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Dr.

Ram Manohar Lohia


National Law University

POLITICAL SCIENCE
FINAL DRAFT
PERSPECTIVES OF INDIA PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND SCENARIO AFTER NDA GOVERNMENT

Submitted To:Dr. Monika Srivastava


(Assistant Professor)
RMLNLU

Submitted By:Tejaswa Kumar Gupta


Roll No. 151

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First of all I would like to thank our honourable Vice-Chancellor Dr. Gurdeep Singh, our
Dean(Academics) Prof Dr, C.M.Jariwala, our Head of the Department Prof. Dr. Atul Kumar
Tiwari and our very own Asst. Prof. Dr. Monika Srivastava for letting me research on such an
interesting topic and providing all the necessary resources required to fulfil it successfully.
I would also like to thank my seniors and my dear batch-mates for providing the necessary
mental support to complete this project.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
THE PERSISTING KASHMIR ISSUE
THE UNENDING REST
CULTURAL LINKS
SCENARIO AFTER THE NDA GOVERNMENT
CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
Relations between India and Pakistan have been complex due to a number of historical and
political events. Relations between the two states have been defined by the violent partition
of British India in 1947, the Kashmir dispute and the numerous conflicts fought between the
two nations. Consequently, even though the two South Asian nations share linguistic, cultural,
geographic, and economic links, their relationship has been plagued by hostility and
suspicion.
After the dissolution of the British Raj in 1947, two new sovereign nations were formed
the Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. The subsequent partition of the former
British India displaced up to 12.5 million people, with estimates of loss of life varying from
several hundred thousand to 1 million. India emerged as a secular nation with a Hindu
majority population and a large Muslim minority while Pakistan was established as
an Islamic republic with an overwhelming Muslim majority population.
Soon after their independence, India and Pakistan established diplomatic relations but the
violent partition and numerous territorial disputes would overshadow their relationship. Since
their independence, the two countries have fought three major wars, one undeclared war and

have been involved in numerous armed skirmishes and military standoffs. The Kashmir
dispute is the main centre-point of all of these conflicts with the exception of the IndoPakistan War of 1971 and Bangladesh Liberation War, which resulted in the secession of East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
There have been numerous attempts to improve the relationshipnotably, the Shimla
summit, the Agra summit and the Lahore summit. Since the early 1980s, relations between
the two nations soured particularly after the Siachen conflict, the intensification ofKashmir
insurgency in 1989, Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 and the 1999 Kargil war.
Certain confidence-building measures such as the 2003 ceasefire agreement and the Delhi
Lahore Bus service were successful in deescalating tensions. However, these efforts have
been impeded by periodic terrorist attacks. The 2001 Indian Parliament attack almost brought
the two nations to the brink of a nuclear war. The 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings, which
killed 68 civilians (most of whom were Pakistani), was also a crucial point in relations.
Additionally, the 2008 Mumbai attacks carried out by Pakistani militants resulted in a severe
blow to the ongoing India-Pakistan peace talks.
According to a 2013 BBC World Service Poll, 11% of Indians view Pakistan's influence
positively, with 45% expressing a negative view, while 19% of Pakistanis view India's
influence positively, with 54% expressing a negative view. Since the election of new
government in Pakistan in mid-2013, significant steps are being taken to improve relations, in
particular the consensus on the agreement of Non-Discriminatory Market Access on
Reciprocal Basis (NDMARB) status for each other, which will liberalize trade.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The most difficult problem in relations between India and Pakistan since partition in August
1947 has been their dispute over Kashmir. Pakistan's leaders did not accept the legality of the
Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India, and undeclared war broke out in October 1947
(see The Experience of Wars, ch. 10). It was the first of three conflicts between the two
countries. Pakistan's representatives ever since have argued that the people of Kashmir should
be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination through a plebiscite, as promised by
Nehru and required by UN Security Council resolutions in 1948 and 1949. The inconclusive

