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School of Business Discussion Papers
Faculty of Business
6-1-1992
Paul S. Kirkbride
Sara F. Y. Tang
Cynthia D. Fisher
Bond University, cynthia_fisher@bond.edu.au
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BOND UNIVERSITY
School of Business
DISCUSSION
PAPERS
JUNE 1992
University Drive,
AUSTRALIA
James B. Shaw
School of 11anagement
Bond University
Gold Coast, QLD 4229
Australia
61-75-95-2235
Paul S. Kirkbride
Ashridge 11anagement College
Berkhampsted, Hertfordshire
United Kingdom
Cynthia D. Fisher
School of 11anagement
Bond University
Gold Coast, QLD 4229
Australia
ABSTRACT
Data were collected from 151 Hong Kong organisations to determine the effect
of culture, firm size, level ofunionsation and several indices related to the presence
of an HRM department within the firm on Human Resource Management (HR)
practices. Culture was a relatively weak predictor of HR practices. Existence of an
HRM department and level of unionisation were moderate predictors while firm
size and the existence of specialised training departments within the HRM
department were the strongest preditors of HR practices.
level of technological change, degree of unionisation, and the existence (or nonexistence) of an HRM department within the organisation were used to predict
various aspects of HRM activity within a sample of 174 firms. In the Singapore
sample, the strongest predictors of HR practices were size and whether or not there
was a formal HRM department within the organisation. In general, the predictors
collectively accounted for relatively small amounts of the variance in HR practices
(3% to 26%).
The study presented in this paper represents a partial replication of the Fisher
and Shaw (1987) research. Some methodological problems were avoided in this
study and more detailed and varied measures of some of the other dependent and
independent variables were available. Of particular importance is the fact that the
data presented below were collected in Hong Kong rather than Singapore. Although
some might argue that the two locations have much in common --- predominantly
Chinese, large trading centers, and a multitude of local and international firms,
there is some reason to argue that Hong Kong represents a better location in which
to test some of the hypotheses originally proposed in the Singapore study. In
contrast to the long espoused "laissez faire" attitude of the Hong Kong Government
(Lethbridge, 1984), the Singapore government has taken a more active,
interventionist approach -- even extending to the realm of HR activities (Ow, 1986).
The Singapore National Productivity Board and other institutions have promoted
training and development activities within local organisations. Government wage
policies have played a major role in the highly successful economic development of
the country. One could argue that the interventionist strategy taken by the
government in Singapore may have tended to homogenise HR practices in both local
and multinational organisations. In addition, organisations included in the mailing
list were obtained primarily from the membership list of the Singapore Institute of
Personnel Management, a professional HRM association. These circumstances may
have contributed to a "restriction of range" in HR practices and may have made it
more difficult to tease out the potential impact of other factors relevant to the
4
local modifications (Dicle, Dicle & Alie, 1988; Ishida, 1986), it is likely that essential
cultural characteristics remain in the operation of Chinese firms in Hong Kong when
compared to American or British firms. Redding (1986) has suggested that Chinese
businesses are characterised by centralised decision making and control systems,
loose organisational structures, paternalistic and autocratic managerial styles,
nepotistic succession processes, intuitive planning, and personalised linkages with
the external environment. Based on Hofstede's (1984) work on the dimensions of
culture, Chinese organisations are influenced by cultural characteristics such as high
power distance and collectivism. "Face" plays a particularly important role in
Chinese culture. On the other hand, Anglo-American organisations stem from
cultures that tend to be individualistic and moderate to low in power distance.
The Chinese emphasis on collectivism focuses primarily on close family
members. Because of this emphasis on mutual obligations to family members,
5
u.K. governments. The "safety net" provided by these types of programs in other
societies is more likely to be handled by the family group of the employee rather
than his/her business group. As a result, we would expect to find Chinese firms in
Hong Kong to have less extensive welfare and fringe benefit programs than their
Anglo-American counterparts.
