stages of the process, an agency has several possible points at which to target its interventions;
at initiation of sexual activity, at contraception use, or,
at the resolution of a pregnancy (Hofferth, 1987, p. 78).
The significance of this formulation becomes apparent
when we return to a time when unwed motherhood was
viewed simply as one transition, a concept that obscured
the strategic points of preventive intervention along the
life course. Given their multiphasic nature, many transitions cover relatively long periods. The female pubertal
transition, for example, begins before menarche and may
last well beyond it. As Dorn and her colleagues (Dorn,
Susman, & Ponirakis, 2003) observe, Although menarche itself is an event (the first bleed), the integration of
our findings of pre- and postmenarcheal hormone variability support a conceptualization of menarche as an integral part of a longer-term biological process (p. 300).
Similarly, the transition to adulthoodas indicated by
demographic markersbegins when youth complete
school, which occurs at age 17 or 18 for most American
youth, and ends with family formation, which may take
place in the mid-30s, if at all (Fussell & Furstenberg,
2005). Developmentalists tend to view transitions as dis-
Nonexperience
Pregnancy
Contraceptive protection
Not Pregnant
Abortion or marriage
Unwed motherhood
Figure 12.2 The life course of unwed motherhood. As adapted from Family Transitions, Cycles, and Social Change (p. 41),
by G. H. Elder Jr., in Family Transitions, P. A. Cowan and M. Hetherington (Eds.), 1991, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Reprinted with
permission.
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Transitions of this kind generally accentuate the behavioral effect of the selected dispositions, producing
greater individual differences and heterogeneity between groups. Cairns and Cairns (1994, p. 117) observe
that social selection and accentuation go together in peer
group formation. Once a group is formed in terms of selected attributes (e.g., aggressivity), the selected behaviors are accentuated. This process has obvious social
implications when unruly behavior is involved and makes
identifying peer effects particularly difficult.
Much research has examined the effects of paid work
during high school on grades, neglecting the possibility
that less academically engaged students may choose to
work longer hours. Adjusting for such a selection process, the effect of work hours on grades is negligible or
insignificant (Schoenhals, Tienda, & Schneider, 1998;
Warren, LePore, & Mare, 2000; see also Paternoster,
Bushway, Brame, & Apel, 2003, for the case of paid
work and antisocial behaviors). The issue can also be
viewed in experimental terms: When preexisting differences between people cannot be ruled out by random assignment (e.g., differing levels of school engagement),
the pure effect of the experimental manipulation
(e.g., hours per week of paid work during high school)
on the outcome (e.g., grades during high school) cannot
be determined with certainty.
In some instances, the problem can be addressed with
highly revealing randomized trials. What, for example,
are the implications of residential change? Perhaps moving from poor urban areas to more advantaged neighborhoods improves the lives of children. Do they profit
from the change? The question is difficult to answer
given that certain types of familiesthose possessing
more resourceswould be likely to move in the first
place. Yet, a randomized study of the question became
possible with the Moving to Opportunity (MTO)
demonstration project, which has operated in five U.S.
cities (Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and
New York) since 1994 (see Katz, Kling, & Liebman,
2001; Ludwig, Duncan, & Hirschfield, 2001). Families
were eligible to participate if they had children and
lived in public housing or Section 8 housing with a
neighborhood poverty rate of 40% or more. Interested
families who applied were randomly assigned to one of
three groups: the experimental group (which received
rent vouchers for housing in low poverty areas), a Section 8 comparison group (which received unrestricted
rent vouchers), and a control group (which did not receive rent vouchers). The design is especially helpful in
learning about how neighborhoods affect well-being because, in normal circumstances, specific types of families live in specific types of neighborhoods, which
makes it difficult to disentangle the contributions of
families and neighborhoods.
In the typical move to a middle-class, EuropeanAmerican suburb, the African American mothers and their
children were involved in radically different worlds with
higher behavioral expectations and typically EuropeanAmerican age-mates. If unemployed before the move,
African American mothers who moved to the suburbs
were more likely to find jobs and to engage in job
searches, when compared to the city movers. In the
follow-up, the suburban minority students more often
followed a college track and attended a 2- or 4-year college. If not in college, they were nearly twice as likely as
city movers to be employed full-time with pay greater
than the minimum wage and job benefits. The suburban
adolescents were also far more likely to be engaged
daily in activities with European-American students,
despite racial threats and harassment.
Before and after comparisons show that the transition improved life chances, at least for the females.
Four to 7 years after baseline, girls mental health improved, although boys problem behaviors may have
worsened as a result of their families receiving the
MTO offer to move (G. J. Duncan, Clark-Kauffman, &
Snell, in press). Girls in the experimental group also reported less risky behavior and better educational outcomes, while males exhibited more risky behaviors and
physical health problems (Kling & Liebman, 2004). The
lack of advantage for boys in the MTO experimental
group is difficult to explain, although Kling and Liebman speculate that boys in the experimental group may
have experienced stereotypes, relinquished fewer ties
to their old neighborhoods, and settled into peer groups
that exerted negative influences. Rabinowitz and
Rosenbaum (2000) provide valuable developmental insights on these transition experiences in their account
of Chicagos Gautreaux program, with its goal of enabling families to leave public housing for suburbs and
city neighborhoods that were better off financially.
In many instances, randomized trials such as the
MTO are not possible or offer imperfect solutions
themselves (Kaufman, Kaufman, & Poole, 2003). In
such cases, statistical models may be helpful in determining unbiased effects of social context. Yet, no statistical solution is without assumptions and drawbacks
(e.g., Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995, on instrumental
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Another linking mechanism involves situational imperatives, the behavioral demands or requirements of a new
situation. The more demanding the situation, the more individual behavior is constrained to meet role expectations.
In emergency family situations, helpful responses become
an imperative for members, as in hard-pressed families
during the worst years of the Great Depression. Rachman
(1979) refers to these imperatives as required helpfulness. The Oakland children were old enough in the early
1930s to be called on to meet the increased economic and
labor needs of their family, and a large number managed
to earn money on paid jobs and to help in the household.
This money was often used to cover traditional family
concerns such as school expenses.
In deprived families, girls generally specialized in
household chores, while boys were more often involved
in paid jobs. This gender difference made girls more dependent on the family and generally fostered greater autonomy among boys. Adolescent jobs in the 1930s
typically included what might be regarded as odd jobs in
the adult world, from waiting on tables and clerking to
delivering newspapers and running errands. Employment of this kind may seem developmentally insignificant, though it carried the important implication that
people counted on themthey mattered. Indeed, staff
observers rated the working boys as more energetic and
efficacious than other boys on a set of scales. The flow
of influence was no doubt reciprocal. The more industrious were likely to find jobs and success in work that
would reinforce their ambition. With additional chores
at home, working boys experienced something like
the obligations of adult status. To observers who knew
them, they appeared to be more adult-oriented in values,
interests, and activities when compared to other youth.
Boys who managed both household chores and paid
jobs were most likely to think about the future and especially about a career. In adulthood, these youth were
more apt to have achieved a measure of clarity and selfassurance in their work career when compared to other
males. They also settled more quickly on a stable
line of work and displayed less floundering during their
20s. Apart from level of education, this work life has
much to do with the occupational success and work
ethic of men who grew up in deprived families during
the 1930s. The response of these young people to Depression imperatives had enduring consequences for
their lives and values.
The developmental significance of adaptations to the
imperatives of new and challenging situations is expressed across the life course and in other cultures.
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Children of deprived rural families in this region assumed more responsibilities such as unpaid chores and
work on the farm. Boys and girls also sought paid work
when faced by the time and labor pressures of both large
households and economically distressed farm families.
Whether living on a farm or not, working adolescents
tended to describe themselves as industrious and efficacious, more so than other youth. Many of these young
people would eventually have to seek their fortunes in
other communities, and we know that the movers were
among the more capable members of the younger rural
generation. Youth with migration intentions had done
well in school, but they perceived dismal life chances in
their local region.
Choice making in migration is vividly expressed in
Hagans (2001) account of American war resisters during the Vietnam War, and their troubled decision to take
the northern passage to Toronto, Canada, a legal sanctuary from the American selective service system.
Nearly 10,000 men chose to defy the military draft and
the counsel of their families, and some made this journey with female friends. A majority continued their
protest of the war along the way and in their northern
community. Though many years removed from the Vietnam crisis, former war resisters (a majority of whom
still reside in Canada) remembered the emotional complexity and discord of their decision process. War resisters made their decision to settle in Canada after
countless appeals and protests, knowing the moral
stigma of their action in the American public. Interviews recall this traumatic time and the process by
which each decision against service in the war constructed a deviant path from the perspective of American society. This was a different path from that followed
by siblings. They were more likely to be employed in
human service and artistic professions, and they ended
up with lower earnings, but this inequality stemmed
more from their prolonged involvement in war protests
and the world of activism, which also altered their sense
of self and relationships with family and friends.
Does planfulness make a difference in the quality of
life choices and agency? In American Lives (1993), John
Clausen focused on this question, with emphasis on the
formative adolescent years of Californians who were
members of the Oakland and Berkeley Guidance Studies.
He hypothesized that competent adolescents who think
about the future with a sense of personal efficacy are
more effective in making sound choices and in implementing them during the transition to adulthood. These
693
694
as a cascade of secondary problems such as school failure, depressed mood, and parent rejection. An early history of antisocial behavior is linked to late adolescent
conduct through such processes.
From this research and studies into the adult years,
three markers along a disadvantaged life course emerge:
(1) age at first arrest, (2) incarceration or jail time, and
(3) unemployment. In combination, they underscore the
importance of onset timing for deviant activities. The
earlier the age at first arrest the greater the likelihood of
a criminal career (Farrington et al., 1990). Age at first
arrest is a reliable predictor of this future because it
sharply increases the likelihood of chronic, violent, and
adult offending and the risk of incarceration. Though incarceration is a popular response to the crime problem,
jail time appears to be a large part of the problem itself,
owing to its role in expanding the disadvantaged population. Using both nationwide and local samples, Freeman
(cited by Sampson & Laub, 1996) reports that in all
analyses having been in jail is the single most important deterrent to employment. This finding held up even
with adjustments for individual differences that account
for unemployment.
An early onset trajectory is defined as a rule by a
first arrest before the age of 14. Studies to date link
early onset with an earlier onset of antisocial behavior
(Patterson & Yoerger, 1996). Perhaps as early as age 6
or 7, a breakdown in parenting processes increases coercive actions (e.g., talking back, explosive behavior, or
hitting). The resulting interchange leads to fighting,
stealing, and truancy. Antisocial actions that are prototypic of delinquent acts, such as stealing from parents
and hitting them, increase the risk of delinquency
through the medium of deviant friends. The later onset
of deviant behavior includes more conventional youth
who are or might be seen as transitory delinquents.
They are more antisocial than uninvolved youth, but not
as antisocial as the early onset youth. Patterson and
Yoerger conclude that the most intriguing thing about
the late-onset boys is that they tend to be more deficient
in social skills than are the early onset boys. They regard this as key to predicting which boys will persist in
adult crime and which boys will not.
The profound life-course implications of early involvement in antisocial behavior continue to focus empirical
work on the dual pathways hypothesis (Farrington &
West, 1990; Moffitt, 1993; Moffitt, Caspi, Dickson,
Silva, & Stanton, 1996; Nagin, Farrington, & Moffitt,
1995). In the Dunedin longitudinal study, Moffitt (1993)
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696
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historical time and place, defined by culture, social institutions, and diversity of peoplethe 1920s, the San
Francisco East Bay, California. The book also describes
a very different Depression experience in Great Britain,
Germany, and Japan. Even in the United States, conditions during the Great Depression varied among cities,
East and West, and between rural and urban places. In
view of this variation, the studys generalizations are
uncertain. Also uncertain are generalizations across
historical time such as periods of economic depression
and recession.
One of the best examples of both historical and spatial variations in the life course and human development
comes from studies of lives during military times. The
immediate years after World War II, for example, were
hard times in many parts of Europe and Asia, unlike the
prosperity experienced in the United States. American
children who grew up in financially strained families
during the Great Depression frequently saw military
service as a bridge to greater opportunity. However,
the age at which they entered the service made a difference in how it affected their lives. When appraised in
terms of costs and benefits, military service for Americans has favored the recruit who entered shortly after
completing secondary school. This time of recruitment
comes well before commitments to higher education, a
marriage partner, children, and a line of work.
By contrast, later recruitment tends to disrupt all of
these activities. Empirical research (Clipp & Elder,
1996; Elder, 1986, 1987; Elder, Shanahan, & Clipp,
1994; Sampson & Laub, 1993, 1996) has documented
the life-course advantages of early mobilization and the
disadvantages of relatively late entry, quite apart from
the mental health and mortality effects of wartime combat. The disadvantages include family disruption, prolonged father absence (Stolz, 1954), family discord, and
divorce (Clipp & Elder, 1996), but these are not due to
the mental and physical wounds of wartime combat. Exposure to heavy combat markedly increased the likelihood of emotional and behavioral problems after leaving
the service, but such problems were not concentrated
among the late entrants. Before getting into the details
of selected studies, we note some basic features of the
transition to military service, in eras of World War II,
the Korean conflict, and the Vietnam War.
First, military service tended to pull young people
from their past, however privileged or unsavory, and in
doing so it created new beginnings for developmental
life changes. Basic training defined a recruits past as ir-
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benefits of the GI Bill and overseas duty on socioeconomic position were observed across the adult years up
to the age of 47.
In combination, these findings provide consistent
support for the life-course advantages of early entry into
World War II, and one study suggests that it applies as
well to the Korean War (Elder, 1986). However, ecological context matters, as one might expect. The timing of
military service had very different effects in countries
that lost World War II, specifically Japan and Germany.
West German males, born between 1915 and 1925 were
drawn very heavily into military action (up to 97% of an
age cohortMayer, 1988, p. 234). These cohorts of veterans lost as many as 9 years of their occupational career in the war, suffered a high rate of imprisonment
during and after the war, and experienced a mortality
rate of 25%. German children born around 1930 were
also hard hit by the war years, according to data from the
German Life History Project (Mayer & Huinink, 1990,
p. 220). The war disrupted their families and education
and they entered the labor market in a war-devastated
economy. Work placements were often poor, mixed with
spells of joblessness, and advancement was unpredictable.
Even the economic boom after the deprivational years of
recovery did not fully compensate this younger cohort for
its wartime losses in occupational achievement. A similar
story is told by these two birth cohorts (circa 1920 and
1930) in Japan (Elder & Meguro, 1987), except that the
younger group was mobilized as students for work in the
fields and factories. A large number reported bomb-damaged homes and a forced evacuation to the countryside.
Today, military service occurs in a very different
life course, marked by a later entry to adulthood for the
college-oriented (Settersten et al., 2005). The nature of
this service has also changed in many places, from obligation to voluntary. The aging of human societies has
extended the transition to young adulthood, from family origins in adolescence to the establishment of a
family in the early 30s or even later. In the United
States, young people are entering adulthood at a time of
rising educational requirements and later family formation for the middle class especially. This contrasts with
an accelerated timetable for the working class and families in povertytheir transition events tend to occur
much earlier.
We have used military service to illustrate the role of
historical time and place in lives. Military service functioned as a trajectory out of disadvantage in the lives of
Depression youth who survived World War II, but this
escape was conditional on historical time and place: Opportunities and life itself were lost by countless youth in
Europe and Asia.
Contributions of Life-Course Theory to the
Study of Human Development
In combination, these paradigmatic themes of lifecourse theory identify its core features and potential
contributions to the study of human development. First,
this perspective places the field of study in a lifelong
framework. Human development and aging are lifelong
processes, expressed in continuity and change, and biological, social, and psychological terms. The early years
of child development have formative implications for
subsequent trajectories and healthy adaptations in later
life. In the course of aging, individuals change their environment and social pathways by differentially interpreting, selecting, and assigning meaning to situations
and personal experiences. This process is expressed by
the principle of human agencylife-course choices are
made in structured situations. Across the life course,
pathways also shape the behavior of individuals through
social demands and challenging options. Contexts and
individuals thus become correlated. Transactional
processes of this kind are established early in life and
contribute significantly to life-course continuity. Life
changes tend to occur when situational demands change
and pressures increase to alter ones life course (e.g.,
marriage and military induction).
Few conceptual distinctions are more relevant to an
understanding of developmental change and the lives of
children than the link between age and timing. Thus, the
full negative impact of a lengthy dependence on welfare
for the educational progress of African American children appears after the third grade (Guo, Brooks-Gunn,
& Harris, 1996). Cumulative dependence on welfare
markedly tends to increase the risk of grade retention
from the third to the ninth grades. Age and timing distinctions also enable studies to relate children to the life
course of significant people in their lives. Middle-aged
parents and their biographical experiences are an integral part of the adolescence of their children, and the experiences of youth figure prominently in the social
world of their parents. In social meaning or function,
parents remain parents for as long as they and their children live. Likewise, the significant relationship of
grandchildren and grandparents can have much to do
with the quality and pattern of their own lives. Lives
701
702
fenbrenner and Cecis (1994) bio-ecological model suggests that proximal processes encourage the actualization
of genetic potential: As proximal processesenduring
forms of social interactions characterized by progressive complexityimprove, the genetic potential for
positive development is increasingly actualized. For example, Rowe and Jacobson (1999) showed that the heritability of verbal intelligence is significantly greater
among high-education households than low. Their results suggest that the genetic potential for verbal intelligence is more fully realized in homes of better-educated
parents, which are assumed to provide enriched proximal processes (e.g., Guo & Stearns, 2002).
Gene-Environment Interactions in the Life Course
What is notable about all of these processes is that they
occur in the life course or are age-graded experiences
that form trajectories or pathways. How can the life
course inform the study of genetic expression? First,
triggering, compensatory, social control, and proximal
processes are all mechanisms that occur over considerable periods, and thus must be studied with life-course
distinctions in mind. Second, the nature of these
processes is multifaceted and will vary through the
phases of life: For example, the factors that constitute social control in childhood differ significantly from social
control mechanisms in adolescence, which, in turn, differ from control in young adulthood. The importance of
these themesthe dynamic and multidimensional nature
of contextcan be appreciated when considering existing approaches to context in behavioral genetic research.
Dynamic Patterns of Context
The case of GE triggering interactions involving lifeevents and depression illustrates the importance of conceptualizing and measuring context through time. As
noted, many studies show that life-events are significant
stressors that trigger depression in people with a genetic susceptibility for that disorder. Such studies typically ask people to indicate from a list of the life-events
that have occurred over a specified period. The total
number of life-events experienced is then associated
with depression.
Yet, the magnitude of the relationship between lifeevents and indicators of distress like depression or depressive symptoms is often modest (Turner, Wheaton, &
Lloyd, 1995), and the cumulative evidence shows that
these modest associations are observed because, in part,
703
704
McLeod and Almazan (2003) note that much of the effect of parental loss (other than by parental separation) is
mediated by subsequent experiences. Studies suggest
that the provision of good child care, integration into and
achievements at school, good peer relations, and supportive, intimate relationships can all act to break the link between parental loss in childhood and poor psychosocial
outcomes in adulthood (e.g., Quinton & Rutter, 1988;
Rutter, 1989). In adulthood, the effects of life-events are
often contingent on how the events are resolved.
While our review of the life-events literature is not
meant to be comprehensive, it underscores that the crosssectional measurement of exposure to life-events represents a crude proxy for increases in stress load that could
actually trigger a genetic diathesis for psychosocial distress. Likewise, variables that represent other forms of
stressorsas well as potential sources of social compensation, control, and enhancementare likely to acquire
their meaning and impact only when viewed as part of a
life-course trajectory. In an effort to enhance the accuracy and validity of their models, behavioral geneticists
are beginning to assess behavior in developmental terms.
A similarly dynamic orientation is necessary to capture
the full significance of social context.
In addition to the dynamic features of experiences,
the life course directs attention to the changing nature
of social processes through the phases of life. Social
context is part of a cascade of associations (Johnston
& Edwards, 2002) or mediating mechanisms that makes
certain behaviors more likely than others. As Rutter and
Pickles (1991) observe, a GE interaction is not an explanation but rather something to be explained. For example, Link and Phelan (1995) suggest that socioeconomic
status is a fundamental cause of well-being, meaning
that, as a rule, high socioeconomic status is associated
with good health. Nevertheless, the mechanism by
which high socioeconomic status has these salutary effects varies considerably depending on the time and
place. Socioeconomic status may promote manifold dimensions of well-being and health through, for example,
preventative behaviors, monitoring and treatment, the
amelioration of stressors, and/or the provision of stimulating, healthy environments. Perhaps all of these mechanisms are at work, or perhaps their importance differs
at different points in life.
Sampson and Laubs research (1993) on informal social control illustrates the multifaceted nature of this
mechanism. In childhood, informal control refers to a
complex range of parenting behaviors, peer relationships, and connections to school and religious institu-
and resilience. The different clusters of events that children experience have different meanings that are lost
when those events are studied in isolation. (p. 401)
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706
CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of life-course theory and its elaboration over the past 30 years can be viewed through
prominent challenges to developmental studies that
questioned traditional forms of thought and empirical
work. They include:
1. The necessity for concepts of development and personality that have relevance beyond childhood and
even adolescence
2. The need for a way of thinking about the social patterning and dynamic of lives over time, as they relate
to developmental processes
3. The increasing recognition that lives and developmental trajectories may be transformed by a changing society
References
roles. By placing people in historical locations, lifecourse theory has oriented research to the third challenge, to understand the process by which societal
changes make a difference in the primary world and development of children.
This chapter on life-course theory represents the beginning stage of a long journey toward understanding
human development in ways that extend across individual lives, the generations, and historical time. Just as the
major themes of developmental psychology from a century ago seem to be regaining prominence in contemporary studies (Parke et al., 1994), including a renewed
interest in genetic influences, emotional regulation, and
the study of hormones, life-course theory can be viewed
through renewed priorities (e.g., social context and
change, life histories) that were once dominant in the
past, particularly in the early Chicago School of Sociology. These observed continuities, however, pale in relation to the novel integrations and new directions of
contemporary theory. Building on a wider net of crossdisciplinary scholarship in developmental science, distinctions of time, context, and process have become
central to a life-course theory of child, adolescent, and
adult development. The integration of biological models
with the life course represents a promising interdisciplinary frontier for this field of study.
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CHAPTER 13
717
718
the last edition of the Handbook, itself signals a continuing appreciation of the value and relevance of cultural
psychology to developmental studies. The last edition
was the first time that the Handbook of Child Psychology
included a chapter under the name cultural psychology.
It should be acknowledged, however, that this chapter
continues a broader conversation about culture and individual development that began in previous editions of the
Handbook, beginning with Margaret Meads contribution to the first edition, published in 1931. The section
of this chapter on the interpersonal worlds of childhood
provides an update of Robert LeVines chapter in the
third (1970) edition of the Handbook. And, the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognitions (LCHC) chapter on culture and cognitive development in the fourth
(1983) edition of the Handbook is an important predecessor to this chapter, especially the section on cognitive development. We carry forward LCHCs emphasis
on the semiotic mediation of experience and on a unit of
analysis that does not abstract the individual from his or
her social and cultural context or focus exclusively on
what is inside the skin or inside the head.
In this chapter, we selectively discuss the cultural psychology of individual development, with special attention
to the way in which culture and psyche make each other
up in the domains of self-organization, thinking, knowing, feeling, wanting, and valuing. The chapter is organized into five sections: an introduction, which lays out
major conceptual issues, followed by four topical areas
the cultural organization of early experience, language
and socialization, self-development, and cognitive developmentalthough issues concerning moral development
and the value-laden nature of mental functioning are addressed throughout the chapter.
We see these topical areas as paradigmatic in the
cultural psychology of development, yet we are also
keenly aware that several topics of vital interest receive
only passing and scattered attentiongender, play,
feelings and emotions, spirituality, and physical development. Without any pretense of representing all relevant research agendas or conceptions of the field, we
characterize some of the things cultural psychologists
have learned about the interpersonal, ideational, and
social communicative dimensions of psychological development. In keeping with cultural psychologys commitment to comparative inquiry within and across
cultures, we make a special effort to draw from the
empirical record in a way that represents the range of
Cultural Psychology: How It Dif fers from Other Approaches to Culture and Psychology
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The doctrine that God and divinity are archaic notions that should be displaced in the contemporary era
The related idea that the era in which we live is
the most advanced, enlightened, and exceptional in
human history and should be classified and heralded
as an age of reason
The behavioral inheritance of a cultural community
consists of its routine or institutionalized family
life, social, economic, and political practices. To
illustrate, a few of the routine or institutionalized
family life practices that are popular among many
rural folk in the South-Asian Hindu cultural region
include:
Joint family living (adult brothers co-reside in the
same family compound or dwelling space with their
living parents and their wives marry in)
Co-sleeping arrangements of children with their parents
Separate eating arrangements for husband and wife
(no family meal)
Sexual division of household tasks
Time-out and seclusion for females during their menstrual period
Parental hand-to-mouth feeding of children long past
infancy and well into middle childhood
Prohibitions on premarital dating and sexuality
Physical punishment for unruly or bad behavior
Arranged marriage between young men and women
of similar social status (primarily based on caste,
local region, and relative wealth)
Of special import for the cultural psychology of individual development is that human beings are the kinds of
beings who benefit from and carry forward a cultural
tradition. They try to promote, promulgate, and share
their understandings and practices with their children,
their relatives, and their community at large. They are
active agents in the perpetuation of their symbolic inheritance, largely because (among other motives) the
ideas and values that they inherit from the past seem to
them to be right-minded, true, dignifying, useful, or at
least worthy of respect.
They are also active agents in the perpetuation of
their behavioral inheritance. They try to uphold, enforce, and require of each other some degree of compliance with the practices of their community, largely
because (among other motives) those practices seem to
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Shweder et al., 1990) describe the different moral developmental pathways and patterns of moral judgment
for children in societies privileging an ethics of autonomy (where individualism, having the things you
want, and harm, rights, and justice concepts predominate) in contrast to societies privileging an ethics of
community (where notions of duty, sacrifice, loyalty,
and hierarchical interdependence and other social roles
based on communitarian moral concepts predominate)
or societies privileging an ethics of divinity (where
notions of sanctity, purity, pollution, and the connection between the sacred order and the natural order
predominate).
A similar point is made by Greenfield (1997) who
notes, It is the human capacity to create shared meaning that produces the distinctive methodological contribution of cultural psychology. She goes on to argue that
it is a mistake of modern psychology in general and
modern cross-cultural psychology in particular to treat
perspective (the shared meanings of a group is a type of
perspective) as a form of bias that should be eliminated
from research procedures. She contrasts the methodology of cultural psychology with that of modern crosscultural psychology as follows:
The methodological ideal of the paradigmatic crosscultural psychologist is to carry a procedure established in
one culture, with known psychometric properties, to one or
more other cultures, in order to make a cross-cultural comparison (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992). In contrast, the methodological ideal of the paradigmatic cultural
psychologist is to derive procedures for each culture from
the lifeways and modes of communication of that culture.
This ideal explains why interpretive methods, especially
ethnographic methods, have been so important to many cultural psychologists. Ethnographic approaches were devised
originally by cultural anthropologists as a means of understanding other cultures on their own termsnot as projections of the researchers own ethnocentric assumptions
(Malinowski, 1922). The goal is to understand what people
say and do from the perspective of insiders to the culture,
to render them intelligible within their own collectively
shared interpretive frameworks. From this standpoint, comparisons within and across cultures make sense only when
they are grounded in descriptions of the local meanings of
the people being studied. At the same time, these approaches carry with them the reflexive recognition that researchers too are members of particular communities and
cultures; that they may come to see their own local meanings in a new light by way of studying people who construe
the world differently.
722
For further discussion of interpretive and ethnographic methods as applied to the study of children, see
C. D. Clark (2003); Corsaro and Miller (1992); Erickson
(1986); Jessor et al. (1996); P. J. Miller, Hengst, and
Wang (2003).
One useful metalanguage or theoretical framework
for the nonethnocentric identification and comparative
translation of culture-specific aspects of mental functioning has been developed by the anthropological linguists Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard (Goddard,
1997, 2001; Goddard & Wiezbicka, 1994; Wierzbicka,
1986, 1990, 1993, 1999; see also Shweder 2003a, 2004).
Wierzbicka and Goddard have identified a core set of
semantically simple, intuitively obvious, universal folk
concepts (such as good, true, want, feel, do) that can
then be used to elucidate the particular ways the mental
states of members of different cultural groups vary. For
example, in the domain of feelings and emotions those
authors have effectively made the provocative point that
the contemporary American notion of sadness has
several cultural specific features (not even shared by
various Northern European subcultures), and they have
proposed that the very idea of an emotion (in contrast to
the idea of a feeling) is not a semantically simple, intuitively obvious, or universal folk concept.
To return to Greenfield, one powerful (and somewhat
ironic) implication of her analysis would seem to be that
the genuine existence of different cultural realities is
incompatible with the methodological assumptions of
cross-cultural psychology. More specifically, if your research procedures and instruments travel readily and
well (e.g., they are easy to administer and they display
the same psychometric properties from one test population to another) then you probably have not traveled far
enough into a truly alternative cultural world.
This may explain why long- and short-term fieldwork, language learning, naturalistic observation, detailed ethnography, and the analysis of the semantics
and pragmatics of everyday discourse and communication are central to the study of cultural psychology, yet
have played a minimal role in cross-cultural psychology.
It may explain why much of the evidence in crosscultural psychology (yet relatively little of the evidence
in cultural psychology) is derived from observations in
university laboratories, or from inventory or test procedures administered primarily to relatively cosmopolitan
university students in other lands.
The Western institution of the university carries with
it many features of an elite cosmopolitan culture wher-
ever it has diffused around the world. University students in Tokyo, Nairobi, New Delhi, and New York may
be far more like one another (and like the Western researcher) than they are like members of their respective
societies whose life ways are embedded in less familiar
indigenous understandings, institutions, and practices.
Even if you have traveled 10,000 miles to get there, a
university setting in another land may be much closer
than you think.
Much (1995) drives home this point with the following observation:
It is especially important to be clear about one distinction.
Cultural psychology is not the same as cross-cultural psychology, which is a branch of experimental social, cognitive and personality psychology. The chief distinction is
that most of what has been known as cross-cultural psychology has presupposed the categories and models that
have been available to participate in experiments or even
to fill out questionnaires. . . . The argument often assumed
to justify the tactic of studying mostly student behavior is
based upon a sweeping and gratuitous universalist assumptionsince we are all human, we are all fundamentally alike in significant psychological functions and
cultural (or social) contexts of diversity do not affect the
important deep or hard wired structures of the mind.
There are several problems with this position. One is that
there have been few if any satisfactory identifications of
deep, hard wired and invariant mental structures which
operate independently of the context or content of their
functioning; the method variance problem in experimental psychology is related to this fact. Another problem
is that even though there may be certain biologically based
psychological foundations . . . this does not necessarily
mean (1) that they are invariant across individuals or populations or (2) that culture does not affect their development as psychological structures and functions.
Whereas Greenfield and Much draw some methodological contrasts between cultural versus cross-cultural psychology, J. G. Miller (1997b) envisions the difference
between cultural psychology and cross-cultural psychology in theoretical terms (although a similar theoretical
point can be found in Greenfield and Much). She suggests, The dominant stance within cultural psychology
is to view culture and psychology as mutually constitutive phenomena which cannot be reduced to each other.
She adds that such a stance contrasts with the tendency
in cross-cultural psychology for culture to be conceptualized as an independent variable that impacts on the
dependent variable of individual psychology.
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constraints of logic and mere sense perception to construct an imaginative (and culture-specific) picture of
the underlying nature of the world and it values, resulting in a mentality (the Homeric mentality, the Hindu
mentality, the Christian fundamentalist mentality) supportive of a way of life.
They took as their data the great symbolic formations
produced by human beings: myths, folk tales, language
patterns, naming systems, ethnoscientific doctrines,
and ethical, social, and religious philosophies. They also
took as their data the great behavioral formations
produced by human beings, including customary practices of various kinds: subsistence activities, games,
rituals, food taboos, gender roles, the division of labor,
and marriage rules. They interpreted those symbolic and
behavioral formations as alternative manifestations,
substantializations, or instantiations of the disparate abstract potentialities of the universal mind, which they
believed was the business of cultural psychology to characterize and to explain.
cause our theoretical language for psychological description will be contextual from the start. In part, cultural psychology involves the study of real things that do
not exist independently of some collectively shared
point of view. Later in this chapter, we address in some
detail this issue, of dichotomies that need to be softened
or recast (see also Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook,
this volume).
The distinction between cultural psychology and
other contextual approaches in psychology is subtle, important, and easy to overlook because all approaches to
psychology that emphasize context share much in
common, especially their opposition to the idea that the
science of psychology is primarily the study of fixed,
universal, abstract processes or forms. Thus, cultural
psychology shares with other contextual psychologies
the assumption that the mind of human beings ( knowing, wanting, feeling, valuing, etc.) can only be realized
through some situated or local process of minding,
which is always bounded, conditional, or relative to
somethingshared meanings, goals, stimulus domain,
available resources, local artifacts, cognitive assistants,
and so on. Beyond that general point of similarity, cultural psychology should be understood as a rather special type of contextual approach.
In the conception of cultural psychology developed in
this chapter, the relevant contexts for the realization of
mind are the customs, traditions, practices, and shared
meanings and perspectives of some self-monitoring and
self-perpetuating group. The primary emphasis is on
contexts thought to be relevant for the realization of
mind in the sense that such contexts are the means for
transforming a universal mind into a distinctively functioning mentality, a distinctive way that people think
and act in the light of particular goals, values and pictures of the world (Berlin, 1976). In this approach,
cultural psychology is not coextensive with contextual
psychology (more on this in a moment). More important,
the contrast between inside and outside, person and context, and subjective perspective and external reality is
reconceptualized in cultural psychology as a process by
which culture and psyche are constantly and continuously making each other up.
725
tion between a mentality and a practice and a partial fusion of person /context, inside/outside, or subjective perspective/external reality.
Examples of a custom complex are so commonplace
they are easy to overlook. They include the mentalities
associated with nursing on demand, co-sleeping in
a family bed, the family meal, enforcing strict Christian discipline, performing the ritual of what did
you do in school today, or practicing ways to bolster
self-esteem.
A Custom Complex Example: Who Sleeps by
Whom in the Family
The mentality (what people know, think, feel, want,
value, and hence choose to do) intimately associated
with the practice of who sleeps by whom in the family
provides a paradigmatic example of a custom complex.
Who sleeps by whom in a family is a customary practice
invested with socially acquired meanings and with implications for a persons standing (as moral, rational, or
competent) in some consensus-sensitive and normenforcing cultural community.
