Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. C/I Economic and Diplomatic Engagement Must Be Conditional counterinterpretation best for China. We meet.
Sutter 98 Robert G. Sutter, Professor of Practice in International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University,
former Senior Specialist and Director of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, former National Intelligence
Officer for East Asia and the Pacific at the U.S. Government's National Intelligence Council, former China Division Director at the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, holds a Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University, 1998 (Convergence and Conflict in U.S.-China Policy, 19961997, U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups, Published by Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0847687252, p. 84)
The thrust of conditional engagement is to bring the PRC into the community of nations through
Chinas acceptance of basic rules of international conduct. In general order of priority, those
rules focus heavily first on military and security questions, notably opposition to PRC use of force
against Taiwan or other countries and opposition to PRC proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology; then economic
issues such as access to the Chinese market, Chinese adherence to world IPR standards, labor practices, and related questions; and finally issues of
values such as human rights and democracy. The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two
parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading
and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage Chinese compliance with accepted
international norms by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice. Both are
hedges against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China. The strategy would require clear positive and negative incentives contained within U.S. policy, though
2. Reasons to prefer
Specificity conditional engagement is most contextual to Chinese foreign policy,
while theirs is most contextual to other foreign engagement. Prefer our
interpretation because it is the most specific and that is key to fairness because we
are debating about China engagement and not EU engagement.
Limits Their interpretation excludes key topic ground. Also, prefer more broad
interpretations because they increase more research which independently increases
education which turns and o/w negs voters.
3. Potential Abuse not voter- Innocent until proven guilty
4. Prefer reasonability with a brightline of substantial disad ground Competing
interps causes a race to the bottom
A2 T Engagement is conditional
1: Counter interpretation - Engagement is unconditional
Smith 5 Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of
Economics, 2005 (Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?, Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, May,
Available Online at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/24863/ichaptersection_singledocument/273de787-0ede-4c7e-a00194d09f793f1b/en/03_Conditionality.pdf, p. 23)
First, a few definitions. Engagement is
2 reasons to prefer
Limits defining engagement as conditional is not semantically valid because
engagement is just about ties. Prefer semantics because they are key to limits. Also,
this independently o/w on the negative interp because this is more specific solving
for potential abuse
Topic education their interpretation excludes key topic area such as many
economic cases. This independently o/w the neg interp because it discourages debate
about economics. Topic education o/w and turns any neg standard because topic
education is the only reason we do debate, so its a preq to all debate.
3. Potential Abuse not voter- Innocent until proven guilty
4. Prefer reasonability with a brightline of substantial disad ground Competing
interps causes a race to the bottom
5. Functional Limits check we have a solvency advocate and theres no literature
for super small affs, their interp makes being affirmative impossible
A2 T QPQ
1. C/I - engagement is not quid pro quo
Smith 5 Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of
Economics, 2005 (Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?, Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, May,
Available Online at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/24863/ichaptersection_singledocument/273de787-0ede-4c7e-a00194d09f793f1b/en/03_Conditionality.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)
First, a few definitions. Engagement is
2 reasons to prefer
Bidirectionality - requiring an explicit QPQ lets in say no affs that dodge
engagement bad strategies. Our interp creates the best conceptual brightline.
Topic education their interpretation excludes key topic area such as many
economic cases. This independently o/w the neg interp because it discourages debate
about economics. Topic education o/w and turns any neg standard because topic
education is the only reason we do debate, so its a preq to all debate.
3. Potential Abuse not voter- Innocent until proven guilty
4. Prefer reasonability with a brightline of substantial disad ground Competing
interps causes a race to the bottom
5. Functional Limits check we have a solvency advocate and theres no literature
for super small affs, their interp makes being affirmative impossible
6. Research solves this interptation-- both sides have to research for the
unconditional/ conditional CP and aff.
can be defined as a strategy whereby a reward is granted or withheld depending on the fulfilment
of an attached condition. More specifically, 'political conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of
perceived benefits to another state, to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic
principles' (Smith 1998: 256). Obligations
can thus be political and economic, as well as technical, legal, institutional and
related to the EU's acquis communautaire. Conditionality can be positive or negative, ex ante or ex post. Positive
conditionality entails the promise of a benefit, in return for the fulfilment of a predetermined
condition. Both the promise and the obligation are specified in the contract. It is most frequently used in the delivery of
economic assistance, as well as within the context of EU accession. Negative conditionality involves the infliction
of a punishment in the event of the violation of a specified obligation. Diplomatic and economic
sanctions on Serbia (1991-2000), Syria (1987-94), Libya (1987-92/1999-03) and Belarus (1998-9) are clear cases of negative
conditionality.