Size. Edwards (1979) and Glueck (1974) proposed that as the size of firms
increased there would be a strong tendency towards bureaucratisation in an effort to
control a large and diverse workforce. There has been some support for the idea that
as firms get larger they tend to develop more extensive and elaborate job analysis,
planning, training, appraisal, selection, and compensation systems (Dimick &
Murray, 1978). Given the greater diversity of resources within the organisation, the
use of internal labour markets (e.g., promotion from within practices) would also be
expected to increase. These propositions are also consistent with an economic
perspective on the determinants of HR practices in that as firm size increases, the
financial resources available for the development of extensive HR practices are
likely to increase as well. Thus, large firms may have more resources available to
spend on HR practices, including extensive social welfare and fringe benefit
systems.
Unionisation. As a potentially powerful political force in organisations,
unions may influence the nature of HR practices within firms. The impact of unions
on specific HR practices is unclear, however. Unions have traditionally placed
considerable emphasis on job security, promotion, and pay issues. Seniority-based
pay systems are a common outcome of union influence as are extensive promotionfrom-within practices. However, Pfeffer and Cohen (1984) found a significant
negative relationship between level of unionisation and the<extent of use of internal
labour markets. Glueck (1974) suggested that unions might increase the likelihood
7
of job evaluation systems, but an equally plausible argument could be made in that
collective bargaining reduces the need for any other type of wage setting system.
Cohen and Pfeffer (1986) and Dimick and Murtay (1978) found that unionisation
was negatively related to the use of sophisticated recruiting and selection systems.
In their Singapore study, Fisher and Shaw (1987) found that level of unionisation
was negatively related to the use of written HR policies. No other effects were
found. This may have resulted from the more cooperative role that unions tend to
play in Singapore as opposed to the traditional adversarial union-management
relationship found in many Anglo-American nations. Unfortunately, Hong Kong
does not provide us with a particularly advantageous location for testing the impact
of unions on HR practices. Chen (1984) notes that unions in Hong Kong tend to have
little power. However, one could argue that where Hong Kong firms do have
extensive union or other forms of employee representation (which would be
unusual), these representative bodies may have some influence on HR activities.
HRM department. The connection between a formal HRM department in the
organisation and the adoption of sophisticated HR practices may occur for several
reasons. First, HRM departments may serve as a political force within the
organisation to promote HR activities. Second, the existence of a formal department
may make it possible to attract qualified HR professionals able to develop
sophisticated practices. Third, the existence of a formal department may be an
indication of top management's commitment to HR activities and thus, the lobbying
done by HR professionals is more likely to be greeted by a receptive audience.
Cohen and Pfeffer (1986) and Pfeffer and Cohen (1984) have found that the existence
of a formal HR department coincided with more extensive use of internal labour
markets and more selective hiring standards. In the Fisher and Shaw (1987)
Singapore study, the existence of an HRM department was the most consistent
predictor of HR practices. Firms with an HRM department used more selection
methods, offered more types of training, had more extensive appraisal systems, had
a more comprehensive promotion-from-within policy, were more likely to have
8
written job descriptions, and had somewhat more extensive written HR policies. In
addition to the simple presence or absence of an HRM department, other features of
the HRM department might be predictive of HR practices as well. For example; the
size of the department, the functional specialisation within the department, the level
or training/professionalism of HRM personnel, and the relative power and
responsibility given to the HRM department by top management may relate to the
level and nature HR activities. In this Hong Kong sample, we will examine these
other features of HRM departments and their relative contribution to the prediction
of HR practices compared with our earlier simple measure of HRM department
presence/absence.
In general, studies examining the links between cultural background of
owners, firm size, level of unionisation, the presence or absence of an HRM
department, and HR practices have been equivocal in their findings. The data
collected in the present study provides us with an opportunity to retest some of
these hypotheses in a cross-cultural setting and to improve on some of the
measurement problems in our earlier Singapore study. A summary of the
hypotheses tested in this study are presented in Table 1.
METHOD
The Survevs
Data were collected in 1988 by Kirkbride and Tang as a general survey of
HRM practices in Hong Kong. A 26-page questionnaire with 159 items was mailed
to 990 firms in Hong Kong. The survey was adapted from Mackay and Torrington
(1986). Usable responses were received from 151 firms representing a 15% response
rate. While non-response bias is certainly a possibility, Kirkbride and Tang (1989a,
1989b) note that respondents represented a relatively good fit to the distribution of
11
Dependent Variables
Data were collected on each of the several HRM areas. In some cases,
multiple measures of a particular HR area were constructed. Initial analyses,
however, indicated that the different measures yielded essentially the same results.