Research on family life customs in different communities in the United States (Abbott, 1992; Okami &
Weisner, in press; Okami, Weisner, & Olmstead, 2002;
Weisner, Bausano, & Kornfein, 1983) and around the
world (Caudill & Plath, 1966; LeVine, 1989, 1990a,
1990b; McKenna et al., 1993; Morelli, Rogoff, Oppenheimer, & Goldsmith, 1992; Shweder, Balle-Jensen, &
Goldstein, 1995; J. W. M. Whiting, 1964, 1981) confirms
the existence on a worldwide scale of several divergent
custom complexes in this domain, each consisting of a
network of interwoven and mutually supportive practices, beliefs, values, sanctions, rules, motives, and satisfactions. Indeed, on a worldwide scale, the European
American who-sleeps-by-whom custom complex is not
the one that communities most typically produce, reproduce, and enforce with the various formal and informal
powers (e.g., legal interventions, gossip, and effects on
reputation) at their disposal.
The middle-class European American custom complex includes the ritualized isolation of children during
the night, the institution of bedtime, and the protection
of the privacy of the sacred couple upheld by a cultural
norm mandating the exclusive co-sleeping of the
husband and wife. This European American custom
complex is typically associated with something like
the following propositional attitudes, where knowing,
726
The cluster of propositional attitudes that lend authority to co-sleeping still need to be worked out for the
different culture regions of the world (although see
Morelli et al., 1992). The Japanese custom complex includes the propositional attitudes:
I value and want to promote interdependency and
feelings of closeness and solidarity among members
of the family; I know that co-sleeping will help children overcome feelings of distance and separation
from members of the family who are older or of a different sex.
The Oriya Hindu custom complex includes the propositional attitudes:
I highly value children as members of the family; I
know that children are fragile, vulnerable, and needy
and therefore should not be left alone and unprotected during the night.
Chastity anxiety and the chaperoning of adolescent females also play a part in the Oriya custom complex
(Shweder et al., 1995).
Examples of the way local experts (pediatricians, advice columnists, or social workers) rationalize, uphold,
and lend authority to the European American custom
complex can be found in the responses of Dear Abby
and Ann Landers to the many letters they receive
about the perceived problem of parent-child co-sleeping.
The following, published May 26, 1994, in the Chicago
Tribune, is a typical exchange between concerned adults
in the European American cultural zone:
Dear Abby: My nieceIll call her Carolis a single
mother with a 4-year-old son. (Ill call him Johnny.)
Carol just turned 40. Since the day Johnny was born, he
has slept with his mother in a single bed. They go to bed
between 8 and 10 oclock every night and always have
snacks and drinks in bed. They watch TV and cuddle until
Johnny falls asleep in his mothers arms. Abby, this child
has never fallen asleep alone. Carol lives with her parents, and there is no shortage of beds in their home. Recently, Carol and Johnny visited me in my country home,
and I gave them the bedroom with twin beds. The following morning, I discovered that Carol had pushed the beds
together so she and Johnny wouldnt be separated. I think
Carols emotional needs are taking precedence over what
is best for her son. He has no father, and his grandparents
have no say in his upbringing. I would appreciate your as-
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feel, want, value, and hence decide to do that are conditional, optional, or discretionary and are primed and
activated through participation in the symbolic and behavioral inheritance of particular groups. In effect, cultural psychology is a discipline committed to the study
of patterns of psychological difference across groups or
subgroups and to the investigation of the emergence
(and dissolution) of stable, relatively coherent, and intimate interconnections between cultural practices and
individual mental states.
Any study of difference, however, presupposes many
commonalities, likenesses, or universals by which attributions of difference become intelligible. A notable feature of our conception of cultural psychology is that it
presupposes certain universal truths about what is (and
what is not) inherent in human psychological functioning. At a minimum, we are committed to a theory of
mind in which everywhere in the world human beings
are the kind of beings who have a mental life (who know,
think, and use language and other symbolic forms) and
who feel, want, and value certain things, which is one
way to explain what they do (Donagan, 1987).
Even more deeply, we are committed to the view that
psyche consists of certain mental powers. Most notable
of these are (a) the representational power to form beliefs about other persons, society, nature, the divine, and
about means-ends connections of all sorts; and ( b) the
intentional power to affect an imagined future state of
affairs by means of acts of the will, which is the human
capacity to have a causal influence on the world through
acts of decision making and choice.
If the power of representation is an essential feature
of the human psyche, then the human psyche can be
studied, at least in part, as a knowledge structure. If the
power of intentionality is an essential feature of the
human psyche, then the human psyche can be studied, at
least in part, as inherently ends-sensitive, which is minimally what it means to be agentic or to have a free will.
This view of the inherent powers of the psyche accords
reasonably well with William Jamess (1950) description
of the marks of the mental. According to James:
The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for
their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon. We all use this test to
distinguish between an intelligent and a mechanical performance. We impute no mentality to sticks and stones because they never seem to move for the sake of anything, but
always when pushed and then indifferently and with no sign
of choice. So we unhesitatingly call them senseless. . . . No
732
actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice
of means, can be indubitable expressions of Mind. (p. 1)
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735
736
Care-Giving Relationships
Mothers are the primary caregivers of their children for
at least the first 2 years of life in most human societies,
but there are significant exceptions, and there is even
greater variation in the array of supplementary caregivers who assist mothers and form relationships with
young children. The ethnographic record as a whole does
not suggest that there is a single system for human child
care but rather a range of parental patterns flexible
enough to respond to and enable varying economic, demographic, and technological conditions with diverse
care-giving arrangements that affect the interpersonal
experience of the growing child.
When women have a heavy workload due to a primary
role in food production, then the resultant scarcity of female labor may create a demand for supplementary caregiving arrangements. When children are scarce relative
to adult women (due to high rates of infertility, infant
and child mortality, or contraception), adult women who
are infertile or postmenopausal may be eager to take
care of young children born to others. When wet nurses
or synthetic milk formulas become available, maternal
breast-feeding may decline. Thus, variations in caregiving practices and relationships are generated by the differing conditions to which human populations adapt.
There are some human populations in which a majority of children under 2 years of age live with and are
cared for by someone other than their mothers. These
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in their observable practices and do not share the European American mentality, but the findings do not describe what custom complex they are committed to and
what goals, values, and pictures of the world they are in
fact and in practice following. To make sense of observable differences in parents practices, it is necessary to
describe the parents cultural models of social relations.
It is necessary to describe the mentalities that guide and
give meaning to their practices and to a childs social
participation. Some illustrations are provided in the
next section.
Age-Graded Activities
In all societies, the social interaction of children is altered by their age-related participation in activities at
home or school. The institution of schooling creates an
extreme form of age-grading. In most schools children,
from the ages of 5- to 8-years-old onward, tend to be
rigidly segregated by age from those older and younger
for many of their daytime activities.
The peer groups that result are neither natural nor
universal. In societies without schools, childrens relationships with each other are formed among siblings or
other multiage groups of juveniles (Konner, 1975). In
these multiage groups, participants are much more
sharply differentiated by authority and knowledge than
in school-based peer groups. In such groups, relationships among older and younger children may facilitate
the learning of skills by the younger, who observe mature practice performed by someone old enough to be
more skilled but close enough in age to be easily imitated (Dunn, 1983).
Sibling relations may also promote interpersonal
responsibility, cooperation, and sensitivity to the
vulnerability of others on the part of the elder children
(Schieffelin, 1990; Weisner, 1982, 1987, 1989b; B. B.
Whiting & Edwards, 1988). Schools, alternatively,
may foster interpersonal comparison and competition among peers and, by obstructing the childs observational access to mature practice, make learning more
problematic and hence more self-conscious (Lave,
1990; R. A. LeVine, 1978; Scribner & Cole, 1973).
Cultural variability in age-graded social activities is
widened further by specific combinations of siblings,
school and work in the local environments of children,
and culture-specific norms that elaborate or diminish
age ranking.
739
lowing a baby to cry more than a few seconds is experienced by Gusii adults as an intolerable breach of caregiving norms.
740
behavioral difference has been interpreted by the investigators to reflect the impact of the childrens prior experience in divergent cultural environments, although it
is probably not possible at this time to choose between
different interpretations of this impact (e.g., facilitation, attunement, or maintenance/ loss, as discussed
earlier; Werker, 1989).
An example from infancy research is the Grossmanns (1981, 1991; Grossmann et al., 1985) study
of infant-mother attachment in Bielefeld, North Germany. This German replication of Mary Ainsworths
Baltimore study (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978) found that the majority of a nonclinical sample
of 12-month-olds was classifiable on the basis of the
videotaped Strange Situation as insecurely attached
to their mothers. Forty-nine percent of the sample was
classified in the A category or anxious-avoidant, almost twice as large a proportion as in American samples. The Grossmanns related this departure from
American norms to the German mothers custom complextheir mentality and practices. German mothers, in
this region of Germany, prefer a greater physical and interpersonal distance from their infants than Americans,
leaving them alone more often and sometimes pushing
them away. They would consider American infants rated
as optimal by attachment researchers to be spoiled.
According to the Grossmanns interpretation, the
culture-specific preferences of the German mothers was
based on a broader cultural mentality, even ideology,
emphasizing an ideal of pure independence that is even
more exaggerated than the European American ethics of
autonomy. For these mothers, this cultural ideology was
translated into maternal practices that affected not only
their infants routine expectations for social interaction
and comforting but also their response to separation and
reunion in the Strange Situation. Their interpretation of
their findings implies, though the Grossmanns do not
say so, that the profile of attachment ratings of American infants in the Strange Situation can be seen as reflecting the culturally influenced parental practices of
European Americans rather than a universal norm for all
human populations (LeVine & Norman, 2001).
If this is so, then claims of species-typical universality for attachment as observed in the Strange Situation
should be considered premature. Infant reactions to reunion with their mother after a brief separation at 12
months of age can be reinterpreted as indicators of early
enculturation to a cultural standard of interpersonal distance mediated through parental practices of infant care.
Language as Practice
LANGUAGE AS PRACTICE
The centrality of language to cultural psychology stems
not only from historical precedent but also from the duality of language. Unlike other domains, language is
both a tool and an object of inquiry. On the one hand,
the use of language as an instrument of inquiry is pervasive; every study of human development depends on
verbal communication in one way or another. Children
are questioned about the reasons for their moral judgments. Parents are interviewed about their child-rearing
beliefs. Verbal behaviors are incorporated into observational coding schemes. Experimental tasks have to be
explained to participants. On the other hand, language
serves as the object of inquiry in many studies that seek
to understand the nature and development of the linguistic system itself, including its various subsystems
(e.g., syntax, morphology).
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more fully later). These fields have been centrally concerned with cross-cultural comparisons and hence are
especially germane to the comparative mission of cultural psychology. Resting on the assumption that everyday talk is a pervasive, orderly, and culturally organized
feature of social life in every culture, they seek to understand the diversity of language use in the conduct
and constitution of social life.
These fields provide a rich set of conceptual,
methodological, and empirical resources that cultural
psychologists should exploit more fully. These include
procedures for grounding interpretations of communicative practices in the public cues that participants
systematically deploy in interaction and critiques of our
own social scientific methods as communicative practices whose meaning may not be shared by the people
we study. For example, C. Briggs (1986) analysis of interviewing as a social and cultural practice is still
timely and demonstrates the critical importance of
customizing interviewing to local metacommunicative
practices (see also P. J. Miller et al., 2003, for an application of this approach).
Another important insight from these fields pertains
to the issue of context. The focus on naturally occurring
discursive practices has led to a much more dynamic
conception of context and practice than is usually assumed in developmental studies. Contexts are treated
not as static givens, dictated by the social and physical
environment, but as ongoing accomplishments negotiated by participants. This shift from static to dynamic is
signaled by the term contextualization, which focuses
attention on the interpretive processes participants
themselves use to determine which aspects of the ongoing activity are relevant (e.g., Bauman & Briggs, 1990;
Duranti & Goodwin, 1992). This conceptual innovation
offers a holistic conception of individual and context as
an interlocking system in which the language practice
changes along with the person (see Goodnow et al.,
1995, for further discussion of this point).
743
everyday life. Although the process of language socialization was assumed to be lifelong, most research focused on the early years. In contrast to many domains of
human development, some of the best documented cases
were non-Western cultures (e.g., Ochs, 1988; Schieffelin, 1990; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1990, 1999) and
working-class and minority groups in the United States
(e.g., Heath, 1983; P. J. Miller, 1982).
Research on language socialization has been the subject of numerous reviews (e.g., P. J. Miller & Hoogstra,
1992; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986a) and collections (e.g.,
Bayley & Schecter, 2003; Corsaro & Miller, 1992; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986b). An important conclusion
emerging from this body of work is that there is enormous diversity in the cultural organization of caregiving
and language learning and that the pattern of sustained
dyadic conversation and mutual negotiation of meaning
so familiar to many middle-class European Americans
is but one variant among many. As noted earlier, groups
differ in the physical and social ecology of child care, in
language ideologies and folk theories about the nature of
children and development, in the practices used to encourage mature speech, and in the principles that organize interaction.
For example, Kaluli mothers of Papua, New Guinea,
believe that infants do not understand and thus cannot be
conversational partners (Schieffelin, 1990). They do not
talk to infants; instead they face babies outwards so that
they can be part of the social flow. When older siblings
greet the baby, the mother speaks for the baby, using
language that is appropriate to the older child. Mothers
do not interpret or paraphrase infants vocalizations, a
practice that reflects a dispreference for talking about
another persons thoughts or feelings. In the workingclass African American community described by Heath
(1983), multiparty talk is the norm and children are almost never alone. Talk around the child, rather than talk
directly to the child, is the primary linguistic resource
for novice learners. In a Mayan community in southern
Mexico, both dyadic and eavesdropper models of language learning are practiced, and nonverbal interaction
plays an important role in organizing infants participation (de Len, 2000).
Coexisting with these and other differences are important similarities. For example, many groups socialize
children into elaborate forms of teasing and oppositional language (e.g., Briggs, 1998; Corsaro, Molinari,
& Rosier, 2002; de Len, 2000; Eisenberg, 1986). Even
more widespread is the use of explicit instruction to socialize young children into valued ways of acting, feeling,
744
Bassos (1996) attempts to understand the significance of these statements yielded one of the most comprehensive accounts available of a groups shared
understanding of how oral narrative functions in their
lives. Working in collaboration with informants whom
he had known for many years, Basso discovered that
Western Apache storytelling exploited two symbolic
resourcesland and narrativefor maintaining the
moral order.
Western Apache use stories about the early history of
the group to establish enduring ties between individuals
and features of the natural landscape. Because of these
bonds, people who have behaved improperly are moved
to reflect on and correct their misconduct. At times, a
member of the community might find it necessary to
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occurring talk in working-class African American families in the Black Belt of Alabama (Sperry & Sperry,
1995, 1996). In working-class European American families in Chicago, 3-year-olds participated in co-narrations
at the remarkable rate of 6 times per hour (Burger &
Miller, 1999). When personal storytelling occurs so
abundantly, it gets woven, densely but almost invisibly,
into the fabric of young childrens social experience.
Moreover, regardless of where they occur, these small,
mundane stories are saturated with value and replete
with culturally patterned messages. Stories vary within
and across cultures along a host of parameters that encompass how the genre is defined and practiced (P. J.
Miller & Moore, 1989). For example, in her classic
ethnography of neighboring working-class communities
in the Piedmont Carolinas, Heath (1983) found that the
European American residents of Roadville adhered to a
criterion of literal truth when narrating their personal experiences. This contrasted with the African American
community of Trackton, who strongly favored fictional
embellishment. Trackton and Roadville also enacted opposing norms toward and away from self-aggrandizement.
Trackton children not only created bold and triumphant
self-protagonists but also asserted their rights to tell stories by adroitly working their way into adult talk, commanding the floor, and receiving approbation for their
verbal artistry.
In their study of an African American community in
rural Alabama, Sperry and Sperry (1995, 1996) found
that 2-year-olds produced more fantasy stories than factual stories of past experience. Both caregivers and
children enjoyed telling stories of escaping from Nicoudini, the Boogabear, Werewolf , or the spectral deer
who entered their home one misty evening. Families told
such stories easily and frequently, and children gathered
around to be thrilled by the imagined terror and to practice creating it themselves (p. 462; Sperry & Sperry,
1996). Boys efforts to tell fantasy stories received
much more support than girls, a finding that may help
to explain how men in this community get to be so good
at tall-bragging.
P. J. Miller, Fung, and their colleagues compared
middle-class Taiwanese families in Taipei and middleclass European American families in Chicago and found
that in both cases narrators interpreted young childrens
past experiences in interpersonal terms, situating the
child in relationship to other people (P. J. Miller et al.,
1997; P. J. Miller, Fung, & Mintz, 1996). At the same
time, personal storytelling differed dramatically: Tai-
wanese families were much more likely than their European American counterparts to tell stories in which they
cast the child protagonist as a transgressor. In keeping
with local beliefs that parents should take every opportunity to correct young children, many of these stories occurred immediately after the focal child had committed a
misdeed in the here and now. Families repeatedly invoked
moral and social rules, structured their stories to establish the childs misdeed as the point of the story, and concluded their stories with didactic codas. By contrast, the
European American families enacted a self-favorability
bias, erasing or downplaying childrens misdeeds. These
differences were also evident in parents beliefs about storytelling (P. J. Miller, Sandel, Liang, & Fung, 2001) and
in pretend play (Haight et al., 1999).
Wang, Leightman, and colleagues compared stories
elicited from Chinese and European American children
and reported similar findings. Chinese mothers from Beijing showed a greater concern with moral rules and behavioral standards when co-narrating stories with their
3-year-olds (Han, Leichtman, & Wang, 1998; Wang, Leichtman, & Davies, 2000), and 6-year-olds told stories
exhibited a parallel concern with moral correctness
(Wang & Leichtman, 2000).
Thus, although personal storytelling is a rich purveyor of values for European American children, the
version of personal storytelling practiced by the Taipei
and Beijing children leans more strongly in a didactic
direction, reflecting and reinforcing larger systems of
meaning that privilege moral education. Fung, Miller,
and Lin (2004) link this didactic bias to Confucian
discourses that valorize teaching, listening, and selfimprovement, discourses that continue to circulate in the
complex mix of local and global influences that are reshaping childrearing and education in contemporary
Taiwan. Li (2002) found that Chinese college students
viewed learning as a moral process, imbued with purpose, undertaken according to the virtues of diligence,
persistence, and humility, and encompassed by the
larger project of self-perfection, but American college
students saw learning as a neutral, mental process of
knowledge acquisition. The stories told by the Beijing
children and their mothers share a similar moral cast.
In sum, studies of childrens early storytelling in
families and communities demonstrate that this narrative genre is culturally differentiated from the beginning. Wherever personal storytelling is practiced with
young children, it takes on local color, absorbing values,
affective stances, and moral orientations. As children
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tion of being intelligent. Similarly, developing a self requires incorporating the communitys definitions of
being a self. Once self-development is considered in cultural context, it is almost immediately apparent that what
a self is and what it means to be an acceptable or good
self can vary dramatically from one cultural place to another (Markus & Kitayama, 1991b; Shweder & Bourne,
1984). As C. Taylor (1989) has argued:
My self-definition is understood as an answer to the question Who am I. And this question finds its original sense
in the interchange of speakers. I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the family tree, in social space,
in the geography of social status and functions. We first
learn our languages of moral and spiritual discernment by
being brought into an ongoing conversation by those who
bring us up. The meanings that the key words first had for
me are the meanings they have for us, for me and my conversation partners together. So I can only learn what
anger, love, anxiety, the aspiration to wholeness, and so on
are through my and others experience for us in some common place. (p. 35)
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of practice and institutions that give it an objective reality. This model is indeed powerful and practical for
characterizing selves in European American contexts,
but it is not the only model of how to be. Other ontologies and ideologies of human nature exist that are as yet
unrepresented in the literature on the development of
self. Analyzing the self in cultural context brings these
other ontologies and ideologies of self to light.
Another model of self contrasts significantly with individualism and is pervasive throughout Japan, China,
Korea, Southeast Asia as well as much of South America
and Africa (Triandis, 1989). According to this perspective, the self is not and cannot be separate from others or
the surrounding social context, but is experienced as interdependent with the social context: the self-inrelation-to-other(s) is focal in individual experience
(Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997; Triandis, 1989,
1990). According to Kondo (1990), the self is fundamentally interdependent with others from a Japanese
perspective, and understanding this Japanese sense of
self requires dissolving the self-other or self-society
boundary that forms such an obvious starting point in
European American formulations.
An important imperative in this alternative way of
being is to avoid becoming separate and autonomous
from others and, instead, to fit in with others, to fulfill
and create obligations and, in general, to become part of
various interpersonal relationships. Individuals are naturally understood to exist interdependently with others.
Sharing, interweaving, or intersubjectivity is the established cultural rule, not a mystical or magical project
(Ames, Dissanayake, & Kasulis, 1994). From this perspective, the individual is an open, communicating center of relationships and thus is intimately connected
with other selves. From a Confucian perspective, groups
are not separate from individuals. The nature of individuals is to work through others, and to reveal themselves,
they must be parts of groups such as families, communities, and nations (Tu, 1994). Moreover, sources of action
are found in a persons pattern of involvements with others, rather than internal mental states or processes.
An interdependent view of self does not, as might be
imagined from a European American perspective, result
in a merging of self and other, nor does it imply that people lack a sense of themselves as agents originating their
own actions. This interdependent view requires a high
degree of self-control, self-discipline, and agency to
effectively adjust oneself to various interpersonal contingencies. Control, however, is directed primarily to
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ticipation in the custom complexes characterizing European American and East Asian cultural contexts. We
aim to highlight the diverse selfways that develop from
such participation. Most of the recent research has focused on a contrast between patterns of cultural participation that construe the person as an independent,
autonomous entity and those that construe the person as
an interdependent part of a larger social unit. Some researchers suggest that variations on the interdependent
pattern characterize about 70% of the worlds population (Greenfield & Cocking, 1994; Triandis, 1989).
Selfways in Some European American Contexts
Speaking generally and probabilistically, the European
American middle-class cultural region is characterized
by selfways that promote independence of the self.
Being a European American person requires the individualizing of experience. A persons subjectivity is sensed
as a more-or-less integrated whole, configured by attributes and values distinct from others or societys (see
Geertz, 1984). The self is experienced as the individuals meaningful center and is understood to be rooted
in a set of internal attributes such as abilities, talents,
personality traits, preferences, subjective feeling states,
and attitudes. A major cultural task often mutually
pursued by caretakers, friends, and teachers is to continually, progressively individualize the child. As researchers become aware that conceptualizing the self as
an object and describing ones self in abstract psychological terms are culture-specific tendencies rather than
consequences of general cognitive development, they
can investigate practices that afford these tendencies.
Despite an explicit cultural emphasis on being nice
and caring and helpful (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Deci & Ryan, 1990), development
in the European American style is almost synonymous
with individualizing and decontextualizing the self.
Even as people seek and maintain interdependence with
otherssocial tasks that must be accomplished everywherethey will maintain a sense of boundedness, relatively greater separation from others, and being in
control. Caring, connecting, and relationality will likely
assume a more individually agentic form. Many cultural
practices that contribute to a sense of agency are so
much a part of everyday, domestic life that they are, for
all practical purposes, invisible.
In many English-speaking cultural communities, language use itself helps create the decontextualized, agentic
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Lebra (1994) argues that among the Japanese, empathy is a psychological mainstay and must be understood
if one is to comprehend almost any aspect of Japanese
behavior. Empathy (omoiyari) refers to the ability and
willingness to feel what others are feeling, to vicariously experience the pleasure or pain that they are undergoing, and to help them satisfy their wishes (Lebra,
1976, p. 38). Lebra sees this focus as diametrically opposed to the self-focus common in many European
American practices.
This emphasis on empathy implies that Japanese
selves should not be conceptualized as lacking individuality or a separate identity or that autonomy is unimportant in Japan (Greenfield & Cocking, 1994; Kim, 1987;
Oerter, Oerter, Agostiani, Kim, & Wibowo, 1996). It
does imply, however, that such empathic ways of being a
self, which explicitly highlight the state of being-inrelation, are different from selfways that emphasize and
reify the individual. In this particular Japanese mode of
being, subjectivity is sensed as interdependence with a
larger whole that includes both the person and others
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Differences by cultural context are especially evident with respect to emotions (Mesquita, 2001; Tsai,
Simenova, & Watanabe, 1999). In many middle-class
European American contexts, emotions constitute an
important aspect of the self and should be emphasized
and explained as one develops individuality. In Chinese
contexts, emotions result from the childs relations with
significant others and serve to both encourage proper
behavior in the child and reinforce a sense of connectedness (Wang, 2001b).
Studies of East Asian child-rearing and schooling
practices also suggest an emphasis on knowing ones
place, role, station, and duties in the social order, particularly in Chinese cultural contexts that explicitly value
self-improvement, order, and hierarchy. In a study of
Chinese American and European American mothers beliefs about what matters for raising children, Chao (1992)
found that Chinese American mothers stressed sensitivity to others expectations and the situation, while European American mothers emphasized nurturing the childs
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quired to perform complicated activities, such as arranging their lunch boxes or putting on their clothes for
outside activities, in the required way (Peak, 2001). As
a child, being part of a family or a school group often
means thinking about the social unit and your place in
it, and then doing what is proper for this situation. It
involves considerations such as What do my parents or
my peers want me to do? or Did I do what they
wanted me to do? In a Japanese cultural context, a
sense of self is developed by being finely attuned to the
expectations of others, by not being left out of their
sympathy, and by making sure you are part of the social process. Perceptually, cognitively, emotionally,
and motivationally, othersthe encompassing social
unit, the group and its standards of excellenceare
important. Thus, the most useful kind of information
about the self concerns your shortcomings, problems,
or negative features. Self-criticism is encouraged in all
societal settings from the classroom to the boardroom.
Cultural participation entails discovering what may be
lacking in your behavior and then closing the gap between the actual and expected behavior (Kitayama
et al., 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1994a, 1994b).
In Japan, a constant focus on social expectations and
meeting them appears to go hand in hand with a simultaneous focus on self-improvement and self-criticism.
In studies comparing self-improving and self-enhancing
motivations (Heine et al., 1999, 2001), Japanese participants who failed on an initial task persisted more on a
follow-up task than those who succeeded. In contrast,
North Americans who failed persisted less on a followup task. In Japanese contexts, failures are important and
diagnostic and thus serve to highlight where corrective
efforts are needed. The emphasis on self-improvement
as a virtue can be seen everywhere in Japanese life. An
advertisement urging Japanese workers to take vacations exhorted, Lets become masters at refreshing ourselves (New York Times, May 1995).
The desire for self-improvement has cognitive consequences: Many Japanese tend to focus on areas needing improvement while discounting positive aspects of
their performance. This tendency to discount the positive is often misinterpreted by European Americans as
self-depreciation, but in Japan it works very well to establish the person as a community member in good
standing. Humility might better describe this culturally
valued disposition. In contrast to European Americans,
who often focus on a self s positive features and
equate self-improvement with individual achievement,
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interdependently with the toddlers without caregiver intervention, suggesting that among the Mayans developing
autonomy is associated with understanding that one is an
interdependent member of the community and is not as
completely autonomous as infants are allowed to be.
Only recently have investigators began to describe
how contexts other than European American and East
Asian ones influence the constitution of self. For example, a review of parenting among U.S. Latino families
finds that despite considerable within-group heterogeneity, Latino parents tend to emphasize the main cultural
values of respeto and familismo (Harwood, Leyendecker,
Carlson, Asencio, & Miller, 2002). Respeto refers to
maintaining proper demeanor, which involves knowing
the proper decorum required in a given situation with
people of a particular age, sex, and social status. Familismo refers to a belief system linking loyalty, reciprocity, and solidarity toward members of the family, which
is seen as an extension of the self (Corts, 1995).
African American parenting, according to a review
by McAdoo (2002), must often address persistent issues
that African American children confront, such as devaluation of their own worth and future potential, inadequate financial resources, and the challenge of teaching
children about race. Moreover, in African American
contexts maintaining communal family traditions is essential. Coresidential extended families and their support systems are common and regarded as an important
survival system for African American families (Hatchett, Cochran, & Jackson, 1991).
Research in cultural psychology challenges some generalizations about self and self-development and significantly strengthens others. In the next decade, these shifts
will likely result in new paradigms for studying the self.
Recent theoretical debates and discussions in psychology
and anthropology aim to clarify and elaborate the general propositions that the self is (a) constituted in interaction with others, ( b) collectively constructed through
sociocultural participation, and (c) a product of history
(see Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this
volume). Each of these propositions reflects a central
claim of cultural psychology, namely, that processes of
self-functioning encompass not only a single psychology
but also multiple psychologies.
The Self Is Constituted in Interaction with Others
It is an old idea that one cannot be a self by ones self.
Although life in the middle-class European American
cultural region has highlighted the conceptual self, studies of self in other cultural locations underscore the im-
portance of what Neisser (1988, 1991) terms the interpersonal self. Selves are constituted and develop in interaction with specific others (J. M. Baldwin, 1911; M. W.
Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Cooley, 1902; Hallowell,
1955; Ingold, 1991; Rosaldo, 1984; Shweder & LeVine,
1984). Echoing Mead (1934) and the early symbolic interactionists, the self literature includes a growing appreciation of the dynamic, socially constructed nature of
self. This idea has the appeal of potentially bridging the
gap between focusing primarily on the individual as a
cultural learner (Tomasello et al., 1993) versus on the
cultural collective of which the individual is an interdependent part (Cole, 1995). This synthesis promises to get
the person back in the practice and the practice back in
the person.
Efforts to understand the mutual constitution of self
and other in the development of self, or just how it is that
selves and others make each other up, are ongoing. Outside of middle-class European American cultural communities many people prefer crowded living conditions
and regard the physical presence of others, especially
family members, as essential to mental health and wellbeing. Peak (1987), writing about Japan, claims that becoming a person involves learning to appreciate the
pleasures of group life and living in human society.
Similarly, Ochs (1988) reports that Samoans are selfconscious about their need for others to acknowledge
and sympathize with them. Menons (1995) interviews
with Oriya Hindu women living in extended joint family
households reveal that in local moral worlds steeped in
an ethics of community the idea of living alone while
sane and happy is almost a contradiction in terms (see
also Kakar, 1978).
In much European American research on the development of self, others become relevant when selves
learn to take the perspectives of these others and get inside their heads (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995), or as
specific relationships are forged with particular others.
It is increasingly evident, however, that others have a
pervasive impact on any persons psychological development throughout life in all cultural contexts. Even prior
to birth, individuals are immersed in social relations and
activities. Human infants only become selves through
their engagement in particular, culturally organized settings (Markus et al., 1997; Weisner, 1982, 1984, 1987).
Ever more investigators now assume that mutual involvement of self and others is so fundamental to human
functioning that others are automatically perceived as
relevant to ones sense of self. Gopnik (1993) refers to
an innate bridge or intersubjectivity between self and
others. Infants are responsive to others affective expressions, and thus others are immediately expected,
implicated, and involved in ones becoming a self (see
also Ingold, 1991).
The Self Develops through
Sociocultural Participation
A cultural psychology perspective places considerable
emphasis on what Kitayama and colleagues (Kitayama,
Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1995; Markus
et al., 1997) term the collective construction of self. The
concept is that selves develop in a dynamic, recursive
process in which sociocultural participation in a given
cultural system of meanings, practices, and institutions
affords characteristic tendencies of the self that further
serve to integrate the person into the meanings and
practices of a given cultural community (see also Bourdieu, 1972; Giddens, 1984; Martin, Nelson, & Tobach,
1995). This perspective emphasizes that from their earliest moments, selves arise from being a person in particular worlds. From a childs earliest days, partial,
incomplete, rudimentary gestures and vocalizations are
infused with specific meanings and significances crucial to enabling the child to become a progressively
more competent partner (Bruner, 1993, p. 532). Children are immediately engaged in the settings of daily
life and are subject to the specific normative expectations and the institutional entailments of what Super
and Harkness (1986) label a developmental niche.
People always live in culture-specific ways. To live otherwise is impossible.
Super and Harknesss theorizing is one of many attempts to resolve the tension between psychologys excesses in viewing development as natural growth or an
unfolding of abilities in stages and anthropologys excesses in viewing development as cultural molding or
conditioning. Super and Harkness claim that a childs
developmental experience is regulated by (a) the settingsphysical and socialin which the child lives; ( b)
the customs of child care and child rearing; and (c) the
mentality of the caretakers. These three mutually interactive subsystems function together with other elements
of the large culture and environment to constitute a
culture-specific child.
Cultural psychologys approach to the study of self
does not deny the individuality, idiosyncrasy, and
uniqueness of the self observable in even the most tightknit and coherent collectives. Children do not become
general people; they become particular persons or selves.
One of the most significant facts about us, writes Geertz
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(1973a), may finally be that we all begin with the natural equipment to live a thousand kinds of life but end in
the end having lived only one (p. 45). Every person participates in combinations of significant cultural settings
or niches, which in contemporary American society
could include specific groups, such as the family or
workplace, as well as contexts defined by ethnicity, religion, profession, social class, gender, birth cohort, and
sexual orientation. Some of the remarkable variation
among people arises at least in part because people are
unlikely to participate in identical configurations of
group memberships. Even those living in similar configurations of cultural contexts will diverge in the specifics
of their everyday, symbolically mediated experiences
and due to prior, innate, received, or temperamental differences in their sense of self will differentially attend
to, seek out, elaborate, or reflect some features of these
experiences and not others. Moreover, participation or
engagement in the activities of a given cultural setting
can assume divergent forms. Cultural participation can
be straightforward and unquestioning, resistant, or
ironic. Consequently, there is little danger that people of
the same sociocultural and historical niches will be
clones of one another. Between-group differences do not
imply within-group homogeneity.
The Self as a Historical Product
A cultural psychology approach to the development of
self has led researchers to appreciate Bourdieus idea
that processes of self are history turned into nature
(1991, p. 7). Many Western researchers focusing on the
self have participated in their discipline long enough
now to have observed historical change in the European
American cultural zone in the natural and normative
self. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a need
to discover the true self and feelings. Currently, there is
the need to say no not yes to experience and to create the
proper self. Many current self researchers were themselves raised according to the dictates of Dr. Spock but
as parents find his prescriptions rigid and inappropriate.
Similarly, American educators note that requiring children to be happy and feel good about themselves has
produced a generation of children with high self-esteem
and no basic skills. Programs under development aim to
raise the educational expectations for American children and to replace an emphasis on positive selfevaluation with an emphasis on building specific skills
(Damon, 1995).
General societal imperatives of the way to be
promulgated by the advertising industry and media have
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A further possible circumstance has to do with repetitions of the same message. Repetition in itself, however,
is a concept still in need of unpacking. It may take the
form of everyone delivering the same message. There are,
for example, experimental studies showing that consensusespecially consensus about the affective significance of a particular viewtends to limit the degree of
monitoring for exceptions (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994).
Repetition may also take the form of the same message
emerging from several practices. Involvement in Westernstyle schooling, for example, is low among Samoan children. Both adults outside school and the nature of school
practices in Samoa, however, all convey the same message: the irrelevance of school for the childrens current
or future ways of living (Watson-Gegeo, 1993).