fighting led to a UN-arranged cease-fire starting on January 1, 1949. On July 18, 1949, the
two sides signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a cease-fire line that was to be
supervised by the UN. The demarcation left Srinagar and almost 139,000 square kilometers
under Indian control and 83,807 square kilometers under Pakistani control. Of these two
areas, China occupied 37,555 square kilometers in India's Ladakh District (part of which is
known as Aksai Chin) in 1962 and Pakistan ceded, in effect, 5,180 square kilometers in the
Karakoram area to China when the two countries demarcated their common border in 196165, leaving India with 101,387 square kilometers and Pakistan with 78,387 square kilometers.
Starting in January 1949, and still in place in 1995, the UN Military Observer Group in India
and Pakistan was tasked with supervising the cease-fire in Kashmir. The group comprises
thirty-eight observers--from Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and
Uruguay--who rotate their headquarters every six months between Srinagar (summer) and
Rawalpindi, Pakistan (winter).
In 1952 the elected and overwhelmingly Muslim Constituent Assembly of Jammu and
Kashmir, led by the popular Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, voted in favor of confirming
accession to India. Thereafter, India regarded this vote as an adequate expression of popular
will and demurred on holding a plebiscite. After 1953 Jammu and Kashmir was identified as
standing for the secular, pluralistic, and democratic principles of the Indian polity. Nehru
refused to discuss the subject bilaterally until 1963, when India, under pressure from the
United States and Britain, engaged in six rounds of secret talks with Pakistan on "Kashmir
and other related issues." These negotiations failed, as did the 1964 attempt at mediation
made by Abdullah, who recently had been released from a long detention by the Indian
government because of his objections to Indian control.
Armed infiltrators from Pakistan crossed the cease-fire line, and the number of skirmishes
between Indian and Pakistani troops increased in the summer of 1965. Starting on August 5,
1965, India alleged, Pakistani forces began to infiltrate the Indian-controlled portion of
Jammu and Kashmir. India made a countermove in late August, and by September 1, 1965,
the second conflict had fully erupted as Pakistan launched an attack across the international
line of control in southwest Jammu and Kashmir. Indian forces retaliated on September 6 in
Pakistan's Punjab Province and prevailed over Pakistan's apparent superiority in tanks and

aircraft. A cease-fire called by the UN Security Council on September 23 was observed by


both sides. At Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in January 1966, the belligerents agreed to restore the
status quo ante and to resolve outstanding issues by negotiation.
The third war between India and Pakistan, in December 1971, centered in the east over the
secession of East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh), but it also included engagements in
Kashmir and elsewhere on the India-West Pakistan front. India's military victory was
complete. The independence of Bangladesh was widely interpreted in India--but not in
Pakistan--as an ideological victory disproving the "Two Nations Theory" pushed by the
Muslim League and that led to partition in 1947. At Shimla (Simla), Himachal Pradesh, on
July 2, 1972, Indira Gandhi and Pakistan's President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto signed the Simla
Accord by which India would return all personnel and captured territory in the west and the
two countries would "settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral
negotiations." External bodies, including the UN, were excluded from the process. The
fighting had resulted in the capture of each other's territory at various points along the ceasefire line, but the Simla Accord defined a new line of control that deviated in only minor ways
from the 1949 cease-fire line. The two sides agreed not to alter the actual line of control
unilaterally and promised to respect it "without prejudice to the recognized position of either
side." Both sides further undertook to "refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of
the line."