Consequently, the different measures were combined into a single "overall" scale.
The measures actually used in the final analyses which are reported in the results
section of this paper are indicated in a bold type font. Means, standard deviations,
reliability coefficients, and intercorrelations for the dependent measures are
presented in Table 3.
feedback systems, appraised perfonnance with multiple methods and made use of
this data for a variety of purposes. Finns with very low appraisal use score might
have had formal appraisal and feedback systems, but these were relatively simple
and were not used for any extensive number of purposes within the firm.
Tob analysis and level of fonnalisation of procedures. Respondents indicated
which of five job analysis methods were used in their finn (questionnaire, narrative
description, key task analysis, critical incidents analysis, and other). A Job Analysis
Methods score was derived by simply counting the number of methods used
(excluding "other"). The extent of formal, written procedures in the organisation was
obtained by asking respondents to indicate, for each of three job groups, whether or
not their firm had "written procedures/agreements" on each of eight issues (pay &
conditions, manning/ productivity levels, discipline/grievance, collective disputes,
redundancies, new technology, disclosure of information, and other). A Procedures
score was obtained by simply counting the number of issues for which there were
written procedures in any of the three job groups (excluding "other" responses).
Socialisation and training. Respondents were asked to indicate which of five
levels of employee orientation were conducted in their firm, ranging from the
provision of an employee handbook, to a multi-day, personal induction program.
Responses were to be made for each of three job groups. An Orientation score was
derived by counting the number of times each respondent indicated that an
orientation program longer than one day in length was conducted for any of three
categories of employees.
Respondents also indicated whether or not their firm provided in-house
training for employees. Additionally, they indicated which of 10 general methods of
training were typically used in their finn. Respondents also indica.ted, using a 4point scale (frequently, sometimes, rarely, and never), the frequency with which 12
management development methods were used. A General Training Methods score
was obtained by counting the number of methods used in any of the three employee
categories. A Management Training Methods score was obtained by counting the
13
derived by simply counting the number of methods used in any of three job groups.
Two measures of selection practices were obtained. Respondents were asked to
indicate which of six selection methods were used in hiring employees (interest,
personality, mental ability, work sample, trainability, or their own job knowledge
tests). An additional item asked respondents to indicate whether reference checks
were used as part of the selection process for each of three job groups. An Overall
Selection score was derived by summing the selection methods and reference check
scores. This score could range from zero to seven) six selection methods plus
reference checks).
Compensation and benefits practices. Respondents indicated which of five
different types of incentive pay systems were used in their firm in each of seven
different employee groups. The pay systems listed were individual payment by
results (PBR), group PBR, commission, profit sharing, and discretionary bonus. The
employee groups were manual unskilled & semi-skilled, manual skilled & technical,
clerical!secretarial, supervisory, middle management & administrative, professional
specialists, and senior managers. An Incentives score was derived by counting the
number of incentive systems used collectively across the various employee
categories (scores could range from
"welfare" programs were present in their firm (e.g., counselling service, social clubs,
subsidized meals, etc.). A Welfare score was obtained by simply counting th
number of programs indicated to exist. Respondents also indicated which of 50
different fringe benefits were provided to employees in four categories (manual,
clerical/supervisory, managerial, expatriates). A Fringe Benefits score was derived
by counting the total number of benefits indicated collectively across the employee
groups. Two measures related to compensation determination practices were
obtained. Respondents indicated which of six job evaluation methods were used in
determining the pay level in three job groups (Hay-MSL, ranking, grading or
classification, factor comparison, points rating, other). A Job Evaluation score was
derived by simply counting the number of methods used in any of the job groups.
15
Respondents also indicated which of several methods were used to monitor external
wage rates. Five of these methods were some form of wage survey, either
conducted by the firm itself or some external group. A Wage Survey score was
derived by counting the number of survey methods used collectively across three
job groups.
RESULTS
17
methods, welfare programs, fringe benefits, and wage surveys than did firms
without formal training departments.