In specifying activities and forms of participation or
nonparticipation, any approach to development that emphasizes the importance of activities needs to move toward distinctions among them. Activities have been
distinguished by, for example, where they take place, the
people who are present, and the psychology of the people present (e.g., their views of how development takes
place; e.g., Super & Harkness, 1986). They have also
been distinguished by the tools or artifacts that are
available or used (e.g., Gauvain, 2001), the patterns of
accompanying talk (Gutirrez, 2002), and the forms and
impacts of repetition (e.g., Hatano & Inagaki, 1992).
Practices, for example, are activities where repetition,
by oneself or others, gives rise to the sense of the natural or proper ways to act (e.g., Goodnow et al., 1995; P. J.
Miller & Goodnow, 1995).
Activities may differ also in the extent to which they
allow various forms of participation. We draw particular attention to this aspect. One reason for doing so is
that changes in participation have been proposed as
promising ways of characterizing the forms that development takes. They may then characterize both the
shape and the bases of development. Another is that descriptions of participation build on descriptions of activities as joint and on distinctions among them as how
two or more people contribute to a task.
Currently, the most familiar form of attention to
changes in participation revolves around teacher-learner
or expert-novice relationships. Prompted, especially by
Vygotskian theory, the course of development is often
seen as one in which the expert provides guidance and
structures the task in ways that allow the novice to take
over more and more responsibility for the task.
That description of a shift is a rich starting point, but
it needs, several expansions that involve (a) the kinds of
relationships considered, ( b) the steps or processes involved, and (c) the nature of nonparticipation.
On the first score (the nature of relationships), we
need to continue questioning the benign and cooperative
quality presented as typical of teacher-learner relationships. Teachers or experts are not always eager to give
up their control and novices are not always eager to learn
or to take on responsibility (Goodnow, 1990b). Teacherlearner relationships are also not the only forms of relationship that can apply. In some situations, for example,
people function or are expected to function more as a
team. In still others, one person (e.g., a concert pianist)
may seem to take the only active part. Even here, however, the audience listens with expectations about what
will be played and how pieces will be played. The performer will take those expectations into account and
also try to persuade the audience that the choice of
pieces or of interpretation is a reasonable or exciting one
(Oura & Hatano, 2001).
For expansions on the second score (specifying steps
or processes in participation), we turn to proposals from
Rogoff and from H. Clark. Rogoff (2003) describes participation as involving two processes. In one, people
seek to achieve some mutual understanding: for example, some mutual understanding of what each knows,
what each seeks, what each understands the task to be.
In the other, they seek to structure what each will do.
They offer choices, invite some actions rather than others, or shape events so that some actions become more
likely than others. In effect, they engage in some mutual structuring of participation (Rogoff, 2003, p. 287).
H. Clarks (1996) analysis starts from conversation or
language in use as a prime example of joint activity.
His analysis is not developmentally oriented; however, it
does suggest several new directions for developmental research. In any joint activity, Clark (1996) argues, we
should ask what each person contributes and is expected
to contribute, what they regard as their shared task, how
they go about that task, and when some perceived limit to
what they can do is reached. In a conversation between a
telephone operator and a caller, for example, one person
seeks information and the other provides it. Each person
checks from time to time that the other has heard what
was said, has heard accurately, that the information provided is what was sought and has been understood (in
essence, are you with me?). Moves toward establishing
mutual understanding (Rogoff, 2003) are not only a way
of describing what people do but also an indication of a
particular competence whose acquisition we might well
seek to trace.
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What are the specific meanings of such phrases, especially in relation to cognitive development? To answer
that question, we divide a large body of material into
two parts, varying in their starting points. The first
starts from several descriptions of contexts and asks
what do these imply for the shape or course of development? The second starts from several descriptions of
cognitive development and asks how do social or cultural contexts enter into these pictures?
Both parts start with the recognition that any description of either term (context or individual development) carries implications for the nature of the other.
Ecological descriptions of context (e.g., the world as a
set of nested circles starting from the home and working
outwards into parts of society) carry with them the connotation of development as a journey, with the individual
discovering routes, acquiring navigational skills, or
finding helpful guides. Descriptions of the world as a
stage in which we all play roles or learn our place carry
with them the implication that development involves acquiring effective ways of self-presentation or emotional
management.
To take the reverse direction, descriptions of development as coming to make sense of events or to discover
regularities imply a world that is not immediately comprehensible, a world in which order or structure is hidden beneath a shifting surface appearance. Descriptions
of development as coming to make effective use of the
symbols or artifacts available imply worlds in which
various tools are available, with some probably more accessible or more promoted than others, varying over
groups or across time. Descriptions as activities and
changing forms of participation imply worlds that vary
in the opportunities they offer for participation or for
establishing routines in what one does. In effect, one
way of mapping part of the person /context universe always suggests a way of mapping the other. Working from
such cross-mapping is likely to be more productive than
trying to link analyses that use quite separate dimensions for the description of persons and contexts (Goodnow, 2004a, 2004b, in press).
Starting from Descriptions of Contexts
There are by now many descriptions of contexts: a variety especially brought out in a review by Cooper and
Denner (1998; see also Cole, Chapter 21, this Handbook,
Volume 2).
As an opening step, we distinguish between descriptions by content and descriptions by quality. Descriptions of a culture as shared meanings and practices, or
as a warehouse of narratives, for example, place their
emphases on content. Descriptions of contexts as always
changing, or as multiple and contested, place their emphasis on quality.
The descriptions we choose for particular comment
are far from exhaustive, and the selection leaves us with
a sense of regretted omissions. We would have liked, for
example, to give more space to descriptions of contexts
that emphasize opportunities for children and families
to establish the routine, everyday activities that are seen
as so crucial to development (e.g., Gallimore, Weisner,
Guthrie, Bernheimer, & Nihira, 1993; Weisner, 2002).
The descriptions chosen for closer comment, however,
strike us as offering some particular shifts in the way we
think about the shape and course of development and as
containing some particular gaps.
We start with some examples of context descriptions.
The first two are descriptions of cultural contexts as
linked practices and warehouses of narratives. For both,
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to indifference, disdain, or scorn. Among cultural psychologists, Wertsch (1991) best exemplifies this approach to culture. More broadly, this concept is central
to the work of Bakhtin, who noted the ways in which
novelists such as Rabelais or Joyce broke the pattern of
previous narratives: the one by covering topics previously regarded as not proper topics, the other by changes
in structure, even at the level of sentences (Kristeva,
1980, provides a brief and readable account). In time,
the argument continues, some ways of breaking up past
patterns become taken up by others. They then become
part of what Valsiner (1994) has described as a spiral of
influence that alters the nature of what is available to
draw from or is regarded as a reasonable selection:
Novels, we would add, are not the only kinds of texts or
narratives that have attracted this kind of attention and
that raise questions about aspects of selection or transformation. Martin-Barbero (1993), for example, is one
scholar who has brought a similar style of analysis to the
way cultural expressions in the form of art, music, film, or
television spread from one culture to another. It is not the
case, he argues, that cultures in areas such as South America are over-run or swamped by the cultural expressions of the North. What occurs instead is a process of
selection, utilization, and adaptation.
ers by the style of dress, with the most obvious dress signal being that of girls from Islamic families wearing a
veil or headscarf. Teased by another child for wearing
something so different, the reply by one girl was Its
part of my tradition, a reply taken from the schools
orientationconveyed in many lessonsof respecting
others traditions. The shared meaning, in effect, was
used as a way of justifying an unshared practice. The selection of the reply, and its quick effect, illustrate aspects of shared meanings and practices for which other
developmental examples might be sought.
Contexts as Multiple and Contested. No society
is monolithic. In most industrialized societies, for example, there are usually to be found more than one religion,
political party, or form of schooling, more than one
class, and more than one country of origin. Some of the
alternate forms may be known by adjectives that imply
their minority status (e.g., alternative medicine, alternative schooling, or independent film producers). It is not
only the presence of variety that matters but also the
way in which these several segments compete or negotiate with one another. The people in one group, for example, may regard the people in another as best avoided,
kept at arms distance, or suppressed. Where these actions do not achieve ones purposes, some form of negotiation or takeover needs to occur. Churches may unite,
union activists may be pushed into management, or independent film producers may be co-opted into studio
affiliations and productions.
This way of viewing cultures is widespread in the area
often known as cultural studies (the work cited by MartinBarbero, 1993, is from this field). Part of its attraction for
the study of development is that it leads us away from a
view of culture or context as a state or thing. The emphasis
falls instead on the presence of various cultural groups, on
their perceptions of each other, and on their relationships
with each other. In addition, recognition of the extent to
which encounters with other people or other positions are
usually controlled is prompted.
Control over access to knowledge is a long-standing
theme in sociological analyses (e.g., Bourdieu &
Passeron, 1977; Foucault, 1980). In developmental studies, it is represented by studies comparing the understanding of animal biology that develops when children
can vary their approaches to feeding and care against
being restricted to the teachers prescriptive routines
(Hatano & Inagaki, 1986). In a more social fashion, it is
represented by questions about the nature of childrens
encounters with other people. Parents may act in cocoon
775
776
1998). First, in privileged domains, humans are genetically prepared to acquire knowledge systems that deal
with important aspects of the world. Second, in nonprivileged domains, development relies on general learning
mechanisms (Keil, 1984) or module acquisition modules
(Sperber, 2002). In these domains, cognitive development is usually conceptualized as the gaining of expertise. In both domains, sociocultural perspectives have
something to offer. Because the two kinds of domain
have been conceptualized differently, suggestions from
cultural psychology vary from one to the other.
Nonprivileged Domains: Cognitive Development
as Expertise. Traditionally, expertise means the accumulation of rich and well-structured domain knowledge, consisting of chunks that can readily be used
(Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). There is also wide agreement among cognitive researchers that gaining expertise
requires years of experience in solving problems in the
domain, carried out with concentration and often taking
the form of deliberate practice (Ericsson, 1996).
What does cultural psychology add to these characterizations? A central addition, as we see it, is the elaboration of what expertise consists of and how it is acquired.
We begin with the argument that through repeated
participation in culturally organized practices, both
children and lay adults acquire the skills and knowledge
needed to perform competently in those practices
(Goodnow et al., 1995). To this we add, first, what matters is not only the amount of time spent in repetition but
also the nature of what is repeated. Studies by Oura and
Hatano (2001) with a group of nonprofessional pianists
bring out this point especially. All of these pianists had
started piano lessons at 6 years of age or younger. Some,
however, had reached a junior expert level. Others were
still at a more novice level. Oura and Hatano (2001)
asked both to practice a short piece of music. Those who
had stayed at the novice level tried only to perform accurately and smoothly. Those who had reached the junior expert level checked and refined their performance
from the perspective of an audience in mind. In effect,
the two differed in the practice in which they had engaged. The less successful students had expected to play
for the teacher who would evaluate how smoothly and
how accurately they played. In contrast, the successful
students had practiced for playing in public, with an eye
to ways of creating their own expression.
Second, we add that the process of gaining expertise
is assisted by other people and artifacts: Novices are not
777
778
CONCLUSION
It is the hope of all those who welcome the return of
cultural psychology as a vibrant research enterprise
that more and more social scientists from various
home disciplines (psychology, anthropology, linguistics, sociology) will become developmental experts on
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791
792
CHAPTER 14
OVERVIEW 795
DEFINING PROPERTIES OF THE
BIOECOLOGICAL MODEL 796
Proposition I 797
Proposition II 798
FROM THEORY TO RESEARCH DESIGN:
OPERATIONALIZING THE
BIOECOLOGICAL MODEL 799
Developmental Science in the Discovery Mode 801
Different Paths to Different Outcomes: Dysfunction
versus Competence 803
The Role of Experiments in the Bioecological Model 808
HOW DO PERSON CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCE
LATER DEVELOPMENT? 810
Force Characteristics as Shapers of Development 810
Resource Characteristics of the Person as Shapers
of Development 812
Demand Characteristics of the Person as
Developmental Inf luences 812
THE ROLE OF FOCUS OF ATTENTION IN
PROXIMAL PROCESSES 813
The bioecological model, together with its corresponding research designs, is an evolving theoretical system
for the scientific study of human development over time
(Bronfenbrenner, 2005). In the bioecological model, development is defined as the phenomenon of continuity
and change in the biopsychological characteristics of
human beings, both as individuals and as groups. The
phenomenon extends over the life course, across succes-
794
combined, along with new elements, into a more complex and more dynamic structure.
The transition in the form and content of the model
actually took place over an extended period of time, an
expression that will become all too familiar to the reader
(Bronfenbrenner, 2005). The transition from a focus on
the environment to a focus on processes was first introduced in the context of Bronfenbrenners unpublished
lectures, colloquium presentations, and contributions
to symposia. Not until 1986, did reference to an emergent new model first appear in print (Bronfenbrenner,
1986b). The following extended excerpt conveys both its
spirit and intended substance. Because both of these attributes are relevant to the gradual evolution of the
model to its present form, we quote from the 1986 statement at some length:
It is now more than a decade ago that, being somewhat
younger, I presumed to challenge the then-prevailing conventions of our field by describing the developmental research of the day as the study of the strange behavior of
children in strange situations for the briefest possible period of time (Bronfenbrenner, 1974). Instead, I argued (as
if it were simply a matter of choice), we should be studying
development in its ecological context; that is, in the actual
environments in which human beings lived their lives. I
then proceeded to outline, in a series of publications, a conceptual framework for analyzing development in context,
and to offer concrete examples of how various elements of
the schema might be applied both to past studies and to
studies yet-to-come. I also emphasized the scientific and
practical benefits of a closer linkage, in both directions, between developmental research and public policy (Bronfenbrenner, 1974, 1975, 1977a, 1977b, 1979a, 1979b, 1981).
Now, a dozen years later, one might think that I have good
reason to rest content. Studies of children and adults in
real-life settings, with real-life implications, are now commonplace in the research literature on human development,
both in the United States and, as this volume testifies, in
Europe as well. This scientific development is taking place,
I believe, not so much because of my writings, but rather
because the notions I have been promulgating are ideas
whose time has come. . . .
Clearly, if one regards such scientific developments as
desirable, there are grounds for satisfaction. Yet, along
with feelings of gratification, I must confess to some discontent. My disquiet derives from two complementary
concerns. The first pertains to one of the main roads that
contemporary research has taken; the second, to some
more promising pathways that are being neglected.
Overview
What followed was an early version of the newly evolving theoretical framework, but the purpose of the present chapter is better served by presenting the model in
its current, albeit still-evolving, form now called the
bioecological model. The term evolving highlights that
the model, along with its corresponding research designs, has undergone a process of development during its
life course (Bronfenbrenner, 2005). The bioecological
model addresses two closely related but fundamentally
different developmental processes, each taking place
over time. The first process defines the phenomenon
under investigationcontinuity and change in the
biopsychological characteristics of human beings. The
second focuses on the development of the scientific
toolstheoretical models and corresponding research
designs required for assessing continuity and change.
These two tasks cannot be carried out independently,
for they are the joint product of emerging and converging ideas, based on both theoretical and empirical
groundsa process called developmental science in the
discovery mode (Bronfenbrenner & Evans 2000,
pp. 9991000). In the more familiar verification mode,
the aim is to replicate previous findings in other settings
to make sure that the findings still apply. By contrast, in
the discovery mode, the aim is to fulfill two broader but
interrelated objectives:
1. Devising new alternative hypotheses and corresponding research designs that not only question existing
results but also yield new, more differentiated, more
precise, replicable research findings and, thereby,
produce more valid scientific knowledge.
2. Providing scientific bases for the design of effective
social policies and programs that counteract newly
emerging developmentally disruptive influences.
This has been an explicit objective of the bioecological model from its earliest beginnings. To orient the
795
OVERVIEW
We begin with an exposition of the defining properties
of the model, which involves four principal components
and the dynamic, interactive relationships among them.
The first of these, which constitutes the core of the
model, is Process. More specifically, this construct encompasses particular forms of interaction between organism and environment, called proximal processes, that
operate over time and are posited as the primary mechanisms producing human development. However, the
power of such processes to influence development is
presumed, and shown, to vary substantially as a function of the characteristics of the developing Person, of
the immediate and more remote environmental Contexts,
and the Time periods, in which the proximal processes
take place.
The sections that follow examine in greater detail each
of the three remaining defining properties of the model,
beginning with the biopsychological characteristics of
the Person. This domain was given sequential priority to
fill a recognized gap in earlier prototypes of the ecological model. Thus, at midstage in the development of the
present model, Bronfenbrenner criticized its theoretical
predecessors and acknowledged his share of responsibility for failing to deliver on an empirical promise:
Existing developmental studies subscribing to an ecological model have provided far more knowledge about the nature of developmentally relevant environments, near
and far, than about the characteristics of developing individuals, then and now. . . . The criticism I just made also
applies to my own writings. . . . Nowhere in the 1979
monograph, nor elsewhere until today, does one find a
parallel set of structures for conceptualizing the characteristics of the developing person. (Bronfenbrenner,
1989a, p. 188)
Three types of Person characteristics are distinguished as most influential in shaping the course of
future development through their capacity to affect
the direction and power of proximal processes through
the life course. First, dispositions can set proximal
processes in motion in a particular developmental
domain and continue to sustain their operation. Next,
796
bioecological resources of ability, experience, knowledge, and skill are required for the effective functioning of proximal processes at a given stage of
development. Finally, demand characteristics invite or
discourage reactions from the social environment
that can foster or disrupt the operation of proximal
processes. The differentiation of these three forms
leads to their combination in patterns of Person structure that can further account for differences in the direction and power of resultant proximal processes and
their developmental effects.
These new formulations of qualities of the person
that shape his or her future development have had the
unanticipated effect of further differentiating, expanding, and integrating the original 1979 conceptualization of the environment in terms of nested systems
ranging from micro to macro (Bronfenbrenner, 1979b).
For example, the three types of Person characteristics
previously outlined are also incorporated into the definition of the microsystem as characteristics of parents,
relatives, close friends, teachers, mentors, coworkers,
spouses, or others who participate in the life of the developing person on a fairly regular basis over extended
periods of time.
The bioecological model also introduces an even
more consequential domain into the structure of the microsystem that emphasizes the distinctive contribution
to development of proximal processes involving interaction not with people but with objects and symbols.
Even more broadly, concepts and criteria are introduced
that differentiate between those features of the environment that foster versus interfere with the development of
proximal processes. Particularly significant in the latter
sphere is the growing hecticness, instability, and chaos
in the principal settings in which human competence
and character are shapedin the family, child-care
arrangements, schools, peer groups, and neighborhoods.
The latter theme speaks to the fourth and final defining property of the bioecological model and the one that
moves it farthest beyond its predecessorthe dimension
of Time. The 1979 Volume scarcely mentions the term,
whereas in the current formulation, it has a prominent
place at three successive levels: (1) micro-, (2) meso-,
and (3) macro-. Microtime refers to continuity versus
discontinuity in ongoing episodes of proximal process.
Mesotime is the periodicity of theses episodes across
broader time intervals, such as days and weeks. Finally,
Macrotime focuses on the changing expectations and
events in the larger society, both within and across gen-
erties but also the way in which the properties are subjectively experienced by the person living in that environment. This equal emphasis on an experiential as well
as an objective view springs neither from an antipathy to
behaviorist concept nor from a predilection for existential philosophic foundations but is dictated simply by the
fact that very few of the external influences significantly affecting human behavior and development can
be described solely in objective physical conditions and
events (Bronfenbrenner & Evans 2000; Bronfenbrenner
& Morris 1998).
Critical to the foregoing formulation is the word
solely. In the bioecological model, both objective and
subjective elements are posited as driving the course of
human development; neither alone is presumed sufficient. Moreover, these elements do not always operate in
the same direction. It is therefore important to understand the nature of each of these two dynamic forces,
beginning on the phenomenological or experiential side.
Both of the terms are relevant because, while related to
each other, they are typically applied to somewhat different spheres. Experiential is more often used in relation to cognitive development and pertains mainly to
changes in how the environment is perceived at successive stages of the life course, beginning in early infancy
and proceeding through childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and, ultimately, old age.
By contrast, experience pertains more to the realm of
feelingsanticipations, forebodings, hopes, doubts, or
personal beliefs. Feelings, emerging in early childhood
and continuing through life, are characterized by both
stability and change: They can relate to self or to others,
especially to family, friends, and other close associates.
They can also apply to the activities in which we engage;
for example, those that we most or least like to do. But the
most distinctive feature of such experiential equalities is
that they are emotionally and motivationally loaded, encompassing both love and hate, joy and sorrow, curiosity
and boredom, desire and revulsion, often with both polarities existing at the same time but usually in differing degrees. A significant body of research evidence indicates
that such positive and negative subjective forces, evolving
in the past, can also contribute in powerful ways to shaping the course of development in the future (Bronfenbrenner & Evans 2000; Bronfenbrenner & Morris 1998).
But these forces are not the only powerful ones at
work, other forces are more objective in nature. This
presence does not mean, however, that the forces are
necessarily either more or less influential, mainly be-
797
cause the two sets of forces are interdependent and affect each other. Like their subjective counterparts, these
more objective factors also rely on their assessment of
corresponding theoretical models and associated research designs, which evolved over time. These more
objective relationships are documented propositions
presented later (see too Bronfenbrenner & Evans 2000;
Bronfenbrenner & Morris 1998). The first proposition
specifies the theoretical model, and provides concrete
examples; the second foreshadows a corresponding research design for their assessment.
However, before proceeding with formal definitions,
it may be useful to point out that traditionally such phenomena as parent-child interactionor, more generally,
the behavior of others toward the developing person
have been treated under the more inclusive category of
the environment. In the bioecological model, a critical
distinction is made between the concepts of environment and process, with the latter not only occupying a
central position, but also having a meaning that is quite
specific. The construct appears in Proposition I stipulating the defining properties of the model. To place its
meaning in context, we cite Proposition II as well.
Proposition I
Especially in its early phases, but also throughout the life
course, human development takes place through processes
of progressively more complex reciprocal interaction between an active, evolving biopsychological human organism
and the persons, objects, and symbols in its immediate external environment. To be effective, the interaction must
occur on a fairly regular basis over extended periods of
time. Such enduring forms of interaction in the immediate
environment are referred to as proximal processes. Examples of enduring patterns of proximal process are found in
feeding or comforting a baby, playing with a young child,
child-child activities, group or solitary play, reading, learning new skills, athletic activities, problem solving, caring
for others in distress, making plans, performing complex
tasks, and acquiring new knowledge and know-how.
For the younger generation, participation in such interactive processes over time generates the ability, motivation, knowledge, and skill to engage in such activities
both with others and on your own. For example, through
progressively more complex interaction with their parents, children increasingly become agents of their own
development, to be sure only in part.
798
Proximal processes are posited as the primary engines of development (see Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume; Tobach,
1981; Tobach & Schneirla, 1968). A second defining
property, the fourfold source of these dynamic forces is
identified in Proposition II.
Proposition II
The form, power, content, and direction of the proximal
processes effecting development vary systematically as a
joint function of the characteristics of the developing person, the environmentboth immediate and more remote
in which the processes are taking place, the nature of the
developmental outcomes under consideration, and the social continuities and changes occurring over time through
the life course and the historical period during which the
person has lived.
Propositions I and II are theoretically interdependent and subject to empirical test. An operational
research design that permits their simultaneous investigation is referred to as the Process-Person-ContextTime (PPCT) model.
Characteristics of the person actually appear twice
in the bioecological modelfirst as one of the four elements influencing the form, power, content, and direction
of the proximal process, and then again as developmental
outcomesqualities of the developing person that
emerge at a later point in time as the result of the joint,
interactive, mutually reinforcing effects of the four principal antecedent components of the model. In sum, in the
bioecological model, the characteristics of the person
function both as an indirect producer and as a product of
development (see Lerner, 1982, 2002; Lerner & BuschRossnagel, 1981).
Finally, because in the bioecological model the concept of proximal process has a specific meaning, it is
important that its distinctive properties be made explicit. For present purposes, the following features of
the construct are especially noteworthy:
1. For development to occur, the person must engage in
an activity.
2. To be effective, the activity must take place on a
fairly regular basis, over an extended period of
time. For example, this means that with young children, a weekend of doing things with Mom or Dad
799
800
12
Poor Process
Good Process
10
8
6
4
2
0
10
0
High SES Mid SES Low SES
Age 2
Age 4
801
examples of the relation between theoretical and operational models now before us, we can address what turns
out to be a complex and consequential question: What is
the function of research design in the bioecological
model? The first point to be made in this regard is that the
main function is not the usual one of testing for statistical
significance. Rather, the research design must provide for
carrying out an equally essential and necessarily prior
stage of the scientific process: that of developing hypotheses of suf ficient explanatory power and precision to warrant being subjected to empirical test. We are dealing with
science in the discovery mode rather than in the mode of
verification. In this earlier phase, theory plays an even
more critical role. From its very beginnings, the bioecological model, through its successive reformulations, represents a sustained effort to meet this scientific need.
What are the appropriate characteristics of research
designs for developmental science in the discovery
mode? Finding an answer to this question is complicated
by the fact that, compared with the physical and natural
sciences, developmental science is admittedly still in an
earlier stage of development. Furthermore, because its
scope falls between the natural and the social sciences,
the discovery process must to some extent be adapted to
the requirements of both. Perhaps in part for these reasons, we were unable to find any discussion of the issue
in the developmental literature. Under these circumstances, we concluded that the best we could do was to
try to make explicit the characteristics of the research
designs that had been employed over the past several
years to arrive at successively more differentiated formulations of the bioecological model.
These design characteristics depend on the constructs, and the possible relations between them, that
are posited in the theoretical model at its present stage
of development. Both the constructs, and the possible interrelationships, have been indicated in Propositions I
and II, but as yet they appear in a relatively undifferentiated form. For example, the directions of the expected
effects of Person and Context on proximal processes for
different types of outcomes are not specified. The reason for such lack of specificity is that a more precise
formulation could not be deduced either from the theory
in its present, still evolving state, or induced from any
already available data (at least, to our knowledge).
Given these limitations, we concluded that an appropriate design strategy at this point in the discovery process
could be one that involves a series of progressively more
differentiated formulations and corresponding data
802
dismissing findings as Type I errors is further compounded by the phenomenon of magnification of early
environmental differences over time. Thus, as illustrated by the escalating effects of proximal processes
shown in Figure 14.2, changes in outcome associated
with a proximal process at Time 1 can be quite small and
nonsignificant statistically. Yet, as shown, they can be
powerful predictors of a marked increase in developmental outcome several years later (in the likely event
that the process continued to be maintained over the intervening period).
At this point, a methodological note is in order. Statistical models widely used for the purpose of hypothesis testing are often ill-suited as operational models for
developmental investigations in the discovery mode.
This is particularly true for models that control statistically solely for linear relationships among the factors
in the research design to obtain an estimate of the independent contribution of each factor in the statistical
model to the outcome under investigation. The validity
of such analyses rests on what in mathematical statistics is referred to as the assumption of homogeneity of
regression. To illustrate the assumption in its simplest
general case: given a dependent variable y and two independent variables x1 and x2, then the relation between x1 and y must be the same at all levels of x2. This
assumption is often not met in developmental data. For
example, when applied to the analysis shown in Figure
14.2, it would require that the relation between proximal process and frequency of problem behaviors be the
same at every social class level, which is not the case.
Nor is this requirement likely to hold with respect to
any combination of the four defining properties of the
bioecological model. As Bronfenbrenner stated in his
1979 monograph, In ecological research, the principal
main ef fects are likely to be interactions (p. 38, italics
in original).
Any research design based on a bioecological model
must allow for the possibility of such interactions. However, it is also essential, especially in the discovery
phase, that the particular interactions to be examined be
theoretically based, and thatif possibletheir anticipated direction and form be specified in advance so that
discrepancies between theoretical expectation and observed reality can be readily recognized and thus provide the basis for a next step in the typically slow,
iterative process of seeking more differentiated formulations that merit further exploration both on theoretical
and empirical grounds. In each case, the new formula-
The term dysfunction refers to the recurrent manifestation of difficulties on the part of the developing person in maintaining control and integration of behavior
803
804
6.9
Mother and
Father
Mother and
Stepfather
5.9
SingleParent Mother
Mean
Mean
4.9
Mean
3.9
2.9
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 M 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 M 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 M
1 3 5 7 9 11
1 3 5 7 9 11
1 3 5 7 9 11
6 = Mostly Bs
7 = 1/2 As, 1/2 Bs
8 = Mostly As
The degree of curvilinearity is measured by the corresponding regression coefficients and not by difference in the
length of each curve from top to bottom. The latter is determined by empty cells in the scatter plot below or above which
entries for both monitoring level and GPA were available.
805
serve to reduce and act as a buffer against effects of disadvantaged and disruptive environments.
806
Boys
Girls
Mean
Mean
Girls
Boys
Boys Girls
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 2 6 10 2 6 10 0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
2 6 10
2 6 10
2 6 10
2 6 10
Mother and
Stepfather
Single-Parent
Mother
boys, a result that is paralleled by corresponding differences in average GPA for the two sexes.5 In each of the
three family structures, girls received higher grades than
boys, with the difference being most pronounced in twoparent households and lowest in single-mother families.
As seen in Figure 14.4, however, a distinctive feature
of the pattern for girls is a marked flattening
of the curve, especially for daughters of single-parent
mothers. This result suggests that, in each of the
three family structures, mothers may be pushing their
already successful daughters to the point where conformity to maternal control no longer brings educational
returns, particularly when the mother is the only parent.
An analysis of data on students whose mothers had
no more than a high school education showed a similar
general pattern, but the effects were less pronounced.
The influence of monitoring was appreciably weaker,
and its greater benefit to girls was also reduced. Nevertheless, girls with less-educated mothers both in singleparent and in stepfamilies still had higher GPA scores
than boys. This means that some other factor not yet
identified must account for this difference.
Although a number of possibilities come to mind regarding this unknown, regrettably the Wisconsin archive
does not contain any data on the principal suspects. What
is available is information about another trail of discovery
that we have already begun to explore. Our successively
more differentiated working models, both conceptual and
operational, for assessing the effects of parental monitoring on school achievement have provided increasing support for the tentative hypothesis that, for outcomes
reflecting developmental competence, proximal processes
are likely to have greatest impact in the most advantaged
environments. But what about the other half of the original
formulation: the complementary postulate that the greater
developmental impact of proximal processes growing up
in poor environments is to be expected to occur mainly for
outcomes reflecting developmental dysfunction?
Data from Small and Lusters archive also provide
the opportunity for cross-validating this provisional
claim. In addition to measures of academic achievement,
the Wisconsin study also included information on
teenagers sexual activity. The decision to analyze this
outcome in the context of a bioecological model was
prompted by Small and Lusters (1990) finding that such
5
6
We are also indebted to Kristen Jacobson, now a doctoral
student at Pennsylvania State University, for her ingenuity
and accuracy in translating into a common format data
archives recorded on different computing systems.
80
60
Mean
Mean
40
20
0
1 2 3 4
Mother Completed
High School Only
1 2 3 4
Mother Had Some Education
Beyond High School
80
Percent Sexually Active
behavior varied systematically by family structure. Sexual activity was measured by a single question: Have
you ever had sexual relations with another person?
This documentation of variations in sexual activity
by family structure takes on special significance in the
light of broader social changes taking place in the lives
of children, youth, and families in contemporary U.S.
society. Today, the United States has the highest rate of
teenage pregnancy of any developed nation, almost
twice as high as that of its nearest competitors (Bronfenbrenner, McClelland, Wethington, Moen, & Ceci,
1996, p. 117). Adolescent sexual activity is also one of
the prominent elements in the so-called teenage syndrome, an escalating pattern of co-occurring behaviors
including smoking, drinking, early and frequent sexual
experience, adolescent pregnancy, a cynical attitude toward education and work, and, in the more extreme
cases, drugs, suicide, vandalism, violence, and criminal
acts (for references and successive summaries of the evidence, see Bronfenbrenner, 1970, 1975, 1986a, 1989c,
1990, 1992; Bronfenbrenner et al., 1996; Bronfenbrenner & Neville, 1994).
In anticipating the effects of parental monitoring on
teenagers sexual activity, we were again confronted
with the issue of the possible direction of influence. In
relation to sexual activity as an outcome, however, some
leverage for the resolution of the issue was provided because each direction could be expected to produce opposite effects. On the one hand, if parental monitoring
functions to defer sexual activity, then the more monitoring the less sexual activity. On the other hand, if the
parents begin to monitor only after the fact, the association would be reversed, with monitoring occurring in reaction to the adolescents behavior; hence, sexually
active adolescents would be monitored more.
The results of the analysis are shown in Figures 14.5
and 14.6.6 The most salient finding for both sexes is that
parental monitoring does substantially reduce adolescents sexual activity. In many other respects, however,
the patterns for female and male adolescents are quite
different. The results for girls in Figure 14.5 show that
the effect of parental monitoring is stronger for daughters of mothers with no education beyond high school
a finding consistent with the working hypothesis
807
Group %
60
Group %
40
20
0
1 2 3 4
Mother Completed
High School Only
1 2 3 4
Mother Had Some Education
Beyond High School
808
This is not the only departure from the expectations generated by the most recent working model. For
example, there was not always correspondence between
the developmental power of proximal processes in a
given family structure and the percentage of sexually
active adolescents in that structure: In stepfamilies in
which the mother has only a high school education, maternal monitoring of daughters is as high as it is in twoparent families, but the percentage of sexually active
girls is even greater than that for single-parent mothers
at the same educational level. The finding is consistent
with research indicating that living in a family with a
stepfather entails a special developmental risk for girls
(Hetherington & Clingempeel, 1992).
And so, we find ourselves engaged in a next stage of the
discovery process in which we are seeking to develop a
more differentiated formulation that, through a corresponding research design, will be most effective in reducing the observed empirical departures from expectations
based on the existing working model. The first step is to
ask an obvious question: What is most likely to account
for such discrepancies? Restating the question from the
perspective of the bioecological model, which of the four
components is a likely suspect? It has to be somebody who
is already on the scene. Parents are already there. Who
else is around who could exert some influence on the sexual activity of high school students? The question answers
itselfthe peer group. And if it is indeed true that proximal processes are at least as powerful determinants of development as either the characteristics of the person or of
the environment, what might that process be?
A tentative first nomination is progressively more intense interaction with peers who are already sexually active. Among other considerations, this suggestion is guided
by the possibility that peer pressure to engage in sexual activity and the prestige that such activity brings are likely to
be higher for boys from less educated families with the result that parental monitoring is not as effective. With respect to the other components in the model, given the
findings just reported, gender would still be a Person characteristic of major importance. The choice of an appropriate environmental Context depends on the precise research
question being asked. Family structure would also still be
appropriate. But from the perspective of the bioecological
model, an option to consider would be the parents beliefs
about the activities they wanted their adolescent son or
daughter to engage in or refrain from, as well as the closeness of the parent-child relationship.