THE PERSISTING KASHMIR ISSUE


During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jammu and Kashmir prospered under a virtually
autonomous government led first by Sheikh Abdullah and then by his son Farooq Abdullah.
In the summer of 1984, differences between Srinagar and New Delhi led to the dismissal of
Farooq's government by highly questionable means. Kashmir once again became an irritant in
bilateral relations. Indian diplomats consistently accused Pakistan of trying to
"internationalize" the Kashmir dispute in violation of the Simla Accord.
In the mid- to late 1980s, the political situation in Kashmir became increasingly unstable. In
March 1986, New Delhi invoked President's Rule to remove Farooq's successor, Ghulam

Mohammed Shah, as chief minister, and replace his rule with that of Governor Jagmohan,
who had been appointed by the central government in 1984. In state elections held in 1987,
Farooq's political party, the National Conference, forged an alliance with Rajiv Gandhi's
Congress (I), which won a majority in the state elections. Farooq's government failed to deal
with Kashmir's economic problems and the endemic corruption of its public institutions,
providing fertile ground for militant Kashmiris who demanded either independence or
association with Pakistan.
A rising spiral of unrest, demonstrations, armed attacks by Kashmiri separatists, and armed
suppression by Indian security forces started in 1988 and was still occurring in the mid1990s. New Delhi charged Islamabad (Pakistan's capital) with assisting insurgents in Jammu
and Kashmir, and Prime Minister V.P. Singh warned that India should be psychologically
prepared for war. In Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stated that Pakistan was willing
to fight a "thousand-year war" for control of Kashmir. Under pressure from the United States,
the Soviet Union, and China to avoid a military conflict and solve their dispute under the
terms of the Simla Accord, India and Pakistan backed off in May 1990 and engaged in a
series of talks on confidence-building measures for the rest of the year. Tensions reached new
heights in the early and mid-1990s with increasing internal unrest in Jammu and Kashmir,
charges of human rights abuses, and repeated clashes between Indian paramilitary forces and
Kashmiri militants, allegedly armed with Pakistani-supplied weapons (see Political Issues,
ch. 8; Insurgent Movements and External Subversion, ch. 10).
A concurrent irritant related to the Kashmir dispute was the confrontation over the Siachen
Glacier near the Karakoram Pass, which is located in northeast Jammu and Kashmir. In 1984,
Indian officials, citing Pakistan's "cartographic aggression" extending the line of control
northeast toward the Karakoram Pass, contended that Pakistan intended to occupy the
Siachen Glacier in order to stage an attack into Indian-controlled Kashmir. After New Delhi
airlifted troops into the western parts of the Saltoro Mountains, Islamabad deployed troops
opposite them. Both sides maintained 5,000 troops in temperatures averaging -40C. The
estimated cost for India was about 10 percent of the annual defense budget for FY 1992. After
several skirmishes between the opposing troops, negotiations to resolve this confrontation
began with five rounds of talks between 1986 and 1989. After a three-year hiatus because of

tensions caused by the other Kashmir conflict, a sixth round of talks was held in November
1992. Some progress was made on the details of an agreement. In March 1994, Indian
diplomats garnered enough support at the UN Human Rights Commission to force Pakistan
to withdraw a resolution charging India with human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir.
The two sides were encouraged to resolve their dispute through bilateral talks.

THE UNENDING UNREST


After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and Indira Gandhi returned to
power in 1980, she quickly dispatched a special emissary to assure Pakistani president
General Mohammad Zia ul Haq that he could remove as many divisions as he wished from
the Indian border without fear of any advantage being taken by India and suggested talks on
reduction of force levels. Indian officials worked hard to prevent Zia from using the Afghan
crisis as an opportunity to alter the regional balance of power by acquiring advanced weapons
from the United States. In addition, Indira Gandhi attempted to avoid antagonizing the Soviet
Union, democratic elements in Pakistan, and the substantial anti-Pakistan lobby within India.
These largely secret efforts culminated in the visit of Minister of External Affairs P.V.
Narasimha Rao to Pakistan in June 1981, during which time he declared publicly that India
was "unequivocally committed to respect Pakistan's national unity, territorial integrity, and
sovereign equality" as well as its right to obtain arms for self-defense.
Despite the setback suffered when the United States and Pakistan announced a new security
and military assistance program, regular meetings took place between high Indian and
Pakistani officials. These meetings were institutionalized in late 1982 in the Indo-Pakistan
Joint Commission, which included sub commissions for trade, economics, information, and
travel. Indira Gandhi also received Zia on November 1, 1982, in New Delhi, and during their
meeting they authorized their foreign ministers and foreign secretaries to proceed with talks
leading to the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC--see Glossary).
The sudden death of Zia in an air crash in August 1988 and the assumption of the prime
minister ship by Benazir Bhutto in December 1988 after democratic elections provided the