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to examine the relationship
between our other (non-categorical) predictor variables and the various dependent
variables. These results are presented in Table 5. The weakest predictor was
employee representation, which correlated significantly with only three of the
thirteen dependent variables. The percent of payroll'allocated for training correlated
with four of the thirteen variables while HRM size correlated significantly with six
and training department size correlated with seven of the dependent variables.
Level of professional HR membership and the extent of responsibility the HRM
department had over HR practices were correlated with 11 and 12 of the 13
dependent variables, respectively. In all cases, the direction of the relationship was
as expected.
responsibility) based upon assumptions about which variables were more proximal
causes of the dependent variables, (6) existence of a specialised training department,
and (7) specific aspects of the training department ._- as with #5, entered in a
hierarchical fashion (7a=training size, then 7b=% wages allocated for training).
Actually, it was our belief that variables related to the HRM department in the firm
were the most proximal causes of HR practices. Variables relating to the specialised
training department were entered after these HRM variables, not because we
believed them to necessarily be more proximally causal, but in order to determine
whether they contributed something unique to prediction over what had already
been contributed by the HRM variables. The results of these regression analyses are
presented in Table 6. In Table 6, the row "beta as entered" indicates the beta weight
of the variable for the step at which it first entered the regression equation. The
multiple R, adjusted R2, and F (change) also relate to the step at which the variable
first entered the equation. The row "beta in final equation" indicates the beta weight
for each variable, and its significance level, in the final equation with all variables
entered.
responsibility, and a higher level of funding allocated for training purposes. In the
final equation, however, the regression coefficients for both cultural background
and professional membership were no longer significant, while firm size had a
marginally significant regression coefficient in the final equation..
As predicted, employee representation and professional membership added
significantly and positively to the prediction of the use of job analysis methods, with
only employee representation remaining significant in the final prediction equation.
Employee representation, HRM size, and HRM responsibility added significantly,
with positive beta weights, to the prediction of the extent of written procedures in
the firm. However, the regression coefficient for employee representation was not
significant in the final equation.
As predicted, firm size, HRM responsibility, training department size, and
the percent of wages allocated to training added significantly and positively to the
prediction of extensive orientation programs within the firm. The coefficient for firm
size was not significant in the final regression equation, however. Also as predicted,
firm size, the existence of HRM and training departments, and the percent of wages
allocated for training all added significantly to the prediction of training methods
used by the firm. Only training department and percent of wages allocated had
significant regression coefficients in the final equation. In addition, the regression
coefficient for HRM responsibility was marginally significant in the final prediction
equation. The extent to which training needs analyses were conducted in the firm
was predicted by firm size, employee representation, HRM department,
professional membership, HRM responsibility, training department, and percent of
wages allocated to training. The regression coefficients for HRM department, HRM
responsibility, training department, and percent of wages all remained significant in
the final regression equation.
Firm size, HRM department, HRM responsibility, and training department
all added significantly to the prediction of the number of recruiting methods used.
However, only HRM responsibility and training department remained significant in
20
the final prediction equation. The number of selection methods used by the firm was
significantly predicted by firm size and HRM responsibility with both significant in
the final equation.
Only HRM responsibility significantly added to the prediction of the use of
incentive schemes within the firm, and this variable had a significant beta weight in
the final equation. Cultural background, firm size, professional membership, and
HRM responsibility added significantly to the prediction of both welfare programs
and fringe benefits within the firm. The existence of a training department also
added significantly to the prediction of welfare programs and HRM department size
added significantly to the prediction of fringe benefits. Chinese firms had fewer
welfare programs than did Anglo-American or miscellaneous firms. For welfare
programs, culture, HRM responsibility and training department remained
significant in the final regression equation. For fringe benefits, cultural background
(Chinese firms had fewer), professional memberships, and HRM responsibility
remained significant in the final regression equation. Use of job evaluation methods
was predicted by level of employee representation and percent of wages allocated
for training, with both variables maintaining a significant beta weight in the final
prediction equation. Finally, cultural background, firm size, HRM responsibility,
and training department added significantly to the prediction of the use of wage
surveys. Chinese firms were less likely to use wage surveys than were AngloAmerican or miscellaneous firms. However, only HRM responsibility remained a
significant predictor in the final equation.