Residents were assigned at random to either the experimental or the control group. Data on psychological and
health characteristics were collected at three time points:
(1) just prior to the introduction of the experiment; (2) 3
weeks later, when the experiment was formally ended;
and (3) in a follow-up study conducted 18 months later.
The substantial effects of intervention found at the
end of the experiment (Langer & Rodin, 1976) were still
in evidence in the follow-up assessment. To be sure, because the residents were almost a year-and-a-half older,
the added age had taken some toll, but, nevertheless,
those in the induced responsibility group not only significantly surpassed their controls, but were appreciably
better off, both psychologically and physically, than
they had been months earlier before the intervention had
begun. In ratings by observers blind to the experimental
conditions, they were judged to be more alert, sociable,
and vigorous. The most striking results were seen in the
comparison of death rates between the two treatment
groups. Taking the 18 months prior to the original intervention as an arbitrary comparison period, in the subsequent 18 months following the intervention, 15% in the
responsibility-induced group died, compared with
30% in the control group.
Environmental Dynamics in Infancy
A remarkable, independent cross-validation of Langer and
Rodins principal hypothesis appears in the findings of
another intervention experimentthis one almost unknownthat was carried out at about the same time with a
sample of 100 9-month-old infants and their mothers in
the Dutch city of Nijmegen (Riksen-Walraven, 1978). Although this author, Marianne Riksen-Walraven, appears
not to have been aware of Langer and Rodins work conducted during the same period, one of the two intervention strategies she employed with her sample of infants
was similar to that used in the New Haven study of elderly
patients. Mothers, randomly assigned to what RiksenWalraven called the responsiveness group, were given a
809
810
The next generative characteristic to evolve goes beyond selective responsiveness to include the tendency to
engage and persist in progressively more complex activities; for example, to elaborate, restructure, and even to
create new features in our environmentnot only physical and social but also symbolic. We refer to propensities of this kind as structuring proclivities.
The transition from one to the other of these dynamic
forms of orientation during early childhood is illustrated
in successive publications from a longitudinal study of infants being carried out by Leila Beckwith, Sarale Cohen,
Claire Kopp, and Arthur Parmelee at UCLA (Beckwith &
Cohen, 1984; Beckwith, Rodning, & Cohen, 1992; Cohen
& Beckwith, 1979; Cohen, Beckwith, & Parmelee, 1978;
Cohen & Parmelee, 1983; Cohen, Parmelee, Beckwith, &
Sigman, 1986). Their imaginative and careful work reveals a progressive sequence of such environmentally oriented dispositions from birth through 7 years of age.
Thus, immediately after birth, infants are especially responsive to vestibular stimulation ( being picked up and
held in a vertical position close to the body), which has
the effect of soothing babies so that they begin to engage
in mutual gazing; by 3 months, visual exploration extends
beyond proximal objects, and the mothers voice is most
likely to elicit responses especially in the form of reciprocal vocalizations.
From about 6 months on, the infant begins actively to
manipulate objects spontaneously in a purposeful way
and to rearrange the physical environment. By now, both
vocalization and gesture are being used to attract the
parents attention and to influence their behavior. In addition, there is a growing readiness, across modalities,
to initiate and sustain reciprocal interaction with a
widening circle of persons in the childs immediate environment. This is the emergence of what we call structuring proclivities.
A number of other investigations have yielded comparable findings, and have extended them to still other
activity domains; for example: individual differences in
childrens creativity in play and fantasy behavior (Connolly & Doyle, 1984; MacDonald & Parke, 1984) or
Jean and Jack Blocks longitudinal studies of ego resiliency and ego control (J. H. Block & Block, 1980;
J. Block, Block, & Keyes, 1988).
The nature of the third and final class of developmentally generative Person characteristics reflects the
increasing capacity and active propensity of children
as they grow older to conceptualize their experience. It
deals with what we call directive belief systems about
811
812
A concrete example of a deficiency in developmental resources has already been documented in the
analysis of Drilliens results depicted in Figure 14.1.
Proximal processes exerted their most powerful effect
on children growing up in the most disadvantaged environment, but in that environment youngsters who at
birth were of normal weight benefited most. Weight at
birth does not imply a directed propensity to engage in
or refrain from a particular kind of behavior. What it
does represent is variation in the biological resources
available to engage in any activity requiring directed
activity or response over extended periods of time.
Thus, in the present instance, one plausible explanation
for the observed asymmetric pattern is that, among
families living in stressful environments, infants who
are physically healthy from birth are more able to engage in reciprocal interaction than those who are biologically impaired.
This interpretation is called into question, however,
by the corresponding results, shown in the same graph,
for infants raised under the most favorable socioeconomic circumstances. Infants of normal birthweight
profited least from interaction with their mothers. How
might this paradox be resolved?
Even though the corresponding interaction term is
statistically significant, under normal circumstances
the preceding result wouldand properly shouldbe
called into question as a post hoc finding. But, in the
present instance, that is not quite the case. To be sure,
there was no a priori hypothesis predicting the precise
pattern of the obtained results. The pattern is consistent, however, with several possibilities envisioned for a
third Person attribute posited as influencing proximal
processes and their developmental effects. And for science in the discovery mode, post hoc findings that are
theoretically relevant are not to be lightly dismissed.
Demand Characteristics of the Person
as Developmental Inf luences
The distinguishing feature of this last set of Person characteristics affecting development is their capacity to invite or discourage reactions from the social environment
that can disrupt or foster processes of psychological
growth: for example, a fussy versus a happy baby, attractive versus unattractive physical appearance, or hyperactivity versus passivity. Half a century ago, Gordon
Allport (1937), borrowing a term originally introduced
by Mark A. May (1932), spoke of such characteristics as
813
814
The second issue introduces an additional component into the research design. As stipulated in Proposition I, proximal processes involve progressively more
complex interactions not only with persons but also
with objects and symbols. The question therefore again
arises as to what extent solitary activities involving objects and symbolssuch as playing with toys, working
at hobbies, reading, or fantasy playcan also foster
psychological development? And to what degree does
involvement in both objects and symbols produce synergistic developmental effects in each domain? The answers to these questions are as yet unknown but are
readily discoverable through the use of appropriate designs that differentiate between measures of process
and of environmental structure.
However, the most promising terra incognita for research on the role of the physical environment in human
development may well lie beyond the realm of childhood
in the world of adults. A preview of this promise appears
815
816
817
The authors findings with respect to specific minority groups are of considerable interest:
818
By contrast:
More often then not, Asian American students have no
choice but to belong to a peer group that encourages and
rewards academic excellence. . . . Asian Americans report
the highest level of peer support for academic achievement. Interestingly, and in contrast to popular belief,
[their] parents are the least involved in their youngsters
schooling. (p. 448)
In this particular study, the investigators did not examine the extent to which the biopsychological characteristics of adolescents, or of their parents, influenced
developmental processes and outcomes. Today, a growing body of researchers (e.g., Plomin, Reiss, Hetherington, & Howe, 1994) claims strong evidence for the view
that individual and group differences in a wide range of
developmental outcomes are mainly driven by differences in genetic endowment (Ability Testing, 1992;
Plomin, 1993; Plomin & Bergeman, 1991; Plomin &
McClearn, 1993; Scarr, 1992). This claim is called into
question, however, by alternative explanations and evidence based on the bioecological model (see also
Lerner, 1995, 2002, 2004a).
Nature-Nurture Reconceptualized:
A Bioecological Interpretation
The theoretical argument is set forth in a series of hypotheses, each accompanied by a corresponding research design (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994b).
Hypothesis 1: Proximal processes raise levels of effective developmental functioning, and thereby increase the proportion of individual differences
attributable to actualized genetic potential for such
outcomes. This means that heritability ( h2) will be
higher when proximal processes are strong and lower
when such processes are weak.
Hypothesis 2: Proximal processes actualize genetic
potentials both for enhancing functional competence
and for reducing degrees of dysfunction. Operationally, this means that as the level of proximal process is increased, indexes of competence will rise,
those of dysfunction will fall, and the value of h2 will
become greater in both instances.
1. The power of proximal processes to actualize genetic potentials for developmental competence (as
assessed by an increase in h2) will be greater in
advantaged and stable environments than in those
that are disadvantaged and disorganized.
2. The power of proximal processes to buffer genetic
potentials for developmental dysfunction will be
greater in disadvantaged and disorganized environments than in those that are advantaged and stable.
Hypothesis 3. If persons are exposed over extended
periods of time to settings that provide developmental
resources and encourage engagement in proximal
processes to a degree not experienced in the other
settings in their lives, then the power of proximal
processes to actualize genetic potentials for develop-
819
Sundet (personal communication, March 17, 1993) reported that, in response to a preliminary version of the article
by Bronfenbrenner and Ceci (1994), he and his colleagues undertook a preliminary analysis that yielded the following results: For twins with mothers having the least education, the
correlation between identical twins is .80, whereas the correlation for fraternal twins is .47. For the twins having mothers
with more education, these correlations are .82 and .39, respectively. As you will see, this yields a heritability estimate
of .66 for the first group, whereas it is .86 for the second
group. If I understand your [Hypothesis 2] correctly, this is in
accordance with your predictions. However, the difference
between the two DZ [dizygotic] correlations does not seem to
reach statistical significance, although it is quite near.
820
821
822
these forces lay mainly in the family, with parents acting as the principal caregivers and sources of emotional support for their children, and with other adult
family members living in the home being next in line.
To a lesser extent, other relatives, family friends, and
neighbors also functioned in this role.
However, there has been a marked change in this pattern over the past 4 decades. Parents, and other adult
family members as well, have been spending increasing
amounts of time commuting to and working at full-time
823
jobs (in which overtime is increasingly required or expected). The nature of this trend and its relevance
for human development are conveyed in the idea that
to developintellectually, emotionally, socially, and
morallya child requires, for all of these, the same
thing: participation in progressively more complex activities, on a regular basis over an extended period of
time in the childs life, with one or more persons with
whom the child develops a strong, mutual emotional
attachment, and who are committed to the childs wellbeing and development, preferably for life (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000; Bronfenbrenner & Morris,
1998; also see Lerner, 2004b). The establishment of a
strong mutual emotional attachment leads to internalization of the parents activities and expressed feelings
of affection. Such mutual ties motivate the childs interest and engagement in related activities in the immediate
physical, social, andin due coursesymbolic environment that invite exploration, manipulation, elaboration,
and imagination.
The establishment and maintenance of patterns of
progressively more complex interaction and emotional
attachment between parent and child depend, to a substantial degree, on the availability and involvement of
another adult, a third party, who assists, encourages,
spells off, gives status to, and expresses admiration and
affection for the person caring for and engaging in joint
activity with the child. It also helps, but is not absolutely
essential, that the third party be of the opposite sex from
that of the other person caring for the child, because this
is likely to expose and involve the child in a greater variety of developmentally instigative activities and experiences (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1996). Where this is an
attachment to two or more parent figures, each can serve
as a third party to the other.
The research evidence for this idea comes mainly by
default. It was produced by demographic data documenting a rapid rise in the proportion of single-parent households. The trend began in the 1980s, and then continued
at an even faster rate through most of the 1990s. The
overwhelming majority of such homes were those in
which the father was absent and the mother bore primary responsibility for the upbringing of the children.
A large number of investigations of developmental
processes and outcomes in families of this kind have
since been conducted across a range of cultural and social class groups. The findings lead to two complementary conclusions:
824
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Wachs, T. D. (1991). Environmental considerations in studies with
non-extreme groups. In T. D. Wachs & R. Plomin (Eds.), Conceptualization and measurement of organism-environment interaction (pp. 4467). Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.
Wachs, T. D., & Chan, A. (1986). Specificity of environmental actions as seen in physical and social environment correlates of
three aspects of 12-month infants communication performance.
Child Development, 57, 14641475.
CHAPTER 15
This chapters organization serves to capture the distinctive contributions of phenomenological variant of
ecological systems theory (PVEST) to available human
development theorizing. Thus, following a brief introductory section, we provide a full presentation of the
PVEST framework, and, although applying it to the pre-
830
tional advantages of the PVEST framework and highlights competing traditional frameworks while also explaining their limitations.
work that takes into account the individuals perspective, or phenomenology (see Rogers perspective as reviewed in Schultz, 1976), PVEST affords specificity
about the individual-context-process nexus as suggested
by Bronfenbrenners (1977, 1989, 1992, 1993) ecological systems theory. The integration imparts significant
benefits. Foremost, given its linkages to both observed
and perceived context features, the framework provides
enhanced understanding of foundational processes and
stage-specific outcomes of diverse groups and individuals (see Spencer & Harpalani, 2004). Specifically, as
indicated, it enhances the interpretation of disparate appearing developmental patterns and outcomes by explicating the how of development for diverse groups (a)
sharing what appears to be the same space and opportunities, ( b) attempting behavioral responses to seemingly
parallel human development tasks and stage-specific expectations for competence, but frequently (c) demonstrating disparate behavioral outcomes in response to
myriad challenges.
This chapter is intended to provide an updated description and explanation of PVEST, first published a
decade ago (Spencer, 1995). Given the 10-year interim,
this update is informed by dozens of empirical publications that describe analyses designed to demonstrate
components of the systems theory (e.g., Fegley, Spencer,
Goss, Harpalani, & Charles, in press; Spencer, Dupree,
Cunningham, Harpalani, Munoz-Miller, 2003; Spencer,
Dupree, Swanson, & Cunningham, 1996, 1998; Spencer,
Fegley, & Harpalani, 2003; Swanson, Spencer, DellAngelo, Harpalani, & Spencer, 2002). Additional published work utilizes the theory for clarifying conceptual
themes and relationships (e.g., Lee, Spencer, &
Harpalani, 2003; Spencer, Dupree, & Hartmann, 1997;
Spencer & Harpalani, 2004; Spencer & Jones-Walker,
2004). Finally, qualitative analyses derived from PVEST
(i.e., either single-method studies or multimethod publications that include empirical demonstrations) provide
helpful illustrations. Multimethod publications augment
and make obvious speculative theoretical linkages by
providing the voices or expressed meaning-making of
young people themselves (e.g., Spencer, Silver, Seaton,
Tucker, Cunningham, & Harpalani, 2001; Youngblood &
Spencer, 2002).
This current and updated version of PVEST is consistent with established associations demonstrated between
young childrens normal cognitive, affectual, and socialdevelopmental processes (e.g., Spencer, 1982, 1983,
1985, 1990). It reasserts the important foundational role
831
of perceptual processes in development (e.g., social cognition; childrens theory of mind) and reinforces the
need to integrate a phenomenological perspective (see
Rogers & Kelly as reviewed in Schultz, 1976) to (a) explain life-course developmental processes and thematic
outcomes, ( b) explicate the role of cultural traditions, (c)
specify the contribution of history ( both for immigrants
and more long-term and indigenous groups; [see Johnson-Powell & Yamamoto, 1997]), and (d) indicate the
critical contributions of context quality for individualcontext interactions. The expanded description of context this model allows specifies how the role of historical
factors is important at several levels, and it acknowledges individual differences in levels of vulnerability
(i.e., the presence of risk and protective factors). The
framework also enhances the interpretation of varied
outcomes (i.e., productive and unproductive) experienced by diverse group members as each transitions
across contexts (see Figure 15.1). Additionally, the
framework focuses on the roles mediating processes play
between vulnerability levels and the coping outcomes individuals experience as they transition across the life
course. The processes provide illumination as individuals confront both unique challenges and contextual
provocation (see Lee et al., 2003) while attending to the
sets of normative life-course developmental tasks initially described by Havighurst (1953).
Frequently, when attempting to disentangle and interpret the complexities of the multiple coping trajectories possible, given the normative character of the
developmental tasks noted, several important contributing factors are usually overlooked. For example, vulnerability is often assumed to be the presence of risks only
without an acknowledgment of protective factors. Worse
yet, particular outcomes are assumed for specific
groups. For example, unproductive outcomes are tacit
expectations for marginalized groups (see Figure 15.2).
Coping Outcomes
Net Vulnerability Level
Risks
Unproductive
Productive
Protective
Factors
832
Coping Outcomes
Net Vulnerability
Risks
Unproductive
Productive
Protective
Factors
Coping Outcomes
Net Vulnerability
Risks
Unproductive
Productive
Protective
Factors
Figure 15.2 Deficit emphasizing: Perspective generally assumed a priori for minorities.
Figure 15.3 Creating new inclusive theorizing requires analyzing both protective factor presence as well as the nuanced
character of risks (e.g., unacknowledged privilege).
Conceptual Shortsightedness in the Study of Diverse Youth: Children of Color and Privilege
CONCEPTUAL SHORTSIGHTEDNESS IN
THE STUDY OF DIVERSE YOUTH:
CHILDREN OF COLOR AND PRIVILEGE
Shortsighted and erroneous perspectives about diverse
youth fall into two major categories. The first major categorical error suggests that Caucasian children (i.e., or
assumptions about their development) represent the
standard of normalcy for all others. This group is most
often the subject of normative studies conducted in developmental and social sciences. The second category of
conceptual errors represents the perceptions about minority status youth or youth of color and their assumed
atypicality. This shortsightedness also includes references used to describe the group itself: Given the
changes in American population statistics, the grouping
previously referred to as minorities is moving toward
majority status andalthough not widelyhas more recently been referred to as AHAANA (Asian, Hispanic,
African American, and Native American). An aspect of
the privileged status associated with Caucasians is that
even the term diversity or diverse youth, unfortunately,
inconsistently elicits images of Whites. Frequently, referencing diversity suggests a concern with adding minorities to a particular issue or task. For example, the
role of diversity task forces is often to highlight issues
that are inclusive of non-Whites. Implicit in the designation is that, without a gentle reminder, the tradition is to
ignore non-Whites: Whites are assumed to represent normative development themes, and minorities (or the poor)
are highlighted when adversity, pathology, deviance, or
problems are of topical interest.
In this chapter, we evoke a different approach. We use
the term diverse youth in this chapter to include both European American (Caucasian) and AHAANA (frequently
marginalized) youth. Unlike the narrow and exclusively
positive connotations associated solely with European
Americans (Caucasians) and the more limited (and generally negative) imagery linked with diverse youths of
color representation in the social sciences generally and
developmental science specifically, we posit a strategy
that acknowledges several major conceptual defects that
our proposed framework seeks to remedy.
Flaw One: Context Ignored
First, as consistently shared (e.g., Spencer 1985, 1995;
Spencer et al., 2006), ecology has been frequently viewed
as a nonissue in the consideration of human development.
833
834
appreciated, prevalent mind-set by scholars in developmental psychology is that macrolevel conditions experienced at the micro-, meso-, and exolevels of social
ecologies (i.e., generally reported as sample demographics) do not deserve serious attention. However, enough
research, conceptual frameworks, and new theories
demonstrate not if but how much these factors matter in
the lives of children.
Further, the resistant and limiting shortsightedness
described suggests that when these factors are brought
to conscious awareness through journal policies and federal funding initiatives, the impact of the many levels of
ecologies described by Bronfenbrenner (1979) and others persist as merely acknowledged (i.e., as statistically
manipulated control variables), but not as factors that
impact the questions posed, balanced character of the
samples (or not), and constructs identified and measured. Moreover, there has been a general disregard for
individuals own perceptions and meanings made from
the multiple ecologies traversed, contexts psychologically experienced (see Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson,
1995), and limitations explicitly and subtly imposed
(see Chestang, 1972). Perceptions have important implications for emotional reactions and subsequent analyses
inferred as human processes that fuel reactive (see
Stevenson, 1997) and stable repetitive coping responses.
Patterns of shortsightedness remain for those producers
of science following 3 decades of cogent critiques,
which highlighted major methodological and conceptual
shortcomings of the research enterprise (e.g., Banks,
1976; Guthrie, 1976). For example, the continuing use
of uneven comparison groups (e.g., low-income diverse
youth compared to middle-income European American
samples) has implications for the interpretation of findings and perpetuation of social stigma (see Steele, 1997;
Steele & Aronson, 1995).
Frequently, the conceptual problems described appear to be resistant to change. Even when the problem of
unequal samples is not an issue, the measurement of
identified variables is frequently insufficient. Identified
variables and measures lack psychometric integrity
across diverse groups, and inferred meanings represent
an unaddressed conundrum: Constructs may lack conceptual validity (i.e., meanings may not be shared).
Often, particular group members experiences at the
microsystem level may vary, given individual-context
linked challenges, coping requirements (i.e., the degree
to which social dissonance or consonance is experienced), and reactive coping strategy availability (see
Stevenson, 1997). Further, because many research ini-
Conceptual Shortsightedness in the Study of Diverse Youth: Children of Color and Privilege
835
836
factors concerning its intended use. For example, information related to safety and protection might include
(a) establishing the number of milligrams of the drugs
active ingredient per kilogram of the users body
weight, ( b) possessing no known allergies to the drug,
(c) not taking other drugs known to cause untoward interactions with the drug intended for use, and (d) lacking the presence of concomitant medical conditions for
which the drug would be counter-indicated (e.g., a pregnant woman drinking alcohol during the pregnancy).
This illustration is helpful given scientific knowledge
concerning the teratogenic influence of many over the
counter, nonprescription drugs (e.g., aspirin and motion
sickness remedies) on prenatal and neonatal development (Note: Teratogenic substances are those found to
have an adverse impact on fetus and infant health,
growth, and development). Thus, it is not a new perspective to undertake thorough understandings about individual and group vulnerability in some fields. This is done
by contemplating both anticipated risks and protective
factors. This procedure appears relevant irrespective of
a specific issue (e.g., applying for a job, contemplating a
vision screen for contact lenses or laser surgery, considering a medicinal regimen for health maintenance, or
contemplating marriage). Curiously so, and as illustrated, a decision-making style that bears in mind both
risks and protective factors appears less prevalent when
inferences concerning race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic disparity themes are at issue.
Unfortunately, for diverse youth of color, simplistic
analyses and dependence on risk characteristics are
most often the norm rather than the analytic exception.
As suggested, the approach is not only ultimately
stereotype-dependent but also tends to produce or reinforce further stigma and stereotyping. In presenting alternative and inclusive theorizing, we propose an
improved and nuanced analysis. The conceptual strategy
described suggests improved interpretations of disparate findings frequently obtained for youth who appear to share family, school, and neighborhood contexts.
Additionally, a more analytic approach that recognizes,
incorporates for consideration, and specifically elucidates the role of protective factors in youths lives might
facilitate improved understandings about high-risk presence along with patterns of positive coping outcomes
(i.e., resiliency). The suggested approach might aid the
identification of culture-sensitive and context-linked
supports and remedies. In sum, for youth of color, social
scientists too frequently err on the side of negative, linear, and deterministic thinking (i.e., high risks are
linked narrowly and often solely with untoward expectations). Figure 15.1 noted another deterministic pattern
used in the consideration of European American youths
experiences.
As reported, the prevalent although simplistic perspective noted in Figure 15.2 leaves the analogous issues
ignored among European American youth (e.g., teen
pregnancy and abortion use, White male aggression, and
high suicide rates). Further, when pursuing remedies for
enhancing productive youthful outcomes, the situation
described (i.e., overlooking protective factors) for diverse youth of color leaves practitioners with the narrow
and erroneous assumption that untoward outcomes can
be remedied from a one-size-fits-all perspective. As
suggested by Figure 15.3, assumptions about inherent
protective factor presence and a total absence of acknowledged risks (i.e., in the case of privileged youth)
may exacerbate vulnerability level. Examples from Littleton, Colorado, manifested by the Columbine High
School killings by upper middle-income European
American youths, clearly demonstrate the downside of
privilege and reaffirm the salience of adaptive coping
skills for promoting healthy identity processes and
stage-specific competence (refer to Figure 15.3). Undoubtedly, the appearance of resilience among lowincome, immigrants, and minority youth is not wellstudied and is often misunderstood or overlooked (e.g.,
Fordham & Ogbu, 1986) as illustrated by Ogbus acting White assertions concerning patterns of underachievement for some African American and Hispanic
youth. Unfortunately, given its broad presence in the
popular media, Ogbus (1985) limited perspective frequently reinforces stigmatizing and stereotyping beliefs
without affording an understanding of the outcomes and
mediating processes. As suggested, this penchant is
most evident when matters of race, ethnicity, and social
class are at issue. CRT would suggest that assumptions
concerning each are frequently made and impair the possibility of equitable treatment.
Flaw Two: Racism Ignored
Unaddressed contextual and psychological issues such as
racism and class inequities may potentially impact child
and adolescent perceptions of self, others, and decision
making about the current coping responses expected and
required given normative and unique challenges; also influenced are preparations for future life prospects. In
parallel fashion, although there are a few recent exceptions (e.g., Luthar, 2003; McIntosh, 1989), beliefs about
Conceptual Shortsightedness in the Study of Diverse Youth: Children of Color and Privilege
837
838
response to stress. At the same time, even though European American males continue to enjoy the most lucrative life-course averages, when earnings and number of
years of education completed are considered over the
several decades of the life course, these males have a
surprisingly high suicide rate. Although, attention has
been paid to the change in peak level of completed suicides for Black young adult males (see Joe & Kaplan,
2002), the lack of anxiety or explanation for the parallel
lines of data for European Americans when compared
against average life income, cumulative education
achieved, and completed suicides considered together
and examined over several decades is cause for alarm.
Flaw Three: General Lack of a Developmental
Perspective When Considering Youth of Color
As indicated, the developmental literature disproportionately focuses on the experiences of European Americans. Alternatively (as suggested by Figure 15.2),
theorizing about youth of color frequently underexamines developmental processes and overemphasizes risk
factors and unproductive stage-specific outcomes (e.g.,
early pregnancy, disproportionate incarceration rates,
school failure, and aggression). The thematic patterns
are both interesting and troublesome because the normative developmental thematic stressors experienced by
youth of color, such as off-timed physical and social
maturation and peer pressure issues, may be compounded by context character factors that are associated
with racial stigma and color-linked traditions that
assume equality of experience and exposures (see
Spencer, 1985; Spencer & Dornbusch, 1990; Spencer &
Markstom-Adams, 1990). Normative child and adolescent developmental processes, such as early maturation,
when considered in conjunction with encounters of race
and economic disparities (e.g., lack of job availability
for parents, under-funded schools, unsafe neighborhoods, inadequate schooling opportunities, and unacknowledged racism) suggest inordinately stressful
contexts for achieving healthy normative social experimentation opportunities necessary for development.
Such conditions would be expected to have implications
for phenomena such as off-timed pregnancies, juvenile
justice contact, and underachievement in school. Yet,
apart from a few exceptions (see Spencer et al., 2001),
these perspectives are seldom acknowledged in publications on the topic. In short, developmental, process-oriented, and context-linked analyses are not emphasized
for youth of color. Alternatively, for European American youth, the concomitant stress and challenges associated with unacknowledged privilege and its downside
(e.g., inadequate coping opportunities that may be
linked with high rates of male suicides), unfortunately,
are seldom integrated into conceptual formulations of
development. Certainly, as indicated, the implications of
the latter for the development of coping skills remain an
oversight in child psychology. The absence of publications on the downside of privilege is clearly demonstrated when considering the several examples of
school-based killings. These occasions are made similar
given the unexpected demographics of the perpetrators;
one of the more recent examples, as noted, was the
killings of fellow students at Columbine High School by
three youth from economically well-endowed families
and communities that were unaware of the threat within.
Domains of Human Development and Competence
Social science research with youth often lacks both cultural understandings (see Lee et al., 2003) and awareness of the af fective component in cognitive functioning
generally (e.g., see DeCharms, 1968) and social competence formation specifically (i.e., effectance motivation; R. White, 1959, 1960). The shortcomings are
evident both in the design and the interpretation of
scholarship on youth of color. Similarly, a general oversight of cultural inclusiveness, including lived privilege
as culture as experienced by White youth, is lacking.
Minority children and adolescents developing in contexts defined by a unique family structure and sets
of cultural practices are (a) generally not well understood, ( b) behaviorally misinterpreted, (c) burdened
with demonizing assumptions, and (d) frequently absent
from developmental science concerned with normative
human processes. The oversights have implications for
schooling experiences (i.e., both for the training of
teaching and administrative professionals), and the
general context-linked socialization experiences of relevance for competence formation and human development more broadly. To sum, conceptually inclusive
approaches to developmental science have important societal implications regarding how policies are framed
and implemented, how contexts are structured, and how
socializing adults (e.g., teachers, administrators, and
service providers) actually deliver the supports intended
for youth of color. Good science representative of the
breadth of human experiences facilitates the best practices and policies. Accordingly, needed are viable and
Conceptual Shortsightedness in the Study of Diverse Youth: Children of Color and Privilege
839
840
incentive structure in support of best practices, the interpretations made of evaluation study outcomes, the
character and process of juvenile justice system-based
experiences and consequences, and decision-making
processes about basic programs of research to be supported (e.g., the actual types and sets of questions
posed). The specific points of view espoused in this
chapter support greater conceptual inclusiveness that
goes beyond the mere inclusion of diverse samples in a
studys design or program of research. As suggested,
good human development theorizing representing real
time and valid human development experiences of
diverse groups and their members serves important
interpretational and decision-making functions. As a
strategy, it impacts the quality of child development
and youth outcomes through implicit social engineering
as social policy. Such a strategy provides ways of articulating challenges and specifying precise supports required for facilitating best practices (i.e., as policy and
application) while at the same time altering deleterious
contexts that interfere with the promotion of productive coping methods, which maximize the various expressions of positive youth outcomes as reactive coping
practices and stable healthy identities.
Particularly for highly stigmatized groups, withingroup variation is seldom acknowledged and, instead,
homogeneity is often assumed. In contrast, betweengroup differences frequently serve to further marginalize or stigmatize outliers (i.e., those performing
significantly outside the mean). The sources of variability observed both within and between groups are broad
and may be due to multiple human characteristics or
contextual experiences that operate as processes and
mediate between an individuals vulnerability level and
stage-specific coping outcome. For example, high performance associated with privilege may be a valid explanation for some; alternatively, high performance for
youth of color may be due to significant levels of adaptive coping and resilience. The implications of each may
be different when individuals of each type are confronted with similar challenges and equivalent supports.
Resilient youth may get better scaffolding from extra
supports, already have a history of dealing with challenges, and thus, possess well-developed coping skills.
However, the same level of challenge for privileged
youth may be more disconcerting than expected because
a history of privileging experiences would not afford
similar opportunities for the developing of multiple coping strategies. Similarly, responses to a standard level of
support may be different as a function of privileged individuals level of personal vulnerability, which, historically, may not have been an issue if maximized support
had remained the standard. However, with the standard
of support, perhaps, being lowered to a level different
from individual history, individual vulnerability characteristics might provide ways of explaining expected differences. Discussion and exploration of such
within-group variation is infrequently addressed for
Caucasian youth. Variation of responses to challenge for
youth of color is generally not sought and perhaps is undermined by the very design of research studies (e.g.,
given the frequent comparison of middle-income European American youth with low-income youth of color).
Accordingly, when considering either within- or
between-group differences, an individuals accrued
vulnerability represents the balance between risks and
available protective factors. On the one hand, risk
types have implications for the character of challenges
that one experiences or anticipates. On the other hand,
protective factors may vary, ranging from the intergenerational sharing of cultural traditions to unusually
high levels of accumulated wealth. Obviously, both
would demonstrate different manifestations as each
serves as a source of support. Further, it is important to
acknowledge that both types of protective factors (e.g.,
cultural socialization versus intergenerational transmitted accumulated wealth) have important implications for both the specific nature of anticipated
supports available and their character (e.g., stability
and persistency or internal versus external origin).
Risks and protective factors may take a variety of
forms given variations in race/ethnicity, gender, faith
community, body type, immigration status, skin color,
privilege, health quality or disability status, cultural traditions, social class, and temperament. All are linked to
the character of the context and the individuals history
of experiences and even the groups history in the nation
(e.g., generational experiences of immigrants as newcomers and long-term adaptations of indigeneous groups such
as Native Americans, Hispanic, and African American
youth and families). When experienced as challenges or
supports, the sources of variation within or between
groups may be biologically inherent (e.g., due to the heritability of temperament, skin color, or body type) or socially constructed (e.g., beliefs and biases concerning
race/ethnicity, social class, and physical attractiveness).
When considered together, as suggested, the noted basis
of variation represents potential sources of risk or protec-
Conceptual Shortsightedness in the Study of Diverse Youth: Children of Color and Privilege
Coping Outcomes
Net Vulnerability
Risks
Unproductive
Productive
Protective
Factors
tion that are associated with some level of human vulnerability. The actual character of individual vulnerability is
unavoidably associated with the nature of the context and
its provision of either excessive challenges or supports.
The level of vulnerability has implications for achieving
stage-specific manifested competence (White, 1959,
1960), resiliency (Anthony, 1974, 1987; Luthar, 2003), or
under-development. In addition, and as described in Figure 15.4 as an example of nondeterministic theorizing,
generally ignored or inadequately recognized (i.e., particularly as it relates to child development and adolescent
experiences) is an emphasis and acknowledgment of the
individuals awareness of (cognition-dependent) perceptions and stage-specific meaning-making processes.
Mediating Processes between Vulnerability and
Coping Outcomes
From our conceptual perspective (as illustrated in Figure
15.4), we hypothesize that intervening processes between
vulnerability level and coping outcomes go beyond an
understanding of the what of the individual-context relationship. A focus on the mediating processes aids in explaining the how of development (Spencer & Harpalani,
2004), not merely the what, as eloquently illustrated by
Bronfenbrenners model (Bronfenbrenner, 1989). Individuals awareness of (cognition-dependent) perceptions and
stage-specific meaning-making processes afford the consideration of critical inferences salient for understanding
youths coping and identity-formation processes. Further,
it is the socially linked and maturation-based variability
841
Net Vulnerability
Risks
Protective
Unproductive
Factors
Productive
OR
Net Stress
(Engagement) Level
Challenges
Supports
Net Stress
(Engagement) Level
Challenges
Supports
Figure 15.5 Stress-focusing research exemplars: Stress conditions may link with either individual vulnerability level or
stage-specific coping outcomes.
842
Reactive Coping
Strategies
Net Stress
(Engagement) Level
Challenges
Supports
Maladaptive
Adaptive
reactive coping styles available through a history of socialization (see Figure 15.6), and, consistent with ego
psychology theorizing by Erikson (1959), it bears in
mind the critical function of emergent, stable, identityformation processes (see Figure 15.7).
The three mediating processes were illustrated previously and collectively (see Figure 15.4) and depicted as
a large question mark and thick arrow between
vulnerability and stage-specific coping outcome. The
mediating processes assist with explanations about the
diversity of individual-context-process mediated links.
These associative relations provide the reason for
a simultaneous consideration of structural factors, cultural influences, individuals perceptual processes about
the self, bidirectional interactions with others, and myriad daily life experiences that impact individual vulnerability, productive coping outcomes, and, for some,
manifested resiliency. The perceptions and patterned
responses occur as individuals confront normative
developmental tasks while navigating countless contexts
in pursuit of demonstrating competence given the unavoidable impact of effectance motivation (R. White,
Emergent Identities:
Stable Coping Responses
Negative
Positive
Reactive Coping
Strategies
Maladaptive
Figure 15.7
Adaptive
Identity-emphasizing research.