two countries with an unexpected opportunity to improve relations. Rajiv Gandhi's


attendance at the SAARC summit in Islamabad in December 1988 permitted the two prime
ministers to establish a personal rapport and to sign three bilateral agreements, including one
proscribing attacks on each other's nuclear facilities. Despite the personal sympathy between
the two leaders and Bhutto's initial emphasis on the 1972 Simla Accord as the basis for
warmer bilateral ties, domestic political pressures, particularly relating to unrest in Sindh,
Punjab, and Kashmir effectively destroyed the chances for improved relations in 1989 and
1990. For her part, Bhutto backed away from her comments on the Simla Accord by
continuing to press the Kashmir issue internationally, and Indian public opinion forced Rajiv
Gandhi and his successor, V.P. Singh, to take a hard line on events relating to Kashmir.
In the early 1990s, Indian-Pakistani relations remained troubled despite bilateral efforts and
changes in the international environment. High-level dialogue on a range of bilateral issues
took place between foreign ministers and prime ministers at the UN and at other international
meetings. However, discussions over confidence-building measures, begun in the summer of
1990 as a response to the Kashmir confrontation, were canceled in June 1992 following
mutual expulsions of diplomats for alleged espionage activities. In June 1991, Pakistani
prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif proposed talks by India, Pakistan, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and China to consider making South Asia a nuclear-free zone, but the minority
governments of Chandra Shekhar and subsequently that of Narasimha Rao declined to
participate. Nevertheless, negotiations concerning the Siachen Glacier resumed in November
1992 after a hiatus of three years. By the mid-1990s, little had occurred to improve bilateral
relations as unrest in Jammu and Kashmir accelerated and domestic politics in both nations
were unsettled.

CULTURAL LINKS
India and Pakistan, to some degree have similar cultures, cuisines and languages which
underpin the historical ties between the two. Pakistani singers, musicians, comedians and
entertainers have enjoyed widespread popularity in India, with many achieving overnight
fame in the Indian film industry Bollywood. Likewise, Indian music and film are very

popular in Pakistan. Being located in the northernmost region of the South Asia, Pakistan's
culture is somewhat similar to that of North India.
The Punjab

region was

split

into Punjab,

Pakistan and Punjab,

India following

the

independence and partition of the two countries in 1947. The Punjabi people are today the
largest ethnic group in Pakistan and also an important ethnic group of northern India. The
founder of Sikhism was born in the modern-day Pakistani Punjab province, in the city of
Nankana Sahib. Each year, millions of Indian Sikh pilgrims cross over to visit holy Sikh sites
in Nankana Sahib. The Sindhi people are the native ethnic group of the Pakistani province
of Sindh. Many Hindu Sindhis migrated to India in 1947, making the country home to a
sizable Sindhi community. In addition, the millions of Muslims who migrated from India to
the newly created Pakistan during independence came to be known as the Muhajir people;
they are settled predominantly in Karachi and still maintain family links in India.
Relations between Pakistan and India have also resumed through platforms such as media
and communications. Aman ki Asha is a joint venture and campaign between The Times of
India and the Jang Group calling for mutual peace and development of diplomatic and
cultural relations.