DISCUSSION
21
incentive pay systems were only marginally predictable. For the remaining HR
practices adjusted R squares ranged from .085 (job evaluation methods used) to .366
(training analysis methods used).
Cultural background of firm owners proved to be a relatively weak indicator
of HR practices. As predicted Anlgo-American firms were more likely to use formal
performance appraisal and feedback systems than were Chinese firms. This is
consistent with the emphasis placed upon "face" by the Chinese (Hofstede & Bond,
1988) and the subsequent avoidance of situations where formal performance
evaluations could lead to loss of face by the poorly performing employee or the
supervisor who must relate that performance information during the feedback
session. As in the Fisher and Shaw (1987) study, Anglo-American firms were more
likely to use "technical approaches to determining the pay value of jobs through the
use of formal wage surveys and job evaluation methods. This would be consistent
with the Confucian emphasis on seniority based wage systems, i.e., the importance
of and respect for age in Confucian philosophy. Anglo-American firms were more
likely to have extensive welfare and fringe benefit programs than were Chinese
firms. This may be the result of a "carryover" effect, with Anglo-American firms
bringing to Hong Kong welfare and benefit programs that are mandated by law in
their home countries. Chinese firms in Hong Kong (mostly local Hong Kong), have
operated in a laissez-faire environment where government has placed little
emphasis on welfare and benefit programs. Fisher and Shaw (1987) found that
Western organisations provided more formal training to employees than did Asian
firms. In our Hong Kong sample, cultural background was only marginally related
to formal training and orientation programs used. Anglo-American firms did show
a somewhat greater extent of formal training than their Chinese counterparts. While
not statistically significant, this was in the predicted direction and is consistent with
Kirkbride and Tang's (1992) suggestion that Chinese firms in Hong Kong have
neither the resources nor a strong motivation to formalise training procedures. We
also found that the use of formal, written procedures was marginally greater in
22
departments within the personnel function. This is certainly consistent with the
control and economic perspectives discussed above.
Level of employee representation was a relatively weak predictor of HR "
practices. Level of representation was related to the use of job analysis methods, the
extent of formal written procedures, the use of]ob evaluation methods, and the
extent of training analysis. The findings "related to job analysis and job evaluation
were opposite our hypotheses with firms with higher levels of employee
representation showing greater use of job analysis and job evaluation methods. No
prediction was made concerning the relationship between employee representation
and training. A positive relationship was found. Consistent with prediction, firms
with a higher level of employee representation showed greater use of formal,
written procedures. Employee representative groups serve as political forces within
the firm (Cohen & Pfeffer, 1986; DiMAggio & Powell, 1983). Employee groups in
Hong Kong have traditionally played an almost non-existent role in influencing
organisational policies. Our findings suggest that when such groups grow to some
significant size within the firm, they tend to encourage better, not more restrictive,
HR practices. Also interesting is that although employee representation relates to
only four of the 14 HR practices, for three of the four, representation remained a
significant predictor in the final regression equation. Employee representation may
not be an extensive predictor, but it is a persistent one.
Four aspects of the presence of a formal HRM function within the firm were
used to predict HR practices. In the Fisher and Shaw (1987) study, the existence of
an HRM department was the strongest predictor of HR practices. This was not the
case in the present study. HRM existence reJated significantly to performance
appraisal and job analysis practices, the number of training methods used, and the
extent of welfare and fringe benefit programs. In all cases the relationship was in the
predicted direction. Firms with formal HRM departments engage in more
sophisticated HR practices. A formal HRM department may serve as an advocate for
the development of HR practices within the firm and is more likely to be staffed by
24
practices. Of particular interest is the fact that when the specialised training
department variable entered the hierarchical regression equations, this variable
significantly predicted 6 of 14 HR practices and remained a significant predictor of
five of these practices in the final regression equations. The size of the training
department entered significantly into the equation of one HR practice, the use of
orientation programs, and remained significant in the final regression equation.