Conceptual Shortsightedness in the Study of Diverse Youth: Children of Color and Privilege
Stage-Specific
Coping Outcomes
Productive
Unproductive
Emergent Identities:
Stable Coping Responses
Positive
Negative
Figure 15.8 Outcome- and identity-emphasizing theorizing: Approach narrowly focuses on specific life stage coping
outcomes and makes assumptions about identity character.
Net Vulnerability
Risks
Protective
843
Factors
Summary
Emergent Identities:
Stable Coping Responses
Negative
Positive
PHENOMENOLOGICAL VARIANT OF
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS THEORY:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY, DYNAMIC,
SYSTEMIC INFLUENCES, AND
PROCESSES OF A SYNTHESIZED
RECURSIVE FRAMEWORK
The meaning-making that individuals formulate about
their lives evolves from basic social and cognitive development processes. These formulations become more
sophisticated with broadened social experiences and
increases in cognitive maturation (Flavell, 1968;
Spencer, 1982, 1983, 1985; Spencer & MarkstromAdams, 1990). These relationships are better understood both from a dynamic framework that crosses
interdisciplinary boundaries (e.g., individual and group
experience, biological foundations, and cultural traditions), one that is indelibly linked to contextual forces,
and from a perspective that includes recognition of individuals information processing efforts available and
reflecting the opportunities and constraints of the various developmental periods.
End of Life
Course
Societal Elders
70+
Middle Childhood
611
1120 Adolescence
Early Childhood
35
Conception
Infancy and
Toddlerhood
02
844
Grandparents
Extended
Kin
Parents
Siblings
Child/
Adolescent
Peers
Media
Popular
Culture
School
Church
845
846
847
848
5
Stage-Specific Coping
Outcomes
1
Net Vulnerability
Protective
Factors
Risks
Unproductive
Productive
2
Net Stress
Engagement
Challenges
Negative
Supports
Positive
3
Reactive Coping Processes
Maladaptive
Figure 15.12
Adaptive
Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory (PVEST): Revised (2004) Process Emphasizing Version.
The second component of PVEST, Net Stress Engagement (2), refers to the actual experiences of challenge
and support that can impinge on an individuals wellbeing. In contrast to the risk factors referred to in the
Net Vulnerability Level, stressors are actualized risks
encountered that require some level of response because
they are experienced as specific challenges. Net Stress
Engagement is recursively linked with Net Vulnerability
Level, and represents the balance between challenges
actually encountered and available supports accessible
or available. Challenges and supports may be physically
experienced or symbolically assessed and their significance inferred (e.g., assumptions about privilege expected and supports available or perceptions about tests
or confrontations to be weathered).
Again, Steele (2004) describes the impact of identity
or social stigma on performance outcomes. He describes
the inferred meaning of a stigmas content that an individual may make (i.e., experienced as some level of
challenge) concerning the character of the performance
expected; the social experiments by Steele and his
colleagues suggest that the effect can be nullified or its
impact diminished by specific supports provided or
through the reframing of expectations. The nature of the
balance achieved (net stress level experienced) has
849
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current challenges, given accessible supports that impact overall stress, but also the recursive links with net
vulnerability because the family situation is increasing
its level of effective risks with potential changes in its
ability to maintain the prior protective factors. In sum,
given the recursive links between net vulnerability
evolving and net-stress level currently experienced,
youth may respond by adopting an in-the-moment reactive coping response.
In response to the challenges noted and in conjunction with available supports, the net level of stress experienced requires that the third component, Reactive
Coping Methods (3), is deployed. Figure 15.12 illustrates that reactive coping responses include problemsolving strategies that can be either adaptive or
maladaptive. For instance, given the prior illustration,
in response to decreased time and attention from parents and the need for adolescents to take on more familial responsibilities, youth may engage in more risk
taking behavior (a maladaptive response) or seek more
support through greater interaction with extended kin
(e.g., grandparents) and non-kin adults (e.g., school
counselor, teacher, or religious leader). Accordingly,
there will be options for positive or adaptive responses
when particular issues surface in peer contexts, the
family system, or with social institutions such as
schools. Conversely, models of maladaptive problem
solving would also be possible reactive coping responses (e.g., staying away from home or other sources
of support, using drugs, dropping out of school, or becoming committed to negative peer models).
As youth employ various reactive coping strategies
consistently over time and place, self-appraisal continues, and those strategies yielding desirable results (i.e.,
objectively viewed as either positive or negative) are repeated. For example, negative peer approval might still
feel comfortable and psychologically safe than the work
involved in creating more adaptive solutions, which
might require a change in peer relationships. The consistency of the reactive coping pattern has important implications for psychosocial processes. As suggested in
Figure 15.12, the reactive coping strategies become stable coping responses, and, over time, yield Emergent
Identities (4). Thus, the fourth component of PVEST defines how individuals view themselves in and between
their various contexts of development (e.g., family,
school, peer group, and neighborhood). The combination of factors such as cultural /ethnic background, understandings about gender roles, and self and peer
5
Stage-Specific Coping
Outcomes
1
Net Vulnerability
Risk
Contributors
Protective
Factors
Unproductive
Productive
Race/Ethnicity/Gender
Competence
Adult support
Sustainable employment
Awareness of stereotypes
Socioeconomic Factors
Welfare history
Long-term vs. short-term
Recent welfare leavers
Never recipients
4
Emergent Identities
Family/household composition
Two-parent (biological) family
Stepfamily
Single parent family
Cohabiting family
Extended family
Nonfamily
Positive
Negative
Adolescent Identities
Early adultification
Self as learner
Neighborhood/school context
Ethnic identity
2
Net Stress
Engagement
Challenges
3
Reactive Coping Processes
Maladaptive
Supports
Adaptive
Economic Stress
Poverty level
Change in income
Increase/decrease in amount
of HH income
Parental employment
Stable vs. unstable
Full-time vs. part-time
Type of work performed
Figure 15.13 Demonstration of Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory (PVEST) application: Using framework for analyzing the effects of specific economic policies and requirements for parents on adolescent academic and employment outcomes.
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PVEST
ICE
Framework
View of Human
Development:
Net Vulnerability
and Stress Levels
Coping
Processes
Figure 15.14
(PVEST) .
853
Nested Ecologies
PVEST
Framework
Identity-focused Cultural
Ecological (ICE)
View of Human
Development
Vulnerability
Level and Stress
Coping
Processes
Figure 15.15 Advantages of framework: Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory (PVEST) enhances interpretations of vulnerability with coping processes as linked with diverse sets of life course outcomes specified for particular developmental periods.
PVEST
Framework
Identity-focused
Cultural
Ecological
(ICE)
View of Human
Development
Vulnerability Level
and Net Stress
Coping
Processes
Figure 15.16 Predicting diversity: Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory (PVEST) demonstrating the
probability of both unique and patterned outcomes.
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Net Vulnerability
Coping Includes
Use of Reactive
Strategies
PLUS
AND
Net Stress
Stable Identity
Formation
Processes
Figure 15.17 Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory (PVEST) analyses afford an integration of individual
coping with context character: As an ICE perspective the framework suggests exacerbating influences (through an acknowledgment of nested ecologies) that impact coping outcomes (i.e., either productive or adverse) given the experiences of net vulnerability and stress level associated with coping processes (i.e., manifested as coping strategies and identity formation efforts).
not frequently the conceptual strategy employed as illustrated by the ways in which we formulate questions,
identify constructs, theorize about phenomena, interpret
results, conceptualize, and implement social policy.
There are few places in which this phenomenonthe
study of lives in contextis less apparent than in the
study of human development of marginalized youth in
urban contexts. Further, when considered over time,
there are few developmental periods for which this
shortsightedness has had more dire consequences than in
the formulation of research, theory, practice, and policy
of relevance for middle childhood youth and adolescents.
855
In addition to Cole, S. H. White posits there has always been a lineage of cultural psychologists who have
argued for:
An emphasis on mediated action in a context; the use of
the genetic method understood broadly to include historical, ontogenetic, and micro-genetic levels of analysis;
the grounding of analysis in everyday life events; the assumption that mind emerges in the joint activity of people
and is in an important sense, co-constructed; the assumption that individuals are active agents in their own
development; rejection of cause-effect, stimulus-response,
explanatory science in favor of a science that emphasizes
the emergent nature of mind in activity and that acknowledges a central role for interpretation in its explanatory
framework; methodologies that draw upon the humanities
as well as the social and biological sciences. (1996, p. xii)
856
that psychology comes to life only when there are research procedures through which people can experience
and know the world together. As noted by S. H. White,
Vygotsky asserts a critical philosophical position of importance in this regard. An artifact is an aspect of the
material world that has been modified over by the history of its incorporation in goal-directed human action.
By virtue of the changes wrought in the process of their
creation and use, artifacts are simultaneously ideal
(conceptual) and material (p. xiv; emphases added).
S. H. White is quite clear that artifacts are the fundamental constituents of culture. The growth of the human
mind, in ontogeny and human history, must properly be
understood as a co-evolution of human activities and artifacts. The words we speak, the social institutions in
which we participate, the man-made physical objects we
use, all serve as both tools and symbols. They exist in
the world around us; they organize our attention and action in that world and, in the aggregate, they create alternative worlds (p. xiv). It would appear that including
the individuals own reporting (i.e., as phenomenology)
of the particulars of alternative worlds would be critical for arriving at an understanding of specific meaningmaking processes by individuals as they mature over
time, transition across multiple settings and physical
spaces, and cope with the attendant contextual demands.
Accordingly, there are few places where this phenomenon is as evident as in the coping processes of youth growing up in socially constructed urban contexts. There
are few examples more poignant than the unique and coexisting struggles of diverse urban youth and families in
their efforts to demonstrate resiliency in socially constructed although infrequently acknowledged urban cultural contexts. S. H. White (1996) suggests that a
cultural-historical approach to the study of mind dictates
that when we study human development we must make the
study of surrounding social practices part and parcel of
our inquiry. And relative to policy and programming issues, Similarly, if we want to change the pattern of a
human beings activities, we need to address the surrounding situations in which those activities live (p. xiv).
As scholars and researchers interested in human
development from a global perspective, there are few
context-concerns of more importance than the need to
examine the assumptions and questions that guide the
conduct of the research industry and policy enterprise.
A clear demonstration of this dilemma is the experience
of immigrant youth (see Spencer, Harpalani, Cassidy,
et al., 2006). As an illustrative case, the cultural context
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African American men, suggests an effort to shortcircuit the use of the slavery-associated penchant of
Whites to refuse adulthood status to Black men by referring to them as boys. Thus, from an African American
adult males perspective, a fathers use of little man
to his son may be solely one of endearment. The particular language used connotes pride in his son and expectations for a future manly role.
The purpose of such language is its attempt to neutralize the prevalent use of Black male stereotyping and
undervaluing of Black males by the broader society.
Young children, however, are developmentally egocentric (appropriately self-centered) and remain so until
about 6 or 7 years of age (see Spencer, 1976, 1982).
Therefore, taking the perspective of another can depend
on a combination of cognitive maturation and social experience. As a consequence, children hear, use, and understand language and interpret its content from their
own (appropriately) limited cognitive perspective. Accordingly, in the case of African American men and
boys, use of little man language may unavoidably result in childrens inferring a set of expectations to behave and take on the responsibilities of manhood while
still a youngster. From a PVEST perspective, specific
socialization strategies, expressed as reactive coping
methods, that are deployed by parents and intended to
short circuit the internalization of prevalent stereotypes, may themselves introduce errant self perceptions.
Cultural socialization is in addition to the other traditional socialization tasks for which all parents are responsible; thus, the additional need of contemporary
Black adults to responsively cope with historical conditions (e.g., the verbal strategy used by slave owners to
render adult African American men to child status) ultimately makes child-rearing responsibilities particularly
onerous for African American parents (see Spencer,
1983, 1990).
African American male adolescents pursuit of and
sensitivity to obtaining respect from others (e.g., teachers, police officers, unknown citizens) can be problematic (see Spencer, 1999a). Teachers uniformly expect
student-like behavior from children irrespective of the
problematic and frequently unacknowledged affective
school climate experienced by many African American
and Hispanic children. Given particular cultural traditions, gender appears to be an exacerbating factor for diverse youth, particularly males. Without carefully
internalized reactive coping strategies obtained from persistent cultural socialization efforts by parents, the disso-
ues to be highly valued by the African American community (Spencer, 1983, 1990). Educational success increases (not guarantees) the probability of acquiring the
long-term respect that hypermasculine reactive
coping behavior connotes and that Black boys and adolescents desperately seek and need (Swanson, Cunningham, & Spencer, 2003). However, the variety of
historical, structural, and contemporary barriers and
challenges make the educational process inopportune for
some youth. Similarly, the normative experiences of immigrants to the United States appear no less complex
and, from a PVEST perspective, suggest different
sources of risk that may contribute to youths vulnerability level. An inclusive and broad understanding of
risks for diverse groups promotes an improved articulation of basic supports required and culturally specific
interventions necessitated for obtaining competence for
youth generally. A PVEST approach provides a culturally sensitive mechanism for linking unique risks and
protective factors with context features experienced by
specific groupsthe individual-context analysis, given
evolving perceptual developments aids, determining the
level of vulnerability anticipated and the kinds of supports required for obtaining the best possible outcomes.
Special Experiences of Immigrants
Given the cautions described by S. H. White (1996) concerning the need for a cultural-historical approach, this
section explores various risk and protective factors that
second-generation immigrants from collectivist societies may experience living in the United States. Focusing particularly on the experiences of Asian Americans,
specifically South Asian Americans, we emphasize that
the problems and concerns addressed here are certainly
not indicative of all South Asian Americans. Consistent
with Coles (1996) cultural psychology perspective and
S. H. Whites (1996) critique, we believe that an individual constructs his or her own worldview in his or her
own way. However, the construction is unavoidably
linked to context character (Lee et al., 2003). As discussed elsewhere (Spencer, Harpalani, Cassidy, et al.,
2006), using the phrase South Asian Americans or
second-generation South Asian children, we actually
refer to individuals who are specifically born and raised
in the United States and who have immigrant parents
from the following countries in South Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. As illustrated previously in Figure 15.12, PVEST provides a helpful
framework for exploring the development of identity in
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group constitutes an individuals immediate social environment. In South Asian countries, this may include the
family ( both nuclear and extended), friends, coworkers,
and peers (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The individual is
connected intimately with their particular in-group and
therefore, according to Sethi, Lepper, and Ross (1999)
the self and relevant in-group members may become
psychological entities prone to relatively similar inferential, judgmental, attributional, motivational, and perceptual biases (p. 10). The collectivist self is thus defined
according to his or her in-group. However, the process of
immigration disrupts the concept of an in-group.
Especially relevant in the case of children, when individuals drastically change their social, societal, and
cultural environments by moving to another country, extended family, friends, coworkers, and peers are left behind. These individuals must break the close bonds they
shared with their established in-group in South Asia and
leave the stability and security of their lives to seek fulfillment of their goals and aspirations in another country. For people who are interdependent, the experience
of leaving their in-group can be very traumatic. The severing of ties may be exceedingly difficult, especially if
a comparable kin network is not already established in
the adopted country. From a PVEST perspective, to
maximize supports for offsetting challenges, immigrants must learn to create their own kin networks with
other immigrants in their new environment. Although
the friendships formed may be comforting and provide
emotional, psychological, and perhaps financial support
they may not compare as favorably to those relationships
between family members or lifelong friends that were
established in their country of origin. Accordingly, the
identification and acquisition of supports may themselves introduce challenges that interfere with the positive balance sought for overall net stress level.
The character and experience of an in-group
may function differently in a foreign country. Triandis
(1989) suggests that collectivism is associated with
child-rearing patterns that emphasize conformity, obedience, and reliability. Such patterns are usually associated
with rewards for conformity to in-group goals, which
leads to internalization of the in-group goals. Thus people
do what is expected of them even if that is not enjoyable
(p. 513). However, characteristics that might suggest psychological protection in the country of origin might function differently in the adopted country. For example, the
heavy emphasis on obedience and conformity, especially
among individuals who are highly traditional and conser-
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decisions, especially if subsequently South Asian American children regret having listened to their families and
are trapped in jobs or marriages that they find unbearably dissatisfying and unpleasant. They may eventually
feel that they wasted their lives on the dreams and expectations of their family and culture and come to resent
both (Spencer, Harpalani, Cassidy, et al., 2006).
Phoebe Eng, in her book entitled Warrior Lessons,
addresses this choice of many Asian American children:
When asked why we frequently forgo our own wants in
order to fulfill our parents expectations, many of us respond with reasons that incorporate notions of filial
piety and reverence for our elders (p. 25). With observations such as Engs, we can see how collectivist
thoughts learned from the family can influence South
Asian American children. The power of filial piety
can be overwhelming and perhaps even suffocating at
times, especially considering these feelings can be complicated further with guilt. Eng comments, Filial
piety is often synonymous with paybacka [childs]
guilt and obedience in exchange for a [parents] undying
but tacit support. Our guilt can come in many currencies (p. 26). These currencies, Eng continues, include
words from immigrant parents that point out the many
sacrifices they may have made. The opportunity to grow
up with privileges and luxuries that immigrant parents
never had and worked hard to give becomes tainted with
guilt, and this guilt can lead South Asian Americans to
feel compelled or obligated to obey their parents.
It is important to note that immigrant parents should
not be viewed as selfish or wrong. These views and attitudes toward children are embedded within South Asian
culture and are normal for collectivist societies. However when South Asian immigrants are placed within an
individualistic framework, they may not realize that the
same rules and social norms that they held in their
mother country cannot necessarily be applied to all situations. The amount of conservatism immigrant parents
may observe can directly relate to whether or not they
themselves have successfully acculturated and dealt
with the immigration process.
South Asian Americans therefore choose to adapt in
various ways, according to how they perceive they
should. They could go through one extreme, rebelling
against their parents and essentially their culture to
identify completely as American, or through another by
identifying completely with their ethnic culture and
denying their national identity. A third possibility is for
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practices, and broad policies are linked to context character. Multiple perspectives about ecological contexts
are available, vary by emphasis, and provide unique contributions to understanding transactional individualcontext interactions.
ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES:
EXPLORING THE BIOECOLOGICAL MODEL
As reviewed in several places (e.g., Spencer &
Harpalani, 2004), Bronfenbrenner and Ceci (1994)
present four distinguishing attributes of the bioecological model. First, they define measurable mechanisms,
known as proximal processes, through which genetic
influences are actualized into observable phenomena.
Thus, the processes that mediate genetic and environmental influences on human development are a
fundamental component of the model. Second, Bronfenbrenner and Ceci (1994) highlight the aforementioned
variability of heritability, noting that the bioecological
model stipulates system variation in heritability as a
joint function of proximal processes and characteristics
of the environment in which these processes take place
(p. 570). With this second feature, the bioecological
model provides heritability as a measurewhich ironically is the same measure used in most behavioral genetic studies. In the model, heritability is interpreted as
the proportion of variance attributable to actualized genetic potential (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1993, 1994), as
opposed simply to genetic influences. Bronfenbrenner
and Ceci (1994) note that heritability matters; they
view its most important contribution in social science as
those instances when researchers focus on its variability. The variation in heritability allows a linkage between heritability and developmental functioning, with
the proximal processes defined in the first feature serving as the conceptual bridge between the two. The third
characteristic of the bioecological model is that it considers variation in heritability as it relates to particular
developmental outcomes (see Figure 15.18).
The fourth feature is that the model simultaneously
evaluates heritability and absolute level of developmental
competence. Bronfenbrenner and Ceci (1994) postulate
that improving the quality of proximal processes will lead
both to higher levels of heritability and to elevated levels
of developmental functioning. The reason for the latter is
readily apparent: Heritability will increase because as
High
Highest
Heritability,
Most competent
Moderately high
Heritability,
More competent
Good Environment
Poor Environment
Moderately low
Heritability,
Less competent
Lowest
Heritability,
Least competent
Low
the developing person, of the environmentboth immediate and more remotein which the processes are
taking place, and of the nature of the developmental
outcomes under consideration (Bronfenbrenner &
Ceci, 1994, p. 572). With this precept, Bronfenbrenner
and Ceci (1994) introduce the factorsattributes of the
person and the environment, and the character of developmental outcomes being analyzedthat govern proximal processes and their impact.
With the third proposition, Bronfenbrenner and Ceci
(1994) restate that proximal processes transform genetic potentials into actualized outcomes (phenotypes)
and note that the factors that govern proximal processes
dictate their power to actualize genetic potentials. From
these three propositions, Bronfenbrenner and Ceci
(1994) derive three hypotheses. First, they restate the
view that effective proximal processes will increase heritability by increasing the proportion of variation attributable to actualized genetic potential. Second, they
propose that in actualizing genetic potentials, proximal
processes work to both enhance competence and reduce
dysfunction, increasing heritability in both cases. The
implications that follow from this hypothesis are:
1. Proximal processes have more power to actualize genetic potentials for positive developmental outcomes
in organized, advantaged environments than in inconsistent, disadvantaged environments.
2. Proximal processes have more power to buffer genetic potentials for negative developmental outcomes
in inconsistent, disadvantaged environments than in
organized, advantaged environments.
These first two hypotheses essentially state that heritability, defined in terms of variance attributable to actualized genetic potential, varies as a direct function of the
quality of both proximal processes and the environment.
Bronfenbrenner and Cecis (1994) third hypothesis is that
proximal processes have a greater ability to actualize genetic potentials for positive developmental outcomes for
individuals living in more inconsistent and disadvantaged
environments. Bronfenbrenner and Ceci (1994) cite a few
studies that they interpret as supporting their first two
hypotheses (Fischbein, 1980; Riksen-Walraven, 1978;
Scarr-Salapatek, 1971), and they note the obvious implications for intervention of the third hypothesis, which is
derived from the first two. However, the authors also note
that the model still needs to be tested extensively.
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Macrosystem
Exosystem
Mesosystem
Microsystem
Individual
i
Fr
hborhood
Sc
en
ds
or
kS
ly
Neig
etti
ng
ho
ol
i
Fam
i
Fam
ly
Social Services
Soc
ia
ence
l, Cult
ural, Historical Influ
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roneously, their experiences are assumed to be homogenous as the minority case, and as suggested, they are
most frequently represented in the literature under categories of deviance, difference, problems, pathology, and
deficit (see Spencer, Brookins, & Allen, 1985). Moreover, the two juxtapositions frequently ignore the multiple contributions of the social and physical ecology:
Except for crediting diverse youth of color for the character of the context, and thus, the source for the groups
high vulnerability ( higher risks than available protective
factors).
Unfortunately, as such, this latter perspective continues to the disadvantage of some youth (i.e., immigrants,
low-income families, and youth of color) because it communicates the penchant that individuals are solely responsible for their own social situations. The working
notion reinforces the stereotype that the problem or
major sources of risk reside in individuals who deterministically create their own environments. Thus, the
assumption is that they are responsible for their own disadvantaged situation. The stereotypes reinforced by
narrow and under-representative scientific efforts have
failed to contribute to inclusive theorizing, proactive research traditions, or culturally authentic programmatic
applications that adequately address and enhance human
development stage-specific outcomes for diverse groups.
As a process-oriented, culturally sensitive and identityfocused framework that addresses the how (which is
important for application), PVEST aids in filling the
long-term void described by S. H. White (1996), Cole
(1996), Lee et al. (2003), and others.
S. H. Whites (1996) chronicling of the history and
cultural shortcomings of contemporary research suggests a significant lack of inclusive thinking. The ICE
perspective provided by PVEST in response, given S. H.
Whites critique, brings attention to the patterned lack
of cultural competence and generally inadequate research perspectives (including acknowledgment of the
broad diversity both within and between groups). Infrequently acknowledged, except to occasionally lament
their existence, the problematic conduct, character, and
interpretation of such programs of research remain endemic to the social sciences and have been highlighted
more recently as outcome disparities, particularly in
the education and health literatures. As a consequence,
given the shortcomings noted, social policies themselves
have provided neither the conceptual leadership nor the
social and psychological protective functions usually intended or inferred from good social policy.
Twentieth-Century Social Science Assumptions and Practices, Judicial Decisions, and Their Implications
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design, determination, and construction of the most appropriate and effective prevention /intervention supports.
PVEST serves as an effective conceptual tool for describing the range of coping strategies possible and aids
in determining the character of coping options that an individual might use in the moment. Some responsive
strategies might evoke jail-time sentencing decisions by
the judicial system (e.g., see Stevenson, 1997) or precipitate effectance motivation that can lead to youths high
levels of success and competence (e.g., see R. White,
1959, 1960). The range of reactive coping responses possible may result in resiliency for some (i.e., positive outcomes in the face of inordinate challenge) or produce
unfortunate labeling and unproductive coping products
that lead to the oft-reported group disparities for a particular characteristic (e.g., academic underperformance,
health status, special education placement, and disproportionate sentencing to the criminal justice system).
In contrast, the several mass school shootings over
the last decades, most recently that at Columbine High
School (Moore, 2002 and documentary, http:// bowlingforcolumbine.com), certainly make the point of privileged youths understudied but apparent vulnerability,
which is consistent with the patterned suicide rates for
White males. Although generally lacking parallel media
coverage, which is frequently reserved for mishaps committed by low-resource youth, particularly youth of
color, these unfortunate situations also fall into the category of unproductive coping processes and outcomes.
Their patterned quality for privileged youth suggests a
particular level and character of vulnerability. Although
not generally discussed, these themes deserve theorydriven scholarly analyses for informing intervention and
prevention efforts. As most evidenced by stereotyping
of marginalized youth, there is a potential downside to
bringing attention to a specific need because the resulting stigma increases individuals experiences of risk and
underscores the need for additional protective factors.
For example, the media acknowledges and highlights
particular disparities, which further stigmatizes referent
group members and can lead to situations of stereotype
threat (Steele, 1997, 2004; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Accordingly, a theoretical perspective relevant to diverse
youth (i.e., both privileged and those inordinately challenged) should accommodate the exacerbating impact of
(a) maturation-linked complexity (e.g., early versus late
physiologic maturation; Spencer, Dupree, Swanson, &
Cunningham, 1998), ( b) transactional-determined dynamism (i.e., individual-context interactions; e.g.,
Twentieth-Century Social Science Assumptions and Practices, Judicial Decisions, and Their Implications
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Twentieth-Century Social Science Assumptions and Practices, Judicial Decisions, and Their Implications
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Twentieth-Century Social Science Assumptions and Practices, Judicial Decisions, and Their Implications
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and the Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can
offer. (Bell, 2000b, p. 243)
Critiques of Critical Race Theory and Their Implications for Child Development Research. It is
important to note that CRT has not been without its
share of critiques. Delgado and Stefancic (2001) relay
general critiques of the CRT approach, and some scholars in the broader discipline of legal studies have critiqued the CRTs use of storytelling in the law. Their
critique rests on several premises, which are not unlike
the standard research tensions between the use of quantitative versus qualitative research approaches in child
development research: (a) These stories may not represent the typical experience of members of the larger
group of individuals of color, ( b) narratives lack analytical rigor, and (c) stories told by individuals of color stifle wider discussion due to the general belief that these
individuals have a superior understanding of race. Some
scholars critique the perspective held by critical race
theorists that truth is a social construct created to further the position of those in power.
Another critique of CRT is that it focuses on changing discourse and cultural forms of racism and does not
speak to the deeply ingrained structural /material
racism, more strongly affecting the poor. This critique
maintains that CRT focuses primarily on issues of identity and does not incorporate a thorough enough class
analysis. Even in the discipline of CRT, theorists voice a
need to develop further theories that look at the intersection between race and class. Also, critical race theorists express the need to develop a broader global
analysis of race, looking at the connections of sweatshop concernsthe oppression of people of color
abroad working low-wage jobsand the unemployment
of people of color in the United States (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).
When considered together, Whiteness studies delineating the impact of racism and privilege along with
CRT increase our understanding of proximal processes
experienced by Americas diverse youth post-Brown.
Unfortunately, the links are seldom acknowledged and
the oversight has important implications for the continuing dissemination of stigma and unquestioned assumptions concerning privilege. As elaborated, there are few
demonstrations of the interaction of these themes than
in the acting White myth associated with African American youth achievement and coping patterns (see
Spencer, Cross, et al., 2003, pp. 276287).
for success (see also Fordham, 1988, 1996). As analyzed by Spencer, Cross, et al. (2003), Fordham and
Ogbus contention is that, accordingly, Black students,
especially adolescents, attending both integrated and
predominantly Black schools face the burden of acting
White. This line of reasoning suggests that Black
youths academic prowess and success are controlled by
external and within-group factors. Thus, according to
Fordham and Ogbu, Apparently, Black childrens general perception that academic pursuit is acting White
is learned in the Black community. The ideology of the
community in regard to the cultural meaning of schooling is, therefore, implicated and needs to be reexamined (p. 203). Overall, Fordham and Ogbu conclude
that Blacks have not historically valued education and
define academic achievement as a White cultural attribute. There is major shortsightedness in the conceptualization of this work, which is consistent with the flaws
noted initially concerning the need for new theory. The
first flaw is the absence of historical accuracy.
Historical Overview of African American
Achievement Motivation
It is commonly assumed that slavery made achievement
motivation impossible. As described, critiqued, and
analyzed by Spencer, Cross, et al. (2003), the view suggests that from slavery forward, Blacks struggled not
only with external sources of oppression but also with
the effects of slavery, such as family dysfunctionality,
psychological hatred, high rates of criminality, and low
achievement motivation: the pattern is inferred by
some to indicate a mark of oppression (see Kardiner
& Ovesey, 1951, as the classic illustration of the deficit
assumption). However, historical evidence traces the
evolution of Black achievement motivation. The record
shows that from the end of slavery and well into the
twentieth century, Blacks, as individuals and as a social group, evidenced high achievement motivation,
and we are hard-pressed to think of any White ethnic
group, including Eastern European Jews, who evidenced a higher regard for achievement motivation for
the period from the end of the Civil War to the early
1930s. The insufficiency of efforts to translate such
high achievement motivation into social mobility was
not linked to the legacy of slavery but to the larger societys failure to cultivate, compliment, reinforce, and
authenticate the numerous manifestations of Black
achievement motivation.
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the 4 million slaves were able to read and write, and literacy was commonplace among free Blacks (Du Bois,
1935; p. 638). Thus, the source of the social movement
suggests ex-slaves themselves because they seemed to
carry educational designs in their ragged pockets as they
crossed over into freedom. After the Civil War, educated Blacks and their White allies were dumfounded
and even mildly shocked at the level of educational demands the ex-slaves immediately made on themselves
and their leaders (Anderson, 1988): A teacher at Port
Royal declared that he could not set forth, in anything
like adequate terms, the eagerness and determination
with which the Black freedmen apply themselves, young
and old, to the task of learning the alphabet [Another
teacher was greeted by] a motley assemblage [who were]
cold, dirty and half naked but eager to learn; [she found
them less concerned with food and clothing] but anxious
to feel sure that they would have the privilege of coming
to school everyday (Butchart, 1980, p. 169). Available
research reported by Spencer, Cross, et al. (2003) indicate that the hunger for education came not simply from
the eyes of children as many teachers conducted night
school as well as day schools to accommodate the aspirations of [adult] workers (Butchart, 1980; p. 170). In
sum, the drive for Black education was organic: It came
from the ex-slaves themselves.
Just after the Civil War, John W. Alvord was appointed the national superintendent of schools for the
Freedmans Bureau, and in 1866 he reported that Blackcontrolled schools numbered 500 and were to be found
all over the South. Just 3 years later, in 1869, Black
schools, now often associated with evolving Black
churches, totaled 1,512, with 6,146 teachers and
107,109 pupils. The demand for education and the desire to be taught by Black teachers quickly strained the
teaching force that first greeted the ex-slaves and their
children. To meet the demands being made by the exslaves, educated Blacks, Northern societies, and the federal government helped to launch such new entities as
Howard University and other Black colleges (Anderson,
1988; Bullock, 1967; Du Bois, 1935). Spencer, Cross,
et al. (2003) suggest that the drive toward Black education, after the Civil War, can only be given its due if
framed as a social movementnot a trend, not a drift,
and not a contrivance imposed by White allies from the
North. While educated free Blacks and White allies
where crucial elements, the sheer scope of the educational demands and depth of ex-slaves revealed a deep
881
882
Furthermore, everyday racism is not necessarily communicated through direct interactions with people of
color. For example, journalists produce their everyday
products that perpetuate racist discourse and policymakers produce programs that can inadvertently perpetuate inequities. Essed maintains that when racist
notions and actions infiltrate everyday life and become
part of the reproduction of the system, the system reproduces everyday racism (2002, p. 188). Hence,
macro and micro forms of racism are extensions of one
another as microaggressions while racists are not always founded by intentional prejudice.
Omi and Winant (2002) refer to a common sense
understanding, which they contend is a normative system of ideas and practicesperpetuated through education, the media, policy, and so on. Similar to Esseds
characterization of everyday racism, racial inequities
are perpetuated through these commonsense ways of
relating and being in such a way that they are more insidiously woven into the fabric of society rather than expressions of direct racial prejudice. However, the
existence of this form of racism in society does not
eliminate more direct forms of prejudice. Rather, Omi
and Winant maintain that our understanding of racism
has broadened such that we now understand it to exist in
plural forms that function through diverse contexts and
power dynamics.
It is through the development of this normative system that hegemony operates. Hegemony defines the
ways in which relations of power frame the shape of
racism. This form of racism, as discussed previously in
this review, is related to the historical and temporal context. This context is also shaped through power relations,
and the form of racial inequity is molded through the
883
884
Building on Omi and Winants (1994) ideological notions of racial formation, Bonilla-Silva (2001) outlines a
theory of racism that is both structural and processoriented: the racialized social systems framework. In
this framework, racialized social systems are societies
that allocate material and social rewards differentially
by race, and such societies develop a particular racial
structure: the set of social relations, cultural practices,
and tacit and explicit assumptions, based on physical
distinctions that govern the social construction of racial
groups in the society.
Inclusive theories of human development, in
conjunction with systemic analyses of racism often
found in CRT, can help elucidate how racism impacts
developmental outcomes. For example, Bronfenbrenners (1989) ecological systems theory provides an effective framework to analyze the role of social, cultural,
and historical context in human development, and thus
to illustrate the impact of racism at multiple levels. As
reviewed by Harpalani and Spencer (2005), in its role as
a process oriented theoretical tool, ecological systems
theory offers mediating points between larger structural processes and the immediate settings where
racism is encountered in everyday life. A final step for
developmental scientists interested in the effects of
racism is to employ an identity-focused, contextually
sensitive, theory of human development that can illustrate how bias (e.g., racism) impacts experiences, coping, identity formation, and outcomes from a
developmental perspectivethrough all stages of the
life course. We posit that PVEST (Spencer, 1995) provides such a framework (see Figure 15.12).