SCENARIO AFTER THE NDA GOVERNMENT


Ever since coming to power in May 2014, the Modi government has been gradually
reshaping underpinnings of Indias Pakistan policy. It appears to have recognized from the
very beginning that a quest for a durable peace with Pakistan is a non-starter. All that matters

is the management of a neighbor that is more often than not viewed as a nuisance by Delhi.
For India, the real challenge is China which has pledged $46 billion worth of investment in
Pakistan and recently blocked Indias move to seek action against Pakistan for release of
Lakhvi in the Mumbai attack trial at a meeting of the UN Sanctions Committee.
After years of ceding the initiative to Pakistan, the Modi government wants to dictate the
terms for negotiations. It has reached out to the Pakistani civilian government even as it has
decided to underline to the Pakistani military the costs of its dangerous escalatory tactics on
the border with massive targeted attacks on Pakistani forces along the border. And now with
its latest move of drawing clear red lines for Pakistan, it has sent out several signals to
various interlocutors. To Pakistan, the message cannot be clearer: There are only two parties
involved in the dispute. The separatists leaders of Kashmir have no locus standi in the matter
and India retains the levers to marginalize them should the need arise. In one stroke, New
Delhi has made separatists hardliners redundant and Pakistan will find its old tactic of wooing
the separatists will no longer pay it any dividends.
The Modi government has also underscored, for the international community, the Pakistani
Armys continuing primacy in setting the agenda for Islamabads India policy. Nawaz Sharif,
however well-intentioned, is yet to demonstrate that he can take on the all-powerful military
when it comes to India. This was soon evident when border tensions rose soon after last
months meeting with Modi and even suggestions from the Pakistani Army that it has shot
down an Indian drone which later turned out to be Chinese made DJI phantom 3.
At a time when Indian foreign policy horizons are widening and New Delhi is self-confident
about its own role in the world, the Modi government has decided to leave it to Pakistan to
choose if it wants to engage with India. If Pakistans only instrument of choice remains
terrorism, then the Indian military is ready to tackle it. Indian diplomacy has more important
things to worry about.

The cancellation of the August 23-24 meeting of the national security advisors (NSAs) of
India and Pakistan is one more indication of the inability of the two countries to talk

constructively. This time, Pakistan canceled the talks, stating that the Modi governments
preconditions not inviting the separatist Hurriyat and following the terrorism-only agenda
as agreed to at Ufa was unacceptable.
The NSA meeting would have been an attempt to resume the composite bilateral dialogue,
but every time such a decision is made at the prime ministerial level, the process falls apart
due to unrealistic expectations on both sides. This is compounded by Pakistans denial of its
support of terrorist activities in India. This pattern of hope and then a block was evident
also in the efforts made by former prime ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee after Kargil in 1999,
and by Manmohan Singh after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. But renewed expectations emerged
in May 2014, when Indias newly-elected prime minister, Narendra Modi, managed a
diplomatic coup by inviting the heads of governments of Indias South Asian neighbors to his
swearing-in ceremony. Pakistans Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attended, after which a
meeting of their respective foreign secretaries was announced. But India called off the August
2014 meeting of foreign secretaries after Pakistan invited the Hurriyat for talks ahead of the
bilateral meet. Pakistan knows that the Modi government does not accept any legitimacy
accruing to the Hurriyat, as it would call into question the democratically-elected government
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), of which the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a coalition
partner. In the following months, the Modi government reached out to Pakistan again. Indian
foreign secretary S. Jaishankar visited Pakistan in March 2015 in the course of his trip to all
SAARC countries. Modi and Sharif had friendly telephone conversations on various
occasions, including during the cricket World Cup in February and on the occasion of Eid in
June. Pakistan also continues to deny that terrorists captured by India during violent attacks
are Pakistani citizens. The most egregious example is Ajmal Kasab, who was captured during
the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, followed recently by Mohammad Naved, the militant
captured alive after a terrorist attack in Udhampur on August 5, 2015.
Given this record of denial, what could have been achieved even if the India-Pakistan NSA
level talks had been held? Instead of building up unrealistic expectations around such talks,
perhaps both countries should now abjure high-profile diplomacy. Instead, they can undertake
small confidence-building measures in specific areas of commercial, consular and civil
society interest, to incrementally address long-standing differences. Pakistan is aware that