Percent of wages allocated to training added significantly to five HR practice
equations and was the final variable entered into the equations. These results on
specialised training departments seem to confirm our notion that the mere existence
of a formal HRM function within a firm is a very rudimentary predictor of HR
practices. It would seem that in our Hong Kong sample, firms who had gone the
"extra step" to specialise training duties were more likely to develop sophisticated
HR practices. It seems that simply having an HRM function may be the result of
institutional forces or imitation as discussed by Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and
Zucker (1987). While most firms have a formal HRM department, only those firms
which have specialised those functions, allocated responsibility to the HRM
department, and provided financial resources to activities such as training are likely
to develop extensive, relatively sophisticated HR practices.
In conclusion, our study is generally supportive of previous research on the
determinant of HR practices. Our study provides an additional cross-cultural
verification of these earlier results, and points to more "specialised" variables that
must be measured in order to accurately predict the sophistication level of HR
practices wi thin firms.
REFERENCES
Alwin, D.F. & Hauser, R.M. (1975) The decomposition of effects in path analysis.
American Sociological Review, 40: 37-47.
Balkin, D.B. (1988) Compensation strategies for firms in emerging and rapidly
growing industries. Human Resource Planning, 11: 207-213.
Chen, E.K.Y. (1984) The economic setting. In D. Lethbridge (Ed.) The Business
Environment of Hong Kong (pp. 1-51). Hong Hong: Oxford University Press.
26
28
TABLE 1
Predictions About The Relationship of Cultural Background of Firm Owners, Firm Size,
Unionisation, and The Existence of an HRM Department To HR Practices
OR PRACTICES
CULTURE
FIRM SIZE
UNIONISATION
I1RM QEPARTMENT
Promotion-FromWithin Policies
Unionised moe
Performance Appraisal
& Feedback
Anglo-American do more,
Chinese less
Non-unioodo more
Do more in formal,
sophisticated HRM depts.
Job Analysis
No clear prediction
more
more
Formalisation of
Procedures
more
Training &
Socialisation
More extensive in
unionsed firms
nOIl-
Selection
More extensive in
unionised firms
OOD-
Compensation
& Benefits
TABLE 2
VARIABLE
1. OWNER CULTURE
Anglo-American
Chinese
Mise. Other
2. SIZE
<200
200-499
500-999
1000+
3. EMPLOYEE REP......
4. HRM DEPARTMENT
Have One
Do Not Have One
5. HRM DEPT. SIZE
6. PROF. MEMBERSHIP
7. HRM RESPONSIBILITY"
8. TRAINING DEPT.
Have One
Do Not Have One
9. TRAINING DEPT. SIZE
10. % PAYROLL FOR TRN.
Mn
SD
35
88
28
23.2
58.3
18.5
13
51
38
49
n,
8.6
3.6
25.2
32.5
n,
n,
n,
n,
2.80
n,
n,
n,
na
n,
.4
n'
n,
n,
n,
1.5
n'
n,
0.00
125
26
n,
n,
n,
82.8
17.2
n,
n,
n,
n,
n,
9.60
1.30
.01
n,
n,
16.2
2.0
2.6
53
98
n,
n,
63.7
35.3
n,
n,
n,
n,
2.40
2.00
n,
n,
6.9
3.9
.:;
lQ
04
27
46
25
35
30
32
05
10
20
27
20
29
08
32
03
26
11
15
02
-09
19
29
(56)
26
31
10
68
18
07
47
-03
03
07
19
21
* decimal points ommited, all correlations with magnitude of > .16 are significant at p < .05.
** z - scores
08
TABLE 3
Frequencies, Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliabilities
For All Dependent Variables
MEAN
Promotion
Appraisal Use*
Job Analysis Methods
Procedures
Orientation
Overall Training Methods*
Training Analysis
Recruiting Methods
Overall Selection
Welfare
Fringe Benefits
Incentives
Job Evaluation
Wage Surveys
'" Z~scores
SD
COEF.ALPHA
~a
A4
00
-.00
2.2
2A
.63
.74
6.7
3.2
6.0
51.2
3.9
1.5
2.9
2.6
1.7
3.2
18.8
3.9
2.2
3.9
nla
nla
nla
nla
nla
nla
nla
TABLE 4
Chi-Square And ANOVA Results For Cultural Background,
Firm Size, HRM Department & Training Department
Significant Chi-Square Results For Promotion Dependent Variable:
Firm Size -- Chi-square = 13.16, P < .005
Independent Variables
ANOVA Results:
Dependent
Variable
Culture
F
Appraisal Use
Job Analysis Meths.