As suggested, PVEST links context and experience
with individual meaning-making and identity formation,
all from the perspective of human development. While
ecological systems theory provides a means for describing hierarchical levels of context, PVEST directly illustrates life-course human development as influenced by
these multiple levels of context. PVEST serves as a
model to examine normative developmental processes
framed through the interaction of identity, lived cultural
experiences, and tangible manifestations of racism, including White privilege, for youth of all ethnicities. In
doing so, it takes into account individual differences in
experience, perception, and negotiations of stress and
dissonance. PVEST demonstrates a recycling through
the life span, as individuals encounter new risks and protective factors, experience new stressors (potentially
885
CONCLUSIONS AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL VARIANT OF
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS THEORY
INFLUENCED INTERPRETATIONS OF
YOUTHS STAGE-SPECIFIC COPING
OUTCOMES AS A FUNCTION OF
NET VULNERABILITY
One major certainty to be concluded from the multidisciplinary literatures integrated and analyses provided in
demonstrating the benefits of PVEST is that any inclusive theory of human development should bear a particular burden. Specifically, not only should the framework
acknowledge and incorporate the major objectively identifiable expressions of human variation (e.g., race, gender, and unique life-course placementan infant versus
an elder) that may differentially interface with context,
but also provide an adequate explanation of the how of
human development processes that leads to the what or
particularly patterned outcomes (see Figure 15.20).
The uniquely structured and experienced processes of
human development are inextricably linked to the tensions produced between nuanced developmental tasks
pursued by the individual given context character and influences of the psychohistorical moment, along with expectations for competence. However, unavoidable
tensions are also produced as a function of childrens
characteristics such as group membership and context
quality; although infrequently noted, the latter continues
to be linked to structural conditions associated with
race, racism, and White privilege. As indicated in the
synthesis statement, this unchanging dilemma is overlooked in the child psychology literature except for a priori assumptions of deviance, psychopathology, or
problems associated with youth of color. Further, this
situation, experienced as stigmatization, is linked to historical conditions and includes their perpetuation as values, beliefs, attitudes, contextual inequalities, and
psychosocial experiences. Considered together, they
serve neither to perpetuate risks nor to promulgate protective factors as net stress is experienced, reactive coping responses evoked, and emergent identities enacted.
Thus, recursively structured, they become associated
with particular stage-specific outcomes as young lives
unfold given particular cultural traditions. Accordingly,
our introduction of PVEST as an ICE perspective suggests that the unfolding coping processes and consequent
coping products experienced at one stage serves as the
886
Reorienting
Processes
1
Vulnerability Level
Protective
Factors
Risk
Contributors
5
Life Stage Outcomes
Productive
Unproductive
Goal Seeking
(Tertiary Coping and
Orienting) Processes
Proximal
Processes
4
Emergent Identities:
Stable Coping Responses
Positive
Negative
Identity Formation
(Secondary Coping)
Processes
2
Net Stress
(Engagement) Level
Social
Supports
Challenges
3
Reactive Coping Strategies
Adaptive
Maladaptive
As suggested by the literatures reviewed and synthesized, high risk assessments without the consideration of
available protective factors have generally represented the
analyses of youth of color. At the same time, unacknowledged White privileging views about European Americans
are generally not associated with estimates of vulnerability (i.e., only protective factors such as social class are
considered). As suggested and more problematic, the high
performance often associated with middle-income European Americans is assumed to be the expected norm for
all youth; outliers are considered deviant or atypical. As
illustrated, two groups are usually compared when conducting research with diverse youth; middle-income
Whites are invariably compared with a group or groups of
low-resource marginalized group youth. This lack of
equivalent sample comparisons, as described in an early
section of the paper, remains a significant problem in the
developmental literature on child development. However,
as illustrated in Figure 15.21 and when compared against
Figure 15.22, there remain conceptual shortcomings and
simplistic assumptions when dual analyses of vulnerability are provided.
As suggested, as a dual axis model of vulnerability,
too frequently Quadrant I is assumed to be poor and mi-
Primary
Coping
Processes
Figure 15.20 Processes Emphasizing Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory (PVEST). Source: From
Spencer & Harpalani, 2004.
High
Low
(Not Evident)
PROTECTIVE
FACTOR
LEVEL
(Presence/
Experience)
High
(Significant
Presence)
Low
Special Needs
or Deviant:
Atypical
High Performance:
Considered
the Norm
High
Low
(Not Evident)
PROTECTIVE
FACTOR
LEVEL
(Presence/
Experience)
High
(Significant
Presence)
Low
Quadrant I
Special Needs
Deviant: Atypical
(Assumed to be poor
and/or minority status)
Quadrant II
(Assumed non-existent
or ignored)
Quadrant III
(Assumed
non-existent)
Quadrant IV
High Performing:
Considered the Norm
(Assumed to be
middle income [MI]
or non-minority status)
Figure 15.22 Shortcomings and assumptions of a traditional dual axis model. Source: Adapted from Introduction:
The Syndrome of the Psychologically Vulnerable Child
(pp. 310), by E. J. Anthony, in The Child in His Family:
Children at Psychiatric Risk, E. J. Anthony and C. Koupernik
(Eds.), 1974, New York: Wiley.
887
Low
(Not Evident)
PROTECTIVE
FACTOR
LEVEL
(Presence/
Experience)
High
(Significant
Presence)
High
Low
Special Needs
Evident:
Quadrant I
(Highly Vulnerable)
Resilience Expected:
Quadrant III
(Low Vulnerability)
Untested:
Quadrant IV
(Undetermined
Vulnerability)
Figure 15.23 PVEST-linked vulnerability level and resiliency predicting dual axis coping outcome model. Source:
Adapted from Introduction: The Syndrome of the Psychologically Vulnerable Child (pp. 310), by E. J. Anthony, in
The Child in His Family: Children at Psychiatric Risk, E. J.
Anthony and C. Koupernik (Eds.), 1974, New York: Wiley.
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Steinberg, L. (1985). Adolescence. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Stevenson, H. C. (1997). Missed, dissed, and pissed: Making
meaning of neighborhood risk, fear and anger management in
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Stoler, A. L. (2002). Racial histories and their regimes of truth. In P.
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Sullivan, M. (1989). Getting paid: Youth, crime and work in the inner
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Swanson, D., Cunningham, M., & Spencer, M. B. (2003). Black males
structural conditions, achievement patterns, normative needs, and
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Swanson, D. P., & Spencer, M. B. (1999). Developmental and cultural
context considerations for research on African American adoles-
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CHAPTER 16
interdisciplinary research, a policy approach, a philosophy, an academic major, a program description, and a
professional identity (e.g., youth development worker).
The idea of positive youth development reaches into a
number of fields, including child and adolescent developmental psychology, public health, health promotion,
prevention, sociology, social work, medicine, and education. Within the past few years, positive youth development has been a focal topic in a wide range of scholarly
journals, including The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science (January, 2004), Prevention and Treatment (June, 2002), The Prevention Researcher (April, 2004), and the American Journal of
Health Behavior (July, 2003). Two established research
journals, Applied Developmental Science and New Directions in Youth Development, help to ground the field.
Undergirding positive youth development is an important and growing line of scientific inquiry, including theory, research, and a set of conceptual models
and frameworks that both guide and emerge from the
research. This chapter: (a) defines the concept of positive youth development; ( b) presents a broad theory of
this sphere of human development; (c) examines empirical support for a series of theory-driven hypotheses;
and (d) proposes implications for theory reformulation,
future research, and applications.
DEFINING POSITIVE
YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
As noted, the field of positive youth development encompasses a vast territory of disciplines, concepts, and
strategies. One recent review of positive youth development (Benson & Pittman, 2001a) suggests four distinguishing features of this field. It is comprehensive in its
scope, linking a variety of: (1) ecological contexts (e.g.,
relationships, programs, families, schools, neighborhoods, congregations, communities) to (2) the production of experiences, supports, and opportunities known
to (3) enhance positive developmental outcomes. Its primary organizing principle is promotion (of youth access
to positive experiences, resources and opportunities,
and of developmental outcomes useful to both self and
society). It is, as the term implies, developmental, with
emphasis on growth and an increasing recognition that
youth can (and should be) deliberate actors in the production of positive development. And it is symbiotic,
drawing into its orbit ideas, strategies, and practices
from many lines of inquiry (e.g., resiliency, prevention,
public health, community organizing, developmental
psychology).
Damon (2004; Damon & Gregory, 2003) argues that
positive youth development represents a sea change in
psychological theory and research, with observable consequences for a variety of fields including education and
social policy. Three central themes are noted here. In
Damons view, positive youth development takes a
strength-based approach to defining and understanding
the developmental process. More precisely, it emphasizes the manifest potentialities rather than the supposed incapacities of young people . . . (2004, p. 15).
There is more to this statement than initially meets the
eye. It connotes a significant critique of mainstream
psychological inquiry that is quite ubiquitous in the positive youth development literature. This critique is that
understandings of child and adolescent development
have been so dominated by the exploration and remediation of pathology and deficit that we have an incom-
895
896
Contexts
Person
897
Developmental Success
Work Place
Peers
Family
(a)
(b)
View of
the Child
(c)
Developmental
Strengths
(d)
Reduction in
High-Risk
Behaviors
(e)
Promotion
of Health
Well-Being
Thriving
Community
Congregrations
Programs
Figure 16.1
School
Neighborhoods
898
of Chicagos experimental Community Youth Development Program, an initiative designed to identify and organize community resources to better serve youth with
special problems or special abilities (Havighurst,
1953).
Federal agencies dealing with juvenile delinquency
expanded on their earlier efforts and took another
important conceptual step. In 1970, the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration
( housed in what was then the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare) developed a delinquency prevention program based on what keeps good kids on
track rather than the more prevalent question of the
day ( why do kids get into trouble?; West, 1974). The
federal answer to the question of why some youth succeed had four components: a sense of competence, a
sense of usefulness, a sense of belonging, and a sense of
power (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Administration for Children and Families, 1996, p. 4).
In these state and federal approaches to addressing
troubled and troubling youth, we see the early signs of
two cornerstones of contemporary youth development
approaches: the primacy of context for shaping development and development understood in terms of strength
rather than deficit. Though such ideas hardly seem like
intellectual advances now, it is important to note how
these ideas came to challenge historical and deeply entrenched therapeutic models.
Subsequently, a number of prominent foundations entered the picture. In addition to major youth development grant programs at the Kellogg Foundation, the
Lilly Endowment, and the Kauffman Foundation, the
Carnegie Corporation of New York and the William T.
Grant Foundation sponsored and broadly disseminated
pivotal reports on the developmental trajectories of
American youth. Moving beyond the question of how society best deals with its so-called at-risk youth, these
influential reports began to document more persistent
and pervasive issues about health and well-being of
American youth. To some extent, the reports expanded
the need for enhancing developmental supports and opportunities to include most young people.
In 1985, the Carnegie Corporation launched the
Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development. The concluding report, Great Transitions: Preparing Adolescents for a New Century, sought to focus the national
spotlight on adolescence (Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, 1995). The report, like many before
it, lamented not only the high rates of high risk behaviors (e.g., alcohol use, illicit drug use, teen pregnancy)
899
900
The second social analysis common in the youth development literature is a critique of deficit models
prominent in the service professions, policy, and research. Indeed, it is a somewhat common refrain that
At first glance, it would appear that positive youth development represents a theoretical, research and practice
paradigm shift from the prevention fielda multidisciplinary area of inquiry, programming, policy, and
practice with a substantial American history (Wandersman & Florin, 2003; Weissberg, Kumpfer, & Seligman,
2003). However, a considerable debate is underway about
the conceptual overlap between prevention and positive
youth development (Benson et al., 2004; Bumbarger &
Greenberg, 2002; Catalano & Hawkins, 2002; Roth &
Brooks-Gunn, 2003; Sesma, Mannes, & Scales, in press;
Small & Memmo, 2004).
Prevention and prevention science are deeply rooted
in public health and epidemiological approaches to disease prevention (Bloom, 1996; Small & Memmo, 2004),
with a particular focus on crafting interventions before
the onset of significant problems, and with a focus on
populations known to be at risk for such onset (Durlak,
1998; Munz, Mrazek, & Haggerty, 1996). This form of
prevention has been called primary prevention, in contrast to secondary and tertiary prevention (Caplan,
1964), or in more contemporary parlance, universal prevention in contrast to targeted prevention (Weissberg
et al., 2003). At the center of current prevention research
are the concepts of risk factors and protective factors
(Jessor, 1993; Jessor, Turbin, & Costa, 1998; Rutter,
1987). Risk factors are individual and/or environmental
markers which increase the probability of a negative
outcome. Protective factors are safeguards identified in
epidemiological research that help individuals cope suc-
901
cessfully with risk. As noted by Rutter (1987), protective factors operate only when risk is present.
There are important points of overlap and of difference when comparing positive youth development with
this major risk and protective factor approach to prevention. The two approaches partially agree on developmental goals. That is, both are dedicated to reducing
problem behaviors and negative outcomes. At the same
time, however, positive youth development tends to place
as much or more focus on promoting additional approaches to health, including thriving skill-building and
competency (Bumbarger & Greenberg, 2002; Pittman &
Fleming, 1991). There is also some overlap in understanding the processes and mechanisms involved in the
production of successful development. Some of the socalled protective factors that buffer risk and reduce negative outcomes also play a role in the production of
positive outcomes (Catalano, Hawkins, Berglund, Pollard, & Arthur, 2002). Alternatively, positive youth development research also identifies a series of additional
supports, opportunities, and developmental assets
whose identification emerges from investigations of environmental and individual factors that promote competence, achievement, growth, and thriving (Benson,
2003a; Lerner, 2004; Scales, Benson, Leffert, & Blyth,
2000). Hence, protective factors and the broader range
of developmental resources central to positive youth development are not isomorphic.
At another level, however, prevention and positive
youth development are grounded in quite different theoretical orientations andthough yoked by common interest in the health of youthspring forth from quite
different visions of youth potential and the developmental, ecological, and social processes at play (Damon &
Gregory, 2003; Lerner, 2004).
902
Human Development
Central to positive youth development theory is a series
of questions rooted squarely in the discipline of developmental psychology. The overarching goals of this theory
are to explain: the capacity of youth to change and to
change in a direction that fosters both individual wellbeing and the social good; how and under what conditions contextual and ecological factors contribute to this
change (and how these factors are informed or influenced by the developing person); and, the principles and
mechanisms that are at play in maximizing the dynamic
and developmentally constructive interplay of context
and individual.
The articulation of a developmental theory of positive youth development is itself an ongoing and dynamic process emerging several decades after the
birthing of positive youth development as a field of
practice (Benson & Saito, 2001; Hamilton & Hamilton,
2004; Larson, 2000; Zeldin, 2000). Zeldin (2000) provides an important analysis of how the science of youth
development emerged:
[I]n hindsight, it is clear that positive youth development,
as a philosophy of service and as a field of study was initiated and grounded in the expertise of practitioners, primarily those working in nonprofit, community-based,
youth-serving organizations. Research was used primarily
to offer empirical justification for exemplary practice
that was already occurring in communities. (p. 3)
903
904
ones engagement with social and symbolic environments (1998, 1999). His assumption is that persons reflect on, learn from, and use feedback from their social
engagements creating behavioral intentions that guide
subsequent behavior. While this proposed dynamic has
currency across the life span, it is a hallmark of adolescence. There are a range of possible constraints on how
the person self-regulates internal engagements with her
or his social and symbolic worlds. As Brandtstdter suggests these constraints lie partly or even completely
outsides ones span of control, but they decisively structure the range of behavioral and developmental options
(1998, p. 808).
In addition to intentionality, there are selection and
optimization processes that also inform how persons
interact with their environments. Aligned with Baltes
and his colleagues (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Baltes,
Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 1984; Baltes, Lindenberger,
& Staudinger, 1998), positive youth development theory
posits that youth select from a range of developmental
supports and opportunities a subset that has psychological and social advantage for prioritized personal goals.
Selection, then, has to do with both ones preferences
(e.g., to learn to play the flute, to find friends, to experiment with drama) and the ecologies one chooses to be
the primary crucibles for development. Optimization is
the process of acquiring, refining, coordinating, and
applying goal-relevant means or resources toward the
selected targets (Lerner, 2002, p. 224). Critical issues in
the applied youth development world include: how well
communities provide meaningful opportunities for optimization; and how well communities make it possible
for youth to create optimization opportunities (e.g., to
begin a new sports or arts program, or to attach oneself
to an appropriate mentor).
The self-regulation of context engagementeven
when buoyed with an internal press guided by intentionality, selection, and optimizationcreates something of
a conundrum for those on whom the constraints on action appear sizable. These constraints, which are well
articulated in a number of life span and life course theories (e.g., Elder, 1974, 1980, 1998, 1999; Nesselroade,
1977; Schaie, 1965), can have strong salience during
adolescence. Youth, after all, both seek control and are
controlled, with many agents in their lives who, by
virtue of position and power, can either suppress or encourage exploration, selection, and optimization.
Among this army of socialization agents are parents,
neighbors, teachers, youth workers, coaches, clergy, em-
multiple contexts. Developmental systems theories derive concepts of developmental regulation from the idea
of relative plasticity. As persons actively regulate their
development, developmental change occurs in the mutual exchange between person and context. Adaptive
( healthy) developmental regulation occurs when there is
a balance between individual capacity or strengths and
the growth-promoting influences of the social world
(Lerner, 2004, p. 44).
Positive youth development, then, occurs in the fusion of an active, engaged, and competent person with
receptive, supportive, and nurturing ecologies. The consequences of these balanced interactionsparticularly
when they are frequent and sustainedcan be seen at
both the individual and social level. Among these hypotheses are the advancement of individual thriving and
the reduction of health-compromising behaviors (Benson, 1997; Benson et al., 1998; Lerner, 2004; Lerner &
Benson, 2003; Scales, Benson, et al., 2000). A common
vocabulary in positive youth development for describing
these effects is the five Cs: competence, confidence,
connection, character, and caring (or compassion;
NRCIM, 2002; Lerner, 2004; Lerner et al., 2000; Roth &
Brooks-Gunn, 2003) has written extensively about a
6th C fueled by adaptive developmental regulations:
contribution. In his frame, the six Cs are essential not
only for individual well-being but also for the creation
of healthy and civil society.
Several recent lines of inquiry are congruent with
this thinking. The goodness-of-fit model, for example,
demonstrates the adaptive consequences of good
matches between individual competencies and needs
with the demands, features, and responsiveness of developmental settings, such as families and schools (Bogenschneider, Small, & Tsay, 1997; Chess & Thomas, 1999;
Galambos & Turner, 1999; Thomas & Chess, 1977).
Similarly, Eccles and her colleagues (Eccles, 1997; Eccles & Harold, 1996), employing a stage-environment fit
model, demonstrate how embeddedness in developmentally appropriate environments such as schools influences motivation and academic achievement.
As we note later in this chapter, the issue of diversity
is central to positive youth development. Spencer and her
colleagues (Spencer, 1995, 1999; Spencer, Dupree, &
Hartmann, 1997) provide a particularly important refinement and extension of the kinds of ecological and
systems dynamics shaping the theory of youth development. Central to her phenomenological variant of ecological systems theory (PVEST), Spencer uses the concept
905
906
Religiosity
Belief in a moral order
Social Skills
Prosocial Peer Attachment
Resilient Temperament
Sociability
TABLE 16.1
Category
External Assets
Definition
1. Family support
4. Caring neighborhood
8. Youth as resources
9. Service to others
Young person serves in the community one hour or more per week.
Support
Empowerment
10. Safety
Family has clear rules and consequences and monitors the young
persons whereabouts.
Category
Commitment to learning
Internal Assets
Definition
23. Homework
Young person reads for pleasure three or more hours per week.
26. Caring
28. Integrity
29. Honesty
30. Responsibility
31. Restraint
Positive values
Social competencies
(continued)
907
908
TABLE 16.1
Continued
Category
Positive identity
External Assets
Definition
Young person feels he or she has control over things that happen
to me.
38. Self-esteem
Source: From All Kids Are Our Kids: What Communities Must Do to Raise Caring and Responsible Children and Adolescents, by P. Benson,
1997, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
internal assets are placed in four categories: (1) commitment to learning, (2) positive values, (3) social competencies, and (4) positive identity. The scientific foundations
for the eight categories and each of the 40 assets are described in a series of publications (Scales & Leffert,
1999, 2004; Scales et al., 2004).
The 2002 report from The National Research Council
and Institute of Medicine, Community Programs to Promote Positive youth Development (NRCIM, 2002), used
the concept of assets to describe the experiences,
supports, and opportunities which facilitate both successful passage through adolescence and optimal transition into the next phase of lifeadulthood (p. 67).
Parallel to Search Institutes distinction between external and internal assets, this national report used the language of personal and social assets. The authors
used three types of empirical studies to identify assets:
studies linking the personal and social assets to indicators of positive current development, studies linking
these characteristics to indicators of future positive
adult development, and experimental studies designed to
change the asset under study (p. 82).
The committee of scholars charged with creating this
report then identified 28 personal and social assets. Unlike Search Institutes developmental asset taxonomy,
the 28 indicators are all personological in nature and do
not include the same balance of contextual factors and
individual-level factors. Nonetheless, there is considerable overlap between the two taxonomies. Table 16.2
displays the NRCIM taxonomy of personal and social assets. It should be noted, however, that the committee
also created a conceptual model of the features of positive developmental settings. These provide some parallel thinking to the concept of external assets. These
features will be discussed in the next section.
Embedded in both the developmental asset model and
the National Research Council report are three explicit
hypotheses, each of which will be evaluated later in this
chapter. The first has to do with the additive or cumulative nature of the elements called assets. The assumption is that the more assets, the better. The National
Research Council Report frames it this way: adolescents with more personal and social assets . . . have a
greater chance of both current well-being and future
success (NRCIM, 2002, p. 42). Benson and his colleagues (Benson, 2003a; Benson et al., 1998; Benson,
Scales, & Mannes, 2003) refer to the longitudinal expression of this principle as the vertical pile up of assets. Both streams of thought also contend that this
principle of accumulated assets generalizes to multiple
forms of behaviorfrom prevention of high risk behavior to the enhancement of positive outcomes such as
school success (Benson et al., 2003; NRCIM, 2002;
Scales & Roehlkepartain, 2003).
Closely related is the idea of the pile up of supportive contexts. That is, positive development is also
enhanced when many settings collaboratewhether intentional or notin generating the kinds of supports
and opportunities known to promote assets. In the
words of the National Research Council (2002),
Research shows that the more settings that adolescents experience reflecting these features, the more likely they
are to acquire the personal and social assets linked to both
current and future well-being. (p. 43)
909
resources/assets have currency for youth in all social locations. This claim is particularly clear in both the National Research Council report and the research
undergirding the developmental asset model. At the same
time, however, both models testify to the diversity of
methods and procedures for promoting assets, and to the
importance of creating strategies of asset-building that
are crafted with deep sensitivity to the experience, wis-
dom and capacity of people within particular racial, ethnic, religious, and economic groups (Hamilton et al.,
2004).
The third assumption is one that arguably is the
strongest point of theoretical consensus across scholars,
research programs, and practitioners within the positive
youth development field. This is the belief that assets
are enhanced when contexts and settings are configured
910
Theory of
Human
Development
personal and social assets are enhanced by positive developmental settings. (NRCIM, 2002, p. 43)
Not surprisingly, then, there is a considerable research tradition on how, and under what conditions,
contexts and ecologies promote positive development.
This body of work shifts the unit of analysis from the
person to contexts, environments, and communities.
Accordingly, it draws us into a number of fields beyond
developmental psychology in which such inquiry is
more at home. We suggest that a theory of person, context, and their intersection such as suggested earlier
in this chapter is a necessary but not sufficient set
of ideas for delineating the territory, scope, and
uniqueness of positive youth development. The major
lacuna in our discussion to this point is the idea of intentional change. At the heart of positive youth development thinking and research is the question of how
the healthy/ balanced/adaptive fusion of person and
context can be enhanced. It is this ideathis possibility of creating changethat has fueled practice for
several decades and, more recently, is fueling research
and policy.
A theory of positive youth development, then, is incomplete without incorporating the concept of intentional change. Without doing so, we have a theory of
adolescent developmentnot positive youth development. Intentional change is the purposeful effort to enhance the fusion of person and context in a healthy
direction. Because of the dynamic bidirectionality of
this interaction, there are three major points of potential
intervention. The three of these, in combination, increase the probability of adaptive developmental regulation. These are:
1. Increasing the developmental-attentiveness of contexts
(to increase their capacity to nurture, support, and
constructively challenge the developing person).
2. Enhancing the skills and competencies of youth (to further enable their natural capacity to engage with,
connect, change, and learn from their social contexts).
3. Creating processes and opportunities to invite youth to
actively exercise and utilize their capacity to engage
with and change their social contexts. In practice and
research, this form of intentional change travels under
Theory of
Context and
Community
Influence
Figure 16.2
development.
Theory of
Context and
Community
Change
911
Benson et al. (2003) enumerated five aspects of relationships germane to positive youth development. First,
supportive relationships with both immediate and extended family members have been shown, in multiple
studies and multiple demographic settings, to enhance
developmental strengths and provide a protective buffer
against risk (Rhodes & Roffman, 2003). Second, supportive relationships with nonparental adults can be
equally compelling in advancing positive development,
particularly during adolescence (Scales, Benson, &
Mannes, 2002; Scales & Leffert, 2004; Scales, Leffert,
& Vraa, 2003). Third, the number of supportive adult
relationships may provide an additive impact: As the
912
number of nurturing relationships increase, probabilities for the presence of developmental strengths such as
caring values, self-esteem, and a positive view of ones
future also may increase (Benson, 1997). An additional
axiom about nonparental adults has to do with the sustainability of relationships. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the strength-building capacity of nonparental
adult connections increases proportionately with the
length of the relationship.
Fourth, exposure to positive peer influencedefined, for example, as peer modeling of prosocial and
achievement valuescan both advance developmental
strengths and inhibit risk behaviors (Leffert et al., 1998;
Scales, Benson, et al., 2000). Finally, the developmental
advantage of relationships is enhanced by three factors:
their quality, their quantity, and their sustainability.
The second theme identified by Bronfenbrenner and
Morris (1998) has to do with the importance and certainty of activity. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) has compellingly made the case that certain kinds of activities
instigate development in his work on flow or the psychology of optimal performance. Csikszentmihalyi has
documented the phenomenon of flow in people like rock
climbers, dancers, and others who engage in highly
TABLE 16.3
Feature
Descriptors
Physical and
psychological safety
Safe and health-promoting facilities, practice that increases safe peer group interaction and decreases unsafe
or confrontational peer interactions
Appropriate structure
Limit setting, clear and consistent rules and expectations, firm-enough control, continuity and predictability,
clear boundaries, and age-appropriate monitoring
Supportive relationships
Warmth, closeness, connectedness, good communication, caring, support, guidance, secure attachment, and
responsiveness.
Opportunities to belong
Opportunities for meaningful inclusion, regardless of ones gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation or
disabilities; social inclusion, social engagement and integration; opportunities for sociocultural identity
formation; and support for cultural and bicultural competence
Rules of behavior, expectations, injunctions, ways of doing things, values and morals, and obligations for
service
Youth-based, empowerment practices that support autonomy, making a real difference in ones community,
and being taken seriously; practices that include enabling, responsibility granting, and meaningful challenge;
practices that focus on improvement rather than on relative current performance levels
Opportunity for
skill building
Opportunities to learn physical, intellectual, psychological, emotional, and social skills; exposure to
intentional learning experiences; opportunities to learn cultural literacies, media literacy, communication
skills, and good habits of mind; preparation for adult employment and opportunities to develop social and
cultural capital
Integration of family, school, Concordance; coordination and synergy among family, school and community.
and community efforts
Source: From Community Programs to Promote Youth Development: Committee on Community-Level Programs for Youth, by the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, J. Eccles and J. A. Gootman (Eds), Board on Children, Youth and Families, Division of Behavioral
and Social Sciences and Education, 2002, Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
913
vices delivery systems (Dorgan & Ferguson, 2004; Dryfoos, 1990; Mannes et al., 2003).
The construct of social capital elucidates why community mobilization is important and points to some avenues for action. Coleman (1990, p. 304) describes
social capital as contained in human relationships.
Human capital includes a persons competencies. Just
like human capital and financial capital, social capital
makes it possible for people to be productive, to accomplish tasks. Coleman points out that social capital is
greater in social networks with a high degree of closure, meaning that many people know each other, communicate, and trust each other (pp. 319320).
Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson, 2001; Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, &
Earls, 1997) have identified community mechanisms
that facilitate the generation of social capital. Chief
among these is the idea of collective efficacy, which signifies an emphasis on shared beliefs in a neighborhoods conjoint capability for action to achieve an
intended effect, and hence an active sense of engagement on the part of residents (Sampson, 2001, p. 10).
Benson and his colleagues (Benson, 1997; Benson et al.,
1998) have suggested that one important source of collective efficacy is a shared community vocabulary of
developmental assets aligned with a publicly shared understanding of the capacity of social contexts to effect
their acquisition.
The Theory of Context and Community Change
The third formulation in a comprehensive theory of positive youth-development focuses on the processes,
strategies, and tactics that can directly or indirectly alter
contexts and community. This is the least developed of
the three theoretical foundations of the theory we envision. One recent review of the science on how change
occurs has argued that a compelling question emerging
from new discoveries about the dynamic and bidirectional sources of positive development has to do with:
the processes and procedures of increasing access to developmental nutrients/assets on a rather massive scale.
And truth be told, though all architects of developmental
nutrient models are deeply interested in application, the
science of how change occurs is in its infancy. We have invested much more intellectual and research energy in
naming the positive building blocks of development and
demonstrating their predictive utility for enhancing health
and academic outcomes than in studying the complex
914
array of strategies and procedures for moving the developmental needle forward. (Benson, 2003b, p. 214)
915
2003) for the broad theoretical connection between developmental assets and developmental outcomes, both
concurrently and longitudinally. This is especially true
when considering as an independent variable the cumulative number of assets young people experience, or
comparing those young people with relatively higher
and lower levels of assets.
There is relative persuasiveness and consistency of
positive findings in the literature on the explanatory
power of positive youth development concepts. But
what level of explanation is reasonable to expect developmental assets or nutrients to provide for complex
outcomes? Luthar et al. (2000), for example, observe
that studies whose findings rest on main effects often
report effects of 10% to 20% for individual protective
factors. When interaction effects are necessary to explain the workings of such assets, effect sizes are far
smaller, in the 2% to 5% range. With both advocacy
and empirical work in recent years reflecting a shift
from merely documenting the impact of developmental
nutrients to studying the processes and interactions
that suggest how those nutrients contribute to outcomes (Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg, Heatherington, &
Bornstein, 2000; Davey, Eaker, & Walters, 2003;
Luthar et al., 2000), it may be expected that the size of
many reported effects will be disappointingly, but understandably, limited.
Ecological and developmental systems theory have
become the predominant frames of theoretical reference
for the study of child and adolescent development
(Lerner et al., 2002). Moreover, individual development
and broader community and social change processes increasingly are linked in positive youth development
frameworks (Benson et al., 1998, 2003; Connell & Kubisch, 2001; Hawkins & Catalano, 1996). These theoretical formulations imply that effects derived from
studies shaped by those theories and frameworks may be
quite modest, a conclusion supported in a recent review
by Wandersman and Florin (2003). All these factors
make it quite challenging scientifically to capture broad
community change in the service of positive youth development (Berkowitz, 2001).
With the preceding comments providing perspective
on the state-of-the-art in positive youth development research, we turn now to illustrating the evidence for each
of the major positive youth development hypotheses, we
can derive from our prior discussion of the theoretical
and practitioner bases of the concept of positive youth
development.
916
Hypothesis One
The first hypothesis is termed the contextual change hypothesis, and consists of two assumptions. First, contexts
can be intentionally altered to enhance developmental
success. And second, changes in these contexts change
the person.
There is abundant evidence that ecological contexts
can be changed to promote positive youth development,
as well as a wealth of data about why such approaches
have those positive effects. In most of this research, researchers have documented (usually, but not always) the
efficacy of intervention or prevention programs in providing youth with experiences that facilitate developmental outcomes. For example, from their review of 60
evaluations of youth development programs, Roth,
Brooks-Gunn, Murray, and Foster (1998) concluded:
[Y]outh development programs are best characterized by
their approach to youth as resources to be developed rather
than as problems to be managed, and their efforts to help
youth become healthy, happy, and productive by increasing
youths exposure to the external assets, opportunities and
supports. (p. 427)
The Social Development Research Group at the University of Washington conducted one of the most wideranging reviews of positive youth development programs
(Catalano et al., 2004). They identified 161 programs
and discussed in detail 25 that were well-evaluated and
showed significant effects on behavioral outcomes. The
programs had to have one or more of the following objectives about building developmental assets or nutrients: Promote bonding; foster resilience; promote social
competence; promote emotional competence; promote
cognitive competence; promote behavioral competence;
promote moral competence; foster self-determination;
foster spirituality; foster self-efficacy; foster clear and
positive identity; foster belief in the future; provide
recognition for positive behavior; provide opportunities
for prosocial involvement; and foster prosocial norms. In
addition, the programs had to address either multiple assets, or a single nutrient but across the multiple social
domains of family, school, or community. Programs that
addressed only a single asset in a single domain were excluded. Competence, self-efficacy, and prosocial norms
were addressed in all 25 programs, and most programs
dealt with at least 8 of the 15 nutrients. Most programs
used positive outcome measures as well as reduction of
problem behavior in their evaluations. Nineteen of the
25 programs demonstrated significant effects on positive youth development outcomes, including improvements in interpersonal skills, quality of peer and adult
relationships, self-control, problem solving, cognitive
competence, self-efficacy, commitment to school, and
academic achievement. In addition, 24 of the 25 showed
significant reductions in problem behaviors such as alcohol and other drug use, school problems, aggressive behavior, violence, and risky sexual behavior.
In a review of more than 1,200 studies of outcomes in
prevention programs for children and adolescents,
Durlak (1998) identified eight common protective factors across programs successful in preventing behavior
problems, school failure, poor physical health, and pregnancy among young people: Social support; personal
and social skills; self-efficacy; good parent-child relationships; positive peer modeling; high quality schools;
effective social policies; and positive social norms. The
resilience literature also suggests from the finding of
synchronous evidence from multiple studies using differing measurements, that there are three critical kinds
of protective factors: Close relationships with caring,
supportive adults, often in primary care-giving roles; effective schools; and positive relationships with prosocial adults in the wider community (Luthar et al., 2000).
In a meta-analysis of 177 primary prevention programs designed to prevent behavioral and mental health
problems among children and adolescents, Durlak and
Wells (1997) reported that most kinds of primary prevention programs (whether person- or environment-centered, and whether universal or targeted) contributed
both to reducing problems and increasing competencies.
However, only 15% of these programs attempted to
change childrens environments, despite the emphasis of
context in the major developmental systems and ecological theories that are the foundation of the positive youth
development field.