jihadi militancy since 1989 has failed to wrest Kashmir for Pakistan from India as has war
and military confrontation. Still, the defiant nation supports Kashmir separatists and terrorist
outfits to bleed India. Pakistan has already fought four wars with India and lost half its
territory in the process, the erstwhile East Pakistan (Bangladesh ), in 1971 but the Kashmir
dispute still rages on.
Meanwhile, the Dawood Ibrahim issue has become the bone of contention between India and
Pakistan. As it presently stands, India is assembling a dossier on Dawood Ibrahim ahead of
NSA-level talks between India and Pakistan on 23-24 August. Intelligence shared by the
UAE in this regard could be critical in building a solid case, and could very well be the
"heavy price" It seems, the Kashmir Independence issue has become a day dream for
Pakistan and the Free Kashmir slogan has lost its significance in the Cold War-era.
India has proceeded to broaden its horizons to encompass traditional Pakistani friends like
China, Iran and the UAE while the poor nation continues on its lonely path to nowhere. In the
global market, India is viewed as too profitable a market to antagonise. As a major importer,
as well as a popular holiday destination, it dwarfs Pakistan in the eyes of the whole world.
The country has established over 20 strategic partnerships over the years with countries that
include Russia, the US, France, Japan, Chin, Nepal and Bangladesh.
Recently, both India and Bangladesh swapped control of some 160 small pockets of land on
each other's territory to end one of the world's most intractable border disputes that has kept
thousands of people in stateless limbo for nearly 70 years. The historic agreement proves that
New Delhi is interested to bolster ties with its neighbour while the Islamabad has failed to do
anything significant to grab the eyeballs of the international community - apart from
promoting terror - to prove that it believes in peaceful coexistence. The Modi-Obama
bonhomie after LeT chief Osama bin Laden's assassination by US Navy Seals is a blot on the
face of Pakistan also. To counter a US-India axis, an isolated Pakistan befriended China but
the country could not tip the balance in Pakistan's favour on its own. Its natural ally America
to changed stance and joined hands with India while Pakistan sat fingers crosses. Pakistan,
which was created on the basis of religion, has failed to fight against terrorism and is at cross
roads -- to fight Taliban or not. Meanwhile, India's strategic partnership with UAE is

expected to hit Pakistan where it hurts. While trade, investment and energy appear in the
India-UAE joint statement, the dominant theme of the agreement by far, is security and
counter-terrorism.
Time has come for Pakistan to come out of the denial mode now.

CONCLUSION
Relations with Pakistan have demanded a high proportion of India's international energies
and undoubtedly will continue to do so. India and Pakistan have divergent national ideologies
and have been unable to establish a mutually acceptable power equation in South Asia. The
national ideologies of pluralism, democracy, and secularism for India and of Islam for
Pakistan grew out of the preindependence struggle between the Congress and the All-India
Muslim League (Muslim League--see Glossary), and in the early 1990s the line between
domestic and foreign politics in India's relations with Pakistan remained blurred. Because
great-power competition--between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the
Soviet Union and China--became intertwined with the conflicts between India and Pakistan,
India was unable to attain its goal of insulating South Asia from global rivalries. This
superpower involvement enabled Pakistan to use external force in the face of India's superior
endowments of population and resources.
In such a turbulent state of time, with both the countries enriched with nuclear arsenals and
being part of one of the most troubled and intensely populated region of the world, it must be
the central philosophy of the leadership of both the countries to avoid being puppet of any
third nations political and economic ambition in this ever changing treacherous world.
Vigilance and security is a must for every nations internal security, both the nations have
taken initiatives towards achieving this, but have lacked bilateral contact on most crucial of
times which led to the major intimidating situations resulting in three major wars. We hope
both the nations will try to avoid such a situation in future.

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