Procedures
Orientation
Training Methods
Training Analysis
Recruiting Methods
Overall Selection
Incentives
Welfare
Fringe Benefits
Job Evaluation
Wage Surveys
3.65*
2.72+
2.97+
2.50+
2.76+
ns
ns
ns
ns
4.21*
4.11*
ns
4.56*
Firm Size
F
HRMDept.
F
2.74*
ns
ns
ns
7.70*
6.74*
6.51*
4.57*
2.85*
9.27*
2.42+
ns
2.39+
Training Dept.
F
15.30*
6.41*
ns
6.77*
31.10*
29.53*
12.29*
ns
ns
22.57*
6.20*
ns
8.97*
26.18*
5.75*
ns
ns
15.77*
28.52*
12.08*
2.98+
ns
9.30*
7.56*
ns
ns
2. HRMSize
5. Training Dept. Size
3. Professional Membership
6. % Payroll For Training
24
18
22
23
22
33
20
31
29
3
22
33
29
18
19
31
37
22
35
35
21
38
24
23
31
30
40
35
24
29
37
37
24
* only significant correlations are shown p < .05, decimal points omitted
6
20
16
35
20
29
29
26
19
23
30
19
TABLE 6
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses*
DV = Promotion
la
lb
Sa
5b
5c
7a
7b
Beta as entered
11
-03
13
-D8
20
01
ns
-13
14
24
02
ns
11
-D4
24
02
ns
06
19
30
04
4.4
18
02
30
-16
32
03
ns
-16
13
34
04
ns
-01
04
30
03
ns
07
06
-01
12
18
01
ns
04
= Appraisal Use
la
lb
Sa
5b
5c
7a
7b
20
-D2
22
034
3.6
11
07
25
038
ns
-01
37
43
153
20.5
25
-Dl
43
147
ns
04
21
47
179
6.6
11
29
53
241
12.6
29
22
57
277
7.9
21
-D9
57
275
ns
-10
16
59
295
4.9
16
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
F(Change)
DV
Beta as entered
01
ns
Multiple R
04
ns
13
12
-01
24
040
ns
-14
la
lb
Sa
5b
5c
7a
7b
Beta as entered
20
42
136
5.3
15
13
44
143
ns
13
12
45
-01
45
144
ns
09
-13
38
110
ns
-13
-02
10
46
148
ns
10
Adjusted R Square
F (Change)
25
13
MultipleR
Adjusted R Square
F(Change)
Beta in final equation
14
23
24
34
14
36
036
3.0
090
05
9.7
22
103
3.0
20
19
022
2.7
14
DV:::: Procedures
la
lb
5a
5b
5c
7a
7b
Beta as entered
24
08
20
15
25
18
31
06
31
19
35
06
36
19
39
05
40
-07
40
10
41
026
043
3.5
070
5.2
067
088
085
106
103
098
102
ns
01
:lli
ns
05
ns
13
4.4
25
4.5
-D2
ns
-02
-07
ns
10
Multiple R
Adjusted R ScJ.uare
F (Change)
150
ns
11
19
3.0
03
DV = Orientation
la
lb
5a
5b
5c
7a
7b
Beta as entered
13
-06
18
020
20
27
04
27
17
31
10
32
057
3.2
-06
059
216
ns
-03
ns
03
14
43
131
2.8
-03
52
043
29
41
120
10.9
30
38
49
190
1ll
5.7
01
01
27
048
ns
-04
37
18
7b
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
F (Change)
054
6.5
18
13
2.5
-15
DV = Training Methods
la
lb
5a
5b
5c
7a
Beta as entered
16
-D4
20
06
39
125
ns
01
21
43
158
6.7
12
03
43
ns
09
14
47
181
2.9
14
30
153
17
46
170
3.8
08
251
14.2
27
-08
55
249
ns
-10
5a
5b
5c
7a
7b
22
59
26
01
14
63
356
63
352
366
ill
ns
01
4.1
14
05
-08
33
38
128
18.7
12
DV == Training Analysis
la
lb
Beta as entered
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
F (Change)
Beta in final equation
16
03
15
008
ns
01
34
37
120
19.8
06
21
43
162
8.2
31
52
240
16.0
19
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
F (Change)
022
2.7
06
13
12
20
53
55
245
ns
10
272
6.3
10
306
7.7
23
54
22
25
60
305
25
64
DV = Recruiting Methods
I.