Developmental theories suggest that, because of the
fusion of person and context, variations or alterations in
developmental context should be associated with variations or alterations in developmental outcomes. For example, theories regarding the development of anti-social
behavior and violence typically posit several differing
trajectories. Children who are chronically high in antisocial behavior from childhood through adolescence, for
example, are seen as having biological or genetic vulnerabilities that manifest themselves in attention and concentration problems, which are associated both with
early school failure and peer rejection (Moffitt, 1993).
Poor parenting may also contribute to this pathway.
917
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of 6th, 8th, 10th, and 12th graders. They compared adolescents who were chronically interested as they went
about their lives, versus adolescents who reported being
habitually bored. The interested, engaged adolescents
had significantly higher global self-esteem, internal
locus of control, and optimism about their future, and
significantly less pessimism than the bored adolescents.
Hunter and Csikszentmihalyi (2003) reasoned that,
over time, engaged adolescents will develop more internal resources of confidence and enthusiasmmore
psychological capitalthan their disengaged peers,
because they view themselves as more effective agents
in constructing the flow of their lives. Moreover, their
openness and interested connection to their experiences
may both partly arise from their social capital in the
form of adults enhancing and guiding their interests,
and also help create further social capital, as their very
interested nature attracts others to them. Ryff and
Singer (1998) also ascribe high importance to the effect
that individuals perceptions of events or circumstances
have on psychological coping and how physiological
cascades unfold (p. 13) based on perceptions.
These theoretical descriptions of social and psychological capital, and the processes that link them, are
quite analogous to Benson et al.s (1998) formulation of
external and internal developmental assets being
key building blocks of success. Similar too is Lerner,
Wertlieb, and Jacobs (2003) elaboration of the reciprocal individual-context relations that are the heart of developmental systems theory.
Dworkin, Larsen, and Hansen (2003) also provide a
theoretical explanation of how youth participation in
one kind of developmental contextextracurricular or
community-based activitiesmight positively influence development through young peoples actions. They
postulated that such activities facilitate six different
developmental processes: Identity exploration; the development of initiative ( the capacity to direct attention and effort over time toward a challenging goal,
p. 18) and goal-directed behavior; growth in emotional
competencies; formation of new and varied peer network connections; development of social skills; and
the acquisition of social capital through developing
relationships with nonfamily adults. Dworkin et al.
concluded that a common thread connecting these
processes is that the young people participating in
youth programs were developing a sense of agency and
seeing themselves as producers of their own development. This empirical conclusion provides support for
919
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port of this hypothesis, studies consistently find constellations of developmental nutrients, including both
internal and external factors, to be associated with various outcomes. For example, Dukes and Stein (2001)
measured several protective factors, including: selfesteem, positive school attitudes, prosocial activities
( homework, clubs, service), purpose in life, and prosocial bonds (attitudes toward police officers). Outcomes
included drug use, delinquency, and weapons possession. A second-order factor comprising the assets predicted significantly fewer of those problem behaviors
among a sample of 13,000 6th to 12th grade students in
Colorado. Similarly, in the Add Health study, lower
levels of violence were significantly predicted by parent-family connectedness, parental expectations for education (weakly), and school connectedness. However,
parent-adolescent activities or self-esteem did not predict lower levels of violence (Resnick et al., 1997).
Leffert et al. (1998) studied a sample of nearly
100,000 youth from more than 200 U.S. communities.
They reported that a cluster of four assetspositive
peer influence, peaceful conflict resolution, school engagement, and safetyadded 30% to the explained variance of engagement in violence, compared to the 8%
explained by demographics.
Crosnoe, Erickson, and Dornbusch (2002) studied a
diverse sample of adolescents from nine California and
Wisconsin high schools. They reported that protection
against delinquency and substance use existed among
adolescents who experienced warm relations with parents, came from relatively well-organized households,
valued academic achievement, were engaged at school,
felt close to teachers, and performed well in school.
Catterall (1998) analyzed subsamples from the
National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 to explore the concepts of commitment resilience and academic resilience among 8th graders followed through
10th grade. Commitment resilience was the recovery by
10th grade of confidence in graduating among those
who in 8th grade had any degree of doubt about graduating. Academic resilience was the significantly better
performance in English of 10th-grade students who in
8th grade had C or lower grades in that subject. Both
kinds of resilience were fostered by a similar constellation of positive assets. These assets included family involvement in and supports for schooling (e.g., books in
the home, a place for studying, rules about TV watching
[for academic resilience only]), teacher responsiveness
( listening and being interested in students), fairness of
921
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enjoy more positive outcomes than children who experienced assets in only one of those contexts.
A test of the social development model (Catalano &
Kosterman, 1996) found an acceptable fit to predicting
drug use among 590 17- and 18-year-olds on the basis of
variables measuring prosocial and antisocial influences
from fifth grade through middle school. In addition to
prior drug use, the model includes such protective factors as: perceived opportunities and rewards for prosocial involvement ( knowing where to go to join clubs,
participating in family decisions, having lots of chances
for extracurricular activities), reported involvement in
prosocial activities (including church attendance and
membership in community groups), social competencies, attachment and bonding to prosocial others, and
belief in the moral order (e.g., importance of telling the
truth, whether it is okay to cheat). All the path coefficients for protective factors to drug use were significant
and in the expected direction.
In a study of 12,500 9th to 12th graders from the
original Add Health study pool of 7th to 12th graders,
Zweig, Phillips, and Lindberg (2002) reported that students with higher levels of protective factors (e.g., decision-making skills, participation in physical activities)
consistently had significantly lower levels of behaviors
such as sexual activity, alcohol use, binge drinking,
other drug use, fighting, and suicidal behaviors.
Similarly, Jessor et al. (1998) examined risk and protection especially among disadvantaged students, with
disadvantage defined by low parental occupational status, low parental education, and single-parent family
structure. The outcome variables of interest were school
engagement, low problem behavior, and a composite of
the two, labeled Making It. They reported that a protective factor index contributed about as much to variance in the successful outcomes as did a risk factor index.
For example, risk contributed 32% to the composite measure of Making It, compared to 26% for protection.
Benson and Roehlkepartain (2004) studied the relation of assets to substance use among a cross-sectional
sample of more than 217,000 6th to 12th graders. They
reported that young people with low levels of developmental assets (0 to 10 of the 40 assets) were from 2.4 to
4.4 times more likely to engage in different kinds of alcohol, tobacco, and other drug use than were students at
average or higher levels of assets (21 or more assets).
The effects of assets were stronger than that of SES or
living in a single-parent family.
The pile-up effect is seen for other outcomes as well.
For example, the overall level of evidence (Miller &
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925
of support, and boundaries and expectations. These results offer an additional provocative suggestion of the
role of developmental assets in protecting young people
from ATOD risks.
Participation in youth programs was found in both
the Scales, Benson, et al. (2000) and Scales and
Roehlkepartain (2003) Search Institute studies to be
linked to school success. In a study focusing on the role
of such extracurricular programs on posthigh school
educational achievement, Mahoney, Cairns, and Farmer
(2003) utilized the Carolina Longitudinal Study to
follow nearly 700 students annually from 4th grade
through 12th grade, interviewing them again when the
young people were 20. They found that consistency of
extracurricular participation was significantly associated with both interpersonal competence over time, as
well as with educational aspirations in late adolescence,
and both of those factors were linked to educational status (whether in postsecondary education or not) at age
20. The researchers explained the theoretical basis for
such results by noting that the peer and adult relationships and skills associated with sustained extracurricular activity participation promote social acceptance,
positive social identity development, less depressed
mood and anti-social behavior, school engagement, and
higher educational expectations.
In an analysis of several waves of data from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, Zaff,
Moore, Papillo, and Williams (2003) reported that volunteering 2 years after high school was significantly
more likely among students who enjoyed key developmental assets from grades 8 to 12, such as having high
levels of parental support and monitoring, positive peer
influences, and attendance at religious services. Moreover, if students consistently participated in extracurricular activities during grades 8 to 12regardless of
whether those activities were sports, schools clubs, or
community clubsthey were twice as likely to volunteer
and to have voted in local or national elections 2 years
after high school as students with only occasional extracurricular participation.
The overall pattern of these results suggests that developmental strengths provide some unique proportion
of influence over time in addition to their much more
substantial impact on concurrent developmental outcomes. In both their strong concurrent relations and
small to moderate longitudinal relations, they provide
support for the theoretical proposition that developmental assets positively affect developmental trajectories.
926
Hypothesis Six
The Community Hypothesis is based on the notion that
community is a viable focus for understanding and promoting dynamics crucial for maximizing context /person
relationships. By analogy to public health, the largest
improvements in positive youth development will occur
in response to interventions/initiatives that are aimed at
changing communities more so than those aimed at individuals. How the community is defined depends on the
target(s) of the intervention /initiative.
The inadequacy of individual treatment is related to
the principles of public health and prevention. Despite
dramatic improvements in medical treatment, Kreipe,
Ryan, and Seibold-Simpson (2004, p. 104) point out that
Improved sanitation, work environments, and immunization programs as well as safety measures . . . have
done more to improve health than one-to-one medical
treatment.
Similarly, community mobilization to promote positive youth development must address not only formal
organizations and programs but also informal norms
and relationships. Studies show that youth do better in
communities where adults share some basic values,
norms, and expectations, including understandings
about what kind of behavior is acceptable and what to
do when someone crosses the line (Damon, 1997;
Sampson et al., 1997).
In this section, we refer to community as the interlocking systems of contexts, ecologies, and settings that
moderate developmental growth. Accordingly, there are
within this broad conception a wide range of influences
on development, including family, neighborhood, school,
playground, and congregation, the relationships inside
and beyond these settings, and the policy, business and
economic infrastructure of a community.
Tolan, Gorman-Smith, and Henry (2003) conducted a
6-year longitudinal study of several hundred African
American and Latino adolescent males and their primary caretakers. As predicted by bioecological theory
(Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998), they reported a complex relationship among community structural characteristics, neighborhood processes, parenting practices,
and youths violent behavior. Neighborhood concentrated poverty and high crime levels were found to predict the extent of perceived neighborhood problems and
neighborliness, as well as directly to predict parenting
practices, such that high poverty and crime were related
to more restrictive parenting, which reduced violence by
limiting youths gang involvement.
lives, such as with neighbors, is potentially more farreaching but has been less well studied. The limited evidence suggests that only 15% of young people report
experiencing a rich level of relationships with adults
other than parents (Scales, 2003; Scales et al., 2002).
But the climate of social expectations is crucial.
Sixty-two percent of U.S. adults with strong social expectations for involvement are highly engaged with
other peoples children, versus 41% for those who feel
only moderate expectations, 22% for those with mild
expectations, and just 9% for those with weak social
expectations for involvement (Scales, 2003). Consequently, although studies regularly demonstrate the effect of community as a source of developmental
assets, potentiation of the full range of possible positive community impact on youth development requires
attention to changing existing social norms about adultyouth engagement.
Some of the more ambitious efforts to intervene at
the level of community have been initiated by national
foundations. The Kellogg Youth Initiative Partnerships
(KYIP) were launched in 1987 to assist three Michigan
communities in expanding beyond investment in fixing
young peoples problems to community collaborations
engaged in promoting youth potential. Combining service integration with youth development principles and a
focus on school reform, the Annie E. Casey Foundation
in 1987 launched New Futures, a 5-year demonstration
project in five cities with high percentages of high-risk
youth. In 1995, with funding from a consortium of foundations, Public/ Private Ventures (P/ PV) launched its
Community Change for Youth Development Initiative
(CCYD). The CCYD provided communities with a set
of research-based core principles and with strategies for
implementing them. Among the principles were adult
support and guidance and structured activities during
nonschool hours.
None of these initiatives reported large and consistent effects in terms of outcomes for youth. However,
new programs, organizations, and leaders demonstrated enduring impact. For example, 5 years after
New Futures funding was ended, investigators (Hahn &
Lanspery, 2001) attributed change that abides to the
ripeness of the communities for change, including
leadership, a widespread recognition of problems, and
utilization of other resources and initiatives with compatible goals.
In a similar vein, a report from the Kellogg Foundation (n.d.) after the 1st decade of KYIP stressed the
critical importance of engaging the community. Such
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928
young people, and how those effects may vary as a function of varying realities of person-context fusion.
Hypothesis Seven
The Universality/ Diversity Hypothesis proposed that
there are developmental supports and opportunities that
enhance developmental success for all youth; strategies
and tactics for promoting them vary. Moreover, because all youth need developmental assets, many community-level interventions will benefit all or almost all
youth. However, youth with few or no assets may require interventions targeted to them and their specific
needs. One of the functions of those extraordinary interventions is to enable those youth to benefit from
more universal interventions.
There are likely variations in the degree to which
developmental assets can explain developmental outcomes, and in which assets may be most critical in promoting specific outcomes, depending on differences
among young peoples contexts and developmental
histories. But studies (e.g., reviews in Montemayor,
Adams, & Gullotta, 2000; Scales et al., 2004; Scales &
Leffert, 2004) suggest significant theoretical and practical insights relevant for most if not all groups of
young people in looking at their development through a
strength-based lens.
However, compared to the literature on developmental strengths and young people of differing gender, age,
racial /ethnic groups, and socioeconomic status, there is
a dearth of empirical work on relating developmental
strengths to other dimensions of diversity, such as sexual orientation, family background, or differing exposure to violence. Goldfried and Bell (2003), for example,
describe literature on sexual minorities as essentially
ignored in mainstream psychology and adolescent development. The available evidence suggests that at least
some developmental strengths, such as self-esteem and,
particularly, family support, seem to diminish or eliminate differences in mental or behavioral health problems
among both sexual majority and minority youth (Blum,
Beuhring, & Rinehart, 2000).
Gender
Studies consistently find that females report higher
levels of most developmental assets than do males,
with the exception of self-esteem (see reviews by
Scales & Leffert, 2004; Scales et al., 2004). The consistency of such findings across studies and measures
provides evidence for the validity of this basic conclusion. However, these systematic differences may be
produced by a lack of measures tapping potential assets that may be more common among young men (e.g.,
assertiveness, competitiveness). Reported gender differences in some assets also may be a result of systematic response biases from young people responding in
gender-typed ways (e.g., girls greater reporting of
prosocial attitudes and behaviorsEisenberg & Fabes,
1998). Apart from frequency differences, however, numerous studies suggest that assets may operate somewhat differently for males and females.
Huebner and Betts (2002) used social control theory
to frame a study of 911 7th to 12th graders from a mining community in the southwest. They found that both
attachment bonds (connections to parents, unrelated
adults, and peers) and involvement bonds (time in
school and nonschool activities, including time in religious activities, volunteering, and clubs or organizations) predicted less delinquency and greater academic
achievement (self-reported grades). Involvement bonds
predicted delinquency more for males than females,
and attachment bonds predicted grades more for females than for males.
Hollister-Wagner et al. (2001) studied resiliency with
regard to aggression ( beating up a peer). In a large sample of rural eighth and ninth graders, they found support
for the role of protective factors in reducing violence for
females, but not males. The researchers reasoned that
exposure to aggressive models, and social reinforcement
for aggression, is sufficiently stronger for males that
protective factors, although still positive, have a weaker
influence on them.
Age
High school students consistently are found to report
fewer developmental assets than do middle school students. For example, in a cross-sectional sample of more
than 217,000 6th to 12th graders, whose average number
of 40 assets was 19.3, 6th graders reported 23.1 assets,
8th graders reported 19.6, and 10th graders reported
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930
Scales, Benson, et al. (2000) also reported that specific clusters of assets could explain from 19% to 32% of
the variance in self-reported grades, over and above demographics, among six different racial /ethnic groups of
students. The assets of achievement motivation, school
engagement, time in youth programs, time at home, and
personal power meaningfully contributed to variance in
grades for three or more of the six racial /ethnic groups.
In an interview study with 45 male African American
gang members and 50 similar youth connected to community organizations, Taylor et al. (2003) found that the
nongang youth reported significantly more positive developmental experiences. However, across nine categories of
positive attributes that reflect developmental assets, an
average of 28% of the gang members scored above the
mean for the nongang youth, suggesting that a reservoir of
developmental strengths may exist among even deviant
youth assets that supports their positive growth. For example, more than one-third of the gang youth had more
positive relations with family and with school or education than the nongang youth, and a fifth had more positive
role models than did nongang youth. In a 1-year longitudinal analyses of this sample, Taylor et al. (2002) also
reported a sizeable correlation (.67, p .01) between
change in developmental assets from Time 1 to Time 2,
and changes in individual growth in positive personal and
social functioning. These findings point to two tentative
conclusions: (1) that the developmental assets that support
positive outcomes are not entirely absent even for young
people who currently are embedded in a behavioral and
social milieu marked by risks (e.g., gang violence, drugs,
and poor familial support) [and] . . . ambient problems of
poverty and racism (p. 513), and (2) that enhancing developmental assets may facilitate positive trajectories for
a subset of such challenged youth.
In another study of several hundred gang and nongang
adolescents, Li et al. (2002) also found, as expected, that
gang members on average reported fewer resilience factors in their lives. But like Taylor et al. (2003), Li et al.
also reported that gang and nongang youth were not significantly different on a number of those contributors to
resilience, including social problem-solving skills, selfesteem, physical activity, and academic performance.
That is, both these studies suggest that individual and
ecological characteristics that promote health and thriving exist among a substantial proportion of seemingly
lost young people, representing a potentially valuable
target of community actions to build better developmental paths for all young people.
931
932
youth development. Ryff and Singer (1998) struck a similar chord in talking about research on health among
older adults. Such research, they argued, routinely defines health by emphasizing the absence of negatives,
such as being unable to dress and feed oneself, at the expense of inquiring about the positive indicators of purpose and engagement in life that actually may better
predict health outcomes. To more accurately understand
health, they argued, questions should be asked about
what persons did today that was meaningful or fulfilling, or whether they love and care for others (p. 21).
Several recent efforts have emerged in response to both
the relative lack of emphasis on measuring positive outcomes, and the lack of a common core of measures to be
used across positive youth development studies. For example, Search Institute, the Institute for Applied Research in
Youth Development at Tufts University, and the Fuller
Theological Seminary, with strategic consultation from
Stanford University and the Thrive Foundation for Youth,
recently embarked on a multiyear Thriving Indicator
Project with the goal of producing effective measurement tools and resources on thriving that would be widely
used and developed from a foundation of deep science.
Initial activities have included a comprehensive review of the literature on thriving and related concepts,
and interviews with scholars, positive youth development practitioners, youth, and their parents that elicited
their views on what describes a thriving youth (King
et al., in press). A group of core dimensions of thriving
is emerging (e.g., Theokas et al., in press) that will then
serve as a lens to help focus development of thriving
measurement tools to be used in clinical, programmatic,
community change, and national tracking applications.
A similar effort, with the goal of developing and embedding common measures of positive youth development
outcomes in state and federal data tracking systems, is
being led by Child Trends. Scholars and policymakers are
recommending reliable, valid, and relatively brief measures in areas such as prosocial orientation, religiosity,
and social competencies (Moore & Lippman, 2004) that
could help track developmental strengths and contribute
to a long-term re-shaping of child and youth policy.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite differences in terminology and comprehensiveness, the similarities across models of positive youth development are apparent, and a substantial body of
research supports the hypotheses emerging from the
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teens are (or are not) becoming responsible citizens. Washington,
DC: Child Trends.
Zaff, J. F., Moore, K. A., Papillo, A. R., & Williams, S. (2003). Implications of extracurricular activity participation during adolescence on positive outcomes. Journal of Adolescent Research,
18, 599630.
Zeldin, S. (1995). Community-university collaborations for youth development: From theory to practice. Journal of Adolescent Research, 10(4), 449469.
Zeldin, S. (2000). Integrating research and practice to understand
and strengthen communities for adolescent development: An introduction to the special issue and current issues. Applied Developmental Science, 4(Suppl. 1), 210.
Zeldin, S. (2002). Sense of community and positive adult beliefs
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331342.
Zeldin, S. (2004). Youth as agents of adult and community development: Mapping the processes and outcomes of youth engaged in organizational governance. Applied Developmental Science, 8(2),
7590.
Zeldin, S., Kimball, M., & Price, L. (1995). What are the day-to-day
experiences that promote youth development? An annotated bibliography of research on adolescents and their families. Washington,
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CHAPTER 17
A Developmental Approach
943
A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
To explain religious and spiritual development requires
explaining the antecedents and consequences of religious
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945
Furthermore, in academia we now find a renewed interest in religion and spirituality as well as new theories
putting religion and spirituality at the very heart of
what it means to be human. We see this renewed interest
especially in the psychology of religion, which long ago
cast off ties restricting it to church religiousness and, in
recent times, turned to discussing diverse forms of spirituality (Argyle, 2000; Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997;
Hood, 1995; Hood et al., 1996; Wulff, 1991). And we
see that many scientists want to connect religious life
and the natural sciences through speculative reflection
(Reich, 2004). As for the new theories, we see them
suggesting religious and spiritual development is indispensable to human functioning. For example, today,
sociobiologists claim religiousness is determined genetically and that religion was and still is an important factor in evolutionary survival (Burkert, 1996; Daecke &
Schnakenberg, 2000; Wilson, 1998). Religion, they
argue, offers advantages of selection; sects especially
serve as examplessince they achieve selection by
strengthening group cohesiveness and because they foster aggression toward threatening entities outside the
group.
Thus renowned psychologists of religion (Hood et al.,
1996, p. 44) have asked, Is religion in our genes? In so
doing, they are thinking not about specific religions,
which are always marked and shaped in sociocultural
ways, but about a basic religious disposition, which according to Oerter (1980, p. 293), is activated when young
children become conscious of their temporally restricted
existence, an experience that leads to a preoccupation,
determined by nature, with religious and metaphysical
problems. Spirituality, too, has been seen as humanitys
answer to its own finite nature (Socha, 1999).
Modern, scientifically based theories of religion and
spirituality have explained religious and spiritual development as a means of satisfying the human need to exercise control, indeed, control over and above the mere
immanence of the here-and-now and into the great transcendent realm beyond (Flammer, 1994).
Throughout human evolution, belief in the divine has
worked because it has helped humans cope with threatening and difficult situations. In addition, religion has legitimized authority and created securitythrough oaths,
for example, but also through the expectation of reciprocity between sacrifice and reward (Burkert, 1996).
As another example of new theories giving a positive
view of religious and spiritual development, Huntington
(1998, p. 61) has theorized that every culture is based
946
on a religion, which, in the nature of a latent disposition, retains its power to grow and spread even after it
has been subjected to waves of secularization. Furthermore, cultural anthropologists point out that every culture produces a system of religious symbols, which
govern individuals relations with transcendence and
provide the ultimate systems of authority. This means
religion can be viewed as a precondition of culture, or
as springing from the same roots as culture (Ohlig
2002, p. 101).
However, discontinuity, boom, genetic issues, and
new developments are not the only terms to use to explain why Condorcets prognosis has been proven
wrong. Today, there are continuities with the past in
the way religiosity and spirituality are experienced.
Children and young people continue, as they did in the
past, to encounter religious phenomena such as church
buildings, saffron robed monks, religious sisters,
veiled Islamic schoolgirls, orthodox Jews with
yarmulkes and side locks, soccer players making the
sign of the cross, and people praying at a funeral. Furthermore, places of spirituality are still represented by
monasteries and convents, houses of retreat for spiritual exercises, and remote places for tranquility and
prayer. Spirituality also includes traditional ideas
negative ideas having to do with suffering and asceticism but also positive ideas having to do with affirming
life, being health conscious, and seeking happiness.
In sum, religion and spirituality are alive and thriving both in traditional ways and in ways not even imagined by Condorcet. Now, more than ever, we need to
understand this widespread and varied human phenomenonespecially by understanding its development.
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The scientific study of religious development dates back
to 1882, the year that G. Stanley Hall, in the context of
his Child Study, investigated childrens religious
imagination (see Huxel, 2000, 95 f ). However, the concept of religious development has a much longer history.
The books of the dead in ancient Egypt and Tibet described steps leading to the gods and Nirvana respectively. In the Bible, the Apostle Paul noted childrens
qualitatively different ways of being in the world when
he wrote, When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; when I became
an adult, I put away childish ways (1 Corinthians 13:11,
New Revised Standard Version).
In the Christian faith tradition, the concepts of development and stage have been used frequently to define
the religious and spiritual lifeso frequently that one
might suspect that current stage developmental theory is
rooted in the mind-set of this Western tradition. There
are many examples. Ambrosias, one of the early church
fathers (dec. 379), described four stages in the ascent to
God, and Benedict of Nursia (dec. 547) described normatively 12 stages of humility.
Mysticism has also played a central role in developing the concept of religious and spiritual development,
and, in recent times, some of the more famous stage
models of mystics have been compared to stage models
of modern theorists. Thus, M. J. Meadow (1992)
showed impressive parallels between Teresa of Avilas
seven stages leading to mystical union and Jane Loevingers model of ego development. Steele (1994) reconstructed John of the Crosss stages of spiritual
development in the light of transpersonal psychology,
and Oser (2002) compared the steps of the mystical
path in both Meister Eckhart and Margerethe Porete to
the stages of religious judgment as presented by Oser
and Gmnder (1991).
These prescientific descriptions of stages provide no
systematic theory or description of age changes. Rather,
they define an ideal for the total religious life. Nevertheless, they show that, early on, religious leaders made
frequent use of the metaphors of stage and step to give
their own developmental accounts.
The phenomenon of religious development was also
obvious to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (17121768). In
Emile (1762/1979), his novel on education, Rousseau observed younger childrens propensity to imagine God as
a person as well as their not understanding the abstract
language of catechism. From these observations,
Rousseau advised that children be kept from religious
instruction until they reach adolescence. Centuries later,
Ronald Goldman would give similar advice but from a
Piagetian theoretical perspective.
In the field of religious education, classical writers
such as Salzmann, Basedow, Jean Paul, and Jean Calvin
were finely attuned to childrens religious development
(Schweitzer, 1992). For example, Jean Calvin (1834,
p. 200) assigned the Old Testament to children and the
New Testament to adolescents, a practice that anticipated G. Stanley Halls advice at the turn of the twentieth century (Hall, 1900, 1908). Calvin assumed that
the vivid stories of the Old Testament matched the interests and mental capacities of children just as the ab-
A Historical Perspective
947
948
G. W. Allport. In The Individual and His Religion (Allport, 1950), Allport described two types of religiousness, which form a developmental sequence. The first
type is the self-interested religiousness of younger
children who see prayers as a means of getting material
things. Children also imagine God in a concrete, anthropomorphic manner. Thus, we have the precursor of
the well-established concept, extrinsic religiousness.
In the years preceding puberty, childrens egocentric religiousness leads to disappointment (e.g., initiated by denial of material goods, experiences of
theodicy). Subsequently, children form new and more
abstract religious concepts and shape a mature and
self-disinterested type of religiousness. In the best
case, religion becomes part of an adolescents own personality and fulfils the criterion of functional autonomy: religiousness becomes intrinsic religiousness.
In the following decades, the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiousness became one of the
most powerful distinctions in the psychology of religion.
Hundreds of studies showed that intrinsic religiousness
is positively correlated with a variety of desirable outcomes, such as a sense of well-being, whereas extrinsic
religiousness is positively correlated with undesirable
outcomes such as being prejudiced (see the overview by
Wulff, 1991, pp. 217242; see also Hood et al., 1996).
In discussing earlier works using this first paradigm,
we see how religious and spiritual maturity can represent an achievable and worthwhile end. Furthermore, we
see how maturity has to do with individuals functioning
well in their cultures and contributing to their societies.
These early works using this first paradigm can be
seen as the forerunners of present-day research on religious maturity (Benson, Donahue, & Erickson, 1993).
Furthermore, they can be seen as the forerunners of
present-day research on resilience and positive youth
development as they relate to religious and spiritual development (Lerner, Dowling, & Anderson, 2003). Later
on, we have more to say about present-day research continuing in this tradition of thinking about religious and
spiritual development as a maturing process.
A Historical Perspective
949
950
Object relations theorists define imagining as a transitional phenomenon, where the boundaries between
subjective and objective become blurred. The partial
differentiation between what is inside and outside allows individuals to not only creatively manage but also
to creatively transform. Pruyser (1991) provides the
example of Martin Luther King Jr. and his I have a
dream speech to illustrate what is meant by religious
imagining being a transitional phenomenon that creatively manages and transforms. He writes:
That speech straddled both the world of ideas and the
world of facts; it introduced a new paradigm after showing
The example of King provides insight into the analytic concept of religious and spiritual maturity and the
role of religious-spiritual imagining in realizing maturity. Pruyser implies that Kings religious imagining
grasped something true, though not something true in
the sense of scientific truth. Truth in this context is obviously not about propositions that are either true or
false. Presumably, truth in this sense has more to do
with living lives that are true.
What is missing, though, is just how to evaluate a religious illusion as true. We are left wondering if Pruyser
means to suggest it is universal truths that are revealed
in religious imaginings or simply truths that are specific to particular groups and individuals. The following
personal story suggests perhaps it is both. Pruyser
(1991) writes,
I attended a denominational school . . . that stood for much
greater Calvinist orthodoxy than did my family. Thus,
home and school presented me with two different religious
and emotional worlds. The first was mellow, optimistic,
and forgiving; the second strict, somber and punitive
both equally taking recourse to scripture. . . . There is
nothing like such an upbringing to convince a young boy
that religion is what you make it, that all of it is what I now
call illusionistic. Fortunately, home won over school,
undoubtedly because of its deeper roots in my childhood
practicing of the transitional sphere. The hand of God,
much talked about in school, was closer to my mothers
tender-and-firm hand than to the threatening and often
slapping extremities of my teachers. (p. 180)
A Historical Perspective
951
development in terms of what is remarkable, so remarkable that one may never actually witness an example of
someone who reaches the endpoint, someone who is
fully developed.
At first glance, this third paradigm seems to revert
back to prescientific days when religious and spiritual
development meant climbing toward some state of mystical union. However, the paradigm leads in a quite different direction. It leads in the direction of offering
specific criteria for defining and evaluating development and for making explicit the often implicit or hidden values in all developmental models. Later on, there
will be extended examples to show how this paradigm
works. Here, and for the purpose of providing a historical perspective, we concentrate on a single example,
namely, the example of William James and his monumental work, The Varieties of Religious Experience
(1902).
The Varieties is arguably the single most influential
book in the psychology of religion. Even after a century
since it was written, readers find in it insights that are
directly relevant to our times (Taylor, 2002). However,
the Varieties is not normally thought of as a text on religious and spiritual development. For one thing, there is
hardly any mention of children. For another, it gives us
religious types, but the types themselves seem ordered
more along a horizontal plane than along a vertical, developmental one. This seems especially true of Jamess
two major types: The Healthy-Minded or once-born
and the Sick Soul or those who feel themselves in
need of being twice-born.
Nevertheless, a closer reading of the Varieties shows
James to be very much a developmentalist as defined by
the third paradigm. In particular, James saw the sick
soul as having a more mature grasp of reality than that
seen in the healthy mindedand a greater potential for
developing spiritually. He shows this developmental ordering of the two types when he turns from writing
about the once-born, healthy-minded to writing about
the sick soul in need of being twice-born:
Let us then resolutely turn our backs on the once-born and
their sky-blue optimistic gospel; let us not simply cry out,
in spite of all appearances, Hurrah for the Universe!
Gods in his Heaven, alls right with the world. Let us see
rather whether pity, pain, and fear, and the sentiment of
human helplessness may not open a profounder view and
put into our hands a more complicated key to the meaning
of the situation. (James, 1902, pp. 135136)
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Nevertheless, even though there is no commonly accepted definition, there are commonly accepted distinctions that help define religious and spiritual development.
In particular, there are the commonly accepted distinctions between religion and religiousness, between religiousness and spiritual, and between content, form, and
function. We discuss each of these distinctions to address
the problem of definition. In addition, we discuss the concepts of structure and stage as indispensable means for
defining and explaining the religious and spiritual development of persons and not just of acts, thoughts, and feelings considered separately.
Religion, Religiousness, and Spirituality
Religion refers to institutions and systems consisting of
organizational structures, codes of behavior, and symbol
systems defining assumptions and beliefs designed to
create in people powerful, comprehensive, and enduring
world views and attitudes. As such, religion is primarily
susceptible to sociological analysis.
Religiousness refers to subjective modes of experiencing and interpreting, making religiousness primarily susceptible to psychological analysis. One and the
same religion can be reconstructed and experienced in
quite different ways leading to quite different types of
religiousness. The Catholic Church, for example, can
be a source of fastidious anxieties for one person and a
secure, maternal home for another. Therefore, it is ultimately the individual who determines religiousness
on the basis of his or her subjective experience:
Events or feelings are only religious if a person defines them as such (Stark, 1965, p. 99). Religiousness
refers to much more than religious practice such as attending religious services and joining religious institutions. Many regard themselves as being religious even
though they have left or avoided religious institutions
and religious practice.
Nor is it any less difficult to arrive at a definition of
spirituality. For a good many experts, when it comes to
spirituality, the problems of defining are even more difficult (Hood et al., 1996, p. 115). However, there is no
way to evade the issue given the fact that at the present
time, there is scarcely a discussion of faith and scarcely
a book on religion that does not use spirituality. Indeed,
the term spirituality is visibly eclipsing the term religiousness. The increased use of spirituality derives to a
large extent from the loss of relevance of religious institutions and traditions. Many feel themselves bound by
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From these data, we see that the overwhelming majority understood themselves as being both spiritual and
religious (74%). Only 19% understood themselves as
being exclusively spiritual. Still, despite there being a
relatively small percentage that understood themselves
to be exclusively spiritual, spiritual development is a potentially powerful resource for positive human development (Benson, Roehlkepartain, & Rude, 2003, p. 205). It
is, however, an understudied, complex, and multifaceted
concept, one that overlaps with many aspects of religious development, and one that is shaped by both individual capacities and ecological influencesas we
discuss later.
It is the relatively small group that considers itself to
be spiritual but not religious, which furnishes the popular stereotype that religion is antiquated for being institutional and dogmatic, whereas spirituality is central for
being personal and open. The wide-spread acceptance of
this stereotype has led Hill (2000) to warn against polarizing religiousness as bad and spirituality as goodbecause virtually all religions promote spirituality, and
virtually all spiritual practices have at one time or another been promoted in religious traditions.
In the social sciences, the effort to distinguish religiousness from spirituality has not been matched by an
equal effort to specify what they have in common. Outside the social sciences, there has been more said about
this issue. The work of Wilfred Cantwell Smith on faith
has been most influential (Smith, 1998a, 1998b).
Smith, the historian and long-time dean of comparative religious studies, has argued that faith is the central
category in both religiousness and nonreligious spirituality. As explained by him, faith refers to a persons involvement in the symbols of a faith tradition rather than
to the symbols themselves. Faith is more a verb than a
noun. It is more about action and living a certain way
than it is about something static such as a dogma, belief,
or symbol. Smith points out that this meaning of faith is
much older than the newer meaning of faith as belief
(Smith, 1998a). It was the Enlightenment that spawned
the newer meaning and reduced religion to matters of
belief or to its alternative, feeling.
But the main point here is that faith is about participation and response, not about belief. One does not believe a symbol. Rather, one responds to it. (Smith,
1998a, p. 146).
The consequences of conflating faith and belief have
been to marginalize religion and to dismiss spirituality
as something less than rational:
Belief became . . . the category of thought by which skeptics, reducing others faith to manageability, translated
that faith into mundane terms. They substituted for an interest in it as faith an interest rather in the exotic mental
processes and conceptual framework of those whose lives
had been sustained and enriched by it. . . . What had been a
relation between the human and something external and
higher . . . was transformed by the new thinking into a selfsubsistent, mundane operation of the mind. . . . To imagine
that religious persons believe this or that is a way of
dominating intellectually, and comfortably, what in fact
one does not truly discern. (W. C. Smith, 1998a, p. 144)
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Stage-Structural Theories
become indispensable concepts for defining and explaining the religious and spiritual development of persons.
The neo-Kantian philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, provides an example of how stage-structural analysis can be
indispensable in defining, evaluating, and explaining the
religious and spiritual development of persons. For Cassirer, at the lower stages of religious and spiritual development, individuals live in a mytho-poetic world where
symbol and referent are fused and where there is no distinction between meaning and existence (Cassirer,
1955). Cassirer distinguishes between mythical and religious consciousness with the latter being more developed. However, myth (a traditions imagination) and
religion are inseparable. Cassirer writes:
If we attempt to isolate and remove the basic mythical
components from religious belief, we no longer have religion in its real, objectively historical manifestation; all
that remains is a shadow of it, an empty abstraction.
Yet, although the contents of myth and religion are inextricably interwoven, their form is not the same. And the
particularity of the religious form is disclosed in the
changed attitude which consciousness here assumes toward the mythical image world. It cannot do without this
world, it cannot immediately reject it; but seen through the
medium of the religious attitude this world gradually
takes on a new meaning.
The new ideality, the new spiritual dimension, that is
opened up through religion not only lends myth a new signification but actually introduces the opposition between
meaning and existence into the realm of myth. Religion takes the decisive step that is essentially alien to
myth: in its use of sensuous images and signs it recognizes
them as sucha means of expression which, though they
reveal a determinate meaning, must necessarily remain inadequate to it, which point to this meaning but never
wholly exhaust it. (p. 239)
In Cassirers account, we see how important structural differences can be for defining what is essential
in religious and spiritual development. For Cassirer, it
is the transformation from living in a mytho-poetic
world to living in a world where the myths and poetry
of faith traditions become symbols pointing to truths to
live by. Others who engage in stage-structural analysis
find different ways to characterize what is essential.
Whatever the ways, the effort is the same, explaining
not only the development of acts, thoughts, and feelings
but also explaining the development of persons. In general, critics forget that stages and structures are heuristic instruments for understanding this development:
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STAGE-STRUCTURAL THEORIES
The stage-structural theories to be discussed here are all
in the constructivist tradition associated with the work
of Jean Piaget. Because Piagets theory focused on epistemology and cognitive development, stage-structural
models of religious and spiritual development are often
criticized for being too cognitive. Critics assume that
any off-shoot of Piagets theory is also bound to be too
cognitive.
It is ironic that few know about Piagets early reflections on religious and spiritual developmentwhat is
generally understood to be a Piagetian approach to religious and spiritual development is not at all Piagetian.
We begin with a brief summary of Piagets actual approach to religious and spiritual development to better
frame the discussion of stage-structural theories.
From his late teens until his early 30s, Piaget preoccupied himself with the question of how one can believe in God and remain objective (Reich, 2005). His
questioning led to a significant development in his
thinking: to his distinguishing between a transcendent
and immanent God. For Piaget, God initially meant the
God of conservative theologya transcendent and
mysterious God whose laws must be followed slavishly. Over time and in the context of actively debating
and discussing, Piaget developed a very different
meaning of God so that eventually God, for him, went
inward. In rejecting transcendence in favor of immanence, Piaget came to identify God with the heart,
with the norms of reason, and with the internalized example of Jesus.
Piagets model of religious development centered
around a transformation from transcendent to immanent meanings of divinity. This transformation was far
more than a cognitive transformation and certainly
more than developing faith in reason. To be sure, reason was there in his model but also the heart and a
faith tradition. He makes this clear in a lecture he gave
in 1929, to members of the Swiss Christian Students
Association:
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TABLE 17.1
Piaget
Goldman
Preoperational
Concrete operational
Formal operational
Stage-Structural Theories
959
960
TABLE 17.2
Stage-Structural Theories
961
962
Stage-Structural Theories
963
964
self-hood and self-identity, type of thinking, and comprehension of symbols. In contrast, Oser and Gmnder
(1991) concentrate on religious matters only to the extent they can be used to cope with life in the face of the
Absolute or Divine.
Fowler speaks of faith in a very general sense,
which has attracted the criticism that we are dealing
here with an everything and nothing view of faith
(Fernhout, 1986, p. 66). In contrast, Oser and Gmnder (1991) speak of religious judgment for establishing
control in a situation of life through a persons regulating the relationship ( bounding) between him- or herself and the Absolute.
Fowler (1981) views the normative goal of religious
education in terms of the biblical metaphor of the kingdom of God (or reigning of God), whereas Oser and
Gmnder (1991) view this goal as not determining the
characteristics of stages.
While Fowlers (1981) approach may be more suitable for raising questions related to life history and existential themes, Oser and Gmnders (1991) approach is
more about the transformation dynamics of cognitive
structures. Fowler is more interested in the implications
of his stage theory for supporting pastoral care, while
Oser and Gmnder are more interested in scientific issues such as the issue of validating stages.
Approaches have their own history and their own
advantages and drawbacks. Oser and Gmnders
(1991) approach is admittedly less explanatory and
more sharply focused on God-man connectedness, but
this could be interpreted as a strength. Fowlers (1981)
approach is more faith related and thus more holistic,
and this, too, can be seen as strength. Therefore, to a
certain extent, these approaches or theories serve complementary roles for understanding religious and spiritual development.
The Relational and Contextual Model of
Development: Helmut Reich
There are numerous religious phenomena calling for
more specialized reasoning than that explained in the
Oser and Gmnders (1991) stage model. In particular,
there are religious dogmas and religious conflicts that
raise intellectual challenges for any believer who feels
obligated to think logically and scientifically. These
more specific challenges call for the development of a
specialized way of reasoning that Reich (1993) has
named relational and contextual reasoning (RCR).
965
RCR reasoning is useful in situations involving competing, bona fide explanations. It is useful because of its
underlying trivalent logic, which can lead to categorizing
competing explanations as being compatible, incompatible, or noncompatible. Noncompatible refers to instances
when competing explanations are both (all) correct, depending on context.
Using the construct of RCR and working in the
framework established by Oser and Gmnder (1991),
Reichs (1993) research has focused on how individuals
develop ways to resolve apparent contradictions having
religious meaning. Examples include the problem of
evil (How can there be a just and all-powerful God
when there is evil and tragedy?) and the contrasting
biblical and scientific accounts of how the universe
came to be.
Reichs (1993) research has demonstrated how individuals, with age and with development, resolve these
apparent religious contradictions using RCR reasoning.
Development is described in the following stages:
Stage One: Only one competing explanation is recognized.
Stage Two: One or more competing explanations are
recognized.
Stage Three: Competing explanations are seen as
needed for full understanding.
Stage Four: The relation between competing explanations is analyzed, and the situation specificity of the
relative contributions of each is at least intimated.
Stage Five: An overarching theory or synopsis is constructed to specify the complex and mutual relationships between competing explanations, and the
situation specificity of their explanatory weight.
So, for example, stage 5 responses to the biblical versus
scientific explanations of the origins of the universe
and humankind might emphasize Gods setting in motion Darwinian evolution and/or the essentially moralspiritual meaning explained in biblical accounts versus
the essentially material-physical meaning explained in
scientific accounts.
At the end of this focus on relational judgment and
reasoning as they both define religious and spiritual development, we admit that they do not need to lead to reducing religious and spiritual development to general
(e.g., Piagetian) stages of cognitive development. Furthermore, we see that adopting such a focus allows for
precision in measuring and explaining.
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STAGE-STRUCTURAL
THEORIES: CONCERNS
Stage-structural theories of development in general and
religious and spiritual development in particular have
come under attack for several reasons. The main reasons
have to do with (a) the linear and normative treatment of
development, ( b) the emphasis on cognition, judgment,
and reasoning, (c) the emphasis on presumed universals
to the exclusion of individual and cultural differences,
and (d) the mostly positive/optimistic view of structural
development that overlooks pathology among those at
higher stages. A fair assessment of stage-structural theories must address these concernswhich we do in the
next section on alternative approaches to religious and
spiritual development.
Those who object to the linear and normative nature of
stage-structural theories generally equate development
with change over time. They may also place greater emphasis than do stage-structural theorists on the short-term
functions that faith plays in individuals lives. Together,
these two ways of thinking about religiousness and spirituality lead us to note that stage-structural theories fail to
capture the changes and consistencies in individuals ways
of being religious and/or spiritual (Wulff, 1993).
This criticism that stage-structural theories are too
linear and normative may even be found as an implied
criticism by the authors of stage-structural models. For
example, Oser and Gmnder (1991), as well as Fowler
(1981), report that using their stages to describe age
changes reveals patterns that are decidedly nonlinear
especially among adults.
However, if the concept of development is distinguished from the concept of change over time, as we
think it should be, then the linear nature of stagestructural models can be seen for its essential worth:
for contributing to the definition of religious and spiritual development and for contributing to our ability to
evaluate any given pattern of faith. A linear model is
needed for the purposes of defining and evaluating,
and age changes need not be linear for stage-structural
models to be validated or useful (Kaplan, 1983b).
As for the criticism that stage-structural theories
overemphasize the role of cognition, judgment, and
reasoning in religious and spiritual development, several points apply. First, as we have seen, Goldmans
(1964) theory and all other stage-structural theories
that treat religious and spiritual development as being
merely an application of universal cognitive structures
with respect to whether an individuals or groups images and beliefs support or undermine an ethical life. Individuals functioning at lower stages in stage-structural
models may show more compassion and be more sensitive to issues of justice than many functioning at higher
stages as defined by structural criteria only. Put another
way, there are spiritual problems at all stagesas we
discuss later in the final section dealing with problems
of a religious and/or spiritual nature, such as the problem of religiously inspired terrorism. There is a need for
research in this area, to document and explain the nature
of problems at different stages of religious and spiritual
development.
Having provided a stage-structural framework for
thinking about religious and spiritual development, we
can move on to evaluating current empirical approaches
in the light of this framework. Because this framework
has to do with norms for defining the maturing of faith
and of persons, the discussion of current approaches is
in terms of their not being about faith or persons, or
about development defined by norms.
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We review the contributions of these current approaches to religious and spiritual development and
their specific, as well as general, criticisms of normative, stage-structural theories, even if they are in part
speculative. We begin with the contributions and criticisms of Susan Kwileckis substantive-functional approach (Kwilecki, 1999), which follows in the tradition
of religious studies.
Susan Kwileckis
Substantive-Functional Approach
Kwileckis work is with adults, not children, because,
in her view, childhood is not the period of consummate religious expression. (1999, p. 264). She is,
therefore, critical of current research on religious and
spiritual development, which she says, meticulously
explains the differences in . . . the religious conceptualization of a 5- and a 9-year-old, but does not address
the spectacular variety of adult religious perspectives
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is, developmental systems theories are essentially relational in nature. This means that development is located
not in the person but in the ongoing transactions between the person and his or her multilayered contexts.
Of concern here is the goodness of fit between person
and environment. Religiousness and spirituality relate to
the extent that they provide ways to foster a better fit.
Indeed, one of the main findings coming out of research
based on developmental systems theories is that religiousness and spirituality do indeed make it more likely
for individuals to thrive because their behavior both
improves and is rewarded by their contexts. In sum,
thriving is the main interest; religious and spiritual development are of interest only as they lead to thriving.
Among the many types of studies linking religious
and spiritual development to thriving are those investigating faith-based communities and their role in helping
youth develop positively (Benson et al., 2003; King &
Boyatzis, 2004; King & Furrow, 2004; Roehlkepartain,
1995). A study by Regnerus and Elder serves as the
main example (Regnerus & Elder, 2003).
This study illustrates the developmental systems approach in several ways, first by its speaking about involvement in a faith based community as a potential
resilient pathway. The term resilient pathway reveals
the approachs main assumption about plasticity as well
as its main interestwhat leads to thriving. The results
of this study show that in high risk communities, church
attendance functions as a protective mechanism stimulating resilience in the lives of at-risk youthas shown
by church attendance correlating positively with staying
on track in school.
However, it is in Regnerus and Elders (2003) explanation of the results rather than in the results
themselves that we see the main features of the developmental systems approach. Regnerus and Elder explain the results as follows:
The ritual action of attending worship services or ceremonies, in contrast with theological differences that mark
distinct religious affiliations and beliefs, appears to be a
process that operates independently of particular belief
systems and organizational affiliations. Church attendance may constituteeven if by accidenta form of social integration that has the consequence of reinforcing
values conducive to educational achievement and goal setting . . . (In addition) . . . church attendance and doing
well in school require commitment, diligence, and routine.
The ritual practice of rising and going to church or mass,
and so forthwhether compelled by ones own faith or
972
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
IN RELIGIOUS AND
SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT
Nowhere do we see the contrast between stage-structural
and cognitive-cultural approaches more clearly than
when characterizing conceptual development in religious
and spiritual development. Stage-structural approaches
provide the following composite picture:
With age, children go from having mostly anthropomorphic and concrete conceptions of supernatural
agencies to having mostly symbolic and abstract
conceptions.
With age, children go from reliance on magical and
egocentric-imaginative reflecting, which includes
thinking about supernatural agencies and prayer, to
more rational and decentered thinking.
In contrast, cognitive-cultural approaches provide the
following composite picture:
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In a study of prayer and its development in adolescence, Scarlett and Perriello (1991) had subjects provide prayers for hypothetical situations calling for
prayer (e.g., praying for a dying friend). Their results
showed that with age, adolescents prayed less for God to
intervene directly to make dramatic changes, such as
curing a sick friend, and more for God to provide support and guidance. Furthermore, with age, adolescents
shifted from talking at God to talking with God
such that they engaged more in sharing feelings, questions, and doubts and not just requests.
Together, these studies of age changes in how children and adolescents pray and think about prayer are
reminiscent of William James (1902) words about the
development of prayer:
the belief is, not that particular events are tempered more
towardly to us by a superintending providence, as a reward
for our reliance, but that by cultivating the continuous
sense of our connections with the power that made things
as they are, we are tempered more towardly for their reception. The outward face of nature need not alter, but the
expressions of meaning in it alter. (p. 474)
975
ing the box for the first time will think there is only cereal in it, not rocks. Therefore, even young children have
a theory of mind.
However, when asked whether God will make the
same mistake, children, by age 5, say, No. Even young
children understand that God is no ordinary agentthat
God has supernatural, counterintuitive powers. In short,
with respect to the concept of God, children are not as
anthropomorphic as previously pictured. Rather, children make a clear distinction between persons and God.
The same holds true for children raised in cultures and
faith traditions with supernatural, religious agents other
than Godsuch as Krishna and ancestors.
The second question, about differences between
childrens and adults conceptions of God, has led to
studies that show adults, as well as children, conceive
of God anthropomorphously. J. Barrett and Keils
(1996) study is the one most cited. Barrett and Keil
found that their adult subjects, when asked directly
about Gods nature, gave theologically correct answers, answers that avoided defining God anthropomorphously. However, when asked to recount stories
involving God, the same adults added to or distorted
the stories by anthropomorphizing Godsuch as
speaking of God as not noticing or as acting sequentially. They spoke of God as acting in very human
ways. Barrett and Keil concluded that adults, like children, develop and maintain conceptions of God that
combine their counterintuitive understanding of God as
a supernatural agent with their intuitive understanding
of how normal agents act. This same combining of the
intuitive and counterintuitive applies to other religious
supernatural agencies as well (spirits and ancestors).
With respect to prayer, Woolleys research provides
a similar finding to that of Barrett and Keil (1996).
Woolley (2000) asked children, ages 3 to 8, to teach a
puppet to pray. She also interviewed the children about
their understanding of prayer, its effects, and why
prayers sometimes do not get answered. Her results
share certain findings with studies carried out from a
stage-structural approach. However, there were important differences stemming from her comparing childrens understanding of prayer and their intuitive
knowledge of causation.
First, Woolley (2000) showed that children as young
as age 5 develop a mentalistic conception of prayer
much earlier than that reported by Long et al., 1967. Second, she showed that, by age 5, children begin to give up
belief in the causal powers of wishing, even as they begin
976
to believe in the causal powers of prayer. Therefore, childrens belief in the efficacy of prayer cannot be attributed to their holding magical views of the causal powers
of thinking in general and wishing in particular. Their
believing in prayers efficacy is, rather, a result of their
being taught or socialized. Woolleys participants came
from religious families. Furthermore, their belief in the
efficacy of prayers but not in the efficacy of wishes
seemed to be tied to their understanding that prayer, unlike wishing, involves an intermediary, God, who is a supernatural agent.
With respect to childrens conceptions of death and
life after death, the same cognitive-cultural framework
applies. In the course of direct experience with death,
children construct their own, intuitive ontology about
death such that they understand deaths irreversibility and
inevitability at much younger ages than stage-structural
theories lead us to believe (Slaughter, Jaakola, & Carey,
1999). However, in the course of experiencing death, children also acquire counterintuitive beliefs about death and
life after deathbeliefs transmitted by culture and faith
tradition through the testimonies of trusted others (Harris, 2000).
Together, these cognitive-cultural accounts of childrens religious concepts leave us with a quite different
picture of childrens capacities and of cultures role in
religious and spiritual development. Whereas some researchers see children as having limited capacity and
culture being responsible for helping children overcome
their natural propensity for magical thinking, others
conceive them as having considerable capacity and culture being responsible for teaching or communicating
beliefs about what is counterintuitive. Therefore, at the
center of the newer picture is the distinction between intuitive and counterintuitive ontology.
However, because there is much that is counterintuitive that is not learned in childhood, for example, the
Darwinian concept of evolution, why are religious counterintuitive concepts learned much earlier? Harris
(2000) provides a compelling answer. Counterintuitive
religious concepts, such as the concepts of gods, spirits,
and ancestors as supernatural agencies, do not require
children to give up their intuitive, commonsense concepts of ordinary agents. In contrast, scientific concepts, such as the Darwinian concept of evolution, do
indeed require children to give up their intuitive, commonsense concepts. One cannot, for example, hold both
the intuitive, creationist view that species are immutable
and the counterintuitive, Darwinian view that states the
opposite. In contrast to counterintuitive scientific concepts, counterintuitive religious concepts operate in parallel to intuitive, nonreligious beliefsat least for most
people, most of the time.
A Synthesis
Where do these contrasting pictures leave us with respect to our present understanding and future research?
One possibility is that they force us to reject one in favor
of the other. However, this possibility seems a poor
choice. On the one hand, the cumulative results of numerous studies suggests that there are indeed important
differences in the way children as compared to adolescents and adults give meaning to religious concepts.
These differences are not simply the result of faulty research methods and unevenness with respect to socialization. On the other hand, the results of careful and
thoughtful studies comparing intuitive and counterintuitive ontologies demonstrate important similarities in
the way children, adolescents, and adults provide meaning to religious concepts.
We suggest that these two approaches are not so opposite as they first appear to be, and that a synthesis is
possible. Focusing on differences does not exclude focusing on similarities. Furthermore, these two foci complement rather than contradict one another. The strength
of the cognitive-cultural approach lies in its providing
better explanations for how religious beliefs are acquired. The strength of the more normative, stage-structural approach lies in its providing possibilities for
explaining how religious beliefs become existentially
relevant or, as Johnson and Boyatzis (2005) said, how
religious concepts help with the task of connecting the
self with a more valued reality. Put another way, the
stage-structural approach may be more useful with respect to explaining how beliefs become integrated with
feelings and actions to form a pattern of faith that can
lead individuals to function at higher religious or spiritual levels. After all, religious and spiritual exemplars
are exemplary largely because of their positive and powerful faith and not because of their concepts and beliefs.
977
Religious behavior
Political behavior
Entertainment
Sports played
Parent-Child
Friend-Child
.57
.32
.16
.13
.20
.16
.10
.16
978
their parents (e.g., When I had ideas of my own in matters of religion, my mother/father took me seriously.)
were significantly higher on the stage scale of religious
judgment (Oser & Gmnder, 1991) than were young
people with little or no religious encouragement.
However, influence goes both ways, and childrens
developmental level is a determining factor in their attitudes toward religion and in the religious climate of the
family as a whole. For example, in a random sample of
Swiss parents and children, Klaghofer and Oser (1987)
found that children evaluated as being at stage 2 on the
Oser and Gmnder (1991) scale had a more positive family climate than did children evaluated as being at stage
3. This finding was expected, since persons at stage 3 attribute a lower status to religiousness than do persons at
stages 4 and 2.
Similarly, recent research has emphasized the positive role played by conversational dialogues between
parents and children on childrens religious and spiritual development. In a study of diary entries recording
conversations between parents and children, Boyatzis
and Janicki (2003) found that children play an active
role in initiating, terminating, and driving religious conversations. Furthermore, they found that parents tended
to ask questions that were open-ended, and the questions themselves were devoid of suggestions revealing
parents personal views. In another study, of young Jewish adults, Herzbrun (1993) found that the frequency of
religious discussion in the family had an enduring influence on young people, especially on girls.
In sum, the collective picture painted of religious
socialization in the family supports a constructivist
perspective and reveals a reciprocity process such
that parents and children are inf luenced by what the
other has to say (Boyatzis, Dollahite, & Marks, 2005).
Through conversations with parents, children are afforded the opportunity to puzzle over religious and spiritual matters and to construct their own personal views.
Further, the transmission of religious views from parent
to child happens not as a result of didactic teaching so
much as it happens as a result of parent and child coconstructing their spiritual identities. Therefore, childrens participation in their own religious development
supports rather than undermines continuity between
generations.
There is sufficient evidence to show the deep extent
to which the family influences religious development,
particularly by the type of religiousness or religious instruction practiced in the family. Most people remain in
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popular subject. A study of 7,000 schoolchildren carried out in Germany on the popularity and perceived efficacy of religious education yielded similar results.
The popularity of religious education is high in elementary school, but in the 2nd year of high school it falls to
the lowest third, with only physics and Latin being less
popular (Bucher, 2000).
With increasing age there is also a marked diminishing of the effects attributed to religious education; these
effects are highest in the area of general knowledge, including knowledge of other religions, but the effects are
small in matters of church practice and devotion.
How can we account for such a significant drop in
popularity and influence of religious education? A first
possible explanation is that religious education loses its
popularity because the popularity of the school as a
whole decreases with age. However, this explanation
does not explain why the acceptance of other school subjects (e.g., mathematics and English) remains constant.
A second possible explanation is provided by Oser
and Gmnders theory (Oser & Gmnder, 1991): Convinced that God is able to intervene in the world and that
He can be influenced through prayersindications of
stage 2schoolchildren are considerably better disposed toward religious education and toward considering religious education to be more relevant than are
adolescents, whose religious judgment is apt to be at
stage 3 (Bucher, 2000, p. 128). At stage 2, children find
it important to conform to Gods expectations, more so
than later on in adolescence when they have developed
to stage 3, the deistic stage, in which self-determination
is central.
However, whether religious education continues to
influence may depend on the character or methods of
that education. For example, in a quasi-experimental intervention study, in which two experimental groups discussed religious dilemmas over a long period of time,
Oser and Gmnder (1996) found the average judgment
stage rose more significantly than did the average for a
control group lacking in opportunities to discuss and
problem solve collectively. Moreover, this difference remained constant in a follow-up survey carried out 6
months later. A similar result was produced by Caldwell
and Berkowitz (1987) who had high school students
aged between 15 and 18 discuss religious dilemmas over
a period of 12 lessons. A subsequent test revealed that
for more than half of the students discussion sessions
lead to significant development with respect to stages of
religious judgment.
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Roehlkepartain, 2005, Yust, 2003). The National Congregational Life Survey (Woolever & Bruce, 2004)
found that 50% or fewer of the surveyed congregations
(n = 2,000) had effective caring for children and youth,
and that a majority was reported to have fewer than 5 of
the 10 strengths researchers examined. Based on these
results, it appears that too few young people are spending time in congregations that are vibrant, spiritually
enriching, communities of faith (Roehlkepartain,
2005).
However, these results are somewhat offset by the
more positive reports from young members of congregations themselves. For example, C. Smith (2003) reported that 62% of teenagers surveyed in one study
said congregations helped them think about important
matters, 75% said their congregation was both warm
and welcoming to teenagers, and 82% said that their
congregation regularly provided opportunities for leadership and service.
Therefore, congregations present an interesting paradox. They have tremendous potential for shaping and
guiding spiritual and religious development. However,
they have not been the focus of a great deal of empirical
research, and what research there is suggests that we
are a long way from determining any actual influence.
Furthermore, the existing body of data on congregations is largely from samples that are both Christian
and North Americanand there is no scientific reason
for assuming that results from these samples can be
generalized elsewhere.
POSITIVE CORRELATES OF RELIGIOUS
AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT
What effects do religiousness and spirituality have on
individuals health and sense of well-being? Does religiousness produce neurotic behavior, as Freud (1961)
asserted, or does it increase the morality of believers, as
is generally assumed (Walker & Pitts, 1998)? Does spirituality, especially at higher stages of development, expand social consciousness and capacity to cope? In this
section, we examine how religiousness and spirituality
relate to the following:
Moral Development
In the history of social science research, religion has
been depicted as serving only a weak influence on
morality, or none at all. This view has been supported in
several well-known studies. For example, Hartshorne
and May (1928) showed that neither religious affiliation
nor religiously directed character education had any effects on moral behavior. Darley and Batson (1973)
found that almost two-thirds of the undergraduates they
observed entering a chapel to hear a sermon on the
Good Samaritan, failed to help a man lying on the sidewalk and in need of help. And in the current debate over
character education, there often is a determined effort
to keep religion out of the discussion (Damon, 2002;
Schwartz, 2002). However, by far the most important
support for this view of religions relationship with
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Service
Reference to moral exemplars reminds us that moral development involves much more than judgment and reasoning. It also involves action. One measure of moral
development is service to others. How does religious
and spiritual development relate to community service
in those who have yet to become moral exemplars?
Most of the research has been about adolescents and
their involvement in religious institutions and community service.
A number of studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between involvement in religious institutions
and community service. For example, Youniss et al.
(1999) found that high school students who valued religion were vibrantly engaged in their schooling and in the
betterment of their communities.
For adolescents, community service in the context of
religious institutions seems to have a different and
more positive meaning than community service in
other contexts. For example, Donnelly and his colleagues (Donnelly et al., 2005) have demonstrated that
adolescents doing community service in the context of
religious institutions as compared to those doing community service in other contexts are more likely to do
community service later on, in their adult lives.
Coping
One of the fundamental and undoubtedly universal functions of religiousness is coping, especially in critical life
events such as the death of a loved relative and serious
illness. Certainly, long before psychologists studied coping processes, religions have disposed resources for facilitating coping.
In the past decades, coping has become a very important concept in the psychology of religion (Pargament &
Brant, 1998). Pargament and Brant distinguished the
following types of religious coping:
Self-directed coping, as when subjects use God-given
resources to individually solve their problems.
Deferring coping, as when individuals, especially in
seemingly hopeless situations, give up control to a
higher power or God, thereby paradoxically gaining
control (Baugh, 1988).
Collaborative coping, as when individuals appraise
God as a helping partner.
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NEGATIVE CORRELATES
AND PATHOLOGY
The preceding section has shown that spirituality and religiousness exert positive influences. The term religion,
however, also elicits images of September 11th, 2001 and
of Jonestown, Guyana. We need to look at the evidence
for negative and not just positive correlates. However, before doing so, we begin by discussing the negative biases
against religion, which, in the social sciences, have impeded progress in sorting out negative from positive.
With respect to religious and spiritual development,
the history of both psychological research and clinical
practice has been a history of negative bias and prejudice. Bias and prejudice persist today but has perhaps
lessenedboth because of a new tolerance for cultural
diversity and because of empirical research that has
challenged old negative stereotypes. Nevertheless, we
begin with a brief discussion of the most obvious negative biases and prejudices because their persistence
presents a significant roadblock to understanding negative correlates and pathology associated with religious
and spiritual development.
Negative bias is particularly evident in stereotyping
in collapsing meaningful distinctions into one negative
category. Stereotyping the religious and a failure to make
distinctions has been the hallmark of negative bias among
research psychologists and clinicians. An overview of the
literature indicates that rarely are distinctions made
when discussing central religious concepts such as belief,
faith, and revelation. Yet, there are many meanings for
each of these three, and the differences matter.
With regard to the concept of belief, research psychologists and clinicians have customarily equated the meaning
of religious belief with the meaning of belief as it is used
when speaking of, say, belief in trees and dogs, though the
two meanings differ from one another (Blackstone, 1963).
With regard to the concept of faith, and, as previously discussed, research psychologists and clinicians have customarily equated faith with belief despite these two
concepts having quite different meanings in the history of
faith traditions (W. C. Smith, 1998a). With regard to the
987
favors that benefit neither the groups members nor society (Barrett, 2001). The media sometimes adds negative terms such as brain-washing to characterize the
socialization of cult members. This negative definition
of cults works well as an ideal type for identifying
harmful cults, but the definition has been applied indiscriminately and to religious groups that do not fit the
definition. As a result, discussions of cults are often
polemical and groups of researchers are divided into
cult critics and cult sympathizers.
Cult sympathizers are more likely to use the terms
new religious movements (NRM) and alternative religions instead of cult, though these terms, too, have their
problems. Certain groups considered by most to be cults
are not new and in some contexts would not be alternatives to the mainstream. The International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, otherwise known as the Hare
Krishna, is an example (Daner, 1976). Nevertheless, new
religious movements or alternative religions have become accepted terms. Cult sympathizers point out,
tongue in cheek, that the difference between a cult and a
religion is about a million members (D. Barrett, 2001).
There is also misunderstanding about the average age
of cult members. Cults are associated with youth religions, which came into prominence in the 1970s. However, the average age of cult members is estimated to be
between 25 and 40 (Schmitz & Friebe, 1992). For those
in Bhagwan Shree Rajneesch, living in Oregon, the average age is 34 years (Richardson, 1995).
Concerning the second point about who joins cults, the
available evidence suggests that members generally are
no more pathological than are nonmembers (Richardson,
1995). In explaining why and how a person comes to join
a cult, a more historical, less psychological approach may
work best because circumstances play a decisive role. For
example, a newly arrived freshman at college may, along
with other freshman, feel lonely and disoriented but adjust without joining a cult, however if that freshman happens to meet and talk with a cult member, he or she may
well end up joining a cult (D. Barrett, 2001).
These words of caution about rushing to judge cults
aside, the extreme example of religion taking the wrong
course is still taken to be the norm. A clear majority of Europeans live in a state of alert on account of religious cults
(Schmidtchen, 1987), and in the United States, there is a
similar negative view as well. Pfeiffer (1992) showed that
the overwhelming majority of American students (82%)
described cult members purely in negative terms, deeming
them to be less happy, less intelligent, and less free.
988
989
990
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References
Author Index
1000
Author Index
Author Index
1001
1002
Author Index
Borstlemann, L. J., 90
Bosman, E. A., 597, 605, 609
Bossom, J., 54
Bothell, D., 339, 340, 347
Bott, H., 126, 136
Botuck, S., 243
Bouchard, T. J., Jr., 226, 614, 615,
702
Boudreau, J. P., 242
Bouffard, L. A., 687
Bound, J., 689
Bourdieu, P., 195, 518, 522, 725,
732, 763, 770, 773, 775
Bourgeois, J.-P., 382, 384, 385
Bourne, L., 752, 753
Bovaird, J., 668
Bovccaccini, M. T., 982
Bowen, K. R., 605
Bowlby, J., 37, 151, 153, 265, 406,
500, 507, 815, 816
Bowman, R. E., 231
Boyatzis, C., 944, 970, 971, 976,
977, 978
Boyce, C., 837
Boyd-Franklin, N., 835
Boyer, P., 959, 970
Boykin, A. W., 835, 856, 857
Bracken, B. A., 752
Bradley, R. M., 242
Bradway, R., 589
Brainard, M. S., 244
Brainerd, C. J., 332, 333, 531
Brame, R., 688
Brammer, G. L., 415
Branchi, I., 239
Branco, A. U., 174, 176, 178, 193,
195
Brand, M., 517, 522
Brandtstdter, J., 6, 51, 411, 517,
519, 520, 524, 525, 526, 527,
528, 529, 530, 532, 534, 536,
537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 543,
545, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552,
554, 555, 570, 578, 579, 581,
582, 584, 585, 587, 593, 620,
622, 628, 634, 635, 636, 637,
638, 641, 903, 904
Brant, C., 984
Braver, T. S., 386
Author Index
1003
1004
Author Index
Author Index
1005
1006
Author Index
Csordas, T. J., 49
Culver, C., 62
Cunningham, C. L., 223, 224
Cunningham, M., 831, 838, 857,
858, 859, 867, 869, 870, 881
Curnan, S. P., 898, 913
Curran, P. J., 685
Cushman, P., 764
Dabholkar, A. S., 602
Daecke, M., 945
Dahlstrom, W. G., 127
Dailey, M. E., 385
Dalton, T. C., 128
Damasio, A., 38, 48, 49, 282, 285,
370, 372, 386, 412, 415, 421,
468
Damasio, H., 421
Damon, W., 2, 6, 11, 12, 27, 38, 63,
67, 69, 73, 336, 496, 533, 550,
576, 756, 763, 845, 895, 896,
900, 901, 913, 926, 983
DAndrade, R., 524, 576, 717, 718,
723, 768
Daner, F., 987
Daniels, M., 230, 231
Dannefer, D., 517, 519, 540, 586,
671
Danziger, K., 170
Darity, W. A., Jr., 832
Darley, J. M., 983
Darling, N. E., 817, 818
Darlington, R. B., 444
Darwin, C., 159, 401, 412, 433
Daselaar, S. M., 602, 616
Dasen, P. R., 721
Daston, L., 172
Datan, N., 586, 674
Datnow, A., 881
Dauber, S. L., 680
Davey, M., 915
Davey, T. C., 613
David, J. P., 641
Davidson, A. L., 772, 845, 867
Davidson, D., 521, 756
Davidson, P., 67, 343, 533
Davidson, R. J., 627, 628, 629, 630
Davies, D. R., 537
Davies, K. I., 746
Author Index
1007
1008
Author Index
Author Index
1009
1010
Author Index
Author Index
1011
1012
Author Index
Author Index
1013
1014
Author Index