Ib
5.
5b
5c
7.
7b
Beta as entered
11
30
32
087
11
03
33
082
ns
-01
19
37
109
5.4
08
04
37
104
ns
12
10
38
IDS
ns
01
25
44
ISO
8.4
25
17
47
169
4.3
20
-12
06
-02
13
003
ns
-05
170
ns
-12
07
48
169
ns
07
1.
Ib
5.
5b
5c
7.
7b
-06
26
27
054
11.0
24
03
27
048
ns
04
06
28
045
ns
04
-07
29
043
18
33
058
4.1
18
02
33
051
ns
04
045
-09
-04
29
037
ns
-08
03
33
-05
-08
06
010
ns
-11
ns
03
01
33
038
ns
01
1.
Ib
5.
5b
5c
7.
7b
13
14
18
010
3.0
12
-02
18
004
ns
-01
01
18
003
ns
-02
-08
19
004
ns
-14
02
19
DOl
ns
-01
29
32
050
10.1
29
-10
33
12
34
051
050
ns
-13
ns
12
-03
34
044
ns
-03
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
F (01.nge)
Beta in final equation
DV
= Selection Methods
Beta as entered
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
F (01.nge)
Beta in final equation
DV
= Incentives Used
14.5
ns
48
F (01.nge)
Beta in final equa tion
13
06
10
001
ns
02
DV = . Welfare Programs
I.
Ib
5.
5b
5c
7.
7b
Beta as entered
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
31
36
43
170
23.3
13
09
44
172
ns
02
14
46
184
3.2
01
12
47
190
ns
08
22
51
224
7.1
13
22
55
259
7.8
25
21
58
293
7.8
20
04
58
288
ns
04
02
58
284
ns
02
Beta as entered
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
22
15
24
044
4.5
12
DV = Fringe Benefits
I.
Ib
5.
5b
5c
7.
7b
Beta as entered
01
22
32
081
7.7
-04
09
33
084
ns
01
12
35
090
ns
-04
21
39
117
5.4
11
25
45
164
2,1
17
31
53
240
13
33
08
53
240
ns
05
54
241
ns
-07
-22
23
040
4.1
-26
13
-06
54
239
ns
-06
Ib
5.
5b
50
7.
7b
12
16
25
31
070
10.2
26
01
31
064
ns
01
-11
32
066
ns
-09
.-01
32
060
ns
-04
16
35
074
3.2
14
02
35
068
ns
-02
01
18
39
061
ns
01
085
F (01.nge)
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
F (01.nge)
Beta in fmal equa tion
21
15.1
F (01.nge)
Beta in final equa tion
20
07
07
18
011
ns
06
DV = Wage Surveys
1.
Ib
5.
5b
5c
7.
7h
Beta as entered
21
-03
24
044
19
31
07
31
074
ns
06
03
32
068
ns
-04
01
32
062
ns
-06
10
33
063
ns
02
20
37
088
4.9
21
18
40
110
11
41
108
ns
10
09
42
109
ns
09
Beta as entered
Multiple R
013
ns
Adjusted R Square
Multiple R
Adjusted R Square
F (01.nge)
Beta in final equa tion
16
4.5
075
5.8
-09
07
4.5
13
35
4.6
18
TABLE 7
Summary Of Hierarchical Regression Results
Culture
Dependent
StepFinal
Variable
Promotion
Appraisal Use
*
Job Analysis
Procedures
Orientation
Training Meths.
Training Anal.
Recruiting
Selection
Incentives
Welfare
Fringe Bens.
Job Evaluation
Wage Surveys
Dependent
Variable
Appraisal Use
Job Analysis
Procedures
Orientation .
Training Meths.
Training Anal.
Recruiting
Selection
Incentives
Welfare
Fringe Bens.
Jon Evaluation
Wage Surveys
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
HRMSize ProfMem
Step Fimil Step Final
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*